Bid Protests in Public Procurement: Czech Case
Název práce v češtině: | Přezkum veřejných zakázek v ČR |
---|---|
Název v anglickém jazyce: | Bid Protests in Public Procurement: Czech Case |
Klíčová slova: | Zadávání veřejných zakázek, veřejné zakázky, napadení rozhodnutí, dohled nad veřejnými zakázkami, Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže |
Klíčová slova anglicky: | Public Procurement, Public Contracts, Bid Protests, Public Procurement Supervision, Office for Protection of Competition |
Akademický rok vypsání: | 2013/2014 |
Typ práce: | bakalářská práce |
Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
Vedoucí / školitel: | PhDr. Mgr. Jiří Skuhrovec, Ph.D. |
Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
Datum přihlášení: | 06.06.2014 |
Datum zadání: | 06.06.2014 |
Datum a čas obhajoby: | 09.09.2015 00:00 |
Místo konání obhajoby: | IES |
Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 31.07.2015 |
Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 09.09.2015 |
Oponenti: | PhDr. Jan Soudek |
Kontrola URKUND: |
Předběžná náplň práce |
Motivation
While many businesses are attracted by the prospect of securing a public contract, only few make the cut and become suppliers for the public sector. The remaining bidders are free to express their objections against the procurement process and challenge it at the Office for the Protection of Competition. While this option should add a substantial degree of transparency to the whole process, it could also become a powerful tool for the contestants to exert a pressure against the other participating parties. Aim of this thesis is to analyse the legal framework of the challenging process, introduce a theoretical model of agent behaviour under this framework and find empirical evidence in the data on dispute resolutions collected from the Office for the Protection of Competition. Methodology A game theory will be used to construct a model describing the decision-making process of agents contemplating challenging the procurement process. The empirical study will use data on dispute resolutions mined from the website of the Office for the Protection of Competition together with data on public procurement obtained by the Centre for Applied Economics. These data will be used in order to perform an econometric analysis verifying given hypotheses. Hypotheses – Participation in procurement disputes makes it harder for the contestants to obtain future public contracts. – It is profitable for the unsuccessful bidders to challenge the public procurement processes. Preliminary structure 1. Analysis of the legal framework 2. Model of agent behaviour 3. Empirical analysis Core literature – OSBORNE, Martin J. An introduction to game theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, xvii, 533 p. ISBN 978-0-19-512895-6. – MASCHLER, Michael B a Eilon SOLAN. Game theory. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 979 s. ISBN 978-1-107-00548-8 – ČESKÁ REPUBLIKA. Zákon č. 137/2006 o veřejných zakázkách. In: Sbírka zákonů České republiky, 2006. Retrieved from: http://www.mvcr.cz/sbirka/1999/sb039-99.pdf – Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every Procurement Challenge System Must Make, 35 Public Contract Law Journal, 2006 – PIGA, Gustavo a Steen TREUMER. The applied law and economics of public procurement. xi, 308 pages. Economics of legal relationships, 16. ISBN 04-156-2216-6. – WOOLDRIDGE, Jeffrey M. a Steen TREUMER. Introductory econometrics: a modern approach. 4th ed. Mason, Ohio: South-Western, 2008, xi, 308 pages. Economics of legal relationships, 16. ISBN 03-245-8548-9. |