Hledání zpravodajství z lidských zdrojů: Měnící se role HUMINT v rámci americké zpravodajské komunity po 9/11
| Název práce v češtině: | Hledání zpravodajství z lidských zdrojů: Měnící se role HUMINT v rámci americké zpravodajské komunity po 9/11 |
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| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Hledání zpravodajství z lidských zdrojů: Měnící se role HUMINT v rámci americké zpravodajské komunity po 9/11 |
| Klíčová slova: | CIA, DIA, HUMINT, Spojené státy americké, reforma, terorismus, zpravodajství |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | CIA, DIA, HUMINT, intelligence, reform, terrorism, United States of America |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2012/2013 |
| Typ práce: | diplomová práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Katedra mezinárodních vztahů (23-KMV) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | prof. Mgr. Oldřich Bureš, Ph.D., M.A. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 18.06.2013 |
| Datum zadání: | 18.06.2013 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 24.06.2014 00:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | IPS FSV UK, U kříže 8/661 158 00 Praha 5 – Jinonice |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 12.05.2014 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 24.06.2014 |
| Oponenti: | Mgr. Nikola Schmidt, Ph.D. |
| Kontrola URKUND: | |
| Zásady pro vypracování |
| Topic: Role of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) within the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) after September 11 attacks.
Motivation for research: The failure to prevent September 11 attacks has been, besides lack of coordination between US intelligence subjects, continuously attributed to lack of sufficient HUMINT collection capabilities within the USIC. Since many experts argue that “countering terrorism – recruiting sources, uncovering plots, and understanding how terrorist organizations develop and grow – is chiefly a HUMINT task,” and since counter-terrorism has been a prominent US national security agenda in the past decade, HUMINT undoubtedly deserves a further attention. Research question: Which factors were most critical in constraining post 9/11 US intelligence community reform in terms of its willingness and ability to gather clandestine Human Intelligence and why? Case selection: The proposed thesis should mainly focus on clandestine HUMINT (i.e. human intelligence collected abroad). Since the two main actors within the USIC responsible for HUMINT gathering are CIA and DIA, they will the primary objects of our analysis. Although the importance of domestic counter-terrorism efforts as represented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is undisputable, the characteristics of HUMINT collection domestically and abroad vary significantly. For this reason, the FBI’s transformation in the HUMINT area will only be discussed briefly. Hypothesis: While the post-9/11 situation favored significant improvement of USIC‘ HUMINT collection capabilities, implementation of concrete changes has remained limited. At the institutional level, formation of dedicated HUMINT departments within both CIA and DIA (National Clandestine Service and Defense Clandestine Service respectively) further anchored position of HUMINT within the USIC as a crucial intelligence gathering method. Transformation of USIC‘ targets from nation states to mainly sub-state actors such as terrorist groups and insurgencies also favored larger HUMINT implementation. Within the Department of Defense (DoD) domain in particular, calls for larger HUMINT implementation have been heeded, resulting in diffusion of tactical/operational HUMINT collection among front-line military personnel (as evidenced by e.g. hastened release of Army Field Manual 2 22.3). However, the dependency of USIC‘ on technological means of intelligence gathering rendered some of the aforementioned improvements insignificant. This is especially holds true for the CIA, which’s preoccupation with covert operations done esp. via drone strikes against foreign targets brought the Agency away from strategic intelligence collection to the realm of paramilitary action. Finally, the USIC has remained in desperate need of case officers with esp. suitable linguistic skills. Given that the United States certainly offer a vast pool of potential candidates with such abilities, the problem is most likely to be in the stringent security clearance procedures and pre-screening which favors candidates from certain demographical groups. Theory of “intelligence system”: The intelligence systems theory was built by Michael Werner as a result of several debates on how should research be conducted in an emerging academic field of “intelligence studies”. Werner’s underlying intention was to create a set of variables usable for comparative research of intelligence among several sovereignties, meaning both state and non-state actors, along the sidelines of traditional Mill’s methods. The main assumption is that intelligence can be researched comparatively with “intelligence systems” being the dependent variable. Intelligence systems, in Werner’s understanding, stand for “how intelligence is organized, treated and exercised.” In the example of United States, intelligence system is represented by the US intelligence community (USIC), its structure, agencies, budget, targets, leadership, management, technological prowess etc. Methodology: Since we aim to understand overall effect of changes in USIC' stance on HUMINT between the situation immediately before September 11 terrorist attacks and current situation, a longitudinal comparison of set of variables in respected time points comes in mind. Given that expected causal relations between variables are too complex to simply employ e.g. Mill's methods, thorough analysis of all relations between all variables shall be employed. Data sources: A natural obstacle in researching contemporary intelligence efforts lies in scarcity of sources or rather their classified nature. However, it has often been suggested that American intelligence agencies are remarkably open to discuss their politics, failures and even tradecraft. Intelligence failures in particular are helpful in shedding light on US’ HUMINT efforts both before and after September 11 attacks. Several reports including 9/11 Commission report thoroughly analyzed USIC’ lack of HUMINT collection abilities, a trend which was further reinforced by a number of policy papers including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in the first decade of 21st century. Specific points in relation to US’ HUMINT were also frequently discussed during declassified meetings of U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Military intelligence tradecraft can be partially understood through several field manuals, esp. FM 2-22.3 (Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 2006). Finally, despite risks of depending on such, firsthand accounts of intelligence operation together with rigorous journalist and scholarly works often present a valuable insight into contemporary conduct of HUMINT, especially when reviewed by field professionals (as often done by e.g. CIA’s Studies in Intelligence Journal). Although presented combination of resources certainly doesn’t represent a complete picture of current U.S. intelligence HUMINT efforts, we believe that if properly analyzed, it can yield a thorough understanding of post-9/11 trends and pitfalls of US’ Human Intelligence. Variables: Given that the intelligence systems theory currently represents the sole example of variable based model used specifically for intelligence studies, it will serve as a basis for our methodology, albeit heavily modified. First, several aspects of the US intelligence system shall be employed as our independent variables – their selection being based upon their close relation to HUMINT and their unclassified nature (e.g. while we may observe institutional changes within the US intelligence community after 9/11 attacks, budgetary allocations are still classified ). Furthermore, certain independent variables such as USIC’ dependency on technological methods of gathering intelligence or certain downfalls in terms of USIC’ human resources have repeatedly been discussed by both scholars and intelligence professionals (see bibliography). Selected independent variables are therefore as follows: Institutional anchoring of HUMINT, Nature of targets, Technological prowess of intelligence system, Availability of human resources within the intelligence system. The dependent variables can be understood as “USIC’ willingness to conduct clandestine HUMINT operations” and “USIC’ ability to conduct clandestine HUMINT operations”. While such concepts might seem rather vague, they are measurable by thorough analysis of US government policy papers, commission reports, declassified Senate hearings, official announcements, as well as ongoing scholarly debate on this topic. Although e.g. exact number of successful US HUMINT operations between 2001 and 2013 might provide much more precise measurement of success of US intelligence reform within the area of HUMINT, such figures will only be declassified in 50 to 100 years (if ever.) Conceptualization and operationalization: Independent variables (qualitative values): Although the operationalization of independent variables shall be done rather qualitatively, we can assign ordinal values, i.e. how favorable certain factors within the USIC were/are for its willingness/ability to conduct HUMINT. Presented operationalization therefore follows a key: 1 – not favorable for HUMINT; 4 – very favorable for HUMINT. 1) Institutional anchoring of HUMINT – to what extent is HUMINT institutionally anchored within the USIC. Values: 1 – no institutional representation; 2 – specialized HUMINT department within a single agency; 3 – specialized HUMINT departments within multiple agencies; 4 – agency dedicated solely to HUMINT collection 2) Nature of targets: Importance of HUMINT as an intelligence gathering method in relation to specific target. Gathering intelligence on state-level actors can be done via several means including variety of technological methods (SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT etc.). However, HUMINT becomes increasingly important when targets such as terrorist networks, insurgencies etc. communicate and coordinate their efforts through personal contact, tribal structures, i.e. often omitting other interceptable means of communication. Values: 1 – culturally related and technologically advanced superpowers 2 – nation states with solid, albeit distinctive, characteristics 3 – non-homogenous tribal societies 4 – decentralized transnational networks, ideologically inspired individuals 3) Technological prowess of intelligence system: extent of technical intelligence (TECHINT) gathering possibilities and intelligence system’s dependency on them. USIC is known for its vast collection of technological means to conduct both intelligence gathering and covert action abroad. Increased dependency on such measures may however decrease intelligence system’s ability to fully utilitize its potential HUMINT capabilities. Values: 1 – capability to conduct covert action solely via technical means (e.g. drones) 2 – orbital IMINT (satellite surveillance), large scale cyber espionage 3 – expanded SIGINT, MASINT and aerial IMINT capabilities 4 – limited TECHINT, dependent on HUMINT networks 4) Availability of human resources within the intelligence system: Willingness to employ people with necessary language skills, ethnic and cultural background as case officers. United States of America, being a nation made of immigrants, is pooling vast amounts of linguistically and culturally adept candidates for clandestine HUMINT tasks. However, USIC’ access to these assets might by constrained by strict e.g. security clearance procedures, which often favor members of specific group. Values: 1 – lack of suitable case officers and/or recruitment based on values such as religion, race, cadre etc. 2 – strong presence of recruitment constrains and lack of effective measures to overcome this issue 3 – while certain institutional and cultural constrains to recruitment are present, agency aims to overcome them with e.g. educational programs 4 – no unnecessary constrains to recruitment, intelligence system maintains human resources necessary for specific environments; Dependent variables (nominal values): 1) USIC’ willingness to conduct clandestine HUMINT operations 2) USIC’ ability to conduct clandestine HUMINT operations Hypothesis: While the post-9/11 situation favored significant improvement of USIC‘ HUMINT collection capabilities, implementation of concrete changes has remained limited. At the institutional level, formation of dedicated HUMINT departments within both CIA and DIA (National Clandestine Service and Defense Clandestine Service respectively) further anchored position of HUMINT within the USIC as a crucial intelligence gathering method. Transformation of USIC‘ targets from nation states to mainly sub-state actors such as terrorist groups and insurgencies also favored larger HUMINT implementation. Within the Department of Defense (DoD) domain in particular, calls for larger HUMINT implementation have been heeded, resulting in diffusion of tactical/operational HUMINT collection among front-line military personnel (as evidenced by e.g. hastened release of Army Field Manual 2 22.3). However, the dependency of USIC‘ on technological means of intelligence gathering rendered some of the aforementioned improvements insignificant. This is especially holds true for the CIA, which’s preoccupation with covert operations done esp. via drone strikes against foreign targets brought the Agency away from strategic intelligence collection to the realm of paramilitary action. Finally, the USIC has remained in desperate need of case officers with esp. suitable linguistic skills. Given that the United States certainly offer a vast pool of potential candidates with such abilities, the problem is most likely to be in the stringent security clearance procedures and pre-screening which favors candidates from certain demographical groups. |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| Literature (selection):
(a) Primary sources: US Legal Acts Homeland Security Act. Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002. Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2012. Public Law 112–87, Jan. 3, 2012. Among other IAAFYs available at: http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/laws.html Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Public Law 108-458, December 17, 2004. Available at: http://www.house.gov/legcoun/Comps/Intelligence%20Reform%20And%20Terrorism%20Prevention%20Act%20Of%202004.pdf National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. Public Law 109–163. Jan. 6, 2006, Available at: http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/PL109-163.pdf USA Patriot Act. Public Law 107-56, October 26, 2001. Available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf Official Reports Cumming, Alfred, Masse, Todd. 2004. FBI Intelligence Reform since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32336.pdf National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Available at: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 2002. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Joint Inquiry Final Report). Available at: http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/1071086v2.pdf Senate Hearings U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Additional Prehearing Questions for Mr. John O. Brennan upon his nomination to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Available at: http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/prehearing.pdf U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. OPEN HEARING ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN O. BRENNAN TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. February 7. 2013, Available at: http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/transcript.pdf Army manuals Department of the Army. FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation, September 28, 1992, Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf Department of the Army. FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations, September 2006, Available at: https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf Department of the Army. FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency, December 2006, Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (b) Secondary literature: Monographs Barger, Deborah G. 2005. Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf Mobley, Blake W. 2012, Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection, Columbia University Press. Patton, Kerry. 2010. Sociocultural Intelligence: A New Discipline in Intelligence Studies. Bloomsbury Academic. Odom, William E. 2003. Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America. New Haven: Yale University Press. Treverton, Gregory F. 2009. Intelligence for an Age of Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zegart, Amy. 2007. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Chapters in Edited Volumes Gerber, Burton. 2005. “Managing HUMINT: The Need for a New Approach”. Pp. 180–197 in Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber. Transforming U.S. intelligence. Georgetown University Press. Hitz, Frederick P. 2007. “Human source intelligence”. Pp. 118–128 in Loch K. Johnson (ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge. MacGaffin, John. 2005. “Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action”. Pp. 79–95 in Jennifer E. Sims, Burton Gerber, Transforming U.S. intelligence. Georgetown University Press. Lahneman, William J. 2007. “U.S. Intelligence prior to 9/11 and Obstacles to Reform”. Pp. 73–95 in Thomas C. Bruneau, Steven C. Boraz (eds.). Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin: University of Texas Press. Pollard, Neal A. 2009. “On Counterterrorism and Intelligence”. Pp. 117–146 in Gregory F. Treverton, Wilhelm Argrell (eds.). National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects. Cambridge University Press. Sims, Jennifer E. 2009. “A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics”. Pp. 58–92 in Gregory F. Treverton, Wilhelm Argrell (eds.). National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects. Cambridge University Press. Warner, Michael. 2007. “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence”. Pp. 17–27 in Loch K. Johnson (ed.). Handbook of Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge. Articles in Scholarly Journals Betts, Richard K. 2002. “Fixing Intelligence”. Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57619/richard-k-betts/fixing-intelligence. Hedley, John. 1996. “The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? How to Fix it?”. Studies in Intelligence 39 (5): 11–19. Hulnick, Arthur R. 2007. “Intelligence Reform 2007: Fix or Fizzle?”.International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20 (4): 567–582. Hulnick, Arthur S. 2008. “Intelligence Reform 2008: Where to from Here?” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21 (4): 621–634. Peters, Ralph. 2005. “The Case for Human Intelligence: Our Addiction to technology is our greatest weakness”. Armed Forces Journal 142 (12): 24–26. Sims, Jennifer. 2012. “More Military Spies: Why the CIA is Applauding the Pentagon’s Intelligence Grab”. Foreign Affairs, Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137649/jennifer-sims/more-military-spies. |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
| Thesis outline:
1) Introduction – motivation for research, research question, case selection, hypothesis 2) Studying intelligence - Short introduction to Intelligence studies as an academic discipline, pitfalls of researching contemporary intelligence, literature review, data sources 3) Terminology and characteristics US HUMINT – introduction to necessary intelligence terminology (intelligence cycle, methods of intelligence gathering, brief overview of USIC‘ history with special regards to HUMINT) 4) Research design – theory of intelligence systems, methodology, conceptualization, operationalization 5) Comparisons based on primary and secondary literature 6) Conclusions, policy recommendations 7) Bibliography 8) Appendices |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| Thesis outline:
1) Introduction – motivation for research, research question, case selection, hypothesis 2) Studying intelligence - Short introduction to Intelligence studies as an academic discipline, pitfalls of researching contemporary intelligence, literature review, data sources 3) Terminology and characteristics US HUMINT – introduction to necessary intelligence terminology (intelligence cycle, methods of intelligence gathering, brief overview of USIC‘ history with special regards to HUMINT) 4) Research design – theory of intelligence systems, methodology, conceptualization, operationalization 5) Comparisons based on primary and secondary literature 6) Conclusions, policy recommendations 7) Bibliography 8) Appendices |