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Module leader: Alistair Jones Email: anjones@dmu.ac.uk Twitter: @dmuanjones
Programme Overview Workshop 1 - Introduction Workshop 2 - Britain and Europe, 1945-1970 Workshop 3 - Britain and Europe, 1970-1990 Workshop 4 - Britain and Europe, post-1990 Workshop 5 - Europeanisation Workshop 6 - British Political Parties and the EU Workshop 7 - The British media, public opinion and the EU Workshop 8 - British Euroscepticism Workshop 9 - Brexit or Bremain? Workshop 10 - A Europe without the UK?
Debate 1 - Should Britain have joined the then-EEC?
Debate 2 - Is there a future for Britain in the EU?
Readings/Sources
Gowland, T., Turner, A. & Wright, A (2010); Britain and European Integration since 1945 (Routledge) Hennessy, P. (2000); The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (Allen Lane) Jones, A. (2016); Britain and the European Union (Edinburgh University Press, 2nd edition) McCormick, J. (2014); Understanding the European Union (Palgrave, 6th edition) Nugent, N. (2010); The Government and Politics of the European Union (Palgrave, 7th edition) Reynolds, D. (2000);Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Powers in the Twentieth Century (Longman, 2nd edition) Sanders, D. (1990); Losing an Empire - Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (Macmillan) Young, H. (1998); This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (Overlook Press) Young, J. (2000); Britain and European Unity, 1945-99 (Macmillan)
Workshop 1 - Introduction
This introductory tutorial provides an opportunity for you meet your tutor and discuss any questions that you might have from the reading list. There will also be an opportunity to examine some of the issues to be covered in future tutorials, as well as in the debates. The session will finally finish with a discussion on the nature of Britain’s relationship with the EU and you will have an opportunity to provide a list of the positive and negative aspects of British participation. Comparisons may be made with the relationship between the EU and other member states.
Workshop 2 - British and Europe, 1945-1970
Introduction A common theme running through accounts of British foreign policy in the post-1945 era has been the way in which successive governments have sought to balance Britain’s declining economic and political influence with maintaining the country as a key strategic player in world politics. At the end of the Second World War, Britain was a nation that had remained undefeated and was the only major power to fought for the duration of the war. Victory brought much to be proud of. Britain could claim to have an Empire and significant economic, political and military influence that would support the notion of it being a great power. In 1945 Britain had a military presence in over 40 countries in nearly every corner of the globe, from Austria to Aden, Burma to Bermuda and Egypt to Ethiopia. But the demands and obligations that came from a desire to maintain a ‘Great Power’ status meant the country faced numerous problems. The economy was in poor shape, with financial resources exhausted by the war effort. The leading economist of the day, Lord Keynes, noted in a Cabinet memorandum of 13 August 1945 that the country faced a ‘financial Dunkirk’.
Although industry suffered from poor competitiveness when compared to newly industrialising countries that utilised the latest methods of production, Britain was still able by virtue of its position to be a significant base of production. Yet the signs of decline were already there. Industry suffered from poor management who showed a disdain for the latest methods of management practices and a workforce that was overly protected by trade unions that often failed to grasp the need to adopt differing working practices. In time this would be referred to as the ‘British disease’, denoting the inefficient working practices that brought British industry to its knees in the late 1960s and 1970s and which would be reflected in the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Britain declining from a position of seventh in the world in 1950 to eighteenth by 1970. But despite the dramatic nature of this decline, in the post-war years many were oblivious that Britain’s place in the world was not assured and that it had a number of key challenges.
British economic policy after the Second World War was one of considerable contradictions. On the one hand, Britain was a bankrupt nation. Yet rather than a complete collapse, the British economy actually expanded after the Second World War. Exports quadrupled between 1944 and 1950. In 1950 Britain accounted for some 25 per cent of total manufacturing exports in comparison to Germany, which had 7 per cent. A few years later in 1957, Britain had around 17 per cent of world manufacturing exports. And while this was a noticeable decline on only a few years earlier, it was a figure that was still considerably higher than the likes of France and Japan. Such a position would lead to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan commenting in 1957 that ‘most Britain’s have never had it so good’. A decade later in 1967 Wilson would reflect that a ‘white heat of technology’ was revolutionising Britain’s competitiveness in science and technology. Yet while there were some truths to these phrases, most notably evidenced by the development of the Franco-British designed supersonic aircraft Concorde which flew for the first time in 1969, the reality was that Britain’s position in the world economy was declining relative to that of others. Whereas in 1960 Britain’s share of world trade was around 16 per cent and Germany’s 19 per cent, the following decade would see Germany’s proportion of trade at the global level increase to 20 per cent while Britain’s fell to 10 per cent. On the one hand, the fact that as a small island nation Britain could still account in 1970 for a tenth of all global trade was clearly a remarkable achievement. But this also highlighted that the British economy had fallen off a cliff in every sense, from having had one quarter of a total value of manufacturing exports in 1950. For some observers this reduction from 25 per cent to 10 per cent in a period of two decades was in every sense a disaster.
Britain also faced pressures for independence in the colonies and the mandated territories that had been acquired after 1920. The issue was not whether change was likely, but rather the nature and timing of that change. Yet the implications of any withdrawal from Empire were massive, most notably in relation to trade and adjustments to the practicalities of government. At the time many people in government were of the thinking that there was scope for the Empire to be maintained in one form or another as a basis for upholding British influence. Others were more sanguine about the reality that Britain would retreat to a regional power, with 1947 proving to be a particularly difficult year: Britain declared that it would grant independence to India, announced that it would withdraw from Greece and took the decision to refer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations (UN). In short, it appeared a formal statement of the country’s fall from great power status.
Since the end of the Second World War successive UK government's faced the problem of deciding whether the nation's destiny lay in Europe or not. In the 1950's there was a failure to grasp the importance of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Messina talks of 1955, which led to the signing of the two Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957. Yet, it was only after the failure of the 1959 European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and a decline in the economic fortunes of the UK, that the government reappraised its position of isolation.
As a result of pressure from the United States, a crisis in the Commonwealth caused by South Africa's expulsion, and evidence the EEC Six were achieving nearly double the rates of growth of the British economy, Macmillan decided to submit Britain's first application for full membership of the EEC. But despite the glaring reality that the UK's future lay in Europe, (the Commonwealth had begun to fragment and the Empire had largely ceased to exist) Macmillan's application (though managed by Edward Heath) of 9 August 1961 to join the Community, failed with De Gaulle's January 1963 veto.
Thereafter, the entry torch was taken up by Wilson, with the 1967 application having fewer reservations than Macmillan’s. The openness of the second application reflected the general feeling that a second failure could not be risked. Between 1958 and 1968 the Gross National Product (GNP) of the Six increased twice as fast as the UK's, while over the period 1958 to 1969 the production of the Six all but doubled with the UK's increasing by roughly 50%. However, De Gaulle vetoed the application at a press conference on 27 November 1967, referring to the weakness of the economy (highlighted by the 14.3% devaluation of the pound in relation to the dollar in November 1967).
Discussion Questions 1. To what extent were British politicians correct in considering the country to be a Great Power after the Second World War? 2. Why did Britain not participate in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)? 3. Why did Macmillan decide to apply for Britain' s full membership of the EEC in 1961, in spite of his previous strong opposition to this organisation? 4. ‘Britain made its second application to enter the EEC chiefly because there was now no alternative if the country wished to remain a major power’. Discuss.
List of relevant sources for workshop 2
Baylis, J (1983); "British Wartime Thinking about the Post-War European Security Group" Review of International Studies vol. 9, pp. 265-281 Beloff, N. (1963); The General Says No: Britain's Exclusion From Europe (Penguin) Burgess & Edwards (1988); "The Six Plus One: British Policy-making and the Question of European Economic Integration, 1955" International Affairs vol. 64, pp. 393-413 Camps, M. (1964); Britain and the European Community 1955-63 (Oxford University Press) Deighton, A. (1998); "The Last Piece of the Jigsaw and the Creation of the Western European Union" Contemporary European History vol. 7, pp. 181-196 Dell, E. (1995); The Schuman Plan and the British abdication of leadership in Europe (Clarendon Press) Dockrill, M. and Young, J. (eds.) (1989) British Foreign Policy 1945-56 (St. Martin's Press) Dutton, D. (1993); "Anticipating Maastricht: The Conservative Party and Britain's First Application to Join the European Community" Contemporary Record vol. 3, pp. 522-540 Kitzinger, U. (1961); The Challenge of the Common Market (Basil Blackwell) Kitzinger, U. (1968); The Second Try: Labour and the EEC (Pergamon Press) Lieber, R. (1970); British Political Parties and European Unity (University of California Press) Macmillan (1969); Tides of Fortune, 1945-55 (Macmillan) Pagedas, C. (1995); "The After-Life of the Blue Streak: Britain's American Answer to Europe" Journal of Strategic Studies vol. 18, pp. 1-24 Warner, G (1979); "'Collusion' and the Suez crisis of 1956" International Affairs vol. 55, pp. 226-239 Young, J. (1984); Britain, France and the Unity of Europe: 1945-51 (Leicester University Press) Young, J. (ed.) (1988); The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime Administration, 1951-55 (Leicester University Press)
Workshop 3 - Britain and Europe, 1970-1990
Introduction By the early 1960s the British economy was beginning to stutter as the strategy of post-war economic growth based on imperial ties was failing to deliver significant economic improvements. Britain’s political influence also appeared to be waning as successive governments defiantly sought to defend Britain’s status as a world power with a seat at the top table of international affairs. But whereas in earlier decades such a claim rested on Empire, naval supremacy and economic influence, the basis of this position had from the 1960s shifted to a reliance on the Commonwealth, being a nuclear power, and military forces spread out in the far-flung corners of the fag end of the Empire. Such changing fortunes resulted in government officials and ministers beginning to reassess Britain’s position in the world, with the conclusion being made in the early 1960s that participation in European cooperation was the only option. But as the previous chapter noted, the applications that Britain put forward to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961 and 1967 failed because of the view that the country was not sufficiently committed to the European cause. Rejection of membership confirmed Britain’s position as a country adrift; it was unable to reposition itself as a European power in the face of a declining global role. The burden of the latter soon became unsustainable, with the 1967 devaluation of the pound being followed within a matter of weeks by the decision to withdraw Britain’s military forces from east of Suez.
That is not to say the years that followed would not involve successive British governments being drawn into conflicts, many of which were influenced by the legacy of Empire. Indeed, a willingness and capacity to intervene would see British forces being involved - with the exception of 1968 - in military action every year since 1945. Moreover, while Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez would be signified by the closure of its naval base in Singapore in October 1971, this did not equate to a retraction of all interests in South-East Asia as it established a Five-Power Defence Agreement with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore on 1 November 1971 to reassure these countries of Britain’s continuing support. To this end, it is evident the legacy of Empire has had a significant impact on shaping British foreign policy. This has been particularly evident in the case of the country’s relationship with European integration. When Britain joined the European Community on 1 January 1973, the general viewpoint among politicians, business leaders and the general public was the nation’s future lay in closer ties with the nations of Europe. Britain would be followed into the Community by Denmark and Ireland and it was hoped this first enlargement would produce renewed optimism in the Community. Yet, on both accounts, the reality proved to be considerably different. Rather than providing the much-needed injection of growth and competiveness that the British economy so badly needed, the 1970s would see a further decline in Britain’s economic performance with some commentators considering the country to be ungovernable by the end of the decade. Such a viewpoint not only reflected the nature of British industrial relations, but also mirrored the fact the Labour government towards the end of the 1970s could only manage to hang on to power by its fingertips.
The process of applying to join the Community led to both Conservatives and Labour experiencing inner divisions between the so-called "marketeers" and "non-marketeers", mainly representing the extreme wings of the two parties. Against this background, when Heath secured the agreement of Pompidou to support Britain's third application in 1971, he faced a parliamentary rebellion from within his party. The Common Market Bill of October 1971 passed thanks to the rebellion of 69 Labour MPs who voted with the government against their own party. One year after Britain's official entry in the EEC, on 1 January 1973, the Labour victory in the elections of 1974 triggered a re-negotiation of the terms of entry negotiated by Heath. With divisions in the Labour Party, Wilson decided to settle the issue of Britain's membership in a popular referendum in June 1975. The result of the referendum gave a decisive vote in favour of Britain's EC membership (by nearly 2:1), but this hardly settled the splits within the main parties or among the electorate.
Britain's interest in the EC appeared to be predominantly economic, coupled with a strong opposition towards the political implications of membership on the sovereignty of the British state. Even the apparent unity of the Conservatives who, in the run up to the 1979 elections, took pride in claiming to be "the party of Europe", was soon to prove superficial and extremely precarious.
Few were surprised when Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party won the May 1979 general election. Her entry into Downing Street ushered in a period of eighteen years of Conservative government. Thatcher proved to be the ultimate conviction politician, with her views about Britain’s foreign and domestic policy being shaped by her own personal leadership. While her policies helped to establish a degree of economic and political stability, this did not mean her period in office was one of consensus. Domestic reforms ushered in dramatic changes to the structure of the British economic and political system, which resulted in a restructuring of the old industrial consensus, an increase in unemployment in traditional heavy manufacturing industries such as coal and steel and a concurrent decline in the power of trade unions.
Although Thatcher herself rose to the leadership of the Conservatives in 1975 as a committed "Europhile", she gradually began to turn into a "Eurosceptical" position during the protracted negotiations over the British Budgetary Question in the early 1980s. The "1992 Single Market Programme" of 1985 and the Single European Act of 1986 succeeded temporarily in reviving her faith in the EC, as she perceived them - mistakenly, according to her later admission in her memoirs - as evidence the Continent had turned towards her own neo-liberal economic agenda.
Thatcher’s disaffection with the EC and especially with the Commission and its President, Jacques Delors, grew again when she realised "1992" was only meant to be part of Delors’s wider agenda which he had presented in June 1985. This included other major initiatives, such as economic and monetary union, a social policy and a common foreign policy. In 1988, in the Belgian city of Bruges, she gave her famous polemical speech outlining her own vision of a "Europe of strong states". She then proceeded to veto both the Social Charter of 1988 and the Delors Report on EMU in 1989, leading Britain to complete isolation among the then 12 members. Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, she developed further her European vision, calling for a "Europe Open and Free".
Discussion Questions
List of relevant sources for workshop 3
Butler, D. & Kitzinger, U. (1976); The 1975 Referendum (Macmillan) Gasiorek, M. et al (2002); "Accession of the UK to the EC" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 40, pp. 352-373 Gowland, T. & Turner, A. (2000); Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-1998 (Routledge) Kitzinger, U. (1973); Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (Thames & Hudson) Lord, C. (1992); "Sovereign or Confused? The Great Debate About British Entry to the EU 20 Years On" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 30, pp. 419-436 Seldon, A. & Collings, D. (2000); Britain Under Thatcher (Longman) Thatcher, M. (1990); The Downing Street Years (Harper Collins) Young, H. (1990); One of Us (Pan Books) Young, J. (2000); Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999 (Macmillan, 2nd edition) Young, S. (1973); Terms of Entry: Britain’s Negotiation with the European Community, 1970-72 (Heinemann)
Workshop 4 - Britain and Europe, post-1990
Introduction The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union were two of the most momentous events of the twentieth century. The very ending of the Cold War brought with it significant questions as to what the post-Cold War world would look like. A common view at the time was that this would be marked by the need for governments to spend less on defence as the result of a peace dividend in the absence of superpower rivalry. This vision of a more peaceful world was summed up by the then US President George H.W. Bush, when he predicted in a speech before a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990 that the period of change would usher in a ‘new world order’. The significance of these words marked the fact America was unchallenged as the leading global power because of the declining influence of the Soviet Union (which eventually collapsed in 1991). These changed circumstances became known as the unipolar moment and emphasised the need for American leadership to reshape the post-Cold War period as it had done in the post-1945 era. But whereas the world was faced with having to deal with the economic, political and humanitarian catastrophe of the Second World War in 1945, the presence of what was regarded to be a more stable environment in 1990-1991 disguised the true complexity of the post-Cold war era.
Thatcher’s successor, John Major, (1990-97) invested a considerable part of his time in office to heal the wounds of his split party: Eurosceptic nationalists and Europhiles constantly undermined his government through inner battles over the issue of Britain’s relations with the EU. For a moment, the Maastricht Treaty, with its British opt-out clauses on EMU and Social Policy, the deletion of the word "Federal" and its explicit reference to the principle of Subsidiarity, seemed to vindicate Major’s negotiating strategy: "game, set, match" was how he presented it to the House of Commons in 1992. Nevertheless, a series of debacles, such the ERM crisis on 16 September 1992, the delays over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the backbench rebellion by a small group of Tory Eurosceptics, the working-time directive issue and the BSE crisis in 1994-95 turned Major’s European policy into a spasmodic and perennial damage-limitation exercise. An unworthy Thatcherite for the right of the party and a hostage to a "little Englander" mentality for the Europhiles, Major resigned from the leadership of the party after his defeat in the 1997 election, leaving behind the most deeply split Conservative party since, perhaps, the controversy over the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s.
The Labour government that was elected to office in 1997 with a 179-seat majority and the youngest Prime Minister since 1812, took over from a Conservative government that had been battered by divisions among MPs and members of the Cabinet over the issue of European integration. Yet the 1997 general election was not fought and won on the issue of European integration or for that matter any other foreign policy issue. The election was instead contested on the basis of the ability of the political parties to govern, most notably with regard to such issues as the economy, healthcare, policing and education. Yet the subsequent thirteen years of Labour government (1997-2010) were dominated by foreign policy decisions, of which Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 became a focal point of discussion. Not only was this unexpected in light of the election campaign, it was also surprising given that Blair knew relatively little about foreign policy, with his expertise prior to becoming Labour leader having been focussed on domestic affairs. As he would later reflect in his memoirs ‘I knew a lot about history before becoming prime minister; but about contemporary affairs, I knew little’. One of the upshots of this was that while the Labour government and its key architects of policy - Tony Blair and Gordon Brown - had specific views as to how they would develop domestic policy, their outlook on foreign policy was far less rooted in a clear sense of policy development. This led to considerable contradictions in British foreign policy during the 1997-2010 period, most notably between a desire to provide an ethical foreign policy and undertaking military intervention, and which resulted in increased levels of public disquiet and criticism over an interventionist foreign policy. This provided the backdrop to the election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 2010, which sought to advance a foreign policy that was less tied to the US-led interventionism that dominated the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Both the coalition government that came to office in 2010 and the Conservative Government elected in 2015 have had a complicated relationship with Europe. The coalition saw a rather Eurosceptic Conservative Party join forces with an avowedly pro-European Liberal Democratic Party. Consequently, mixed messages emerged with regard to Britain’s relationship with the EU. The knock-on effect of this was a stalemate. Neither greater integration nor an increase in subsidiarity made it to the political agenda. As a result, the Conservative Party, post-2015, was been far more dogmatic in its approach to Europe. The terms of entry were to be re-negotiated, as in 1974, with a referendum on these new terms of entry to be held before the end of 2017. That it will be almost impossible to complete such re-negotiations in such a time frame is immaterial. All of this is to satiate domestic demand from the right wing of British politics.
Discussion Questions
3. Should Britain have joined the single currency?
4. Why has European integration become so contentious an issue for the Conservative Party under David Cameron?
List of relevant sources for workshop 4
Atkins, J. (2013); "A Renewed Social Democracy for an ‘Age of Internationalism’: An Interpretivist Account of New Labour’s Foreign Policy" British Journal of Politics and International Relations vol. 15, pp. 175-191 Baker, D. (2001); "Britain and Europe: The Argument Continues" Parliamentary Affairs vol. 54, pp. 276-288 Baker, D. (2002); "Britain and Europe: More Blood on the Euro carpet" Parliamentary Affairs vol. 55, pp. 317-330 Baker, D. (2003); "Britain and Europe: treading water or slowly drowning" Parliamentary Affairs vol. 56, pp. 237-254 Baker, D., et al (1993); "1846…1906…1996? Conservative Splits and European Integration" Political Quarterly vol. 64, pp. 420-434 Blair, A. (2001); "Understanding the Major Governments" Contemporary British History vol. 15, pp. 115-122 Buller, J. (2000); "Understanding Contemporary Conservative euro-scepticism" Political Quarterly vol. 71, pp. 319-327 Bulmer, S. (2008); "New Labour, New European Policy? Blair, Brown and Utilitarian Supranationalism" Parliamentary Affairs vol. 61, pp. 597-620 Charles, G. (2005); "What if the British Vote No?" Foreign Affairs vol. 84, pp. 86-87 Gamble, A. & Kelly, G. (2000); "The British Labour Party and Monetary Union" West European Politics vol. 23, pp. 1-25 Garel-Jones, T. (1993); "The UK Presidency: An Inside View" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 31, pp. 261-267 Garry, T. (1995); "The British Conservative Party" West European Politics vol. 18, pp. 170-189 Holmes, M. (1998); "The Conservative Party and Europe" Political Quarterly vol. 69, pp. 133-140 Kettell, S. (2004); "Why New Labour wants the Euro" Political Quarterly vol. 75, pp. 52-59 Menon, A. (2004); "Britain and European Integration" Political Quarterly vol. 75, pp. 284-317 Messner, W. (2003); "Taming Labour’s MEPs" Party Politics vol. 9, pp. 201-218 Roper, J. (2000); "Two Cheers for Mr Blair? The Political Realities of European Defence Cooperation" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 38, pp. 7-23 Smith, J. (2005); "A missed opportunity? New Labour’s European policy 1997-2005" International Affairs vol. 81, pp. 703-781 Wallace, H. (1995); "Britain out on a Limb?" Political Quarterly vol. 66, pp. 46-58 Whitman, R. (2010); "The Calm after the Storm? Foreign and Security Policy from Blair to Brown" Parliamentary Affairs vol. 63, pp. 834-848
Workshop 5 - Europeanisation Introduction This workshop focuses on the changing dynamics of Britain’s relationship with the EU. Attention is specifically attached to the manner in which government policy has been affected by European affairs, detailing both the mechanisms of policy co-ordination and noting the extent to which policy developments at the European level have shaped this process. This emphasis on the changing nature of Britain’s relationship with the EU is equally explored in the remaining three chapters of section two of this book.
Many changes have occurred since Britain’s accession to the then European Community in 1973. Most notably, there has been a blurring in the distinction between what is considered domestic policy from what is regarded foreign policy. Whilst the narrowing in the distinction between these two fields is true for British foreign policy in general, it is especially pertinent for matters of a European nature. There are now surely only a few people in Britain who are not aware of the importance that the European Union has on domestic affairs, both in terms of their own personal life and in terms of the affairs of government. Thus, although we may think that domestic activities are distinct from international affairs, the fact of the matter is that external influences have a great deal of influence over domestic policy, whilst at the same time domestic pressures also significantly influence foreign policy objectives. The reality of this state of affairs was, for instance, clearly demonstrated by Britain’s exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. That domestic affairs and international affairs are no longer as distinct from each other as they once were is, of course, not a novel development . For much of the last 30 years the literature devoted to international relations has witnessed an expansion in the number of studies that have dealt with this topic, being referred to as interdependence and more lately globalization. Of the factors behind this development, the evolution of an international economy has been one of the most important.
The reality of interdependence is, of course, particularly evident in terms of Britain’s membership of the European Union, and is reflective of the broader changes in British foreign policy in the twentieth century. This was, of course, starkly demonstrated by the creation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1968 from the merger of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office (which had itself emerged out of the amalgamation over time of the Colonial Office, the India Office, the Dominions Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office). For Britain, EU membership is therefore reflective of its shift from being a major world power to being a regional actor with reduced state autonomy. What this means is that just as there has been a decline in the nation’s strength, and ergo its capacity to construct a more independent policy, there has at the same time been a growing web of connections with Europe that have to be taken into account when framing British policy. To be sure, prior to joining the Community in 1973 British governments had been constrained by the actions of foreign governments. Membership did, however, demonstrate the stark reality of this situation because ‘it made explicit what had previously been implicit’. Moreover, within the European setting, the further integration of European economies through the Single European Market (SEM) programme of the 1980s and early 1990s had a notable impact in deepening the connections among member states. With this in mind, this chapter examines the method by which Britain’s European policy is constructed and the mechanisms used for the conduction of that policy. It additionally explores the extent to which the Europeanisation of British government has undermined the British system of government and policy co-ordination. Discussion Questions
List of relevant sources for workshop 5
Bache, I. & Jordan, G. (eds.) (2008); The Europeanization of Whitehall (Palgrave) Blair, A. (2002); "Adapting to Europe" Journal of European Public Policy vol. 9, pp. 841-856 Börzel, T. (2002); "Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 40, pp. 193-214 Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2000); "When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change" European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, no. 15. Available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2012); "From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction" West European Politics vol. 35, pp. 1-19 Buller, J. (2006); "Contesting Europeanization" West European Politics vol. 29, pp. 289-309 Bulmer, S. & Burch, M. (1998); "Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and European Union" Public Administration vol. 76, pp. 601-628 Christoph, J. (1993); "The effects of Britons in Brussels" Governance vol. 6, pp. 518-537 Dyson, K. (2000); "Europeanization, Whitehall Culture and the Treasury as a Veto Player" Public Administration vol. 78, pp. 897-914 Holliday, I. (2000); "Is the British State Hollowing Out?" Political Quarterly vol. , pp. 167-176 Jeffrey, C. (2000); "Sub-National Mobilization and European Integration" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 38, pp. 1-23 Mitchell, J. (2000); "Devolution and the End of Britain?" Contemporary British History vol. 14, p. 76 Radaelli, C. (2000); "Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change" European Integration online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4 No. 8.Available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm. Rosamund, B. (2003); "The Europeanization of British Politics" in Dunleavy, P. et al (eds.); Developments in British Politics 7 (Palgrave) pp. 39-59. Williams, P. (2004); "Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?"International Affairs vol. 80, pp. 911-929
Workshop 6 - British Political Parties and the EU The attitudes of the different political parties in the United Kingdom to the European Union can be described as problematic. A key reason for this is that few parties would even claim to be unified on this subject. While there may be clear guidance as to the position of the party leadership, this is not necessarily followed by all members or representatives of the party. If anything, the European Union is one subject that cuts across party lines. It has resulted in what have been described as ‘unholy alliances’ across the British political parties - both in support of, and in opposition to, further developments in the Union. On top of this, as the European Union has developed, the major parties have changed their positions on it. In some cases, they have moved from opposition to membership to support of membership and vice versa. The same also applies to some of the minor parties as well. Yet, as dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties has risen, one party - UKIP - has developed a clear populist, anti-European Union platform that appears to have hit a cord with the public.
Discussion Questions 1. Why have the different political parties changed their positions on EU membership? 2. Why do the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties have a more positive outlook on the EU? 3. What are the links between English nationalism and Euroscepticism?
List of relevant sources for workshop 6
Bratberg, Ø. (2010); "Multi-level Parties in Process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their Home Parties" West European Politics vol. 33, pp. 851-869. Ford, R. et al (2012); "Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections" European Journal of Political Research vol. 51-2, pp. 204-234 Jensen, C. and Spoon, J. (2010); "Thinking locally, acting supranationally: Niche party behaviour in the European Parliament" European Journal of Political Research vol. 49, pp. 174-201 Johansson, K. and Raunio, T. (2005); "Regulating Europarties" Party Politics vol. 11, pp. 515-534 Jones, A. (1994); "Parties, ideologies and issues: the case of the European Community" in Robins, L.; Blackmore, H. and Pyper, R. (eds.); Britain’s Changing Party System (Leicester University Press) pp. 75-92
Workshop 7 - The British Media, Public Opinion and the EU
Introduction This workshop will focus on the relationship between the British media, public opinion and the European Union. In previous workshops, reference was been made on a number of occasions to the way in which the tabloid press of the UK has presented the EU. This workshop will examine this in greater detail, as well as how the European Union is reported in the broadsheet press, and in broadcast media. What becomes evident is the extent of the vitriol the majority of tabloid newspapers have for the EU. This is not replicated - at least not to the same degree - anywhere else. The new media - including social media such as twitter, and, more broadly, the internet - presents the full gamut of perspectives on the EU. Much of this is often personal diatribes for or against the EU with little or no supporting evidence. Caution must always be borne in mind when utilising such sources. For the most part, as we progress along the scale from broadcast media to print media to social media such as blogging, the extent to which there is peer review of what is being produced diminishes.
There are many reasons as to why Britain has been perceived to be ‘reluctant’ about participating fully and enthusiastically in the European Union. One reason has been public opinion. British public opinion on the issue of Europe has fluctuated from being relatively enthusiastic to outright hostility. The one time the British public was asked about EEC membership, however, a comfortable majority in favour was returned. Forty years on, there is greater demand than ever for another referendum. What is also interesting is many other countries within the European Union have also returned less than favourable opinion polls about membership - and some countries have even defeated referenda on European issues. Yet, for some reason, it is the British public that is portrayed as being reluctant and even opposed to EU membership. Having said this, what is also interesting is the British public appears to be among the least well informed of all EU citizens.
Discussion Questions
List of relevant sources for workshop 7
Boomgaarden, H. et al (2013); "Across time and space: Explaining variation in news coverage of the European Union" European Journal of Political Research vol. 52, pp. 608-629 Carey, S. and Burton, J. (2004); "Research Note: The Influence of the Press in Shaping Public Opinion towards the European Union in Britain" Political Studies vol. 52, pp. 623-640 Gamble, A. (2012); "Better Off Out? Britain and Europe" Political Quarterly vol. 83, p. 468-477. Gamble, A. (2012); "Better Off Out? Britain and Europe" Political Quarterly vol. 83, pp. 468-477. Greenwood, J. (2003); Interest Representation in the European Union (Palgrave) Greenwood, J. and Dreger, J. (2013); "The Transparency Register: A European vanguard of strong lobby regulation?" Interest Groups and Advocacy vol. 2, pp. 139-162 Hawkins B. (2012); "Nation, Separation and Threat: An Analysis of British Media Discourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 50, pp. 561-577 Jowell, R. and Hoinville, G. (eds.) (1976); Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC 1961-75 (Croom Helm) Maier, J. and Rittberger, B. (2008); "Shifting Europe's Boundaries: Mass Media, Public Opinion and the Enlargement of the EU" European Union Politics vol. 9, pp. 243-267. Pedler, R. (ed.) (2002); European Union lobbying: Changes in the arena (Palgrave) Rasmussen, A. et al (2014); "Representatives of the public? Public opinion and interest group activity" European Journal of Political Research vol. 53, pp. 250-268 Vannoni, M. (2013); "The determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU: A multi-dimensional proxy of corporate lobbying" Interest Groups and Advocacy vol. 2, pp. 71-90.
Workshop 8 - British Euroscepticism Introduction One of the most noticeable trends of the last twenty years of Britain’s relations with the European Union is the way in which Eurosceptic opinions have become a dominant them in British political life. In many ways this was publically marked on 1 November 1990 with The Sun newspaper’s headline of "Up Yours Delors" that was published on 1 November 1990. This brilliant and in many ways ludicrous piece of journalism conveyed a crucial and profound message about the eurosceptic tide that was engulfing British politics. In essence, the headline marked a turning point when issues of European integration became central to the electoral strategy of political parties. In Britain, a division within political parties as well as the electorate about European integration marked the years that followed.
For Margaret Thatcher, her unwillingness to chart a constructive European policy was one of the fundamental reasons for her downfall as Prime Minister. Her successor, John Major, at first attempted to offer a positive European foreign policy that positioned Britain at the ‘heart of Europe’. This, however, quickly became a hostage to fortune as Major’s period in office became dominated by political infighting, with the Prime Minister famously describing three of his Cabinet colleagues as ‘bastards’ in comments that were accidentally recorded after a television interview in July 1993.
The history of Britain’s difficult relationship with European integration prompted Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1998 to request a review of Britain’s overall approach to the EU. The outcome of this review was a ‘step change’ programme that emphasised the necessity for Britain to advance a more positive negotiating position on European issues. Having argued that Britain needed to play a full part in Europe in 1997, Prime Minister Tony Blair prevaricated on the possibility of Britain entering the euro, while Gordon Brown first as Chancellor and then as Prime Minister appeared to relish the opportunity to identify the weaknesses of the economic policies pursued by other European countries. The current Conservative-Liberal Democrat government has embraced rather than tackled this eurosceptic tide. It is a situation that has been influenced by the rise of eurosceptic parties, most notably UKIP, and the impact that these parties have had and continue to have on core Conservative political support. This, surprisingly, had little impact on Conservative electoral fortunes in 2015 - although that may be attributed to the failings of the Labour Party.
Discussion Questions
List of relevant sources for workshop 8
Aspinwall, M. (2003); "Britain and Europe" Political Quarterly vol. 42, pp. 145-167 Aspinwall, M. (2003); "Odd Man Out" Review of International Studies vol. 29, pp. 342-364 Baker, D. & Seawright, D. (1998); Britain For and Against Europe (Clarendon Press) Buller, J. (1995); "Britain as an Awkward Partner: Reassessing Britain’s Relations with the EU" Politics vol. 15, pp. 33-42 Daddow, O. (); "Euroscepticism and History Education in Britain" Government and Opposition vol. 41, pp. 64-85 Evans, G. (1998); "Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an Asset became a Liability" British Journal of Political Science vol. 28, pp. 573-590 Flood, C. (2009); "Dimensions of Euroscepticism" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 47, pp. 911-917 Forster, A. (2002); "Anti-Europeans, Anti-Marketeers and Eurosceptics: The Evolution and Influence of Labour and Conservative Opposition to Europe" Political Quarterly vol. 73, pp. 299-308 Gabel, M. & Hix, S. (2005); "Understanding British public support for Membership" Political Studies vol. 53, pp. 65-81 Gamble, A. (2003); Between Europe and America: the future of British Politics (Palgrave) Gamble, A. (2006) "The European Disunion" British Journal of Politics and International Relations vol. 8, pp. 34-49 George, S. (2000); "Britain: Anatomy of a Eurosceptic State" Journal of European Integration vol. 22, pp. 15-33 Gifford, C. (2006); "The rise of post-imperial populism: the case of right-wing Euroscepticism in Britain" European Journal of Political Research vol. 45, pp. 851-869 Heffernan, R. (2001); "Beyond Euro-scepticism" Political Quarterly vol. 72, pp. 180-189 Lord, C. (1992); "Sovereign or Confused?" Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 30, pp. 419-436 Mullen, A. & Burkitt, B. (2005); "Spinning Europe" Political Quarterly vol. 76, pp. 100-113 Smith, A. (2006); "’Set in the silver sea’: English National Identity and European integration" Nations and Nationalism vol. 12, pp. 433-452
Workshop 9 - Brexit or Bremain
Introduction The debate on membership of the EU is divided between the two camps: Brexit and Bremain. These are umbrella labels, under which a number of different organisations are campaigning. At this time, the date of the referendum - assuming it will go ahead - is unknown. Prime Minister Cameron gave a commitment of a referendum on the ‘renegotiated terms of entry’ to be held before the end of 2017. There is conjecture, however, that he would prefer to hold it in 2016 - before the Brexit campaign can be fully mobilised.
Politicians in the major political parties will be allowed to campaign as they see fit, after the completion of the negotiations. For some members of the Conservative Party, this will present them with a platform to mount a challenge for the party leadership (David Cameron has committed himself to not fighting the 2020 general election as party leader). Thus domestic politics look to be of greater importance than the referendum question.
Both campaigns are based upon conjecture: what will happen if Britain leaves/stays. Consequently, it is very difficult to prove or to refute so many of the arguments being presented. Even the ‘factually accurate’ data is contorted and misrepresented by both sides.
The outcome of the referendum will be decided by arguably the least well informed voting population in the EU.
Discussion Questions
List of relevant sources for workshop 9
Adler-Nissen, R. (2014); Opting Out of the European Union (Cambridge University Press) Baimbridge, M. et al (2011); Britain in a Global World (Andrews UK) Baker, D. (2001); "Britain and Europe: The Argument Continues" Parliamentary Affairs vol. 54, pp. 276-288 Besslich, N. et al (2013) "Better Off Out?" Available at www.europawissenschaften-berlin.de/media/pdf/MA/Besslich_vfinal.pdf?1381412326 Campos, N. & Coricelli, F. (2015); "Why did Britain join the EU?" Available at http://www.voxeu.org/article/britain-s-eu-membership-new-insight-economic-history Charter, D. (2012); Au Revoir Europe: What if Britain left the EU? (Biteback Publishing Liddle, R. (2014); The Europe Dilemma: Britain and the Challenges of EU Integration (I. B. Taurus) MacShane, D. (2015); Brexit: How Britain Will Leave Europe (I. B. Taurus) Minford, P. et al (2015); Should Britain Leave the EU? (Edward Elgar, 2nd edition) Springford, J. (2013); "Is immigration a reason for Britain to leave the EU?" Available at cer-live.thomas-paterson.co.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2013/pb_imm_uk_27sept13-7892.pdf
Workshop 10 - A Europe without the UK?
Introduction This final workshop provides an opportunity to consider the implications for the European Union without Britain as a member.
The history of Britain’s engagement with the process of European integration is one that has been overshadowed by a reluctance to commit to Europe. Whereas other member states, particularly the original Six member states of the Community, considered their future was intrinsically linked to the development of the Community, this was not the case for Britain. By contrast, British foreign policy was directed towards America and the Commonwealth, and it was only when Britain’s economic progress was in danger of being harmed by staying out of the Community that membership was considered to be of importance. From the outset it was therefore evident that Britain had a different approach to European integration from the other European member states.
There is a belief in parts of Britain, especially in Eurosceptic quarters, that Britain can revert back to those old trading partnerships of Commonwealth and America, and supplement these with the BRIC countries and other developing countries.
What is not considered in all of this is the impact upon the remaining EU member states. How will the EU manage without Britain as that ‘reluctant’ member? That reluctance was often a brake on the integration process - for better or for worse.
There are trade issues to be considered. While around 75% of UK trade was with the EU, how will the relationship function with Britain outside the EU? How much of an impact will Community preference have upon the relationship?
There are also budgetary issues to be resolved. The UK was a significant contributor to the EU budget, despite the cheque Britannique. How much funding will be lost to the less well developed parts of the EU?
All of this debate is based upon conjecture. Yet, while the focus has been on the consequences for Britain in leaving the EU, the consequences for the EU have been neglected.
Discussion Questions 1. To what extent, if at all, will EU members ‘notice’ a lack of British membership? 2. Will British withdrawal lead to the collapse of the EU? 3. Will Britain be able to re-apply for membership at some time in the future?
Debate Details
There are two debating sessions. For each of these, the class will be divided in an arbitrary manner. The aim is to get students working in groups to present a case on a particular topic. The students will not know which side of the argument they will be defending.
There will be one debate each week.
Debate 1 - Should Britain have joined the then-EEC?
Debate 2 - Is there a future for Britain in the EU?
Assessment: a 500-word reflection on the module: this could include student expectations, what they got out of the module, how it might impact upon their other studies and any career prospects. It will be a straight pass/fail assignment. Poslední úprava: Kubátová Hana, doc., M.A., Ph.D. (10.02.2016)
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