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Poslední úprava: prof. James Hill, Ph.D. (11.12.2021)
Philosophers often hold that consciousness, in addition to its qualitative features, is characterised by its subjectivity. Subjectivity in this sense has been described by Joseph Levine as ‘a way it’s like for me’, or simply ‘for-me-ness’. Conscious experience, then, according to this approach, essentially makes us aware of itself, which means that it involves a form of ‘self-awareness’. Such a view of subjectivity, famously held by Brentano, has recently undergone a revival, associated with authors such as Uriah Kriegel, Dan Zahavi and Michelle Montague. Our course will focus on various approaches to self-awareness in current analytic philosophy. It will also look at their inspiration in continental philosophy as well as the influence of cognitive psychology. We will, moreover, track the implications of one’s understanding of self-awareness for metaphysical theories of consciousness, such as representationalism, Russellian monism, and physicalism. This course is a Masters’ course and a basic acquaintance with philosophy of mind will be an advantage. |
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Poslední úprava: prof. James Hill, Ph.D. (12.09.2021)
Self-awareness: Contemporary theories
Anthologies: Borner, M., Frank, M. & Williford, K. (eds.) (2019) Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. Frankfurt am Main: Gerhard Preyer. Kriegel, U. & Williford, K. (eds.) (2006) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. Cambridge (MA.): MIT Press. Siderits, M., Thompson, E. & Zahavi, D. (2010) Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Monographs & Papers: Billon, A. (forthcoming) “What Is It Like to Lack Mineness? Depersonalization as a Probe for the Scope, Nature and Role of Mineness”, in: M. Guillot & M. Garica Carpintero (eds.), The Sense of Mineness. Oxford University Press. Brentano, F. (1874/2015). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. London: Routledge. Chalmers, D. (2010) The Character of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coleman, S. (2015) “Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory”, Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733. Dretske, F. (2003) “How do you know you are not a zombie?” In B. Gertler (Ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. 1-14. Duncan, M. (2018) “Subjectivity and Self-Acquaintance”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25(3–4): 88–111. Guillot, M. (2017) “I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience”. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8: 23-53. Howell, R. & Thompson, B. (2017) “Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8, 103–127. Kriegel, U. (2009) Subjective Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levine, J. (2001) Purple Haze. The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. Levine, J. (2019) “Acquaintance is consciousness and consciousness is acquaintance”, in J. Knowles & T. Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 33-48. McClelland, T. (forthcoming) “Four Impediments to the Case for Mineness”, in: M. Guillot & M. Garica Carpintero (eds.), The Sense of Mineness. Oxford University Press. Mihálik, J. (under review) “Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental”. Montague, M. (2016) The Given. Experience and Its Content. New York: Oxford University Press. Nagel, T. (1974) “What is it like to be a bat?”, Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-450. Nida-Rümelin, M. (2017) “Self-Awareness”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82. Rosenthal, D. (2005) Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Salje, L. & Geddes, A. (forthcoming). “Conscious Experience: What’s In It For Me?”, in: M. Guillot & M. Garica Carpintero (eds.), The Sense of Mineness. Oxford University Press. Siewert, C. (2013) “Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness”, in: U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, D. W. (1986) “The Structure of (Self-) Consciousness”, Topoi 5, 149-156. Strawson, G. (2017) “Self-Intimation”, in G. Strawson, The Subject of Experience. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 136-164. Thomasson, A. L. (2000) “After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness”, European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):190-210. Williford, K. (2015) “Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance”. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (eds.), Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. Zahavi, D. (2005) Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person. Cambridge MA.: MIT Press. Zahavi, D. & Kriegel, U. (2015) „For–Me–Ness. What It Is and What It Is Not”, In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge, 36-53. |
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Poslední úprava: prof. James Hill, Ph.D. (01.10.2021)
There are two course requirements: (i) attendance and (íí) an essay. The essay should be from 5-7 standard pages in length and should show knowledge of one of the theories we have discussed in class. The deadline for handing in the essay is December 1st 2021. |
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Poslední úprava: Mgr. Jakub Mihálik, Ph.D. (07.10.2021)
Weeks 1-2 Basic concepts (Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Joseph Levine)
Weeks 3-5 Brentano and neo-Brentanians (Uriah Kriegel, Kriegel-Zahavi, Michelle Montague, Galen Strawson)
Weeks 6-8 Criticisms and revisions (Marie Guillot, Salje & Geddes, Charles Siewert, Jakub Mihálik)
Weeks 9-11 Alternative theories of self-awareness (Martine Nida-Rümelin, Joseph Levine, David Rosenthal, Sam Coleman) |