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Course Overview:
This course explores the intersection of legal theory, moral philosophy, and psychology to examine what motivates citizens to obey the law—and under what conditions such obedience can be said to be autonomous, meaningful, and legitimate. Legal positivism, a dominant tradition in modern legal thought, holds that the validity of law is determined by its sources rather than its moral content. This formalist conception has come under increasing scrutiny in light of rising populism, democratic backsliding, and growing social polarization. While positivism aims to present law as neutral and independent from politics, religion, and society, critics argue that such neutrality is both illusory and politically dangerous. These critics converge on the view that legal validity alone cannot account for citizens’ sense of political obligation. Instead, they argue that obedience to the law must rest on substantive moral grounds—grounds that make law not only formally legitimate but meaningfully just. Yet despite this shared critique of positivism, critical and civic approaches diverge profoundly on what those moral grounds should be. Broadly speaking, they offer three competing answers to the question of why people follow the law: freedom, culture, and justice. Course Aims: This course critically examines these moral foundations of rule-following, exploring how perceptions of fairness and legitimacy shape civic motivation and the internalization of norms. This course has three primary aims: 1. Understanding Rule-Following as Freedom: The first part of the course introduces students to how political liberalism (Rawls), deliberative democracy (Habermas) and republicanism (Pettit) conceive rule-following as a form of individual freedom supported by legitimate institutions. We will explore how legal obedience is tied to notions of public reason, deliberation, and non-domination and critically examine their relevance in contemporary democratic theory. 2. Analyzing Rule-Following through Culture: The second part investigates how communitarian thinkers ground legal compliance in shared meanings, recognition, and social practices. Students will consider the role of language, identity, and belonging in motivating citizens to follow rules, and assess how law functions within and through cultural contexts. 3. Examining Justice and the Moral Psychology of Rule-Following: The final part turns to theories that link rule-following to moral truth and objectivity. Drawing on Rawlsian moral psychology, we will analyze how a sense of justice and civic motivation emerge from experiences of fairness, moral education, and institutional trust. Learning Objectives: By the end of this course, students will be able to: 1. Explain the foundations of legal positivism and its account of rule-following. 2. Compare and critically assess competing theories of legal obligation from political liberalism, republicanism, communitarianism, and critical legal theory. 3. Analyze the psychological and moral dimensions of legal compliance and civic motivation. 4. Evaluate the relationship between law’s legitimacy and its cultural or moral grounding. 5. Apply interdisciplinary approaches to real-world questions of legal obedience, populism, and democratic legitimacy. Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (28.01.2026)
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1. Class Attendance and Participation: Attendance, regular engagement with readings, and participation in class discussions (20%). 2. Class Presentation: Presentation of (1) a reading and (2) an application of a theory to a structured case (40%). 3. Final Paper (take-home exam): 1500-word reflective essay comparing and discussing one case across two theories (40%). Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (28.01.2026)
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The subject covers following topics: 1. February 12, 2026 Introduction: The Problem of Rule-Following Reading: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§185-187, 189-190.
2. February 19, 2026 Wittgenstein – The Rule-Following Paradox Reading: Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§185-202. Student presentation (Group 1)
3. February 26, 2026 Kripke – Radical Skepticism about Rules Reading: Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, pp. 7-54. Student presentation (Group 2)
4. March 5, 2026 Practical Application 1 – Fictive Case Study Group 1 and 2 apply Wittgenstein‘s and Kripke‘s theories to a structured case
5. March 12, 2026 The Anthropology of Rule-Following Reading: Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society, pp. 20-38. Group 3: Student presentation and application of Rosen’s theory to a structured case
6. March 19, 2026 Pettit – Normativity in Social Practice Reading: Pettit, “The Reality of Rule-Following.” Student presentation (Group 4)
7. March 26, 2026 Dworkin – Interpretive Normativity and Moral Principles Reading: Dworkin, “The Model of Rules.” Student presentation (Group 5)
8. April 9, 2026 Practical Application 2 – Fictive Case Study Group 4 and 5 apply and Pettit’s and Dworkin’s theories to a structured case
9. April 16, 2026 Conclusion – Comparing Theories and Integrating Practice Groups 1-5 discuss strengths and limits of each rule-following theory and reflect on practical implications for legal reasoning Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (28.01.2026)
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1. Basic literature 1. DWORKIN, Ronald. “The Model of Rules.” University of Chicago Law Review 35(1): 14–46, 1967. 2. KRIPKE, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. 3. PETTIT, Philip. Pettit, “The Reality of Rule-Following.” Mind 99, 393: 1-21, 1990. 4. ROSEN, Lawrence. The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 5. WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd edition, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. Poslední úprava: Šicnerová Barbora, Mgr. (28.01.2026)
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