Public Procurement of homogeneous goods: Czech Republic case study
| Název práce v češtině: | Veřejné zakázky na homogenní statky: empirická studie z České republiky |
|---|---|
| Název v anglickém jazyce: | Public Procurement of homogeneous goods: Czech Republic case study |
| Klíčová slova: | veřejné zakázky, homogenní zboží, , energetické trhy |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | public procurement, homogenous goods, energy markets |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2010/2011 |
| Typ práce: | diplomová práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | PhDr. Mgr. Jiří Skuhrovec, Ph.D. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 08.06.2011 |
| Datum zadání: | 08.06.2011 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 28.06.2012 00:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | Opetalova ul. 26 |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 18.05.2012 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 28.06.2012 |
| Oponenti: | Ing. Zdeněk Hrubý, CSc. |
| Zásady pro vypracování |
| Public procurement is an institutional procedure of governmental purchases. In developed countries, total volume of public procurements accounts for roughly 20 % of GDP. I would like to describe the main characteristics of tendering processes and identify their impact on final price of procurement. Moreover I would like to detail the contracting authority and propose its objective or goal function.
In my empirical research I would like to study a dataset of homogeneous goods purchased frequently by the state. As a source of data I will use the Czech informational system of public procurements (www.isvzus.cz) |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| Bajari, P.; Tadelis, S.: “Incentive versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts.” Rand Journal of Economics 89(3), 2001.
Bandeira, O.; Prat, A.; Valetti, T.: Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment, working paper, 2008 Domberger, S.; Hall, Ch.; Lik Li, A.: The Determinants of Price and Quality in Competitively Tendered Contracts, The Economic Journal, 1993 Chvalkovská, J.; Skuhrovec, J.: Measuring transparency in public spending: Case of Czech Public e-Procurement Information System, IES working paper 11/2010 Niskanen, W. A.: Bureaucracy and Public economics, Edvard Elgar publisching co., 1994 Pavel, J.: Veřejné zakázky v České republice, Studie Národohospodářského ústavu Josefa Hlávky, 2009 Soudek, J: Veřejné zakázky; Institucionální analýza procesu zadávání a výběrového řízení zakázek, Bachelor thesis, IES FSV UK, 2010 Tollison, R.D. , Congleton, R.D. (eds):The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking, 1995 |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
| In my empirical research I would like to test whether the final price of the procurement is affected by characteristics of the contracting authority or by characteristics of the procurement procedure. The hypotheses can be defined as follows:
1. Hypothesis #1: The final price of the procurement is affected by the type of the contracting authority and by the procurement procedure. 2. Hypothesis #2: Final price of procurement is decreasing function of an amount of applicants interested in procurement. 3. Hypothesis #3: Contracting authorities do not choose optimal procurement type for minimizing costs. After the description of facts and characteristics of public procurements I would like to create a theoretical framework of contracting authority behavior by modifying several theories of bureaucracy and transaction costs. Additionally, I would like to implement the theory of rent-seeking on public procurement case. In empirical part of my thesis I would like to test hypotheses defined above by standard econometric approaches. The research will be composed as a case study. My dataset will cover few groups of goods purchased by Czech authorities. Each of the selected goods has to have two properties: measurable quantity of purchased goods and enough procurement listed in Czech informational system of public procurements. Then my dependent variable will be the price of one unit of purchased good and explanatory variables will be the characteristics of the submitter and the procurement procedure. |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| In my empirical research I would like to test whether the final price of the procurement is affected by characteristics of the contracting authority or by characteristics of the procurement procedure. The hypotheses can be defined as follows:
1. Hypothesis #1: The final price of the procurement is affected by the type of the contracting authority and by the procurement procedure. 2. Hypothesis #2: Final price of procurement is decreasing function of an amount of applicants interested in procurement. 3. Hypothesis #3: Contracting authorities do not choose optimal procurement type for minimizing costs. After the description of facts and characteristics of public procurements I would like to create a theoretical framework of contracting authority behavior by modifying several theories of bureaucracy and transaction costs. Additionally, I would like to implement the theory of rent-seeking on public procurement case. In empirical part of my thesis I would like to test hypotheses defined above by standard econometric approaches. The research will be composed as a case study. My dataset will cover few groups of goods purchased by Czech authorities. Each of the selected goods has to have two properties: measurable quantity of purchased goods and enough procurement listed in Czech informational system of public procurements. Then my dependent variable will be the price of one unit of purchased good and explanatory variables will be the characteristics of the submitter and the procurement procedure. |