Game Theory Approach to Hostile Takeovers
| Název práce v češtině: | Game Theory Approach to Hostile Takeovers |
|---|---|
| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Game Theory Approach to Hostile Takeovers |
| Klíčová slova: | game in extensive form; hostile takeover, defense strategy, case study |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | game in extensive form; hostile takeover, defense strategy, case study |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2016/2017 |
| Typ práce: | bakalářská práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | RNDr. Michal Červinka, Ph.D. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 09.11.2016 |
| Datum zadání: | 09.11.2016 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 18.09.2017 09:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | Opletalova - Opletalova 26, O109, Opletalova - místn. č. 109 |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 01.08.2017 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 18.09.2017 |
| Oponenti: | Mgr. Aleš Čornanič |
| Kontrola URKUND: | |
| Zásady pro vypracování |
| Hostile takeovers play an important role in the stock market as every publicly traded company is potentially vulnerable to them. The vast literature spans numerous attempts to create (hopefully successful) defensive strategies to prevent hostile takeover. We shall make an effort to utilize game theory to provide answers to the following research question: "What is the most efficient defensive strategy when facing a tender offer and how does this strategy affect the shareholders?" Our model shall be based on the recent results of Loyola and Portilla (2016). In the process of answering this question we shall focus on subsequent goals. In particular, we shall investigate an effective algorithm to defend against a hostile takeover in an optimal way. Further, we shall inspect whether the optimal defense strategy leads to a loss for the shareholders, whether there exists a defensive strategy which will not leave the company much weaker than it was before the raid, and last but not least, whether the equilibrium in a Hostile Takeover game is in favor of the raider. In this thesis we shall also include some case studies to illuminate the effects of the described theory.
In the light of the research hypotheses specified above, the results of this thesis might be useful in practical situations for a decision making process of putting hostile takeover defenses in place. |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| [1] R.S. Ruback: An Overview of Takeover Defenses, In: A.J. Auerbach (editor): Mergers and Acquisitions, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1987.
[2] G. Loyola, Y. Portilla: A Bargaining Model on Friendly and Hostile Takeovers, International Review of Finance, online First January 5, 2016. [3] L. Bebchuk, J. Coates IV, G. Subramanian: The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Stanford Law Review 54, 2002, pp. 887-951. [4] E. Berkovitch, N. Khanna: How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive Strategies in Takeovers, The Journal of Finance 45(1), 1990, pp. 137-156. [5] T. Basar, G.J. Olsder: Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, Classics in Applied Mathematics (Book 23), SIAM Academic Press, New York, 1982 (1995 2nd ed). |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
| 1) Introduction
2) Literature review and basic strategies on hostile takeovers 3) Games in extensive form 4) Game-theoretic model of hostile takeover 5) Case studies, results and discussion 6) Conclusion |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| 1) Introduction
2) Literature review and basic strategies on hostile takeovers 3) Games in extensive form 4) Game-theoretic model of hostile takeover 5) Case studies, results and discussion 6) Conclusion |