

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Political Science

Bachelor's Thesis

2018

Tomáš Koutský

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Department of Political Science

**Comparative Study on the Military
Effectiveness of the Turkish Army Post 2016
Coup**

Bachelor's Thesis

Author of the Thesis: Tomáš Koutský

Study programme: Political Studies and International Relations

Supervisor: RNDr. Jan Kofroň, Ph.D.

Year of the defence: 2018

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on May10,2018

Tomáš Koutský

References

KOUTSKÝ, Tomáš. *Comparative Study on the Military Effectiveness of the Turkish Army Post 2016 Coup*. Praha, 2018. 41 pages. Bachelor's thesis (Bc). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of Political Science. Supervisor RNDr. Jan Kofroň, Ph.D.

Length of the Thesis: 92 939 letters including spaces.

Abstract

The bachelor's thesis is a process-tracing case study focusing on the military effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces (TAF) before and after the failed coup d'état that occurred on the night of July 15, 2016. Inspired by the works of Stephen Biddle and Caitlin Talmadge, the work combines variables of the authors and tries to determine if the military has lost its military effectiveness in conventional warfare, by searching for examples of coup-proofing operational practices within the TAF. Since Talmadge depicts such practices as occurring in authoritarian regimes, a brief overview of the current Turkish semi-authoritarian political landscape is added at the beginning, along with a brief description of the role of the TAF within the system. Additionally, a description and timescale of the coup is provided. During the research, coup-proofing practices were witnessed in three out of the four independent variables. Interestingly, the practices were not only found after the coup, but in the preceding years as well. A short-term decrease of military effectiveness was undeniably discovered. Currently, it is impossible to determine if such practices will continue in the long-run, that warrants further research. Furthermore, the deterioration has not affected the TAF significantly, due to its military preponderance in comparison with other countries or non-state actors in the region.

Abstrakt

Bakalářská práce se zabývá vojenskou efektivitou tureckých ozbrojených sil (TAF). Jedná se o srovnávací studii dvou období; před a po puči, který se uskutečnil 15. července 2016. Práce těží z dosavadních poznatků Stephena Biddlea a Caitlin Talmadge. Kombinací jejich poznatků byly vytvořeny čtyři proměnné, které korelují se zlepšením či zhoršením vojenské efektivity. Jelikož Talmadge popisuje praktiky, které vedou ke zhoršení vojenské efektivity v autoritářských režimech, rozhodl jsem se ze začátku vysvětlit, proč považuji Turecko za polo-autoritářské; tzv. hybrid regime. Následuje stručný přehled role a postavení tureckých ozbrojených sil v historii Turecka. Poté je v práci popis puče s důrazem na časovou osu a participaci složek armády. Tři ze čtyř hledaných proměnných poukázaly na praktiky, které prokazatelně snížily vojenskou efektivitu TAF. Tato opatření kupodivu nezačala po puči, ale byla zjištěna i před rokem 2016 ve spojitosti s kauzami Ergenekon a Balyoz. V práci bylo zjištěno krátkodobé zhoršení vojenské efektivity. Momentálně nelze posoudit, zda toto zhoršení bude i dlouhodobé, v tomto ohledu je zapotřebí dalšího zkoumání. Ačkoliv bylo zjištěno zhoršení vojenské efektivity, zmíněná opatření nezasáhla turecké ozbrojené síly natolik, jak se ze začátku předpokládalo.

Tuto skutečnost lze vysvětlit zřetelnou převahou turecké armády vůči ostatním aktérům v regionu, ať se jedná o státní, či nestátní aktéry.

Keywords

Turkey, military effectiveness, army, coup, geopolitics

Klíčová slova

Turecko, vojenská efektivita, armáda, puč, geopolitika

Název práce

Srovnávací studie vojenské efektivity turecké armády (před a po puči 2016)

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor RNDr. Jan Kofroň, Ph.D., whose constructive criticism helped in improving this bachelor's thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank Maj. Gen. Rostislav Pilc, Ing. František Štěpánek, Lt. Col. Ing. Petr Kovanda, Mgr. Richard Stojar Ph.D. for their free time, expertise, and aid by accepting my request for an interview. In addition, I would like to thank PhDr. Tomáš Laně and PhDr. Andrea Kučerová Ph.D. for assisting me in my research in this field of study and Mr. Daniel Kumermann for proofreading the final version.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
1. AUTHORITARIAN TURKEY	3
2. ARMY IN THE TURKISH CONTEXT	5
3. BASIC FRAMEWORK	7
4.MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS BEFORE JULY 15, 2016	11
4.1. Years 2003-2008.....	12
4.2 Years 2008-2016.....	15
5. COUP	16
5.1. As it happened	16
5.2. Reasons for Failure	17
5.3. Purges	18
6.CHANGES AFTER THE COUP	20
6.1. The Personnel	20
6.2 Education and Structural Changes.....	22
7.MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AFTER THE COUP	24
8.POLICY IMPLICATIONS	27
CONCLUSION	28
ZÁVĚR	30
REFERENCES:	32
THESIS	38
LIST OF APPENDICES	41

Introduction

Turkey boasts an enormous army, which regularly features in the TOP 10 of most military capability indexes. It is the 2nd largest army in NATO. Since 2002, it is embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his Justice and Development Party, the AKP. The Turkish army no longer has the leading role in political matters the way it did in the past. It must be noted that for the outside world, the July 2016 military coup d'état, which failed within a few hours represented the highlight of changes happening in Turkey. What was the motivation for such a drastic measure? What were the repercussions for the military personnel? How did the army transform? These questions persuaded me to explore this complex problem, with hope of finding the right answers.

My bachelor's thesis will be a comparative study of military effectiveness of the Turkish army. The study will aim to compare the internal structure and functionality of the Turkish armed forces before, and more importantly, after the 2016 coup d'état regarding the possible military effectiveness in the future. I consider this topic to be an interesting one due to its "freshness" in terms of being an uncharted territory.

A lot of my inspiration stems from C. Talmadge's critically acclaimed *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes*. The author works with a notion that authoritarian regimes face major coup threats, hence they tweak the structure of the army to prevent such events. By adoption of such practices, the effectiveness of the army declines significantly against so-called conventional threats. I will search for patterns within the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) for such examples. Turkey under Erdoğan should be considered a semi-authoritarian regime, due to the evident aspects resembling one. Using typology of other authors, it can be considered a competitive authoritarianism. Using logic described above, the study should provide evidence of the decline of Turkish military effectiveness due to significant changes being implemented to the structural organization of the army. This brings me into the formulation of my main research questions:

1. What was the organization of chain of command of the TAF, and in what environment did it exist before the mentioned 2016 coup d'état? What were the operational practices of TAF?
2. What segments of the military took active part in the coup, and what was their role?
3. How did the organization of the TAF change after this historical event, and what are the repercussions?
4. Did these changes increase, or decrease the military effectiveness of the TAF?

I expect to clearly state and explain the complexity of my main research questions. What must not be forgotten is the specific nature of the Turkish army in the political and societal landscape of Turkey. The ideas of Kemalist ideology are deeply rooted into the military organization. TAF considered itself a guardian of the Turkish secular state for the major part of the independent republic since 1923.¹ The TAF had a privileged position in the Turkish society. Authors describe the army as gaining valuable positions in the private sector, which made it

¹ Some authors describe the environment as military tutelage (Caliskan 2017), some try to conceptualize the problem into classifying the army into measurable such as principal/agent category (Sarigil 2013).

possible for high-ranking officers to be part of important economic groups (Göktepe, Satyanath 2013; p.542-543). Others mention the indoctrination of aspiring cadets in the military schools, thus promoting the Kemalist clique instead of the classical Islamist education normally present in the Middle East (Satana 2018, Tombuş, Aygenç 2017).

The first part of the thesis will explain if Turkey under Erdoğan can be classified as an authoritarian regime. Additionally, I will provide a brief description of past coups that preceded the 2016 one. This additional information should show the reader the specific nature of the army within the political system of Turkey. Hopefully, this will provide a solid base for the rest of the study. Furthermore, I will focus primarily on present knowledge of military effectiveness. I plan to use academic literature from specialists in international affairs such as S. Biddle, C. Talmadge, and others to formulate independent variables and conceptualize the whole subject.

Secondly, the project will map processes such as promotional patterns, training regimens, information sharing and command arrangements in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) before the year 2016. I will research the commanding structures of the army, specifically data sharing and the chain of command. I suppose such changes of the independent variables will affect the outcome of the searched dependent variable, i.e. military effectiveness.

In the third part, I will look into the structure of the 2016 coup. There will be a description of the whole event. Furthermore, I will describe the sections of the army that seemed to have been involved in the coup, and the actions carried out by them. I will try not to dwell too much on this part of my thesis. One of the reasons is the short timescale of the coup. Few hours between the 15th and 16th of July simply do not deserve an elaborative 30-page description with my research goal in mind. The second notable reason is the visible failure of the coup planners to persuade the other segments of the army to join and overthrow the government.

The final part of my research will focus on the consequences of the aforementioned event. I will try to determine if the army changed its functioning in any way. My presumption is that it did, it is yet to be seen if in a major way. If the army did change its strategy in a major way, I will also describe the process by providing clear examples. I will try to figure out if such practices correlate with the fact that some divisions of the army had a higher number of arrested officers than others. If so, I will attempt to find out if these hypothetical factors are decisive to be considered a valid explanation, or if some previously unknown facts have arisen.

The study will try to answer the primary question about Turkish army internal practices. The prediction is that there will be observations of the use of coup preventing practices in the years preceding the mentioned coup d'état. However, the main inquiry will not focus solely on unraveling the practices used before, but also after the year 2016, specifically on the hypothetical changes that happened. There is a possibility of not finding drastic changes in the environment, which would bring into account the possibility of seeing other coups on the horizon of the next couple of years. After considering all the information, I will try to predict if Turkey's army is more likely being prepared for conventional threats, or if the political leadership still views internal coup threats as the greatest risk to the system. This would not mean a complete paralysis of the army, but it would create significant obstacles in reaching the army's full potential.

Due to the relatively current nature of such a project, I will rely heavily on the academic literature while trying to set the variables of such research. I assume I will rely significantly on

experts of the Turkish military, such as Metin Gurcan. Since I personally do not possess even remote knowledge of the Turkish language, my sources will consist primarily of English written literature and reliable sources. Furthermore, I will try to gain information from Czech military experts in the form of recorded and documented interviews.

There were difficulties in the course of this research. As expected, the greatest obstacle gaining in relevant information out of the four chosen variables was with the ultimate one-information sharing. Problems with collecting evidence of such nature was my main worry before the start of my research, and these concerns proved justified. It must be said that it did not change my conclusions, since the other three variables were obtainable, and as such we might predict with certain accuracy the fourth, missing one. For the variables, proceed to Chapter 4, Basic Framework.

1. Authoritarian Turkey

Since this work will draw a lot of inspiration from Talmadge and her focus on military within authoritarian regimes, I must begin my framework by explaining why I chose Turkey as an example of an authoritarian regime. I believe the best possible definition of post-2002 Turkey is a hybrid regime², which would oscillate between competitive authoritarianism and full authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way (2010; p. 5-13) present criteria that help establish and classify the regime type. The most important indexes are considered:

- Elections
- Civil liberties
- Uneven playing field (resources, media, access to the law)

The abovementioned authors describe the trend of hybrid regimes as holding elections which are at first glance democratic, but under closer scrutiny, possess major deficiencies. Opposition parties may participate in elections, but they face notable challenges. Those constitute voter list manipulations, ballot box frauds, and even results falsification. We can mention also notable disproportionate time segments in the mainstream media for each of the parties. In most cases, the authoritarian incumbent party receives the majority of airtime in comparison to the opposition ones. There were many examples of such problems in Turkey in the recent years.

Most recently, new cases confirming these issues have emerged during the 2017 referendum, which was accepted by the slightest of majorities in favor of Erdoğan's proposal of an authoritarian presidential regime. These changes are dubious due to the lack of checks and balances that come hand in hand with the centralization of power (Venice Commission 2017; p.11-20). The referendum had a vast amount of discrepancies, which were listed in the OSCE report. In its valuation, OSCE (2017; p.2-20) described lack of transparency during the reshuffling of board chairpersons, insufficient representation in Ballot Box Committees, the inability of registered parties to participate in mobilization for the referendum (only 10 out of 92 were eligible) and much more. Another widely reported issue with the referendum was the disproportionate time segment for the campaigns of the backers of "Yes" and "No" campaigns.

² The definition is taken from Levitsky, Way (2010).

Not only did the “Yes” camp get much more airtime compared to the “No” camp, it even had the public backing of president Erdoğan, although such practice is strictly prohibited by convention.

Civil liberties consist of free speech, press, and association. Authoritarian regimes vary in the amount of suppression of these freedoms. In the less repressive, competitive ones, opposition press may exist, but its functionality is severely restricted by libel laws, tax fines and other hidden control mechanisms. Those mechanisms aim at creating as many obstacles as possible for the sole economic functionality of such a medium. Subliminal effects of such policies include ruining the critical media outlets economically by financial restrictions and astronomical tax fines. One clear example is the 2.5 billion Dollars fine for Doğan Group, which was known to be a fierce opponent of Erdoğan. Another thing worth mentioning is the acquisition of (at the time of purchase) second largest media group Sabah-ATV by a company that had ties to Erdoğan’s son-in-law, Berat Albayrak (Freedom House Special Report; p.7). The other effect is a self-imposed censorship of the press concerning critical opinions towards the incumbent, and firing of the vocal anti-government journalists (ibid.; p.9).³ Full authoritarian regimes do not hide their disgust for opposition media, and so they ban all opposition outlets. Freedom of the press is not restricted solely to the widely known forms such as television or radio, but it reaches to the sphere of internet as well.

Topak (2017; p.537-541) describes the slow but persistent spread of surveillance used under the Erdoğan administration. It uses techniques such as wiretapping, internet surveillance and collaboration of informants primarily against members of the opposition. Things escalated into a mass surveillance after Gezi Park riots in 2013. Amendments to security laws (No. 6638 and 6526) allow the police to wiretap or seize property without a warrant. Furthermore, it empowers the police to use lethal weapons against protestors. There have been reports of a special surveillance unit, specializing on social media surveillance, nicknamed “AKTrolls” (ibid.; p.539). Meanwhile, over 80 thousand websites were banned under the AKP rule, YouTube being amongst them. The vast majority were blocked without a court order (Akgül, Kırılıdoğ 2015; p.9) Freedom of association is being limited by creating for registration and activities of political parties and non-government organizations. OSCE (2017; p. 10-11) notes quite clearly that practices exist.

Uneven playing field links quite closely to the civil liberties. The uneven field in access to resources points to ties between the government and the private sector. Authoritarian governments have a tendency to connect the private sector with a political party, which creates a network of clientelism. Privileged groups of businessmen are given financial benefits, be it directly, or indirectly in the form of favoritism in public tenders. Unbalanced media correlates with the problem of free speech. The media landscape is dominated by television, newspapers, radio stations and other means of the mainstream that are quite clearly in favor of the incumbent government. Since mainstream is dominated by pro-government sympathizers, opposition media outlets that are not yet banned can hardly reach out to a sufficient part of the population needed to pose a realistic threat to the government. By insufficient access to the law, Levitsky and Way (2010; p.13) describe a process when legal institutions of the states are manipulated

³ I refer to the cases of well-known journalists Hasan Cemal and Nazli Ilıcak. The former was fired from Milliyet, the latter from Sabah.

in a way to favor the authoritarian government. May it be by intimidation, blackmailing, or party loyalty, the marginalization of the judicial branch is evident.

Bardakçi (2013; p. 414) describes the slow but steady linkage of the private sector to the AKP government. That was made possible through the improved economic situation and growing fondness for the AKP by the ever-growing Islamist middle class. Some of the associations include Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, The Turkish Exporters Assembly, and "Anatolian tigers" referring to small and medium-sized export-oriented firms.

To sum it up, Turkey of today may at first glance look like a democracy, but upon closer inspection, it shows serious deficiencies. Civil liberties are being violated, elections do not take place in orderly fashion, and there are signs of possible cartel practices regarding the AKP and the private sector. It seems the authoritarian practices are not well institutionalized yet, hence why the regime may be considered a hybrid regime. Amongst other classifications, it might be also put into the bracket of personalist authoritarian regime. One might find similarities between the way countries such as Putin's Russia, Erdoğan's Turkey or Kim-Jong-Un's North Korea are run. All are distinguished by a strong, unopposed leader.

2. Army in the Turkish Context

The army was held in high esteem by the Turkish public since the independence of 1923. It considered itself the keeper of Kemalist ideology, which means having a guardian role within society, trying to suppress all extremist ideologies spanning from the left to the right of political spectrum, which may by any chance endanger the political system (Satana 2008, Sarigil 2014, Kutay 2017). For major part of the period, the army tried to wipe out any radical political parties wanting to join the political landscape. The period 1923-1960 is viewed in the civil-military relations as a time of civilocracy (Sarigil 2013; p. 173), a time when civilian institutions had the upper hand in ruling the country. The situation changed when the military intervened to overthrow the elected governments via coups in the years 1960, 1971, 1980. The 1960 coup was especially significant due to the establishment of National Security Council (MGK) and the addition of that body into the Constitution the following year. It was supposed to have an informative role at the beginning. But its powers were upgraded and strengthened after each coup. Later, it turned into an advisory institution that would recommend a course of action, as it was cited in the 1982 constitutional amendment. MGK consisted of the Chief of Staff, army generals, government ministers, and the president. The military had the upper hand in the decision-making process, due to the fact that soldiers made up the voting majority. The most notable changes that reduced the power of this body came with Erdoğan's reforms, which significantly reduced the operational capability of the MGK (Ahmad, Naseem, Memon 2017; p.56-58).

Those were coups in the classical sense when violence erupted in the streets with many civilian casualties. A category of "memorandum" coups includes those from the years 1997 and 2007. They were still forceful actions, but without civilian casualties. The former was a memorandum by the generals of the Council (MGK) to the government. The latter was an internet memorandum to the Erdoğan government before the election process concerning

Abdullah Gül, whom the military suspected of having Islamic ties. The very fact that an internet memorandum in 1997 had enough power to shift the government policies shows the tremendous informal influence the MGK had over the policy-making of the Turkish republic. That a similar persuasive tactic failed 10 years later clearly reflects on the significant deterioration of the informal influence of the military on the Turkish political landscape.

Now to the general structure of the army. The Chief of the General Staff was the supreme commander of the TAF, until the major constitutional changes that were passed by the widest of margins in 2017. He was the commander of the land, air, and naval forces. The gendarmerie was under control the Chief only in times of war, otherwise, it is subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. The newest data bank estimates that Turkey has around 355 000 active military personnel, with additional 378 000 personnel listed as reserves (Chapter Four: The Military Balance 2018; p.156). Conscription into the military is mandatory, every adult citizen is expected to spend 2 years in the military. There is an exception for conscripts with university education, such condition shortens the time spent in the army. Since 2014 there is a possibility of buying out of the military service (Cililier 2016; p.508). The sum is roughly 9000 dollars. As I have noted earlier, Turkey has the second largest army in NATO.

The TAF has a special aura for the Turkish society. The guardianship of the army refers to protecting the unitarianism, republicanism, and secularism of the Turkish republic. Throughout nearly 100 years of its history the army meddled into the political affairs of the state through its informal influence. Some regions are historically very fond of the military and provide a stable number of new conscripts, such as Cankiri, Sakarya, Marmara (Çaya 2015; p. 516).

I would like to add an interesting psychological aspect to the thought process of the army personnel. Sahin (2016; p.36-42) read the private correspondence, diaries and monographies of hundreds of soldiers of different ranks and time periods. Interestingly there was a shared notion of being apolitical. Most of the authors stated they valued Kemalism and were prepared to intervene in politics through this apolitical narrative. Basically, the problematic political situation is the reason for the military interventions. That stems from the visible distaste for politicians, and radical extremists that would undermine the democratic principles of the Republic. The general feeling of the army personnel is that they have an obligation to their predecessors to maintain the special military status, and so they abide by this principle. Another notable trait is the distaste for civilian control of the army.

Although the TAF made many interventions into the politics, its reputation has hardly been tainted for many years. It might be due to the mild nature of such interventions, as opposed to more praetorian tendencies of armies in other states, such as Pakistan or Argentine (Singh, Hickman 2013; p. 44-45). In the years 1960 and 1971 TAF intervened and quickly retracted from the political scene. 1980 was an exception - the military had ruled until 1983 through the MGK, until democracy was re-installed. The 1997 coup was carried out through an internet memorandum, to which the government obliged as well. The last preceding “coup” was the one that took place in 2007. The AKP dominated parliament elected the AKP candidate, Abdullah Gül, without meeting the required quorum of 367. The TAF issued an internet memorandum, reminding the AKP of the constitution. AKP reacted by claiming that the TAF was subordinate to the Prime minister, and not vice versa. The subsequent July 2007 elections were a major victory for the AKP. With the newfound majority, AKP elected Gül. Such sequence of events

could be considered the first major defeat in the imaginary battle between the AKP and the TAF, that was highly secular at the time (Bardakçi 2013; p.414). Overall, the coups that occurred were viewed positively by the public due to the fact that they were reactionary – they tried to untangle the difficult political situation without taking permanent political power in the long run.

3. Basic Framework

As noted earlier, the aim is to have a process tracing case study (Van Evera 1997; p.50). I will test the Talmadge's theory using observations within the case. In theory, the plan is to supply decisive evidence for the theory (ibid.; p.54). Since the basic schematics were taken from Stephen Biddle and Caitlin Talmadge, it is clearly necessary to define and describe the independent and dependent variables for my bachelor's thesis. In her work, Talmadge (2015) clearly states her affection for Biddle's (2004) famous work and thus elaborates on his thoughts. Due to this fact, I deem it necessary to depict the main ideas of Biddle first, and the ones of Talmadge later. Within these two works, I will highlight the variables I have selected for the thesis and explain them in detail. It should be noted that the following information was obtained from chapters 2-4 of Biddle's work, and from chapter 1 of Talmadge's book. Additional information will be compared to other chapters within her book, such as 4 and 5, since they focus on the authoritarian regimes of Iran and Iraq, respectively. There might be similarities to the Turkish case, since it occupies a similar geopolitical location.

Biddle focuses on explaining the transformation of military power throughout the 20th century. He clearly states his disapproval of the material-centric discourse that seems to have the upper hand in the perception of military effectiveness. Material-centric scholars focus for instance. on the army personnel numbers, number of armored vehicles or aircrafts, the advancement of technology in the military sphere etc. By this logic, preponderance of state A in those key areas against state B with lesser capacities deem the former a most likely victor in cases of a battle clash, or war. Biddle disagrees with the notion and through n-testing does not find a correlation between material preponderance and battle effectiveness. By testing more than a 100 battle conflicts, he points out that only in slightly more than half the cases, the numerically superior actor achieved victory. He believes the main independent variable, force employment, is the main factor in determining military power/military capability.

First of all, Biddle describes how the increased lethality of weapons transformed the battlefields. As a hallmark for this change, he chooses World War I. He depicts how the millions of casualties, that were inflicted on both sides without any notable territorial gains, forced the participant armies to change the structure of conducting the war operations. Here comes the term *modern system*. The new system acknowledges the severe lethality of weaponry, and thus incorporates actions that are set to nullify, or at least render partially ineffective the ability to inflict massive casualties. One of the benchmarks of such a system is concealment. The ability to conceal a soldier's movement and position is vital for survival. A bullet that cannot hit a soldier cannot kill him. Long gone are the days of long rigid battle lines of muskets and non-moving unconcealed artillery. The ability to use the Earth's uneven surface and exploit it for cover seems to be the key in achieving victory.

The second important factor is the suppression fire. Concealed or entrenched soldiers must advance or retreat from a specific position. Artillery fire that covers them gives the moving army a chance to minimize casualties, since the opponent cannot exploit the loss of cover due to their own need to cover from the artillery fire. So, as it stands, for such action to be successful, there must be high levels of coordination between multiple divisions of the army. Coordination is not enough; the personnel must be sufficiently skilled to be able to comprehend and facilitate the actions at the right moments. This brief description dips into the complexity of the modern warfare system, which I will elaborate on further.

The key elements of offensive and defensive battle tactics, as Biddle states, are: concealment, suppression fire, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, combined arms integration and limited aim operations. To shorten it up: Biddle sees the modern system as one favoring small-unit operations, due to the evident difficulty to target them with highly lethal weapons. Such units must be highly trained and independent. They must be able to react to unexpected situations, and there must be a high level of communication and coordination within the segments of the army to perform such complex operations. For Biddle, the above-mentioned force employment strategies determine the victor. Through n-tests he finds a strong correlation between victors who used these kinds of force employment strategies, and the defeated parties, which did not adapt to such changes. Biddle even tries to have a glimpse at the future by predicting the needed variables, that could overhaul the current modern system. He notes that such system would have to make terrain, dispersion and combined arms integration irrelevant, since they form the basis that the modern system is centered around.

It must be noted that Biddle believes in land force employment superiority over air or naval employment. It goes hand in hand with the problems of gaining and controlling a territory. Naval and air strikes create a great advantage if one party of a conflict possesses those options and the other does not, but only land forces bring the benefit of retaining a territory. That goes in line with the realism school of thought, which also believes military land power to be superior (Mearsheimer 2001; p.23).

Talmadge notes her inspiration by Biddle, although she takes a deeper insight into the problem of battle effectiveness. Firstly, she distinguishes between basic and complex operations (Talmadge 2015; p.34). Basic operations are ones that do not require extensive military knowledge to be performed. One might think of ambushes, static defenses, basic retreats. Although soldiers need some basic training to grasp the tactics, basic operations are prone to improvisation on the battlefield and cohesion of different units. On the other hand, complex operations require tactical proficiency and high education of the commanding structure. Armies which grasp complex operations can coordinate multiple battalions or divisions from different spectra of the army (infantry, artillery, naval, air etc.) to fulfill the mission tasks. Other forms might be mobile depth defenses, or counter-offensives (the last two examples might be seen as a direct reference to Biddle).

Furthermore, Talmadge distinguishes basic military organizational practices which are essential for combat abilities of an army (ibid.; p. 13). Those are:

- Promotion patterns
- Training regimens
- Command arrangements
- Information management

If these practices are being implemented in a way which I will describe below, then Talmadge believes that the battle effectiveness of an army in conventional warfare increases tremendously. If they are not, then the battle effectiveness deteriorates. The correct processes, according to her, are as follows:

Promotion patterns in armies that strive for good battle effectiveness should be concentrated around merit. That means the internal structure promotes competent and well-educated soldiers into the officer and higher ranks. Soldiers who do not perform well in training, battles, or who do not possess the required attributes, find it hard to deserve a promotion.

Ideal training regimens are those which emphasize rigorous, frequent, and realistic exercises. Soldiers train with their equipment before combat. Training activities are conducted with small and large-scale units in different settings and surroundings. Small-scale unit training exercises usually target the basics, such as concealment, usage of equipment, basic defense etc. Large-scale training operations focus on the synergy of different regiments. One example might be a training exercise focusing on offense, which would possibly incorporate infantry, artillery and air units. Large-scale operations require skilled and educated personnel to be fulfilled accordingly.

Command arrangements should be relatively decentralized and clear. Although the clear chain of command exists, in-field commanders are given the opportunity to react to unexpected circumstances on the battlefield without the need of confirming everything with the headquarters. There is a visible autonomy of units, although the responsibility is unambiguous - there is a clear understanding of which commands were issued by which officers. This self-sufficiency and clarity helps to complete complex operations.

Information management focuses on sharing of the information. In the ideal scenario, sharing should be horizontal and vertical without restrictions. The institutionalization of such practices is essential in a modern-day army. The information flow should not be partially restricted or even prohibited by internal mechanisms, it should be encouraged so that some auto-censorship does not occur within the army. Misinterpretation of obtained information might prove to be fatal in a conflict.

These above-mentioned parts are essential for maintenance of conventional war practices within the army. Logically, all armies should strive to get a grasp of such practices, but that is not always the case. Conventional war practices are prepared to deal with external threats, rather than internal ones. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, must calculate the sustainability of their system in contrast to external threats. Thus, emerges the problem of balance of threats. What threats will each regime prioritize? Talmadge proposes two indexes that help us determine the priorities: the strength of the regime's institutions and civil-military relations. (ibid.; p. 30).

Weakly institutionalized regimes, tend to have a a problem with maintaining legitimacy. Normally, personalist or military regimes fall into such category (Talmadge 2016; p. 123). Personalist regimes are highly susceptible to coups, since due to their nature they create tension. Inability of the military institutions to exercise autonomy automatically creates tension and gives rising concerns to the dictator about the security of such a regime type. Personalist regimes are by far the most fragile (ibid.).

Civil-military relations are tied to the history of a country. Each country has its specifics. Some tend to have a history of wild military coups, some do not. Conflictual nature of such relations increases the probability of coups. There may be strains between institutions caused by societal cleavages, economical divisions and other reasons. Another problem may be the transformation of political system. That was visible during the transformation of Iran after the Iranian Revolution. The Islamic regime had strong doubts about the soldiers associated with Imperial Guards, which it inherited from the Shah whom they overthrew (ibid.; p.170).

Furthermore, there is notion that currently resonates in this field of study, that authoritarian regimes, when faced with the problem of internal vs. external threats, in most cases prioritize the use of such internal processes that negate the internal threats (ibid.; p.19) Normally a dictator feels more inclined to react primarily to domestic matters, rather than to the external ones. In accordance with this, he then creates practices which are supposed to eliminate domestic insurgencies. Such practices decrease the ability to react to conventional warfare threats, since the military organizational practices aimed at preventing coups are in stark contrast with the ones described above. Following that logic, promotional patterns, training regimens, command arrangements and information sharing in states using coup preventing military organizational practices should be as follows:

Promotional patterns are based on loyalty, rather than merit. Excellent results in training, exams, or wars are quite ironically, a burden for the officer seeking promotion. Qualified army personnel, may be viewed as a threat by the regime. It might be considered as a potentially dangerous opposition within the system. That is why authoritarian regimes focus mainly on bringing to the army people who are loyal to the party or dictator. Logically, such actions must necessarily reflect on the military effectiveness of that army. If the main factor for promotions becomes loyalty, rather than merit, it is quite likely that the quality within the ranks will drop. Less capable army personnel will still have the ability to conduct basic operations, but it might struggle with handling complex military operations. And most importantly, successful army generals are normally held in high esteem within the army, they command natural respect. Army coups depend on loyalty of soldiers to the army.

Training regimens might be altered to minimize risks that come hand in hand with them. Army practices might be modified by limiting the number of participating units, or weaponry used. Training practices might be conducted as far away from the capital as possible, just to limit the possibility of a normal military exercise being transformed into a military coup. Troops that participate in such restricted exercises have a limited knowledge of conventional warfare, since the experience is quite clearly missing. A strong army poses a natural threat to the incumbent regime.

Changes in command arrangements are even more visible. The command of the army is highly centralized, with basically no possibility of delegating competences to officers positioned on the battlefield. There is a possibility of political leadership directly exercising its will on the armed forces. Another notable action might be constant reshuffling of officers in their command posts. Officers that must switch their positions frequently cannot become familiar with the units. This practice prevents the formation of any significant bonds between the superiors and their subordinates.

Information sharing also takes a hit in authoritarian regimes. The information flow is restricted on both levels, be vertical or horizontal. That may be generally due to the mistrust in

such regimes. Subordinates are afraid to report problems to their superiors because there is a realistic possibility of facing repercussions for that. They might decide not to report issues to their superiors. This self-censorship then leads to falsification of received and processed information. An army without the right information has a disadvantage in calling the right shots.

Since I have effectively described why I view modern-day Turkey under Erdoğan as authoritarian, I believe projecting a process-tracing case study on such topic might bring invaluable information. The basic independent variables have been sketched above. I will try to compare such variables before, and more importantly after the coup of 2016. I believe that the greatest obstacle will be finding evidence on information sharing, due to the confidentiality of such a topic. It must be noted though, that if there is clear-cut evidence on the first three variables (promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements), I may be able to assume that the fourth variable will correlate with the previous three.

Biddle searches for force employment, Talmadge for battle effectiveness. I have decided to call my dependent variable military effectiveness because I believe it incorporates the previous two in a way that is clear to the reader. I believe I will find evidence pointing to military organizational practices that fall into the second bracket, i.e. coup-proofing practices after July 2016. It is yet to be seen if the practices were held even before this significant event, due to the fact there were problems within the armed forces preceding the coup. Most notable cases are those of the Gülen movement and its influence on the Turkish armed forces before the July coup. At the start of this inquiry, I believe there will be visible deterioration of the military effectiveness after the July event. It has to be noted that since then, Turkey participated in the operation Euphrates shield, and at the time of writing of this bachelor's thesis, it launched operation Afrin in northern Syria against the Kurds. It is possible that the military effectiveness has decreased, but not as significantly as it might seem, due to the previous military supremacy of the Turkish Armed Forces in the Middle East.

4. Military Effectiveness Before July 15, 2016

Defining the timescale for the military before the July coup might be a tricky assignment at first glance. I am fully aware of the challenges this research presents. It not only focuses on a relatively new topic, but also involves the military. Militaries worldwide tend to designate a lot of private information as classified. Even though I collected a lot of my information from public academic literature, I still believe in relevance of research through connecting the dots. The practices found might be similar to those used in the past. It must be said that I have presented publicly accessible facts to the interviewed Czech military experts, I tried to interpret them, and waited to possibly get affirmative responses. Sometimes it worked, sometimes they corrected me and brought in an alternative view of the events. That is what I wished for, since the last thing I wanted to get from the interviews were opinions that only concurred with the previously stated facts. Clash of different opinions is the right way to go, since no event can be viewed by the black and white metric. After thoughtful consideration, I decided to divide the timescale of 2003-2016 into two parts. The first one is 2003-2008, and the second one goes from 2008 to 2016.

At the beginning of my research, my premise was that the TAF had practices X, which drastically changed after 2016. As I conducted the research and the interviews, new viewpoints unfolded in front of my eyes, I had to reconsider my timescale due to the Ergenekon trials in the years 2007-2010. Those seemed as a milestone at the time, but after the coup 2016, they lost significance in the grand scheme of events. Still, these peculiar cases play a significant role in comprehending the events of 2016.

4.1. Years 2003-2008

Štěpánek (2018)⁴ notes the specific nature of the TAF, since Turkey has historically no natural ally in the Middle East. Turkey happens to be lying on two continents, and theoretically, it perceives threats from all directions. It may be under potential threat from Greece from the west, Russia from the north, Iran from the east, or Syria/Iraq from the south. Turkey is surrounded by latent danger, and so its primary objective is to survive. For decades, TAF's primary concern was to defend the nation from external threats. In addition to these external threats, internal threats have arisen as well. Those were Islam, sectarianism, and most notably the decades-long struggle Kurdish minority in the south-east of the country which has taken its toll (Sakallioğlu 1997; p.154).⁵ Turkey's problems are divided into internal and external threats, and the internal structure of the army had to cope with the division of threats.

I will begin with the general structure of the army first. According to Satana (2008) The Chief of the General Staff was the supreme commander of the TAF. Putting aside MGK, there existed the High Military Council, which aided the generals. The Chief of Staff was the commander of the land, air, naval forces, gendarmerie, and the coastal guard. The gendarmerie was a strange phenomenon in the Turkish case. It was related to the Chief of the General Staff in terms of training and military education, but in the cases of security and order, it was transferred under the full control of the Ministry of Defence. (Satana 2008; p.369) Gendarmerie had historically vast privileges in Turkey due to the security problems regarding the southeast of the country. That area has a large Kurdish minority, which fought the government for decades, mostly via the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), either by guerilla warfare or by terrorist attacks. Police forces were not able to control the area, and the gendarmerie was sent to the region. Since it was assigned with guarding the borders as well, gendarmerie was effectively responsible for 90 percent of space in Turkey.

The TAF consisted of roughly 639 000 personnel at the beginning of the millennium. A ten-year plan for the reduction and professionalization of the army was introduced. (ibid.; p. 368). That goes in line with the general trend happening worldwide. Militaries in the post-modern era are set to maximize their efficiency with the least possible number of personnel. It must be noted that technology plays part in this process as well. For example, equipment that needed 10 people to operate it, needs only half now (Štěpánek 2018).

There is a shared concept in the Middle East regarding security. Armies of any state are the backbone of the local regime. It must be noted that only one can be considered fully

⁴ Ing. František Štěpánek is an expert in military intelligence, with focus on the Middle East. He was stationed at NATO headquarters in Brussels in 2001-2004, and in 2006-2010 served as Consul general in Turkey.

⁵ I will refer to this author as Ümit Cizre later in the work. The reason I chose the surname Sakallioğlu was because it corresponds with the full name provided in the article from 1997. In the article cited from 2016, she only states Ümit Cizre as her name.

democratic (Israel). Turkey has the hybrid regime described above, and the rest of the Middle East should be considered autocratic with varying degrees of repressiveness (Černý 2015; p. 46-51). Middle East countries allocate a substantial amount of finances to their armies. The share of GDP ranges from 3-5 percent, and Turkey during this studied period was no exception in this regard.

Pilc (2018)⁶ thinks that TAF are considered a privileged entity within the nation, which does not differentiate from the rest of the region. Members of the army are given benefits by the state, they are financially well secured. Being in the army is a case of honor, it brings respect, and as such it makes the army an entity possible separated from the rest of the population.

Regarding military promotional patterns, it seems that the promotional patterns were based on merit. Although at this studied timescale there might have been some pressures from the civilian government⁷, it seems that TAF had complete control of the education program, which emphasized Kemalist values. Soldiers were educated and socialized that way (Narli 2000; p.118). The recruitment came from military high schools, military and war colleges. Some soldiers came from civilian universities as well. The prohibition of Islamic tendencies is again noted by Satana (2008; p.370).⁸ Stojar heard a story about one Turkish military officer forcing his subordinates into swimwear, to determine which ones were religious. The key was simple: those with visibly bruised knees were practitioners of Islam. It must be noted that such story does not have the necessary verification.

The educational syllabus was taught in accordance with Higher Educational Council, which was established by the military in 1980 (Tomuş, Aygenç 2017; p.77). The two people I interviewed, Štěpánek and Kovanda⁹, had personal experience with Turkish officers while being stationed abroad, at NATO. They both confirmed that the soldiers they met were highly professional and that they had the required education. This steers my thought process into the direction that soldiers were promoted on merit, rather than some loyalist patterns.

When we consider command arrangements, I can without any doubt claim that the TAF had a long-standing history of hierarchy. The chain of command was clear, everyone was accountable. The chain of command was: the Turkish General Staff (TGS), and the High Military Council (sometimes referred to as Supreme Military Council). There came the three-layered pyramid of first lower-ranking generals, second advanced corps of special staff officers, and then the rest of the officer staff (Satana 2008; p.369). Further evidence from Štěpánek adds that Turks have strict hierarchy rules, whatever the superior officer commands, the subordinates carry out. That was in no way different from any normal, functioning army. In addition, Pilc adds that the whole region is strictly hierarchical in such a way, due to the fact that “everyone

⁶ Maj. Gen. Rostislav Pilc is a highly acclaimed expert in military intelligence. I chose him due to his impeccable knowledge regarding the Middle East.

⁷ The AKP was originally seen as a democratic, pro-western party. In the early years of the millennium, AKP tried to curb the institutional barriers by stating a need for reform due to possible EU accession talks. The military enjoyed privileges that were non-compatible with EU standards. Amongst those were military judges present at civilian courts, or the strict secularism tendencies, which discriminated women that wanted to wear headscarf at universities. The AKP won the 2002 elections with promises of reforming such secular practices. AKP promised a more democratic and liberal model, with addition of furthering religious guarantees (Tomuş, Aygenç 2017).

⁸ She notes that religious tendencies are a “cause for expulsion” from the professional military service.

⁹ Lt. Col. Ing. Petr Kovanda specializes in civil-military relations. He had first-hand experience with Turkish soldiers during his participation in KFOR in Kosovo as a leader of a CIMIC group.

knows someone". Some soldiers might be admitted into military academies due to some favor, and thus they are in debt to their benefactor. When we think of hierarchy in the Middle East, we must not think of only the institutional one within the TAF, but also the cognitive, societal one.

Regarding training regimens, Stojar (2018)¹⁰ notes TAF's long history of combat experience, since they were permanently endangered. This permanent state of emergency (with the south-eastern Kurdish separatism problem in mind) greatly adds to the general toughness of these soldiers. It seems that Turkish soldier was not only tough, but also capable due to extensive, rigorous training. One must not forget that Turkey, as the second largest army in NATO, had, and still has, an enormous military apparatus, which is unmatched by its neighbors, and possible adversaries.

The greatest challenge was obtaining some facts concerning the information sharing. Štěpánek mentioned that Turks had problems with sharing information even within the official structures of NATO. He puts it in contrast with information sharing within the Visegrad Group, which is done without major obstacles. If Turkish soldiers were unwilling to share information with allies in NATO, one must wonder how it worked within the army itself. To sum it up, I have not managed to gain undisputable facts on this variable in my research, just uncheckable bits of information from various sources. The evidence is inconclusive and I cannot provide an unambiguous summary on this variable without resorting to fabrication.

It must be added that there was tension between the TAF and the AKP. The civilian government tried to decrease the influence of the army the institutional sense. The pressure was of political nature, they focused primarily on the civil-military relations, rather than on arrangements that could affect the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The pressure was forced through constitutional amendments that curbed the influence the military personnel had in other areas of the political sphere. Those came with the Seventh Harmonization reforms, which repealed the obligation of having military background for the Secretary General of the MGK. They severely restricted his competences as well. The amendments were enforced on August 7, 2003. In 2004, further amendments removed military representatives from the Higher Education board and abolished state security courts, which were a domain of the military since 1982 (Ahmad, Naseem, Memon 2017; p. 55-57).

It seems that the Turkish military maintained most of positive organizational practices in the 2003-2008 period, suggesting that the TAF were in good shape and capable of not only dealing with internal threats, but also conventional threats. Evidence suggests that the soldiers were promoted on merit, rather than loyalty, they were well trained, and that a clear hierarchical command structure existed. Evidence regarding information sharing was not obtained. It should be added that the TAF were a military hegemon in the Middle East. That was helped by 3,5-4 percent of GDP being spent on the military. One must not forget the robust arms industry, that has helped the TAF to keep modernizing for decades.

¹⁰ Mgr. Richard Stojar Ph.D. is an expert in security studies, and the security dimension of the European integration. Although his primary specialty is the Balkan region, he aided me in my work thanks to his contacts and views on the current state of Turkey.

4.2 Years 2008-2016

Although the first wave of destabilizing the military began in late 2007 with the discovery of 27 grenades in Ümraniye district in Istanbul, the judicial processes rocked the Turkish system in unprecedented manner mainly in the following years. I will not go into full detail about the complete list of waves of prosecutions, nor about the purges in the civilian sector. The Ergenekon and Balyoz trials are too vast to properly detail. Hence, I will focus solely on the repercussions that they brought to the TAF.¹¹

In reference to military personnel, the prosecutors focused on retired top-tier generals, such as Veli Kucuk, Fikri Karadag, Hursit Tolon, and most notably, former Commander of the 1st Army, Cetin Dogan. Jenkins (2009; p.49) is highly skeptical of the judicial integrity in the processes. He depicts raids that were undertaken without solid evidence. Jenkins criticizes the indictments, due to the evident haste in which they were prepared (ibid.; p. 56). Aydinli (2011; p. 235) explains how one of the focal points of the prosecutions against Dogan included supposed plans that he shared with 29 generals and 133 officers in a meeting. Dogan talked about the eventuality of bombing two mosques in Istanbul and gunning down a Turkish jet. As it turned out later, the examples were supposed to be a model situation, not a real plan (Kutay 2017; p.76). Another example of mismanagement of information is the one of a CD which was supposed to incriminate the military personnel in the Balyoz case. The CD, dated from 2003 was the evidence in the case of coup planning. The indictment had one major flaw, the document incriminating the officers was written on Microsoft Office 2007 (Jenkins 2014). Such examples adequately demonstrate the nature of the rest of the cases, and their deficiencies.

While pointing out the major deficiencies in the prosecutors' indictments, more than 400 members of the armed forces were charged with unconstitutional acts. Out of that number, the TAF lost 15% of its generals and admirals (Kadercan, Kadercan 2016; p.96). In 2011, the Chief of TGS, Işık Koşaner, resigned along with other commanders of the land, naval and air forces in protest against the trials (ibid.). In some cases, life sentences were imposed. The most notable victim of such a decision was the former Chief of General Staff, İlker Başbuğ. Some of the defendants were later (in 2014) liberated by the Constitutional Court of Turkey.

Furthermore, the gendarmerie was detached from command of the Chief of General Staff in 2014 and transferred under the Ministry of Interior. That once again hampered the military, since gendarmerie provided tremendous informational and operational power in the remote corners of Turkey (Cilliler 2016; p. 508).

In terms of variables important for the study, this is considered the focal point of the Gülenist ties to the army. It seems that most of the military personnel appointed to the vacated spots was from the sympathizers of the Islamic organization. In accordance with Talmadge, this is an obvious example of a promotional pattern based on loyalty. According to Stein (2017; p. 7), most of the officers promoted between the years 2010-2014 were purged after the 2016 coup d'état.

It seems that the training regimens were not affected in a serious way. That makes sense due to the relatively small amount of purged military personnel compared to the overall number. It makes sense that 400 members, with even retired soldiers counted in, do not significantly

¹¹ For further details, I refer to Jenkins (2009) and (2014).

affect the training of a colossus, which the TAF is. Gurcan (2018; p.12) confirms that with his evaluation of the training exercise named Efes, which took place shortly before the July coup. During the exercise, no visible problems occurred.

Regarding command arrangements, Aydinli (2011; p. 236) thinks that the existing rift that was highlighted by the trials. The division of the army was between absolutists, defending the vintage superiority of the TAF within the political landscape, and gradualists, advocating the steady transfer of military prerogatives into the civilian hands. The latter won this power struggle. Additionally, Gurcan (2017) conducted research within the officer ranks. In his work, he mapped the religious, motivational, political and other beliefs of the officer corps. The highlighted conclusions are that the land forces officers are more conservative and religious, as opposed to their counterparts from the air force, or navy. Another interesting discovery was the fact that while one fifth of the officers from navy and land forces declined to reveal their political preferences (on the left-right scale), the number of air force officers who refused to answer this question was almost 40%. That is an interesting number considering the purges that occurred one year later.¹² Unfortunately, no viable information regarding information sharing was obtained once again.

5. Coup

This chapter will focus on the coup. I will first describe what happened and the timescale of events. An explanation of the failure will follow. Ultimately, the segments of the army which participated in the coup will be highlighted.

5.1. As it happened

The failed coup d'état that happened on July 15 was different from the previous ones in one important aspect. While those were carried out to install order on the divided political scene, this one aimed at causing disorder.

According to the publicly available information, the coup began at 10 p.m. local time. There were reports of military operation going on in Turkish cities, most notably Ankara, the capital, and Istanbul. There were reports of a helicopter shooting at the MGK, situated in Ankara, and a takeover of the TRT, Turkish national television. Furthermore, an explosion occurred at the police operations center in Gölbaşı, south of Ankara. Istanbul's bridges, connecting the Asian and European parts of the city, were blocked by tanks (Esen, Gumuscu 2017; p. 62). At around 11 pm., the Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım was the first government official that brought the information about an ongoing coup. He tried to downplay the event. Additionally, the putschists targeted places such as Istanbul airport, military high-schools, city halls, and telecommunications. About an hour and a half later, the Chief of the General Staff, was taken captive alongside other generals (Altinordu 2017; p.151) at the General Staff headquarters, and later transferred to Akinci Air Base.

¹² For the complete results, i refer to Gurcan (2017).

The first official statement from the putschists came at 12.05 am via TRT, the national public broadcaster. The channel was off air in the previous hours. The official statement was read multiple times by the broadcaster, and later it was played in a loop. The putschists called themselves “Peace at Home Council”. The structure of the message was similar to the 1980 coup.¹³ Half an hour later, president Erdoğan came with his first public statement. It was an improvised call to the nation via FaceTime, which a CNN Türk anchor held on her phone towards the cameras. Erdoğan called civilians into the streets to oppose the putschists, and in hindsight, it was a masterstroke, since he mobilized an enormous number of civilians into the streets. He was aided by thousands of mosques which rallied the population. Altinordu (2017; p.147) believes that there was a contrast in the effect of the two opposing calls to the Turkish population due to two crucial persuasive techniques. Erdoğan managed to:

- Claim legitimacy (by challenging the legitimacy of the putschists)
- Project power (by downplaying the strength of the rebelling forces)

After those two announcements, the streets filled with tens of thousands of citizens opposing the armed forces. Such actions resulted into two main outcomes. In the first case, the soldiers surrendered peacefully. In the second outcome, the armed forces clashed with the civilians, which resulted in casualties (shootings at Bosphorus Bridge, now known as 15 July Martyrs Bridge) and escalation of the violence (ibid. p. 148).

After the two presented announcements, additional events occurred. The putschists bombed the Turkish Parliament at around 2.30 am.¹⁴ Approximately an hour later, flying jets were heard above Istanbul, causing sonic booms that created an illusion of bombing. The pro-coup forces interfered with the CNN Türk broadcast at around the same time, effectively disrupting the air time. The Marmaris residence, where Erdoğan was supposed to be at the time, was also raided at around 4.am, without successfully capturing him. At the time, Erdoğan was already on his way to Istanbul, where he arrived in the early morning hours.¹⁵

At 5.00 am the Turkish police captured the putschists that occupied CNN Türk headquarters. Soldiers occupying the Bosphorus Bridge surrender at roughly 6.30 am. Finally, at around 8.30 am, the Chief of the General Staff, Hulusi Akar, was rescued from captivity. By the early morning hours of July 16, it was clear that the coup d'état failed.

5.2. Reasons for Failure

There are few notable explanations for the failure of the coup. Reports suggest that the coup was made prematurely, in haste, due to a prepared reshuffle of the armed forces that was supposed happen in the course of a scheduled Supreme Military Council meeting on August 1, 2016. (Tol, Mainzer, Ekmenc 2016). That could have possibly affected the putschists. Furthermore, the same authors claim that the National Intelligence Organization (M.I.T.) discovered plans of a possible coup at around 4.pm, July 15.

¹³ That is an opinion gathered from statements of Esen, Gumuscu (2017), Altinordu (2017) and Akin (2017).

¹⁴ Štěpánek described the strategic deficiencies of Ankara, regarding air fire. The capital is located in a valley, making it highly susceptible to air attacks.

¹⁵ For such exact time determination, I have combined the information from Altinordu (2017), Esen,Gumuscu (2017) and Tol,Mainzer, Ekmenc (2016).

Gurcan (2016), citing an anonymous, but reliable source for the Al-Monitor, claims that if the coup had not materialized, there would have been purges on July 16 and 17, linked to the Supreme Military Council meeting.

Those two above mentioned pieces are unverified information, on the basis of speculation. Clearly, the putschists failed at controlling communication lines. They tried to control the television, but they failed. Besides that, they did not deal with the power of the internet, and the phenomena of social media. These means of communication mobilized tens of thousands of Erdoğan supporters into the streets. Additionally, Altinordu (ibid.; p.152) claims that the inability of the putschists to present a face for the audience cost them, due to the inability of the audience to identify with the coup forces.

Furthermore, Erdoğan was aided by muezzins in thousands of mosques around Turkey, whose rallying calls helped the mobilization (Esen, Gumuscu 2017; p.52).

Besides these facts, one must not forget that all the leaders of the opposition parties which had long-lasting quarrels with Erdoğan, pledged their support unanimously in this time of crises (ibid.). Namely Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the main oppositional party, CHP, Devlet Bahçeli of the nationalist MHP, and even the leader of the Kurdish party HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş.

Additionally, the pro-coup forces failed to capture their main objective, president Erdoğan, while he was on a vacation in Marmaris.

Retrospectively, the coup was mistimed, disorganized, and poorly executed. There were 265 casualties in total. Out of that number, 161 were civilians or police officers, 104 were participants of the coup (Hackley, Tattersall 2016).¹⁶

5.3. Purges

What strikes any outsider is the number of people that were either dismissed from their jobs, detained by the police, or arrested after the coup. According to Turkeypurge.com¹⁷ roughly 152 thousand citizens were dismissed from their jobs (mainly state officials, academics, school teachers, bureaucrats). 133 thousand people were detained. Out of those, 64 998 were arrested. Thousands of schools were shut down.

At first glance, one might consider the possibility of government overstretching. This conclusion comes from comparing the number of casualties and length of such an event with the purges which still have not ceased. Additionally, Erdoğan declared a state of emergency, which was originally planned for three months (Akin, 2017; p.521). As of April 3, 2018, the state of emergency is still active (Hurriyet Daily News 2018). This enables Erdoğan to govern by decrees, bypassing the parliament.

¹⁶ Information on this topic varies, Ümit Cizre(2016) writes about 246 civilians, and 24 coup planners. Gurcan writes about 240 civilians and 106 putschists. What can be concluded is that the number of casualties has not surpassed 400.

¹⁷ Detailed information available from <https://turkeypurge.com>, along with the methodology for calculating the amount of purged Turkish citizens. The numbers stated are of April 3, 2018.

Regarding the TAF, sources differ on the amount of personnel affected by the purges. Shortly after the coup, Turkish authorities detained roughly 10 000 military personnel (Caffarella, Sercombe, Vallee 2016). According to Gurcan (2018; p.4), 7 800 personnel were dismissed as of December 2017.

In the course of the night of July 15-16, the putschists used 35 planes, 37 helicopters, 74 tanks and 246 armed vehicles. (Altinordu 2017; p.150). Those included F16 planes, AH-1W and T129 ATAK helicopters, M60T Sabra and Leopard 2A5 tanks (Gurcan 2018; p.2).

The segments of the army that undoubtedly participated in the coup were the following ones (Caffarella, Sercombe, Vallee 2016):

- Istanbul based Gendarmerie.
- 1st Army 3rd Corps (NATO response force), based in Izmir.
- Ankara-based 2nd Army 4th Corps.
- 4th Main Jet Base group from Akinci Air Base.
- 10th Tanker regiment at Incirlik Air Base.

Notable officers that were purged from the land forces included:

- Brigadier General Hidayet Ari Erdine of the 5th Corps 54th Mechanized Brigade, stationed at Erdine (proximity to borders with Bulgaria and Greece).
- Lieutenant General Erdal Öztürk of the 3rd Corps located at Izmir.
- General Adem Huduti of the 2nd Army. The 2nd Army is situated to the south near the borders with Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
- Chief of Staff Mehmduh Hakbilen and Deputy Chief of Staff Hakan Eser of the 4th Army located on the west coast.

The navy was affected as well, the two key commanders dismissed were:

- Rear Admiral Serdar Ahmet Gundogdu – Commander of the Dardanelles Strait.
- Read Admiral Hasan Dogan – Commander of the Black Sea Region.

The segment of the army that was affected the most by the purges was the Air Force. Commanders of all the nine Main Jet Base Group Commands were removed. The notable high-ranking officers were:

- Former Commander of the Turkish Air Force, four-star general Akin Öztürk.
- Commander of the 10th Tanker Base Command at Incirlik Air Base, General Bekir Ercan Van.
- Former Deputy of the Commander of the Turkish Air Force, Gokhan Sahin Sonmezates.

Additionally, most of the officers that were part of the NATO commanding structures were either arrested or advised to return home. The bulk of officers stationed abroad refused to return. The notable mentions include:

- Chief of Staff of NATO Land Command, Salih Sevil – the command is based in the town of Izmir.
- Commander of the Afghanistan Turkish Task Force, Major General Mehmet Cahir Bakir.
- Commander of the Train, Advice, and Assist Command in Kabul, Brigadier General Sener Topuc.

Interestingly, none of the highest-ranking generals, that were all part of the Turkish General Staff, happened to be disloyal to Erdoğan. The Chief of General Staff, Hulusi Akar, remained loyal during his captivity. The commanders of land forces (Salih Zeki Colak), navy (Bulent Bostanoglu), and air forces (Abidin Unal) remained devoted as well. The only highest-ranking general affected by the purges was Galip Mendi, Commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie, but as stated above, the gendarmerie was at the time under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior, which is why I have not included him on the list.

It must be added that one of the generals is considered a hero by the government. The General of the 1st army situated in Istanbul, Umit Dundar, was the person who informed Erdoğan about the ongoing coup d'état and persuaded him to travel from Marmaris to Istanbul, rather than the capital, Ankara (Kutay,2017; p.79).

It is difficult to assess what were the exact roles of the coup plotters, due to the ongoing trials. Additionally, it is safe to declare that the putschists were not of a single ideological entity, e.g. Gülenists. The spectra presumably ranged from Gülenists, Kemalists dissatisfied with the outcome of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, to simple opportunists (Intercultural Dialogue Platform 2016; p 10 and Haugom 2016; p. 4).

6.Changes After the Coup

The following chapter aims to address the changes that occurred within the TAF. The changes are divided into two parts. The first focuses on adjustments on the level of personnel, the second on the shifts in structure of the TAF and modification of the education.

6.1. The Personnel

The purges affected mainly generals and colonels just below the top tier rank. Some sources say the TAF has lost 38% of its generals and admirals (Haugom 2017), others consider the number to be as high as 45% (Gurcan 2018; p. 4).

As stated before, the number of military personnel dismissed from the TAF reached roughly 7 800. Out of that, 4 690 were dismissed from the land forces, 1 075 from the navy and 1 726 from the air forces (ibid.).

The land forces thus have the highest number of casualties, but one has to remember that the land forces form majority within the TAF. When considered proportionally, the sector of the TAF most affected by the purges was the air force. Before the aforementioned event, the air forces had the ratio of two pilots per plane, that number plummeted to 0.8 (ibid.). That is a worrying trend, not catastrophic, but worrying due to the specific nature of the air force personnel. Generally, the pilots tend to be among the most qualified and capable within a typical army structure (Pilec 2018). It is not easy to attain such a position in an army; the requirements are steep and the process of educating aspirants to the required level lasts many years. To be fair, numbers cannot say the whole story, since there is a worldwide trend of problems with finding suitable people for such demanding positions (Štěpánek 2018).

Furthermore, the Army Aviation School and Army Aviation Command, situated in Ankara, were moved to a base in Isparta, more than 300 km away from Ankara (Han 2017; p.78). It must be noted that the Aviation School was scheduled for relocation even before the July 16 coup, but the Aviation Command was added to the move after the event. Additionally the Akinci Air Base, considered the command center of the putschists, was closed and renamed to Mürted – Apostle in translation. The 141st, 142nd and 143rd squadrons stationed there were deactivated and reestablished as 113th, 151st and 153rd squadrons, and transferred under different command to bases at Merzifon, Eskisehir, and Konya (ibid.).

There are additional reports of closure of barracks and relocation of the personnel, primarily from Ankara and Istanbul. Among those included were the Bastabaya Barracks and the Mamak Barracks. The former were relocated to Çorlu, Tekirdağ and Sivas provinces, the latter to Kahramanmaraş and Gaziantep. Troops in Hasdal, Istanbul were relocated to Çorlu as well. Those are areas that might be considered rural, e.g. Kahramanmaraş and Gaziantep are located near the borders with Syria (ibid.).

The nature of these transfers leads to speculation. Naturally, one might suspect that the reshuffled segments participated in the coup and were punished accordingly. In this sense it can be seen as a punishing act. It can also be considered a precautionary action since most of the transferred segments of the army were originally stationed in either Istanbul or Ankara, the two focal points of the coup. This might bear resemblance with Talmadge¹⁸ and her evidence of divisions being transferred to rural areas away from capital as means of security for the government. The sole unambiguous evidence available is the dismissal of the 3 Akinci squadrons.

On the other hand, relocation of army personnel is normal within armed forces, and distances such as 300km cannot be considered a tremendous distance nowadays (Štěpánek 2018). Those changes might have been planned before the actual coup d'état, and the above-stated actions might be a case of trying to make a self-fulfilling prophecy.

¹⁸ See chapter Basic Framework.

6.2 Education and Structural Changes

In the context of changes happening in Turkey, the actions that formulate the future of the military forces need to be tackled. Decree with the force of law no. 669¹⁹ addresses the future of the TAF. Not only does this unusually long decree address Gülenists and other enemies of the government, it also transfers a lot of institutional powers out of the hands of the TAF.

The highlight of these changes useful for research is Article 104, which explicitly states that: *“War Colleges, military high schools and training schools for noncommissioned officers have been shut down.”*

According to the decree, cadets from those schools were supposed to be transferred to other military schools that were to fall under the Ministry of Defence in accordance to their previous exam results (ibid. Article 105). The catch is that there is no real way of verifying if the students were allowed to change the schools, given the nature of the purges going through the whole society.

The real change to the educational system came with the abolishment of above stated military education institutions. A National Defense University was created on July 31, 2016. It was set up with the intention to replace the old institutions, abolished by the above-mentioned decree. The National Defense University formally falls under the Ministry of Defense. With that in mind, it is virtually impossible to determine the exact numbers of expelled cadets that were transferred to this newly setup institution, how many quit their studies, how many were detained, or arrested. Furthermore, there have been reports of a revised educational curriculum (Gurcan, 2018; p. 5). Additionally, Haugom (2017) states that students from the religious imam-hatip schools and women with headscarves are newly able to join military schools. Such a thing was unacceptable in the previous years. There are rumors that over 30 percent of new students have been accepted on the recommendations of officials of the ruling AKP (ibid.)

Furthermore, the command structures of the past were changed drastically. The Chief of Staff is now appointed directly by the President. Not only that, Erdoğan can bypass him and give orders to his subordinates – the commanders of land, naval and air forces, directly. This development cripples the ability of the Chief of Staff to have any real power, if compared to the past. Besides that, the number of civilians in Supreme Military Council had increased once again, forming a new majority. That basically means that civilian sector has an even greater say in the promotions within the armed forces. Such practice is reminiscent of the situation in Iraq,

¹⁹ Original document available at: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/07/20160731-5.htm>, English version: <http://www.turkishpedia.com/2017/01/25/decreed-with-force-of-law-no-khk-669-english>, Accessed on April 12, 2018.

PhDr. Tomáš Laně helped me with the translation in this part of the research. His translation went in accordance with the English version provided above.

where Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist Party had the final say in military promotions (Talmadge 2015; p.154-156). Such an act can be considered a coup-proofing measure. For additional changes, I attach the table by Gurcan (2018).

Table 1 describing the restructuralization of the armed forces, classified into 2 categories.

<p>INITIATED AND COMPLETED</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Subordinating the Gendarmerie Command and Coast Guard to the Ministry of the Interior† ▪ Foundation of National Defense University (NDU) and subordinating this institution to the MoD, closure of military high schools and attachment of war academies and Staff College to the NDU* ▪ Revision of officers’ promotion and appointment criteria within TAF, making the MoD the final authority on the appointments of all officers‡ ▪ Abolition of the autonomous military health system and independent military judiciary* ▪ Civilianization of the Supreme Military Council with the involvement of deputy prime minister, foreign, justice and interior ministers from the cabinet along along with the prime minister, chief of General Staff, defense minister, and the service commanders** ▪ Revision of the curriculum of the professional military education system at the undergraduate and graduate levels ▪ Abolition of the privileged staff officer system
<p>INITIATED BUT NOT COMPLETED</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Sharing of command-control, personnel-recruitment, operations, intelligence, logistics-acquisition, military education, and budget management functions/responsibilities between the TGS and MoD in a coordinated and synergistic way mainly due to the TGS’s still uncertain status in the security sector architecture ▪ The redesign of the MoD’s organizational structure according to the MoD’s expanding roles and responsibilities, especially the strengthening of the MoD structure in terms of personnel management (promotion and assignment) and consultancy (decision support), command-control, operation and military intelligence issues, in addition to military education, military procurement, acquisition, and budgeting ▪ Empowerment of the institutional agency of MoD within the security architecture so as to rescue it from the dominance of the TGS ▪ De-Gulenification of the military through purges and dismissals

Taken from Gurcan(2018).

The rise of the private military company SADAT is an interesting one. Its founder, Adnan Tanrivedi, was released from the military in 1997 for his Islamic orientation. Shortly after the coup, Erdoğan named Tanrivedi his top aid (Jenkins 2018). Officially SADAT is a company providing consultancy services, along with conventional and unconventional training.²⁰ However, reports suggest that SADAT has a much greater say in the Turkish system since Tanrivedi has an on par or even higher influence than the Chief of Staff (Rubin 2017). Commentators talk about SADAT surpassing its competencies since it is not restricted in any way as a private consulting agency. The comparisons to Erdoğan’s private army are widely used (ibid.), (Spyer,2018).

The rehabilitation of previously imprisoned soldiers during the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials is another process happening in the current climate (Misztal, Danforth, Michek 2017;

²⁰ Information gained from official site: <http://sadat.com.tr/our-services.html>, Accessed on April 12, 2018.

p.16). This goes hand in hand with the previous rehabilitation of the former Chief of Staff, General İlker Başbuğ.

7.Military Effectiveness After the Coup

After putting forth all the detailed information on the current state of the TAF available, it is time to assess the searched variable of this study, that is military effectiveness. Since the processes are still going on the bachelor's thesis is written, the aim is to try to figure out what is actually happening in the armed forces in the meantime.

Regarding promotional patterns, it is obvious that the main criterion during the purges was loyalty to the governing party, the AKP. This statement does not contradict the fact that many commissioned officers within the TAF are still highly educated, and that their positions were gained by merit. The problem with the whole Middle East is that the sole competency is not enough, there is a degree of expected loyalty to the incumbent government, alternatively to the authoritarian leader (Pirc 2018), which works well for both parties. One side gets the protection and the other gets the rewards and benefits. The Turkey system nowadays can be loosely compared to the situation in Iran after the 1979 Revolution (Talmadge 2015; p. 171).

There are two main differences between the two cases. Firstly, the Iranian purges hit the generals and other high rankings officers massively. Later on, in 1980, they spread through the rest of the army. In the end, the Iranian officer corps lost 40 percent of its strength. That has not happened in Turkey. Turkish purges were directed primarily at the high echelons of the officer corps (generals), the lowers segments of the army were not hit as hard. Nor has the reduction of officer corps and the rest of the personnel been so massive.

I am not dismissing the fact that the newly promoted generals and other high-ranking soldiers were most likely promoted based on loyalty, but it could have been a factor of a mixture of merit and loyalty. That is not unusual in the Middle East. We must add the fact that a large chunk of soldiers imprisoned in the Ergenekon trials was rehabilitated, and some of them could have filled the missing places within the TAF. To recapitulate, the amount of jailed active or retired military personnel in the years 2007-2011 did not surpass the number 400. That is noticeably less than what was witnessed in the 2016 purges. What must be examined here are the reports of cadets gaining a scholarship in the newly set up education system based on loyalty to the AKP. That is, however, not verifiable at the moment.

What must be closely examined are the future promotional patterns regarding the modified Supreme Military Council, in which the civilian sector has the say on soldiers' promotions. That is a source of concern for the future. At the moment, it is not possible to say that the promotions are based on loyalty only, nor are they based solely on religion or any other specified criteria to coup-preventing practices described by Talmadge.²¹ What can be said though, is that there is an inclination to promotions based on loyalty, which could be considered a coup-proofing measure. Experts mostly agreed the Turkish army has such a talent pool available, that they do not expect any long-term shortages in this field (Pilc 2018, Stojar 2018, Štěpánek 2018, Kovanda 2018).

When searching for training regimens, the TAF has not disclosed any training operations on its official website since those that took place in 2016.²² Pilc (2018) believes that after such event, there will be no major training exercises happening for at least a couple of years. There might be small-scale training exercises, but Pilc believes none will occur on a grander unit scale. As discussed in this framework, units that do not train rigorously and often are expected to lose some of their effectiveness. Once again, a coup-proofing measure is witnessed here. Since there are no official records of training exercises, it is necessary to dwell on the operational practices of the TAF in military operations after the coup by examining the conflicts TAF has participated in. The two main operations launched after the coup concentrated on dealing with Turkey's security threats in northern Syria. The official names of such commenced operations were Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch. The former initiated on August 24, 2016 and terminated successfully on March 31, 2017. The latter began on January 20, 2018 and has not ended conclusively in the time this thesis is written.

Although Euphrates shield ended victoriously for the Turkish side and its allies, there are focal points that merit the attention. General Zekai Aksakalli, a special forces commander, was charged with leading the operation. Reports depict the classical use of conventional operational practices, such as concealment, ability to gain control of a large, uneven chunk of area and hold it and the ability to complete a complicated joint operation. (Yeşiltaş, Seren, Özçelik 2017; p.19). The main problems during the operation came from tactical deficiencies. Those included bad timing of the operation, which led to avoidable delays, tactical problems with coordination and deployment of the tank units (ibid.; p. 44-45), and most notably, problems with air support within the region (ibid.; p. 11). The last problem probably correlates to the

²¹ As in case of South Vietnamese army and its criteria of "3 D's": religion, origin, party affiliation; p.54, Nor does it resemble the case of Hussein's Iraq in the earlier years, which demanded strict Ba'athist allegiance; p. 155.

²² Information gained throught the official website of the TAF: <http://www.tsk.tr/TrainingExercises/ExercisesAndShows> Accessed on April 15,2018.

shortage of air fighters available at the time. Furthermore, Gurcan (2018; p.13) reveals a power struggle during the campaign between generals Aksakalli and Metin Temel (who assumed the command of the 2nd army after the previously mentioned Huduti), which affected the cooperation between segments of the army. The overall operation was a success, but it was accompanied with deficiencies on tactical and operational levels, with signs of friction in the command as well. Additionally, the deficiencies that most probably related to a lower number of air pilots were witnessed.

Operation Olive Branch is a new operation, and it is difficult to assess it after three months. At first sight, there is a visible improvement of the operational practices of the TAF, even in such a difficult, mountainous terrain. As of March 2017, Turkey has seized control of a crucial objective, the city of Afrin (Teoman, Cafarella 2018). According to Kasapoğlu, Ülgen (2018; p. 3), the TAF secured tactical depth in the difficult terrain, helped by the overwhelming fire support from the land and air forces. Those are classical examples of the use of conventional operational practices. The improvement of the air support must be highlighted, since there has been a visible upward spiral, compared to the preceding operation. There have been no visible examples of coup-proofing arrangements witnessed in this searched variable. It must be noted though, that the scale of success does not necessarily have to go hand in hand with improved military effectiveness, but the military inferiority of the Turkish opposition – namely PKK, KCK, PYD-YPG and Daesh in this case.²³

The command arrangements have visibly changed within the TAF. The preceding structure was more decentralized than the current one. The command structures were curbed to be more centralized, with the president assuming a more pro-active stance as a commander-in-chief (Haugom 2016; p.3), with the Chief of TGS being his direct subordinate. Erdoğan may also issue orders to the commanders of the land, naval and air forces, without consulting the Chief of Staff, a practice previously unseen within the TAF. The organizational structure has been curbed to strengthen the civilian sector preponderance, resembling the German model (Stojar 2018). However, the question is if such a transformation is possible, given the democratic deficiencies of the Turkish politics. Furthermore, new and relatively mysterious actors emerged on the Turkish scene. The counseling services provided to Erdoğan by a SADAT founder further diversify the scene, making it more unpredictable, since some sources consider SADAT to be Erdoğan's private

²³ This belief stems from Biddle, who claims that military deficits of one participant might be overshadowed by even greater deficiencies of its opponents. I believe this is the case due to the fact that Turkey faced an inferior opponent in this, and the previous clash.

army. This can be viewed as another coup-proofing measure. Additionally, segments of the army, mainly from Ankara and Istanbul, were transferred far away from the two main cities. Such a practice yet again resembles a coup-proofing measure described by Talmadge.

On to the last searched variable, information sharing, there have been visible deficiencies regarding horizontal and vertical communication during operation Euphrates shield, resulting in the delay of securing the objectives. Such problems have not yet been witnessed in the following operation, Olive Branch. Those are the facts. One must assume that the information sharing may not be ideal on both levels due to the current state of affairs in the TAF. Structural changes affected the shape of the TAF that was in course for decades. Transformation of any kind creates natural bumps on the road, and even more if it is preceded by a military coup. Kovanda (2018) mentions the subliminal message such an event might have signaled to the remaining force. In his view, the post-coup purges messages were sent to the army in three ways. Physically (by means of communication), informationally (the cases of who and why was fired) and cognitively (it might destabilize the unscathed personnel of the army by being cautious in their actions, their thoughts). It can be assumed that the extended factionalism within the TAF (Gurcan 2018; p.9), which is aided by different cliques within the TAF, will not improve the information sharing. I have taken such conclusion due to unclear, but persuasive evidence gathered during the research.

8. Policy Implications

By providing clear evidence of the practices maintained in the TAF in the previous chapters, it is safe to say that the purges after the coup d'état were not a one-time event, as witnessed in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases in the past. That is a worrying trend, since such actions may occur again in the future. One new feature is the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces are under greater control of the civilian sector now. This may resemble the supremacy of the civilian sector in western democracies. Unfortunately, Turkey does not resemble a democracy of the western sense.

Evidence suggests that Turkey's military effectiveness should have deteriorated after the purges. Why was it victorious in the Euphrates shield operation then, and why does it seem probable that the subsequent Olive Branch will end in victory as well? As the interviewed experts agreed, Turkey is a military hegemon in the region. It is safe to say that the operations conducted in northern Syria were against inferior foes. It is possible to

assume the Kurdish forces had many internal problems as well, but such subject requires a different research. Stojar (2018) proposed that the purges might have actually increased the military effectiveness since young, educated officers will try twice as hard to distinguish themselves. That might happen to be true in the long-run, but surely not in the short-term. Regarding the military preponderance, no other actor in the region has similar military capacities. Potentially the Iranian Armed Forces, but even they cannot compare to the TAF (Pilc 2018).

At the moment, it all depends on the threat environment assessment by Erdoğan. If he fears for his position at home, more coup-proofing measures might be seen in the future. Currently it seems that he wants to use the momentum of the economic growth and successful military operations to solidify his position in Turkey, by calling early elections in place of those originally scheduled for November 2019 (Cagaptay 2018). When the situation stabilizes, the coup-proofing measures might be overturned in favor of previous organizational practices, with the possible expansion in mind. Erdoğan's comments about revision of the Treaty of Lausanne and reclaiming the Aegean islands (Bulut 2018) cannot be taken lightly. Just by sheer numbers, TAF have an edge on their Greek counterparts (Chapter Four: The Military Balance 2018; p.111, p.157), but as Biddle stresses, the quantitative superiority is not enough. The TAF must take into consideration its deficiencies regarding the air force, and possibly the navy as well. Comparing the Hellenic Armed Forces with the TAF is a topic that warrants further research.

Conclusion

The research focused on comparing the dependent variable, military effectiveness of the TAF, before and after the July 2016 coup. The results were determined by gathering four independent variables. There were problems obtaining one of those, namely information sharing. That obstacle aside, the rest of the gathered evidence provided necessary information to make a conclusion about the military effectiveness of the TAF in the two researched time periods. The answers to the main questions stated in the Introduction are as follows:

The organization of chain of command within the TAF before the coup d'état was hierarchical and clear. The forces were commanded by the Chief of the General Staff. The promotions were based on merit, and the Supreme Military Council, which consisted primarily of military personnel, oversaw the promotions. The training exercises were

rigorous and frequent, Turkish soldiers seemed capable based on the observations of the experts that encountered them. Civilian sector did not interfere in the command structures in a way that would affect military effectiveness. There were bumps along the way by emergence of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials, which initiated the first coup-proofing organizational practices. Interestingly, the first coup-proofing measures were not witnessed after 2016 only, but in the years preceding to the event as well. Those measures did not have a significant impact in the long-term though.

Regarding the second main question, the groups of the army that mainly participated in the coup were from barracks in Ankara and Istanbul. Additionally, the air forces participated in a higher proportion than the land forces or navy. The Akinci Air Base was the command center of the putschists. The putschists were a mix of dissatisfied Gülenists, Kemalists, and mostly likely some opportunists.

Penultimately TAF was affected by changes on a structural level and on personnel level. Regarding the structural ones, the organization of the chain of command became more centralized, with significant strengthening of the role of the President as the commander-in-chief, leaving the role of the Chief of the General Staff marginalized. Additionally, Erdoğan has brought SADAT's Adnan Tanrıverdi, a former brigadier general fired from the military due to his Islamic ties, as his top advisor. Furthermore, war colleges, military high schools and training courses for noncommissioned officers were shut down and later unified under a newly created National Defense University, with revised curriculum. Citizens from the religious imam-hatip schools and women with headscarves may newly join the army. Regarding personnel, the subsequent purges affected roughly three percent of the total number. Roughly 40 percent of generals and admirals were purged from the TAF, meaning the top tier officers were affected significantly. Another notable group was the army pilots. Their number plummeted from a ratio of 2 pilots per plane 0.8. Furthermore, many units stationed in the cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, were transferred to rural areas and their former barracks were closed.

Ultimately evidence I gathered indicated coup-proofing organizational practices were being used within the TAF. Some loosely resembled Talmadge's examples, some were comparable. Such facts led to the conclusion that the TAF military effectiveness has deteriorated, as was visible during the Euphrates Shield operation. The main question however, is the possible duration of such a decrease in military effectiveness. It seems that for majority of the TAF, the drop in military effectiveness will be temporal, the process will not be long-term, something which most experts agreed on. Operation Olive Branch

exemplifies the improvement in aspects. The only long-term concern should be the availability and quality of future air pilots, due to the time needed for training in such specific segment of the army.

The conclusion is that the TAF military effectiveness has decreased after July 2016, but it will probably not be a long-term problem, given the significant military preponderance of the TAF within the region and the pool of future talent available at disposal. The military effectiveness might actually improve in the long-run, as the better operational practices during Operation Olive Branch suggest. The next course of action depends on Erdoğan's threat assessment. Only future will tell if Erdoğan continues cementing his position on the Turkish political scene, or if military actions abroad prevail. The former would suggest maintenance of the coup-proofing measures, the latter their reduction.

Závěr

Práce se zaměřila na komparaci vojenské efektivity před a po puči 2016, čehož bylo docíleno hledáním čtyř definovaných proměnných. Původní obavy se potvrdily, největší obtíže nastaly při hledání proměnné *information sharing*. I přes tento problém jsem díky získaným poznatkům z ostatních proměnných mohl dospět k závěru ohledně vojenské efektivity TAF ve zkoumaných obdobích. Odpovědi na otázky vyřčené v úvodu jsou následující:

Turecké ozbrojené síly v období do roku 2016 prokazovaly víceméně všechny znaky správného fungování popsáno C. Talmadge. Povýšení byla za zásluhy, cvičení byla prováděna často a profesionálně, v armádě existovala jasná hierarchie. Vojska se zodpovídala náčelníku Generálního štábu. První náznaky protipučových (*coup-proofing*) opatření byly zjištěny při kauzách Ergenekon a Balyoz. Tato opatření ovšem citelně nezasáhla vojenskou efektivitou.

Segmenty armády, které byly nejvíce zapleteny do puče, pocházely převážně z kasáren v Istanbulu a Ankaře. Vojáci z letectva se puče zúčastnili proporcionálně více, než ti z pěchoty či námořnictva. Za velící centrum pučistů se pokládá letecká základna Akinci. Pučisty lze rozdělit na gülenisty, kemalisty a pravděpodobně i oportunisty.

Čistky zasáhly armádu na dvou úrovních. První úroveň byla strukturální. Velení je oproti minulosti více centralizované, Erdoğan nyní může dávat příkazy přímo generálům, čímž dochází k marginalizaci role náčelníka Generálního štábu. Dále byly zrušeny některé vojenské školy a další výcviková zařízení. Studenti těchto škol byli přesunuti do nově vytvořené Národní univerzity obrany. Ve výuce došlo ke změně osnov a nově mohou do armády vstoupit studenti z náboženských středních škol. Druhá úroveň se týkala lidských zdrojů. Čistky zasáhly zhruba tři procenta vojenského personálu. Čistkami bylo zasaženo okolo čtyřicet procent generálů a admirálů. Proportionálně došlo k největšímu úbytku u letectva. Z průměru dvou pilotů na stíhačku kleslo číslo na 0,8 pilota. Některé jednotky z Istanbulu či Ankary byly přesunuty na venkov.

Po puči došlo k nálezům opatření, která více či méně korespondovala s příklady v autoritářských režimech uvedenými v práci C. Talmadge. S ohledem na veškeré nalezené poznatky jsem došel k závěru, že po puči došlo ke snížení vojenské efektivity tureckých ozbrojených sil. Otázkou zůstává, zda se bude jednat o dlouhodobý problém. Vybraní experti se shodli na tom, že pro většinu TAF se bude jednat o krátkodobý pokles vojenské efektivity, z důvodu neuvěřitelného lidského kapitálu, který je pro tureckou armádu k dispozici. Dlouhodobé problémy se dají očekávat pouze u pilotů bojových letounů, jelikož výcvik nových letců potrvá mnoho let. V budoucnu může dojít i k opačnému jevu, tedy zvýšení vojenské efektivity. Vše závisí na vyhodnocení hrozeb z pohledu Erdoğana. Pokud se soustředí na domácí hrozby, lze očekávat setrvání nastoleného směru. V případě, že se Erdoğan zaměří na zahraniční hrozby, lze očekávat zmírnění těchto protipučových praktik.

References:

- AHMAD, Mughees, Saima NASEEM a Fahmida MEMON. Government: Research Journal of Political Science. *Government: Research Journal of Political Science* [online]. 2017, 2017, **5**(Supplementary Edition), 49-60 [cit. 2018-02-20]. Available from: <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.is.cuni.cz/ehost/detail/detail?vid=4&sid=acd03332-7a76-46c0-b976-2cd2f48cea9b%40sessionmgr101&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBIPWlwLHVpZCxlcmwmbGFuZzljcyZzaXRIPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#AN=123667187&db=poh>
- AKIN, Altug. Conditions of sense making and news making in Turkey after the failed coup attempt: Sisyphus labor on two fronts. *Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism* [online]. 2016, **18**(4), 518-532 [cit. 2018-04-13]. DOI: 10.1177/1464884916677758. ISSN 1464-8849. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1464884916677758>
- AKGÜL, Mustafa and Melih KIRLIDOĞ. Internet censorship in Turkey. *Internet Policy Review Journal on Internet Regulation* [online]. 2015, June 2015, **4**(2), 1-22 [cit. 2018-04-13]. DOI: 10.14763/2015.2.366. Available from: <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/internet-censorship-turkey>
- ALTINORDU, Ateş. A Midsummer Night's Coup: Performance and Power in Turkey's July 15 Coup Attempt. *Qualitative Sociology*[online]. 2017, **40**(2), 139-164 [cit. 2018-04-13]. DOI: 10.1007/s11133-017-9354-y. ISSN 0162-0436. Available from: <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11133-017-9354-y>
- AYDINLI, Ersel. Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish "Inner State". *Turkish Studies* [online]. 2011, **12**(2), 227-239 [cit. 2018-05-02]. DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2011.572630. ISSN 1468-3849. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2011.572630>
- BARDAKÇI, Mehmet. Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey under AKP Rule. *Turkish Studies*[online]. 2013, **14**(3), 411-428 [cit. 2018-02-04]. DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2013.831256. ISSN 1468-3849. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2013.831256>
- BIDDLE, Stephen D. *Military power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. 2004. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c2004. ISBN 0691116458.
- BULUT, Uzay. Why Turkey Wants to Invade the Greek Islands. *Gatestone Institute, International Policy Council* [online]. 2018 [cit. 2018-05-02]. Available from: <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/11954/turkey-threats-greek-islands>
- CAFARELLA, Jennifer, Elizabeth SERCOMBE and Charles VALLEE. Partial Assessment of Turkey's Post-Coup Attempt Military Purge. In: *Institute for Study of War* [online]. July 30, 2016 [cit.

2018-04-13]. Available from: <http://iswresearch.blogspot.cz/2016/07/partial-assessment-of-turkeys-post-coup.html>

CAGAPTAY, Soner. Will Turkey Call Early Elections?. *Policywatch 2916* [online]. The Washington Institute, 2018 [cit. 2018-05-02]. Available from: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/will-turkey-call-early-elections>

CALISKAN, Koray. Explaining the end of military tutelary regime and the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey. *Journal of Cultural Economy* [online]. 2017, **10**(1), 97-111 [cit. 2018-05-02]. DOI: 10.1080/17530350.2016.1260628. ISSN 1753-0350. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17530350.2016.1260628>

ÇAYA, Sinan. Different Attitudes in Different Regions Aimed at Military Personnel in Turkey. *Sociology Study*, [online]. 2015, **5**(6), 510-517 [cit. 2018-02-11]. Available from: <http://www.davidpublisher.org/index.php/Home/Article/index?id=20302.html>

ČERNÝ, Karel. *Instability in the Middle East: structural changes and uneven modernisation 1950-2015*. Prague: Charles University, Karolinum Press, 2017. ISBN 9788024634272.

Chapter Four: Europe. *The Military Balance* [online]. 2018, **118**(1), 65-168 [cit. 2018-05-06]. DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416980. ISSN 0459-7222. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416980>

CILILIER, Yavuz. Popular Determinant on Civil-Military Relations in Turkey. *Arab Studies Quarterly* [online]. 2016, **38**(2), 500-520 [cit. 2018-05-06]. Available from: <http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.is.cuni.cz/ehost/detail/detail?vid=4&sid=3e390f54-d4d4-45f1-81f5-1411faf45d67%40pdc-v-sessmgr01&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBIPWlwLHVpZCxlcmwmbGFuZz1jcyZzaXRIPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#AN=114855056&db=asn>

CIZRE, Ümit. Turkey in a Tailspin The Foiled Coup Attempt of July 15. *Middle East Report* [online]. Middle East Research and Information Project, 2016 [cit. 2018-05-06]. Available from: <https://www.merip.org/mero/mero081016>

Decree with Force of Law No. (KHK) 669 | English | *Turkishpedia.com* [online]. 2016 [cit. 2018-04-12]. Available from: <http://www.turkishpedia.com/2017/01/25/decreed-with-force-of-law-no-khk-669-english/>

Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey. *A Freedom House Special Report* [online]. 2014, 1-12 [cit. 2018-03-17]. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/democracy-crisis-corruption-media-and-power-turkey>

ESEN, Berk and Sebnem GUMUSCU. Turkey: How the Coup Failed. *Journal of Democracy* [online]. 2017, **28**(1), 59-73 [cit. 2018-03-31]. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0006> Available from: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/645538>

Exercises and Shows. *Turkish Armed Forces* [online]. [cit. 2018-04-15]. Available from: <http://www.tsk.tr/TrainingExercises/ExercisesAndShows>

GÖKTEPE, Gökçe a Shanker SATYANATH. The economic value of military connections in Turkey. *Public Choice* [online]. 2013, **155**(3-4), 531-552 [cit. 2018-02-04]. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9886-8. ISSN 0048-5829. Available from: <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-011-9886-8>

GURCAN, Metin. A snapshot of the blackbox: a 2015 survey of the Turkish officer corps. *Turkish Studies* [online]. 2017, **19**(1), 97-117 [cit. 2018-04-20]. DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2017.1374862. ISSN 1468-3849. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2017.1374862>

GURCAN, Metin and Timur GÖKSEL. Why Turkey's coup didn't stand a chance. *Al-Monitor* [online]. 2016, July 17, 2016 [cit. 2018-04-13]. Available from: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160719142125/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-kamikaze-coup-attempt-fails.htm>

GURCAN, Metin. Tentative Transition: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey Since the July 15 Uprising. *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* [online]. 2018, (Policy Notes 48) [cit. 2018-04-13]. Available from: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/tentative-transition>

HACKLEY, Ayla Jean and Nick TATTERSALL. Death toll rises to 265 in failed Turkey coup: official. *Reuters* [online]. 2016, July 16, 2016 [cit. 2018-05-05]. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-casualties/death-toll-rises-to-265-in-failed-turkey-coup-official-idUSKCN0ZW132>

HAN, Kubilay. Turkish Armed Forces: Modernisation in Troubled Times. *Military Technology* [online]. 2017, **41**(5), 78-82 [cit. 2018-03-03]. Available from: <http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.is.cuni.cz/ehost/detail/detail?vid=3&sid=87ac6207-5b3b-4264-ae1f-3d2aca7cb62e%40sessionmgr4007&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBIPWlwLHVpZCxlcmwmbGFuZz1jcyZzaXRIPWVob3N0LWxpdmU%3d#AN=123666187&db=asn>

HAUGOM, Lars. The Turkish Armed Forces Restructured. *Turkey Analyst* [online]. 2016 [cit. 2018-05-08]. Available from: <https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/566-the-turkish-armed-forces-restructured.html>

HAUGOM, Lars. An Uncertain Future for the Turkish Armed Forces. *The Turkey Analyst* [online]. 2017 [cit. 2018-05-05]. Available from: <https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/588-an-uncertain-future-for-the-turkish-armed-forces.html>

JENKINS, Gareth. *Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation* [online]. *Silk Road Paper, 2009* [cit. 2018-05-02]. ISSN ISBN: 978-91-85937-61-5. [online]. In: . Singapore: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2009, s. 9-83 [cit. 2018-05-02]. ISBN ISBN: 978-91-85937-61-5. Available from: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/publications/silkroad-papers-and-monographs/item/13091-between-fact-and-fantasy-turkeys-ergenekon-investigation.html>

JENKINS, Gareth. The Ergenekon Releases and Prospects for the Rule of Law in Turkey. *Turkey Analyst* [online]. 2014, 7(5) [cit. 2018-05-02]. Available from: <https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/96-the-ergenekon-releases-and-prospects-for-the-rule-of-law-in-turkey.html>

JENKINS, Gareth. Turkey's Toxic Mix: Fear, Loathing and the Empowerment of Paranoia. *Turkey Analyst* [online]. 2018 [cit. 2018-05-01]. Available from: <https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/593-turkeys-toxic-mix-fear-loathing-and-the-empowerment-of-paranoia.html>

KADERCAN, Pelin Telsere and Burak KADERCAN. The Turkish Military as a Political Actor: Its Rise and Fall. *Middle East Policy*[online]. 2016, 23(3), - [cit. 2018-05-06]. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12219>. Available from: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/mepo.12219>

KASAPOĞLU, Can and SINAN ÜLGEN. *Turkey's Operation Olive Branch Enters a New Phase* [online]. EDAM, 2018 [cit. 2018-05-06]. Available from: <http://edam.org.tr/en/turkeys-operation-olive-branch-enters-a-new-phase/>

KUTAY, Acar. *From Guardianship to Civilian Control: How did the Turkish Military Get Here?* [online]. 2018 [cit. 2018-05-08]. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319532871_From_Guardianship_to_Civilian_Control_How_did_the_Turkish_Military_get_here

LEVITSKY, Steven and Lucan WAY. *Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Problems of international politics. ISBN 978-0-521-70915-6.

MEARSHEIMER, John. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. ISBN 978-0-393-07624-0.

MISZTAL, Blaise, Nicholas DANFORTH and Jessica MICHEK. Deep State of Crisis: Re-Assessing Risks to the Turkish State. *Bipartisan Policy Center* [online]. 2017, March 2017, , 1-24 [cit. 2018-04-13]. Available from: <https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/re-assessing-risks-to-the-turkish-state/>

NARLI, Nilüfer. Civil-military relations in Turkey. *Turkish Studies* [online]. 2007, 1(1), 107-127 [cit. 2018-05-02]. DOI: 10.1080/14683840008721223. ISSN 1468-3849. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683840008721223>

Our Services. *SADAT Inc.* [online]. Istanbul [cit. 2018-04-12]. Available from: <http://sadat.com.tr/our-services.html>

SAHIN, Hakan. Reading the Memoirs: Some Notes on Turkish Soldiers' Political Thoughts. *Mediterranean Quarterly* [online]. 2016, 27(2), 28-46 [cit. 2018-02-04]. DOI:

10.1215/10474552-3618050. ISSN 1047-4552. Available from:
<https://read.dukeupress.edu/mediterranean-quarterly/article/27/2/28-46/1954>

SAKALLIOGLU, Ümit Cizre. The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy. *Comparative Politics* [online]. 1997, **29**(2), 151- [cit. 2018-05-02]. DOI: 10.2307/422077. ISSN 00104159. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/422077?origin=crossref>

SARIGIL, Zeki. The Turkish Military. *Armed Forces & Society* [online]. 2013, **40**(1), 168-190 [cit. 2018-02-04]. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X12442309. ISSN 0095-327x. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0095327X12442309>

SATANA, Nil S. Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy. *Armed Forces & Society* [online]. 2008, **34**(3), 357-388 [cit. 2018-03-31]. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X07302679. ISSN 0095-327X. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0095327X07302679>

SINGH, Chaitram and John HICKMAN. Soldiers as saviors of the state: The cases of Turkey and Pakistan contrasted. *Journal of Third World Studies* [online]. 2013, **30**(1), 39-54 [cit. 2018-02-04]. Available from: <http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=4&sid=49773d35-53a6-4885-9ea5-913bf49698fa%40sessionmgr4006&bdata=Jmxhbmc9Y3Mmc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#AN=88018706&db=asn>

SPYER, Jonathan. Erdogan's Shadow Army. *Jerusalem Post* [online]. 2018, April 13, 2018 [cit. 2018-04-24]. Available from: <https://www.meforum.org/articles/2018/erdogan-s-shadow-army>

State of emergency in Turkey extended for sixth time. *Hurriyet Daily News* [online]. 2018, 2018 [cit. 2018-04-03]. Available from: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/state-of-emergency-in-turkey-extended-for-sixth-time-125972>

TALMADGE, Caitlin. *The dictator's army: battlefield effectiveness in authoritarian regimes*. London: Cornell University Press, 2015. Cornell studies in security affairs. ISBN 9781501700293.

TALMADGE, Caitlin. Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies. *Security Studies* [online]. 2016, **25**(1), 111-141 [cit. 2018-02-11]. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1134192. ISSN 0963-6412. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134192>

TEOMAN, Elizabeth a Jennifer CAFARELLA. Turkey Threatens New Attacks in Syria and Iraq. *Institute for the Study of War*[online]. 2018, March 20, 2018 [cit. 2018-05-01]. Available from: <http://iswresearch.blogspot.cz/2018/03/turkey-threatens-new-attacks-in-syria.html>

The Failed Military Coup in Turkey and The Mass Purges. *Intercultural Dialog Platform* [online]. Brussels: Dialogue Platform, 2016, , 6-48 [cit. 2018-04-13]. Available from: <http://admin.dialogueplatform.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Turkeys-failed-coup-and-the-aftermath.pdf>

TOL, Gönül, Matt MEINZER and Zeynep EKMEKCI. Unpacking Turkey's Failed Coup: Causes and Consequences. *Middle East Institute* [online]. 2016, August 17, 2016 [cit. 2018-04-13]. Available from: http://www.mei.edu/content/article/unpacking-turkey-s-failed-coup-causes-and-consequences#_edn21

TOMBUŞ, H. Ertuğ and Berfu AYGENÇ. (Post-)Kemalist Secularism in Turkey. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* [online]. 2017, **19**(1), 70-85 [cit. 2018-04-13]. DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2016.1201995. ISSN 1944-8953. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19448953.2016.1201995>

TOPAK, Özgün E. The Making of a Totalitarian Surveillance Machine: Surveillance in Turkey Under AKP Rule. *Surveillance and the Global Turn to Authoritarianism* [online]. 2017, **15**(3/4), 1-8 [cit. 2018-02-11]. Available from: <https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/6614>

Turkey - Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a National Referendum on 16 April 2017, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 110th Plenary Session (Venice, 10-11 March 2017) [online]. Strasbourg: European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 2017 [cit. 2018-03-17]. ISBN CDL-AD (2017)005. ISSN Opinion 875/2017. Available from: [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad\(2017\)005-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2017)005-e)

Turkey, Constitutional Referendum, 16 April 2017: Final Report [online]. In: . Warsaw: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2017, s. 1-31 [cit. 2018-03-17]. ISBN 324816. Available from: <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/324816?download=true>

Turkey Purge [online]. 2018 [cit. 2018-04-04]. Available from: <https://turkeypurge.com/>

VAN EVERA, Stephen. *Guide to methods for students of political science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. ISBN 080148457X.

YEŞILTAŞ, Murat, Merve SEREN and Necdet ÖZÇELİK. *Operation Euphrates Shield Implementation and Lessons Learned* [online]. Istanbul: SETA, 2017 [cit. 2018-05-02]. Available from: <https://www.setav.org/en/operation-euphrates-shield-implementation-and-lessons-learned/>

Thesis

Explanation of the Choice

I chose the above-mentioned topic due to my personal fondness for the Middle East. As it stands, Turkey, after the previous years of adequate stability, happens to be heading into a new era of semi-authoritarianism, embodied by President Recep Erdogan. Turkey's army has a special place in the Turkish political system. While the army is in no way part of the three classical branches of democracy, i.e. legislative, executive and judiciary, it still possesses significant influence and leverages within the political system, as the coup d'états of the years 1960 and 1980 indicate.

Many geopolitical experts predicted bright future for Turkey, calling it fit to be part of the next TOP 10, highlighting its successful transformation into a secular state. I consider the year 2016 to be a major milestone in this regard, along with the 2017 referendum. I believe the path for the future can be mirrored in the internal practices of the army. If the whole country is heading into a semi-authoritarian regime, it would be only logical if the army was to lose some of the democratic practices within itself. That could be quite worrying for the democratic West, since Turkey's army is the 2nd largest of the NATO members, and in the top 10 or 15, depending on the criteria, in the world.

Authoritarian regimes have the suppression of opposition and any possible rebellions amongst its top priorities. That transcends into the army as well. The armies (mirroring the system) lack the platform for freedom of opinions and critical thinking, which makes them less effective in military activities. Does this theory apply to the Turkish army under the new forming Erdogan regime as well? I believe this field to be Terra incognita in the present-day research of such topic, which can be only positive for my bachelor's thesis.

Expected Goal

A lot of the inspiration stems from C. Talmadge's critically acclaimed *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes*. The mentioned author works with the notion that authoritarian regimes face major coup threats, hence they tweak the structure of the army to prevent such events. By adoption of such practices, the effectiveness of the army declines significantly against so called conventional threats. I will search for patterns within the Turkish armed forces for such examples. I will also include the threat environment, which will take into account Turkey's previous coup attempts and the strength of its institutions (notably decreased by the referendum of the year 2017)

Turkey under Erdogan should be considered a semi-authoritarian regime, due to the evident aspects resembling one. By the above described logic, I believe the study will provide evidence of the decline of Turkish military effectiveness (stemming from my set criteria) due to significant changes being implemented to the structural organization of the army.

Methodology

The work will be a comparative study focusing on military effectiveness of the Turkish army before, and more notably after, the 2016 coup d'état. I will also take into account the threat environment. I'll try to look into the internal processes of Turkish army. I will look into

promotional patterns; if they were based on merits or on an individual's affiliation to the reigning party. Among other research variables will be command arrangements, and information management within the army. The process will be as follows: I will search for the preset independent variables, which should help determine my main dependent variable, i.e. military effectiveness.

To make it perfectly clear: the main goal of my bachelor's thesis will be the comparison of the two timescales, focusing on military effectiveness in each one. By taking into consideration Talmadge's theory, I predict to observe a decline in the military effectiveness following the 2016 coup.

Due to the relatively up to date nature of such a project, I will rely heavily on the academic literature while trying to set the variables of such an inquiry. I assume there will be a significant reliance on experts of the Turkish army, such as Metin Gurcan. Since I personally do not possess any remote knowledge of the Turkish language, my sources will consist primarily from English written literature and reliable sources. Furthermore, I will try to gain information from Czech experts on Turkey and military attachés in the form of recorded and documented interviews.

Basic Characteristics of the Research

As I have mentioned before, the work will center around comparing the military effectiveness of the Turkish army in the two above mentioned timescales. As of now, I plan on observing a decline in the military effectiveness, but I might be proven wrong.

Due to the relative freshness of such topic, I expect to conduct a lot of my research by questioning relevant experts in my inquiry.

Expected Structure of the Research

The first part of the thesis will focus primarily on present knowledge of military effectiveness. I plan to use academic literature from specialists in international affairs such as S. Biddle, C. Talmadge and others to formulate independent variables and conceptualize the whole subject. Furthermore, there will be an explanation to why present Turkey under Erdogan can be classified as semi-authoritarian. A brief mention of the past coups will be included.

The second part will map processes such as promotional patterns, training regimens, information sharing etc. in the Turkish armed forces before the year 2016. There will be investigation into the commanding structures of the army, specifically data sharing and the chain of command. I will try to unravel if the army changed its functioning after the coup in any way.

My last part will summarize the changes that occurred within the two searched timescales. Did the military effectiveness increase, decrease, or did it remain the same? That will depend on the fact if there will be any major/minor differences between the variables in the compared timescales. At this stage I cannot write off the possibility of my work being predicative in the final part.

Principal Literature

ALTINORDU, Ateş. A Midsummer Night's Coup: Performance and Power in Turkey's July 15 Coup Attempt. *Qualitative Sociology*[online]. 2017, **40**(2), 139-164 [cit. 2018-04-13]. DOI: 10.1007/s11133-017-9354-y. ISSN 0162-0436. Available from: <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11133-017-9354-y>

BIDDLE, Stephen D. *Military power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. 2004. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c2004. ISBN 0691116458.

CAFARELLA, Jennifer, Elizabeth SERCOMBE and Charles VALLEE. Partial Assessment of Turkey's Post-Coup Attempt Military Purge. In: *Institute for Study of War* [online]. July 30, 2016 [cit. 2018-04-13]. Available from: <http://iswresearch.blogspot.cz/2016/07/partial-assessment-of-turkeys-post-coup.html>

ESEN, Berk and Sebnem GUMUSCU. Turkey: How the Coup Failed. *Journal of Democracy* [online]. 2017, **28**(1), 59-73 [cit. 2018-03-31]. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0006> Available from: <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/645538>

LEVITSKY, Steven and Lucan WAY. *Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Problems of international politics. ISBN 978-0-521-70915-6.

SATANA, Nil S. Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy. *Armed Forces & Society* [online]. 2008, **34**(3), 357-388 [cit. 2018-03-31]. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X07302679. ISSN 0095-327X. Available from: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0095327X07302679>

TALMADGE, Caitlin. *The dictator's army: battlefield effectiveness in authoritarian regimes*. London: Cornell University Press, 2015. Cornell studies in security affairs. ISBN 9781501700293.

TALMADGE, Caitlin. Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies. *Security Studies* [online]. 2016, **25**(1), 111-141 [cit. 2018-02-11]. DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1134192. ISSN 0963-6412. Available from: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134192>

VAN EVERA, Stephen. *Guide to methods for students of political science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. ISBN 080148457X.

List of Appendices

Appendix no.1: Restructuralization of the TAF (table 1).

Interviews conducted with the experts, provided on a CD in .mp3 files.

MP3 files in alphabetical order:

Appendix no. 2: F.Štěpánek 2018.mp3

Appendix no. 3: P.Kovanda 2018.mp3

Appendix no. 4: R.Stojar 2018.mp3

Appendix no. 5: R.Pilc 2018, Interview no.1.mp3

Appendix no. 6: R. Pilc 2018, Interview no.2.mp3

Appendix no. 7: Basic Schematic of the Questions Prepared for the Interviews (.pdf file)