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Course Overview:
This course explores the intersection of legal theory, moral philosophy, and psychology to examine what motivates citizens to obey the law—and under what conditions such obedience can be said to be autonomous, meaningful, and legitimate. Legal positivism, a dominant tradition in modern legal thought, holds that the validity of law is determined by its sources rather than its moral content. This formalist conception has come under increasing scrutiny in light of rising populism, democratic backsliding, and growing social polarization. While positivism aims to present law as neutral and independent from politics, religion, and society, critics argue that such neutrality is both illusory and politically dangerous. These critics converge on the view that legal validity alone cannot account for citizens’ sense of political obligation. Instead, they argue that obedience to the law must rest on substantive moral grounds—grounds that make law not only formally legitimate but meaningfully just. Yet despite this shared critique of positivism, critical and civic approaches diverge profoundly on what those moral grounds should be. Broadly speaking, they offer three competing answers to the question of why people follow the law: freedom, culture, and justice. Course Aims: This course critically examines these moral foundations of rule-following, exploring how perceptions of fairness and legitimacy shape civic motivation and the internalization of norms. This course has three primary aims: 1. Understanding Rule-Following as Freedom: The first part of the course introduces students to how political liberalism (Rawls), deliberative democracy (Habermas) and republicanism (Pettit) conceive rule-following as a form of individual freedom supported by legitimate institutions. We will explore how legal obedience is tied to notions of public reason, deliberation, and non-domination and critically examine their relevance in contemporary democratic theory. 2. Analyzing Rule-Following through Culture: The second part investigates how communitarian thinkers ground legal compliance in shared meanings, recognition, and social practices. Students will consider the role of language, identity, and belonging in motivating citizens to follow rules, and assess how law functions within and through cultural contexts. 3. Examining Justice and the Moral Psychology of Rule-Following: The final part turns to theories that link rule-following to moral truth and objectivity. Drawing on Rawlsian moral psychology, we will analyze how a sense of justice and civic motivation emerge from experiences of fairness, moral education, and institutional trust. Learning Objectives: By the end of this course, students will be able to: 1. Explain the foundations of legal positivism and its account of rule-following. 2. Compare and critically assess competing theories of legal obligation from political liberalism, republicanism, communitarianism, and critical legal theory. 3. Analyze the psychological and moral dimensions of legal compliance and civic motivation. 4. Evaluate the relationship between law’s legitimacy and its cultural or moral grounding. 5. Apply interdisciplinary approaches to real-world questions of legal obedience, populism, and democratic legitimacy. Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (22.08.2025)
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1. Class Participation: Regular engagement with readings and discussion (15%). 2. Class Presentation: Presentation of a reading (25%). 3. Short Reading Responses (2x): 500-word reflections on assigned texts (20%) 4. Final Paper: 3000–3500 word paper on a topic of choice (40%). Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (22.08.2025)
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Předmět zahrnuje tato témata: 1. Introduction: Why Do We Follow Rules? Reading: Schauer, Playing by the Rules (Ch. 6).
2. Legal Positivism: Formal Rules and Validity Reading: Hart, The Concept of Law (Ch. 5 & 6).
3. The Thin Morality of Law: Positivism Under Pressure Reading: Unger, Critical Legal Studies Movement (Ch. 4).
4. Public Reason and Constitutional Consensus Reading: Rawls, Political Liberalism (Lecture IV).
5. Law, Reasons and the Discourse Principle Reading: Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Ch. 4).
6. Law as Non-Domination Reading: Pettit, Republicanism (Ch. 6).
7. Rule-Following as Recognition Reading: Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition (Ch. 4).
8. Rules and Practices Reading: Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (Ch. 5).
9. Rules and Moral Objectivity Reading: McDowell, “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.”
10. The Sense of Justice (1) Reading: Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Ch. 8).
11. The Sense of Justice (2) Reading: Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Ch. 8).
12. Justice and the Good Reading: Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Ch. 9).
Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (22.08.2025)
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1. CAVELL, Stanley. Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. 2. HABERMAS, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (trans. William Rehg). Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1996. 3. HART, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 4. HONNETH, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1996. 5. MCDOWELL, John. “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.” Synthese 58(3): 325–363, 1984. 6. PETTIT, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 7. RAWLS, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge (MA): Belknap Press, 1971. 8. SCHAUER, Frederick. Playing by the Rules, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. 9. UNGER, Roberto. The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (22.08.2025)
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