Mapping Institutional Development: An Analysis of Deposit Insurance in Argentina
| Název práce v češtině: | Mapování institucionálního rozvoje: Analýza pojištění vkladů v Argentině |
|---|---|
| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Mapping Institutional Development: An Analysis of Deposit Insurance in Argentina |
| Klíčová slova: | Instituce; Ekonomický rozvoj; Finance a pojištění; Argentina |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | Institutions; Development; Finance and insurance; Argentina |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2011/2012 |
| Typ práce: | diplomová práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | doc. Ing. Tomáš Cahlík, CSc. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 05.06.2012 |
| Datum zadání: | 05.06.2012 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 14.09.2016 09:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | Jinonice - U Kříže 8, J3093, Jinonice - místn. č. 3093 |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 29.07.2016 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 14.09.2016 |
| Oponenti: | doc. Ing. Vladimír Benáček, CSc. |
| Kontrola URKUND: | |
| Zásady pro vypracování |
| According to the FSV guidelines for master theses. |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| Acemoglu, D & Robinson, J. 2012. Why NationsFail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown.
Argentina: Fondo De Cultura Economica, 2010. Auyero, Javier. Poor People's Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001. Chen, Linda. "Chapter 6: Argentina in the 21st Century." Latin American Politics and Development. By Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline. 6th ed. New York: Westview, 2007. 97-125. Coase, R. (1937). "The Nature of the Firm". Economica 4 Coase, R. H. The Problem of Social Cost. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago Law School, 1960. Cull, Robert, and George Clarke. "Bank Privatization in Argentina: A Model of Political Constraints and Differential Outcomes." Policy Research Working Papers (1999): n. pag. Gallup, J & Sachs, J & Mellinger, A (1998, December). Geography and Economic Development. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. Available from: <www.nber.org/papers/w6849>. Accessed: October 2013. Levitsky, Steven. "Organization and Labor-Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective." World Politics 54 (2001): 27-56. Ménard, Claude. "Embedding Organizational Arrangements: Towards a General Model." Journal of Institutional Economics 10.04 (2014): 567-89. Ostrom, E. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems." American Economic Review. 100.3 (2010): 641-672. Rodrik, D (2013, June). The Past, Present, and Future of Economic Growth. (1). Global Citizen Foundation, USA. Available from: <http://www.gcf.ch/?page_id=5758>. Accessed: October 2013. Rodrik, D (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth. 1st. ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Romero, Luis Alberto. A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. 1st ed. Buenos Aires, Smith, William C. Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1989. Sachs, Jeffrey D. Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance: Country Studies--Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2007. |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
| Topic Characteristics:
The “middle income trap,” is the observed phenomena that as a nation’s GDP per capita reaches a certain level, its growth rate is significantly reduced. A commonly cited issue that faces nations that are unable to break into higher levels of economic development are the nation’s institutional designs and these institutions relative instability. The paper will use concepts proposed by economic “institutionalist” to show the current concepts and theories that explain economic development. While utilizing their reasoning the paper will attempt to go beyond the conventional explanations for economic instability, and analyze Argentina as it concerns and is connected with its institutions. The paper will seek understanding on how institutions effect development, and if it has an effect on middle income nations. There are two phenomena occurring in developing economies. Many nations are entering into the middle income status, and the world is rapidly urbanizing. I wish to understand how these correlate, how they can affect policy, and what this means for developing economies. Working hypotheses: 1. Can theories of economic extraction and inclusion explain institutional development in Argentina 2. Can theories of economic strength and weakness explain institutional development in Argentina 3. Does new institutional economics suffice in explaining the economic development of Argentina. Methodology: This study is based on the analysis of the changing regulations and legal structure of deposit insurance in Argentina. I chose deposit insurance in Argentina as it’s a fascinating regulation given Argentina’s rocky monetary and inflationary periods. I will analyze deposit insurance as it develops and regresses through the lens of theories of economic extraction and weakness. I will use theoretical concepts based on the works Acemoglu and Robinson as well as Levitsky and Murillo. Outline: 1) Introduction a) Development of Argentina’s Economy i) Alfonsin and the 1980’s ii) Menem and Neo-Liberla 1990’s iii) Kirchner’s and Export Populism of post 2000 b) Development of Argentina’s Political climate since the onset of democracy in 1983 i) Ostiguy Development 2) Theoretical Background a) Review of Transaction Cost Theory i) Coase b) Review of Foundation of New Institutional Economics i) North ii) Williamson iii) Menard c) Review of New Institutional Economics and Economic Development i) Acemoglu and Robinson ii) Levitsky and Murillo 3) Methodology a) Review of the methodological framework for examining institutions as provided by Voigt b) Establish the Groundwork of the Study i) Levitsky and Murillo’s theory of weak institutions ii) Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory of extractive and inclusive institutions c) Review Transaction Cost Theory of Deposit Insurance and Deposit Insurance Institutions 4) Find and Analysis a) Review Historical Regulations of Deposit Insurance in Argentina b) Classify Deposit Insurance based upon the theories of Acemoglu &Robinson and Levitsky and Murillo 5) Discussion of Findings a) Implications for Argentina Institutional Development b) Reviewing Strength of New Institutional Economics i) Consistency among theories ii) Application to institutional explanations c) Recommendations for New Conceptual Design of Institutions i) Bridging theories together ii) Toward a new conceptual design 6) Summary and Conclusion |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| Topic Characteristics:
The “middle income trap,” is the observed phenomena that as a nation’s GDP per capita reaches a certain level, its growth rate is significantly reduced. A commonly cited issue that faces nations that are unable to break into higher levels of economic development are the nation’s institutional designs and these institutions relative instability. The paper will use concepts proposed by economic “institutionalist” to show the current concepts and theories that explain economic development. While utilizing their reasoning the paper will attempt to go beyond the conventional explanations for economic instability, and analyze Argentina as it concerns and is connected with its institutions. The paper will seek understanding on how institutions effect development, and if it has an effect on middle income nations. There are two phenomena occurring in developing economies. Many nations are entering into the middle income status, and the world is rapidly urbanizing. I wish to understand how these correlate, how they can affect policy, and what this means for developing economies. Working hypotheses: 1. Can theories of economic extraction and inclusion explain institutional development in Argentina 2. Can theories of economic strength and weakness explain institutional development in Argentina 3. Does new institutional economics suffice in explaining the economic development of Argentina. Methodology: This study is based on the analysis of the changing regulations and legal structure of deposit insurance in Argentina. I chose deposit insurance in Argentina as it’s a fascinating regulation given Argentina’s rocky monetary and inflationary periods. I will analyze deposit insurance as it develops and regresses through the lens of theories of economic extraction and weakness. I will use theoretical concepts based on the works Acemoglu and Robinson as well as Levitsky and Murillo. Outline: 1) Introduction a) Development of Argentina’s Economy i) Alfonsin and the 1980’s ii) Menem and Neo-Liberla 1990’s iii) Kirchner’s and Export Populism of post 2000 b) Development of Argentina’s Political climate since the onset of democracy in 1983 i) Ostiguy Development 2) Theoretical Background a) Review of Transaction Cost Theory i) Coase b) Review of Foundation of New Institutional Economics i) North ii) Williamson iii) Menard c) Review of New Institutional Economics and Economic Development i) Acemoglu and Robinson ii) Levitsky and Murillo 3) Methodology a) Review of the methodological framework for examining institutions as provided by Voigt b) Establish the Groundwork of the Study i) Levitsky and Murillo’s theory of weak institutions ii) Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory of extractive and inclusive institutions c) Review Transaction Cost Theory of Deposit Insurance and Deposit Insurance Institutions 4) Find and Analysis a) Review Historical Regulations of Deposit Insurance in Argentina b) Classify Deposit Insurance based upon the theories of Acemoglu &Robinson and Levitsky and Murillo 5) Discussion of Findings a) Implications for Argentina Institutional Development b) Reviewing Strength of New Institutional Economics i) Consistency among theories ii) Application to institutional explanations c) Recommendations for New Conceptual Design of Institutions i) Bridging theories together ii) Toward a new conceptual design 6) Summary and Conclusion |