Construction of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Imperial Borders (1918-1921)

• Název práce v češtině: Výstavba Gruzínské demokratické republiky v imperiálních hranicích (1918-1921)
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Construction of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Imperial Borders (1918-1921)
• Klíčová slova: První Gruzínská republika, zahraniční politika, svrchovanost, evropská integrace, Ruské impérium, imperiální hranice, případová studie, konstruktivismus, mezinárodní vztahy, budování národa
• Klíčová slova anglicky: First Republic of Georgia, foreign policy, sovereignty, European integration, Russian empire, imperial borders, case study, constructivism, international relations, nation-building.
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2024/2025
• Typ práce: bakalářská práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra ruských a východoevropských studií (23-KRVS)
• Vedoucí / školitel: doc. Adrian Brisku, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 03.10.2024
• Datum zadání: 03.10.2024
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 26.06.2025 09:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: Areál Jinonice, B316, 316, seminární místnost IPS
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 29.04.2025
• Oponenti: Pelin Ayan Musil, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

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Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2017). The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations (7th ed.). Oxford University Press.
Brisku, A. (2016). Renegotiating the empire, forging the nation-state: The Georgian case through the political economic thought of Niko Nikoladze and Noe Zhordania, c. 1870–1920. Nationalities Papers, 44(2), 299–318. https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1102214
Britannica. (2025, April 11). Case study | Definition, types, creation, & facts. https://www.britannica.com/science/case-study
Chikovani, N. (2012). The Georgian historical narrative: From pre-Soviet to post-Soviet nationalism. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 5(2).
Constitutional Court of Georgia. (2012). The 1921 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia: Looking back after 90 years (G. Papuashvili, Ed.). Batumi: Constitutional Court of Georgia.
Devdariani, J. (2024, March 21). 1918: Georgia’s Act of Independence proclaimed. Civil Georgia. https://civil.ge/archives/242519
IDFI. (n.d.). Diplomatic relations between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the Kingdom of Sweden according to the documents preserved at the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden. https://idfi.ge/en/diplomatic_relations_betweenthe_democratic_republic_of_georgia_and_the_kingdom_of_sweden
Figes, O. (1998). A people’s tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924. Penguin Group USA.
Gabisonia, A. (2013). Formation of the Georgian national discourse. Identity Studies, 4.
ICCN. (2023). Georgia’s efforts to join the League of Nations. https://iccn.ge/index.php?article_id=369&clang=1
Inasaridze, K. (2021). Sakartvelos 1921 ts’konstitutsia da demokratiuli respublika [The 1921 Constitution of Georgia and the Democratic Republic]. National Parliamentary Library of Georgia.
Janelidze, O. (2018). Saqartvelos demokratiuli respublikis istoriis narkvevebi [Essays of the history of the Democratic Republic of Georgia]. Sakartvelos Parlamentis Erovnuli Biblioteka.
Javakhishvili, P. (n.d.). The issue of unamendable norm in the first constitution of Georgia.
Jones, S. (2012). Georgia: A political history since independence. I. B. Tauris.
Kirtadze, N. (1997). Evropa da damoukidebeli Sakartvelo, 1919–1923 ts’ts’. Tbilisi: Evropisa da Amerikis Sametsniaro-Kvleviti Instituti.
Kobakhidze, B. (2013). Representative of the First Georgian Republic to His Britannic Majesty’s Government (1918–1921). OAKA, 8–15.
Kobakhidze, B. (n.d.). The First Republic of Georgia.
Kobakhidze, B., Silakadze, D., & Vacharadze, A. (2020). The First Republic of Georgia, 1918–1921: Documentary album. National Archives of Georgia.
Kobakhidze, B. (2015). Sakartvelos Sakitxi Parizis Sazavo Konperenciaze 1918–1921 (Doctoral dissertation). Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University.
Kveselava, I. (2004). Saqartvelos istoriis qronikebi (1970–1990), wigni I [Chronicles of Georgian history (1970–1990): Public and political movement, Book I]. Technical University of Georgia.
Lee, E. (2017). The experiment: Georgia's forgotten revolution 1918–1921. Zed Books.
firstrepublic.ge. (n.d.). https://firstrepublic.ge/ka
Pipes, R. (1990). The Russian Revolution. Knopf Publishing Group.
Sakartvelos Demokratiuli Respublika (1918–1921): entsiklopedia-leksikoni. (2018). Tbilisi: Universitetis Gamomcemloba.
Sharadze, G. (2001). Istoriuli relikviebis dabruneba: 1918–1921 [Return of historical relics: 1918–1921]. National Library of Georgia.
Smith, G., Law, V., Wilson, A., Bohr, A., & Allworth, E. (1998). Nation-building in the post-Soviet borderlands: The politics of national identities. Cambridge University Press.
Svanidze, M. (2002). Osmaltis istoria: 1600–1923. Tomi II [History of the Ottoman Empire: 1600–1923. Vol. II] (G. Beradze, Ed.). Khronographi.
Suny, R. G. (1988). The making of the Georgian nation. Indiana University Press.
Tavartkiladze, S. (2020). The first international treaty of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and its economic aspects. Globalization and Business, 9, 207–217. https://doi.org/10.35945/gb.2020.09.026
Vadachkoria, S. (2003). Sakartvelos politikuri istoriis sakitkhebi: XX saukune [Issues in Georgia’s political history: 20th century]. Mematiane.
Veyne, P., & Wissing, P. (1988). Did the Greeks believe in their myths?: An essay on the constitutive imagination. University of Chicago Press.
საქართველოს პირველი დემოკრატიული რესპუბლიკა - საქართველოს ეროვნული არქივი. (n.d.). Საქართველოს Ეროვნული Არქივი. https://archive.gov.ge/ge/sakartelos-pirveli-demokratiuli-respublika



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Předběžná náplň práce

Table of Contents

Table of Contents 7
Chapter 1: Introduction 8
1.1 Introduction 8
1.2 Literature Review and Research Objectives 9
Chapter 2: Methodology 12
2.1 Constructivism 12
2.2 Case Study 13
Chapter 3: Historical Pretext 14
3.1 Nation Building in Imperial Borders 14
3.2 Russian Revolution 17
3.3 The Act of Independence 19
Chapter 4: Georgia's Foreign Policy 21
4.1 Relations with Europe and Western Powers 21
4.2 Relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan,Turkey 25
4.3 Paris Peace Conference 27
4.4 Georgia and The League of Nations 30
Chapter 5: The Fall of Republic and its diplomatic aftermath (1920-1921) 35
5.1 Soviet Invasion and the Collapse of he First Republic of Georgia 35
5.2 Georgian Government in Exile and Continued Diplomatic Efforts 37
5.3 Legacy of the First Republic in Modern Georgia 40
Chapter 6: Conclusion 43
References 45
Summary: 49

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction

Achieving sovereignty and establishing The First Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921) was a breakthrough moment in Georgia's history, marking the first attempt to establish a European-style democracy in the Caucasus region. More than a century later, the historical significance of this event remains relevant especially as Georgia still continues its pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration and democratic consolidation. The challenges that the first republic of Georgia has faced such as balancing national sovereignty, democratic governance, and external pressures from imperial powers are still central issues to modern Georgian politics. Nowadays as Georgia again strives to establish a relationship with the European Union and NATO, its historical success in establishing state during the early 20th century is a reference point for ongoing political discourse, foreign policy decisions, and national identity formation. This thesis aims to delve into foreign policy of Georgia during the years of 1918-1921 in terms of navigating its path towards democracy while being within imperial borders. It aims to analyze how Georgia pursued diplomatic recognition, engaged with European powers, and managed regional conflicts while striving to maintain its independence. Using a constructivist framework and case study methodology, this thesis will analyze Georgia's participation in international negotiations, diplomatic relations with Western democracies, as well as strategic defense against neighboring Soviet Russia.
The first chapter of this thesis consists of introduction, the literature review and research objectives. The Second chapter of the research is devoted to methodology, explaining why constructivism and case study have been chosen for research methodology followed by the research question and the hypothesis. The third chapter provides the historical pretext analyzing the development of Georgian national consciousness under Russian imperial rule highlighting the ideological and institutional groundwork before the declaration of independence in 1918. The fourth chapter presents the findings particularly about Georgia’s foreign policy between 1918-1921 with particular emphasis on how it was strategically opposed to Russian imperial and Soviet diplomacy. The fifth chapter concludes the findings and addresses the factors influencing Georgia’s democratic development, reflecting on the internal and external factors that influenced the republic’s trajectory, and the lasting legacy of the First Republic in contemporary Georgian political identity. Finally, the sixth chapter summarizes all the findings of the research connecting it with the stated hypothesis by positioning Georgia’s post-1918 foreign policy within the wider framework of small nations asserting sovereignty in defiance of dominant imperial powers.

1.2 Literature Review and Research Objectives

The foreign Policy of the First Republic of Georgia, and the First Democratic Republic of Georgia itself have been getting a lot of scholarly attention lately yet still it remains an understudied area within both Georgian and broader international historiography. There are various works exploring Georgia’s internal political development and the broader socio-cultural transformation during its brief independence but it is interesting to analyze Georgia's diplomatic trajectory, especially in contrast to the Russian imperial and Soviet models. This thesis seeks to contribute to analyzing this field by delving into Georgia’s foreign policy through a constructivist lens, focusing on how the republic strategically navigated its foreign policy and sovereignty through identity construction, legal diplomacy, and rejection of Russia’s political logic.
Most foundational and primary sources for this subject are the archival sources provided by National Archives of Georgia which include original and digitized documents. According to those materials have been created a digital platform “Firstrepublic.ge” which unites digitized materials of official texts, biographies, legal documents, and photographs from 1917 to 1924 (firstrepublic.ge, n.d.). Aside from the primary sources, Georgian and foreign scholars have played a crucial role in understanding the First Republic of Georgia in more depth. For example, one of the most valuable contributions to the diplomatic history of the First Republic belongs to Zurab Avalishvili (sometimes referred as Zurab Avalov), a Georgian diplomat and legal scholar who participated directly in key diplomatic negotiations. He offers a primary insider account in The Independence of Georgia in International Politics of 1918–1921 where he documents the strategic efforts of Georgian diplomats to gain recognition from western powers and join the League of Nations. Avalishvili shows how Georgian leaders of that time used the legal and ideological tools of international law and self-determination to distance themselves from both the Bolshevik and Tsarist Russian visions of post-imperial order (Avalishvili, 1981).
More recent contribution to this topic belongs to Beka Kobakhidze, Georgian historian who analyzed foreign policy of First Republic and his work on Georgian diplomatic envoys especially about David Ghambashidze in London provides a detailed analysis of how individual diplomats acted with autonomy, creativity, and persistence to promote Georgia’s case in Europe (Kobakhidze, 2013). Kobakhidze emphasizes that these efforts were part of a coherent foreign policy framework that positioned Georgia within a European legal and political sphere, bringing the argument that foreign policy was as much about identity as interest. Other Georgian scholars like Otar Janelidze and Giorgi Sharadze have addressed the broader historical and political contexts of the First Republic of Georgia, providing background on internal developments that influenced its external policies. Janelidze highlights the legalistic and parliamentary foundations of the republic’s diplomacy, while Sharadze analyzes Georgia's efforts to join the League of Nations and resist Soviet aggression, demonstrating how Georgia used institutional diplomacy as a mechanism against imperial coercion. Additionally, aside of Georgian sources, Ronald Grigor Suny’s The Making of the Georgian Nation (1988), provides a broad and essential background for understanding the long-term formation of Georgian national identity Suny argues that while Russian rule was repressive, it paradoxically fostered modernizing processes education, literacy, and urbanization that gave rise to national movements (Suny, 1988, p. 122). This paradox created the intellectual and institutional foundation for Georgia’s future foreign policy orientation, which was rooted in cultural resistance and the pursuit of international recognition. He also argues that Georgia’s foreign policy was driven by both a desire for Western recognition and a fear of Bolshevik expansionism, making Georgia’s position one of “political tightrope walking” between great powers.
Building upon the research objectives outlined above, this thesis specifically addresses the following research question: How did the First Republic of Georgia navigate its foreign policy to establish sovereignty within the imperial borders from 1918 to 1921? Based on this question, the central hypothesis proposed is that Georgia’s diplomatic success was largely due to its foreign policy being strategically opposed to the Russian one. The argument developed through the thesis is that Georgia’s foreign policy between 1918 and 1921 was not simply a response to external pressures, but a carefully designed and consistent strategy. It was rooted in the conscious construction of a sovereign national identity, commitment to democratic principles, and reliance on legal diplomacy. By systematically distancing itself from both the Russian imperial and Soviet frameworks, and by aligning its policies with European standards of governance and international law, Georgia constructed its sovereignty. This strategic opposition to Russia was fundamental for securing international recognition as well as for shaping the modern foundations of Georgia’s national identity.

Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Constructivism

This research employs constructivism as its primary theoretical framework to analyze how the First Republic of Georgia (1918–1921) navigated its foreign policy to establish sovereignty within imperial borders. Constructivism as stated by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, suggests that international relations are shaped not only by material power but also by ideas, identity, historical narratives, and social interactions (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2017, 196 ). Unlike realism, which implies the idea that states’ actions are driven by security and material interests, constructivism believes that state actions are influenced by historical experiences, national identity, and perceptions of legitimacy. In the case of this thesis topic, the given perspective is particularly useful for understanding Georgia's foreign policy during the period of time from 1918 to1921 as the country tried to position itself as a European state, gain international recognition, and distance itself from its Russian imperial influence. Another key element of constructivism is the argument that state interests are not inherent but they are socially constructed through political discourse and historical processes. (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2017) Foreign policy of The First Republic of Georgia was framed around Georgia's European identity, emphasizing historical ties to European ideologies and democratic values. This identity-based approach played a crucial role in shaping Georgia’s interactions with international actors, particularly with western democracies and regional empires. By applying constructivism, this research shows that Georgia's foreign policy was not entirely driven by strategic interests but also by the country's identity and the need for international recognition. This methodological approach allows for a deeper analysis of how the First Republic of Georgia used identity-based diplomacy to construct sovereignty, legitimacy, and international alliances, and how this strategy fundamentally contrasted with the Russian imperial and Bolshevik models of foreign policy.
2.2 Case Study
This thesis adopts a single-case study approach to investigate the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Georgia between 1918 and 1921. Case study with its definition means “detailed description and assessment of a specific situation in the real world created for the purpose of deriving generalizations and other insights from it”(Raikar & Pai, 2025), which suits this thesis by allowing for the in depth analysis of a historically unique and complex subject such as Georgia’s brief period of independence emerged from the collapse of the Russian Empire. It provides an opportunity to analyze how a newly independent state attempted to construct foreign relations and international legitimacy under conditions of post-imperial transition and regional instability. Furthermore, the case study approach allows the thesis research to attain interdisciplinary approach drawing on diplomatic correspondence, government declarations, contemporary newspapers and publications as well as personal memoirs to trace how foreign policy of Georgia was shaped and navigated. It also allows for deeper analysis of Georgia's interactions with different political actors including neighboring states like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and major powers like Britain and Germany, and institutions like the League of Nations through the lens of both diplomatic strategy and identity construction. The single-case study also allows for an investigation into counterfactuals and alternative routes. Georgia's refusal to become aligned with Soviet Russia and ongoing attempts for joining Europe demonstrate a difference in strategy that was neither inevitable nor materially advantageous, but totally ideologically driven. These aspects and depths of the issue are best explored through the case study approach.
Chapter 3: Historical Pretext
3.1 Nation Building in Imperial Borders
Despite the fact that throughout history Georgia was going through different political challenges, its aspirations and trajectory were always clearly towards Europe and western part of the world. This aspirations and claim was most clear and Georgia was nearest to its goal in 1918-1921 years when Georgia got its independence and established the First Democratic Republic of Georgia (Kveselava,2004). It is crucial to analyse how the nation building process was going in Georgia while being in Russian imperial borders and what gave Georgia the chance to make a historical breakthrough. To analyse how Gorgia came to its independence in 1918 it is essential to delve into the path which Georgia went through from becoming part of Russia , after that being under Russian Imperial Rule and finally achieving independence. Georgia became part of the Russian Empire in the early 19th century, beginning with the annexation of the eastern Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in 1801 and later expanding to western Georgian territories (Janelidze, 2018, p.24). Interestingly, the Russian imperial rule of Georgia went through both repression and modernization. Repressions were expressed in the enforcement of Russification policies, suppressing local autonomy, and subordinating the Georgian Orthodox Church to the Russian Synod. Modernization, on the other hand, included imperial integration, which brought in educational reforms, urbanization, and limited industrialization, creating a literate and politically aware Georgian elite. According to Ronald Grigor Suny, Russian imperialism paradoxically created the conditions under which non-Russian national movements could emerge (Suny, 1988, p.122). By the mid-19th century, a Georgian national revival was underway. The highlight and the most influential figure of this period and Georgia’s history in general was Ilia Chavchavadze, Georgian publisher and writer. He with the group of “Tergdaleulebi” ( intellectual movement, consisting of Georgian intellectuals against Imperial Rule) laid the ideological foundations for modern Georgian nationalism. The emergence of the Tergdaleulebi, or “those who drank from the river Tergi,” created a turning point in Georgia’s national awakening and nation-building process (Chikovani, 2012, p.108). Tergdaleulebi consisted of Georgia intellectuals, particularly people who have studied abroad, mostly in St.Petersburg and Moscow and later on, inspired by enlightenment ideas again paradoxically used their knowledge against the Russian regime. Ilia Chavchavadze, as a movement’s intellectual leader, personified this cultural transformation by promoting the protection of the Georgian language, advocating for social and legal reforms, and emphasizing the idea of national self-determination. To this extent, Adrian Brisku (2016) argues that Georgia's nation-building was not merely a negation of imperial power but an active synthesis of European political models and local traditions. Georgian elites understood their national project not only as the revival of historic statehood but also as a modernizing endeavor to align Georgia with European standards of political and legal organization (Brisku, 2016, p. 302-304 ). This dual aspiration, restoration and modernization characterized the ideological trajectory of Georgia's political development under imperial rule. The paradox of imperial modernization prepared a Georgian political class ideologically to pursue sovereignty even under conditions of repression. The period from the 1860s through the early 1900s witnessed the consolidation of national consciousness, as Georgian elites increasingly defined themselves as distinct from the Russian imperial order and envisioned an independent Georgian state within a European legal and political tradition. In this way, the ideological foundations of Georgia's eventual independence were laid during the imperial period through a gradual but determined cultural, educational, and political awakening. As Brisku (2016) argues, Georgia followed a path similar to that of other imperial borderlands, where the dissolution of the empire provided a final opportunity for long-gestating national projects to materialize (Brisku, 2016). When the Russian Empire began to disintegrate following the 1917 revolutions, the Georgian national movement was both institutionally and ideologically prepared to assert independence. Thus, Georgia's nation-building within imperial borders was both a reaction to and a product of the imperial experience. Georgian nationalism was forged not only in opposition to imperialism but also through the educational, administrative, and political institutions introduced by imperial modernization. This complex development allowed Georgia, when the opportunity arose, to transform a long-standing cultural revival into a concrete political achievement: the establishment of the First Democratic Republic in 1918.


3.2 Russian Revolution

A French historian, Paul Veyne compares Russian Revolution and Roman Empire’s conversion to Christianity and truly the October revolution was a radical transformation in Russian political history which marked a profound shift and reshaped the political order of Eurasia (Veyne, 1988, p. 22). The February Revolution ( March 1917 according to the Gregorian calendar) culminated with the end of the Romanov dynasty which had reigned for over 300 years in Russia. Various factors contributed to the revolution. The defeat in WWI which resulted in food shortages, drained resources of fuel and goods, economic crisis, inflation which on its own resulted in low moral attitude among the troops and civilians(Pipes, 1990). Political dissatisfaction only grew stronger as Tsar Nicholas II persisted in his autocratic rule, refused to implement meaningful reforms, and relied increasingly on repressive measures. The Petrograd protests in early 1917, sparked by food shortages, quickly escalated into mass strikes and army mutinies. Lacking both the political will and military strength to suppress the rebellion, Nicholas II abdicated on March 2, 1917. This created a temporary power vacuum in which a Provisional Government attempted to establish liberal democratic rule, but its authority was undermined by the competing power of the Petrograd Soviet and the rising influence of radical Bolshevik forces (Figes, 1998). The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 was thus not only the result of a failed monarchy but also of the collapse of moderate republicanism. Lenin's Bolsheviks presented an alternative not only to imperial rule but also to democratic pluralism replacing it with a one-party revolutionary dictatorship legitimized by Marxist ideology. Although they claimed to act in the name of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks quickly dissolved the Constituent Assembly, banned opposition parties, and established a centralized regime. The revolution, in this sense, was not simply a reaction against Tsarism, but an attempt to reshape the entire post-imperial space under a new ideological empire. In Marich,1918 Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers which included Russia’s withdrawal from World War I and giving up Russian Empire’s territory including Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics, and the Caucasus. As for Georgia, this was a historical chance for a historical breakthrough. For the first time in over a century, Georgia found itself outside of a hegemonic power structure and free to determine its own diplomatic course. As the Russian Empire disintegrated and Soviet authority had yet to reach the Caucasus, Georgia’s leaders realized the fleeting opportunity to transform their long-standing national ambitions into political reality and Georgia proclaimed its independence on 26 May 1918, giving birth to the Democratic Republic of Georgia (Janelidze, 2018, p. 29). The Russian Revolution thus served as a structural rupture that enabled Georgia’s long-imagined identity to take institutional form. More importantly, the revolution showed the contrast between the Georgian and Russian trajectories: while Bolshevik Russia moved toward centralization, suppression of political pluralism, and militarized control, Georgia moved toward decentralization, parliamentary democracy, and diplomatic openness . This divergence was also symbolically codified. Georgian leaders framed their statehood in terms of “European civilization,” “historical continuity,” and “the right to national self-determination.” In official speeches, newspaper editorials, and diplomatic correspondences, the Georgian Republic emphasized its distinctiveness from Bolshevik Russia. This identity construction was not only an internal matter but a calculated foreign policy strategy, designed to attract sympathy and recognition from Western democracies.The establishment of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 26 May 1918 marked the institutionalization of this divergence. It was a declaration of both independence and geopolitical choice, a break from imperial subordination and an embrace of Western political modernity. The path forward, however, would not be smooth. While the ideological and diplomatic groundwork had been laid, Georgia now had to navigate a dangerous international environment, with hostile neighbors, shifting alliances, and uncertain Western commitment to small, newly formed states.

3.3 The Act of Independence
As Zurab Avalishvili writes in his “ The Independence of Georgia in International Politics, 1918-1921”, the aspiration towards independence among Georgian society was noticeable since the first days of the Russian revolution (Avalishvili, 1981, p.17 ). After the Russian Revolution, the imperial order that had ruled the South Caucasus for more than a hundred years collapsed. In the power vacuum left by the fall of the Romanov dynasty and the Bolshevik takeover, Georgia, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, formed the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) on 22 April 1918. As Brisku and Blauvelt (2020) argue, the TDFR was not simply an improvised response but the culmination of earlier regional initiatives to preserve order, avert anarchy, and coordinate diplomacy toward external powers, particularly the Ottoman Empire and Soviet Russia (Brisku and Blauvelt, 2020, p.2). This short-lived federation was a pragmatic effort to preserve regional solidarity and negotiate collectively with outside powers, particularly the advancing Ottoman Empire. However, deep ideological disparities, clashing national interests, and external military threats soon fractured the union. Georgia's leaders realized the incompatibility of their political goals with their neighbors and started to prepare for full independence. Despite attempts to maintain the federation, the conflicting national interests and external threats ultimately doomed the TDFR, providing Georgia with a platform to assert diplomatic agency before its independence (Brisku and Blauvelt, 2020, p. 4–5). The political groundwork for this had already been laid. In November 1917, in response to the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd, the Georgian National Council was formed in Tbilisi as a representative political body encompassing all major parties and national groups. It served as the de facto parliament and was tasked with safeguarding Georgian interests amid the fluid post-imperial situation. When the TDFR disintegrated in late May 1918, the National Council acted decisively. On 26 May, it declared the Democratic Republic of Georgia an independent and sovereign state. This was neither an improvised nor a purely reactive mov but it was the institutional realization of a long-standing national endeavor. In choosing independence, Georgia distinguished itself not only from the collapsed empire but also from the new ideological empire taking shape under Bolshevik Russia. The declaration opened a new chapter, in which Georgia would begin building a European-style republic founded on the rule of law, political pluralism, and diplomatic engagement. The formal declaration of independence on 26 May 1918 by the National Council of Georgia was the political culmination of a decades-long intellectual and cultural project, and a direct response to the collapse of centralized power in both imperial and Bolshevik Russia. Georgia’s declaration was not simply a rejection of foreign domination but a carefully crafted articulation of a new identity rooted in democratic principles, national sovereignty, and geopolitical alignment with Europe. The Independence Declaration flow is interesting to analyse as well. On 25 May 1918, the day before the Declaration Day itself, the National Council called a board and started working on the Declaration document and as Giorgi Sharadze states in “The Return Of Historical Relics”, the core idea for the board was to be inclusive within Georgian territory as well outside of its borders. The document was written within 72 hours and later on 26 May was presented to the public in white hall. (Sharadze, 2001, p.17). This event was attended by 42 members, 36 candidates and a significant number of people. The committee was led by Noe Zhordania, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Council. He opened the session by saying that that day, in that room one died while the other one was born and the one which was born aimed to survive in the modern historical storm for which according to him Georgia was ready, since it used to fight for survival. Interestingly, his speech already included a pro western way of foreign policy and attitude towards neighboring states. Zhordania continued his speech by expressing empathy for the Armenian people, stating that the Georgian people would continue standing by the Armenian people as before. Then he continued by emphasizing the importance of a friendly attitude towards Mahmadians and suggested they take Georgia's example and establish their own state and continue friendly relationships with Georgia (Sharadze 2001,18). And finally Noe Zhordania noted that the unity of neighboring states was crucial in case an outside enemy would one day become stronger and attack them. The Independence declaration itself was presented after this preface which on its own stated that Georgia used to be part of Russia in case Russia protected Georgia from outside enemies, but since the Russian revolution, Georgia with Transcaucasia were in charge of their own paths and Georgia was Declared as an independent state.

Chapter 4: Georgia's Foreign Policy
4.1 Relations with Europe and Western Powers

After achieving sovereignty and declaration of independence, Georgia’s main concern was international acknowledgement. Georgia’s foreign policy between 1918 and 1921 was not only a result of diplomatic necessity but it was a conscious, strategic articulation of a sovereign state’s identity in strong opposition to the imperial past it had just escaped. After declaration of independence, Georgia’s political mission was to gain both De Facto and De Jure recognition from Europe, Western powers, and neighboring countries. In this formative period, the leaders of the First Republic did not entirely adopt a European political model, they created Georgia’s diplomatic worldview in direct contrast to the logic of Russian expansionism, whether Tsarist or Bolshevik. Every decision , every alliance sought, every declaration made, every refusal to compromise, was part of a deliberate project to construct a European-style republic with a Western-oriented diplomatic posture. For more than a century, Georgia had been held tightly within the Russian imperial system. It had suffered the systematic erosion of autonomy , from the abolition of the Georgian monarchy in 1801, to the annexation of the Church’s independence in 1811, to the suppression of language, education, and media. The idea of independence in 1918 was, therefore, not a reactive moment but a culmination of long-standing ideological opposition to Russia’s internal and external policies. The act of declaring independence on May 26, 1918, was not simply about political separation, rather it was about projecting Georgia as fundamentally incompatible with the Russian imperial idea.
One of the most powerful and thoughtful decisions that was made by Georgia was the attempt to define itself as clearly not Russian, not part of the former empire, not a post-Russian republic in the making and not a province rebelling against the center. As the first clause of the Independence Act stated Georgia was a totally sovereign democratic state, not a separatist region of a collapsing empire. (Sharadze, 2001,p. 19) To accomplish its aim, Georgia refused to take part in any diplomatic format that presumed the survival or restoration of the Russian state including both Bolshevik Russia and the Russian White movement. For example, the Prinkipo Conference organized by the Entente in early 1919 sought to bring together all factions of the former Russian Empire to discuss the postwar order. Georgia rejected the invitation outright, arguing that it had declared independence and therefore would not sit at the same table as Russian forces regardless of whether they were Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik. This was not just a gesture but it was a carefully planned act of foreign policy that drew a permanent line between Georgia’s future and Russia’s imperial legacy (Kobakhidze, Silakadze, and Vacharadze, 2020, p. 58). These actions were consistent with Georgia’s broader foreign policy trajectory. One of the first major diplomatic moves of Georgia was the Treaty of Poti, signed with Germany in May 1918 (Tavartkiladze, 2020, p. 208). While the Russian Empire dissolved and the Ottoman army had an advantage, Georgian leaders realized the need for the immediate protection, and Germany was seen as a potential guarantor of security. Although the alliance with Germany was short-lived due to the Central Powers’ defeat, it demonstrated Georgia’s pragmatic effort to align with a European power and distance itself from Russia’s orbit . This strategic positioning also led to Georgia’s first de jure recognition, when the Ottoman Empire acknowledged its independence in June 1918 as part of their negotiated settlement (Avalishvili, 1990, p. 49). While politically fraught, this recognition showed that Georgia was capable of functioning as a sovereign actor in regional diplomacy.Following Germany’s defeat in November 1918, Georgia reoriented its foreign policy toward the British, who filled the power vacuum in the South Caucasus. The British military presence in Georgia between 1918 and 1920, although limited, was essential in stabilizing the republic temporarily and in facilitating Georgian appeals to Western powers for formal recognition . Georgian diplomacy then concentrated on London and Paris, and emphasized the republic’s democratic institutions, moderate socialist leadership, and commitment to European values. Diplomats like David Ghambashidze in London and Akaki Chkhenkeli in Paris advocated tirelessly for recognition. They highlighted Georgia’s democratic institutions, legal reforms, and European orientation while carefully distancing the republic from the narrative of imperial disintegration (Kobakhidze, 2013). In early 1920,when Russian riots came to an end Soviet Russia thought that it was time to invade Georgia through its Red Army, but the operation failed due to Georgian military resistance and lack of support from local populations. This failure pushed Moscow to reconsider its approach, and in May 1920, the Treaty of Moscow was signed, through which Soviet Russia formally recognized Georgia’s independence and agreed not to interfere in its internal affairs. This moment was not only a tactical retreat by the Bolsheviks but it was a diplomatic victory for Georgia, which had successfully defended its sovereignty both militarily and diplomatically (Suny, 1988).This recognition by Soviet Russia, although temporary and ultimately violated in 1921, played a crucial role in convincing Western powers to reconsider their positions as it is known Georgia mostly had De Facto recognition from most of the western countries and inn January 1921, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom officially granted Georgia de jure recognition. By early 1921, Georgia stood recognized as an independent, democratic republic by both East and West which was a significant thus fragile accomplishment. The country’s consistent strategy of diplomatic alignment with Europe, refusal to legitimize Russian-imperial continuity, and insistence on legal and moral sovereignty culminated in a brief but remarkable period of international legitimacy.

4.2 Relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan,Turkey

Aside from Georgia's foreign policy towards western powers, its relations with Neighboring states is crucial to analyze. Georgia’s foreign policy showed that Georgia wanted to be an independent player in the South Caucasus and its relationship with its immediate neighbors Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey shows how carefully Georgia tried to maintain that distance while navigating complex territorial and diplomatic tensions.
The relations between Georgia and Armenia can be marked by both cooperation and confrontation. The most serious conflict occurred in December 1918, when the two countries engaged in a brief military clash over the Lori region, an ethnically mixed territory along their shared border. Despite the potential for escalation, Georgia opted to submit the dispute to British arbitration, demonstrating its preference for judicial intervention over gunboat diplomacy.(Janelidze,2018) A neutral corridor was created in Lori under British administration, and although tensions ran high, there was no mass violence.This episode demonstrated a significant difference from Russian imperial and later Soviet policy. In Bolshevik and Tsarist systems, border and ethnic disputes were commonly used as pretexts for intervention and eventual annexation (Suny, 1988). Georgia, however, reversed this logic, exercising restraint and diplomatically reaffirming its identity as a European, rule-of-law state . Moreover, the Armenian population in Tbilisi coexisted peacefully during this time, and Georgian media avoided provocative rhetoric once again reflecting the government's belief in pluralism and stable governance.
The relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan was somewhat less complicated. Positively, both republics shared an interest in countering Bolshevik expansionism and Ottoman influence. Georgian and Azerbaijani leaders engaged in preliminary talks regarding the formation of a Caucasian political bloc in 1918, aiming to revive the model of regional cooperation briefly established under the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (Janelidze, 2018). However, territorial disputes most notably over the Zaqatala region, a mountainous area claimed by both sides and Azerbaijan’s growing alignment with Turkey impeded the realization of any lasting union. Nevertheless, in June 1919, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a bilateral treaty establishing mutual recognition of each other's independence and a commitment to respecting borders. This was a critical milestone, representing the first instance in which two post-imperial republics in the region recognized one another as equal sovereign entities, rather than as components of a contested or shared imperial legacy. In doing so, Georgia once again pursued a diplomatic strategy rooted in mutual recognition and international law, rather than the Russian zero-sum model of dominance or ideological expansion
As for Turkey, geography, shared adversaries, and recent military conflict shaped Georgia’s relations with it. During World War I, Ottoman forces had advanced into southwestern Georgia, particularly the regions of Adjara and Batumi. After the Ottoman defeat in late 1918, Georgia swiftly reasserted control over these areas. (Suny, 1988) The situation in Batumi, however, remained unstable, complicated by overlapping Turkish, British, and Bolshevik interests. Despite these challenges, Georgia managed to establish the relationship with remarkable diplomatic restraint. It cooperated with British troops stationed in Batumi and refrained from provoking Turkey, which was itself undergoing a turbulent postwar transition. In 1919, Georgia initiated direct negotiations with Ankara on the basis of non-aggression and mutual respect. (Kveselava, 2004) This cautious and calculated approach stood in stark contrast to Russia’s historical pattern of dominating its neighbors or undermining them through revolutionary proxies . Georgia’s foreign policy toward Turkey was also strategically informed. Having received its first formal recognition of independence from the Ottoman Empire in June 1918, the Georgian government sought to preserve a functional relationship with Ankara, even amid concerns over Turkish irredentist ambitions. The Treaty of Batumi, although signed under coercive circumstances, was later reinterpreted by Georgia not as an act of submission, but as a juridical confirmation of its sovereignty (Svanidze, 2002, p. 274).
In its regional interactions, Georgia consistently pursued legalism, negotiation, and sovereign equality, a principled and pragmatic diplomatic approach. In contrast to the Russian doctrine of coercion, absorption, or ideological conquest, Georgia favored bilateral treaties, arbitration, and non-aggression pacts. It did not seek to dominate its neighbors, nor did it pursue the revival of the Transcaucasian federation at the expense of its own autonomy.This regional strategy aligned seamlessly with Georgia’s broader foreign policy vision: survival through sovereignty, and sovereignty through diplomatic distinction. From a constructivist perspective, these diplomatic behaviors reflected Georgia’s active construction of a sovereign national identity distinct from imperial or Bolshevik models. Foreign policy was not merely pragmatic but a deliberate expression of Georgia’s self-perception as an independent, democratic state within a European framework. Each regional decision whether in the Caucasus or on the European stage, was an intentional effort to reject imperial inheritances and present Georgia as a modern, independent republic worthy of international legitimacy.

4.3 Paris Peace Conference
The Paris Peace Conference, held between January 1919 and January 1920, was the diplomatic conference that formally concluded World War I. Summoned in the aftermath of a war that had devastated Europe and redrawn borders across continents, the conference brought together the victorious Allied nations primarily France, Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States to negotiate peace treaties with the defeated Central Powers (Kobakhidze 2015, 4). The conference was an international forum for redefining international relations on new foundations: opposition to empire, acceptance of self-determination, and the institution of the League of Nations as a supranational force of collective security and international cooperation. For the Democratic Republic of Georgia, participation in the postwar diplomatic reordering of Europe was essential to its international legitimacy.For Georgia it was not just about recognition, but about positioning Georgia as a modern, sovereign, European republic that rejected any association with post-imperial Russia either Tsarist or Bolshevik. The Georgian delegation to Paris, led by Akaki Chkhenkeli, one of the foremost Menshevik politicians, was aimed at securing both political legitimacy and legal recognition for the new state. As Beka Kobakhidze highlights, Chkhenkeli’s strategic approach was not simply to plead for assistance but to demonstrate that Georgia already fulfilled the necessary criteria for statehood under international law: a defined territory, a permanent population, a functioning government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Kobakhidze 2015). The challenge, however, lay in the internal inconsistencies of Allied policy toward Russia. France, above all nations, favored the restoration of a Russian central state White or even Bolshevik and viewed secessionist republics unfavorably. Georgia tried to distinguish its case by emphasizing its internal stability, absence of civil war, democratic elections, and clean break with the Russian imperial tradition. This way Georgia placed itself not as a revolutionary venture, but as a European-style democracy worthy of recognition on legal and normative grounds (Kobakhidze 2015, 57) . Georgia's memorandum presented to the Allied Supreme Council established the republic's territorial claims, historical rightness, and its firm commitment to democratic government. It was a step forward in distancing Georgia fromRussia and emphasizing its independence. Concurrently, Paris White émigré organizations insisted on a claim over all areas of the previous empire even of Georgia on grounds that the republics did not legally possess claim over independence. Counter to this argument, the Georgian delegation invoked the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk whereby Bolshevik Russia already waived any claim on past territorial holdings (Kobakhidze, 2020). Georgian envoys worked to form connections with socialist and liberal politicians across Europe. Leaders such as Émile Vandervelde, Ramsay MacDonald, and Jean Longuet, key voices for the Second International commended Georgia's parliamentarian state, women's votes, and multiparty politics. Such endorsement lent Georgia additional moral and political legitimacy when patronage by great powers was in doubt (Kobakhidze, 2020, pp. 19–20). Georgia's stance was backed up again by its working institutions: having a national currency (the Georgian maneti), postal and customs administration of its own, elected Constituent Assembly, and advanced system of law that reached its apogee with the promulgation of the 1921 Constitution. These were not acts of a secessionist movement but these were the attributes of a sovereign and modern democratic state. As noted by Kobakhidze, Georgian diplomacy was exemplary among non-recognized states in terms of gradual and peaceful expression of sovereignty, in contrast to military power or revolution (Kobakhidze, 2020). However, full de jure recognition was put back by Allied prudence. Still, Georgia's initiatives were not in vain. In January 1920, the Allied Supreme Council de facto acknowledged Georgia, which was a monumental diplomatic success. For Georgian policymakers, this meant not just approval of independence but also of foreign policy approach, a pledge of legalism, impartiality, and Western alignment in preference to combat or coercion. To this extent, Georgia's performance at the Paris Peace Conference is a dramatic articulation of the central thesis of this thesis: that the diplomatic victory of the First Republic was based on its principled and strategic refusal of Russian norms of geopolitics. While Russia imperial or Soviet relied on coercion, ideological rigor, or claims of historical right, Georgia invoked international law, democratic legitimacy, and diplomatic modernity. The Georgian delegation arrived not as the pawn of transnational politics nor as an anachronism of the empire, but as an autonomous and deserving participant in the new European order. Although in the end not enough to prevent Soviet invasion in 1921, Georgia's Parisian diplomatic endeavor left an enduring legacy. It proved that a small state, emerging from the empire's ashes, could articulate sovereignty on its own terms through the grammar of law, legitimacy, and liberal values. The recognition provided, and respect won, would endure the short lifespan of the First Republic and be a model for Georgia's current diplomatic persona.

4.4 Georgia and The League of Nations

Following its diplomatic efforts at the Paris Peace Conference and gaining de facto and de jure recognition from major allied powers, the Democratic Republic of Georgia pursued an even more ambitious goal: membership in the League of Nations. The League of Nations which was established in 1919 was the most prominent international organization that emerged from the Versailles system and embodied the liberal world order of collective security, self-determination, and sovereign equality (Vadachkoria, 2003, p.436). Georgia had an ambition to join the League and its will was not merely utilitarian, it was both a symbolic and diplomatic statement of its desire to be firmly rooted in the European legal and diplomatic community.
The step towards its goal and membership formed part of Georgia’s broader foreign policy trajectory, the one that deliberately aspired to distance itself from both the pragmatic and symbolic appeal of the Russian imperial legacy. For Georgia’s political leadership, League membership would have gained full access to the ranks of civilized states. It would also have provided juridical guarantees of territorial integrity at a time when Soviet ambitions in the region were getting stronger. Yet the geopolitical climate of 1920 was less idealistic than the League’s founding principles. The League’s organizational framework particularly Article 10, which required members to come to one another’s defense in the event of aggression posed the principal obstacle to Georgia’s admission. Most League member states were unwilling to accept this obligation, particularly in the context of an increasingly unstable South Caucasus and the looming threat of Soviet incursion (Kveselava, 2004, p. 52 ). In December of 1920 at the session of the League in Geneva, Georgia’s application for full membership was formally considered. Ten states voted in favor, thirteen against, and seventeen abstained (ICCN, 2023). The result was negative for Georgia not because Georgia lacked legitimacy, but because of geopolitical calculations. On the contrary, Georgia had demonstrated its capacity for democratic governance, diplomatic maturity, and peaceful coexistence. The League’s refusal reflected a strategic unwillingness to provoke Soviet Russia and refusal to defend a small Caucasian republic against a great power . Even though Georgia got rejected to join the League of Nations it was one of the most politically strategic and strong statements from Georgia for its foreign policy direction which included alignment with international law, dissociation from imperial and revolutionary coercion, and the construction of a national identity premised on democratic and cooperative values. The League’s rejection was not a failure of diplomacy, but a demonstration of the principled consistency of Georgian foreign policy, a policy defined not by imitation of Russia, but by its firm and deliberate opposition to both imperial and Soviet paradigms. Though diplomatically disappointing , the League’s refusal did not discredit Georgia’s foreign policy. Rather, it underscored the republic’s commitment to internationalism even when it yielded no tangible security benefits. For Georgia’s foreign policy understanding of sovereignty was fundamentally incompatible with both imperial and Soviet systems. In this sense, even in rejection, the League experience affirmed Georgia’s identity as a European, rule-bound, and modern international actor.

4.5 The 1921 Constitution

February 21, 1921 is an important date for Georgia’s political history. On that day, while Soviet soldiers were approaching Tbilisi, the Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Georgia adopted one of the most advanced constitutions of its time. Even though the republic would be lost to Bolshevik conquest within days, the adoption of the 1921 Constitution was not a desperate gesture but it was a final, clear expression of a political identity founded on democracy, legalism, and Europeanism. The Constitution united the very principles that had guided Georgia's foreign policy since 1918: republicanism, rule of law, social and political pluralism, and peaceful diplomacy. It was a deliberate and principled departure from Russian imperialism and the ideological authoritarianism of Soviet rule. As Georgian writer and political figure Karlo Inasaridze evaluates it, the 1921 Constitution was an historically important fact since for the first time through Georgia's 3000 years history, Georgia went from Monarchy ruling system to republican one (Inasaridze 2021). Working on the constitution started back in 1918 after the declaration of independence and was finalized in February 1921. In 1918 , the National Council of Georgia established a constitutional commission, which included politicians from different political parties such as Social-Democrats, Social-Federalists, Social-Revolutionaries, National- Democrats and one member without party. This commission was a great contribution to the upcoming 1921 Constitution since it defined Georgia’s main ruling form-Democratic Republic, started working on various provisions of the Constitution connected with defining national territories, parliament and executive power, court, churches, armed forces, national finance and rights of foreigners and minorities. (Sharadze, 2001, p.253). Last session of this Constitutional Commission was on 9 march, 1919 which stated that already stated provisions would be handed over to the The Constituent Assembly. In February 1919, the proportional elections for the The Constituent Assembly were held where both genders voted where social democrats got 103 places out of 130. Later on The Constituent Assembly, during its third session chose the new Constitutional Commision. As the member and minister of justice Razhden Arsenide wrote that thus the mission was hard and they worked nearly all day long and used different constitutions of democratic states to take examples and fit it to Georgia and Georgian people, a lot of examples were taken from Switzerland’s constitution as well as other democratic states’ principles were taken as a role model. The Commission started working again on the constitution and after several committees, detailed analysis and presentations of the constitution, on February 21, 1919 the Georgian government established the constitution. It consisted of 17 chapters and 149 articles. The 1921 Georgian Constitution was a pioneering document. It exercised universal suffrage (including women’s voting rights), abolished the death penalty, guaranteed the right of habeas corpus, introduced trial by jury, and protected freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. In terms of civil liberties and democratic foundations, it even surpassed many modern Western constitutions​. The government it established was parliamentary, with constitutionally enshrined local self-government and a commitment to human rights that matched the most progressive legal traditions in Europe. Most notably, Article 19 abolished capital punishment outright, a legal standard that was novel at the time. The Constitution was deliberately rigid, with amendments requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority and ratification by national referendum, a demonstration of the authors' resolve not to allow any drift toward authoritarianism​ (Sharadze 2001, 256 ).This increasingly law-based system owed much to Georgia's ruling political leadership mostly Menshevik social democrats who viewed their efforts not as revolutionary utopianism, but as gradual development grounded in European democratic values. Noe Zhordania, the head of government, openly blamed Bolshevik ideology for bypassing the democratic stage and thus ending not in socialism but in "vandalism"​ (Constitutional Court of Georgia, 2012). By contrast, Georgian social democrats saw themselves as modernizers in the European tradition.The Constitution also met with international applause. European visitors from the Second International, including principal figures like Ramsay MacDonald, were taken aback by Georgia's advanced constitutional thinking. MacDonald famously observed that what he witnessed in Georgia was something he hoped to see in his own country​ (Constitutional Court of Georgia, 2012). The Constitution had been translated into French and was approved by the Constituent Assembly for distribution abroad on February 22, 1921​ (Kirtadze, 1997). The 1921 Constitution thus was not just the juridical completion of the First Republic's state-building project, but also a diplomatic declaration. By enshrining liberal, social-democratic values in a binding legal document, Georgia openly declared that its sovereign identity was incompatible with both Russian imperial and Bolshevik models of rule. The historical context of the Constitution’s adoption made it even more symbolic. Four days after the adoption of the Constitution on February 25 the Soviet Red Army occupied Tbilisi (Suny,1988). The Georgian government, forced to retreat to Batumi, was nevertheless able to print and circulate the third and final draft of the Constitution before going into exile. At a moment of national peril, the leadership embraced neither militarism nor autocracy. Instead, it offered the world a constitutional model of Georgia's place as a modern European republic.

Chapter 5: The Fall of Republic and its diplomatic aftermath (1920-1921)
5.1 Soviet Invasion and the Collapse of he First Republic of Georgia
February 21, 1921, the day Georgia adopted its progressive Constitution, marked the peak of the Democratic Republic’s state-building efforts. However, only four days later, this vision was violently destroyed by Soviet military aggression. The Soviet Red Army invaded Georgia on February 11, and by February 25, Tbilisi had fallen. The Republic was not undone by internal crisis, but by an external threat aimed at destroying its democratic identity and international legitimacy (Suny,1988). The fall of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in February March 1921 was not an inevitable collapse of a weak state, nor a result of internal chaos. It was a direct consequence of external aggression- a deliberate Soviet invasion aimed at eliminating the only functioning democracy in post-imperial space. The Soviet invasion was not an accidental or defensive response. It was a well calculated action to regain control over a strategically important state whose foreign and domestic policies had become fundamentally incompatible with the Bolshevik system of governance. As known, Georgia had already been recognized de jure by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy in January 1921, just one month before the invasion (Kobakhidze 2018). Moreover, in May 1920, the Treaty of Moscow had guaranteed Georgia's sovereignty and explicitly prohibited Russian intervention in its internal affairs (Suny, 1988, p.206) Despite the treaty, the Bolsheviks viewed Georgia’s successful attempt to build a democratic, Western-oriented state as a direct threat. It was specifically Georgia’s foreign policy divergence from the Russian imperial model, its pro-European diplomacy and legal, democratic government, that rendered the country “intolerable” to Soviet ambitions (Kobakhidze, 2018). The justification for the invasion a fabricated rebellion in the Lorri region allegedly initiated by Georgian Bolsheviks was little more than diplomatic cover.Georgian troops mounted strong resistance, not only in and around Tbilisi, but throughout the country as the government retreated westward. Despite their lack of resources, the mobilization of Georgian forces served to demonstrate that the republic had not collapsed from within but it was defending itself in a war it could not win without external support. Hopes for Western military assistance went unfulfilled. Although British forces remained in Batumi, they were under strict orders not to engage (Janelidze, 2018). By early March, Tbilisi fell. The government retreated to Kutaisi and then to Batumi, where it held out until the Treaty of Kars was signed with Kemalist Turkey. With no hope of continuing resistance and unwilling to subject the country to further destruction, the government decided to evacuate. On March 17, 1921, the leaders of the republic boarded ships bound for France. The First Republic was over.The government, led by Noe Zhordania, decided to evacuate in early March. On March 17, 1921, the leadership departed for Leuville-sur-Orge, France, where the Georgian government-in-exile would continue operating for decades. Zhordania famously stated, “The government did not resign it was interrupted,” a phrase that would come to define the diplomatic mission of the Georgian exile movement (Kobakhidze, 2018 ).Although the Red Army’s occupation of Tbilisi was swift, it was not met with universal acceptance. Between 1921 and 1924, Georgia witnessed a series of uprisings against Soviet rule, culminating in the August Uprising of 1924, which was violently suppressed. These revolts testified to the strength of the democratic and national consciousness that had taken root during the First Republic, and to the widespread rejection of Bolshevik governance by the Georgian population (Janelidze, 2018). Therefore, the fall of the First Republic cannot be explained as the natural consequence of internal dysfunction. Rather, it was the direct result of the success of its foreign policy. Georgia had succeeded in establishing an internationally recognized sovereign republic, founded on law, pluralism, and European diplomatic norms. It had done so without resorting to military subservience or ideological dependence on Russia, making it an ideological anomaly within the post-imperial space.The Soviet invasion, then, was not merely a territorial conquest it was also an ideological act. It was the forceful reassertion of Moscow’s claim that no part of the former Russian Empire could exist outside its political and ideological control. The occupation was meant to extinguish what Georgia had come to represent: a functioning democracy, born from the imperial collapse, guided by Western principles, and determined to assert its sovereignty through diplomacy rather than war.

5.2 Georgian Government in Exile and Continued Diplomatic Efforts

Although the First Republic of Georgia was militarily defeated in March 1921, its political project did not end with the Soviet occupation.The Georgian government-in-exile, based in Leuville-sur-Orge, France, continued to uphold the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic and pursue its foreign policy objectives for decades. Far from being a symbolic institution, the government-in-exile became a platform for diplomatic resistance and a custodian of Georgia's democratic legacy demonstrating the resilience of a state whose founding principles could not be extinguished by force.The leadership of the exile government headed by Noe Zhordania included many of the same individuals who had shaped Georgia's institutions and policies between 1918 and 1921. These figures refused to recognize the legitimacy of Soviet occupation and instead committed to maintaining the juridical continuity of the republic. Their argument was straightforward: the Soviet invasion was a violation of international law and of the bilateral Treaty of Moscow (1920). Because Georgia had been recognized de jure by several Western powers prior to the occupation, the government-in-exile asserted its continued legitimacy as the sole rightful authority representing the Georgian nation (Kobakhidze, 2018). Even without territorial control, the exile government remained active in diplomatic and informational initiatives. It published statements condemning Soviet repression, sent representatives to international organizations and political forums, and maintained correspondence with foreign governments. While these efforts did not always receive formal support, they helped to keep the idea of an independent Georgia alive in international political discourse. Arguably, its most significant achievement was the preservation of state symbols and legal continuity. The government-in-exile continued to use Georgia's national flag, seal, and the 1921 Constitution as emblems of sovereignty. It also produced newspapers, hosted community events, and published historical works to remind both the world and future generations of Georgians that the First Republic had not disappeared it had simply been interrupted. The government-in-exile also played a vital role in shaping and inspiring Georgian diaspora communities in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Politicians such as David Ghambashidze were active in building ties with European parliamentarians and journalists, emphasizing Georgia’s compatibility with European democratic values and the injustice of Soviet aggression and Western passivity. These efforts situated Georgia’s diplomatic message within the broader framework of small nations suffering under totalitarian regimes. Importantly, the exile government did not remain silent about the failures of Western powers to act decisively in 1921. The Treaty of Rapallo (1922) between Germany and Soviet Russia was seen as a betrayal, effectively legitimizing Soviet conquests and disregarding the sovereignty of occupied countries like Georgia. In response, Georgian émigré leaders issued public letters and critiques, accusing the West of sacrificing small nations in the name of geopolitical expediency (Janelidze, 2018). In 1945, following World War II, Georgia’s exiled leadership once again expressed dismay that the Yalta Conference had failed to address the Soviet occupation of the Caucasus. They argued that the Allied powers, by accepting Soviet postwar borders, had abandoned the principle of self-determination they themselves had championed during the war. These criticisms formed part of a wider effort to document Soviet abuses and sustain the legal and moral case for Georgian independence. Throughout the Cold War, the Georgian exile community also contributed to the preservation of national memory and political consciousness. Intellectuals such as Irakli Tsereteli, Noe Ramishvili, and Razhden Arsenide published memoirs, political commentaries, and historical studies that documented the achievements of the First Republic while exposing Soviet falsifications. These publications were not merely academic, they were deeply political, meant to counteract Soviet narratives portraying the First Republic as short-lived or illegitimate. When Georgia regained independence in 1991, the symbolic legacy of the government-in-exile became central to the rebirth of the Georgian state. The five-cross flag was restored, references to the 1921 Constitution reappeared in foundational legal documents, and the remains of exiled leaders were ceremoniously repatriated. In 2021, on the centenary of the Soviet invasion, the return of Noe Zhordania’s remains was not just a symbolic act it was an affirmation of the historical continuity of Georgian statehood.
In conclusion, the Georgian government-in-exile was essential in preserving the diplomatic and political legacy of the First Republic. Despite being deprived of territory, it defended Georgia’s sovereignty, denied legitimacy to Soviet occupation, and continued to project Georgia’s identity as a democratic, European-oriented state. This chapter reinforces the core hypothesis of this thesis: Georgia’s strategic opposition to Russian imperial and Soviet domination was not incidental, but a foundational and enduring element of its foreign policy and national identity, one that survived both within its borders and beyond them.
5.3 Legacy of the First Republic in Modern Georgia
Even though the First Republic of Georgia lasted only for three years, its institutional system, diplomatic ambitions, and ideological orientation had a lasting impact on the political identity of the nation. The years 1918–1921 marked Georgia's first attempt to become a modern, independent, and democratic state, and that legacy continued to shape the nation's foreign policy even after the republic's collapse (Suny, 1988). The years 1918–1921 marked Georgia's first attempt to become a modern, independent, and democratic state, and that legacy continued to shape the nation's foreign policy even after the republic's collapse. Since the Georgian government of 1918-1921 after soviet invasion went to France, for Georgia the democratic republic was not defeated, Georgia was under occupation and later ot it regained its sovereignty and independence continued.Accordingly, when Georgia regained independence in 1991, it did not rebuild its political identity from scratch but it deliberately returned to the legacy of the First Republic, reviving its symbols, its constitution, and its Western geopolitical orientation. The 1921 Constitution, ratified just days before the Soviet occupation, was not merely a historic legal document but a lasting declaration of national values. Upon the restoration of independence, the preamble of the 1995 Constitution referenced 1921 as a founding moment in Georgian statehood, asserting that Georgia's democratic aspirations had not been lost, but only postponed. The parliamentary system of government, the protection of minority rights, and the commitment to international law, defining features of the First Republic were formally reinstated in post-Soviet politics (Sharadze,2001). In the decades following 1991, Georgia consistently oriented its foreign policy toward the West, following the strategic vision of its first independent government. All subsequent administrations have pursued integration into NATO and the European Union, emphasizing Georgia's European identity and rejecting any return to the Russian sphere of influence. From the 2014 signing of the EU Association Agreement to the formal application for EU candidacy in 2022, Georgia's post-Soviet trajectory has followed the diplomatic path laid in 1918: achieving sovereignty through multilateral diplomacy and international legitimacy. Georgia's aspiration towards Europe is not merely pragmatic but it is symbolic as well. Politicians and citizens routinely refer to the First Republic as a source of inspiration and legitimacy. Public commemorations on May 26, the anniversary of the 1918 declaration of independence, are accompanied by official speeches that reaffirm the republic’s legacy. Major state institutions, school curricula, and diplomatic rhetoric regularly reference 1918–1921 as Georgia's foundational experiment in modern statehood and as a point of contrast with Soviet domination.The rejection of Russian hegemony remains one of the most crucial features of modern Georgian foreign policy. Just as the First Republic distanced itself from both Tsarist and Bolshevik models, modern Georgia has also resisted Russian-led initiatives such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Instead, Georgia has pursued deeper integration with the European Union, the United States, and other democratic allies, articulating its sovereignty not as resistance to domination, but as a positive identification with international norms based on the rule of law.The August 2008 War and the ongoing Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have further strengthened the perception of Russia as a coercive and colonial power. Georgian leaders such as Mikheil Saakashvili frequently invoked the First Republic to draw historical parallels, arguing that Georgia’s modern-day conflict with Russia is a continuation of the same struggle for independence and geopolitical self-determination that began in 1918 (Saakashvili, as cited in Kobakhidze, 2020).This legacy is also evident in Georgia’s participation in international peacekeeping missions, contributions to NATO-led operations, and its insistence on democratic institution-building as a precondition for international engagement. These are not new policies, but the continuation of a diplomatic vision first articulated during Georgia’s brief independence. Furthermore, the memory of the government-in-exile underscores the importance of historical continuity. When, in 2021, the remains of Noe Zhordania were returned to Georgia, the event was not merely commemorative but it was presented as the conclusion of a long-interrupted historical cycle. The state-led repatriation of exiled leaders, the translation and publication of exile memoirs, and the incorporation of the First Republic into education all reflect a deliberate national effort to reclaim historical identity.According to all these the First Republic was not a failed experiment. It was, rather, a deliberate and visionary attempt to redefine Georgia’s role in the international system, one whose legacy outlasted its brief existence. The political, legal, and diplomatic structures it established were robust enough to be revived 70 years later and continue to guide Georgia’s statecraft today.In conclusion, the foreign policy of the First Republic was not a reactive strategy born of chaos, but a conscious expression of sovereign identity, based on European standards and in strategic opposition to Russian imperial institutions. This orientation has fundamentally shaped Georgia's diplomatic direction in the post-Soviet era. The struggle for sovereignty during 1918–1921 laid the moral and ideological foundation for Georgia's current independence. And that is why even though the First Republic was ultimately destroyed by force its legacy endured and remained a lasting symbol in Georgia’s national consciousness.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
The foreign policy of the First Republic of Georgia between 1918 and 1921 was a deliberate and strategic effort to construct sovereignty under highly challenging geopolitical circumstances. Georgia’s leaders did not merely react to the collapse of the Russian Empire rather, they actively worked to position Georgia as a European-oriented, democratic republic. By consistently rejecting participation in post-imperial Russian frameworks, affirming its independence through international law, and pursuing diplomatic recognition from Western powers, Georgia demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how sovereignty could be asserted through both identity and diplomacy. Through its refusal to participate in negotiations that treated it as a fragment of the Russian Empire, such as the Prinkipo Conference, and through its continuous appeals to the principles of self-determination and democratic governance, Georgia positioned itself not as a rebellious province but as a legitimate sovereign state. This strategy culminated in its de facto and de jure recognition by major powers and its application for membership in the League of Nations, even though the latter ultimately failed due to international geopolitical considerations rather than shortcomings in Georgia’s diplomatic efforts. The case of Georgia between 1918 and 1921 demonstrates that foreign policy can serve as an instrument of nation-building, identity consolidation, and international legitimation, even when material power is lacking. The First Republic’s reliance on legal, diplomatic, and identity-based strategies offers important insights into the foreign policy behavior of small states seeking to assert themselves within a competitive international system. Although ultimately overcome by Soviet military aggression, Georgia's foreign policy achievements during this period laid the foundation for its modern aspirations toward European integration and democratic governance. The First Republic’s diplomatic legacy endures today as a critical element of Georgia’s national consciousness and international orientation.
Závěr
Zahraniční politika První Gruzínské republiky v letech 1918 až 1921 byla promyšleným a strategickým úsilím o vybudování státní svrchovanosti v mimořádně náročných geopolitických podmínkách. Gruzínští představitelé nereagovali pouze na kolaps Ruského impéria – aktivně usilovali o to, aby byla Gruzie vnímána jako evropsky orientovaná, demokratická republika. Tím, že důsledně odmítala účast v postsovětských strukturách, potvrzovala svou nezávislost prostřednictvím mezinárodního práva a usilovala o diplomatické uznání od západních mocností, projevovala Gruzie sofistikované pochopení toho, jak lze svrchovanost prosazovat prostřednictvím identity i diplomacie.Odmítnutím účasti na jednáních, která s ní zacházela jako s částí bývalého Ruského impéria – jako například na konferenci v Prinkipu – a neustálým odvoláváním se na principy sebeurčení a demokratické správy věcí veřejných se Gruzie prezentovala nikoli jako vzbouřená provincie, ale jako legitimní a suverénní stát. Tato strategie vyvrcholila v jejím de facto a později i de iure uznání hlavními světovými mocnostmi a v podání žádosti o členství ve Společnosti národů, které sice nakonec nebylo přijato, ale spíše kvůli mezinárodním geopolitickým okolnostem než kvůli nedostatkům v gruzínské diplomacii.Případ Gruzie v letech 1918 až 1921 ukazuje, že zahraniční politika může sloužit jako nástroj budování národa, upevnění identity a mezinárodní legitimace, i když stát postrádá materiální sílu. Spoléhání se První republiky na právní, diplomatické a identitní strategie poskytuje důležité poznatky o chování malých států v konkurenčním mezinárodním prostředí. Ačkoli byla Gruzie nakonec poražena sovětskou vojenskou agresí, její úspěchy v oblasti zahraniční politiky v tomto období položily základy jejím současným aspiracím na evropskou integraci a demokratické řízení. Diplomatické dědictví První republiky tak dodnes tvoří klíčovou součást národního vědomí Gruzie a jejího mezinárodního směřování.
References


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საქართველოს პირველი დემოკრატიული რესპუბლიკა - საქართველოს ეროვნული არქივი. (n.d.). Საქართველოს Ეროვნული Არქივი. https://archive.gov.ge/ge/sakartelos-pirveli-demokratiuli-respublika



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Summary:

This thesis explores the foreign policy of the First Republic of Georgia (1918–1921) within the context of its emergence from Russian imperial rule. Using a constructivist framework and historical case study methodology, the research analyzes how Georgia constructed its sovereignty through diplomatic strategies, legal arguments, and identity-building efforts. The study demonstrates that Georgia’s foreign policy was not merely reactive but represented a proactive articulation of a European, democratic, and independent identity. Key diplomatic actions including the refusal to participate in Russian-centered negotiations, efforts to gain Western recognition, and the application for League of Nations membership reflect Georgia's commitment to international law and self-determination. Despite its short lifespan and ultimate Soviet occupation, the First Republic’s diplomatic achievements had a lasting impact, shaping Georgia’s modern political identity and its ongoing pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

Table of Contents

Table of Contents 7
Chapter 1: Introduction 8
1.1 Introduction 8
1.2 Literature Review and Research Objectives 9
Chapter 2: Methodology 12
2.1 Constructivism 12
2.2 Case Study 13
Chapter 3: Historical Pretext 14
3.1 Nation Building in Imperial Borders 14
3.2 Russian Revolution 17
3.3 The Act of Independence 19
Chapter 4: Georgia's Foreign Policy 21
4.1 Relations with Europe and Western Powers 21
4.2 Relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan,Turkey 25
4.3 Paris Peace Conference 27
4.4 Georgia and The League of Nations 30
Chapter 5: The Fall of Republic and its diplomatic aftermath (1920-1921) 35
5.1 Soviet Invasion and the Collapse of he First Republic of Georgia 35
5.2 Georgian Government in Exile and Continued Diplomatic Efforts 37
5.3 Legacy of the First Republic in Modern Georgia 40
Chapter 6: Conclusion 43
References 45
Summary: 49

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction

Achieving sovereignty and establishing The First Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921) was a breakthrough moment in Georgia's history, marking the first attempt to establish a European-style democracy in the Caucasus region. More than a century later, the historical significance of this event remains relevant especially as Georgia still continues its pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration and democratic consolidation. The challenges that the first republic of Georgia has faced such as balancing national sovereignty, democratic governance, and external pressures from imperial powers are still central issues to modern Georgian politics. Nowadays as Georgia again strives to establish a relationship with the European Union and NATO, its historical success in establishing state during the early 20th century is a reference point for ongoing political discourse, foreign policy decisions, and national identity formation. This thesis aims to delve into foreign policy of Georgia during the years of 1918-1921 in terms of navigating its path towards democracy while being within imperial borders. It aims to analyze how Georgia pursued diplomatic recognition, engaged with European powers, and managed regional conflicts while striving to maintain its independence. Using a constructivist framework and case study methodology, this thesis will analyze Georgia's participation in international negotiations, diplomatic relations with Western democracies, as well as strategic defense against neighboring Soviet Russia.
The first chapter of this thesis consists of introduction, the literature review and research objectives. The Second chapter of the research is devoted to methodology, explaining why constructivism and case study have been chosen for research methodology followed by the research question and the hypothesis. The third chapter provides the historical pretext analyzing the development of Georgian national consciousness under Russian imperial rule highlighting the ideological and institutional groundwork before the declaration of independence in 1918. The fourth chapter presents the findings particularly about Georgia’s foreign policy between 1918-1921 with particular emphasis on how it was strategically opposed to Russian imperial and Soviet diplomacy. The fifth chapter concludes the findings and addresses the factors influencing Georgia’s democratic development, reflecting on the internal and external factors that influenced the republic’s trajectory, and the lasting legacy of the First Republic in contemporary Georgian political identity. Finally, the sixth chapter summarizes all the findings of the research connecting it with the stated hypothesis by positioning Georgia’s post-1918 foreign policy within the wider framework of small nations asserting sovereignty in defiance of dominant imperial powers.

1.2 Literature Review and Research Objectives

The foreign Policy of the First Republic of Georgia, and the First Democratic Republic of Georgia itself have been getting a lot of scholarly attention lately yet still it remains an understudied area within both Georgian and broader international historiography. There are various works exploring Georgia’s internal political development and the broader socio-cultural transformation during its brief independence but it is interesting to analyze Georgia's diplomatic trajectory, especially in contrast to the Russian imperial and Soviet models. This thesis seeks to contribute to analyzing this field by delving into Georgia’s foreign policy through a constructivist lens, focusing on how the republic strategically navigated its foreign policy and sovereignty through identity construction, legal diplomacy, and rejection of Russia’s political logic.
Most foundational and primary sources for this subject are the archival sources provided by National Archives of Georgia which include original and digitized documents. According to those materials have been created a digital platform “Firstrepublic.ge” which unites digitized materials of official texts, biographies, legal documents, and photographs from 1917 to 1924 (firstrepublic.ge, n.d.). Aside from the primary sources, Georgian and foreign scholars have played a crucial role in understanding the First Republic of Georgia in more depth. For example, one of the most valuable contributions to the diplomatic history of the First Republic belongs to Zurab Avalishvili (sometimes referred as Zurab Avalov), a Georgian diplomat and legal scholar who participated directly in key diplomatic negotiations. He offers a primary insider account in The Independence of Georgia in International Politics of 1918–1921 where he documents the strategic efforts of Georgian diplomats to gain recognition from western powers and join the League of Nations. Avalishvili shows how Georgian leaders of that time used the legal and ideological tools of international law and self-determination to distance themselves from both the Bolshevik and Tsarist Russian visions of post-imperial order (Avalishvili, 1981).
More recent contribution to this topic belongs to Beka Kobakhidze, Georgian historian who analyzed foreign policy of First Republic and his work on Georgian diplomatic envoys especially about David Ghambashidze in London provides a detailed analysis of how individual diplomats acted with autonomy, creativity, and persistence to promote Georgia’s case in Europe (Kobakhidze, 2013). Kobakhidze emphasizes that these efforts were part of a coherent foreign policy framework that positioned Georgia within a European legal and political sphere, bringing the argument that foreign policy was as much about identity as interest. Other Georgian scholars like Otar Janelidze and Giorgi Sharadze have addressed the broader historical and political contexts of the First Republic of Georgia, providing background on internal developments that influenced its external policies. Janelidze highlights the legalistic and parliamentary foundations of the republic’s diplomacy, while Sharadze analyzes Georgia's efforts to join the League of Nations and resist Soviet aggression, demonstrating how Georgia used institutional diplomacy as a mechanism against imperial coercion. Additionally, aside of Georgian sources, Ronald Grigor Suny’s The Making of the Georgian Nation (1988), provides a broad and essential background for understanding the long-term formation of Georgian national identity Suny argues that while Russian rule was repressive, it paradoxically fostered modernizing processes education, literacy, and urbanization that gave rise to national movements (Suny, 1988, p. 122). This paradox created the intellectual and institutional foundation for Georgia’s future foreign policy orientation, which was rooted in cultural resistance and the pursuit of international recognition. He also argues that Georgia’s foreign policy was driven by both a desire for Western recognition and a fear of Bolshevik expansionism, making Georgia’s position one of “political tightrope walking” between great powers.
Building upon the research objectives outlined above, this thesis specifically addresses the following research question: How did the First Republic of Georgia navigate its foreign policy to establish sovereignty within the imperial borders from 1918 to 1921? Based on this question, the central hypothesis proposed is that Georgia’s diplomatic success was largely due to its foreign policy being strategically opposed to the Russian one. The argument developed through the thesis is that Georgia’s foreign policy between 1918 and 1921 was not simply a response to external pressures, but a carefully designed and consistent strategy. It was rooted in the conscious construction of a sovereign national identity, commitment to democratic principles, and reliance on legal diplomacy. By systematically distancing itself from both the Russian imperial and Soviet frameworks, and by aligning its policies with European standards of governance and international law, Georgia constructed its sovereignty. This strategic opposition to Russia was fundamental for securing international recognition as well as for shaping the modern foundations of Georgia’s national identity.

Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Constructivism

This research employs constructivism as its primary theoretical framework to analyze how the First Republic of Georgia (1918–1921) navigated its foreign policy to establish sovereignty within imperial borders. Constructivism as stated by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, suggests that international relations are shaped not only by material power but also by ideas, identity, historical narratives, and social interactions (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2017, 196 ). Unlike realism, which implies the idea that states’ actions are driven by security and material interests, constructivism believes that state actions are influenced by historical experiences, national identity, and perceptions of legitimacy. In the case of this thesis topic, the given perspective is particularly useful for understanding Georgia's foreign policy during the period of time from 1918 to1921 as the country tried to position itself as a European state, gain international recognition, and distance itself from its Russian imperial influence. Another key element of constructivism is the argument that state interests are not inherent but they are socially constructed through political discourse and historical processes. (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2017) Foreign policy of The First Republic of Georgia was framed around Georgia's European identity, emphasizing historical ties to European ideologies and democratic values. This identity-based approach played a crucial role in shaping Georgia’s interactions with international actors, particularly with western democracies and regional empires. By applying constructivism, this research shows that Georgia's foreign policy was not entirely driven by strategic interests but also by the country's identity and the need for international recognition. This methodological approach allows for a deeper analysis of how the First Republic of Georgia used identity-based diplomacy to construct sovereignty, legitimacy, and international alliances, and how this strategy fundamentally contrasted with the Russian imperial and Bolshevik models of foreign policy.
2.2 Case Study
This thesis adopts a single-case study approach to investigate the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Georgia between 1918 and 1921. Case study with its definition means “detailed description and assessment of a specific situation in the real world created for the purpose of deriving generalizations and other insights from it”(Raikar & Pai, 2025), which suits this thesis by allowing for the in depth analysis of a historically unique and complex subject such as Georgia’s brief period of independence emerged from the collapse of the Russian Empire. It provides an opportunity to analyze how a newly independent state attempted to construct foreign relations and international legitimacy under conditions of post-imperial transition and regional instability. Furthermore, the case study approach allows the thesis research to attain interdisciplinary approach drawing on diplomatic correspondence, government declarations, contemporary newspapers and publications as well as personal memoirs to trace how foreign policy of Georgia was shaped and navigated. It also allows for deeper analysis of Georgia's interactions with different political actors including neighboring states like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and major powers like Britain and Germany, and institutions like the League of Nations through the lens of both diplomatic strategy and identity construction. The single-case study also allows for an investigation into counterfactuals and alternative routes. Georgia's refusal to become aligned with Soviet Russia and ongoing attempts for joining Europe demonstrate a difference in strategy that was neither inevitable nor materially advantageous, but totally ideologically driven. These aspects and depths of the issue are best explored through the case study approach.
Chapter 3: Historical Pretext
3.1 Nation Building in Imperial Borders
Despite the fact that throughout history Georgia was going through different political challenges, its aspirations and trajectory were always clearly towards Europe and western part of the world. This aspirations and claim was most clear and Georgia was nearest to its goal in 1918-1921 years when Georgia got its independence and established the First Democratic Republic of Georgia (Kveselava,2004). It is crucial to analyse how the nation building process was going in Georgia while being in Russian imperial borders and what gave Georgia the chance to make a historical breakthrough. To analyse how Gorgia came to its independence in 1918 it is essential to delve into the path which Georgia went through from becoming part of Russia , after that being under Russian Imperial Rule and finally achieving independence. Georgia became part of the Russian Empire in the early 19th century, beginning with the annexation of the eastern Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti in 1801 and later expanding to western Georgian territories (Janelidze, 2018, p.24). Interestingly, the Russian imperial rule of Georgia went through both repression and modernization. Repressions were expressed in the enforcement of Russification policies, suppressing local autonomy, and subordinating the Georgian Orthodox Church to the Russian Synod. Modernization, on the other hand, included imperial integration, which brought in educational reforms, urbanization, and limited industrialization, creating a literate and politically aware Georgian elite. According to Ronald Grigor Suny, Russian imperialism paradoxically created the conditions under which non-Russian national movements could emerge (Suny, 1988, p.122). By the mid-19th century, a Georgian national revival was underway. The highlight and the most influential figure of this period and Georgia’s history in general was Ilia Chavchavadze, Georgian publisher and writer. He with the group of “Tergdaleulebi” ( intellectual movement, consisting of Georgian intellectuals against Imperial Rule) laid the ideological foundations for modern Georgian nationalism. The emergence of the Tergdaleulebi, or “those who drank from the river Tergi,” created a turning point in Georgia’s national awakening and nation-building process (Chikovani, 2012, p.108). Tergdaleulebi consisted of Georgia intellectuals, particularly people who have studied abroad, mostly in St.Petersburg and Moscow and later on, inspired by enlightenment ideas again paradoxically used their knowledge against the Russian regime. Ilia Chavchavadze, as a movement’s intellectual leader, personified this cultural transformation by promoting the protection of the Georgian language, advocating for social and legal reforms, and emphasizing the idea of national self-determination. To this extent, Adrian Brisku (2016) argues that Georgia's nation-building was not merely a negation of imperial power but an active synthesis of European political models and local traditions. Georgian elites understood their national project not only as the revival of historic statehood but also as a modernizing endeavor to align Georgia with European standards of political and legal organization (Brisku, 2016, p. 302-304 ). This dual aspiration, restoration and modernization characterized the ideological trajectory of Georgia's political development under imperial rule. The paradox of imperial modernization prepared a Georgian political class ideologically to pursue sovereignty even under conditions of repression. The period from the 1860s through the early 1900s witnessed the consolidation of national consciousness, as Georgian elites increasingly defined themselves as distinct from the Russian imperial order and envisioned an independent Georgian state within a European legal and political tradition. In this way, the ideological foundations of Georgia's eventual independence were laid during the imperial period through a gradual but determined cultural, educational, and political awakening. As Brisku (2016) argues, Georgia followed a path similar to that of other imperial borderlands, where the dissolution of the empire provided a final opportunity for long-gestating national projects to materialize (Brisku, 2016). When the Russian Empire began to disintegrate following the 1917 revolutions, the Georgian national movement was both institutionally and ideologically prepared to assert independence. Thus, Georgia's nation-building within imperial borders was both a reaction to and a product of the imperial experience. Georgian nationalism was forged not only in opposition to imperialism but also through the educational, administrative, and political institutions introduced by imperial modernization. This complex development allowed Georgia, when the opportunity arose, to transform a long-standing cultural revival into a concrete political achievement: the establishment of the First Democratic Republic in 1918.


3.2 Russian Revolution

A French historian, Paul Veyne compares Russian Revolution and Roman Empire’s conversion to Christianity and truly the October revolution was a radical transformation in Russian political history which marked a profound shift and reshaped the political order of Eurasia (Veyne, 1988, p. 22). The February Revolution ( March 1917 according to the Gregorian calendar) culminated with the end of the Romanov dynasty which had reigned for over 300 years in Russia. Various factors contributed to the revolution. The defeat in WWI which resulted in food shortages, drained resources of fuel and goods, economic crisis, inflation which on its own resulted in low moral attitude among the troops and civilians(Pipes, 1990). Political dissatisfaction only grew stronger as Tsar Nicholas II persisted in his autocratic rule, refused to implement meaningful reforms, and relied increasingly on repressive measures. The Petrograd protests in early 1917, sparked by food shortages, quickly escalated into mass strikes and army mutinies. Lacking both the political will and military strength to suppress the rebellion, Nicholas II abdicated on March 2, 1917. This created a temporary power vacuum in which a Provisional Government attempted to establish liberal democratic rule, but its authority was undermined by the competing power of the Petrograd Soviet and the rising influence of radical Bolshevik forces (Figes, 1998). The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 was thus not only the result of a failed monarchy but also of the collapse of moderate republicanism. Lenin's Bolsheviks presented an alternative not only to imperial rule but also to democratic pluralism replacing it with a one-party revolutionary dictatorship legitimized by Marxist ideology. Although they claimed to act in the name of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks quickly dissolved the Constituent Assembly, banned opposition parties, and established a centralized regime. The revolution, in this sense, was not simply a reaction against Tsarism, but an attempt to reshape the entire post-imperial space under a new ideological empire. In Marich,1918 Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers which included Russia’s withdrawal from World War I and giving up Russian Empire’s territory including Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics, and the Caucasus. As for Georgia, this was a historical chance for a historical breakthrough. For the first time in over a century, Georgia found itself outside of a hegemonic power structure and free to determine its own diplomatic course. As the Russian Empire disintegrated and Soviet authority had yet to reach the Caucasus, Georgia’s leaders realized the fleeting opportunity to transform their long-standing national ambitions into political reality and Georgia proclaimed its independence on 26 May 1918, giving birth to the Democratic Republic of Georgia (Janelidze, 2018, p. 29). The Russian Revolution thus served as a structural rupture that enabled Georgia’s long-imagined identity to take institutional form. More importantly, the revolution showed the contrast between the Georgian and Russian trajectories: while Bolshevik Russia moved toward centralization, suppression of political pluralism, and militarized control, Georgia moved toward decentralization, parliamentary democracy, and diplomatic openness . This divergence was also symbolically codified. Georgian leaders framed their statehood in terms of “European civilization,” “historical continuity,” and “the right to national self-determination.” In official speeches, newspaper editorials, and diplomatic correspondences, the Georgian Republic emphasized its distinctiveness from Bolshevik Russia. This identity construction was not only an internal matter but a calculated foreign policy strategy, designed to attract sympathy and recognition from Western democracies.The establishment of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 26 May 1918 marked the institutionalization of this divergence. It was a declaration of both independence and geopolitical choice, a break from imperial subordination and an embrace of Western political modernity. The path forward, however, would not be smooth. While the ideological and diplomatic groundwork had been laid, Georgia now had to navigate a dangerous international environment, with hostile neighbors, shifting alliances, and uncertain Western commitment to small, newly formed states.

3.3 The Act of Independence
As Zurab Avalishvili writes in his “ The Independence of Georgia in International Politics, 1918-1921”, the aspiration towards independence among Georgian society was noticeable since the first days of the Russian revolution (Avalishvili, 1981, p.17 ). After the Russian Revolution, the imperial order that had ruled the South Caucasus for more than a hundred years collapsed. In the power vacuum left by the fall of the Romanov dynasty and the Bolshevik takeover, Georgia, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, formed the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) on 22 April 1918. As Brisku and Blauvelt (2020) argue, the TDFR was not simply an improvised response but the culmination of earlier regional initiatives to preserve order, avert anarchy, and coordinate diplomacy toward external powers, particularly the Ottoman Empire and Soviet Russia (Brisku and Blauvelt, 2020, p.2). This short-lived federation was a pragmatic effort to preserve regional solidarity and negotiate collectively with outside powers, particularly the advancing Ottoman Empire. However, deep ideological disparities, clashing national interests, and external military threats soon fractured the union. Georgia's leaders realized the incompatibility of their political goals with their neighbors and started to prepare for full independence. Despite attempts to maintain the federation, the conflicting national interests and external threats ultimately doomed the TDFR, providing Georgia with a platform to assert diplomatic agency before its independence (Brisku and Blauvelt, 2020, p. 4–5). The political groundwork for this had already been laid. In November 1917, in response to the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd, the Georgian National Council was formed in Tbilisi as a representative political body encompassing all major parties and national groups. It served as the de facto parliament and was tasked with safeguarding Georgian interests amid the fluid post-imperial situation. When the TDFR disintegrated in late May 1918, the National Council acted decisively. On 26 May, it declared the Democratic Republic of Georgia an independent and sovereign state. This was neither an improvised nor a purely reactive mov but it was the institutional realization of a long-standing national endeavor. In choosing independence, Georgia distinguished itself not only from the collapsed empire but also from the new ideological empire taking shape under Bolshevik Russia. The declaration opened a new chapter, in which Georgia would begin building a European-style republic founded on the rule of law, political pluralism, and diplomatic engagement. The formal declaration of independence on 26 May 1918 by the National Council of Georgia was the political culmination of a decades-long intellectual and cultural project, and a direct response to the collapse of centralized power in both imperial and Bolshevik Russia. Georgia’s declaration was not simply a rejection of foreign domination but a carefully crafted articulation of a new identity rooted in democratic principles, national sovereignty, and geopolitical alignment with Europe. The Independence Declaration flow is interesting to analyse as well. On 25 May 1918, the day before the Declaration Day itself, the National Council called a board and started working on the Declaration document and as Giorgi Sharadze states in “The Return Of Historical Relics”, the core idea for the board was to be inclusive within Georgian territory as well outside of its borders. The document was written within 72 hours and later on 26 May was presented to the public in white hall. (Sharadze, 2001, p.17). This event was attended by 42 members, 36 candidates and a significant number of people. The committee was led by Noe Zhordania, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Council. He opened the session by saying that that day, in that room one died while the other one was born and the one which was born aimed to survive in the modern historical storm for which according to him Georgia was ready, since it used to fight for survival. Interestingly, his speech already included a pro western way of foreign policy and attitude towards neighboring states. Zhordania continued his speech by expressing empathy for the Armenian people, stating that the Georgian people would continue standing by the Armenian people as before. Then he continued by emphasizing the importance of a friendly attitude towards Mahmadians and suggested they take Georgia's example and establish their own state and continue friendly relationships with Georgia (Sharadze 2001,18). And finally Noe Zhordania noted that the unity of neighboring states was crucial in case an outside enemy would one day become stronger and attack them. The Independence declaration itself was presented after this preface which on its own stated that Georgia used to be part of Russia in case Russia protected Georgia from outside enemies, but since the Russian revolution, Georgia with Transcaucasia were in charge of their own paths and Georgia was Declared as an independent state.

Chapter 4: Georgia's Foreign Policy
4.1 Relations with Europe and Western Powers

After achieving sovereignty and declaration of independence, Georgia’s main concern was international acknowledgement. Georgia’s foreign policy between 1918 and 1921 was not only a result of diplomatic necessity but it was a conscious, strategic articulation of a sovereign state’s identity in strong opposition to the imperial past it had just escaped. After declaration of independence, Georgia’s political mission was to gain both De Facto and De Jure recognition from Europe, Western powers, and neighboring countries. In this formative period, the leaders of the First Republic did not entirely adopt a European political model, they created Georgia’s diplomatic worldview in direct contrast to the logic of Russian expansionism, whether Tsarist or Bolshevik. Every decision , every alliance sought, every declaration made, every refusal to compromise, was part of a deliberate project to construct a European-style republic with a Western-oriented diplomatic posture. For more than a century, Georgia had been held tightly within the Russian imperial system. It had suffered the systematic erosion of autonomy , from the abolition of the Georgian monarchy in 1801, to the annexation of the Church’s independence in 1811, to the suppression of language, education, and media. The idea of independence in 1918 was, therefore, not a reactive moment but a culmination of long-standing ideological opposition to Russia’s internal and external policies. The act of declaring independence on May 26, 1918, was not simply about political separation, rather it was about projecting Georgia as fundamentally incompatible with the Russian imperial idea.
One of the most powerful and thoughtful decisions that was made by Georgia was the attempt to define itself as clearly not Russian, not part of the former empire, not a post-Russian republic in the making and not a province rebelling against the center. As the first clause of the Independence Act stated Georgia was a totally sovereign democratic state, not a separatist region of a collapsing empire. (Sharadze, 2001,p. 19) To accomplish its aim, Georgia refused to take part in any diplomatic format that presumed the survival or restoration of the Russian state including both Bolshevik Russia and the Russian White movement. For example, the Prinkipo Conference organized by the Entente in early 1919 sought to bring together all factions of the former Russian Empire to discuss the postwar order. Georgia rejected the invitation outright, arguing that it had declared independence and therefore would not sit at the same table as Russian forces regardless of whether they were Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik. This was not just a gesture but it was a carefully planned act of foreign policy that drew a permanent line between Georgia’s future and Russia’s imperial legacy (Kobakhidze, Silakadze, and Vacharadze, 2020, p. 58). These actions were consistent with Georgia’s broader foreign policy trajectory. One of the first major diplomatic moves of Georgia was the Treaty of Poti, signed with Germany in May 1918 (Tavartkiladze, 2020, p. 208). While the Russian Empire dissolved and the Ottoman army had an advantage, Georgian leaders realized the need for the immediate protection, and Germany was seen as a potential guarantor of security. Although the alliance with Germany was short-lived due to the Central Powers’ defeat, it demonstrated Georgia’s pragmatic effort to align with a European power and distance itself from Russia’s orbit . This strategic positioning also led to Georgia’s first de jure recognition, when the Ottoman Empire acknowledged its independence in June 1918 as part of their negotiated settlement (Avalishvili, 1990, p. 49). While politically fraught, this recognition showed that Georgia was capable of functioning as a sovereign actor in regional diplomacy.Following Germany’s defeat in November 1918, Georgia reoriented its foreign policy toward the British, who filled the power vacuum in the South Caucasus. The British military presence in Georgia between 1918 and 1920, although limited, was essential in stabilizing the republic temporarily and in facilitating Georgian appeals to Western powers for formal recognition . Georgian diplomacy then concentrated on London and Paris, and emphasized the republic’s democratic institutions, moderate socialist leadership, and commitment to European values. Diplomats like David Ghambashidze in London and Akaki Chkhenkeli in Paris advocated tirelessly for recognition. They highlighted Georgia’s democratic institutions, legal reforms, and European orientation while carefully distancing the republic from the narrative of imperial disintegration (Kobakhidze, 2013). In early 1920,when Russian riots came to an end Soviet Russia thought that it was time to invade Georgia through its Red Army, but the operation failed due to Georgian military resistance and lack of support from local populations. This failure pushed Moscow to reconsider its approach, and in May 1920, the Treaty of Moscow was signed, through which Soviet Russia formally recognized Georgia’s independence and agreed not to interfere in its internal affairs. This moment was not only a tactical retreat by the Bolsheviks but it was a diplomatic victory for Georgia, which had successfully defended its sovereignty both militarily and diplomatically (Suny, 1988).This recognition by Soviet Russia, although temporary and ultimately violated in 1921, played a crucial role in convincing Western powers to reconsider their positions as it is known Georgia mostly had De Facto recognition from most of the western countries and inn January 1921, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom officially granted Georgia de jure recognition. By early 1921, Georgia stood recognized as an independent, democratic republic by both East and West which was a significant thus fragile accomplishment. The country’s consistent strategy of diplomatic alignment with Europe, refusal to legitimize Russian-imperial continuity, and insistence on legal and moral sovereignty culminated in a brief but remarkable period of international legitimacy.

4.2 Relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan,Turkey

Aside from Georgia's foreign policy towards western powers, its relations with Neighboring states is crucial to analyze. Georgia’s foreign policy showed that Georgia wanted to be an independent player in the South Caucasus and its relationship with its immediate neighbors Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey shows how carefully Georgia tried to maintain that distance while navigating complex territorial and diplomatic tensions.
The relations between Georgia and Armenia can be marked by both cooperation and confrontation. The most serious conflict occurred in December 1918, when the two countries engaged in a brief military clash over the Lori region, an ethnically mixed territory along their shared border. Despite the potential for escalation, Georgia opted to submit the dispute to British arbitration, demonstrating its preference for judicial intervention over gunboat diplomacy.(Janelidze,2018) A neutral corridor was created in Lori under British administration, and although tensions ran high, there was no mass violence.This episode demonstrated a significant difference from Russian imperial and later Soviet policy. In Bolshevik and Tsarist systems, border and ethnic disputes were commonly used as pretexts for intervention and eventual annexation (Suny, 1988). Georgia, however, reversed this logic, exercising restraint and diplomatically reaffirming its identity as a European, rule-of-law state . Moreover, the Armenian population in Tbilisi coexisted peacefully during this time, and Georgian media avoided provocative rhetoric once again reflecting the government's belief in pluralism and stable governance.
The relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan was somewhat less complicated. Positively, both republics shared an interest in countering Bolshevik expansionism and Ottoman influence. Georgian and Azerbaijani leaders engaged in preliminary talks regarding the formation of a Caucasian political bloc in 1918, aiming to revive the model of regional cooperation briefly established under the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (Janelidze, 2018). However, territorial disputes most notably over the Zaqatala region, a mountainous area claimed by both sides and Azerbaijan’s growing alignment with Turkey impeded the realization of any lasting union. Nevertheless, in June 1919, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a bilateral treaty establishing mutual recognition of each other's independence and a commitment to respecting borders. This was a critical milestone, representing the first instance in which two post-imperial republics in the region recognized one another as equal sovereign entities, rather than as components of a contested or shared imperial legacy. In doing so, Georgia once again pursued a diplomatic strategy rooted in mutual recognition and international law, rather than the Russian zero-sum model of dominance or ideological expansion
As for Turkey, geography, shared adversaries, and recent military conflict shaped Georgia’s relations with it. During World War I, Ottoman forces had advanced into southwestern Georgia, particularly the regions of Adjara and Batumi. After the Ottoman defeat in late 1918, Georgia swiftly reasserted control over these areas. (Suny, 1988) The situation in Batumi, however, remained unstable, complicated by overlapping Turkish, British, and Bolshevik interests. Despite these challenges, Georgia managed to establish the relationship with remarkable diplomatic restraint. It cooperated with British troops stationed in Batumi and refrained from provoking Turkey, which was itself undergoing a turbulent postwar transition. In 1919, Georgia initiated direct negotiations with Ankara on the basis of non-aggression and mutual respect. (Kveselava, 2004) This cautious and calculated approach stood in stark contrast to Russia’s historical pattern of dominating its neighbors or undermining them through revolutionary proxies . Georgia’s foreign policy toward Turkey was also strategically informed. Having received its first formal recognition of independence from the Ottoman Empire in June 1918, the Georgian government sought to preserve a functional relationship with Ankara, even amid concerns over Turkish irredentist ambitions. The Treaty of Batumi, although signed under coercive circumstances, was later reinterpreted by Georgia not as an act of submission, but as a juridical confirmation of its sovereignty (Svanidze, 2002, p. 274).
In its regional interactions, Georgia consistently pursued legalism, negotiation, and sovereign equality, a principled and pragmatic diplomatic approach. In contrast to the Russian doctrine of coercion, absorption, or ideological conquest, Georgia favored bilateral treaties, arbitration, and non-aggression pacts. It did not seek to dominate its neighbors, nor did it pursue the revival of the Transcaucasian federation at the expense of its own autonomy.This regional strategy aligned seamlessly with Georgia’s broader foreign policy vision: survival through sovereignty, and sovereignty through diplomatic distinction. From a constructivist perspective, these diplomatic behaviors reflected Georgia’s active construction of a sovereign national identity distinct from imperial or Bolshevik models. Foreign policy was not merely pragmatic but a deliberate expression of Georgia’s self-perception as an independent, democratic state within a European framework. Each regional decision whether in the Caucasus or on the European stage, was an intentional effort to reject imperial inheritances and present Georgia as a modern, independent republic worthy of international legitimacy.

4.3 Paris Peace Conference
The Paris Peace Conference, held between January 1919 and January 1920, was the diplomatic conference that formally concluded World War I. Summoned in the aftermath of a war that had devastated Europe and redrawn borders across continents, the conference brought together the victorious Allied nations primarily France, Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States to negotiate peace treaties with the defeated Central Powers (Kobakhidze 2015, 4). The conference was an international forum for redefining international relations on new foundations: opposition to empire, acceptance of self-determination, and the institution of the League of Nations as a supranational force of collective security and international cooperation. For the Democratic Republic of Georgia, participation in the postwar diplomatic reordering of Europe was essential to its international legitimacy.For Georgia it was not just about recognition, but about positioning Georgia as a modern, sovereign, European republic that rejected any association with post-imperial Russia either Tsarist or Bolshevik. The Georgian delegation to Paris, led by Akaki Chkhenkeli, one of the foremost Menshevik politicians, was aimed at securing both political legitimacy and legal recognition for the new state. As Beka Kobakhidze highlights, Chkhenkeli’s strategic approach was not simply to plead for assistance but to demonstrate that Georgia already fulfilled the necessary criteria for statehood under international law: a defined territory, a permanent population, a functioning government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Kobakhidze 2015). The challenge, however, lay in the internal inconsistencies of Allied policy toward Russia. France, above all nations, favored the restoration of a Russian central state White or even Bolshevik and viewed secessionist republics unfavorably. Georgia tried to distinguish its case by emphasizing its internal stability, absence of civil war, democratic elections, and clean break with the Russian imperial tradition. This way Georgia placed itself not as a revolutionary venture, but as a European-style democracy worthy of recognition on legal and normative grounds (Kobakhidze 2015, 57) . Georgia's memorandum presented to the Allied Supreme Council established the republic's territorial claims, historical rightness, and its firm commitment to democratic government. It was a step forward in distancing Georgia fromRussia and emphasizing its independence. Concurrently, Paris White émigré organizations insisted on a claim over all areas of the previous empire even of Georgia on grounds that the republics did not legally possess claim over independence. Counter to this argument, the Georgian delegation invoked the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk whereby Bolshevik Russia already waived any claim on past territorial holdings (Kobakhidze, 2020). Georgian envoys worked to form connections with socialist and liberal politicians across Europe. Leaders such as Émile Vandervelde, Ramsay MacDonald, and Jean Longuet, key voices for the Second International commended Georgia's parliamentarian state, women's votes, and multiparty politics. Such endorsement lent Georgia additional moral and political legitimacy when patronage by great powers was in doubt (Kobakhidze, 2020, pp. 19–20). Georgia's stance was backed up again by its working institutions: having a national currency (the Georgian maneti), postal and customs administration of its own, elected Constituent Assembly, and advanced system of law that reached its apogee with the promulgation of the 1921 Constitution. These were not acts of a secessionist movement but these were the attributes of a sovereign and modern democratic state. As noted by Kobakhidze, Georgian diplomacy was exemplary among non-recognized states in terms of gradual and peaceful expression of sovereignty, in contrast to military power or revolution (Kobakhidze, 2020). However, full de jure recognition was put back by Allied prudence. Still, Georgia's initiatives were not in vain. In January 1920, the Allied Supreme Council de facto acknowledged Georgia, which was a monumental diplomatic success. For Georgian policymakers, this meant not just approval of independence but also of foreign policy approach, a pledge of legalism, impartiality, and Western alignment in preference to combat or coercion. To this extent, Georgia's performance at the Paris Peace Conference is a dramatic articulation of the central thesis of this thesis: that the diplomatic victory of the First Republic was based on its principled and strategic refusal of Russian norms of geopolitics. While Russia imperial or Soviet relied on coercion, ideological rigor, or claims of historical right, Georgia invoked international law, democratic legitimacy, and diplomatic modernity. The Georgian delegation arrived not as the pawn of transnational politics nor as an anachronism of the empire, but as an autonomous and deserving participant in the new European order. Although in the end not enough to prevent Soviet invasion in 1921, Georgia's Parisian diplomatic endeavor left an enduring legacy. It proved that a small state, emerging from the empire's ashes, could articulate sovereignty on its own terms through the grammar of law, legitimacy, and liberal values. The recognition provided, and respect won, would endure the short lifespan of the First Republic and be a model for Georgia's current diplomatic persona.

4.4 Georgia and The League of Nations

Following its diplomatic efforts at the Paris Peace Conference and gaining de facto and de jure recognition from major allied powers, the Democratic Republic of Georgia pursued an even more ambitious goal: membership in the League of Nations. The League of Nations which was established in 1919 was the most prominent international organization that emerged from the Versailles system and embodied the liberal world order of collective security, self-determination, and sovereign equality (Vadachkoria, 2003, p.436). Georgia had an ambition to join the League and its will was not merely utilitarian, it was both a symbolic and diplomatic statement of its desire to be firmly rooted in the European legal and diplomatic community.
The step towards its goal and membership formed part of Georgia’s broader foreign policy trajectory, the one that deliberately aspired to distance itself from both the pragmatic and symbolic appeal of the Russian imperial legacy. For Georgia’s political leadership, League membership would have gained full access to the ranks of civilized states. It would also have provided juridical guarantees of territorial integrity at a time when Soviet ambitions in the region were getting stronger. Yet the geopolitical climate of 1920 was less idealistic than the League’s founding principles. The League’s organizational framework particularly Article 10, which required members to come to one another’s defense in the event of aggression posed the principal obstacle to Georgia’s admission. Most League member states were unwilling to accept this obligation, particularly in the context of an increasingly unstable South Caucasus and the looming threat of Soviet incursion (Kveselava, 2004, p. 52 ). In December of 1920 at the session of the League in Geneva, Georgia’s application for full membership was formally considered. Ten states voted in favor, thirteen against, and seventeen abstained (ICCN, 2023). The result was negative for Georgia not because Georgia lacked legitimacy, but because of geopolitical calculations. On the contrary, Georgia had demonstrated its capacity for democratic governance, diplomatic maturity, and peaceful coexistence. The League’s refusal reflected a strategic unwillingness to provoke Soviet Russia and refusal to defend a small Caucasian republic against a great power . Even though Georgia got rejected to join the League of Nations it was one of the most politically strategic and strong statements from Georgia for its foreign policy direction which included alignment with international law, dissociation from imperial and revolutionary coercion, and the construction of a national identity premised on democratic and cooperative values. The League’s rejection was not a failure of diplomacy, but a demonstration of the principled consistency of Georgian foreign policy, a policy defined not by imitation of Russia, but by its firm and deliberate opposition to both imperial and Soviet paradigms. Though diplomatically disappointing , the League’s refusal did not discredit Georgia’s foreign policy. Rather, it underscored the republic’s commitment to internationalism even when it yielded no tangible security benefits. For Georgia’s foreign policy understanding of sovereignty was fundamentally incompatible with both imperial and Soviet systems. In this sense, even in rejection, the League experience affirmed Georgia’s identity as a European, rule-bound, and modern international actor.

4.5 The 1921 Constitution

February 21, 1921 is an important date for Georgia’s political history. On that day, while Soviet soldiers were approaching Tbilisi, the Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Georgia adopted one of the most advanced constitutions of its time. Even though the republic would be lost to Bolshevik conquest within days, the adoption of the 1921 Constitution was not a desperate gesture but it was a final, clear expression of a political identity founded on democracy, legalism, and Europeanism. The Constitution united the very principles that had guided Georgia's foreign policy since 1918: republicanism, rule of law, social and political pluralism, and peaceful diplomacy. It was a deliberate and principled departure from Russian imperialism and the ideological authoritarianism of Soviet rule. As Georgian writer and political figure Karlo Inasaridze evaluates it, the 1921 Constitution was an historically important fact since for the first time through Georgia's 3000 years history, Georgia went from Monarchy ruling system to republican one (Inasaridze 2021). Working on the constitution started back in 1918 after the declaration of independence and was finalized in February 1921. In 1918 , the National Council of Georgia established a constitutional commission, which included politicians from different political parties such as Social-Democrats, Social-Federalists, Social-Revolutionaries, National- Democrats and one member without party. This commission was a great contribution to the upcoming 1921 Constitution since it defined Georgia’s main ruling form-Democratic Republic, started working on various provisions of the Constitution connected with defining national territories, parliament and executive power, court, churches, armed forces, national finance and rights of foreigners and minorities. (Sharadze, 2001, p.253). Last session of this Constitutional Commission was on 9 march, 1919 which stated that already stated provisions would be handed over to the The Constituent Assembly. In February 1919, the proportional elections for the The Constituent Assembly were held where both genders voted where social democrats got 103 places out of 130. Later on The Constituent Assembly, during its third session chose the new Constitutional Commision. As the member and minister of justice Razhden Arsenide wrote that thus the mission was hard and they worked nearly all day long and used different constitutions of democratic states to take examples and fit it to Georgia and Georgian people, a lot of examples were taken from Switzerland’s constitution as well as other democratic states’ principles were taken as a role model. The Commission started working again on the constitution and after several committees, detailed analysis and presentations of the constitution, on February 21, 1919 the Georgian government established the constitution. It consisted of 17 chapters and 149 articles. The 1921 Georgian Constitution was a pioneering document. It exercised universal suffrage (including women’s voting rights), abolished the death penalty, guaranteed the right of habeas corpus, introduced trial by jury, and protected freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. In terms of civil liberties and democratic foundations, it even surpassed many modern Western constitutions​. The government it established was parliamentary, with constitutionally enshrined local self-government and a commitment to human rights that matched the most progressive legal traditions in Europe. Most notably, Article 19 abolished capital punishment outright, a legal standard that was novel at the time. The Constitution was deliberately rigid, with amendments requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority and ratification by national referendum, a demonstration of the authors' resolve not to allow any drift toward authoritarianism​ (Sharadze 2001, 256 ).This increasingly law-based system owed much to Georgia's ruling political leadership mostly Menshevik social democrats who viewed their efforts not as revolutionary utopianism, but as gradual development grounded in European democratic values. Noe Zhordania, the head of government, openly blamed Bolshevik ideology for bypassing the democratic stage and thus ending not in socialism but in "vandalism"​ (Constitutional Court of Georgia, 2012). By contrast, Georgian social democrats saw themselves as modernizers in the European tradition.The Constitution also met with international applause. European visitors from the Second International, including principal figures like Ramsay MacDonald, were taken aback by Georgia's advanced constitutional thinking. MacDonald famously observed that what he witnessed in Georgia was something he hoped to see in his own country​ (Constitutional Court of Georgia, 2012). The Constitution had been translated into French and was approved by the Constituent Assembly for distribution abroad on February 22, 1921​ (Kirtadze, 1997). The 1921 Constitution thus was not just the juridical completion of the First Republic's state-building project, but also a diplomatic declaration. By enshrining liberal, social-democratic values in a binding legal document, Georgia openly declared that its sovereign identity was incompatible with both Russian imperial and Bolshevik models of rule. The historical context of the Constitution’s adoption made it even more symbolic. Four days after the adoption of the Constitution on February 25 the Soviet Red Army occupied Tbilisi (Suny,1988). The Georgian government, forced to retreat to Batumi, was nevertheless able to print and circulate the third and final draft of the Constitution before going into exile. At a moment of national peril, the leadership embraced neither militarism nor autocracy. Instead, it offered the world a constitutional model of Georgia's place as a modern European republic.

Chapter 5: The Fall of Republic and its diplomatic aftermath (1920-1921)
5.1 Soviet Invasion and the Collapse of he First Republic of Georgia
February 21, 1921, the day Georgia adopted its progressive Constitution, marked the peak of the Democratic Republic’s state-building efforts. However, only four days later, this vision was violently destroyed by Soviet military aggression. The Soviet Red Army invaded Georgia on February 11, and by February 25, Tbilisi had fallen. The Republic was not undone by internal crisis, but by an external threat aimed at destroying its democratic identity and international legitimacy (Suny,1988). The fall of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in February March 1921 was not an inevitable collapse of a weak state, nor a result of internal chaos. It was a direct consequence of external aggression- a deliberate Soviet invasion aimed at eliminating the only functioning democracy in post-imperial space. The Soviet invasion was not an accidental or defensive response. It was a well calculated action to regain control over a strategically important state whose foreign and domestic policies had become fundamentally incompatible with the Bolshevik system of governance. As known, Georgia had already been recognized de jure by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy in January 1921, just one month before the invasion (Kobakhidze 2018). Moreover, in May 1920, the Treaty of Moscow had guaranteed Georgia's sovereignty and explicitly prohibited Russian intervention in its internal affairs (Suny, 1988, p.206) Despite the treaty, the Bolsheviks viewed Georgia’s successful attempt to build a democratic, Western-oriented state as a direct threat. It was specifically Georgia’s foreign policy divergence from the Russian imperial model, its pro-European diplomacy and legal, democratic government, that rendered the country “intolerable” to Soviet ambitions (Kobakhidze, 2018). The justification for the invasion a fabricated rebellion in the Lorri region allegedly initiated by Georgian Bolsheviks was little more than diplomatic cover.Georgian troops mounted strong resistance, not only in and around Tbilisi, but throughout the country as the government retreated westward. Despite their lack of resources, the mobilization of Georgian forces served to demonstrate that the republic had not collapsed from within but it was defending itself in a war it could not win without external support. Hopes for Western military assistance went unfulfilled. Although British forces remained in Batumi, they were under strict orders not to engage (Janelidze, 2018). By early March, Tbilisi fell. The government retreated to Kutaisi and then to Batumi, where it held out until the Treaty of Kars was signed with Kemalist Turkey. With no hope of continuing resistance and unwilling to subject the country to further destruction, the government decided to evacuate. On March 17, 1921, the leaders of the republic boarded ships bound for France. The First Republic was over.The government, led by Noe Zhordania, decided to evacuate in early March. On March 17, 1921, the leadership departed for Leuville-sur-Orge, France, where the Georgian government-in-exile would continue operating for decades. Zhordania famously stated, “The government did not resign it was interrupted,” a phrase that would come to define the diplomatic mission of the Georgian exile movement (Kobakhidze, 2018 ).Although the Red Army’s occupation of Tbilisi was swift, it was not met with universal acceptance. Between 1921 and 1924, Georgia witnessed a series of uprisings against Soviet rule, culminating in the August Uprising of 1924, which was violently suppressed. These revolts testified to the strength of the democratic and national consciousness that had taken root during the First Republic, and to the widespread rejection of Bolshevik governance by the Georgian population (Janelidze, 2018). Therefore, the fall of the First Republic cannot be explained as the natural consequence of internal dysfunction. Rather, it was the direct result of the success of its foreign policy. Georgia had succeeded in establishing an internationally recognized sovereign republic, founded on law, pluralism, and European diplomatic norms. It had done so without resorting to military subservience or ideological dependence on Russia, making it an ideological anomaly within the post-imperial space.The Soviet invasion, then, was not merely a territorial conquest it was also an ideological act. It was the forceful reassertion of Moscow’s claim that no part of the former Russian Empire could exist outside its political and ideological control. The occupation was meant to extinguish what Georgia had come to represent: a functioning democracy, born from the imperial collapse, guided by Western principles, and determined to assert its sovereignty through diplomacy rather than war.

5.2 Georgian Government in Exile and Continued Diplomatic Efforts

Although the First Republic of Georgia was militarily defeated in March 1921, its political project did not end with the Soviet occupation.The Georgian government-in-exile, based in Leuville-sur-Orge, France, continued to uphold the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic and pursue its foreign policy objectives for decades. Far from being a symbolic institution, the government-in-exile became a platform for diplomatic resistance and a custodian of Georgia's democratic legacy demonstrating the resilience of a state whose founding principles could not be extinguished by force.The leadership of the exile government headed by Noe Zhordania included many of the same individuals who had shaped Georgia's institutions and policies between 1918 and 1921. These figures refused to recognize the legitimacy of Soviet occupation and instead committed to maintaining the juridical continuity of the republic. Their argument was straightforward: the Soviet invasion was a violation of international law and of the bilateral Treaty of Moscow (1920). Because Georgia had been recognized de jure by several Western powers prior to the occupation, the government-in-exile asserted its continued legitimacy as the sole rightful authority representing the Georgian nation (Kobakhidze, 2018). Even without territorial control, the exile government remained active in diplomatic and informational initiatives. It published statements condemning Soviet repression, sent representatives to international organizations and political forums, and maintained correspondence with foreign governments. While these efforts did not always receive formal support, they helped to keep the idea of an independent Georgia alive in international political discourse. Arguably, its most significant achievement was the preservation of state symbols and legal continuity. The government-in-exile continued to use Georgia's national flag, seal, and the 1921 Constitution as emblems of sovereignty. It also produced newspapers, hosted community events, and published historical works to remind both the world and future generations of Georgians that the First Republic had not disappeared it had simply been interrupted. The government-in-exile also played a vital role in shaping and inspiring Georgian diaspora communities in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Politicians such as David Ghambashidze were active in building ties with European parliamentarians and journalists, emphasizing Georgia’s compatibility with European democratic values and the injustice of Soviet aggression and Western passivity. These efforts situated Georgia’s diplomatic message within the broader framework of small nations suffering under totalitarian regimes. Importantly, the exile government did not remain silent about the failures of Western powers to act decisively in 1921. The Treaty of Rapallo (1922) between Germany and Soviet Russia was seen as a betrayal, effectively legitimizing Soviet conquests and disregarding the sovereignty of occupied countries like Georgia. In response, Georgian émigré leaders issued public letters and critiques, accusing the West of sacrificing small nations in the name of geopolitical expediency (Janelidze, 2018). In 1945, following World War II, Georgia’s exiled leadership once again expressed dismay that the Yalta Conference had failed to address the Soviet occupation of the Caucasus. They argued that the Allied powers, by accepting Soviet postwar borders, had abandoned the principle of self-determination they themselves had championed during the war. These criticisms formed part of a wider effort to document Soviet abuses and sustain the legal and moral case for Georgian independence. Throughout the Cold War, the Georgian exile community also contributed to the preservation of national memory and political consciousness. Intellectuals such as Irakli Tsereteli, Noe Ramishvili, and Razhden Arsenide published memoirs, political commentaries, and historical studies that documented the achievements of the First Republic while exposing Soviet falsifications. These publications were not merely academic, they were deeply political, meant to counteract Soviet narratives portraying the First Republic as short-lived or illegitimate. When Georgia regained independence in 1991, the symbolic legacy of the government-in-exile became central to the rebirth of the Georgian state. The five-cross flag was restored, references to the 1921 Constitution reappeared in foundational legal documents, and the remains of exiled leaders were ceremoniously repatriated. In 2021, on the centenary of the Soviet invasion, the return of Noe Zhordania’s remains was not just a symbolic act it was an affirmation of the historical continuity of Georgian statehood.
In conclusion, the Georgian government-in-exile was essential in preserving the diplomatic and political legacy of the First Republic. Despite being deprived of territory, it defended Georgia’s sovereignty, denied legitimacy to Soviet occupation, and continued to project Georgia’s identity as a democratic, European-oriented state. This chapter reinforces the core hypothesis of this thesis: Georgia’s strategic opposition to Russian imperial and Soviet domination was not incidental, but a foundational and enduring element of its foreign policy and national identity, one that survived both within its borders and beyond them.
5.3 Legacy of the First Republic in Modern Georgia
Even though the First Republic of Georgia lasted only for three years, its institutional system, diplomatic ambitions, and ideological orientation had a lasting impact on the political identity of the nation. The years 1918–1921 marked Georgia's first attempt to become a modern, independent, and democratic state, and that legacy continued to shape the nation's foreign policy even after the republic's collapse (Suny, 1988). The years 1918–1921 marked Georgia's first attempt to become a modern, independent, and democratic state, and that legacy continued to shape the nation's foreign policy even after the republic's collapse. Since the Georgian government of 1918-1921 after soviet invasion went to France, for Georgia the democratic republic was not defeated, Georgia was under occupation and later ot it regained its sovereignty and independence continued.Accordingly, when Georgia regained independence in 1991, it did not rebuild its political identity from scratch but it deliberately returned to the legacy of the First Republic, reviving its symbols, its constitution, and its Western geopolitical orientation. The 1921 Constitution, ratified just days before the Soviet occupation, was not merely a historic legal document but a lasting declaration of national values. Upon the restoration of independence, the preamble of the 1995 Constitution referenced 1921 as a founding moment in Georgian statehood, asserting that Georgia's democratic aspirations had not been lost, but only postponed. The parliamentary system of government, the protection of minority rights, and the commitment to international law, defining features of the First Republic were formally reinstated in post-Soviet politics (Sharadze,2001). In the decades following 1991, Georgia consistently oriented its foreign policy toward the West, following the strategic vision of its first independent government. All subsequent administrations have pursued integration into NATO and the European Union, emphasizing Georgia's European identity and rejecting any return to the Russian sphere of influence. From the 2014 signing of the EU Association Agreement to the formal application for EU candidacy in 2022, Georgia's post-Soviet trajectory has followed the diplomatic path laid in 1918: achieving sovereignty through multilateral diplomacy and international legitimacy. Georgia's aspiration towards Europe is not merely pragmatic but it is symbolic as well. Politicians and citizens routinely refer to the First Republic as a source of inspiration and legitimacy. Public commemorations on May 26, the anniversary of the 1918 declaration of independence, are accompanied by official speeches that reaffirm the republic’s legacy. Major state institutions, school curricula, and diplomatic rhetoric regularly reference 1918–1921 as Georgia's foundational experiment in modern statehood and as a point of contrast with Soviet domination.The rejection of Russian hegemony remains one of the most crucial features of modern Georgian foreign policy. Just as the First Republic distanced itself from both Tsarist and Bolshevik models, modern Georgia has also resisted Russian-led initiatives such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Instead, Georgia has pursued deeper integration with the European Union, the United States, and other democratic allies, articulating its sovereignty not as resistance to domination, but as a positive identification with international norms based on the rule of law.The August 2008 War and the ongoing Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have further strengthened the perception of Russia as a coercive and colonial power. Georgian leaders such as Mikheil Saakashvili frequently invoked the First Republic to draw historical parallels, arguing that Georgia’s modern-day conflict with Russia is a continuation of the same struggle for independence and geopolitical self-determination that began in 1918 (Saakashvili, as cited in Kobakhidze, 2020).This legacy is also evident in Georgia’s participation in international peacekeeping missions, contributions to NATO-led operations, and its insistence on democratic institution-building as a precondition for international engagement. These are not new policies, but the continuation of a diplomatic vision first articulated during Georgia’s brief independence. Furthermore, the memory of the government-in-exile underscores the importance of historical continuity. When, in 2021, the remains of Noe Zhordania were returned to Georgia, the event was not merely commemorative but it was presented as the conclusion of a long-interrupted historical cycle. The state-led repatriation of exiled leaders, the translation and publication of exile memoirs, and the incorporation of the First Republic into education all reflect a deliberate national effort to reclaim historical identity.According to all these the First Republic was not a failed experiment. It was, rather, a deliberate and visionary attempt to redefine Georgia’s role in the international system, one whose legacy outlasted its brief existence. The political, legal, and diplomatic structures it established were robust enough to be revived 70 years later and continue to guide Georgia’s statecraft today.In conclusion, the foreign policy of the First Republic was not a reactive strategy born of chaos, but a conscious expression of sovereign identity, based on European standards and in strategic opposition to Russian imperial institutions. This orientation has fundamentally shaped Georgia's diplomatic direction in the post-Soviet era. The struggle for sovereignty during 1918–1921 laid the moral and ideological foundation for Georgia's current independence. And that is why even though the First Republic was ultimately destroyed by force its legacy endured and remained a lasting symbol in Georgia’s national consciousness.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
The foreign policy of the First Republic of Georgia between 1918 and 1921 was a deliberate and strategic effort to construct sovereignty under highly challenging geopolitical circumstances. Georgia’s leaders did not merely react to the collapse of the Russian Empire rather, they actively worked to position Georgia as a European-oriented, democratic republic. By consistently rejecting participation in post-imperial Russian frameworks, affirming its independence through international law, and pursuing diplomatic recognition from Western powers, Georgia demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how sovereignty could be asserted through both identity and diplomacy. Through its refusal to participate in negotiations that treated it as a fragment of the Russian Empire, such as the Prinkipo Conference, and through its continuous appeals to the principles of self-determination and democratic governance, Georgia positioned itself not as a rebellious province but as a legitimate sovereign state. This strategy culminated in its de facto and de jure recognition by major powers and its application for membership in the League of Nations, even though the latter ultimately failed due to international geopolitical considerations rather than shortcomings in Georgia’s diplomatic efforts. The case of Georgia between 1918 and 1921 demonstrates that foreign policy can serve as an instrument of nation-building, identity consolidation, and international legitimation, even when material power is lacking. The First Republic’s reliance on legal, diplomatic, and identity-based strategies offers important insights into the foreign policy behavior of small states seeking to assert themselves within a competitive international system. Although ultimately overcome by Soviet military aggression, Georgia's foreign policy achievements during this period laid the foundation for its modern aspirations toward European integration and democratic governance. The First Republic’s diplomatic legacy endures today as a critical element of Georgia’s national consciousness and international orientation.
Závěr
Zahraniční politika První Gruzínské republiky v letech 1918 až 1921 byla promyšleným a strategickým úsilím o vybudování státní svrchovanosti v mimořádně náročných geopolitických podmínkách. Gruzínští představitelé nereagovali pouze na kolaps Ruského impéria – aktivně usilovali o to, aby byla Gruzie vnímána jako evropsky orientovaná, demokratická republika. Tím, že důsledně odmítala účast v postsovětských strukturách, potvrzovala svou nezávislost prostřednictvím mezinárodního práva a usilovala o diplomatické uznání od západních mocností, projevovala Gruzie sofistikované pochopení toho, jak lze svrchovanost prosazovat prostřednictvím identity i diplomacie.Odmítnutím účasti na jednáních, která s ní zacházela jako s částí bývalého Ruského impéria – jako například na konferenci v Prinkipu – a neustálým odvoláváním se na principy sebeurčení a demokratické správy věcí veřejných se Gruzie prezentovala nikoli jako vzbouřená provincie, ale jako legitimní a suverénní stát. Tato strategie vyvrcholila v jejím de facto a později i de iure uznání hlavními světovými mocnostmi a v podání žádosti o členství ve Společnosti národů, které sice nakonec nebylo přijato, ale spíše kvůli mezinárodním geopolitickým okolnostem než kvůli nedostatkům v gruzínské diplomacii.Případ Gruzie v letech 1918 až 1921 ukazuje, že zahraniční politika může sloužit jako nástroj budování národa, upevnění identity a mezinárodní legitimace, i když stát postrádá materiální sílu. Spoléhání se První republiky na právní, diplomatické a identitní strategie poskytuje důležité poznatky o chování malých států v konkurenčním mezinárodním prostředí. Ačkoli byla Gruzie nakonec poražena sovětskou vojenskou agresí, její úspěchy v oblasti zahraniční politiky v tomto období položily základy jejím současným aspiracím na evropskou integraci a demokratické řízení. Diplomatické dědictví První republiky tak dodnes tvoří klíčovou součást národního vědomí Gruzie a jejího mezinárodního směřování.
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Summary:

This thesis explores the foreign policy of the First Republic of Georgia (1918–1921) within the context of its emergence from Russian imperial rule. Using a constructivist framework and historical case study methodology, the research analyzes how Georgia constructed its sovereignty through diplomatic strategies, legal arguments, and identity-building efforts. The study demonstrates that Georgia’s foreign policy was not merely reactive but represented a proactive articulation of a European, democratic, and independent identity. Key diplomatic actions including the refusal to participate in Russian-centered negotiations, efforts to gain Western recognition, and the application for League of Nations membership reflect Georgia's commitment to international law and self-determination. Despite its short lifespan and ultimate Soviet occupation, the First Republic’s diplomatic achievements had a lasting impact, shaping Georgia’s modern political identity and its ongoing pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration.