The purpose of the following study is to compare different views on the nature of Meno’s paradox and to link it with the theory of recollection.
Seznam odborné literatury
Scott, D. (1995). Recollection and Experience: Plato's Theory of Learning and its Successors. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511597374
Fine, Gail (2014). The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno’s Paradox from Socrates to Sextus. Oxford University Press.
Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce
In one of the dialogues Socrates’ interlocutor Meno is raising a set of serious questions (80d5-e5), whether inquiry into something is possible if one doesn’t know at all what it is. Socrates’ reformulates those questions into dilemma whether one does or doesn’t know that which one is inquiring into. The Meno’s challenge and Socrates’ dilemma happened to be known as Meno’s paradox. In the same dialogue Socrates’ introduces the theory of recollection, according to which we all have immortal souls that knew some range of things prenatally. Since recollection is possible, so too are inquiry and learning. According to Gail Fine “the theory of recollection plays a crucial role both in disarming the dilemma and in answering Meno’s questions”. However for some authors this explanation doesn’t seem that obvious. According to Dominic Scott "there is no evidence that the theory was meant to explain such learning" (Recollection and experience, p. 24). Moreover “recollection is neither necessary nor sufficient to solve the dilemma” (ibid. p. 80).