Do Information Cascades Arise Easier under Time Pressure? Experimantal Approach.

• Název práce v češtině: x
• Název v anglickém jazyce: Do Information Cascades Arise Easier under Time Pressure? Experimantal Approach.
• Klíčová slova: Informační kaskády, stádové chování, experimentální ekonomie, měření tepové frekvence, osobnostní charakteristiky
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Information cascades, herding, experimental economics, heart rate measurement, personality traits
• Akademický rok vypsání: 2010/2011
• Typ práce: rigorózní práce
• Jazyk práce: angličtina
• Ústav: Institut ekonomických studií (23-IES)
• Vedoucí / školitel: doc. PhDr. Michal Bauer, Ph.D.
• Řešitel: skrytý - zadáno vedoucím/školitelem
• Datum přihlášení: 04.02.2011
• Datum zadání: 04.02.2011
• Datum a čas obhajoby: 30.03.2011 13:00
• Místo konání obhajoby: IES
• Datum odevzdání elektronické podoby: 11.02.2011
• Datum proběhlé obhajoby: 30.03.2011
• Oponenti: Ing. Filip Pertold, Ph.D.

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Předběžná náplň práce

Informační kaskády jako forma racionálního stádového chování pomáhají vysvětlit celou řadu ekonomických jevů, kde neoklasická teorie zaostává, jako například módní trendy, tvorba 'bublin' na burze, konformismus nebo obecně následování rozhodnutí ostatních. Za použití laboratorního experimentu se snažím modelovat sklon ke stádovému chování stejně jako sklon k zobrazení informace, která může ke stádovému chování vést. Účastníci experimentu měli za úkol splnit jednoduchou kognitivně nenáročnou úlohu za různých experimentálních podmínek. Úloha není pravděpodobnostní, ale nejistota ohledně vlastního signálu je tvořena různými stupni časové tísně. Očekávám, že tato situace přiměje účastníky k častější imitaci výsledků ostatních. Mezi hlavní výsledky patří, že sklon ke stádovému chování není významně odlišný ani v jedné ze tří úrovní časové tísně. Osobnostní charakteristiky měřené pomocí protokolu Big Five naproti tomu významně vysvětlují model, nicméně ani jejich vztah není vždy intuitivní. Informační kaskády nastaly, nicméně nikdy v perfektní formě. Tepová frekvence narostla v průběhu řešení úlohy, ale nebyla korelovaná se subjektivním údajem stresu. Tepová frekvence navíc významně predikuje sklon ke stádovému chování, nicméně se záporným znaménkem. Efekt reputace hraje významnou roli ve vysvětlení pravděpodobnosti ke stádovému chování, nicméně opět se záporným znaménkem, což jde proti původním očekáváním.

Předběžná náplň práce v anglickém jazyce

Information cascades as a form of rational herding help to explain real-life phenomena such as fads, fashion, creation of 'bubbles' in financial markets or conformity in general. In this paper I attempt to model propensity to herd and infer its relationship to time-pressure by conducting a laboratory experiment. I let subjects perform a simple cognitive task under different treatment conditions and levels of time pressure with the possibility to herd. The order of decision-making is endogenous and the task is not probabilistic. Rather, I impose uncertainty of private signal by different levels of time pressure. This is expected to make participants prone to imitate the behavior of others. Apart from that I examine the effect of reputation (also called endorsement effect) as an addition to the public pool of information, which is expected to increase the probability to herd. The main findings are that propensity to herd was not significantly influenced by different levels of time pressure. Information cascades arose, but never in a perfect form. Personality traits measured by the Big Five protocol contribute considerably to the explanation of the model, but their relationship is not straightforward. Heart-rate increased during performance of a task, but was not correlated to subjectively stated level of stress. Moreover, it significantly influences the propensity to herd, but unexpectedly with a negative sign. The endorsement effect plays an important role in determining the probability to herd, but again unexpectedly with a negative sign.