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U.S. Policy and the Gulf War

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Čestné prohlášení: stvrzuji, že práci jsem zpracoval samostatně s použitím uvedených pramenů a literatury.

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## **Introduction**

The end of the Cold War brought hope of a New World Order. Democracy, justice and equal opportunities prevailed over evil and a new chapter of the History of Humanity was to be written. Before the fruits of victory could even be relished a new form of menace threatened international stability, Iraq's brutal dictator Saddam Hussein launched an unprovoked attack at his tiny neighbor Kuwait, thus coming to control a quarter of the World's oil reserves. While Europe was busy uniting, the U.S.S.R. disintegrating, China licking its wounds after Tiananmen, the U.S. President George H. W. Bush was in the middle of a budget crisis that could have made the U.S. military obsolete. To the hawkish conservatives who formed the core of the Bush administration the Iraqi aggression was a golden opportunity to give America a victory it was craving for since the Vietnam War. However military action wasn't seen by everyone as the only option, a wide specter of politicians in the U.S. and the World were opposed to the use of force and preferred to solve the Gulf crisis in a diplomatic fashion.

This thesis will examine who took which stance and where it led. The main goal of this paper is also to describe to which extent U.S. policy during the Gulf War was fair and balanced, the thesis being: were the Gulf War and its consequences an inevitable epilogue in the long chapter of Saddam Hussein's ruthless regime or a mere excuse by hawks in the US trying to sway international politics' course towards a New World Order in a more conservative way?

In order to try and answer this question many books, essays, memoirs and papers have been published. The most direct sources in which answers can be found are probably George H. W. Bush's *A World transformed* and James Baker's *Politics of Diplomacy*. These memoirs give a detailed perspective of decision-making during the crisis and are invaluable to understand U.S. policy during the Gulf War. However both publications were made public years after the events and tend to defend the politicians' steps instead of critically reevaluating specific decisions and moves. On the antipode of these opinions is *The Gulf War, Overreaction and excessiveness* by El-Najjar Hassan, a professor at Dalton State College of Georgia. According to this author, the Gulf War shouldn't have taken place at all; it was provoked by some elements in the Bush administration that sought the total destruction of Iraq, regardless of Kuwait's invasion. However these 3 books were written by biased authors and need critical assessments in order not to make erroneous conclusions. At no point in their publications do George Bush and James Baker admit having made the wrong decision. They firmly stand by it, arguing for a military intervention, without taking into account or even expressing numerous reasons not to attack. Hassan El Najjar on the other hand, strongly criticizes the administration's decision making. Being an American of Palestinian decent, this academic views negatively U.S. hegemony in the Middle East regardless of it being direct, indirect, legitimate or illegitimate.

The article "*Notre ami Saddam*" published in the monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique* manages to briefly describe events in Iraq from the beginning of the 1980 War with Iran to the 2003 invasion by the U.S. with the recess required. This recess is essential to

understanding the Gulf War, being the outcome of a crisis, which finds its roots deeper than in the August invasion.

Although the British colonial era left its mark in the history of the Middle East, this paper will only go back to the Iran – Iraq War, after which a policy shift by the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, can be analyzed.

*“Iraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in Baghdad”* by Gregory Gause, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont, balances the points of view of both mainstream and revisionist historians. Here the invasion of the small Emirate is put back in perspective: Kuwait was considered by Saddam Hussein to be Iraq’s 19<sup>th</sup> province and a geo-strategic focal point. First of all Kuwait itself holds 10% of the world’s proven oil reserves, secondly Iraq with it’s 15% doesn’t have a quality gateway to export the oil. Kuwait and its two islands Warbah and Bubiyan are this gateway. Already during the 19th century the British were aware of Kuwait’s geo-strategic importance, regardless of the oil it had. Until 1899 it had been part of the Basra *vilayet* (along with Baghdad and Mosul, these former Ottoman provinces became Iraq in 1932), however in order to guarantee the route to India, Kuwait was created as a British protectorate, independent from the rest of Basra. Since the first oil crisis in 1973, Kuwait has become a major contributor to US economy. Until 1980, \$55 billion were invested abroad from oil surplus only. However, all Middle Eastern finances in Europe and North America weren’t an investment per se; between 1985 and 1995 \$186 billion were spent on weapons<sup>1</sup>. This volatile region is and has long been a gold mine for arms dealers from

around the World. During the Iran Iraq War, Baghdad became dependent not only on Gulf finances but more important, on Western political and military support.

## **I. U.S. Policy prior to the Invasion**

### **1.1 Iran – Iraq War**

The second half of the 1970s was marked by positive relationship between Iraq and Iran. This was made possible thanks to the 1975 Algiers Accord which put an end to Iranian support of a Kurdish autonomy uprising in Iraq, in return, Saddam Hussein, then Iraqi Vice-President, agreed to a new delimitation of boundaries between the two countries (the line would be drawn at the *thalweg*, meaning in the middle of the maritime boundary of the Shatt Al Arab) <sup>2</sup>. However millennium old antagonism between Babylon and Persia took over again with the 1979 revolution in Teheran and the ousting of the pro-Western Shah. The new leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini was still bitter because of his past experience with the Iraqis. In 1964 he sought refuge in Iraq because of his opposition to the Shah, but the 1975 Algiers Accord prevented Baghdad from supporting revolutionary movements against the regime of Teheran therefore Khomeini had to leave Iraq. He fled to France where he led the revolution until his triumphant (and bloody) return to Iran as the new leader <sup>3</sup>. The spiritual leader of the Iraqi opposition Al-Da'wa, Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, sent to Teheran a telegram congratulating Khomeini and expressing support to the new regime. He also stated that “other tyrants still remain, for whom judgment day hasn't arrived yet” explicitly aiming at Saddam Hussein.

The level of tension between the two countries was all the more heightened by the unsolved Gulf islands and Khuzestan – Arabistan region issues which hadn't been solved as agreed upon in 1975 <sup>4</sup>. Between October and November 1979 the Iraqi consulate in Khorramshahr was attacked four times. In retaliation, Saddam Hussein had the Iranian consulates in Basra and Karbala closed <sup>5</sup>. On March 31<sup>st</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini delivered a speech in which he stated, “That Iranians had to do whatever they could to export the revolution to other parts of the World” and a week later he called upon Iraqis to overthrow their regime. The most evident violation of the 1975 Algiers Accord by Iran was the support of the Iraqi opposition organization Al-Da'wa that on April 1<sup>st</sup> attempted to assassinate Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. Between the Revolution in February, and July of 1979 Iran had “conducted 244 land, air, and naval violations and attacks against Iraq” after which, war became inevitable <sup>6</sup>.

Saddam Hussein was the first to make a real move, whether it was provoked or not is not an issue, the matter of the fact remains that he perceived the 1975 Algiers Accord as blackmail from the part of the Iranians: delimitate new boundaries giving Iran more seashore and islands, in return it would stop supporting Kurdish rebellion in eastern and northern Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraqi President thought Iran weak after the revolution had dismembered its army and political structures. By waging a victorious war against his neighbor he would not only put an end to the Shiite opposition at home but would boost his prestige around the Arab world. Under Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, no military advisor would dare remind his President of basic facts that make his plans seem unrealistic. First of all Iran was four times more populated than Iraq, secondly the two

countries shared a 1300km border and finally the capital Teheran was 650km from the Iraqi border. In such circumstances, it was obvious that the battle wasn't won in advance for the Iraqis <sup>7</sup>. The Iran - Iraq War can be divided into five main periods: the Iraqi offensive, the Iranian human wave response, the tankers war, the Karbala offensive and in between all these phases, a perpetual stalemate.

Until March of 1981 the Iraqi army went from victory to victory, seldom facing stiff opposition, it soon occupied the city of Khorramshahr and most of the southwestern province of Khuzestan - Arabistan. Iran was on the defensive and had to mobilize its population. Poorly armed and trained, the Iranians had to be at least motivated. The conflict was to become a crusade to liberate the mother country from the "Satan of Baghdad" <sup>8</sup>. Iran adopted a human wave tactic making Iraqi material superiority futile. Soon the Iranians were on the offensive. By July of 1982 they had reached the outskirts of the southern Iraqi city Basra. By then, many countries in the West and in the Gulf started worrying about a possible Iranian victory, which would have had unthinkable consequences. U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent Donald Rumsfeld as special envoy to Iraq. His mission was to renew cooperation in order to help Saddam Hussein stand ground against the Iranian advance. Kuwait also started supporting Iraq by allowing it to export its oil through Kuwaiti pipelines and tankers, in retaliation Iran started engaging in the tankers war. The two belligerents attempted to cripple the other country's economy by preventing it from exporting oil. Thus a tactic of sinking oil tankers was adopted, however very fast Iraqi and Kuwaiti tankers started flying under U.S. and Soviet flags and traveled with military escort <sup>9</sup>. The Soviet Union also renewed its weapons sale to

Iraq calculating that it would be easier to deal with Iraq owing it for the weapons than with a victorious fundamentalist Iran. In the summer of 1983 France delivered Iraq its high-tech Exocet missiles and Super Etandard fighter planes <sup>10</sup>.

The United States officially renewed diplomatic contact with Iraq on October 27<sup>th</sup> 1984, even though they had already been cooperating before. American firms delivered Iraq many chemical materials that would be used as weapons, amongst others, to counter the Iranian advance in the southern Iraqi Faw (Fao) peninsula. After the chemical attacks, the Iranian political leaders accepted a cease-fire in July of 1988 <sup>11</sup>.

The war cost Iraq 150,000 lives and \$450 billion in damaged infrastructure; it owed \$85 billion to numerous countries. Iran lost 300,000 lives and suffered \$640 billion in damage. Ending in a status quo ante bellum, this war was one with “neither victor nor vanquished” which in retrospective was in the interest of everyone, except the two countries at war <sup>12</sup>.

## **1.2 Western policy shift**

Western Europe, the U.S. and the Gulf states saw Iraq as a wall protecting them from Iran’s fundamentalism. It is not until the end of the war in 1988 that they realized the potential threat that Baghdad represented. The president of Iraq Saddam Hussein went as far as developing his own weapons building system. At that point it became obvious that a change of policy was necessary. In March of 1990 Mossad agents murdered the Canadian engineer Gerald Bull who was building the “Babylon Super Gun” for Iraq <sup>13</sup>. This device was supposed to enable the Iraqi Army to put in orbit its own satellites, or

even worse, launch medium and long-range missiles. In March 1989 the canon successfully fired a 500kg explosive charge on a target 1000km away <sup>14</sup>. After the death of the super canon's designer, many countries including the United Kingdom and Turkey intercepted shipments destined to Iraq, the cargoes contained parts that would have been used to finish the "super gun". Also in the United Kingdom on March 1989, Iraqi prominent arms dealer Ali Dagher was arrested; delivering Iraqi weapons import a serious blow.

This was seen by Saddam Hussein as part of an international effort to undermine Iraq's reconstruction after the war. In fact, Western analysts and policy makers decided to take action before it was too late, just like Israel did in 1981 when it bombarded the French-built nuclear installation Osirak south of Baghdad (Operation Opera) <sup>15</sup>. Only this time, Iraq did actually have the missiles it needed to transport nuclear warheads. After years of research and engineering, the Soviet made Scud missiles were transformed into medium range ballistic missiles. Two versions were completed, in 1987 the "Al-Hussein" which could fly 600km and in 1989 the "Al-Abed" which went as far as 2000km <sup>16</sup>. On December 9<sup>th</sup> 1989 US officials told reporters that Iraq's missile program had become a "subject of major concern" to the Bush administration <sup>17</sup>.

To prevent Iraq from becoming a nuclear power, the West decided to exert a weapons embargo on Iraq. Saddam Hussein however grew even more defiant, appearing on television with two cryotrons in his hands <sup>18</sup>, an original one made in the US and an Iraqi version. He tried to demonstrate that Iraq had become self sufficient in weapons development and didn't need the West anymore. However theatrical, this scene did make

Western politicians uneasy, and weapons manufacturers angry. During the 1989 Baghdad Arms Fair, Iraq proudly displayed the replicas it was developing from weapons it had obtained during the Iran – Iraq War. The French Chief-of-staff, General Maurice Schmidt, later publicly expressed his discontent, warning that France “had better begin paying closer attention to what the Iraqis were developing in the way of armament”<sup>19</sup>.

The Iraqi president was aware of the risk he was taking but felt he had no choice, he was seeing history repeating itself and knew he had to take action; actually even Iraqi intelligence was sending signals of an imminent attack. The question remained, where from? Saddam Hussein’s position was at risk as much from home as from abroad. The 8 year long war with Iran had only bought him time, his position certainly wasn’t stronger and Saddam Hussein knew that. His paranoia of losing grip on power made him see danger and enemies everywhere, from the U.S., Israel, his Gulf neighbors and most importantly, from his own entourage<sup>20</sup>. The Iraqi President regarded these parties’ steps as an orchestrated conspiracy against him and his country. However illogical this theory may appear, the naked facts do seem as if the tide had turned against Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. for one had changed its attitude vis-à-vis the Iraqi president. In its 1988 report, the WINEP had warned the Bush administration of the danger an armed Iraq represented<sup>21</sup>. Drafted by Dennis Ross and Richard Haass, the policy paper forecast aggressive Iraqi hegemony in the region, Kuwait being the first step, followed by Saudi Arabia and then Israel. Dennis Ross went as far as changing the Secretary of State’s policy towards Iraq. Along with Bob Kimmit, he convinced James Baker to change from the carrot to the stick. This change of policy was sent on to the U.S. ambassador to Iraq,

April Glaspie. Along with the other steps taken in the course of 1990 (limitation of grain sale and weapons sale, critics of Iraqi human rights activities, joint U.S. – U.A.E. military exercise in the Gulf, etc.) these have probably convinced Saddam Hussein that the U.S. was shifting from ally to foe<sup>22</sup>.

Although given actions do lead to this conclusion, in 1990 the shift wasn't followed by any warnings to Iraq itself. In the 1990 N.S.C. Report, there was no mention of Iraq or even Kuwait, be it as a strategic ally or potential threat. On July 23<sup>rd</sup>, State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler mentioned that the U.S. “had no defense treaty with Kuwait; no special defense or security commitment to Kuwait”<sup>23</sup>. This message was repeated one week later by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs John Kelly, who also stated that the U.S. was indifferent to the Iraq – Kuwait border dispute<sup>24</sup>. An assertion emphasized again on July 25th by Ambassador April Glaspie during her meeting with Saddam Hussein. She went as far as saying that “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America”, the Ambassador did however mention that border, and other, issues should be resolved peacefully<sup>25</sup>.

Ambassador Glaspie has since been harshly criticized for not being tough on Saddam Hussein during their meeting. The Iraqi President is said to have taken it as a “green light” to invade Kuwait. Actually April Glaspie only followed instructions from the State Department and spoke in common diplomatic language. It is the U.S. policy as a whole that should have been criticized for sending the Iraqi President contradictory signs.

### **1.3 Kuwait and Iraq prior to the invasion**

Mixed signals were being sent from Washington at a time when Saddam Hussein was openly complaining about Kuwait's "economic war" against Iraq. During the Iran - Iraq War, Baghdad's military effort was financed, as mentioned above, mainly by neighboring Gulf States. In 8 years, Iraq ended up owing a total of \$85 billion to its former allies, \$12 billion of which it owed to Kuwait <sup>26</sup>. While King Fahd of Saudi Arabia wrote off most of the Iraqi debt in recognition of the protection it offered in the face of Iran, Kuwait on the contrary began pushing for reimbursement. A task impossible to complete for Iraq, which was one step from bankruptcy after a long and devastating war. An objective all the more difficult to achieve with Kuwait violating OPEC quotas that caused oil prices to plummet. The Iraqi president calculated that the drop in price cost Iraq \$14 billion, finances the country badly required <sup>27</sup>. As if this was not enough, Saddam Hussein began accusing Kuwait of "slant drilling" Iraqi oil in the bordering Rumaila area.

Some steps had been taken to deescalate the situation with Iraqi, Kuwaiti and numerous third party mediators (Yasser Arafat, Hosni Mubarak, Saudi King Fahd, Jordanian King Hussein, etc.) trying to find a compromise. Talks were held on July 31<sup>st</sup> in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in order to resolve the border, oil and loan issues <sup>28</sup>. These talks lead nowhere.

The Iraqi demand of erasing debts, accumulated during the Iran - Iraq War, was used in return by Kuwaitis demanding Iraqi recognition of definite borders.

No compromise was possible in such a climate, especially given the tone with which the Kuwaiti emissary negotiated. He ended the talks by provoking the Iraqis to “ride their highest horses” in other words, defying them in combat <sup>29</sup>. This stance from the Kuwaitis was unusually provocative given the circumstances, after all Iraq had protected them from Iran’s fundamentalism, was 20 times larger with 10 times more inhabitants and had a 1 million man strong army with years of combat experience.

When all talks, warnings and threats had failed, Saddam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait. As the former French ambassador to Iraq described it, “for Saddam Hussein, it had become a question of life or death. As his threats had taken the situation nowhere, he sent his troops to the Kuwaiti border.” <sup>30</sup> The invasion took place during the night of August 1<sup>st</sup> 1990 and was completed in a matter of hours. The Kuwaiti emir fled to Saudi Arabia where he formed the government-in-exile.

## **II. After the invasion**

The reaction of the United States to the invasion was immediate. President George H. Bush issued an Executive Order to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the U.S., Westminster did the same in the United Kingdom and eventually U.N. Resolution 660 included freezing all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets <sup>31</sup>. President Bush also ordered troops to move in the Gulf region and adopted a two track - strategy: to sanction Iraq and give ultimatums while moving in forces. US Military Command put down a list of targets to be destroyed in case of a military action against Iraq.

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger reminded the Policy Paper which foresaw the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and stressed that Saddam Hussein’s next steps

would be Saudi Arabia and Israel. He insisted on the use of force as the only means of countering the predicted Iraqi hegemony. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell raised the question whether there was an alternative to the use of force, Lawrence Eagleburger reiterated that Saddam Hussein would not comply and evoked chapter 7 of the UN Charter <sup>32</sup>. Since the creation of the organization in 1945, the U.S. resorted to this chapter only once in the past, during the Korean War in 1950.

At that point James Baker was also hesitating to bury a peaceful solution, his stance changed for good on November 29<sup>th</sup> after the U.N. vote, hereupon he believed his role was “to help wage war and win it” <sup>33</sup>.

President Bush also wasn't convinced from the beginning of the necessity to solve the crisis with force. On the first day of the invasion he answered he “was not contemplating intervention” <sup>34</sup> to journalists asking whether the U.S. was seeking military action against Iraq. Although he later explained that he didn't wish to inform the public of an issue that sensitive during an interview, the fact remains that at that point he “had no idea what (his) options were” <sup>35</sup>.

On August 2nd he met British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who lectured him of her military, and political, success in the Falklands crisis. He was told not to hesitate or get “wobbly” under whatever pressure he was. Later on the Iron Lady continued pressuring George H. Bush to take action soon, reminding of the upcoming Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which was to be followed by the Hajj and coarse heat. This left, according to the prime minister, little time to react <sup>36</sup>.

President Bush and his advisors quickly sought a U.N. resolution to condemn the Iraqi aggression. This resolution was supposed to have two sine qua non points: first, Iraq was to withdraw unconditionally and second, any means necessary were to be used to get Iraq out of Kuwait in case it didn't comply<sup>37</sup>. These steps were following a plan sketched by Richard Haass. According to this plan, the US should put together a broad coalition that would liberate Kuwait and punish Iraq under the authority of a U.N. resolution. This plan however, also stressed that the formation of a coalition and even a U.N. resolution were not mandatory. If necessary, the US would have to act solo<sup>38</sup>. It remains a question to which extent President Bush would have followed this plan, had the U.N., or even the coalition members, been reluctant to back the U.S. Either way, the matter of the fact remains that both conditions were met, in great part thanks to the Secretary of State James Baker's *politics of diplomacy*.

## **2.1 Bakerian Politics of Diplomacy**

The Secretary of State's first step was to acquire the necessary funds to wage the upcoming war. He visited Saudi King Fahd and Kuwaiti Emir Sabah from whom he got guarantees they would pay all war-related expenses, including weapons, oil, water and food supplies amounting to \$100 billion. These visits were called the "tin cup" tour.

Next, James Baker insured the political and military backing of Arab countries. Amongst them was Egypt, lead by President Hosni Mubarak, a U.S. ally and personal friend.

The Secretary of State required President Mubarak to "take a firm stance", thus Egypt ended up supporting the U.S. even in its military operations against Iraq, a fellow Arab country. In return, Egypt's \$7 billion debt towards the U.S. was forgiven<sup>39</sup>.

Syria became part of the coalition against its neighboring fellow Ba'ath regime country, for which it obtained \$3 billion from the Gulf countries and the U.S. deleted it from the State Sponsored Terror List<sup>40</sup>. Turkey enabled the coalition to make use of its strategic air bases, by being part of the coalition it obtained \$1.6 billion from the Gulf States, got the \$1.5 billion loan it had been seeking from the World Bank and was also promised US and British support for its bid to enter the E.E.C.<sup>41</sup>

This same procedure was repeated amongst members of the UN Security Council to pass resolution 678, the most severe resolution adopted since the beginning of the crisis, it called upon Iraq to withdraw by January 15<sup>th</sup> 1991, or else “all means necessary” would be employed to liberate Kuwait<sup>42</sup>. Permanent member China badly needed recognition from the U.S. after the Tiananmen massacre. James Baker got Chinese abstention in return of a U.S. delegation visit to Beijing. Malaysia first expressed its disagreement with the U.S. double standard policy towards Iraq and Israel. While the latter had been occupying Arab territory since 1967 violating U.N. Security Council resolutions 446 and 497, Iraq was being threatened for the very same sin. James Baker dismissed the Malaysian Foreign minister Abu Hassan Omar's remarks as unfounded and threatened that “future relations with the United States would be affected” after which the latter sat dead silent. The only two members of the U.N. Security Council, which did not bow to U.S. pressure, were Cuba and Yemen. Although the Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca Peoli was threatened his country risked “being isolated” if it vetoed the resolution, his vote remained negative. The Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh

took the same decision and voted negatively, this act cost Yemen its annual \$70 million humanitarian aid from the U.S. <sup>43</sup>

Just like it did on the diplomatic front, the Bush administration waged war against Saddam Hussein at home, on the media front. President George H. Bush started a tour of American states to gain the backing of Senators and citizens. During the rallies he often compared Saddam Hussein to Adolph Hitler, reminding of the Fuhrer's invasions that never stopped. Obviously this time, the U.S. President was not going to adopt a policy of appeasement. That is why the Geneva Meeting of November 29<sup>th</sup> can certainly not be compared to the Munich Conference of September 29<sup>th</sup> 1938. The Geneva Meeting lasted 6 hours and involved U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, during which the U.S. envoy conveyed the "four no's" to his Iraqi counterpart. President Bush expressed there would be "no negotiations, no compromise, no attempts at face-saving, and no rewards for aggression" in a letter designated to the Iraqi President. Tariq Aziz refused to hand over such a letter to his President citing that it contained nothing but "threats" <sup>44</sup>.

Intended to be a peace conference, the Geneva Summit ended up being a fruitless meeting where the only shared information were the rules of engagement. In hindsight, it also seems as if it was intended to show U.S. politicians who were opposed to war, that everything had been done to prevent it and that the Iraqi President was the sole responsible for the failure of diplomatic negotiations.

“Cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy.”<sup>45</sup> This tactic, which is more political than diplomatic, can have only two consequences. First, the U.N. resolutions and the coalition will not reflect collective will of countries from around the World. Secondly, the U.N. which was the basis of the resolutions will be tarnished and lose credibility. In order to gain shortsighted support, the Bush administration sacrificed this organization that was supposed to platform international diplomacy in the New World Order.

## **2.2 1990 Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearings**

The entire U.S. political spectrum was not determined to go to war. James Carter was the father of the Rapid Deployment Forces, which had the sole mission of swiftly responding to any kind of threats to American interests, mainly in the Middle East. This was part of the Carter Doctrine, aimed at countering Soviet influence which was rising in this oil rich strategic region. However, in 1990, the former U.S. President and Nobel Peace prize laureate, wrote a letter to the U.N. Security Council urging it not to pass a resolution that would authorize the use of force. According to him, such action would lead to vast loss of human lives, serious economic consequences and permanent destabilization of the Middle East<sup>46</sup>. Very similar arguments were repeated during the 1990 Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearings.

Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia summoned these hearings on September 11<sup>th</sup>, November 27<sup>th</sup> and December 3<sup>rd</sup> 1990. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was the first to speak stating the economic aspect of the invasion. He reminded that it was the United State’s duty to protect its interests abroad, which in this case included oil. In fact the invasion

had caused the “third energy crisis” with oil prices soaring up to \$40.42 per barrel. As the Secretary of Defense described it, this shock was damaging the global, and U.S., economy <sup>47</sup>. The hearing itself was opened by Dr. James Schlesinger who urged for patience, explaining in detail that sanctions took time to work; in Iraq’s case a period of 6 months would be necessary. He was followed by General Norman Schwarzkopf who shared the same message, reminding there was absolutely nothing glorious about war. Senator Kennedy took stance confirming Dr. Schlesinger’s arguments; in his analysis Iraq was losing \$1.5 billion each month because of the sanctions. Thus Iraq’s economy was recessing at a rate of 5% per month, which evidently left little time before the effects of the sanctions would be felt. Admiral Crowe also mentioned the necessity to give the sanctions time to work. In his opinion, any U.S. intervention in the Middle East would have a destabilizing effect, arousing great anti-American feelings and creating irreparable damage in the region. Military strategist James Webb criticized the possibility of a “premature, unprovoked ground offensive” which should be instead replaced by a mutual withdrawal by U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia and Iraqi troops from Kuwait. According to James Webb, this would have been the face-saving exit Iraq was seeking, and would be in accordance with U.S. interests.

Edward Luttwak from the Center of Strategic and International Studies also advised reducing the number of troops in the region, not increasing them. In his testimony he also predicted that an air campaign would be followed by a ground attack totally annihilating Iraq’s military machine. His prediction proved true. Middle East expert Christine Helms repeated the argument described by Admiral Crowe that a U.S. intervention would

certainly be a victory from a military point of view (in the short term at least) but would destabilize the Middle East in the medium and long term with “economic, political and military problems [...] extending far beyond Iraq and Kuwait”. In her opinion, the sanctions in place were the solution to avoiding these future problems. This point of view was, once again, repeated by Dr. Phoebe Marr who warned that a war against Iraq would turn much of its population, and the Arab world, against the U.S. Dr. Marr mentioned this fact in various points. First of all she reminded an argument cited above concerning what is perceived in the Arab world as the double standard U.S. policy towards Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and Israel’s occupation of Palestine, south Lebanon and part of Syria. Secondly she explained the lack of reaction by Arab countries in the beginning of the crisis, being seen as the outcome of a sorrow disparity between large poor countries and small Gulf monarchies, viewed as wealthy beyond imagination. Finally, U.S. occupation of Middle Eastern land would be used as a pretext by nationalists and fundamentalists in their quest against democratic and liberal regimes.

A compromise was proposed by Lt. General Williams, who suggested keeping the forces already in place to exert pressure, but not to intervene in order to give sanctions the time needed for them to work <sup>48</sup>.

Arguments given for an intervention were suggested by Senator Al Gore, Dr. Henry Kissinger and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. According to Al Gore, the embargo may take too long to work, making it possible for an even more dangerous situation to unfold. The former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized the need to reduce “Iraq’s offensive capability, which now overshadows its neighbor’s

capabilities” and also mentioned the need to keep the embargo and sanctions against Iraq in place, but after a military intervention. Richard Perle expressed his opposition to sanctions stating that they would not eradicate the Iraqi threat <sup>49</sup>. These arguments seem to omit the very reason of the Committee Hearings: the invasion of Kuwait.

On December 3<sup>rd</sup> the Committee Hearings were concluded with statements by Richard Cheney and Colin Powell. The Secretary of Defense warned of the danger of waiting too long, according to him it was “far better for us to deal with Saddam now, while the coalition is intact, while we have the United Nations behind us [...] than it will be for us to deal with him 5 or 10 years from now”. On the other hand, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell reiterated that “the mission was not to punish or retaliate” at Iraq and summoned both parties’ points of view: sanctions do need time to work and the military will be ready in 4, 10 or 18 months just as it is today, however sanctions will have worked only once Saddam Hussein will have withdrawn from Kuwait <sup>50</sup>.

### **2.3 Iraqi withdrawal proposals**

Less than a week after invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein proposed a withdrawal plan. His demand was the same as prior to the invasion: better access to the Gulf waters and renegotiation of oil prices which would be, according to him, acceptable. As this proposal did not meet the UN resolution’s “unconditional” term, it was rejected <sup>51</sup>. One day later, on August 12<sup>th</sup> another withdrawal proposal was rejected, this time because the Iraqi president linked two problems: the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. A month later, on September 9<sup>th</sup>, the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev mediated a third withdrawal proposal: Iraq was to release all the hostages it

was holding and completely withdraw from Kuwait, in return Saddam Hussein asked a peace conference on the Middle East. Once again it was rejected because of the linkage with the Israeli conflict (which would have been addressed during the conference).

Even when UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar visited George H. Bush in Camp David on January 5<sup>th</sup> he was denied the possibility to mediate a peaceful solution. This time President Bush openly admitted he did not want to give “Saddam hope that he could find another way out”<sup>52</sup>. Three days before the Air Campaign phase of operation Desert Storm began, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas tried one last initiative to avoid war. He offered to organize a peace conference on the Middle East in return Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait. As most previous peace initiatives, President Bush refused it because of the linkage with the Israeli conflict.

After the Coalition bombardment began the Iraqi president continued proposing to withdraw. The first attempt was mediated by the Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksander Bessmertnykh on January 26<sup>th</sup> 1991 during his meeting with his U.S. counterpart James Baker. The Secretary of State refused to accept the terms because they would have allowed Saddam Hussein to “withdraw his military intact”<sup>53</sup> which seemed to have eventually become contrary to U.S. interests. The next initiative was taken by Yevgeny Primakov, member of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Presidential Council and Soviet Special Envoy to Iraq. During his visit to Baghdad he met Saddam Hussein and convinced the Iraqi President to withdraw unconditionally, for practical and logistical reasons it could be done only in a fixed period of time, not overnight. In exchange, he promised a cease-fire. George H. Bush’s answer was his famous statement “No way, Jose” a statement

which very well describes the U.S. President's attitude towards his Iraqi counterpart <sup>54</sup>. According to James Baker, the U.S. President had to reject this offer for three reasons, first of all they couldn't let Saddam Hussein gain any political credit from the crisis, secondly James Baker suspected the Soviet administration of exaggerating the Iraqi President's offer and most important the Soviets hadn't consulted the U.S., "not even in private" <sup>55</sup>. President Bush rejected a third proposal suggested by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz during his visit to Moscow on February 18<sup>th</sup>. Although the U.S. Secretary of State admitted that Saddam Hussein "was beginning to behave as though he genuinely feared a ground attack" and that "Gorbachev's plan contained some new elements" it still "fell well short" of what President George H. Bush saw as an acceptable solution <sup>56</sup>.

On February 22<sup>nd</sup>, two days before the ground offensive, Saddam Hussein finally agreed to an unconditional retreat and abandoned the linkage with the Israeli conflict. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev called President Bush and explained the plan in detail. Although it met all points the two Heads of State had agreed upon before, including withdrawing in accordance with U.N. resolution 660, George H. Bush rejected the plan at which point his Soviet counterpart asked "what is our priority?" a question full of irritation, resulting from permanent U.S. refusal no matter what the conditions were <sup>57</sup>. For George H. Bush, it all came to a point where he didn't trust President Saddam Hussein anymore and wanted to punish him for his scorched-earth tactic in Kuwait. Again, this is far from the initial withdraw from Kuwait rhetoric. According to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz "Iraq was designed by George Bush for destruction, with or

without Kuwait, inside or outside Kuwait, before the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August or after the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August”<sup>58</sup> in the same spirit as Cato the Elder’s *Carthago delenda est*.

## **2.4 Operations Desert Storm and Desert Saber**

After Operation Desert Shield successfully protected Saudi Arabia, came Operation Desert Storm. This first part of the attack against Iraq was conducted from the air. The bombarding campaign started on the night of January 17<sup>th</sup> 1991 and lasted until February 24<sup>th</sup> when the second phase began. During the Air Campaign, a total of 100.000 sorties were conducted, approximately 84% of which by the USAF, in second position came Saudi Arabia with 6%. Contrary to popular belief, most bombs used were not the “smart” ones the Allied Commanders were praising on CNN, actually only 7% of all bombs were the hi-tech and precise smart bombs. A total of 88.500 tons of bombs were fired at Iraq and Kuwait<sup>59</sup>. On January 18<sup>th</sup> Iraq fired Scud missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel in a desperate attempt to drag the Jewish State in the war, which would have probably fractured the Coalition. Even though “a total of 74 people died as a consequence of Scud attacks. Two died in direct hits, four from suffocation in gas masks and the rest from heart attacks”<sup>60</sup> the Israeli Defense Force did not respond to Iraq’s provocation, thus maintaining the Coalition bound to destroy the Iraqi Army. This was Saddam Hussein’s second blowback. First he grossly violated the Geneva Convention by holding Western diplomats as hostages and human shields. It seems he wanted to use them as bargaining chips to raise his gains from the crisis; however the exact opposite happened as he lost all credibility, even in the eyes of his former allies.

The hostages were eventually released by December but the harm had been done as Iraq was perceived as a rogue state using terrorist methods.

Operation Desert Saber began on February 24<sup>th</sup> with an extensive ground offensive coming from the Saudi territory. Iraqi troops were outflanked by Coalition forces and stuck between attacks from the south and west border, in a maneuver called “the left hook”, their only exit was to flee north back into Iraq. During their meeting in Geneva, James Baker guaranteed Tariq Aziz that “Americans don’t shoot their adversaries in the back” <sup>61</sup> , however, this second phase of the operations caused 200.000 Iraqi casualties, many of which were killed while retreating on highway 9 leading from Kuwait City to Basra. This route was nicknamed the “Highway of Death” by journalists as they uncovered the damage done. Even Airmen nicknamed the operation a “Turkey shoot” as it was so easy for them to track down and eliminate Iraqi soldiers <sup>62</sup>.

A cease-fire was declared on March 2<sup>nd</sup> in compliance with U.N. resolution 686. The same day a major uprising erupted in the southern and northern parts of Iraq. Encouraged by the U.S., these uprisings were conducted by Kurds and Shiites who strongly opposed Saddam Hussein’s regime. By March 24<sup>th</sup> Kurdish Peshmerga fighters controlled almost all of Iraqi Kurdistan including the cities of Arbil and oil rich Kirkuk <sup>63</sup> In the south, the Shiite’s thirst for revenge after decades of Sunni ruthless repression exploded in the massacre of Ba’athist officials and their families in Basra, Nadjaf and Karbala. Baghdad’s reprisal was staunch. Republican Guard units quickly reacted to the events even though they had just been crushed by the Coalition. Iraqi Army helicopters bombarded Kirkuk and Sulaymania in the north and Shiite strongholds in the south,

provoking the escape of 2.5 million Kurds to neighboring Iran (eventually to Turkey <sup>64</sup>) and the death of up to 300.000 Shiites. In April the U.N. imposed a “security belt” north of the 36<sup>th</sup> parallel where Iraqi forces could not enter, thus enabling the Kurds to establish a de facto autonomic government. In the south, a “no fly zone” was established under the 33<sup>rd</sup> parallel to prevent the massacre of more Shiites. Despite these steps, the Coalition did not live up to the Iraqi opposition’s expectations by not supporting them topple Saddam Hussein <sup>65</sup>.

## **2.5 Gulf War aftermath**

Passed on October 11<sup>th</sup> 1991, U.N. Security Council resolution 715 gave the International Atomic Energy Agency authorization to search and destroy all Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Eventually, the U.N. even imposed a permanent control of Iraqi installations that could potentially build weapons of mass destruction <sup>66</sup>. The embargo imposed before the beginning of hostilities towards Iraq was not lifted and soon became a major humanitarian concern for the whole world. Therefore Iraq was allowed to sell \$1 billion worth of oil per 90 days, for which it could purchase harmless basic needs and food. 30% of the income however had to be turned over to the Compensation Fund for damages caused during the war <sup>67</sup>. On August 1994 the chief of the UNSCOM mission Rolf Ekeus declared himself satisfied with the Iraqi disarmament, with surveillance equipment installed and running. Soon U.N. Security Council permanent members China, Russia and France started calling for the partial lift of the

embargo, a call ignored by the U.S. which managed to prolong it for another 2 months, just as it had been doing for the past 4 years<sup>68</sup>.

One problem that prevented the embargo lifting was the Iraqi refusal to recognize the border suggestion proposed by the U.N. However resolution 687, under which the embargo was implemented, didn't put this as a condition to the lifting. All the other conditions were met by Iraq. This embargo, which was originally intended to punish the Iraqi military machine, was hitting weak Iraqi people, mainly children. According to the U.N. from 500.000 to 1.000.000 children died as a direct result of the 12 years embargo.

U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Denis Halliday offered his resignation in 1998, protesting the ongoing "genocide" against the Iraqi people<sup>69</sup>. According to him, the U.N. sanctions totally destroyed Iraq's health system by preventing the import of vital medicaments and medical equipment, a step taken so that Iraq could not smuggle weapons under the cover of medical accessories.

Dennis Halliday also complained about the poisoning of Iraqi water systems as a result of the war. This provoked the outbreak of typhoid epidemics and other disease transported by water. Although there was no official U.S. plan of poisoning Iraqi water systems, a 1991 Pentagon secret document entitled "Iraq water treatment vulnerabilities" did explain in detail how the demolition of the water system (which took place during the war) and the maintaining of the embargo would result in disease outbreaks and consequently massive deaths<sup>70</sup>.

When in 1995, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright was asked whether the 500.000 – 1.000.000 children's deaths were worth keeping the sanctions in place, she plainly answered "It is a very difficult choice, but we think it's the price to pay, yes it's worth it"<sup>71</sup>. The Iraqi people weren't the only to suffer from the Gulf War long after it was over. Veterans that fought the ground phase of the war were hit by the Gulf War Syndrome. Unlike the Vietnam Veteran's Syndrome, which is regarded as mainly a psychological disorder due to combat stress and defeat, the syndrome developed by veterans that returned from Iraq was physical, the most serious impact included birth defects (that hit 67% of the veteran's offspring) or death due to cancer. Although the syndrome's origins are still unknown, it is widely speculated that the use of depleted uranium in weapons and the compulsory anthrax vaccination could be the cause<sup>72</sup>.

The consequences of the Gulf War were very serious for all sides. It seems as if the Bush administration didn't take into account the fallouts that would occur, or they were mere collateral damage expected in advance.

### **Conclusion**

The Gulf War can be summoned in one single sentence: miscalculation by all sides. First and foremost by the Kuwaitis, who believed Saddam Hussein's threats to be mere bellicose posing and chest pounding, that by throwing at him millions of dollars and erasing the Iraqi debt they would keep him at bay. They also chose the wrong moment to bargain debt for border recognition, thinking that after the war Iraq would be too weak and disorganized to truly represent a menace to the Emirate. It also underestimated

Saddam Hussein's reaction to the pressure, which the Kuwaiti leadership was applying by decreasing oil prices. As a matter of fact, the war had weakened the economy but not the military juggernaut.

The U.S. administration also assumed that Iraq was too disorganized to pose any immediate threat to its neighbors. Most policy makers were convinced that Iranian radical fundamentalism was far more threatening to the region and started dealing with Iraq too little and too late, miscalculating that the master of Baghdad would occupy, at worst, the bordering region and a couple of islands but never dare annex the whole of Kuwait.

Finally, the gravest of all miscalculations was Saddam Hussein's, the one that cost his country millions of lives, years of development and a crushing defeat from which it would not recover even after 15 years. Abroad, the Iraqi President's steps actually backfired, bringing a new meaning to President Bush's "New World Order" by strengthening Washington hawks' position in the administration and turning much of the U.S. public opinion to the conclusion that even after the fall of the U.S.S.R. serious threats still remain. As a consequence, military expenditure boomed once again as it did every time a threat to American interests loomed in the horizon.

In his farewell speech of 1961 President Dwight Eisenhower warned the U.S. people and political representatives of the danger a strong military lobby represented to American democracy, warning that "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military – industrial complex [...] only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security

and liberty may prosper together”<sup>73</sup> emphasizing the *peaceful methods and goals* that should forge the very basics of U.S. statecraft. These methods and goals were missing in the U.S. policy during the Gulf War mainly under the influence of hawkish advisors who sought to wage war at all costs, regardless of the long term consequences for both the Middle East and the United States.

### Notes:

- 1/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 5 pages 2 & 9
- 2/ Sluglett Marion *Irák od roku 1958*, page 197
- 3/ Pečenka Marek *Encyklopedie Moderní Historie* page 204
- 4/ Sluglett Marion *Irák od roku 1958*, page 292
- 5/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 5 page 16
- 6/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 5 page 17
- 7/ Sluglett Marion *Irák od roku 1958*, page 294
- 8/ Sluglett Marion *Irák od roku 1958*, page 296
- 9/ Pečenka Marek *Encyklopedie Moderní Historie* page 203
- 10/ Sluglett Marion *Irák od roku 1958*, page 297
- 11/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 5 page 20
- 12/ Ibid, however precise numbers vary from one source to another
- 13/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 6 page 14
- 14/ Ibid
- 15/ The U.N. (including the U.S.) vigorously condemned The Israeli raid. Resolution 487 was passed which “strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and the norms of international conduct.” 10 years later a group of U.S. politicians (including Richard Cheney) signed a letter thanking Menachem Begin for bombing the Iraqi nuclear facility, even though it is widely speculated that the former prime minister actually authorized the raid as a political

maneuver, Operation Opera took place three weeks before elections in which his Likud Party was not favorite, after the bombing he narrowly won the elections.

16/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 9 page 3

17/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 6 page 15

18/ Cryotrons are high speed switches used to turn on and off a device or detonate a reaction. In this case the cryotrons were intended to detonate an explosive device:

[http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\\_ofn=mar91albright\\_015](http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=mar91albright_015)

<http://columbia.thefreedictionary.com/cryotron>

19/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 5 page 21

20/ Gause F. Gregory *Iraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in Baghdad*, pages 8 & 9

21/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 7 page 6

For more information about the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy (WINEP)

see: <http://mondediplo.com/2003/07/06beinin>

22/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 7 page 16

23/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War* introduction, page 5

24/ Despratx Michel, Barry Lando *Notre ami Saddam*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique* November 2004, page 12

25/ For the Glaspie – Hussein meeting transcript see:

<http://www.chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/glaspie.html>

26/ Gause F. Gregory *Iraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in Baghdad*, page 6

27/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 6 page 3

See also G. Bush *A World Transformed*, pages 308 & 309

28/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 6 page 4

- 29/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 7 page 16
- 30/ Despratx Michel, Barry Lando *Notre ami Saddam*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique* November 2004, page 12
- 31/ Resolution 660 which froze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets  
<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>
- 32/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 7 page 19
- 33/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 346
- 34/ G. Bush *A World Transformed*, page 315
- 35/ Ibid
- 36/ G. Bush *A World Transformed*, pages 384 & 385
- 37/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 305
- 38/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 7 page 9
- 39/ J. Baker *The Politics of Diplomacy*, page 291
- 40/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 8 page 15
- 41/ J. Baker *The Politics of Diplomacy*, pages 284 & 372
- 42/ J. Baker *The Politics of Diplomacy*, pages 304 & 305
- 43/ J. Baker *The Politics of Diplomacy*, pages 316 – 320
- Describing the negotiations with China, Malaysia, Cuba and Yemen
- 44/ J. Baker *The Politics of Diplomacy*, page 358
- 45/ J. Baker *The Politics of Diplomacy*, page 305
- 46/ Pečenka Marek *Encyklopedie Moderní Historie* page 369
- See also G. Bush *A World Transformed*, pages 413 & 414

47/ Oil price evolution and in-depth analysis:

<http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm>

48/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 8 pages 12 & 13

49/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 8 page 14

50/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 8 pages 27 & 28

51/ El Najjar Hassan *The Gulf War*, chapter 8 page 2

52/ G. Bush *A World Transformed*, page 440

53/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 391

54/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 403

55/ Ibid

56/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 404

57/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 405

58/ Tariq Aziz during an interview for PBS program “Frontline: The Gulf War”

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/index.html>

59/ Brief description of the Gulf War and information concerning weaponry:

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf\\_war#Air\\_campaign](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_war#Air_campaign) viz “Technology”

60/ Myths & Facts about the Gulf War on the Jewish Virtual Library:

<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf12.html>

61/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 360

62/ J. Baker *Politics of Diplomacy*, page 436

63/ Sluglett Marion *Irák od roku 1958*, page 333

64/ Although Ankara had to let the refugees take cover on its territory as the World was watching the events unfold, it couldn't afford support or even let the rest of the Coalition

support the Kurds autonomic rights in Iraq, as this would have aroused Turkish Kurds similar ambitions.

65/ Despratx Michel, Barry Lando *Notre ami Saddam*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique* November 2004, page 13

66/ UN Resolution 715 giving the IAEA authority to search Iraq for WMD:

<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm>

67/ UN Resolution 986 creating the “Oil-for-food” program:

<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1995/scres95.htm>

68/ Despratx Michel, Barry Lando *Notre ami Saddam*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique* November 2004, page 13

69/ Ibid

70/ the integral declassified version of the document:

[http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950901/950901\\_511rept\\_91.html](http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/dia/19950901/950901_511rept_91.html)

71/ Madeleine Albright’s answer on the program “60 minutes”:

<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1084>

72/ BBC article about the link between depleted uranium and the Gulf War Syndrome:

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73/ President Dwight Eisenhower’s integral farewell speech:

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## Résumé

Neexistuje snad žádný stát ve Světě, o kterém se v roce 2005 mluvilo tolik jako o Iráku. Již od první války v Perském Zálivu, neboli Válka Irán – Irák, je prezident Saddam Hussain středem zájmu v oblasti mezinárodních vztahů. Tento konflikt poznamenal Blízký Východ na dlouhou dobu. Hned po ukončení tohoto dlouhého, krvavého a zhrocujícího konfliktu, se irácký diktátor vydal na agresivní cestu ústící ve válku v Perském Zálivu během které, se postavil proti němu celý svět. Co ho mohlo vést k takovému sebevražedného kroku? Irácký konflikt s Kuvajtem nebyl první v dějinách, předchozí byly vyřešeny diplomatickým způsobem. Proč se tedy tak nestalo i v roce 1990? Z dnešního pohledu je postoj Západu jasný, avšak před invazí byl Irák považován za spojence v boji proti Iránu. Jak popisuje tehdejší francouzský Ministr zahraničních věcí Jean-Pierre Chevènement. Na Blízkém Východě nemají západní politiky „výběr mezi dobrem a zlem, ale výběr mezi hrozným a ohavným“ v tomto případě se přiklonili k Bagdádu. V tomto kontextu, proč došlo ke změně politiky ještě před samotnou invazí do Kuvajtu? Irák představoval nebezpečí pro celý region. Podle některých amerických analytiků, bylo na čase změnit dosavadní směr, který mohl udělat z Iráku nejmocnější vojenský stát na strategicky důležitém Blízkém Východě. Proto invaze do Kuvajtu byla vítanou příležitostí zbavit se irácké hrozby.

Celé spektrum politiků Spojených Států se k tomuto názoru nepřiklápělo. Během diskuze „utočit, či neútočit“ byli američtí politici rozděleni. Mnoho specialistů na Blízký Východ obecně, a Irák obzvlášť, odmítali vojenský útok jako řešení krize. Jaké měli argumenty? Jaký byl ohlas? Proč tento ohlas neměl žádný vliv?

Když už se rozhodlo pro válku, proč neustoupil irácký agresor, když mu bylo jasné, že se proti jeho armádě chystá koalice, kterou nemůže za žádných okolností porazit? Odpověď na tuto otázku lze rychle vznést. Faktem je, že Saddam Hussain nabídl mnohokrát před a během Operace Pouštní Bouře, že vyklidí Kuvajt. Proto správná otázka zní, proč Spojené Státy všechny tyto plány odmítly? S mírovým řešením krize souhlasili Francouzi, Sověti, Arabské státy, vlastně všichni účastníci kromě USA a Velká Británie.

Dalším zajímavým momentem během krize je hlasování Rezoluce OSN a formování Koalice proti Iráku. Zde nesehrála roli všeobecná či svobodná vůle národu, nýbrž „Politika Diplomacie“ Státního Tajemníka James Bakera.

Spojené Státy tak za sebou postavily širokou koalici, která jim pomohla rozehnat Iráckou armádu z Kuvajtu. I když plány zahrnovaly tzv. „chytré bomby“, které měly chirurgicky zničit své cíle, bylo nemyslitelné, že válka se může odehrát bez masy obětí.

Stal se pravý opak. V důsledku války a následujícího embarga Irák skončil na úrovni Rwandy či Libérie co se týče kvality zdravotní péče a sociální infrastruktury.

Co vedlo nejvyspělejší, nejmocnější a demokratický stát zakročit takto razantně proti zemi, kterou v 80. letech považoval za spojence?