PředmětyPředměty(verze: 837)
Předmět, akademický rok 2018/2019
   Přihlásit přes CAS
Game Theory and Political Economy - JEB064
Anglický název: Game Theory and Political Economy
Zajišťuje: Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES)
Fakulta: Fakulta sociálních věd
Platnost: od 2016
Semestr: letní
Body: 6
E-Kredity: 6
Způsob provedení zkoušky: letní s.:
Rozsah, examinace: letní s.:2/2 Zk [hodiny/týden]
Počet míst: 59 / 59 (59)
Minimální obsazenost: neomezen
Stav předmětu: vyučován
Jazyk výuky: angličtina
Způsob výuky: prezenční
Poznámka: předmět je možno zapsat mimo plán
povolen pro zápis po webu
při zápisu přednost, je-li ve stud. plánu
Garant: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D.
Vyučující: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D.
Prerekvizity : JEB004
Soubory Komentář Kdo přidal
stáhnout Syllabus.pdf Course description doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D.
Anotace -
Poslední úprava: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D. (20.02.2018)
This course introduces into non-cooperative game theory in the context of economic policy-making and collective decision-making in corporations and organizations. The course develops the game-theoretical toolkit through which economic policy-making, including budgeting, structural reforms, industry regulations, state aid, and decisions in budgeting and monetary committees can be rigorously analyzed.

The course targets three audiences:

1) Economists who want to model how firms, interest groups, individual politicians and political parties strategically shape economic policies.
2) Students of various fields who are interested in an introduction into game theory, and expect to use game-theoretical tools in various economic and political contexts.
3) Those familiar with basic tools from non-cooperative game theory who seek applications focused on collective decision-making, including decision-making in corporations.

Prerequisites: Introductory microeconomics and introductory knowledge of probability and statistics

Course requirements: 4 homeworks 50%, a written (three-hour) final exam 50%

Grades ETCS
90-100 A
80-89 B
70-79 C
60-69 D
50-59 E
0-49 F
Literatura
Poslední úprava: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D. (27.02.2017)

Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E. (2001) Special Interest Politics. MIT Press.

McCarty, N., Meirowitz, A. (2007) Political Game Theory. Cambridge University Press.

Mueller, D. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press.

Tadelis, S. (2013) Game Theory: An Introduction. Princeton University Press.

Weingast, B., Wittman, D. (2006) Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press.

Sylabus -
Poslední úprava: doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D. (05.03.2018)

Voting. Policy preferences in a population and Condorcet winner. The non-existence of Condorcet winner. Spatial preferences. Euclidean preferences. Median bliss point. McKelvey Theorem. Majority and supramajority voting for spatial preferences. Alternative voting systems. Neutral Condorcet and neutral reversal requirements. Strategic voting. Killer amendments. Dictatorial voting system. Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Pairwise (simple majority) voting on tax and transfers. Inequality on redistribution. Cross-country differences in redistribution.

*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 2.4-2.5, 4, 5.1-5.3; or, Tadelis (2013)

** Grossman, Helpman (2001) Ch. 2.1-2.2

** Saari, D. (2006) A Tool Kit for Voting Theory, Handbook, Ch. 22

* Barberà, S., Gerber, A. (2017) Sequential voting and agenda manipulation. Theoretical Economics 12, 211–247.

* Brandt, F. et al. (2016) Tournament Solutions. In: Brandt, F. et al., eds., Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3.

* Duddy, C. (2017) Geometry of run-off elections. Public Choice 173, 267-288.

* Fishburn, P. C., Brams, S. J. (1981). Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections. Public Choice 36 (1), 89-114.

* Glaeser, E.L. (2006) Inequality, Handbook, Ch. 34

* Milanovic, B. (2000). The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data, European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 367-410.

* Mueller (2003) Ch. 5.2-5.8, 5.13


Elections.
Direct democracy. Median voter theorem. Electoral competition of two parties for deterministic and stochastic voting. Competition of policy-seeking parties in the presence and absence of a dominant point. Games in the normal form: pure-strategy Nash equilibria and their existence. Swing voters. A test of the role of referendum. Elections and tactical redistribution: exclusive (plurality) vs. inclusive (antiplurality) electoral rules.

*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 5.1-5.3; or, Tadelis (2013)

** Duggan, J. (2006) Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium, Handbook, Ch. 4

* Mueller (2003) Ch. 11, 12.1-12.3, 21.2

* Myerson, R.B. (1995) Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (1), 77-89.

* Myerson, R.B. (1993) Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems, American Political Science Review 87 (4), 856-869.

* Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2004). Constitutions and Economic Policy, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (1), 75-98.

* Londegran, J. (2006) Political Income Redistribution, Handbook, Ch. 5

* Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2006) Electoral Systems and Economic Policy, Handbook, Ch. 40


Coalitions
. Coalitional fiscal policies and their electoral determinants. Excessive deficits, excessive spending and tragedy of budgetary commons. The role of decision-making fragmentation. National procedural fiscal rules. Legislative bargaining and budgeting. Games in the extensive form. Perfect and imperfect information. Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information. Backward induction. Subgame-perfect equilibrium. Structure-induced equilibrium. Coordinated vs. sequential budget process.

*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 7.1-7.5, 7.8; or, Tadelis (2013)

** Diermeier, D. (2006) Coalitional Government, Handbook, Ch. 9

** Von Hagen, J. (2006) Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions, Handbook, Ch. 26

* Eslava, M. (2011) The Political Economy of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey, Journal of Economic Surveys, 25 (4), pp. 645–673

* Knight, B. (2004) Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects, Journal of Public Economics 88, 845–866.

* Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2006) Electoral Systems and Economic Policy, Handbook, Ch. 40


Contests for policies
. Bilateral and multilateral political transactions. Rent-seeking (contests for policy rents). Contest success functions and contest design: general results for logit-form and all-pay auction. Mixed-strategies. Dominance. Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. The long-term effects of consolidation on the number and activities of interest groups. Example: Trade policy. Measuring returns from rent-seeking.

*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 5.4-5.7, 5.10; or, Tadelis (2013)

*** Mueller (2003) Ch. 15

*** van Winden, F. (2003) Interest Group Behavior and Influence. In Rowley, C.K., and Schneider, F. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Springer US, 118-129.

* Che, Y., and Gale, I.L. (1998) Caps on Political Lobbying. American Economic Review 88 (3): 643-651.

* Liebman, B. H. and Reynolds K. M. (2007) The returns from rent-seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment, Canadian Journal of Economics 39 (4), 1345-1369.

* Münster, J. (2006) Lobbying Contests with Endogenous Policy Proposals. Economics & Politics 18(3): 389-397.


Reforms.
Modeling policy conflicts. Who wins a conflict between monetary and fiscal policy? Chicken game. Crisis bargaining and reforms. Waiting games. War of attrition in debt stabilization. Strategic uncertainty. Uncertainty over types. Bayesian games. Bayesian equilibria. Electoral risks in the formulation of electoral reform platforms. Electoral predictions through prediction markets.

*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 6.1-6.2, 6.7-6.8, 10.5-10.7; or, Tadelis (2013)

* Berger, H., Kopits, G., Székely, I.P. (2007) Fiscal Indulgence in Central Europe: Loss of the External Anchor? Scottish Journal of Political Economy 54 (1), 116–135.

* Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2006) Paths of Economic and Political Development, Handbook, Ch. 37

* Acemoglu, D. (2011) Theory, General Equilibrium, and Political Economy in Development Economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (3), 17–32

* Wren, A. (2006) Comparative Perspectives on the Role of the State in the Economy, Handbook, Ch. 35

 
Univerzita Karlova | Informační systém UK