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Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Papariga (21.01.2022)
The goal of this course is to examine the role of institutions and political economy in economic development. |
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Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Papariga (21.01.2022)
We will overview some theoretical contributions to the literature. However, the main focus of the course is on empirical evidence. Specifically, an accent will be made on empirical methods and applying them in your research. The toolbox of causal inference methods will broadly follow “Causal Inference: The Mixtape” by Scott Cunningham (available online and free). We will also rely on some more recent methodological contributions. The course will be helpful for all students whose field of concentration is within applied economics. |
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Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Papariga (21.01.2022)
1. Motivation for Studying Political Economy and Development Economics. Course Overview. Perfect Experiment and Rubin Causal Model. Methods and Concepts: Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT), Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
Chapters 2-4 of The Mixtape by Scott Cunnigham Page, Lucy, and Rohini Pande. "Ending global poverty: Why money isn't enough." Journal of Economic Perspectives 32.4 (2018): 173-200. Financial Times Review of “The Narrow Corridor” Enikolopov, Ruben, et al. "Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110.2 (2013): 448-452.
2. Long-run Effects of Institutions. Local and Macro development. Persistence on the Local Level. Methods and Concepts: Regression Discontinuity Design and Instrumental Variables.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation." American economic review 91.5 (2001): 1369-1401. Chapters 6 and 7 of The Mixtape by Scott Cunnigham Dell, Melissa. "The persistent effects of Peru's mining mita." Econometrica 78.6 (2010): 1863-1903. Mendez-Chacon and Van Patten (2021)
3. Leaders and Politicians. Methods and Concepts: Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, Difference in Differences
3a. Clientelism, Patronage, and Programmatic Politics. Shefter, Martin. 1977. “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy.” Politics and Society, 7: 403-451 Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2000. “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective.” Quarterly Journal of Economics Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico. 2004. “Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government with an Application to Britains Age of Reform”, Quarterly Journal of Economics Chapters 8 and 9 of The Mixtape by Scott Cunnigham 3b. Political Agency and Incentives in the Public Sector Besley, Timothy. 2006. Chapter 2: “The Anatomy of Government Failure,” from Principled Agents: The Political Economy of Good Government. Pande, Rohini and Benjamin A. Olken. 2013. “Governance Review Paper.” Jameel Poverty Action Lab Governance Initiative working paper, pp: 4 – 36. Dixit, Avinash. 2002, “Incentives and Organisations in the Public Sector,” Journal of Human Resources, 37 (4): 696-727. 3c. Selecting Politicians Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2): 703-745. Besley, Timothy. 2006. Chapter 3: “Political Agency and Accountability,” from Principled Agents: The Political Economy of Good Government. Dal Bo, Ernesto, Frederico, Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne, 2017. “Who Becomes a Politician?” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 132 (4). Pp. 1877-1914. 3d. Motivating and Constraining Politicians Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2011. “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audit Reports of Local Governments.” American Economic Review, 101: 1274-1311. Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2011. “Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance.” NBER Working Paper No. 14906. REPLACE BY RICARDO PIQUE? 3e. Politicians and Service Delivery; Gender and Minority Quotas and Policies Fujiwara, Thomas. 2015. “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil.” Econometrica, 83(2): 423-464 Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Padró-i-Miquel, Gerard, Yang Yao, and Nancy Qian. 2015. “Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountabilty? Evidence from Rural China.” NBER Working Paper No. 16948 Pande, Rohini. 2003. “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India.” American Economic Review, 93(4): 1132-1151 Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India.” Econometrica, 72: 1409–1443. Beaman, Lori, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova. “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?” 2009. Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 123, Issue 4, pp. 1497-1540. Besley, Timothy, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne. “Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden.”, American Economic Review, 2017. Vol. 107 (8). pp. 2204-42 4. Bureaucrats and Bureaucracies: 4a. Bureaucrats, and Service Delivery Wilson, James Q. “Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.” Chapters 1 and 2 from Bureaucracy by James, Q. Wilson, Basic Books . 1989. John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. 2006. “Politics, Delegation and Bureaucracy,” in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford University Press). Bloom, Nicholas, Carol Propper, Stephan Seiler and John Van Reenen . 2015. “The Impact of Competition on Management Practices in Public Hospitals,” Review of Economic Studies 0, 1-33. Gulzar, Saad and Ben Pasquale. 2016. “Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 111 (1)
4b. Selecting Bureaucrats Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martín A. Rossi. 2013. “Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(3): 1169-1218. Weaver, Jeffrey. "Jobs for Sale: Corruption and Misallocation in Hiring." American Economic Review, forthcoming. Leaver, Clare, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin "Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools." American Economic Review forthcoming. 4c. Motivating Bureaucrats Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. "Tax farming redux: Experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131.1 (2016): 219-271. Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. "Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings." American Economic Review 109.1 (2019): 237-70. Spenkuch, Jorg L., Edoardo Teso, and Guo Xu. “Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations”. No. w28673. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021. Edward P. Lazear and Michael Gibbs. 2009. Chapter 9 in Personnel Economics in Practice, John Wiley & Sons Inc. 4d. The Structure of Bureaucracy and Service Delivery Quality Rasul, Imran, and Daniel Rogger. "Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: Evidence from the nigerian civil service." The Economic Journal 128.608 (2018): 413-446 Callen, Michael, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, Muhammad Yasir Khan. 2015. “The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan.” Xu, Guo. "The costs of patronage: Evidence from the british empire." American Economic Review 108.11 (2018): 3170-98. 5. Evidence on Governance Reforms: 5a. Fair Elections, Informed Voters Callen, Michael, and James D. Long. 2015. “Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan.” American Economic Review, 105(1): 354-81. Bidwell, Kelly, Katherine Casey, and Rachel Glennerster. "Debates: Voting and expenditure responses to political communication." Journal of Political Economy 128.8 (2020): 2880-2924. Muralidharan, Karthik, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar. 2016. “Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India.” American Economic Review, 106(10): 2895-2929. 5b. Decentralization, Community Driven Development, and Get Out the Vote. Duflo, Esther and Abhijit Banerjee “Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action” Annual Review of Economics Vol. 6. Pp. 951-971 Duflo, Esther. 2017. “The Economist as Plumber.” Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Clement Imbert, Santosh Mathew, and Rohini Pande. 2014. “Can E-Governance Reduce Capture of Public Programs? Experimental Evidence from a Financial Reform of India’s Employment Guarantee.” Harvard University mimeo. Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster and Edward Miguel. 2012. “Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Pre-Analysis Plan” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4): 1755-1812. Björkman, Martina and Jakob Svensson. 2009. “Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(2): 735 – 769. Pons, Vincent. "Will a five-minute discussion change your mind? A countrywide experiment on voter choice in France." American Economic Review 108.6 (2018): 1322-63.
6. Conflict: International Conflicts and Civil Wars World Bank. 2011. World Development Report, Chapter 1: “Repeated Violence Threatens Development.” Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel. 2010. “Civil War.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 48(1): 3 – 57. Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War” International Organization. Vol. 49 (3): 379-414. Caselli, F., M. Morelli, and D. Rohner (2015). The Geography of Interstate Resource Wars. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(1), 267–315. 6a. Causes of Conflict, Methods: more on Difference in Differences Dube, Oeindrilla and Juan Vargas. 2013. “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia.” Review of Economic Studies, 80: 1384-1421. Nunn, Nathan, and Nancy Qian. "US food aid and civil conflict." American Economic Review 104.6 (2014): 1630-66.
6b. Dealing with Costs of Conflict, Methods: Synthetic Controls Abadie, Alberto, and Javier Gardeazabal. "The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country." American economic review 93.1 (2003): 113-132. Chapters 10 of The Mixtape by Scott Cunnigham Dell, Melissa, and Pablo Querubin. "Nation building through foreign intervention: Evidence from discontinuities in military strategies." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133.2 (2018): 701-764. Blattman, Christopher, Julian C. Jamison, and Margaret Sheridan. "Reducing crime and violence: Experimental evidence from cognitive behavioral therapy in Liberia." American Economic Review 107.4 (2017): 1165-1206.
7. Corruption: Efficient or Inefficient? Monitoring Corruption. Costs of Corruption Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1993). Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3), 599– 617. Di Tella, R. and E. Schargrodsky (2003). The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires. Journal of Law and Economics 46(1), 269–292. Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson (2004). Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2), 679–705. Bandiera, O., A. Prat, and T. Valletti (2009). Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment. American Economic Review 99(4), 1278-1308. Oliva, P. (2015). Environmental Regulations and Corruption: Automobile Emissions in Mexico City. Journal of Political Economy 123(3), 686–724. Bertrand, M., S. Djankov, R. Hanna, and S. Mullainathan (2007). Obtaining a Driver’s License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4), 1639–1676. Olken, B. A. (2007). Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy 115(2), 200–249. Olken, B. A. and P. Barron (2009). The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh. Journal of Political Economy 117(3), 417–452. Olken, B. A. and R. Pande (2012). Corruption in Developing Countries. Annu. Rev. Econ. 4(1), 479–509 Colonnelli, Emanuele, and Mounu Prem. "Corruption and firms." Available at SSRN 2931602 (2020), forthcoming at the Review of Economic Studies
8. Media: Information, Persuasion, Coordination. Media Bias. Government Control Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2): 703-745. Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2002). The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1415–1451. Snyder Jr, J. M. and D. Strömberg (2010). Press Coverage and Political Accountability. Journal of Political Economy 118(2), 355–408. DellaVigna, S. and E. Kaplan (2007). The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3), 1187–1234. Enikolopov, R., M. Petrova, and E. Zhuravskaya (2011). Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia. American Economic Review 101(7), 3253–85 Enikolopov, Ruben, Alexey Makarin, and Maria Petrova. "Social media and protest participation: Evidence from Russia." Econometrica 88.4 (2020): 1479-1514 Gentzkow, M. and J. M. Shapiro (2010). What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from US Daily Newspapers. Econometrica 78(1), 35–71. Rao, Justin, and Andrey Simonov. "Demand for Online News under Government Control: Evidence from Russia." (2021), forthcoming at the Journal of Political Economy |
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Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Papariga (21.01.2022)
Class participation & a presentation: you will find the list of readings in the next section. You can choose readings from a separate sub-list for a class presentation. Each person will need to present once, the presenter will need to write an executive summary of a paper, no more than four pages, and everyone else should read it before the class. Both the summary and the presentation should explain what the paper's contribution to the literature is, the primary empirical method used, and the main findings. The presenter should be presenting the paper as his/her research, arguing that the question is important, and the empirical analysis is robust and sufficient. I will ask everyone else to prepare two-slides discussions with criticism of the paper and suggestions for improvement. I will randomly select a student for a brief discussion after the main presentation.
Final paper: you will need to develop three research ideas on political economy and development topics. These ideas should have the potential to be converted into a paper. An initial proposal should have three original research questions. You will need to motivate their importance, suggest how you would answer them, and develop the methods to carefully do it (what is the identification strategy?). Each idea should be no more than one page. You will need to develop one of the ideas into a more extended final project, with data work highly recommended to be done by the beginning of the Spring semester. |
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Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Papariga (21.01.2022)
1. Motivation for Studying Political Economy and Development Economics. Course Overview. Perfect Experiment and Rubin Causal Model. Methods and Concepts: Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT), Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) 2. Long-run Effects of Institutions. Local and Macro development. Persistence on the Local Level. Methods and Concepts: Regression Discontinuity Design and Instrumental Variables. 3. Leaders and Politicians. Methods and Concepts: Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, Difference in Differences 3a. Clientelism, Patronage, and Programmatic Politics. 3b. Political Agency and Incentives in the Public Sector 3c. Selecting Politicians 3d. Motivating and Constraining Politicians 3e. Politicians and Service Delivery; Gender and Minority Quotas and Policies 4. Bureaucrats and Bureaucracies: 4a. Bureaucrats, and Service Delivery 4b. Selecting Bureaucrats 4c. Motivating Bureaucrats 4d. The Structure of Bureaucracy and Service Delivery Quality 5. Evidence on Governance Reforms: 5a. Fair Elections, Informed Voters 5b. Decentralization, Community Driven Development, and Get Out the Vote. 6. Conflict: International Conflicts and Civil Wars 6a. Causes of Conflict, Methods: more on Difference in Differences 6b. Dealing with Costs of Conflict, Methods: Synthetic Controls 7. Corruption: Efficient or Inefficient? Monitoring Corruption. Costs of Corruption 8. Media: Information, Persuasion, Coordination. Media Bias. Government Control
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