2021 Taliban Takeover: Defeat of the Afghan National Security Forces through the lens of proxy warfare theory

• Název práce v češtině: 2021 - převzetí moci Talibanem: Porážka afghánských národních bezpečnostních sil optikou teorie proxy válčení
• Název v anglickém jazyce: 2021 Taliban Takeover: Defeat of the Afghan National Security Forces through the lens of proxy warfare theory
• Klíčová slova: Proxy Války, Afghanistán, Spojené Státy Americké, Taliban, Afghanská Národní Armáda, Insurgency, Coutnerinsurgency,
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Proxy Warfare, Afghanistan, United States of America, Taliban, Afghan National Army, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency,
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2022/2023
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Katedra bezpečnostních studií (23-KBS)
• Vedoucí / školitel: Ing. Bc. Luděk Michálek, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 30.12.2022
• Datum zadání: 30.12.2022
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 31.01.2024 07:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: Areál Jinonice, B330, 330, seminární místnost IPS
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 02.08.2023
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 31.01.2024
• Oponenti: prof. PhDr. Emil Aslan, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

Academical sources


Barno W., D. (2006) Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters. Volume 36 Number 2 Summer Issue

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (1984). The Strategy of War by Proxy, Cooperation and conflict XIV 263-73

Bell, D. (2022) Back to the Future: Is this really a new period in History? Foreign Policy Summer 2022

Brown, S. (2016). Purposes and pitfalls of war by proxy: A systemic analysis. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27:2, 243-257. Routledge

Chan, S. (2009). Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army. Military Review January-February 2009

Clancy J., Crossett Ch (2007). Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters Volume 37, no. 2

Cleveland, Ch. (2020) The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir. Rand Corporation

Freedman, L. (2022). Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine. Allen Lane

Gallagher, B. (2019) Tbe Day After: Why America Wins the War but Loses the Peace. Cornell University Press

Giustozzi, A. (2007). Auxilliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan´s “ANA” and the Counter-Insurgency Effort, 2002-2006. Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.18. No.1, 45-67. March 2007

Giustozzi. A. (2009). Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope? The RUSI Journal, 154:6, 36-42

Giustozzi. A. (2015). Army of Afghanistan: Political history of fragile institution. C. Hurst&Co.

Hammes, T.X. (2004) The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Zenith Press

Hammes, T.X. (2016). Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Chapter 4 in Lessons Encountered Lessons from the Long War. National Defense University Press.

Huber, Thomas M. (2004). Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot. University Press of the Pacific

International Crisis Group (2010). A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army. Asia Report No.190, International Crisis Group, Washington, D.C.

Jones, S. (2008). Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. National Defense Research Institute. RAND Corporation

Jones, S. (2009). In the Graveyard of Empires: America´s war in Afghanistan. Norton & Companz

Kitts, M. (2020). The Strategic Use of Force in Counterinsurgency. The Rowman & Littlefield

Krieg, A., Rickli, J-M (2019). Surrogate Warfare: The transformation of War in the twenty-first century. Georgetown University Press

Ladwig III, Walter C. (2017). The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency. Cambridge University Press.

Liang, Q., Xiangsui W. (1999) Unrestricted Warfare. English translation (2017) by Shadow Lawn Press.

McCausland. Jeffrey D. (2022). Putin Chooses between a Series of Bad Options. Parameters 52 The US Army War College

Morelock, J. (2004) Washington as Strategist: Compound Warfare in the American Revolution, 1775-1783. Chapter in Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot. University Press of Pacific

Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy Warfare. Polity

Mumford, A. et col. (2014). The Theory and Practice of Irregular War: Warrior-Scholarship in Counterinsurgency

Nagl, J. (2022) Why America´s Army Can´t Win America´s Wars. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters Volume 52 Number 3 Autumn Issue

Pearlman, M. (2004) The Wars of Colonial North America, 1690-1763. Chapter in Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot. University Press of Pacific

Pollack, K. (2019). Armies of Sand. Oxford University Press

Potter, J.B (2022). Haunted by Clausewitz´s Ghost: Moral Forces in the Collapse in the Afghan Military. Military Review November-December 2022. U.S Army University Press

Rauta, V. (2021). Proxy War – A reconceptualization. Civil Wars, 23:1, 1-24

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2015). Afghanistan Annual Report 2015
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. United Nations Humans Rights

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2019). Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2019. United Nations Humans Right
Younossi, O. et col. (2009). The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army. National Defense Research Institut.RAND Corporation


US and Afghan government sources – transcripts and reports


Congressional Research Service (2021). U.S Military Withdrawl and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions. CRS Report for Members and Committees of Congress

Saleh, Amrullah (2006) Strategy of Insurgency and Terrorist in Afghanistan. National Directorate of Security

SIGAR (2012). Quarterly Report to The United States Congress. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR (2017). Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons From the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR (2021) What we need to learn: Lessons from Twenty years of Afghanistan reconstruction. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR (2022) DOD Efforts to Recruit, Retain, and Train Women in the ANDSF. Sigar 22-12 Audit Report. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

U.S Government Accountability Office (2005) Transcript of Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives.

U.S Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (2009). U.S Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

United States Department of the Army (2007) Counterinsurgency Field Manual. University of Chicago Press

Online sources

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2016) Afghanistan: Events of 2016. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/afghanistan

INSIDER (2019, December 10) More US contractors have died in Afghanistan than US troops — but the Pentagon doesn't keep track. https://www.businessinsider.com/more-us-contractors-have-died-in-afghanistan-than-us-troops-2019-12

Naval Postgraduate School (2007) Summary of Afghan National Army. Program for Culture and Conflict studies. https://nps.edu/documents/105988371/107571254/Afghan+National+Army+Summary.pdf/66246d93-15c0-4945-a4db-0f6d5d318f81

TAYLOR, N. (2010, September 20) Women in the Afghan National Security Forces. Commentary at Rusi.org https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/women-afghan-national-security-forces

WATSON INSTITUTE. BROWN University (2021, August). Human and Budgetary costs to date of the U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022 https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022

ZAWULISTANI, J. (2018, April 30) A Battle of Several Fronts: Afghan Women in the Security Forces. The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/a-battle-of-several-fronts-afghan-women-in-the-security-forces/

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

The thesis will first provide a comprehensive introduction to the theoretical framework of proxy
warfare and present different theoretical approaches to what constitutes proxy warfare.
Afterward, a history of the war in Afghanistan will be presented as well as the relationship
between the United States and the Afghan Islamic Republic. Subsequently, the facts presented in
the two previous sections will be used to explain why the proxy benefactor relationship can be
used in this particular case.
The thesis will first introduce the theoretical framework of proxy warfare and discuss different
aspects and classifications by a number of different authors. Afterward, the brief history of the
war in Afghanistan and the relationship between the United States and the Afghan Islamic
Republic will be discussed. The primary focus will be on the relationship between the United
States and the components of the Afghan forces, which were engaged in the conflict with the
Taliban insurgency. Subsequently, the facts presented in these two sections will be used to
examine the question if the relationship between the United States and the Afghan forces can be
understood as a proxy and a principal relationship by the definitions laid out in the theoretical
section.
After the relationship is sufficiently contextualized and correctly placed on the line between a
principal and an agent, the documents and the available records of engagements will be studied
and compared to the theories of non-state warfare and cases of doctrine adoptions to determine
the main causes of military ineffectiveness. These findings will then be compared to similar
cases in other conflicts to determine if adoptions of the doctrines in proxy and principal
relationships constantly produce reoccurring inefficiencies. The findings will help better
understand the relationship between patron states and proxies and draw lessons that can be
applied in future conflicts.