

Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Humanities



Patočka and the Problem of the Second Movement of Existence.

By Heriberto Castilla Hernández

Under the supervision of Mgr. Jakub Marek, Ph.D.

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1. Introduction

We begin our introduction of the concept of **movement** by turning to Patočka's intention behind his own writings on movement, as to "attempt a philosophy which takes movement as its basic concept and principle."¹ He wants to show that the world "is change by its very nature (a mode of change - development), but that in this (non-static) world there can *arise* comprehension, understanding, cognition, truth."² Patočka's conception of movement follows Aristotle's conception of movement as a "realization of possibilities."³ Aristotle placed emphasis on the idea of *dynamis*, on the idea of movement as a realization of potentials, and Patočka's initial discussion takes place in relation to Aristotle's conception of movement. However, Patočka finds Aristotle's conception of *dynamis* essentially the inversion to the modern concept of movement as "possibilities in the course of realization."⁴ *Dynamis* as potentiality is for Aristotle "always perceived in relation to some **substrate** that makes change possible. The presupposition of change is a persisting substrate; the precondition of change is something changeless."⁵ The incompatibility between Aristotle's conception of movement as *dynamis* and Patočka's conception of movement as temporality lays in the different notion of potentiality between them. For Patočka "by understanding movement on the basis of the substrate's possibility of passing from determination to determination, Aristotle objectifies movement, making it something that requires an objective bearer who makes this dynamic aspect possible."⁶ Patočka however, has taken upon himself the task of understanding the concept of movement "independently of the opposition of subject and object."⁷ In this Patočka rejects the prevalence of either "on the one hand an objective world, complete, self-enclosed - and on the other hand a subject, perceiving

1Kohák. *Jan Patočka : philosophy and selected writings*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. Print. P. 278

2 Ibid

3 Ibid

4 Ibid

5 Ibid

6 Ibid p. 279

7 Ibid p. 278

this world,”⁸ over each other in his investigation into the origin of movement. He likewise rejects the idea of a subjective existence where movement is reduced to duration.

Patocka’s position stands apart as a conception of movement at the center of which we identify the concept of ‘**lived corporeality**’. What Patocka means by this is understanding our *existence* by *integrating* it into the world, understanding the being of the subject as a “genuinely real process.”⁹ “Lived corporeality is precisely something lived, a part of life, of the vital process, and so is itself a process.”¹⁰

Being in corporeality “is a being that not only is in the world... but rather is itself a part of the whole process. This movement, because it is precisely something that *is*... is a being that understands itself; it is a being that makes possible clarity, understanding, knowledge and truth.”¹¹ Patocka speaks of “three basic movements in which existence becomes actual,”¹² his task of ‘tracing out’ their respective meanings is a task we will share in the following chapters.

Nevertheless from Aristotle, Patocka furthers the idea that “life is a movement from beginning to end,”¹³ as the basis for his analysis of movement. Following Aristotle we find that “the movement of a living being is continuous, made up of many individual movements, though in all of them a unitary meaning of the vital movement of the being from birth to death is being realized. All compartments, all functions together constitute a unitary line of a vital movement. Each individual task, function has its meaning in relation to life itself... Aristotle recognizes a distinctive duality of life: the overall life line (from birth to death) and individual functions, compartments, movements.”¹⁴

For Patocka we turn to the natural world not in “mere theoretical curiosity... we turn toward it because we are searching for life in its originality.”¹⁵ Patocka wants to the origin of what leads to

8 Ibid

9 Ibid p. 279

10 Ibid

11 Ibid p. 280

12 Ibid

13 Ibid

14 Ibid

“concrete human life *in the world*, in society and in history.”¹⁶ He wants to find not only the meaning of life in its origin, but concretely the specific moments which make up existence as a whole. To understand life as movement, he proposes a phenomenological analysis of the ontological meaning of the world in its “fundamental moments of time, space, and motion.”¹⁷

His conception of movement follows Aristotle’s conception of life as movement “with its emphasis on the realization of dynamis.”¹⁸ However Patocka’s conception is rather a *radicalization* of Aristotle’s understanding of movement as “the original life which does not receive its unity from an enduring substrate but rather generates itself its own unity.”¹⁹ “Only movement thus understood is the *original* movement.”²⁰ This *radicalizing* is expressed by Patocka in the sense that “movement thus no longer presupposes constituted being but rather constitutes it.”²¹

Patocka’s conception is also a radicalization in its difference from Aristotle’s. For Aristotle, potentiality exists in the substrate as something which is immovable but for Patocka, the source of original movement is not found in defining whether movement is effected on the human being or the world, nor in identifying what is changeless and what is not; rather his and our investigation must be an attempt at qualifying what is atemporal itself. Time neither as duration nor as change but as synonymous to the world, to Being in general, “must itself be what makes possible both the elapsing and the enduring of things.”²²

Human life understood as movement also represents a “substantial contribution to the problem of *praxis* as the fundamental element of human life and history.”²³ For Patocka as we shall later see in further detail,

15 Patočka, Jan, et al. *The natural world as a philosophical problem*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2016, Print. P. 160

16 Ibid p. 161

17 Ibid

18 Ibid

19 Ibid

20 Ibid

21 Ibid

22 Ibid p. 162

23 Ibid

“every existent is practical and active, each and every one enters into ‘causal’ connections, every actual reality is an act, a manifestation. But only a reality which not only is not indifferent to itself but can realize itself only insofar as it is not indifferent to the fact that it is and how it is - only a reality capable of understanding its own being (and this means at the same time understanding being in general, being as a whole, understanding the world) -is active in the eminent sense, i.e., in such a way that its action does not concern only existents in their reality, that their being too must be opened in it, that the inner richness of what is, its tenor its fullness, its meaning is opened up in and through this action.”²⁴

At the center of Patocka’s concept of movement as existence, we identify the following notions:

a) that “all human action is thus ‘open’ (for existents and their being). It is open precisely as action, i.e., as a self-responsible movement, one that I take upon myself as an act.”²⁵ **b)** That “movement is the realization of possibilities.”²⁶ And **c)** the idea that existence is *essentially bodily*, the idea that “lived corporeality is...the possibility of action which precedes and opens every fact and experience of action.”²⁷ It is on the basis of this corporeality that we can conceive of human existence as “a movement *from somewhere to somewhere*, that it always has a starting point and a goal.”²⁸

It is on the basis of this corporeality that we say existence is initially preoccupied with “the repetition, restitution, and the extension of its own corporeality.”²⁹ This is the basis on which the first two movements of existence come about; understanding their relationship (between the movement of the world and the movement of individuation.) will be the subject of our thesis, that the problem of the second movement of life is constituted in a way as reversal of the first. For Patocka symbolically “the circle of existence...always somehow includes the circle of life, carrying out its vital functions.”³⁰ In our analysis of the relationship between the first two movements, we will also describe how existence becomes a “*modification* of life that passes

24 Ibid p. 163

25 Ibid p. 162

26 Ibid p. 163

27 Ibid

28 Ibid

29 Ibid

30 Ibid

from instinctual univocity to practical plurivocity and is no longer concerned only with itself as existent but rather with its *mode* of being, with the manner in which it *realizes* its existence.”³¹

In addressing the topic of our thesis as an investigation into the problem of existence as a movement, in the fact that the movement of our being is a modification of life, we refer to Patocka’s position that “the temporalization of temporality leads directly to three different movements depending on which moment of temporality is stressed... and though the unity of all three moments is present in each of them.”³²

The specific problem we want to discuss is that even in the second movement, which emphasizes the present and in which the passivity of the past as an awaiting of movement has been overcome by the “ready-made potentials (which) are put to use in order to alter the present”³³; we remain still “under the rule of the past—a hidden rule, no longer immediate but mediated by things.”³⁴ Paradoxically then, the first two movements are reversals of each other’s meanings, yet do not overcome the situation of finitude, for we are in both subject to the power of an already existent Earth. In the process of our discussion of temporality within the relationship of these two initial movements, we will arrive at the third movement of existence in truth focused on the future. And an accent on the future requires “that the already existent cease to be regarded as the decisive instance of possibilities, that the possibility of not-being come to the fore and sharpen our eyes for that to which alone we can, and must, *give ourselves up*.”³⁵

2. The first movement of acceptance or anchoring

The original movement of man coming into the world can be observed as the synthesis of two separate moments: **a)** our integration into the world in a movement of “instinctively affective harmony with the world”³⁶, stemming from the fact that originally we are born into a world

31 Ibid

32 Ibid 164

33 Ibid

34 Ibid

35 Ibid

36 Kohák. 1989., 200 274

which is already pre-given. **B)** the movement of our bodily and spiritual individuation or the “original mastery of our own organism which is presupposed in all further, freer modes of comportment, of relating to humans and things.”³⁷ This second moment refers to the idea of embodiment as corporeality(*quote from pdf), to the fact that our being points to our physical existence (our body) as something which belongs to ourselves. Our body is that “through which (we) (are) in continual interaction with the things of (our) environment.”³⁸ Our being in the world, “dealing with things, instruments, tools, all practical comportment presupposes a mastery of the body, a sense contact with things, an orientation in the world.”³⁹

2.1 Temporality

In the words of Patočka the world we are thrust into is always already there, and in turn we are always already somewhere. This necessitates that our initially relation to the world take place by relating to the past. The **past** as a “product of human work and creativity”⁴⁰ references “that aspect of our existence which is our situation (that we are already always set into a world).”⁴¹ The **temporal character** of our original movement is therefore determined conditionally by the past: we exist conditioned in a world of pre-given structures and meaning. In this sense the first movement of acceptance and anchoring is “by its very nature rooted in the primordial temporal dimension of the past.”⁴² And because our coming into being is dependent on others before us and their way of life, it is also a pre-existing world of *others* in which we coexist.

2.2 Anchoring

Our initial movement into the pre-existing world, both integrates and releases us. We are integrated within the world in an instinctual affective movement; that is to say we are instinctively drawn to earth, and although we are a form of distinct consciousness, we are nevertheless universally determined by the same world. “We are individuals, separated out of the whole of nature, but at the same time nature permeates us internally, determining us through

37 Ibid

38 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 53

39 Kohák.1989, p. 274

40 Kohák.1989, p. 275

41 Ibid

42 Ibid p. 274

internally given needs which rule us, and so keep us in separation, following previously set goals.”⁴³

This is the foundation of earth’s determination over human life by which the primordial character of the world is expressed as an intrinsic part of our existence. For Patocka “therein lies the harmony with the overall aspect of nature as a whole.”⁴⁴ We are “singled out as individuals, yet still bound, still determined by the natural foundation.”⁴⁵ Thus our integration into the world is metaphorically understood by Patocka as an anchoring of our being to the foundation world and to things. Our movement of **anchoring** can then be said to take the explicit form of a “movement of instinctively affective harmony with the world.”⁴⁶

The dynamic of anchoring, between the movements of the world upon us and our response to them, can be expressed as a mutual **bonding** and **resisting**. “This bonding/resistance contains bodily movements as the basis of our comportment, our original mastery over the body, without which there is no life... It is the *a priori* framework within which all our experience of our possibilities of movement unfolds.”⁴⁷

2.3 Acceptance

As newborns we are absolutely determined by our biological needs and thus we are inherently dependent on others. Our being in this world presupposes that our needs can be satisfied for us by someone else, we depend in a sense on the acceptance of this task by others. Their acceptance of us into safety, into the “warmth created by the human microcommunity”⁴⁸ reveals others as the source of “protection and kinship”⁴⁹. Our original movement is also a movement of **acceptance**. The comovement of acceptance by another is characterized by the limitations of our own movement: in our individuation we are determined by fundamental needs we cannot alleviate ourselves. “the acceptance of the newborn into human warmth (therefore) compensates

43 Ibid p. 283

44 Ibid p. 280

45 Ibid p. 280

46 Ibid p. 274

47 Ibid p. 280

48 Ibid p. 275

49 Ibid

for bodily individuation.”⁵⁰ Later, in our “release into the world of adults,”⁵¹ into ‘spiritual individuation,’ the movement of acceptance will be reversed; it is a “repetition of that movement, though not as acceptance but as giving.”⁵²

For Patočka acceptance “is a movement from one sphere of vital warmth, which we receive, to another one which we create.”⁵³ Our relationship to others within these spheres is essentially defined in terms of the *fulfillment of needs*. The movement of acceptance has pleasure as its ruling principle in a life which “aims and is fulfilled by it”⁵⁴. Life in the “instinctually affective realm is fragmented into individual moments of good luck and bad, happiness and sorrow, on which life focuses as if it had no overall conception.”⁵⁵ The pursuit of pleasure is for Patočka “a call to the purposive in the contingent”⁵⁶, it is a “wish that the *immediate* might include as much as possible of what gratifies us, what fills us with pleasure, what calls for bonding.”⁵⁷

Only in this context part of a “mutuality of living beings,”⁵⁸ can we move, exist; “in it he first finds all the primordial possibilities of a perceiving and moving being, only in this so to speak *external interiority* can man develop into a being capable of penetrating from this sphere outward.”⁵⁹

We are accepted in more than one sense. We are accepted as part of a world yet at the same time as we single ourselves out from that world, “from the context of its processes;”⁶⁰ in turn we are accepted as “having become something for ourselves.”⁶¹ We are accepted in our being and in the being of another. We are accepted as something that is for itself only “if we are ourselves an uncovered object.”⁶²

50 Ibid

51 Ibid

52 Ibid

53 Ibid p. 281

54 Ibid

55 Ibid p. 283

56 Ibid

57 Ibid p. 282

58 Ibid p. 281

59 Ibid

60 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 165

61 Ibid

62 Ibid

For Patocka “we make ourselves accepted by showing ourselves in our dependence and by bonding.”⁶³ Dependence “is the situation of something singled out, something existing for itself,”⁶⁴ as we have stated the essence of dependence is in the requirement of our needs and their satisfaction. “The necessary replenishing (of needs) from its surroundings, has to be mediated by others.”⁶⁵ It is for this reason that “the accepted being is initially a mediated being.”⁶⁶ In the life of our being in helplessness and neediness, we *bond* “with the utmost intensity to those on whom (we) depend.”⁶⁷

This form of “bondage at once to the other and to (the world) itself, is “an implicit expression of the nonautonomous autonomy of life”⁶⁸ out of original movement. This bonding out of dependence is here a form of *bliss*: the fulfillment of our neediness, where the pursuit of pleasure is the inclination of our movement in “the alternate succession of displeasure and bliss.”⁶⁹ “The blissful bonding which assimilates the outside... is, in a way, a triumph over the incompleteness of individuation.”⁶⁹ This special kind of relation to others and the world, in acceptance, is expressed as a triumph because in it we encounter instead of the totality of the world, which is the non-individuated prerequisite of individuation but has no being for itself,” there is here, for the first time, a relation to the whole which makes this totality live, appear, become a phenomenon.”⁷⁰

The phenomenon of this unveiling, of the structures with which life originally bonds to our being, “is necessarily accompanied by a concealing of all the rest of what is.”⁷¹ The world is concealed apart from the form of shelter and safety of “this mediating and protecting world.”⁷²

63 Ibid

64 Ibid

65 Ibid

66 Ibid

67 Ibid p. 166

68 Ibid

69 Ibid

70 Ibid

71 Ibid

72 Ibid

Seeing as “no one is master of the situation that sets him into the world,”⁷³ corporeality is initially “the mastering (of) our receptive and active, perceptual and motoric, permeable and permeating body,”⁷⁴ However by the fact of our neediness, our “passivity calls for the other’s activity,”⁷⁵

Therefore “in the course of differentiated experience, a situation which we have not chosen and cannot justify, yet which is nonetheless ours, and for which we bear responsibility,”⁷⁶ we discover one of the “fundamental characteristics of human finitude.”⁷⁷ That characteristic referred to here is that in the synthesis between acceptance and bodily individuation, the explicit “possibility for existent things to show themselves to us in what they are,”⁷⁸ can be revealed. “We see ourselves as seen, glimpsed, experienced especially in the eyes of others.”⁷⁹

Patocka describes this as a synthesis of ‘ontogenic movements’: “movements that make manifest, phenomenalyze, uncover.” These movements are the source for our “faculty of phenomenalization, this understanding of the world and being in it.”⁸⁰

2.4 Referent and Contingency

All movement has its inevitable **referent** in the earth itself , in our sense “as moving beings we are drawn to something that is motionless.”⁸¹ Our understanding of movement through this referent points to earth as a **power**: “something which has no counterpart in our lived experience.”⁸² “We are in our nature, in the composition of our life, *earthlings*.”⁸³ “Corporeality of our life’s goals is a manifestation of the power of the earth in us.”⁸⁴

73 Ibid

74 Ibid p. 167

75 Ibid p. 168

76 Ibid p. 167

77 Ibid

78 Ibid

79 Ibid

80 Ibid p. 168

81 Kohák.1989, p. 276

82 Ibid

83 Ibid

84 Ibid

Movement also has a “particular boundary situation of existence”⁸⁵, a fundamental situation made up of those “facts of being which cannot be further analyzed and thought away from our existence.”⁸⁶ The **boundary situation** of life in the first movement is contingency. That we exist suddenly and unintentionally into a pre-existing world is matter of contingency, “of chance; we are born into definite conditions, a definite tradition”⁸⁷ Happiness is therefore also a matter of contingency in the sense that our movement is “something purposeful, but its purpose is an exterior one.”⁸⁸

2.5 Aesthetic Ideal

Meaning for Patocka is always ‘meaning for someone.’ The original meaning of acceptance and anchoring can be characterized by an **aesthetic ideal**, This is to say that the meaning of an existence “aiming at the moment of happiness, pleasure, immediacy”⁸⁹, is an aesthetic meaning. Patocka explains the aesthetic ideal of the first movement as follows.

“It is extasis of our life which has always already projected itself in advance of our every free decision, anchoring itself in something that was already given, that is already here in the structure of our life.” “Therein there is no freedom, since the goal, the orientation, is instinctually given.” “In this aesthetic realm there thus exists no continuity, no being true to oneself or to something other than this instinctual goal; nothing here is freely chosen, there is only a fascination with something to which man had previously committed himself... to which he had been committed.”⁹⁰

The meaning underlying this movement as we have discussed “continually renews itself in the experience and the satisfaction of needs”⁹¹ and is therefore “integrated within the overall

85 Ibid

86 Ibid p. 282

87 Ibid

88 Ibid

89 Ibid

90 Ibid

91 Ibid p. 281

meaning of the intrinsically affective.”⁹² The aesthetic life is thus “a circular one, closing in on itself”⁹³, where meaning is exhausted in the **acceptance** and **reproduction** of itself.

2.6 Self-understanding

We can address now the “understanding of our fundamental possibilities”⁹⁴, our **self-understanding** as the “integrating center of our movement.”⁹⁵ The self-understanding that goes with the original movement of existence is paradoxically a contradiction of itself. A reflection of its **self-concealment**: “a special kind of lack of self-understanding... a kind of original inauthenticity.”⁹⁶ This **inauthenticity** has its source in the movement of our anchoring to the world, the dichotomy behind the bonding and resistance as the basis for human movement is in this sense a denial, a repression of life itself. We are bound in contingency by determinants of a pre-existing world, yet still our being strives into corporeality and individuation against the same structuring world. This ‘existential’ struggle is the source of our self-understanding as a feeling of inauthenticity, For Patocka our self-understanding is originally a repression of the ‘instinctual affective movement’ in the process of our corporeality.

Our life can be described as ‘broken’ on the basis of inauthenticity. We do not experience the earth’s power (it’s instinctual, affective determination of human life) as a singular and absolute quality of life, as do for example animals and other living beings. In human consciousness, we sense the individuation of our being (as something different from the world itself), we sense our strangeness, in relation to that world, to everything; yet we are still fundamentally a part of this world having come from within it. Although our being cannot in this first movement achieve more than an acceptance of the world, it does not mean that we cannot see before us the *possibilities* for a different life. It is in this case how the movement of truth is also found in the movement of acceptance. Patocka identifies that the repression of our life, its ‘breaking’ “is not a matter of a specific contingent social structure,”⁹⁷ but actually already a matter in the fact our

92 Ibid p. 282

93 Ibid

94 Ibid p. 281

95 Ibid

96 Ibid p. 276

97 Ibid p. 274

existence is a “fundamental multiplicity of moments...which presuppose and penetrate each other.”⁹⁸

Our movement into the pre-existing structures of the world, unfolds in the “context which is a human product, the product of human work and creativity, in the context of a traditionality constituted by the second and the third movements.”⁹⁹ It is for this reason that our “original inauthenticity manifests itself here especially in contact with the line of the second movement which extends and projects our activity into the world.”¹⁰⁰ “The confrontation of these movements, a break in the instinctual affective sphere, is the drama of a distinctive repression of this sphere.”¹⁰¹ Ultimately the first movement as he have analyzed above, has the function “that the world is not a mere correlate of labor (and utility) but spreads out into the distance, and into temporal depth, that (life) bears within it a central vital core, a core of vital warmth which is not only an addition to the being of what surrounds us but a condition of the being of our life.”¹⁰²

As we have shown, “in the movement of anchoring thus takes shape the primal structure which belongs to the human world as an overall framework”¹⁰³, a framework which manifests embodiment and the fact that the fact that the human world is a shared environment, “the you and the ‘I’ being both equally bodily.”¹⁰⁴

“All in all, it can be said that, in the movement of anchoring, being binds us to the existent in its singularity. The bond used here is the bond of pleasure. The bliss which gives a feeling of unity and fusion in which all things singular disappear is paradoxically, what ties life most deeply to itself in its individualized finitude, compensating its incompleteness, showing that life has in it an overwhelming, irresistible moment of wholeness, a wholeness in unwholeness, everything in one instant, making up for all want. All separation and one-sidedness. Thus if life bound at once to itself and to the contingency of that being which quenches our inner thirst for the fulfillment of

98 Ibid p. 274

99 Ibid p. 276

100 Ibid

101 Ibid p. 275

102 Ibid p. 275

103 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 168

104 Ibid

pleasure and warmth. Thus, before itself appearing, being binds us to our own and to an alien being in its singularity and contingency.”¹⁰⁵

Lastly we can highlight in the words of Patočka above not only the unintentionality character of original being, but also the way in which the original life of acceptance into corporeality relates phenomenologically to the second movement of existence: the movement of self-projection and defense. Although the movement of life initially is bound to the world by its instinctual affective character, the movement of anchoring from the past into the present, reveals how life through work will be bound to life itself, in the context of the second movement, bound to the reproduction of a safety from this contingency and alienation.

3. The second movement of self-extension or defense

The movement of **self-extension** or **self-projection** takes place as man reproduces the sphere of vital processes (which belong to the first movement), through work. It is the movement of us “creating our non-organic body, of extending our existence into things.”¹⁰⁶ In a sense we now characterize the pre-given structure of the world by its functions and utility, where man is “reduced to his role,”¹⁰⁷ and “the meaning of our world is one of tools.”¹⁰⁸ This world is the basis for “the *material* of all human formation.”¹⁷³ We create here social relations based on the mediate and utilitarian character of things.

We are in the first movement “nakedly inserted into the system of providing for needs... The system of providing is permeated by the primitive fact that someone has to provide primarily.”¹⁷³ In the second movement we experience the fact that “the product of this primary providing can be taken from him. The other can be exploited, turned into a provider on a one-time temporary basis or enduringly.”¹⁰⁹

105 Ibid p. 171

106 Kohák.1989,p. 276

107 Ibid p. 277

108 Ibid o. 276

109 Patočka et al., 2016, o. 173

The second movement is thus characterized by “the reduction of man *to his social role*.”¹¹⁰ The dialectic of a social interaction ruled by the (possible) exploitation of the man in his functionality, is the reason we can call this a movement of defense. We attempt to distance ourselves from relationships based on interest, and from the pressure to exploit and be exploited by others. However, “nothing independently disinterested and dedicated, neither the authentic self nor an authentic undertaking, can develop in this sphere.”¹¹¹

3.1 Temporality

This movement occurs in the **temporal dimension** of the **present** because it “is determined by coming to terms with what is given in the form of things, of what is present.”¹¹² The movement of **self-extension** into things, has “no longer the overall relationship to what is *already* but rather a relation to the matter of transforming the present.”¹¹³ Our movement in the present is a movement of the **reproduction** of life for itself, an expression of “life’s bondage to itself.”¹¹⁴

The movement of reproduction is thus “both an extension of the movement of anchoring and a reversal of its meaning.”¹¹⁵ We take the possibilities of the world uncovered as a world of things in the original instinctual affective movement of anchoring and “put them at the service of instrumentality, continuation, self-projection into things and self-reification.”¹¹⁶ The original task of acceptance, our “constant neediness and dependence on vital functions... now becomes reciprocal.”¹¹⁷

The movement of **self-projection** is “concerned only with things... purely in their utility and not in their independence.”¹¹⁸ It is a life “dealing with tasks, entrusted with a function and a

110 Ibid

111 Ibid

112 Ibid p. 171

113 Ibid p. 173

114 Ibid

115 Ibid p. 172

116 Ibid

117 Ibid p. 173

118 Ibid p. 171

role.”¹¹⁹ We share the “utensil world with autonomous personal beings”¹²⁰, and is therefore “a shared world, a world not only of work but of cooperation.”¹²¹ In the first movement of the world, we understood human beings as independent centers of possibilities, now in the second sphere “these possibilities are all and only possibilities to provide and take care of things.”¹²²

In the present, life renounces *satisfaction*, opting instead for the “service and bondage of life to itself.”¹²³ Our movement is essentially thus a “deferred instinct, deprived of satisfaction.”¹²⁴ It “means to bear the burden of satisfying, to be seen, not with the kind and loving eye of acceptance, but rather in a cold appraisal of the way in which we can be *put to use*.”¹²⁵

Our discovery of the being of others, as we create a categorical world of things, links our beings together in their individuality as much as in their utility. Therefore in the movement of “placing ourselves among things there is a link to situations of suffering, struggle, guilt.”¹²⁶ The experience of our finitude in the being of others’ functions and labor, is the **boundary situation** of this second existence.

Here “begins understanding no longer as simply immediate but intelligent, the sphere of intelligence, of understanding both objective relations and personal relations and interests.”¹²⁷ For that reason we can say the “realm of self-extension, self-projection into things is the realm of mediation, of **work**.”¹²⁸ We thus are bound through work, to others and things, against our freedom, “we mediate for each other the outside which we put to use, while at the same time using one another.”¹²⁹ The basis for relationships of mediation within the second movement is for Patočka “that which directly mediates between human needs and the outside, things. This mediation, the systematic and permanent expenditure of life and its energies in intervening in the

119 Ibid

120 Ibid p. 172

121 Ibid

122 Ibid

123 Ibid p. 171

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid p. 172

126 Kohák. 1989, p. 282

127 Ibid p. 281

128 Ibid

129 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 173

outside so as to adapt it to human needs and thus make life possible, is *labor*, work in the primary sense.”¹³⁰

3.2 Referent

In movement as labor, there is no *object* of reference, our **referent** here is for Patočka “only a network of instrumental references.”¹³¹ “This referring is a movement from presence to presence, always similarly unfulfilled, purely instrumental; mediating unfulfillment.”¹³² Within this network of referents, for Patočka, it may seem that “all possibilities of encountering realities and giving them meaning are exhausted in the circle of praxis - that this is the authentic and original human world.”¹³³ However it is not the case, the special kind of self-understanding that originates out of the mediation of life through labor is still a form of inauthenticity, perpetuated in the very categories of work and defense.

3.3 Ascetic ideal

Work takes place in the context of the **ideal of asceticism**: “of overcoming what is instinctual, immediate.”¹³⁴ We are still ruled by the Earth but “no longer in the form of an immediate instinctual power. Here the immediate instinctual gratification is placed at a distance.”¹³⁵ Instead “instinctual goals are made conscious, habitual.”¹³⁶

In categorizing our being through its social roles, we experience similarly as in the first movement, “a **mode of incomprehension**, one that has to do with the way we are interested. We

130 Ibid

131 Ibid p. 171

132 Ibid

133 Ibid

134 Kohák.1989, p. 282

135 Ibid p. 281

136 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 172

note primarily what agrees with our interests, and we overlook what resists them. We automatically create the means of an inner rule of the Earth over ourselves and over others.”¹³⁷

In spite of our individuation, as independent beings no longer determined solely by *biological needs* and the instinctual affective character of the world, we still feel our existence as an emptiness, “a want - a need to be accepted and supported in the whole of our being, and not merely in our functions.”¹³⁸ “Individuated being does not cease to feel its incompleteness, it does not cease to understand its finitude.”¹³⁹

3.4 Self-understanding

Our **self-understanding** in this second movement, is thus also a mode of **inauthenticity** here explained by the case that our “existence in this entire realm is an *interested* one.”¹⁴⁰ Inauthenticity stems from having others and things as referents for our self-understanding; in making them the fundamental boundary situations of our life, “we have already overlooked ourselves, put ourselves aside.”¹⁴¹ “In the second realm, an essential mediateness, a lack of closure, prevents a global conception.”¹⁴²

The movement of self-extension as a movement of defense and reproduction, is an extension of the first movement of acceptance, and is concerned with a search for the ‘practical discovery’ of things. It creates the appearance of a reality “as if man were the work of the primary pressure brought to bear on him by life’s bondage to itself... As if the collective effort of mankind were shaping an ever more complicated social-natural body, a kind of supra-organic organism.”¹⁴³ This belief brings about a special kind of self-understanding or lack thereof: “interestedness produces a way of seeing whereby we stimulate ourselves and our partners in our social roles”¹⁴⁴ because we believe these to be authentic categories of meaning.

137 Kohák.1989, p. 282

138 Patočka et al., 2016, 169

139 Ibid

140 Kohák.1989, p. 277

141 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 172

142 Kohák.1989, p. 283

143 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 174

144 Ibid

This mode of inauthenticity follows from the fact that life in the movement of self-projection “falls into the categories of *work* and *struggle*... in work man confronts things, in struggle he confronts his fellows”¹⁴⁵ Life, in “the organization of human for work is the result of a struggle, (yet) is itself a struggle.”¹⁴⁶ Struggle is represented here by what Patočka calls a feeling of “guilt, oppression and suffering.” Guilt “does not signify culpability in the moral sense,”¹⁴⁷ but rather it represents the dialectic of human relations to each other on the basis of *interest* and *power*.

Although the life in the second movement is not an autonomous whole, “in the movement of self-projection there is something reflexive, self-discovery, discovery of one’s own possibilities.”¹⁴⁸ Life in the second movement is not anymore a single circular line, it is a world of different perspectives which now interact organically, through work, in having shared previously the fundamental movement of acceptance.

It is a movement which nevertheless still contains for Patočka “an uncontrolled element, a chaos inside and out.”¹⁴⁹ “In its organizing of life into ever more extensive wholes, there is something uncontrollable which is not merely the inadequacy of organization but rather the absence of the essential... Especially in modern times, when the accumulation of utensils and means for life to extend and multiply its possibilities is palpable, yet the absence of what really matters only escalates.”¹⁵⁰

4. The movement of self-surrender or truth

Is the movement of self-achievement in the proper sense, it is the movement of integrating finitude into our being. Finitude is the fundamental boundary situation of existence we tried to exclude in the previous two movements where we fully realize ourselves in this finitude, “and in

145 Ibid

146 Ibid

147 Ibid

148 Kohák.1989, p. 282

149 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 175

150 Ibid

that sense let the power of the earth rule over them.”¹⁵¹ In a “detachment from particulars... we can integrate finitude, situatedness, earthliness, mortality precisely into existence.”¹⁵²

4.1 Temporality

“The third movement is an attempt at breaking through our earthliness.”¹⁵³ Our coming to terms with the determination of our finitude, with inauthenticity itself. The temporal dimension here is the future.

Initially “our finitude (was) contained in our life as we are tied to an instinctual goal.”¹⁵⁴ Here “we know that a failure to satisfy needs means perishing - though in such a way that we are constantly overlooking it... Our condition is analogous to that of an animal, a finite being which cannot become aware of its finitude because it is too preoccupied.”¹⁵⁵ Later “the Earth preoccupies us too much, leading us to live within our individual occupations (in work), ultimately so that we cannot see our finitude, our life as a whole. Therein precisely consists the dominance of the Earth over us. We do not conceive of the attempt at breaking out as an effort at mastering, seizing hold; it is not a will to dominance but a striving for clarity in this situation, accepting this situation, and, with this clarity, it is a transformation of that situation.”¹⁵⁶

The movement where “man makes an attempt to break out of the rule of the Earth,”¹⁵⁷ is described by Patočka as a **shaking**, a “shaking (of) what binds us in our distinctiveness.”¹⁵⁸

The third movement is an attack on the limitations of life bound first to the world and second to itself as we have in the previous movements. We shake ourselves from the intrinsic bond of the determination of earth as a reaction against “an orientation to oneself, enclosing oneself in a personal, private sphere, centering the world on oneself, on one’s private personal I, inevitably

151 Kohák.1989, p. 277

152 Ibid

153 Ibid

154 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 283

155 Ibid

156 Ibid

157 Ibid

158 Ibid

unfulfilled and unfulfillable in its finitude.”¹⁵⁹ For Patočka in our overcoming of the “self-enclosure of the individual I”¹⁶⁰, we do not however abolish understanding, and retain at the same time the validity of the world.

4.2 Self-understanding

The movement of breakthrough or actual self comprehension, is the movement not of our interaction with the world, nor our relationship with others, but of our encounter with one’s own being. “The point is to see myself in my ownmost human essence and possibility - in my ‘earthliness’, which is at the same time, a relationship to being and to the universe.”¹⁶¹ As we have said, following the second movement of our self-extension over the possibilities of particular things, the point here is now “not to let the mass of these particular possibilities conceal the essential.”¹⁶² In the third movement we can “modify this bondage to the particular”¹⁶³ by actualizing the fundamental possibilities which determined us in the previous movements. It is the movement of having “to come to terms with the fact that I am precisely also as a whole this possibility either to disperse and lose myself in particulars or to find and realize myself in my properly human nature.”¹⁶⁴

This mode of life is not simply reflexive but “means grasping and realizing this possibility, it is a mode of praxis.”¹⁶⁵ We don’t relate to any one thing but rather to the presence of the world, “this presence is what makes it possible for us to see ourselves in the world... the ‘part’ we play in the world.”¹⁶⁶ **Myth** exemplifies the narrative form of the behavior of the first two movements, it contains “the same encounter of the world called forth by ritual behavior, but as given through the transparent medium of language.”¹⁶⁷ Myth is our dealing with the original inauthenticity of our finitude and relates to all three instances of movement.

159 Ibid p. 284

160 Ibid p. 284

161 Kohák.1989, p. 175

162 Ibid

163 Ibid

164 Ibid

165 Ibid

166 Ibid 176

167 Ibid

Firstly myth transposes reality into the past by the very disposition of original being, “myth is an expression of the primordial relations we know from the movement of anchoring, the mysteries of individuation and primal unity, the dramas of division and duality, hatred and resentment in the protective shade of life’s primal warmth, the tragic blindness through which this warmth conceals cruel reality.”¹⁶⁸ Later myth narrates the atmosphere of the second movement of work as a punishment, our guilt and neediness, while at the same time revealing the acts of “mercy and redemption from the slavery into which man sinks by the mere fact of existence.”¹⁶⁹ The actual intention of myth, relating itself to the present, “also contains a standpoint, an attitude, an openness for the future in which we disclose our ownmost possibility.”¹⁷⁰

Myth is therefore also a call for caution, it is the personification of temporality, of being in the world. The possibility to personify these 2 aspects of life implies our ability to create meaning as something authentic. Myth explores the bondages of life within the responsibility of our own being. The themes addressed by myth are a “practical effort to inwardly act against those life-structures which force existence into a situation incompatible with its character as a free possibility.”¹⁷¹

The investigation of myth in the third movement consists “in showing life in bondage to be a mere possibility, and by no means a reality.”¹⁷² It is contained as possibility by virtue of our freedom. The third movement is therefore a new attitude, a new way of life where “confronting finitude does not mean self-attachment, binding and relating everything we encounter to ourselves,”¹⁷³ but rather “now has the meaning of devotion.”¹⁷⁴ “My being is no longer defined as a being for me but rather as a being in **self-surrender**, a being which opens itself to being.”¹⁷⁵ This movement reveals life as an *event*, “the event of being which has chosen man as the locus of its appearing, has found its fullness in a fully ‘true’ man.”¹⁷⁶

168 Ibid

169 Ibid

170 Ibid

171 Ibid p. 177

172 Ibid p. 178

173 Ibid

174 Ibid

175 Ibid

176 Ibid

The christian myth of resurrection deals with the confrontation of our finitude, as an ideal of achieving the divine within man. This ideal “opens a future from which a new self is forthcoming, the self given in dedication - but in such a way that each must accomplish his conversion to it.”¹⁷⁷ The ideal of attaining the divine within man refers to leaving behind the need to anchor life to the world or reducing our being to its function in place of a movement into truth. This movement “begets a community of those who understand each other in surrender and devotion... and cement a fellowship of dedication, a fellowship in devoted service, which transcends every individual.”¹⁷⁸ The movement of self-achievement can be said to be a truly authentic life.

“The third movement of existence, which is to the first two in a relation of integration and repression, i.e., a dialectical relation, discovers here a fundamental dimension of the natural world, a dimension which is not given, which escapes both perception and recollection.”¹⁷⁹ This is the dimension of truth, of authenticity through responsibility. In our understanding of the mutual presupposition and suppression between the three movements of existence, the sphere of the third movement follows the first two movements of life into a tangible synthesis of existence. For Patočka this synthesis is to “achieve a certain perspective on the way in which these three sources - two movements under the domination of the Earth and a third breaking through it - constitute the global human movement we call history.”¹⁸⁰

5. Conclusions

We have presented a discussion on the concept of existence as movement and further analyzed the three specific movements of human existence. In our discussion we want to identify the characteristics of each movement, its temporality, referent, ideal and self-understanding. In identifying each movement independently we then characterize the relationships between them.

177 Ibid p. 179

178 Ibid

179 Patočka et al., 2016, p. 280

180 Ibid p. 284

Specifically our work is concerned with the relationship of the second movement with the first, it has been our thesis that we can explain the problem of the second movement of existence in its intrinsic relation to the first movement. We have found not only the phenomenological characteristics of each moment but have managed also to address the essence of our being in the whole of these movements.

This study of Patočka's philosophy of movement is at the same time an explanation of the framework of being he developed over the course of his writings. We believe that this thesis can serve as fundamentals for a possible investigation into the correlation Patočka ascertains between the three movements of existence and the three levels of human events. The juxtaposition of these two ideas and their correlation is explained by Jan Patočka purely on the basis of meaning (not anymore on temporality as has been the case in our present work), in his Heretical Essays, a work which he wrote 5 or 6 years after and on the basis of texts whose analysis we have hereby contained.

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