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Předmět, akademický rok 2025/2026
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Medieval Theories of Intentionality - AFSV00454
Anglický název: Medieval Theories of Intentionality
Zajišťuje: Ústav filosofie a religionistiky (21-UFAR)
Fakulta: Filozofická fakulta
Platnost: od 2025
Semestr: letní
Body: 0
E-Kredity: 5
Způsob provedení zkoušky: letní s.:
Rozsah, examinace: letní s.:2/0, Zk [HT]
Počet míst: neomezen / neurčen (50)
Minimální obsazenost: neomezen
4EU+: ne
Virtuální mobilita / počet míst pro virtuální mobilitu: ne
Kompetence:  
Stav předmětu: vyučován
Jazyk výuky: angličtina
Způsob výuky: prezenční
Úroveň:  
Další informace: https://dl1.cuni.cz/course/view.php?id=18844
Garant: Elena Baltuta, Dr.
Vyučující: Elena Baltuta, Dr.
Třída: Exchange - 08.1 Philosophy
Exchange - 08.9 Others-Humanities
Anotace
Our mental states are generally, if not each and every time, directed at something. That is, they have an object. We think about books, persons, and numbers, remember past experiences, feel longing for places and smells, and even imagine things that do not exist, such as unicorns. Philosophers have traditionally called this directedness of the mind intentionality. Nevertheless, the way intentionality was, and still is, understood is by no means free from controversy. What makes our mental states intentional? Are there exceptions to this description of them? Is intentionality encountered beyond our mental states? These questions provide the framework for analysing and clarifying key concepts, drawing distinctions, and weighing arguments.
In contemporary philosophy, the discussion of intentionality is often traced back to Franz Brentano, who claimed to have recovered the notion of so-called intentional “inexistence” from medieval Scholastic thinkers. But did medieval philosophers actually understand intentionality in the way we understand it today? What did they understand by concepts such as intentio or esse intentionale? To what extent do modern presuppositions shape, and possibly distort, the understanding we reach today of medieval conceptions of intentionality? To address these questions, we will explore several medieval approaches to intentionality in the work of thinkers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, as well as lesser-known figures such as Robert Kilwardby and John Pecham. We will examine whether intentionality belongs only to intellectual acts, whether perception too is intentional, or whether non-human or non-mental processes can exhibit genuine directedness. We will also ask whether intentionality requires something like mental content, or whether such a framework already distorts what is at stake.
Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
Cíl předmětu

The aim of this course is threefold: (1) to train students to engage carefully with primary texts from the medieval period, (2) to challenge standard narratives in the history of philosophy through close historical and conceptual analysis, and (3) to develop the ability to formulate and defend philosophical arguments.

Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
Podmínky zakončení předmětu

Attendance 25%, and the written exam 75%.

Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
Literatura

  1. Aristotle. De Anima II.12 and III.4. Translated by Christopher Shields. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016.
  2. Shields, Christopher. “Commentary on De Anima II.12 and III.4.” In De Anima, translated by Christopher Shields. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016.
  3. Caston, Victor. “Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality.” In Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, edited by Dominik Perler, 23 to 48. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
  4. Augustine. On the Trinity, Book IX, chapters 6 to 10. Edited by Gareth B. Mathews, translated by Stephen McKenna. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
  5. Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae, I, questions 78 to 79 and question 85, articles 1 to 2. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 2nd revised ed. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1920.
  6. Aquinas, Thomas. De Veritate, question 10, articles 4 and 7. Translated by James V. McGlynn, S.J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953.
  7. Perler, Dominik. “Things in the Mind: Fourteenth Century Controversies over Intelligible Species.” Vivarium 34 (1996): 231 to 253.
  8. Kilwardby, Robert. On Imagination, pages 56, 63, and 103. Translated by Alexander Broadie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
  9. Silva, José Filipe, and Juhana Toivanen. “The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi.” Vivarium 48 (2010): 245 to 278.
  10. Pecham, John. Tractatus de anima, I.4. Edited by G. Melani. Rome, 1948.
  11. Silva, José Filipe. “John Pecham’s Theory of Natural Cognition: Perception.” In Early Thirteenth Century English Franciscan Thought, edited by Lydia Schumacher, 283 to 310. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021.

Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
Metody výuky

The course combines close reading of primary and secondary texts with philosophical discussion.

Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
Požadavky ke zkoušce

There will be a hybrid examination format: 25% attendance and active participation during class, and 75% an in-class written exam. Students are encouraged to bring one A4 page of handwritten notes on the course material, which they may consult during the written exam.

Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
Vstupní požadavky

No prior background in philosophy, medieval or contemporary, is required. Students should, however, be willing to struggle with demanding philosophical ideas.

Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
Požadavky k zápisu

No requirements

Poslední úprava: Baltuta Elena, Dr. (29.01.2026)
 
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