Germany's commitment to CSDP operations: comparing the cases of the DRC and Libya

• Název práce v češtině: Angažovanost Německa v operacích SBOP: srovnání misí v Demokratické republice Kongo a Libyi
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Germany's commitment to CSDP operations: comparing the cases of the DRC and Libya
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Germany, strategic culture, EUFOR RD Congo, Libya, military deployment abroad, political decision-making, process tracing, foreign and security policy
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2017/2018
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra bezpečnostních studií (23-KBS)
• Vedoucí / školitel: PhDr. JUDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 06.06.2018
• Datum zadání: 06.06.2018
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 20.06.2019 00:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: Jinonice
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 10.05.2019
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 20.06.2019
• Oponenti: PhDr. Jan Beneš, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

Berger, Thomas U. “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan.” In The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein.

Bloomfield, Alan. “Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate.” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 3 (2012): 437–61. doi:10.1080/13523260.2012.727679.

Brockmeier, Sarah. “Germany and the Intervention in Libya.” Survival 55, no. 6 (2013): 63–90.

Brummer, Klaus. “The Reluctant Peacekeeper: Governmental Politics and Germany’s Participation in EUFOR RD Congo.” Foreign Policy Analysis 9, no. 1 (2013): 1–20. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00174.x.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. “The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes.” Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 339–59. doi:10.1177/0967010605057020.

Duffield, John S. World power forsaken: political culture, international institutions, and German security policy after unification. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Glenn, John. “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?” International Studies Review 11, no. 3 (2009): 523–51. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00872.x.

Koenig, Nicole. “The EU and the Libyan Crisis – In Quest of Coherence?” The International Spectator 46, no. 4 (2011): 11–30.

Lantis, Jeffrey. “The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo.” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 1 (2002): 21–46. doi:10.1080/014959302317350864.

Longhurst, Kerry A. Germany and the use of force. Issues in German politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=144558.

Miskimmon, Alister. “German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis.” German Politics 21, no. 4 (2012): 392–410.

Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer. “All the way? The evolution of German military power.” International Affairs 84, no. 2 (2008): 211–21.

Peifer, Douglas. “Why Germany Won’t Be Dropping Bombs on Syria, Iraq or Mali.” Orbis 60, no. 2 (2016): 266–78. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2016.02.008.

Rinke, Andreas. “Eingreifen oder nicht? Warum sich die Bundesregierung in der Libyen-Frage enthielt.” Internationale Politik, no. 4 (2011): 44–52. https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2011/juli-august/eingreifen-oder-nicht.

Schmitt, Olivier. “Strategic Users of Culture: German Decisions for Military Action.” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 (2012): 59–81. doi:10.1080/13523260.2012.659586.

Tull, Denis M. “EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model.” The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations. SWP Research Paper 2009/RP 14, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) - German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany, December 2009.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

This thesis analyses Germany’s commitment to multilateral military operations. Following the research question why Germany participates in some multilateral military operations but not in others, Germany’s respective decision-making process regarding troop deployment in the DR Congo in 2006 on one hand and military non-engagement in Libya 2011 on the other hand is traced. By contrasting the concept of strategic culture with a purely rational assessment of the factors of alliance politics, risk-analysis and military feasibility of the operations, the decisiveness of taking into account Germany’s strategic culture to explain deployment decisions is stressed. Neither is there a lack of external pressure for German military participation in the case of Libya, nor is the military operation in the DR Congo decisively less risky or militarily more feasible. Rather, Germany’s multilateral and anti-militaristic strategic cultural strands affect its decision-making. Next to demanding a thorough justification and legitimization of any military engagement, two red lines for military deployment can be identified. First, Germany refuses to act unilaterally and displays a high reluctance towards military engagement outside the multilateral framework of the UN, NATO or EU. Secondly, Germany rejects to engage in active combat, being particularly reluctant towards the aggressive use of military force.