Effort and cheating behavior: An experiment
Název práce v češtině: | Úsilí a podvádění: experiment |
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Název v anglickém jazyce: | Effort and cheating behavior: An experiment |
Klíčová slova anglicky: | effort cheating behavioral economics honesty experimental economics |
Akademický rok vypsání: | 2011/2012 |
Typ práce: | bakalářská práce |
Jazyk práce: | angličtina |
Ústav: | Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES) |
Vedoucí / školitel: | doc. PhDr. Michal Bauer, Ph.D. |
Řešitel: | skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem |
Datum přihlášení: | 31.05.2012 |
Datum zadání: | 04.06.2012 |
Datum a čas obhajoby: | 20.06.2013 00:00 |
Místo konání obhajoby: | IES |
Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: | 17.05.2013 |
Datum proběhlé obhajoby: | 20.06.2013 |
Oponenti: | doc. PhDr. Lubomír Cingl, Ph.D. |
Seznam odborné literatury |
Fischbacher, U. & Heusi, F., 2008. Lies in Disguise. An experimental study on cheating. TWI Research Paper Series.
Cappelen, A.W. & Tungodden, B., 2007. Rewarding effort. Economic Theory, 39(3), pp.425–441. Mazar, N., Amir, O. & Ariely, D., 2008. The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 45, No. 6, pp. 633-644 Gneezy, U., 2005. Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review. Wilkinson, N., 2007. An introduction to behavioral economics, Palgrave Macmillan. Kagel, J.H.J.H. & Roth, A.E., 1995. The handbook of experimental economics, Princeton University Press. |
Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce |
The purpose of this study is to test experimentally how cheating in reporting one's own payoff is affected by different means of earning it. Treatments used in the experiment differ by required level of effort : from a low-effort windfall gain determined by luck to effort-intensive tasks. Cheating behavior is a relatively novel topic in behavioral economics despite the fact that honesty (or lack of it) can largely influence economic well-being. The topic is interesting since many experimental findings on dishonesty behavior cannot be explained by standard economic theory.
The method of this work is an economic experiment. Our intention is to choose known experimental designs (that vary in effort levels) thanks to which we could even compare our results using experiment participants from the Czech Republic with results from other countries. We allow for cheating behavior by allowing participants to self-report their payoffs and letting them know in advance that their self-reported information cannot be verified by experimenters. The outline of the thesis is as follows. 1. Introduction, 2. Literature review 3. Experimental design 4. Results 4. Discussion 5. Conclusion |