Manipulation through Evaluative Voting in the State Cinematography Fund
| Název práce v češtině: | Manipulace evaluativním hlasováním ve Státním fondu kinematografie |
|---|---|
| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Manipulation through Evaluative Voting in the State Cinematography Fund |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2016/2017 |
| Typ práce: | bakalářská práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | doc. PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 07.06.2017 |
| Datum zadání: | 07.06.2017 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 11.06.2019 09:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | Opletalova - Opletalova 26, O206, Opletalova - místn. č. 206 |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 10.05.2019 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 11.06.2019 |
| Oponenti: | PhDr. Tomáš Adam, Ph.D. |
| Kontrola URKUND: | |
| Zásady pro vypracování |
| Research question and motivation
The Board of the State Cinematography Fund is a body of 9 appointed members. It determines the allocation of public resources the Fund provides to support the cinematography in Czech Republic. It does so via anonymous evaluative voting, which is well known to be vulnerable to insincere voting. One particular vote in year 2014, resulting in allocation of 60% of total subsidies for a single film, has raised many questions about the exploitation of evaluative voting amongst its members. The thesis will first try to answer the questions from voting theory: Is evaluative voting, anonymous or not, an appropriate form of voting for small committees such as the Board? What are the advantages and disadvantages of cardinal voting systems such as evaluative voting, compared to other electoral systems? The second and main part of the thesis will quantitatively analyse the possible scope of manipulation in the form of strategic voting in the Board of the State Cinematography Fund, measured by the extra funds that strategic members can secure to their preferred movies. Contribution The choice of an electoral system is a crucial part for any committee, especially if it is a small one. The results of the thesis could provide policy makers a helpful insight into how the cardinal electoral systems perform in the allocation problems. Moreover, the specific results from the Board will help to understand the degree to which allocations could be manipulated by a single member of a coalition of a few members. |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| HILLINGER, Claude. The Case for Utilitarian Voting. Discussion Papers in Economics [online]. 2005 [cit. 2017-05-25].
HOUFKOVÁ, Petra. Státní fond kinematografie [online]. Brno, 2014 [cit. 2017-05-25]. MACÉ, Antonin. Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum? AMSE Working Papers [online]. 2015 [cit. 2017-05-25]. MENTON, Curtis. Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control. Theory of Computing Systems [online]. 2013, 53(4), 507-531 [cit. 2017-05-25]. DOI: 10.1007/s00224-012-9441-0. ISSN 14324350. NUNEZ, Mattias a LASLIER, Jean-Francois. Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections. Social Choice and Welfare [online]. 2014, 42(2), 313-340 [cit. 2017-05-25]. ISSN 01761714. SANVER, Remzi a LASLIER, Jean-Francois. The Basic Approval Voting Game. Handbook on Approval Voting, Chapter 8. DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7 Respekt: www.respekt.cz/delnici-kultury/preceneny-projekt-filipa-rence-dostal-bezprecendentni-podporu |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
| Methodology
Using the complete history of the Board of the State Cinematography Fund, I will try to accomplish two things. The first is estimating an allocation function from projects scores into projects allocations, as it is not exactly known how the results translate into the allocations. The second is analysing and simulating the possible outcomes of strategic voting. Specifically, the thesis will quantify how a single member or a small coalition of members can influence the allocation of resources. Outline 1. Introduction 2. Review of literature 3. Evaluative voting 4. The State Cinematography Fund 5. Data description 6. Allocation function 7. Manipulation in the Board 8. Conclusion |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| Methodology
Using the complete history of the Board of the State Cinematography Fund, I will try to accomplish two things. The first is estimating an allocation function from projects scores into projects allocations, as it is not exactly known how the results translate into the allocations. The second is analysing and simulating the possible outcomes of strategic voting. Specifically, the thesis will quantify how a single member or a small coalition of members can influence the allocation of resources. Outline 1. Introduction 2. Review of literature 3. Evaluative voting 4. The State Cinematography Fund 5. Data description 6. Allocation function 7. Manipulation in the Board 8. Conclusion |