PředmětyPředměty(verze: 962)
Předmět, akademický rok 2024/2025
   Přihlásit přes CAS
Advanced Microeconomics - JEM215
Anglický název: Advanced Microeconomics
Zajišťuje: Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES)
Fakulta: Fakulta sociálních věd
Platnost: od 2024
Semestr: zimní
E-Kredity: 9
Způsob provedení zkoušky: zimní s.:
Rozsah, examinace: zimní s.:2/2, Zk [HT]
Počet míst: 180 / 180 (185)
Minimální obsazenost: neomezen
4EU+: ne
Virtuální mobilita / počet míst pro virtuální mobilitu: ne
Stav předmětu: vyučován
Jazyk výuky: angličtina
Způsob výuky: prezenční
Způsob výuky: prezenční
Poznámka: předmět je možno zapsat mimo plán
povolen pro zápis po webu
při zápisu přednost, je-li ve stud. plánu
Garant: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D.
Vyučující: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D.
Tersoo David Iorngurum
Třída: Courses for incoming students
Neslučitelnost : JEM003
Je neslučitelnost pro: JEM003
Anotace - angličtina
The course covers key topics in the economics of information with applications mostly in financial economics.
Poslední úprava: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (03.09.2024)
Cíl předmětu - angličtina

The aim is to develop tools to study the role of informational frictions in markets and within companies and organizations. The main applications cover equity and debt contracting, credit rationing, investment efficiency, earnings management, accounting conventions, financial market microstructure, currency runs, career concerns, non-linear price screening, disclosures, and strategic communication between corporate boards and top management.

Poslední úprava: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (03.09.2024)
Literatura - angličtina

Main books

Foucault, T., Pagano, M., Röell, A. (2013). Market Liquidity: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. Oxford University Press. (FPR)

Jann, O., Schottmüller, C. (2024). Notes on Information Economics. Mimeo. (JS)

Jehle, G. A., Reny, P. (2011). Advanced Microeconomic Theory. Pearson Education. Especially Chapter 8. (JR)

Kreps, D. M. (2023). Microeconomic Foundations II: Imperfect Competition, Information, and Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press. Especially Chapter 20. (DK)

Liang, A. (2024) Information and Learning in Economic Theory. Available at: https://www.anniehliang.com/lecture-notes (AL)

Tirole, J. (2010). The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press. Chapters 3 and 6. (JT)

Tadelis, S. (2013). Game Theory: An Introduction. Princeton University Press, Chapters 12 and 15. (ST)

 

Readings

Baley, I., Veldkamp, L. (2023). Bayesian Learning. In Handbook of Economic Expectations (pp. 717-748). Elsevier Academic Press.

Birchler, U., Bütler, M. (2007). Information Economics. Routledge.

Guttman, I., Kadan, O., Kandel, E. (2006). A rational expectations theory of kinks in financial reporting. The Accounting Review, 81(4), 811-848.

Milgrom, P. (2008). What the seller won't tell you: Persuasion and disclosure in markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2), 115-131.

Stiglitz, J. E., Kosenko, A. (2024). The Economics of Information in a World of Disinformation: A Survey Part 1: Indirect Communication (No. w32049). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Stiglitz, J. E., Kosenko, A. (2024). The Economics of Information in a World of Disinformation: A Survey Part 2: Direct Communication (No. w32050). National Bureau of Economic Research.

 

Recent applications

Acharya, V. V., DeMarzo, P., Kremer, I. (2011). Endogenous information flows and the clustering of announcements. American Economic Review, 101(7), 2955-2979.

Banerjee, S., Szydlowski, M. (2024). Harnessing the overconfidence of the crowd: A theory of SPACs. Journal of Financial Economics, 153, 103787.

Davis, J., Gondhi, N. (2024). Learning in Financial Markets: Implications for Debt-Equity Conflicts, The Review of Financial Studies, 37, 1584--1639.

Gregor, M., Michaeli, B. (2024). Board Bias, Information, and Investment Efficiency. Review of Accounting Studies, forthcoming.

Kanodia, C., Sapra, H. (2016). A real effects perspective to accounting measurement and disclosure: Implications and insights for future research. Journal of Accounting Research, 54(2), 623-676. Section 3.

Poslední úprava: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (24.09.2024)
Metody výuky - angličtina

Lectures, Seminars, Assignments, Exams

Poslední úprava: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (03.09.2024)
Požadavky ke zkoušce - angličtina

Assignments (pass/fail)        20%

  • You may expect 3-4 assignments.

Midterm                              30%

  • Midterm is scheduled for November 6, 2024 (9:30-11).

Final Exam                          50%

  • Final exam dates will be announced in December.
Poslední úprava: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (14.10.2024)
Sylabus - angličtina

I Foundations of Information

Information and Knowledge

Bayesian Updating

Gaussian Information

Information Properties: MLRP and FOSD

Comparing Information: The Blackwell Order

Merging of Beliefs and Disagreement

AL 1-4, 6

BB 3, 4

 

II How to Solve Games with Incomplete Information?

Complete and Incomplete Information

Perfect and Imperfect Information

Bayesian Nash Equilibria

Perfect Bayesian Equilibria

JS 2.2

JR 7

Application: Career concerns (Holmstrom, 1999)

Application: Coordination (Morris and Shin, 2002)

 

II Asymmetric Information in Markets: Adverse Selection

Market Breakdown/Unraveling (Akerlof, 1970)

Underinsurance in Simple Insurance Markets

JS 3

 

Adverse Selection in Corporate Finance: Securities Design

Equity and debt contracting

Investment Efficiency

Capital Structure (Pecking-order Hypothesis)

Seasoned Equity Offerings

JT 6

Application: SPACs vs Equity Contracting (Banerjee and Szydlowski, 2024)

 

Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Market Microstructure

Noise Traders (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985)

FPR 3, BB 7

Market Depth (Kyle, 1985)

FPR 4

 

III Asymmetric Information in Markets: Signaling and Screening

Unverifiable Costly Messages: Signaling

Warranties vs Installation Packages and Training

JS 4.3

 

Signaling in Corporate Finance

Dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979)

Capital structure (Myers, 1984)

JT 6

 

Signaling in Financial Markets: Financial Reporting

Linear and Non-linear Equilibria

JT 7

Application: Earnings management (Guttman, Kadan and Kandel, 2006)

 

Monopolistic Screening with Non-linear Prices

JS 5.2

 

IV Asymmetric Information and Contracting: Moral Hazard

Credit Rationing and Moral Hazard

JT 3

Application: Real Effects of Accounting Conventions on Investments (Kanodia and Sapra, 2016)

 

 

V Strategic Communication

Unverifiable Costless Messages: Cheap Talk

Kreps 20.9

 

Exogenous Verifiable Messages: Disclosure

Unraveling

Partial disclosure due to cost and endowment uncertainty (Milgrom, 2008)

Application: (Ir)relevance of Public News in Financial Markets (Acharya and Kremer, 2011)

 

VI Information Aggregation, Coordination, and Higher-order Uncertainty

Information Aggregation

Bayesian Learning in Macroeconomics

BV 2-3

Application: Feedback Loops in Financial Markets (Davis and Gondhi, 2024)

 

Macroeconomic Coordination Games

BV 3.2 and 4.6

Global Games

 

VII Production of Information

Information Acquisition

AL 5

 

Endogenous Verifiable Messages: Bayesian Persuasion

Information Design

AL 8

Application: Corporate Board Conservatism and CEO’s Project Reporting (Gregor and Michaeli, 2024)

Poslední úprava: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (03.09.2024)
Vstupní požadavky - angličtina

No entry requirements for Master students of Economics and Finance.

Poslední úprava: Gregor Martin, doc. PhDr., Ph.D. (03.09.2024)
 
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