

The work deals with the problem of freedom in the theory of the early Stoics (3. c. BC) which has been a controversial issue since antiquity up to this very day. In its three parts the author examines basic aspects of this problem in order to offer his own interpretation.

The first part tackles the question of action and responsibility being thus an introduction to the whole problem which in this light reveals its paradoxical form: on the one hand, the Stoics teach “fatal” determination of all motion, on the other, they defend human responsibility pointing at the specific faculty of human soul – the assent.

In the second part, the author offers an analysis of the Stoic notion of reason in the full scope of its different characterizations as collection of concepts, as inner language and as specific structure of the motion of human soul. On the basis of an attempt to bring these definition together as complementary perspectives, the interpretation of the Stoic assent is proposed showing that it is to be understood as reflective turn of the reason towards itself. This claim aims also at solving the paradox of the assent – determined and autonomous in the same time: the assent is autonomous only insofar as it represents reason giving approval to its own interpretation of the world; it is however not autonomous in the sense of being excluded from the universal causality.

In the third part, the Stoic notions of virtue and freedom are dealt with. Close analysis of the aporetic character of these notions is the starting point of an argument which shows that Stoic virtue and freedom can't be understood without the concept of assent as the point of reflection: Stoic virtue and freedom is realized only in reflective turn of reason in which man grasps himself or herself as part of the determined universe.