German Foreign Policy Towards Russia and China after Zeitenwende: Changes and Challenges
| Název práce v češtině: | Změny a výzvy německé zahraniční politiky vůči Rusku a Číně po "Zeitenwende" |
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| Název v anglickém jazyce: | German Foreign Policy Towards Russia and China after Zeitenwende: Changes and Challenges |
| Klíčová slova: | Zeitenwende, Německo, Rusko, Čína, balance of power, realismus, válka na Ukrajině, Olaf Scholz |
| Klíčová slova anglicky: | Zeitenwende, Germany, Russia, China, balance of power, realism, war in Ukraine, Olaf Scholz |
| Akademický rok vypsání: | 2023/2024 |
| Typ práce: | diplomová práce |
| Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
| Ústav: | Katedra mezinárodních vztahů (23-KMV) |
| Vedoucí / školitel: | PhDr. Martin Jeřábek, Ph.D. |
| Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
| Datum přihlášení: | 12.06.2024 |
| Datum zadání: | 12.06.2024 |
| Datum a čas obhajoby: | 18.06.2025 09:00 |
| Místo konání obhajoby: | Areál Jinonice, B329, 329, seminární místnost IPS |
| Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 29.04.2025 |
| Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 18.06.2025 |
| Oponenti: | Mgr. et Mgr. Tomáš Kučera, Ph.D. |
| Seznam odborné literatury |
| Literature
Eberle, J., 2021. Germany as a Dividual Actor: Competing Social Logics and their Political Articulations. German politics, 30(1), pp.14-30. Eberle, J., 2023. Understanding German Foreign Policy in the (Post-)Merkel Era—Review Essay. International Studies Review, 25(2). Fix, L., 2021. Germany's Role in European Russia Policy: A New German Power? Springer International Publishing. Groitl, G., 2022. Zeitenwende Revisited: Neue Weltordnung nach Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine? Zeitschrift für Politik, 69(4), p.393. Helferich, J., 2023. The (false) promise of Germany’s Zeitenwende. European View, 22(1), 85-95. Kamp, K., 2023. The Zeitenwende at Work: Germany's National Security Strategy. Survival (London), 65(3), pp.73-80. Kostić Šulejić, M., 2023. Zeitenwende and the German National Security Policy: Analysis of the First National Security Strategy. Review of international affairs, 74(1188), pp.79-105. Lobell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M. and Taliaferro, J.W. (eds.), 2009. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lough, J. & Monaghan, A., 2021. Germany's Russia problem: the struggle for balance in Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Maull, H., 2000. Germany and the use of force: still a 'civilian power'? Survival (London), 42(2), pp.56-80. Maull, H.W., 2018. Reflective, Hegemonic, Geo-economic, Civilian ...? The Puzzle of German Power. German politics, 27(4), pp.460-478. Mello, P.A., 2024. Zeitenwende: German Foreign Policy Change in the Wake of Russia's War Against Ukraine. Politics and governance, 12. Powell, R., 1999. In the shadow of power: States and strategies in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schweller, R.L., 2008, c2006. Unanswered threats: political constraints on the balance of power. Course Book., Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Schweller, R. L., 2016. The Balance of Power in World Politics. Ohio State University. Szabo, S.F., 2015. Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Szabo, S.F., 2023. Germany's Strategic Reorientations, Present and Past. Survival (London), 65(4), pp.31-39. Waltz, K.N., 2000. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International security, 25(1), pp.5-41. Wohlforth, W.C. et al., 2007. Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History. European journal of international relations, 13(2), pp.155-185. Yin, R.K., (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, Ca Sage Publications. Online sources Batch, B. & Wessling, C. (2023). Germany’s new China strategy: Ambitious language, ambiguous course. MERICS. Available at: https://merics.org/en/report/germanys-new-china-strategy-ambitious-language-ambiguous-course (Acessed: 18.10.2024) Beach, D. (2018). Process Tracing Methods. International Relations. Available at: https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0227.xml#backToTop. (Acessed: 24.10.2024) Die Bundesregierung. (2023). Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Available at: https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/. (Acessed: 24.10.2024) Die Bundesregierung. (2023). China-Strategie der Bundesregierung. Available at: https://www.publikationen-bundesregierung.de/pp-de/publikationssuche/china-strategie-2203504. (Acessed: 24.10.2024) Meister, S. (2024). Germany and Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine: The Third Year. German Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/germany-and-russias-war-aggression-against-ukraine-third-year. (Acessed: 24.10.2024) Meister, S. & Jilge, W. (2024). A New Russia and Eastern Europe Policy Based on Lessons from the Past. German Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/DGAP_Analyse_2023_EN-02-After%20Ostpolitik_0.pdf. (Acessed: 24.10.2024) Oertel, J. (2023). The end of Germany’s China illusion. ECFR. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/the-end-of-germanys-china-illusion/ (Acessed: 15.10.2024) Rühlig, Tim. (2023). Germany’s new China strategy: following Brussels. German Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/germanys-new-china-strategy-following-brussels. (Acessed: 28.10.2024) Tallis, B. (2024). The End of the Zeitenwende. German Council on Foreign Relations . Available at: https://dgap.org/de/node/41083. (Acessed: 24.10.2024) |
| Předběžná náplň práce |
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Úvod do tématu Německá zahraniční politika prošla v posledních dvou letech zásadní proměnou. Ruská válka proti Ukrajině donutila Berlín zásadně přehodnotit svůj postoj vůči Moskvě. Krátce po začátku invaze oznámil kancléř Olaf Scholz zásadní změny v zahraniční i domáci politice Německa. Tento proces se vžil do širšího povědomí pod názvem Zeitenwende. Kancléř slíbil, že opustí dosavadní ekonomicky orientovanou politiku Wandel durch Handel a bude aktivně vyvažovat kroky Moskvy. Další změnu ohlásil ve vztahu k Číně. Agresivní chování Pekingu a jeho podpora Ruska rovněž přinutila Berlín ke změně postoje. Čína je nyní považována za partnera, konkurenta i systémového soupeře (Strategy on China 2023: pg. 8). Více než rok po ruské invazi zveřejnila německá vláda první Národní bezpečnostní strategii (Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie). Tento dokument slibuje komplexní a ambiciózní pojetí bezpečnosti, jehož cílem je zvýšit odolnost Německa vůči vnějším hrozbám. Vysvětlení výběru tématu Éra Zeitenwende představuje nový směr zahraniční politiky Německa. Je proto důležité se zaměřit na to, jak se podařilo tuto politiku implementovat a jaké z toho plynou důsledky do budoucnosti. Také je důležité prozkoumat, jak tuto změnu přijala německá veřejnost a politické elity. Na éru Zeitenwende se již zaměřili mnozí autoři. Téma se však rychle vyvíjí a zdá se, že téma německé politiky vůči Rusku a Číně zatím představuje spíše okrajový zájem v odborné literatuře. Tato práce se snaží tuto mezeru zaplnit a přispět tím k analýze německé politiky Zeitenwende. Výzkumný cíl, výzkumná otázka Těžištěm práce je německá zahraniční politika vůči Rusku a Číně po ruské invazi na Ukrajinu. Analyzovaným úsekem bude období od února 2022 do léta 2024. Práce si klade za cíl zjistit, zda Německo skutečně posunulo svoji politiku směrem k vyvažování moci, nebo zda je Zeitenwende spíše rétorickým krokem současné vlády. Hlavní výzkumná otázka proto bude znít: Dá se označit zahraniční politika Berlína vůči Rusku a Číně za vyvažování moci? Další výzkumná otázka bude znít: Jaké domácí faktory ovlivňují politiku (ne)vyvažování moci a existuje na této politice shoda mezi vládnoucími elitami? Detailní informace o struktuře práce jsou dostupné v části: Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
| Introduction to the Topic
German foreign policy has undergone a significant change in the last two years. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine forced Berlin to reconsider its position towards Moscow. Shortly after the attack, Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave his famous Zeitenwende speech. In his address, he announced a radical policy shift towards Russia. He promised to abandon the previous business driven policy of change through trade (Wandel durch Handel) and to actively balance against Moscow’s aggressive behaviour. Another change was announced in the relationship with China. The rise of Beijing has led Berlin to announce a more confrontational course. China is now considered to be a partner, competitor, and a systemic rival (Strategy on China 2023: pg. 8). More than a year after the Russian invasion, the German government has published the first National Security Strategy (Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie). This document promises a comprehensive and ambitious security plan with the aim to make Germany more resilient to external threats. More importantly, the new strategy promises to significantly readjust the foreign policy towards Russia. Explaining the Research Gap The era of Zeitenwende represents a new course of foreign policy in Germany. It is therefore important to understand to what degree has this policy already been implemented and what the implications are for the future. It is also valuable to explore how the new policy was accepted by the German political elites and the public. The era of Zeitenwende has been studied by many researchers. However, the topic is evolving rapidly and there seems to be a research gap in the assessment of German policy towards Russia and China. This thesis seeks to fill this gap and to contribute to the growing literature on the policy of Zeitenwende. Research Target, Research Question The focus of the thesis is German foreign policy towards Russia and China after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the beginning of 2022. The analysed period will be from February 2022 to summer of 2024. The research target is to explore whether Germany has truly shifted its policy towards a balance of power approach or whether the Zeitenwende is more of a rhetorical move by the current government. Therefore, the main research question will be: Is Berlin actively balancing against Russia and China to protect its security and economic interests? An additional research question will be: What are the domestic factors that influence the (non-)balancing policy and is there a consensus about the policy among the ruling elite? Conceptual and Theoretical framework The thesis uses neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework to analyse German foreign policy towards Russia and China. Beside the systemic level of analysis, neoclassical realism focuses on domestic factors as well. Other realist theories such as neorealism mostly focus on the systemic level when explaining a state behaviour and neglect the unit-level analysis. In other words, they ignore the black box because they believe that the international system is characterized by an anarchic structure that forces the individual states to react in a similar manner. This behaviour usually manifests itself in the form of balance of power (Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro 2009: pg. 18-19). Neoclassical realism does not reject the idea of systemic pressure on states. However, it focuses predominantly on the black box of domestic politics to explain or predict the reaction of a state to outside pressure (Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro 2009: pg. 21-22). The thesis utilizes balance of power as analytical framework. This concept is arguably among the most frequently used ones in the theoretical realm of realism. Balance of power was interpreted in various ways by prominent realist authors. According to Kenneth Waltz “As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power” (2000: pg. 28). His understanding of the concept suggests that states always choose balance because the anarchic system forces them to do so. However, such an interpretation has been criticised by many authors for focusing only on structural factors and for overlooking domestic variables. Furthermore, some authors have tested the balance of power theory and concluded that states do not automatically choose to balance but to rather wait, free-ride or bandwagon (Powell 1999: pg. 196). This was the conclusion of a study that tested the concept on several ancient civilizations and concluded that balance of power is not a rule nor a default reaction of states (Wohlforth et al. 2007). Neoclassical realism agrees with this premise. Randall Schweller argues that balance of power is not an automated feature imposed on states, but a result of a political decisions made by the governing elites (2016: pg. 3). The thesis will utilize the analytical framework presented in his book Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Schweller: 2008). His work focuses on the domestic processes that influence the decision to balance or not to balance against a threatening state. To uncover the black box, Schweller presents four variables at the state level: elite consensus, elite cohesion, government or state vulnerability, and social cohesion (Schweller 2008: pg. 47). Elite consensus is the most important of the variables because if the elites do not agree about a perceived threat, there could be hardly any balancing behaviour. Furthermore, the analysis offers a casual scheme which suggests what type of policy was or will be applied. Depending on the outcome, it can be either overbalancing, balancing, underbalancing or non-balancing (Schweller 2008: pg. 62). This model is applied to the German policy towards Russia and China to analyse the first two years after the announcement of Zeitenwende. The aim is to determine if Berlin is balancing, overbalancing, non-balancing or underbalancing against Russia and China. According to the research target, the following hypotheses will be tested: H1: Germany is actively balancing against Russia and China because the domestic factors allow the government to do so. H2: German policy towards Russia is primarily shaped by security concerns, while policy towards China is mainly driven by economic factors. H3: Germany is non-balancing or underbalancing Russia and China because of the domestic factors. H4: The domestic factors do not affect Germany’s foreign policy towards Russia and China in a significant manner. Methodology The research design utilizes case study to examine the German foreign policy. It further uses process tracing method to test a neoclassical realist theory of balance of power and to explore casual mechanisms. Case study is useful in researching contemporary events because it allows one to apply various research methods and therefore gain a thorough understanding of a certain phenomenon. It can be characterized as an empirical analysis that focuses on a specific phenomenon in its real-life context (Yin 2009: pg. 18). The process tracing method tends to be useful because it provides an in-depth focus on causes that may lead to a particular outcome and therefore it allows establishment of a casual mechanism (Beach 2018). The thesis uses case study and process tracing to test the modified version of balance of power theory developed by Randall Schweller (2006) to analyse German policy towards Russia and China after the invasion of Ukraine. It focuses on the domestic factors such as the government of Olaf Scholz, the consensus among German political elites, the stability of the government and the public support for the Zeitenwende policies. The analysis then determines what type of balancing behaviour, if any, did the German government use towards Moscow and Beijing. The two countries will be analysed separately, and both findings will be put into perspective using a comparative method. The first chapter will introduce the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism and the concept of balance of power. The chapter will explain why the concept is often problematic and how a modified version will be used to analyse the process of Zeitenwende. The second chapter will discuss the appropriate methodological tools. The third part will provide a literature review of the articles on the process of Zeitenwende. The fourth and fifth parts will focus on the cases of Russia and China. These chapters will include a detailed analysis of the proposed variables and domestic factors. Finally, the findings of the case studies will be compared. The proposed structure of the thesis will be: Introduction 1. Theoretical framework 1.1. Neoclassical realism 1.2. The concept of balance of power 2. Methodology 2.1. Case study 2.2. Content analysis 3. Literature review 4. Case study Russia 4.1. Analysis of domestic units 4.2. Balance of power analysis 5. Case study China 5.1. Analysis of domestic units 5.2. Balance of power analysis 6. Comparison of the findings Conclusion |