Cooperation with incomplete monitoring

• Název práce v češtině: Kooperace za neúplného monitoringu
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Cooperation with incomplete monitoring
• Klíčová slova: Experimentální ekonomie, Public Goods Game, Kooperace, Reciprocita, Sítě
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Experimental economics, Public Goods Game, Cooperation, Reciprocity, Networks
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2010/2011
• Typ práce: diplomová práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES)
• Vedoucí / školitel: doc. PhDr. Michal Bauer, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 10.06.2011
• Datum zadání: 17.07.2012
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 13.09.2012 00:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: IES
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 30.07.2012
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 13.09.2012
• Oponenti: RNDr. Michal Červinka, Ph.D.

Seznam odborné literatury

Ambrus, A., & Greiner, B. (2011). Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study. forthcoming .
Andreoni, J. (1998). Why Free Ride? Strategies And Learning in Public Goods Experiments. Journal of Public Economics 37 , 291 - 304.
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006). When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behvaiour? Science 6 , 47-52.
Carpenter, J. P. (2004). Punishing Free Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods. IZA DP No. 1337 .
Croson, R., & Marks, M. (1998). Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42 , 167 - 190.
Croson, R., & Marks, M. (2001). The Effect of Recommended Contributions in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods. Economic Inquiry, 39(2) , 238-249.
Dickson, E. S. (forthcoming). On the (In)Effectiveness of Collective Punishment: An Experimental Investigation.
Etzioni, A. (1995). Morální Dimenze Ekonomiky. Praha: Victoria Publishing.
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A Theory of Reciprocity. Games and Economic Behaviour , 54: 293–31.
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005). Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1635 .
Fatas, E., Melendéz, M. A., & Solaz, H. (2010). An Experimental Analysis of Team Production in Networks. Exp Econ 13 , 399 - 411.
Fatas, E., Morales, A. J., & Ubeda, P. (2010). Blind Justice: An experimental Analysis of Random Punsihment. Journal of Economic Psychology 31 , 358-373.
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The Nature of Human Altruism. Nature, vol 425 , 785-791.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review , 4:980-994.
Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (2007). Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations. The Annual Review of Sociology 33 , 43-64.
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economic letters 71 , 397-404.
Gächter, S. (2006). Heterogenous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2011 .
Gächter, S., Renner, E., & Sefton, M. (2008). The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322 , 1510.
Grechenig, K. R., Nicklisch, A., & Thöni, C. (2010). Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt. U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-06 .
Hayek, F. A. (1973). Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (2004). Foundations of Human Sociality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hermann, B., & Gächter, S. (2009). Reciprocity, Culture and Human Cooperation: Previous Insights and A New Cross-Cultural Experiment. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society , 364: 791-806.
Herrmann, B., Gächter, S., & Thöni, C. (2008). Antisocial Punishment Across Societies. Science 319 , 1362 - 1367.
Hobbes, T. (2005). Leviathan. Broadview Press.
Hogg, M. A. (2002). Chapter 3: Social Categorization, Depersonalization, and Group Behavior. In R. S. Michael A. Hogg, Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Process. Blackwell Publishing.
Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Sustaining Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey of Literature. Exp Econ 14 , 47-83.
Kosfeld, M. (2004). Economic Networks in the Laboratory. The Review of Network Economics, Vol. 3(1) , 20 - 42.
Ledyard, J. O. (1994). Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research . Econ WPA - Public Economics .
Leibbrandt, A., Rmalingam, A., Sääksvuori, L., & Walker, J. M. (2012). Broken punishment netowrks in public goods game: exoerimental evidence . Jena economic research papers 004 .
Marques, J. M., Abrams, D., & Hogg, D. P. (2002). Chapter Seventeen. Social Categorization, Social Identification, and Rejection of Deviant Group Members. V M. A. Hogg, & R. S. Tindale, Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Process. Blackwell Publishing.
Marquez, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J. (1988). The 'Black Sheep Effect': Extremities of Judgements Towards Ingroup Members as a Function of Group Identification. European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 18 , 1-16.
Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., & Villeval, M.-C. (2003). Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. American Economic Review 93 , 366-380.
Nikiforakis, N. (2008). Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: can we really govern ourselves? Journal of public economics 92 , 91-112.
O'Gorman, R., Henrich, J., & Van Vugt, M. (2009). Constraining Free Riding in Public Goods Games: Designated Solitary Punishers can Sustain Human Cooperatio. Proceedings of The Royal Society .
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with And without A Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible. American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 2 , 404-417.
Patel, A., Cartwright, E., & van Vug, M. (2011). Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity. University of Gothengurg Working papers in economics no. 451 .
Polanyi, K. (2001). The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.
Schotter, A., Cabral, L., & Ozbay, E. Y. (2011). Intrinsic and Instrumental Reciprocity: And Experimental Study. Working Papers NYU .
Schotter, A., Kariv, S., & Carpenter, J. (2010). Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring In Public Goods Experiments. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5307 .
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). Chapter 3: An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. V W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel, The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. CA: Brooks-Cole.
Zellner, J. (2003). Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta Analysis. Experimental Economics , 6: 299-310.

Předběžná náplň práce

V této práci se zabýváme se poskytováním veřejných statků. Tento problém studujeme na základě experimentální ekonomické hry „Public Goods Game“. Jednotlivci v této hře mohou trestat ostatní jednotlivce za jejich chování, ale čelí při tom různým informačním omezením. Snažíme se přispět k současné literatuře zabývající se reciprocitou a zjistit, jestli jsou lidé ochotni trestat, i pokud jsou jejich informace o ostatních jen velmi kusé. Prospěšnost trestání za nejistoty je centrálním tématem této práce, které úzce souvisí s tím, nakolik jsou lidské společnosti schopné spontánně fungovat bez působení centrální autority. Z hlediska veřejné politiky se snažíme přispět k debatě o tom, kdy by lidské jednání (trestání) mělo být omezené centrální autoritou. Z hlediska pracovního týmu může být naše práce aplikována při vytváření strategie pro sledování zaměstnanců.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

We approach the topic of provision of public goods in an experimental economic study using the Public Goods Game setting. We allow subjects to punish each other but vary the structure and amount of information they can base their decisions upon. We try to add to the current literature on reciprocity and study whether people are willing to punish under such incomplete information. Since punishment under uncertain conditions can be quite destructive in terms of welfare, this closely relates to whether people are able to provide public good themselves or whether they need some external assistance. In terms of public policy, this can add to the debate on when should government provide certain services and when it should be left to individuals. In terms of behaviour inside of an enterprise, our study could be well applied to problems that arise when teams work on a common project but some people free-ride on effort of others.