Analysis of decision making of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition in public procurement cases
| Název práce v češtině: | Analýza rozhodování Úřadu pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže ve veřejných zakázkách |
|---|---|
| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Analysis of decision making of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition in public procurement cases |
| Klíčová slova: | veřejné zakázky, dohled nad veřejnými zakázkami, protest, šikanozní návrh, délka řízení, kauce |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | public procurement, procurement oversight, protest, frivolous proposal, length of the proceeding, deposit |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2013/2014 |
| Typ práce: | bakalářská práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | PhDr. Jan Soudek |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 28.05.2014 |
| Datum zadání: | 28.05.2014 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 08.09.2015 00:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | IES |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 27.07.2015 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 08.09.2015 |
| Oponenti: | PhDr. Mgr. Jiří Skuhrovec, Ph.D. |
| Kontrola URKUND: | |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| Pavel, Jan. 2009. Veřejné zakázky v České republice. Studie 2/2009. Studie Národohospodářského ústavu Josefa Hlávky.
Kolektiv autorů. 2012. Veřejné zakázky v ČR: Co říkají data o chování zadavatelů? Studie 5/2012. IDEA CERGE-EI. Retrieved from http://idea.cerge-ei.cz/documents/studie_2012_05.pdf. Bajari, P. & Tadelis, S. 2001. Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement contracts. RAND Journal of Economics, 32(3), p. 387–407. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2696361. Zákon č. 137/2006 Sb. o veřejných zakázkách, ve znění pozdějších předpisů. Retrieved from http://portal.gov.cz/app/zakony/zakon.jsp?page=0&nr=137~2F2006&rpp=15#seznam. Zákon č. 143/2001 Sb. o ochraně hospodářské soutěže, ve znění pozdějších předpisů. Retrieved from http://portal.gov.cz/app/zakony/zakon.jsp?page=0&nr=143~2F2001&rpp=15#seznam. Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every Procurement Challenge System Must Make, 35 Public Contract Law Journal, 2006. HAVLÍČEK, Jan. Právní rámec a praktické otázky zadávání veřejných zakázek ve světle vybraných rozhodnutí Evropského soudního dvora a Úřadu pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže. Obchodní právo. 2009, s. 16-27. |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
| ne of the purposes of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition is to oversee the compliance with the law of public procurement. The administrative procedure at the Antimonopoly Office can be started both upon own initiative of the Office and upon the request of the participant of public procurement, who believes the law of public procurement was breached. For both the Office and the participants the right to initialize the administrative procedure is very powerful tool against restricting competition. In my thesis I would like to focus on the activity of the Office in the public procurement cases. I would like to analyze whether on one hand the Office has enough capacity to resolve all the cases and if it uses its power sufficiently, on the other hand I would like to investigate possible overuse of right to turn to the Office by the competitors in order to limit competition.
Data sources: http://www.uohs.cz/en/homepage.html http://www.vestnikverejnychzakazek.cz/ https://www.profilzadavatele.cz/ own search on websites Hypothesis 1) The majority of decision making of the office is procedural rather than on merits. 2) The remedies imposed by the Office are on the lower border of their competencies. 3) The probability of successful appeal within the Office is lower than 50%. 4) The competitor who initializes the administrative procedure is willing to participate in the process and to cooperate with the Office by satisfying all the legal conditions – mainly by paying the refundable deposit and by providing all the important documents. Methodology Firstly, I am going to discuss the relevant literature, with main focus on decision making of the Office and with proposals how to make the administrative procedures more efficient. The brief description of the Czech legal framework of public procurement and of the Czech Office for the Protection of Competition would follow. In order to test the proposed hypothesis I am going to analyze selected decisions of the Office. I am going to focus on group of decisions in public procurement cases, where the contracting authorities are the cities with 20 000 inhabitants plus. The data come from recent years. The main outcome of rulings analysis would be whether there were detected the breach of public procurement law, on which side the infringement was detected, if the decision of the Office was procedural or substantive (on merits) and whether there was used successful appeal. Outline I. Introduction 2. Theoretical part 2.1 Related literature 2.2 Czech legal framework 3. Empirical part 2.1 Used methods, description of data 2.2 Data analysis 2.3 Testing hypothesis 2.4 Results 4. Conclusion |