

**Strengthening Europe's defences: external threats and their
impact on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)**

Table of Contents

AKNOWLEDGMENTS	1
ABSTRACT	2
ABBREVIATIONS	3
INTRODUCTION	4
<i>Research Question and Hypothesis</i>	6
<i>Literature Review</i>	6
<i>Methodology and Data</i>	9
<i>Conceptual and theoretical framework</i>	12
CHAPTER 1 – THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)	13
1.1 Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy	14
1.2 Franco-German bilateralism	20
1.3 European Strategic Autonomy	21
CHAPTER 2 - THREATS	27
2.1 Russia’s assertive foreign policy	27
2.1.1 Analysis	32
2.2 Challenges in transatlantic relations.....	33
2.2.1 Analysis	37
2.3 Brexit’s security implications	38
2.3.1 Analysis	41
2.4 The threat of jihadi terrorism and ‘Migration Crisis’	43
2.4.1 Analysis	46
CHAPTER 3 – Strengthening of the CSDP	47
CONCLUSION	53
REFERENCES	54

AKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank my supervisor Dr. Tomáš Karásek for his support, guidance and sharing of knowledge. He was always ready to answer my questions, give me right directions and motivation while writing my thesis.

I am grateful to the administration of the Charles University for unconditional support and assistance regarding all the technical issues.

I would like to thank all my lecturers, for these beautiful 2 years and wonderful courses. The knowledge I received from them is significant and I really appreciate their hard work.

Finally, I must express gratitude to my wonderful family and friends. I have been going through extremely hard period and if not their support and encouragement, I would not be able to finish my thesis.

Lika Gogliashvili

ABSTRACT

The given work explores the current European security environment, external threats and challenges and their effect on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy.

The work gives particular attention to Russia's aggressive policy, Brexit, Jihadi terrorism and migration crisis, as well as, the United States' new isolationist politics. Furthermore, for this work two most powerful EU member states, France and Germany are selected to analyse, as their close cooperation is indispensable for the EU's stronger security and defence role. Selected threats are explored in depth in order to identify their strategic consequences for both, Germany and France. Additionally, the work explores recent EU documents, initiatives and discourse in security and defence area to assess the overall effect of the challenges coming from the deteriorated security environment.

At the same time, the work uses the balance of threat theory from the Neorealist school and applies to the study document analysis and discourse analysis as a relevant methodology . The work is based on academic works, articles and documents.

ABBREVIATIONS

EU – European Union

US/USA – The United States

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy

ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy

UN – The United Nations

PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation

CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

WEU – Western European Union

EDC – European Defence Community

EC – The European Community

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

EPC – European Political Cooperation

TEU – Treaty on European Union

EES – European Security Strategy

ESA – European Strategic Autonomy

EUGS – Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy

EDF – European Defence Fund

UNSC -United Nations Security Council

IS -Islamic State

ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

AfD – Alternative of Germany

HR – High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

CARD – Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

EI2 – The European Intervention Force

INTRODUCTION

It is often believed that trans-boundary crises and perceived security threats can produce a clear upgrade in European Union (EU) member states' common interests, stimulate their joint action and subsequently strengthen European defence cooperation. Indeed, European Integration has often advanced because of the pressures of crises within, around and beyond the EU's borders. Recently the global strategic environment has become more congested and contested, therefore, it is crucial to consider strategic consequences that the emergence of the new threats have wrought for security and defence policies of the European Union. (Haroche 2017) The following work aims to investigate major threats, which emerged in the last decade, and explore how they affected on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In other words, it aims to identify if the emergence of selected threats pushed EU member states' to invest more in defence cooperation within the European integration framework as opposed to national or the NATO framework.

For Europe, recent years have been marked with a high level of uncertainty. Multiple, simultaneous threats have emerged and threatened the security and the stability of the European Union. Having made little progress during the past decade toward a stronger security role for the union, the debate about future of Europe gained new momentum and number of scholars and politicians have started exploring the possibilities for strengthened Common Security and Defence policy.

Current commentary on the future of European security can be divided into two camps. The first camp has an optimistic attitude and argues that Europeans are surrounded by an increasingly inhospitable strategic environment, therefore, they have the strongest incentives to get together and boost their defence cooperation.

To the East, a new kind of uneasy relationship is developing with Putin's revisionist Russia, which tries to overturn the European order by influencing politics with different means. Mainly, through the manipulation of media and society, deliberate interference in elections and by supporting Eurosceptic politicians in Europe. Furthermore, it continues to violate the sovereignty of its neighbours and encroaches on EU members' territorial waters and airspace. Moscow's decision to seize and subsequently annex Crimea and to launch the war in Eastern

Ukraine in 2014 have destroyed key elements of the post-Cold War security system in Europe. (Rumer 2016)

Another intimidating threat is coming from the MENA region where state failures and instability have contributed to the rise of extremism and increased the fears of jihadi terrorism. At the same time, conflict and disorder in the Middle East have caused massive migration since 2015 onwards and created political crisis inside the European Union.

Since 2016 Transatlantic relations have been facing its difficult challenges as well. The US presidential election and the following victory of Donald Trump marked a turning point for Europe. After entering into office Trump took a nationalist, transactional approach and called the American internationalist tradition into question. Furthermore, he openly embraced authoritarian leaders and even expressed doubts about the continued usefulness of the NATO, as well as, anti-EU sentiments. European leaders are concerned that the Trump's administration will become increasingly disinterested in continuing to fulfil the role of the "benign hegemon" and disregard the American defence commitment to Europe.

And finally, the imminent withdrawal of the UK from the European Union – so called Brexit, which is internal rather than external challenge, but its security implications are equally important for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. The United Kingdom is the second largest military power and has the biggest number of deployable forces in the union, therefore, Brexit will have substantial effect on Europe's long-term defensive posture and capabilities.

The second camp has a more pessimistic attitude towards CSDP and points out that the EU's internal divisions are particularly sharp on security and defence issues. On the one hand, most of the member states differ from each other in terms of threat perceptions and capabilities and on the other hand, they are still highly concerned with their relative gains. Furthermore, some experts and politicians believe that without the NATO and mainly US support, Europeans alone are unable to provide their own security. These factors suggest that, there exist substantial obstacles and truly integrated European defence seems like a distant hope.

Research Question and Hypothesis

RQ1: How did the emergence of the selected major threats in the last decade affected the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy?

H1: The myriad of threats which emerged in the last decade gave CSDP new power and led to a faster development

Literature Review

Changing global security environment has raised a number of concerns around the world and the debate regarding the future of European security and defence has grown in relevance. Most of the academic world has become set on the question whether the new challenges and threats pushed the European Union to take the road towards becoming a stronger security actor in the world. Furthermore, various experts are identifying the importance of Franco-German cooperation in the process of reviving the European defence policy and trying to explore similarities, as well as, differences between their perceptions and strategic priorities.

According to Annegret Bendiek in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the conceptual and practical activity of the Common Security and Defence Policy – a policy area that was assumed dead. Externally, Russian annexation of the Crimea triggered the return of war and conflict to Europe. At the same time, the UK's exit from the EU, the looming US withdrawal from Europe, migration crises and threat of terrorism are reinforcing the sense of vulnerability between member states and pushing them to make the EU's security and defence policies more forceful. Furthermore, since the summer of 2016 France and Germany have been advocating a "multi-speed Europe" and calling for the enhanced cooperation in defence and security matters, meanwhile, issues ranging from the creation of the European Defence Fund, to the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) also have seen major reform or proposals for reform. (Bendiek 2017)

Ulrich Krotz & Joachim Schild explore the possible consequences of Brexit on European defence cooperation. They argue that, Brexit in combination with other forces and factors brings three basic future scenarios for the EU. First, so-called German Hegemony. Second, the degeneration, decline or disintegration of the European project and third, the 'back to the future' possibility of a rejuvenated Franco-German link at the Union's centre. While each of the three scenarios are possible, authors point out that 'back to the future' is most likely and plausible. Krotz and Schild further argue that the EU's dramatically changing international environment and increasing external pressures, provide strong incentives for member states to commit more seriously to taking care of their own security and defence. Brexit is just one of the forces which is likely to boost the significance and impact of Franco-German bilateralism and EU commitment in the domains of foreign policy, security and defence. The empirical evidence available so far – such as slew of initiatives, states intentions and policy projects also document that Franco-German cooperation is gathering momentum in these areas. Furthermore, while causing trouble in the short term, Brexit is unlikely to undermine the CSDP and in fact, it even removes significant hindrances to greater union-ambitions. While Brexit has certainly sharpened French and German leaders' perceptions of the challenges confronting the EU, crucial factors for a determined renewal of Franco-German embedded bilateralism are located at the domestic level. If Germany proves unwilling or unable to step in to provide stronger leadership and if France fails to modernize/reform and restore its international competitiveness, then Brexit can get a quite different direction and meaning. (Krotz and Schild 2018)

Dr Nicole Koenig and Marie Walter-Franke argue that there are three key drivers behind the revitalisation of the CSDP. The first is thorough destabilisation of the EU's geopolitical environment. To the east, member states face tensions with Russia, while to the South, state failures have given rise to jihadist terrorism and triggered mass migration. Second, the UK – one of the most powerful and experienced military player in the EU- preparing to leave the union. And third, the election of President Trump and uncertainty that exists in Europe over the future of the transatlantic security partnership. Authors explore the current window of opportunity for the further development of CSDP and point out that the review of new drivers and old constraints offer a mixed picture. In recent years, external challenges fuelled strategic convergence between France and Germany. They played an important role in overcoming long-standing obstacles and the EU managed to agree on concrete deliverables concerning the planning, conduct and financing of CSDP operations. However, the EU has so far only taken

cautious steps and some more ambitious ideas such as pooling resources and sovereignty are still in the pipeline. Furthermore, differences remain between France and Germany when it comes to political culture and public perception. The French were often unhappy about Germany's reluctance to take greater international responsibility, while Germans were wary of being dragged into military missions which were serving French rather than European interests. (Koenig and Franke 2017)

Marianne Riddervold & Akasemi Newsome explore various articles in order to find out how autonomous is the EU in a changing and more uncertain world and how EU-US relations have been impacted by the context of multiple crises and the US policies under the Trump administration. According to authors, all selected foreign and security policy articles suggest that the crises context has resulted in a weakening of traditional US-EU security relations and EU is becoming more unified and more independent of the US in its foreign and security policies. However, it is clear that most European states still rely on US as their main security guarantee. The recent EU developments in the foreign and security policy domain are driven by combination of factors, including an ability to bend together in the face of common external threats. In the paper, Riddervold and Akasemi also highlight Michael E. Smith's findings, who argues that much of the variation we observe in transatlantic relations come from the European Union itself, as the crises and challenges increasingly affect the EU's thinking of its own international role. The EU is still committed to a strong partnership with NATO, however, it is also trying to be more autonomous and forge its own path in international security affairs. Smith concludes, that it increasingly likely that in the coming years the EU will play a greater role in international political and security affairs. Finally, Riddervold and Akasemi summarize findings from all the articles and suggest that EU-US relations are weakening in the context of contemporary crises and a current US administration. Furthermore, they argue that it is not a first time when the EU is facing multiple crises, nor is this the first time when EU-US relationship experience a crisis, however, in the contrary to the previous periods the transatlantic relationship is under more pressure today, as its institutional and normative structure is also challenged. (Riddervold and Newsome 2018)

Susi Dennison, Ulrike Eshter Franke & Pawel Zerka argue the security of the European Union is challenged like never before and aim to better understand security perceptions across the European Union. The results reveal that generally the EU is fairly united in its understanding of the threats, however, member states significantly diverge in the vulnerability they feel to the

various threats. France regard terrorism and cyber-attacks as the most significant threats to its security and unlike other large EU member states also perceives the return of military competition as a genuine threat. However, Paris feels highly resilient across the range of threats, particularly military attacks on its territory. French government firmly believes that it is vital for the EU to develop closely interconnected – if not unified and strengthen defence industry cooperation, as well as, European strategic autonomy. Unlike France, Germany feels vulnerable to a wide variety of new and traditional threats. Berlin portrays jihadism as a “cross-cutting issue” and is most concerned about terrorism, a lack of state resilience and the potential for state collapse in the EU’s neighbourhood. Germans also have begun to regard the US as a kind of security threat since the election of the President Trump and his foreign policy unpredictability. Furthermore, the German government wants to stay transatlantic, while at the same time, it wants to become more European. Consequently, Berlin is very supportive of new EU Security and Defence initiatives and emphasize the importance of being more independent. (Dennison, Franke and Zerka 2018)

Methodology and Data

The following work will be conducted by qualitative research method. According to Alan Bryman “Qualitative research is a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data”. (BRYMAN 2008) Qualitative research is primarily concerned understanding human beings’ experiences in a humanistic interpretive approach and seeks to contribute to a better understanding of social realities. (Jackson, Drummond and Camara 2007) In other words, it aims to draw attention to processes, meaning patterns and discover how human beings understand, interpret and produce the social world. Qualitative research comprises methods such as: a case study, discourse analysis, comparative method, grounded theory and so on.

This particular study employs a document analysis alongside with a secondary discourse analysis to investigate how selected threats affected on the development of CSDP. Triangulation is a word used in social sciences and defined as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints cast light upon a topic. (Olsen 2004) The use of multiple methods or triangulation reflects an attempt to secure in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in

question and adds rigor, richness and depth to any inquiry. (Denzin 2012) There are four types of triangulation: data triangulation, theory triangulation, methodological triangulation, investigator triangulation. (Hales n.d.) In this research, methodological triangulation is used, as it involves more than one kind of method to study a phenomenon: document analysis and discourse analysis. Furthermore, methodological triangulation has been found to be beneficial in providing more comprehensive data and enhanced understanding of studied phenomena.

Document analysis is a form of qualitative research and very common method of collecting data. It is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic material. Documents that may be used for systemic evaluation as a part of a study take a variety of forms and are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around the assessment topic. For this purpose various public records can be used, as well as, books and brochures, advertisements, letters and memoranda, newspapers, diaries and journals, minutes of meetings, organisational and institutional reports, or press releases. (Bowen 2009)

For this M.A thesis, document analysis procedure was selected because it gives an opportunity to find and analyse information gathered by group of academics, politicians, or other people who have insights into the current geopolitical environment and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. As Sharan B. Merriam pointed out, 'Documents of all types can help the researcher uncover the meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem'. (Merriam 1988) Furthermore, documentary sources have highest level of accessibility, are very cost effective (Denscombe 2014) and contain very valuable information and insights as many of them in "public domain" are prepared by professionals. (Cohen, et al. 2010)

Two different sampling methods can be used when choosing documents: Random and purposive sampling. The first way of selection is to have sample of documents of certain kind and choose randomly from these documents. While the second method gives you a possibility to choose documents according to some set of pre-specified inclusion criteria. In other words it is possible to purposively select documents and reconstruct a case. (Flick 2008) In this paper, the method of purposive selection will be used in order to explore the official documents of the governments or the EU. In addition to that, speeches, texts and interviews of EU representatives and government officials will be analysed in the discourse analysis framework.

Discourse analysis is about studying and analysing the uses of language. (Hodges, Kuper and Reeves 2008) Like document analysis, discourse analysis is very useful if the researcher is interested in using texts to conduct his work. It is used by many fields and has many approaches, methods and frameworks. Usually, regardless of the approach, a vast array of data sources is available to discourse analyst, such as, published literature, samples of conversations, media, transcript from interviews, etc. (Hodges, Kuper and Reeves 2008)

According to the Brian Paltridge “discourse analysis examines patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which it is used.” (Paltridge 2012) Furthermore, as Chimombo and Roseberry argue the primary purpose of discourse analysis is to provide deeper understanding and appreciation of texts. (Chimombo and Roseberry 1998)

In this paper, the tools of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be used, which according to the Van Dijk are primarily interested in and motivated by the endeavour to understand pressing social issues. (Dijk 2006) To put it simply, CDA allows the researcher to describe, interpret and explain social processes. Critical approaches to discourse are particularly significant in relation to the study of politics. Investigating ideological discourse, such as political speeches is very useful, since a political speech can be considered as the primary means of influencing others, using rhetoric to persuade, excite and claim leadership. (Klebanov, Diermeier and Beigman 2008) Furthermore, Dijk argues that the researcher has to take into consideration three main components while conducting critical analysis of the political discourse. First, political actors or authors – the addressors of political speeches of professional politicians or political institutions, such as presidents, prime ministers and other members of government, parliament or political parties. Second, the assumed recipients of the political speech – such as the public, the people, citizens and other groups or categories. And third, political speech itself. (Dijk 1997) To sum up, the main goal of the selected method is to critically investigate the major elements of the political speeches.

Both above-mentioned methods, document analysis, as well as, discourse analysis can offer insights into what security implications the EU prioritizes since the emergence of the various threats and how this is an outcome of the discourse. In other words, it is possible to explore how selected threats affected on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and how related topics and proposals have changed over time.

In this M.A thesis, I will resort primary and secondary sources. The main primary sources will be decisions, reports and documents published by European Union bodies or its committees. As a secondary sources, articles, academic research newspapers, books and journals will be used.

Conceptual and theoretical framework

In this study, I have decided to use the balance of threat theory – from structural realist school of thought.

Structural Realism, or Neorealism is one of the most influential, theoretically sophisticated theories in international relations which has been applied extensively to explain the rise of post-Cold War European defence cooperation. First outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*, structural realism claims that power is the most important factor in international relations. It is divided into two competing schools of thought: Defensive and Offensive Realism. The former is predicated on the assumption that the states in general seek to survive and maximize their security by preserving the existing balance of power, while the latter believes that states maximize power, influence and wealth to be become more secure in a world of anarchy. (Lobell 2010)

Stephan Walt's 'balance of threat' theory emerged in the 1980s and it provides a very useful means to understand European security and defence cooperation. As Walt notes, states ally to balance against threat rather than against a nation's superior power alone. In other words rather than allying in response to power alone, states generally act to balance the greatest threats to their security. (Walt 1985) Usually, state that is equipped with offensive capabilities, is geographically proximate, and displays higher level of aggressive intent poses a more immediate threat to Europe. (Dyson 2013) The theory helps us to understand that states that are close by are more dangerous than those that are far away and "states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them". (Walt 1990) In a large-N study, Fritz and Sweeney found that great powers pursue costly balancing policies only when they face significant external threats. (Paul and Sweeney 2004) Kratochvíl believes that

although Walt's framework is limited, "the underlying idea of asking both about the origin the threat and about the state's behaviour in face of threat is an exceptionally good starting point for the construction of the model of threat politics". Furthermore, he claims that Walt's balance of threat theory shows how close the starting point of realist thinking is to constructivist theories and that the basic rationale - states encountering threats because they have to act somehow in the presence of threat does hold in both realist and constructivist readings. (Kratochvil 2004) I argue that, Stephen M. Walt's theory will help to explain the current developments.

CHAPTER 1 – THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)

1.1 Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy

The story of European cooperation in security and defence dates back to the pre-European Union (EU) period. It is not surprising that, in the aftermath of the chaotic and bloody World War II, the need for security and defence arrangements emerged immediately and Europe's political leaders got a strong interest in securing the continent's peace and prosperity. The onset of the Cold War and the emergence of the Soviet threat both to Eastern and Western European societies further shaped the necessity to prevent any future prospect of war.

The first step in this direction was the signing of the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence in 1948 and subsequent creation of the Western European Union (WEU) - first attempt at a common European Defence Alliance. This was followed by the European Defence Community initiative (EDC) in 1950, another attempt at a unified European defence, however, the treaty was rejected by the French in 1954. This failure led to the amendment of the Brussels Treaty, whereby European military cooperation was transferred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In this way, the Europeans lost the opportunity to use their own military capabilities in pursuit of their own foreign policy choices, and exclusively European defence cooperation was confined to the inactive forum of the Western European Union whose strategic dimension was ignored by the EU member states for the rest of the Cold War. (Keukeleire 2009)

Despite these various plans and initiatives after the World War II, there has been more progress on European security and defence issues since 1998 than in the previous 50 years due to the powerful historical factors that substantially affected EU Member States' policy goals and preferences. (Howorth 2001)

Since the end of the Cold War fundamental changes have transformed the European security architecture, which was structured around East-West conflict for 40 years. The fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 and subsequent demise of the Soviet threat marked the beginning of the improved relations between two parts of the continent that had long been divided. This has raised expectations for the creation of a new peaceful and stable Europe once again.

However, the end of the Cold War did not completely eliminate other sources of instability and unleashed long-suppressed ethnic, national and religious conflicts. New levels and issues of security came to the fore that forced the principal political/security institutions, such as NATO, Western European Union (WEU), the United Nations (UN), The European Community (EC) and others to adapt to the emerging problems. (Steinberg 1992)

Evidently, the changes in the international security environment created most important challenges for the European Community, now the European Union (EU). Economic, social and security instabilities started emerging from Western Europe's own neighbourhood towards which the Member states had limited foreign or security policy instruments. The Gulf conflict which started in August 1990 clearly demonstrated the European military impotence, the EU Member States' inability to formulate a common response towards the crisis and their heavy dependence on the US and the NATO in terms of political leadership and military capabilities. The new level of uncertainty was raised over the future Euro-Atlantic cooperation regime as well. Designed first and foremost as a defence alliance, NATO remained in charge of European defence during the Cold War. However, since the danger presented by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces shrank away, it was likely that the United States would be more and more reluctant to its commitment in Europe. Therefore, there emerged a need in the Both sides of the Atlantic to redefine their respective roles and obligations in the formation of the new European security architecture. (USLU 2004)

Against this background, it was impossible for the EU member states to continue to ignore the military dimension of security while negotiating the new Treaty of Maastricht and the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The new CFSP was intended to replace the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was initiated in the 1970s as the first informal cooperation in the field of foreign policy. Several countries, such as France and Germany were pleading for a "common defence", meanwhile, neutral countries and Atlantic oriented countries opted for minimal changes, recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO. Finally, the intensive politics of 1990-91 allowed the EU to overcome the paralysis and sign the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Treaty provided legal framework for the Union to take joint action on matters of the Common Foreign and Security policy of the EU. Member states agreed that "the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related

to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”. (Keukeleire 2009)

During the Maastricht negotiations, in late June 1991, the Yugoslav crisis erupted. At first the crisis was seen as an opportunity for the EU to lead the management of the conflict and to assert itself as a security player. However, Looking back, the Balkan wars-particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo highlighted the inability of European Partners “to act in a decisive manner” and to end conflicts on their doorstep. In fact, the EU’s response to the outbreak of the war presented key characteristics of civilian type of intervention, without credible military capacity. This was particularly painful as neither NATO nor Washington was willing to involve in the initial stage of the conflicts and they intervened only after thousands of people were killed. The Yugoslav wars further demonstrated that U.S leadership remained indispensable in the region and that NATO’s monopoly of European security persisted. (Jankovski 2007)

The bloodshed in the Balkans increased frustration among the EU members, as well as, in Washington over Europe’s slow response to the conflicts, its lack of common policy stance and a lack of military capacity. Most European countries, particularly the UK and France recognized the constraints of being a merely civilian power and the need for the EU to take more responsibility for its own security. Consequently, at the Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo, in 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac agreed on a declaration that provided the political basis for the establishment of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and permitted progress which had hitherto been elusive. (Keukeleire 2009)

The Joint Declaration on European Defence stated the following: “The European Union needs to be in position to play its full role on the international stage. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. It was also emphasized that Europe would be “contributing to the vitality of the modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.” (Joint Declaration on European Defence 1998)

The Saint-Malo declaration represents a milestone in the history of the construction of a European Security and Defence Policy. Such an important initiative owes its existence to powerful historical factors, the dire deficiencies in the capabilities of the EU that the Bosnian war had exposed and following national foreign security policy adjustments in France and Britain - Europe's two leading military powers. Getting France and Britain to move toward common ground was a fundamental prerequisite for the start-up of the European Security and Defence Policy.

Surprisingly, the most important impetus behind the issuing of Saint-Malo Declaration came from a major shift in Britain's European Policy. During the Cold War years, the UK - one of the most Eurosceptic member-states, wanted to cooperate closely with Washington and to rely entirely on the existing NATO structure. London long opposed the direct involvement of the EU in military matters and tried to ensure the pre-eminence of NATO in any emerging European security architecture. Furthermore, Britain was against the establishment of a structure that could rival that of the alliance, arguing that it could undermine NATO and annoy Americans. (Gegout 2002) The British policy of favouring NATO, as the mainstay for security and defence in Europe, remained intact with the end of the Cold War, however, due to the new developments that took place throughout the second half of 1990's, the UK decided to take a fundamental shift in its defence policy.

Since taking the office, Tony Blair has begun to look for ways of engaging more constructively in the European Union. The UK Prime Minister was obsessed by the notion of leadership for Britain in Europe and on the global stage and believed that Britain could be one of the EU's leading member-states, with as much clout as France and Germany. In the face of public hostility, Britain had to stay out of the monetary integration and an initiative in the security arena gave Blair an opportunity to project leadership in Europe. (Deighton 2002) Furthermore, the UK learnt from past policy failures. On the one hand, Blair was unhappy with the US reluctance to intervene in the Balkan crisis. He argued that Europeans should not expect the United States to play a role in every disorder in Europe's backyard. On the other hand, the British Prime Minister was disappointed by the weak equilibrium of European security, lack of European military capabilities and for this reason Britain's inability to formulate and lead active European policy on Balkans. These issues had been discussed by the EU ministers at the Pörschach meeting in October 1998, where Tony Blair expressed his frustration over the

European inability to act in Kosovo and stated his willingness to boost EU's role in defence. (Gegout 2002)

The changes in the British attitude in turn mobilized the French, who have had strong views of an exclusively European security and defence policy and have long pleaded for increased military cooperation. However, contrary to the popular belief, France had never sought to undermine the Atlantic alliance and in fact, has benefited enormously from its stabilizing effects throughout the Cold War. What France constantly refused was to be directed by the United States, an idea that has its origins in the Gaullist tradition. General Charles de Gaulle, president of the French Republic from 1958 to 1969, wanted to create an "European Europe" as opposed to "Atlantic Europe" and to realize a continental West European bloc that could be truly independent of the United States as well as Soviet Union both militarily and politically. (Trachtenberg 2012) General De Gaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966, did not however put an end to France's participation in common exchanges and exercises with its allies.

The end of the Cold War raised fundamental issues for French security and defence policy. Consequently, Paris shortly revised its policies and readapted itself to the international environment, just as the United States or other powers did. Since 1990s, France started the process of rapprochement with NATO and conceded that in order to deal with Europe's new security needs and establish France as an important actor on the new security agenda, more rather than less engagement was necessary with the United States and NATO. (USLU 2004) Obviously, from that time on political leaders in Paris, assumed a more pro-Atlantic attitude and even deployed forces to the major theatres in which NATO was involved: Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF). (Fortmann, Haglund and Hlatky 2010)

Such changes in British and French attitudes were culminated at the December 1998 summit in Saint-Malo, which marked the sudden convergence of British and French policies towards European security institutions. The Saint-Malo declaration contained both the European and Atlantic elements that satisfied both, the French and the British and facilitated the launch of the Common European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union.

Only half a year after the Franco-British declaration, the Cologne European Council of June 1999 marked the beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as the

distinctive part of the of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and certified the need for the establishment of appropriate decision-making mechanisms, as well as, credible military/civilian capabilities in order to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU)- the so-called "Petersberg Tasks". (Jankovski 2007) In 1997, in Amsterdam the incorporation of these tasks by TEU embodied the member states' shared determination to safeguard European security through operations such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. (Kernic 2006)

The following years demonstrated that Member States engaged in remarkable efforts to move beyond the declaratory level and endow the Union with necessary civilian and military instruments. This process began at the 1999 European Council summit in Helsinki and was followed by the European Council of June 2000 in Feira, when steps were taken to improve the credibility of these instruments - materializing in the EU Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and EU military Headline Goal 2010. (Jankovski 2007) Immediately after Helsinki and Feira meetings, the member states started a series of capability commitment conferences in order to evaluate the available capabilities, assess shortfalls and to set out concrete targets. (Keukeleire 2009)

One of the most difficult aspects of establishing ESDP was clarifying the relationship with NATO and the United States. However, the historic U.S opposition to the autonomous European military capabilities was reversed when the U.S president Bill Clinton expressed the positive attitude toward the development of the CSDP, but based on condition that the EU avoided the "three Ds", no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination. Furthermore, following the political decision of December 2002, the "Berlin Plus" arrangements was adopted in 2003 that provided the basis for NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management. Under these arrangements, the EU can conduct an operation autonomously by using NATO's collective assets and capabilities. In 2003 the EU also launched his first operation, which soon was followed by other military and civilian operations in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Asia. (Keukeleire 2009)

Remarkably, the establishment of the ESDP and its subsequent development were possible despite of the split between the EU member states over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Some members actively participated in the American-led military invasion, while others

considered the war illegitimate and detrimental. (Keukeleire 2009) During this period progress in the field of security and defence did not seem possible, however, the dramatic events provided new impetus to the ESDP and even highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at the EU level. In the same year, the European Security Strategy (EES), a brief but comprehensive document was adopted by the European Council. It defines for the first time the EU's security environment, identifying key security challenges and calls for more active, coherent and capable union, as well as, for preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts/crises. (European Union External Action Service 2016)

In October 2007 another important development happened. Particularly, the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon. The new treaty has converted ESDP into the 'Common Security and Defence Policy' (CSDP) and has equipped the European Union with more tools and instruments in the field of external affairs, foreign and security policy.

1.2 Franco-German bilateralism

Since the beginning of the European integration, Germany has been France's primary ally in European policy-making and up to now they remain strongly interconnected. To describe a special character of the Franco-German relationship the term "embedded bilateralism" has been coined – which refers deeply rooted institutional nature of relationship and underlines the importance of formal institutions framing the Franco-German bilateralism. (Krotz & Schild, 2018)

Since the UK's decision to leave the European Union, it seems like the Franco-German relationship is the single most important relationship in the EU. While European members are usually divided on different issues and each of them tries to advance its own agenda, Franco-German couple decided to overcome their own strategic differences and take a leading role in the union.

Throughout the years, Berlin and Paris have repeatedly launched successful integration initiatives, acted together as agenda-settlers in the European affairs and introduced a number of reforms or proposals. However, if we look at the history, we also find times when their European policies drifted apart and acute tensions prevailed. (Krotz & Schild, 2018)

Since at least 2012, Franco-German tandem has been widely diagnosed as no longer working. However, the election in 2017 of Emmanuel Macron and the re-election of Angela Merkel suggested a reversal of fortunes in Franco-German relationship. Macron is avowedly pro-European who made a strategic choice in favour of Germany as France's key partner for his plans to strengthen the EU. German chancellor also showed his appreciation of the new French President, meanwhile Brexit, election of the Donald Trump as a president and other emerging threats also helped to bring Franco-German cooperation back to centre stage in Europe. (Droul, 2017)

Remarkably, since the election of the Macron, France and Germany have made various statements that they are willing to provide European leadership and effectively deal with the various emerging crises. Berlin and Paris both have long-standing opposing views on how EU/euro area should work, or how the EU's defence policies should look like. However, current geopolitical environment forces both of the countries to compromise and work closely with each other in order to maintain European stability.

1.3 European Strategic Autonomy

The concept of "European Strategic Autonomy" (ESA) has been around for a while in European politics, but recently has gained more attention as a reaction to the new shocks and longer-term concerns. Alongside the "European Strategic autonomy", terms such as "European sovereignty" and "European army" have become more common - yet these concepts cause confusion and sometimes, even alarm, as they are rarely defined and their political and practical implications are usually left unstated.

However, it is not a first time when the notion of strategic autonomy has caused controversy among politicians. The most well-known instance happened in the aftermath of the Balkan crisis, during the Saint-Malo Summit when Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac set "autonomy" as a foundational logical behind CSDP and called for the EU to develop the capacity for autonomous military action. This in turn led the US administration to warn the EU that its military autonomy should not cause any de-linking with NATO, nor duplicate existing efforts or discriminate against non-EU members. (Fiott 2018)

Currently, the EU and its member states are under the pressure from within and without. While various external actors seek to influence the EU's inner workings and sow division among the member states, populist and nationalist movements are also joining together to tear Europe apart. In response to the rising threat levels, the issue of the security and defence has come to the fore in the union and leaders started arguing that the EU must "take its fate into its own hands". Although, they do not clarify what precisely they have in mind or what is reasonable to expect from the EU to achieve autonomously. (Howorth 2019)

In the last few years, ESA has been used many times in European Parliament, European Commission, European Council and European External Action Service (EEAS) communications, but most importantly in the EU's June 2016 Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). (Mauro 2018) The EUGS was presented only few days after the Brexit referendum and it is one of the most ambitious EU documents on defence, stating the following:

"As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend its members- most of which are Europeans – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders." (European Union External Action Service 2016)

The necessity for Europe to be more autonomous was endorsed by political figures such as French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, yet differences remain on the level of ambition considered to be "appropriate" and the notion of strategic autonomy is still far from having an agreed understanding. (BRUSTLEIN 2018) Against this background, It is important to explore what strategic autonomy might be in European context, what does it require, how it is defined in capitals across Europe -particularly in Paris and Berlin, and to what extent does it have governments' support.

According to the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and its research, many of the EU member states see strategic autonomy as a French concept. They view Paris as the main

proponent of the ESA - partly because after the end of the Cold War, the words strategic autonomy first appeared in French “White Paper on Defence” of 1994 and since then the concept has been a defining element in French strategic debate. Furthermore, France sees ESA as a continuation of national strategic autonomy, which it defines “as the ability to decide and act freely in an interdependent world” and tries to actively advocate it as a goal for Europe. (Franke and Varma 2019) For this reason, number of European allies have expressed their fear and suspicion - claiming that France would love to commit the EU to Gaullist turn, severe transatlantic link and bolster French influence. However, a reality-check of France’s defence policy shows that autonomy and alliance membership can go hand in hand. Paris view ESA important due to the two factors: the emergence of the new hybrid threats which significantly deteriorated Europe’s political environment and the advent of Trump administration that has strained transatlantic ties. Nevertheless, for France strategic autonomy is not about conducting a foreign and security policy in total political or military isolation from the United States, but rather about having an ability to decide and act freely in an interdependent world. This freedom is necessarily linked with the reinforcement of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in order to provide the requisite operational capabilities. Like other NATO allies, Paris has benefited from outside support and frequently relies on others- particularly on the United States to develop and maintain critical elements of its military capabilities or to face its adversaries. But, over the past decades France has also invested heavily to be more autonomous and conduct important military operations without depending on others. As French analyst Brustlein explains: “for Europe, being strategically autonomous requires the ability to set a vision of its role in its neighbourhood and on the world stage, to identify desirable political goals, and to craft and implement plans meant to achieve those, including through the use of military force.” (BRUSTLEIN 2018)

While France is one of the main proponents of the European strategic autonomy, other member states of the EU are more divided on the concept. Alongside the France, Germany and Italy consider ESA as an important or somewhat important goal, but neither Germany or Italy has defined its own concept of strategic autonomy. In Berlin the current discourse on strategic autonomy gained prominence after Donald Trump’s election to the presidency and his increased criticism towards Germany. Unlike France, German official documents do not use the exact term and German policy experts sometimes even argue that ESA remains vague, however, Berlin believes that it is important for Europe to improve its capabilities and take on a stronger geopolitical role. Other countries such as Poland, Denmark, the United Kingdom,

the Netherlands and Sweden see ESA as an unimportant or even contested goal and they do so for different reasons. For instance, Dutch experts are concerned that it might lead to the creation of a European army, meanwhile, Luxembourg is generally uninterested in defence questions. Perhaps due to the ambiguity of the concept, member states also find it difficult to agree whether there has been any progress towards European Strategic Autonomy. Paris firmly believes that there has been significant progress towards ESA goals in all areas- whether it is budgetary issues, operational cooperation or collaboration on capacity-related projects, meanwhile, rest of the members regard ESA efforts as having mixed results, and this further reveals the underlying confusion about the issue. (Franke and Varma 2019)

Obviously, a vigorous debate taking place among European policy-makers and analysts about the degree of strategic autonomy and about the extent to which the EU should bolster independent capabilities. The most important factor affecting on this debate is member states' concerns about the relationship with the US and the future of transatlantic defence cooperation. Some EU members argue that "autonomy" implies "separation" or "divorce" and express fear that strategically autonomous Europe can weaken the transatlantic bond and undermine NATO. (Howorth 2019)

Historically, the United States has been very cautious of initiatives which were designed to bolster Europe's strategic autonomy. Even now, Trump and his administration seem to oppose ESA, as they have on multiple occasions criticised the EU and particularly, its efforts to build up its common defence capacity. On the one hand, they have raised objections about diverting resources from NATO and discrimination against the US defence industry, while on the other hand, they have insisted that European states should do more in order to strengthen their capabilities and spend more on defence. (Thompson 2019) In May 2019, in a letter to EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, two US undersecretaries of the Department of State and Department of Defence criticised new European initiatives- such as PESCO and European Defence Fund (EDF) and expressed concerns that the approval of their regulations and conditions risks EU capabilities developing in a manner that produces duplication and unnecessary competition between NATO and EU. (Lord and Thompson 2019)

Such combative behavior intensified Europeans' concerns about the future of transatlantic defence cooperation and left some member states unsure about whether and how to pursue strategic autonomy. For instance, Central and Eastern European countries are increasingly worried about Washington's criticism and its consequences for their own security. The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania feel the most vulnerable in the current geopolitical environment as their regional security situation deteriorated significantly since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and launched a war in Eastern Ukraine. It is important to mention that, since these events the US contribution to security in the Baltic Sea region has grown, however, Baltic leaders are highly concerned about a possible weakening of US presence in the future for two obvious reasons. First, Trump neither cares or values alliances as such and second, rapid changes happening in the global balance of power and there is possibility that the importance of Europe will inevitably decline as the US increasingly focuses on managing China's rise. Against this background, it is not surprising, that Baltic countries raise the objections to the concept of the European strategic autonomy. They believe that NATO remains the corner stone of Europe's collective defence and Europe lacks the resources or political willingness to create a real substitute for America's security umbrella. The view that the EU should complement, and not replace, NATO activities is also shared by non-EU member states in the region, such as Sweden and Finland. (Raik 2019)

That the US criticism has become such an important topic, can be partly explained by the fact that Europeans themselves have not fully defined ESA. Washington also has a poor understanding of the current intra-European debate, its core notion of strategic autonomy and possible implications. Some of the negative reaction particularly in the US, has been caused by the word "autonomy" itself, coupled with the word "strategic" and by the fear that these words could imply delinking between EU and NATO activities. Nevertheless, in spite of the persisting confusion, most member states disagree with the US claim that European efforts in security and defence damages NATO in any way.

A lack of clarity inside the Union is also intensified by the fact that the EU member states significantly diverge about the design and nature of ESA. While some members perceive it as decision-making autonomy, (Especially larger states such as Germany, France, Poland, Belgium or the UK) others believe that it is autonomy of action, which requires military and civilian capabilities and operational readiness. (A concern in countries such as Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria). And finally, information autonomy, which involves

intelligence and data collection and which is mainly a concern in Austria, Estonia, Croatia and Malta. Furthermore, there remains countries which see ESA involving all three components, others none of them, and countries who primarily view ESA as “autonomy from outside powers” (Franke and Varma 2019)

An essential question about the nature of European strategic autonomy concerns whether it should involve only civilian missions or it should replace NATO’s main function and include European territorial defence as well. In the EUGS, there are sentences to the effect that while NATO remains the primary actor in European collective defence, EU member states should have a capacity to work together and undertake robust missions when European and American interests are not aligned. To quote the EUGS:

“While NATO exists to defend its members - most of which are European -from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as, to act autonomously if and when necessary”. (European Union External Action Service 2016)

Strategic autonomy does not mean the creation of completely independent capabilities, nor the rejection of the US support. It rather shows that the EU (via the CSDP) aims to become a military actor comparable to NATO without undermining or questioning its supremacy. (Howorth 2018) Furthermore, currently the clear and undisputed leadership in NATO lies with the United States and it is materially and financially impossible for the EU to provide its own security without the American support. Some analysts argue that even though EU members spend approximately 207 billion Euros per year on defence, “it would take European countries up to 10 to 15 years before they would be able to reach the level of conventional military capabilities that they would need to compensate for American contributions”. Others argue that Europeans at the most will be able to improve their capacity and tackle regional crises without American help. (Dent 2018)

Various experts and policy-makers are making statements that in order the EU to be able to transform its enthusiasm into reality and achieve credible and viable strategic autonomy, it needs to combine three indispensable building blocks- operational, industrial and political autonomy. Operational autonomy refers to the capacity to plan and conduct variety of civilian and/or military operations without major contributions from others. Europeans need to have

the necessary capabilities at its disposal, such as command and control assets, as well as, modern and deployable capabilities to counter threats and effectively use them during conflict prevention, crisis response or conflict resolution. Furthermore, it is important for member states to deal with both collective to individual inefficiency in defence spending, which directly contributing to a lack of interoperability. More sustainable defence policies has the potential to help foster Europe's operational autonomy. Another important dimension, Industrial autonomy refers to the capacity to develop and build important capabilities which are required to achieve operational autonomy. Strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base is a key when it comes to achieving strategic autonomy, especially at the operational level – as it provides its basis. And finally, these two dimensions should be complemented by political autonomy, which is the ability to take security policy decisions freely and independently and act upon them. European Union needs to seek improvements in capabilities generation, operations and procurement, but at the same time, it has to analyse strategic environment, formulate clearly defined foreign and security goals and decide which tools will be used in their pursuit. These different types of autonomy are mutually dependent, and important proposals aimed at acquiring capabilities, funding research and development or establishing institutions cannot be implemented if there is a lacuna existing at political level. (KEMPIN and KUNZ 2017)

CHAPTER 2 - THREATS

2.1 Russia's assertive foreign policy

Russia poses a multifaceted threat to Europe. President, Vladimir Putin's active revisionist policy in Europe and beyond generating a new reality on the ground and put at stake the very foundations of the regional security arrangements so thoroughly constructed since the end of the Cold War. For years, European and U.S policymakers were slow to acknowledge and react to the reality of Russia and the threat it posed to western democracies and its neighbours. During the first six years of Putin's presidency, Russia was treated as a great power and was one of the selected countries in G-8 summit – an annual meeting between leaders from eight of the most powerful countries in the world. (Andrew 2018) However, things changed after Russia's illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea in March 2014, as well as, its subsequent

engagement in the Donbas region and support for the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. Seizing the territories of neighbouring states, such as Georgia and then Ukraine sparked widespread concern among Western policymakers over Moscow's assertive foreign policy and its direct challenge to the European security architecture.

First of all, with the seizure of Crimea, Kremlin openly violated fundamental principles of the international law. As an open act of aggression it contradicted the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly, the commitment of participating states to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or independence of any state. (Pifer 2017) Furthermore, Russian revisionism is undermining well-known principles/norms of European politics. It carries out its alternative agenda and puts forward its own vision, so-called *realpolitik* which implies spheres of influence, balance of power and principle of self-help. Until recently, European security has been constructed mostly along the neoliberal and neo-functional lines - meaning that high levels of interdependence, mutual trust, and long-term cooperation have been key elements of the security environment. Meanwhile, the use of force, arms races and intimidation have been mostly marginalized. However, the Ukrainian crisis marked the end of the Post-Cold War period that was characterized by widespread hope that the peaceful revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe would give rise to the democratic peace. (Kapitonenko 2016)

At the core of current political dispute between Russia and the West are two competing claims. On the one hand, West wants to spread its fundamental values, such as peace and liberal democracy and gives a chance to any state that meets certain criteria to be accepted as a member of Western structures, such as NATO or the EU. On the other hand, Putin's Russia actively resists Western actors, their values and institutions and tries to create anti-Western sphere of influence in its neighbourhood. (Nünlist and Thränert 2015) These clashes share a common thread- they are all rooted in a normative disagreement over the rules of the international order. As a result, Kremlin openly projects influence over the post-Soviet states by promoting regional cooperation and integration through new regional organisations, and uses wide range of instruments to pressure those countries to follow its leadership priorities. It also increasingly tries to weaken post-Soviet countries' efficiency by cultivating separatism, corruption and energy ineffectiveness in order to increase their dependence on Russia's political and financial support. (Kapitonenko 2016)

Ukraine is the fulcrum of this geostrategic contest. It is one of those countries that seeks to avoid a return to Russia's tutelage and aims to become part of the Western structures. However, Kremlin significantly contributes to ensuring that Kiev remains weak and divided, deeply embroiled in territorial conflicts for the foreseeable future. After the Georgia war in 2008 – a crisis, the long-term consequences of which have remained under looked, Russia confirmed once more that it can react violently to the encroachment of Western-led globalization and perceived challenges in what it regards as its “privileged sphere of influence”. (Nünlist and Thränert 2015)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine provoked the security concerns in Europe. Nevertheless, the perceptions of Russia as a military threat differ sharply among the EU member states and appear to be heavily influenced by Geographical proximity to Russia. European countries that share a border with Russia regard it as potentially posing an existential threat to their security and feel concerned about Russian subversion or surprise attack. This is particularly true for Baltic States, Poland and to a lesser extent Finland, Norway, Denmark and lastly, Sweden – which does not have a common border with Russia but has the strategically located island of Gotland. Russia's neighbours are well aware of the military imbalance between Russian forces and their own much smaller forces and believe that this threat can be best addressed by the deployment of U.S and NATO troops on their territory. By contrast, countries that do not share a border with Russia do not see as immediate a threat from Moscow and even worry that permanently stationing of U.S and NATO troops would antagonize Kremlin. European countries, particularly eastern NATO members are also increasingly concerned that Russia could employ hybrid warfare – which is defined as a combination of various types of tactics, from conventional to non-conventional methods such as cyber warfare, irregular or psychological warfare and influencing the domestic politics. (Pezard, et al. 2017)

The Ukrainian conflict and the term ‘hybrid warfare’ which is now ultimately linked to Russia has fundamentally altered the European security debate due to a number of reasons. For the West, the ‘surprise’ of Russia's military operations in Ukraine was not primarily generated by the tools which were used to support a military action (corruption, economic coercion or disinformation campaigns or deception) but rather by the ability to utilise such tools in an efficient and simultaneous manner. Furthermore, until Crimea hybrid operations were thought to be mainly conducted by non-state actors, however, in the Ukrainian crisis it was one of the strongest military powers adopting such tactics. (Popescu 2015)

Russia employs a very broad array of instruments against the West. In some cases, Moscow acts openly, but in many others, it uses clandestine measures to mask its intent and affect political and strategic realities within the EU and NATO. The image from 2017 French election perfectly capture the current Russia-EU relationship and Moscow's attempts to erode the Western liberal consensus from within. Over the past several years, the Russian leader and French far-right politician and presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen have developed close ties. On 24th March, one month before the vote, Putin received Le Pen in the Kremlin and stressed the "great importance" of ties between his country and France. This meeting intensified Europe's fears that Putin was sympathetic for far-right leaders and that the European project destroyed by nationalist-populist forces would be cheered on by the Kremlin. Two months later, despite of a hacking attack on the eve of the election and Russian propaganda channels that actively spread false information during the election, Emmanuel Macron became the new pro-European French President. (Liik 2018)

The French experience, as well as, Russia's earlier interference in Germany and the United States, confirmed that currently Moscow is much more motivated to fight on the normative front than it once was. On the one hand, Russia is actively working to empower anti-European Union populists with offers of cooperation, loans and propaganda in order to erode the EU's confidence and position from within. While on the other hand, Russia uses the hacker community and private companies to carry out its cyber operations and meddle in the European domestic politics. Such efforts have been accelerated after 2004-2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the 2008 war in Georgia, when Russia realized that its military was underdeveloped and that it had lost the information war with the West. Subsequently, Moscow decided to compensate for its deficiencies and created an array of propaganda websites with the aim to promote Russian narrative instead of Western one. (Liik 2018)

While Russia is not the only state in having designed cyber tools that have real world effects, its behaviour and tactics are still different from other cyber powers. Moscow obtains significant amounts of information and tries to release it on a massive scale in order to shape Western politics in ways and to an extent that other cyber players have not done. Furthermore, Russia tries to implement its long-standing intent to throw-off balance domestic politics in EU countries by actively dumping leaks ahead of elections, using trolls and bots to spread disinformation and advertising fake news on its media outlets. Obviously, in the last decade,

Russia moved from quiet cyber-espionage into more assertive behaviour - choosing aggressive and more high-profile cyber strategies than other hostile cyber powers, such as China or North Korea. (Popescu 2018)

It is interesting to explore the impact of Russian meddling in Europe. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations' (ECFR) surveys, most EU countries see some evidence of Russia's attempts to influence their domestic politics, but think that Russia has not established considerable influence over the country as a whole and that its effects remain limited. Still, some narratives promoted by Moscow gain significant traction in Europe, and Western capitals try to stay alarmed at Russia's hybrid warfare campaigns. Even countries that have not experienced much Russian meddling, take this issue very seriously and are remarkably united in their assessment of Russia. This sharply contrasts with the situation a decade ago, when a lack of unity was the chief reason that Europe had no effective policy on Russia. Increased number of cyber-attacks, disinformation operations and exploitation of minorities in target countries served as a wake-up call for the EU member states and now European policymakers overwhelmingly perceive Russia as posing a normative threat. Furthermore, most of the EU countries are also significantly aligned in assessments of the military threat from Moscow, and believe that Russia's actions actually or potentially destabilising almost all the strategic regions. (Liik 2018)

Most of the EU member states agree that Putin's Russia threatens normative, as well, as a military challenge, however, the union still seems to be divided over its Russia policy. Maintaining the post-2014 sanctions regime on Russia was already a big achievement for the EU, but the recent developments show that after several years of relative unity, it is increasingly difficult to balance member states' different positions and interests vis-à-vis Moscow. On the one side of the current rift are those who see Russia as a primary security threat and call the EU to adopt a much stricter stance towards Moscow. On the other side are those who call for engagement with Russia because they consider other challenges more important in the context of a changing international system. (Fischer 2019) Nevertheless, despite of the diverging views, most of the member states realize that it is important to maintain their current, rather fragile, unity on Russia in order to effectively respond to the possible conventional and unconventional offensive actions.

2.1.1 Analysis

Russia's ties with Germany – its most important European partner – have become increasingly strained in the last few years. The trend of largely positive Russian-German relations began to unravel when Putin announced that he would again run for president in 2012 and markedly deteriorated when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. (Trenin 2018) Nowadays, as Berlin looks to the east, it is undergoing a process of redefinition of its Ostpolitik (German: “Eastern Policy”). In the Cold War context, the primary example of Ostpolitik was West Germany's willingness to engage with Soviet Union through energy cooperation, while at the same time, it participated in the western sanctions regime. Such a cooperative approach, remained at the core of German policy towards Russia, after the end of the Cold War and Soviet Union dissolution. However, since 2014 up to the present, the relationship between Russia and Germany has not evicted the same level of mutual appreciation as before. (Forsberg 2016) Russia's revanchism and military aggression have profoundly changed German foreign policy, which since the Russia-Ukraine crisis has been subject to international pressure to engage more actively in restoring the peace and security order in Europe. Following the annexation of the Crimea, a narrative about Vladimir Putin's autocratic governance style and aggressive foreign policy began to dominate in German public discourse and Berlin started a process of redefinition of its Ostpolitik. Subsequently, Russian actions triggered a change of heart in Germany's foreign policy elite and Berlin deviated from long-term tradition of co-operative and trusting relations with Moscow. (Daehnhardt and Handl 2018)

Furthermore, changing international environment and simultaneous crises have put German foreign policy under considerable pressure. Brexit, U.S isolationist politics and threats such as migration and terrorism have compelled Berlin to find a reliable ally, such as France in order to strengthen EU's security and defence role and to balance a threat coming from Russia. Germany's increased will to play more prominent role in EU's security and defence cooperation can be explained through the lens of Stephen M. Walt's balance of threat theory. According to the balance of threat theory, states will not balance against states that are increasing in power, but rather against those that are perceived as threat. Moscow is geographically proximate to Europe, displays higher level of aggressive intent and overall, poses a serious threat to EU both in the military arena and in cyberspace. While Berlin is not threatened by Russia's direct military attack, Germans increasingly fear that Russia might interfere in their domestic politics through hacking, propaganda, business ties and manipulating

domestic media. Furthermore, Berlin knows that the Central and Eastern European countries are particularly concerned with Russia's assertive policy. Given how tiny the Baltic states are and how vast and threatening the Russian military exercises near their borders, Berlin might expect that Moscow will threaten the EU's stability. Germany tries to increase resilience, deterrence and defence options against Russia through close cooperation with France. This is particularly important in times when the president of EU's main ally, U.S seems to view alliances as encumbrances and the UK – union's biggest military power is leaving.

France which historically had close ties with Russia, currently, does not feel as threatened by Moscow as Germany or other EU member states. Most recently, French President Emmanuel Macron declared Russia to no longer be NATO's enemy and called for closer ties with the Kremlin. Moreover, He stated that there are more severe threats which need to be addressed and that new talks with Russia are vital to European security. (Brest 2019) However, France like Germany, also fears that Russia can interfere in its domestic politics through propaganda or opinion leaders. Generally, French public does not share positive views of Vladimir Putin and its aggressive foreign policy. Yet, Paris likes to use dialogue with Russia to emphasize its continued relevance on the international stage. On the one hand, France tries to defend the European project against Putin's assertive policy, while on the other hand, it tries to strengthen ties with Russia and secure Moscow's co-operation in other international crises. (Liik 2018)

For Germany, Russia is an emerging threat. The perception of Russia as a threat is intensified by the construction of the Nord Stream Pipeline 2, which would link Russia to Germany under the Baltic sea. Europe has depended on Russian energy for a long time, however, as Moscow is increasingly becoming a dangerous adversary, Germany needs to take into account future strategic considerations. Berlin realizes that "soft power" will no longer be enough if the EU wants to assert itself on the world stage, especially, if the main ally - America will be reluctant to deal with the European challenges. For this reason, Germany tries to take more proactive role in the EU's security and defence and cooperate with France in order to strengthen its position and balance potential political or economic threats from Moscow.

2.2 Challenges in transatlantic relations

It is widely believed that the post-war, liberal international order has been a largely US creation. Washington's consensus, geopolitically bound to the Western 'core' during the Cold War, went global after the Soviet threat disappeared and the "unipolar moment" had arrived. (Stokes 2018) The United States, through the gaze of its hegemony, recognized that its national interest was to ensure international stability, provide leadership, economic openness, security cooperation and spread liberal democracy. (Rielly 2019) In the security domain, American commitment to Europe has been a reliable constant since 1945, as a multilaterally oriented US has always been the main supporter of the NATO – whose principal task is to protect its European members.

Throughout NATO's existence, numerous US defence secretaries and presidents have criticized European members of the alliance and complained about their tendency to take advantage America's security shield to free-ride. (Carpenter and Tupy 2010) Since the late 1990s, such criticism intensified because of the lack of political commitment to the NATO and insufficient military contributions of European NATO members. Especially, since the George W. Bush administration, the US has called on European states to increase their defence expenditures and build up capacities to become more active in international military operations. The Obama administration also encouraged European allies to boost their military capabilities. However, despite repeated US calls, most European countries preferred to continue benefiting from the American security umbrella rather than taking necessary steps to become a more powerful actor itself. (Dyck 2018)

Donald J. Trump's victory in the 2016 US presidential election has inspired alarm across the political spectrum in the United States and marked a turning point for Europe. The "America First" motto proclaimed by Donald Trump – or in other words "Americanism, instead of globalism" directly calls the American internationalist tradition into question and causes a high degree of uncertainty among European leaders over the future of the transatlantic relations. Many of the Trump's statements are incompatible with the general guidelines of the American foreign policy and captures a strongly felt scepticism about the value of America's alliance commitments, as well as, doubts about the usefulness of the free trade. (Rudolf 2017) With more nationalist and transactional approach, the current US administration is laying the groundwork for a fundamental shift in the predominant American foreign policy narrative that has been prevailed since the end of the Second World War and that portrays the US as an indispensable, leading power - guaranteeing the liberal international order. (Thompson 2017)

Indeed, Trump is a president to whom the logic of “liberal” hegemony is completely foreign. His “America First” concept is all about US national security and prosperity and it seems that he has very little inclination to base US foreign policy on the country’s traditional democratic and humanitarian values. (Larres 2017) Trump administration at least partly builds on a ‘Jacksonian’ foreign policy tradition, which was only a marginal phenomenon in the last decades. Jacksonian foreign policy puts America first and it is not interested in the promotion of democracy or multilateral processes. Such orientation is the total opposite of Wilsonian tradition, which during the post-Cold war period embraced the opportunity to work with allies and enlarge the democratic space within Europe. (Hamilton 2017)

When it comes to conducting US’ foreign policy, President Trump often shows his abrasive style of personalized diplomacy and unpredictable behavior. Certainly, in recent years, Trump’s erratic behavior, his opposition to America’s alliance relationships and free trade, as well as, his sympathy for strongmen and autocrats have soured transatlantic relations. Already, during his presidential campaign Trump repeatedly questioned the utility of NATO and since coming to power he continued to cast doubt over the value of NATO to the USA and the sanctity of the Alliance’s Article V security guarantee. (AGGESTAM and PRICE 2019)

Furthermore, American calls for higher European defence expenditures have been growing louder ever since President Trump took an office. His administration has attached great importance to burden sharing and berated the Europeans for free riding, argued that they were taking advantage of US generosity. After attacking NATO leaders for months, for not meeting a 2% spending target, on July 11, 2018 during the NATO summit Trump suddenly announced that members should increase their defence spending to 4 per cent of their country’s economic output - double the group’s current goal. (Carbonnel 2018)

European allies realize that the increased calls for greater defence spending are linked to questioning of the American pledge to stand by the mutual clause. For this reason, they are forced to take a defensive stance and rethink how well they can compete in the world. (Rudolf 2017) Moreover, Europeans fear that Trump may threaten not just the transatlantic bond, but the state of their union. As European Council President Donald Tusk told the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit in an interview: “Donald Trump poses one of the biggest challenges for the European Union, because he is “praying” for the breakup of the bloc”. (Neinaber 2019) On

several occasions, Trump has openly demonstrated its lack of faith in European integration and the cohesion of the EU. (Janning 2017) He has blamed Germany for its ‘hegemonic’ position in Europe and welcomed Britain’s decision to leave the EU, labelling Europe a trade “foe”. (Neinaber 2019) Clearly, Trump’s policy favours bilateral relations as a cornerstone of his foreign policy and deemphasizing the value of multilateralism and regional organisations. (Laipson 2017)

Most recently, President Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S forces from the Syrian-Turkish border, has further shaken the confidence and trust of Washington’s longtime allies and partners. (MILLER and SOKOLSKY 2019) Until now, the Kurdish-led forces had been Washington’s main ally in the region, however, the Turkish government views Syria’s Kurds as terrorists. Trump’s abrupt decision to pull back U.S troops gave the green light to Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to launch military offensive and invade northern Syria. (Caspani 2019) Consequently, the withdrawal created space for a Turkish assault on the Kurds that has so far costed hundreds of lives and more than 130 000 displaced persons. (The Economist 2019) Even though, it is not a first time when U.S has betrayed Kurdish people, Trump has been universally scorned for putting U.S credibility at risk with its allies in the region and beyond. Indeed, European leaders now think carefully about relying on the U.S for their security and are increasingly worried that Trump might pull American forces from the continent. Such worries are particularly intensified in the east of the continent – where many US troops are based and where countries feel threatened by the potential Russian aggression. (Drury 2018)

Obviously, Trump’s political choices have already affected core European interests and create dangerous implications for Europe. On the one hand, Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S troops from Northern Syria and on the other hand his decertification of the nuclear deal with Iran produced greater anxiety among Europe’s principal players. Trump’s withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal affected a project whose origins are found in an European initiative taken in 2003 and which was aimed at limiting and controlling Iran’s nuclear programme through peaceful means. (Tertrais 2018) The United States and the European Union have often differed over Middle East politics, however, the current dispute goes deeper and could have more far-reaching strategic implications for the transatlantic relationship, as the EU believes that President Trump’s decision constituted an outright challenge to international community of states. (Perthes 2018)

2.2.1 Analysis

While mix of external and internal forces exerting unprecedented pressure on the EU, the US-EU relationship is ailing and weakening both sides of the Atlantic. (Smith 2019) Already during Barack Obama's presidency it was obvious that Europe was a major, but no longer the main focus of American foreign policy. However, President Donald Trump has treated European allies more cavalierly than any other president since the World War II. (Gedmin and Muravchik 2018) Tensions between Germany and the United States began since Trump has become a President and has unleashed a verbal assault on the NATO members, calling them free riders on American power. While most of the allies, had failed to fulfil the goal of spending two per cent of G.D.P for defence, Trump focussed on Germany's military spending and kept berating German Chancellor Angela Merkel personally on number of occasions. (Glasser 2018) U.S has accused its longtime European ally of hurting the U.S financially, taking U.S security guarantees for granted and criticized the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project – claiming that Germany is totally controlled by Russia.

Already in the wake of Brexit and the election of the Donald Trump, Angela Merkel has indicated that Europe can no longer rely on its American and British allies. At the 2017 election rally in Munich, she stated “ The era in which we could fully count on others is somewhat over, as I have noticed in the past few days. We, Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands”. (Paravicini 2017) With this speech German Chancellor pushed EU members to take more responsibility for their own security - implying that they cannot rely solely on an unpredictable United States.

On the other hand, French President also called Europeans to work on building European sovereignty. Speaking in front of a group of French ambassadors on August 27, 2019 Macron stated the following “Europe can no longer rely on the United States for its security. It is up to us to guarantee European security, and therefore European sovereignty”. (Macron 2019) Although, Macron did not call for any break with NATO, it criticized U.S president for being an “unreliable” partner and “turning his back” on the “multilateralism.”

Most recently, in an interview with the Economist, Macron went even further and stated “ We find ourselves for the first time with an American president who does not share our idea of the European project, and American policy is diverging from this project. We need to draw conclusions from the consequences. The consequences, we can see them in Syria at the moment: The ultimate guarantor, the umbrella which made Europe stronger, no longer has the same relationship with Europe. Which means that our defence, our security, elements of our sovereignty, must be re-thought through.” (The Economist 2019) He also warned Europe that NATO is experiencing a brain death and European allies can no longer rely on the US for their own security.

Shortly, German Chancellor publicly condemned Macron’s words during a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. “The French President has found rather drastic words to express his views. This is not how I see the state of cooperation within NATO. Obviously we have to take our destiny in our hands a little bit more in Europe, but the transatlantic partnership for us is absolutely indispensable.” (NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 2019)

Obviously, Berlin is keen on partnership with Paris on EU’s defence and vice versa, but the visions of the two country are somewhat different. Germany wants to remain transatlantic, but it also wants to become more European. Meanwhile, France is being more ambitious and assertive when it comes to EU’s security and defence cooperation. For Germany, as well as, for France Trump and American political trends he represents are highlighting American unreliability and raising awareness among policymakers that the EU can no longer rely solely on US security guarantees. Indeed, the geopolitical logic behind Europe reducing its dependence on the US is very strong, especially during the time when Russia is also becoming more threatening and the Middle East becoming even more unstable. Generally, Europe has an intense strategic and psychological dependence on the United States, however, Trump’s America or any future America might be uninterested in or unable to fulfill their traditional role in Europe and the EU member states should be preparing for that day. (Shapiro and Pardijs 2017)

2.3 Brexit’s security implications

Brexit - the impending withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union, is taking place at a time of growing concern over Europe's strategic and economic position in the world. Given the current international climate, number of scholars have expressed concerns about Brexit and possible European disintegration and started to examine future prospects for European security. The United Kingdom has long ranked among the world's most capable and influential nations in the area of security and defence, therefore, it is important to assess Brexit's strategic consequences for Europe.

The relationship between the EU and the UK has long been peculiar. Since becoming a member in 1973, the United Kingdom has negotiated a number of opt-outs on key parts of EU legislation and in 2016 has become a first country to break away from the union as its citizens voted overwhelmingly in favour of an exit (51.89 % in favour of Brexit and 48.11 % in favour of remaining in the EU). (XAVIER 2018) Brexit was originally due to happen on 29 March, 2019, however, the UK's departure from the union was repeatedly delayed and the EU then agreed to a further extension until 31 January 2020.

In the 21st century, the United Kingdom is no longer a great power, but it is a power of great importance to European security and defence. It possess formidable economic, political and military resources and there is no doubt that British withdrawal will cause a substantial reduction in the EU's operational weight. The UK has the largest defence budget and alongside France is the only military power in the EU which has the ability to deploy close to full-spectrum military capabilities. (Martill and Sus 2018) Following the second World War, Britain continued to spend significant proportion of GDP on defence and it has been fourth largest contributor to the EU's budget, leaving the union with a shortfall estimated at around 9 billion euros per year. (Herszenhorn and Aries 2017)

The other member states are particularly concerned with British withdrawal, as the UK is also a nuclear power with the biggest military capability resources within the EU. Its armed forces remain among Europe's most capable fighting forces with particular strengths in the high-end warfighting spectrum. In contrast to many continental counterparts, British armed forces have considerable reach beyond Europe and can be deployed on different expeditionary operations around the globe. In the land domain, the UK provides high-quality standing deployable corps headquarters and is accustomed to acting as the lead nation for multinational divisions and brigades. When it comes to the air or sea domains, it holds about 50 per cent of all heavy

transport aircraft and more than 25 per cent of all heavy transport helicopters, alongside with 50 % of all nuclear-powered attack submarines in the EU. Moreover, London makes leading contribution to European security through intelligence collection and analysis and effectively develops countermeasures against terrorism and hybrid-warfare techniques. (Giegerich and Mölling 2018)

Brexit is likely to negatively affect almost all EU policy areas and the union stands to lose more tangible assets than those based on military capabilities. The UK represents one of the largest economies in the European Union and holds crucial diplomatic and strategic skills that gives London important weight on the international scene. Furthermore, the UK holds permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where it has considerable political capital and where it is seen as one of the most effective actors. (Gifkins, Jarvis and Ralph 2019) Britain also enjoys ‘special partnership’ with the United States and acts like an important facilitator in transatlantic relations. However, after Brexit the EU will cease to directly benefit from the UK’s key networks and formidable diplomatic presence in most countries. (Martill and Sus 2018)

Despite the fact, the UK is a European foreign policy heavyweight and historically it has played an important role in developing CSDP, more recently it has been viewed as a state that is blocking further defence integration. (Lain and Nouwens 2017) While in military terms, Brexit means a serious capability crunch which risks damaging the EU’s credibility, it is worth recalling that generally the UK had a preference for commitments through the NATO framework and relative to its size it has been very modest contributor to the military strand of the CSDP operations. (Whitman 2016) London has always been reluctant to accept major institutional reforms, permanently blocking the deployment of CSDP missions and operations or not been willing to engage at a level of significant scale and scope with CSDP military operations and vetoing the aspiration of a permanent operational headquarters. (XAVIER 2018)

In the wake of the Brexit vote, many politicians and experts predicted more fragmented and inward-looking EU with less political unity and credibility. Concerns were expressed that the UK’s withdrawal could serve as an example and embolden populist and nationalist movements across the continent. However, instead of anticipated unravelling and disintegration of the union, Brexit appears to have had the opposite effect, reinforcing a sense of “existential crisis”

and greater solidarity among member states. (Martill and Sus 2018) Although most countries regret Brexit because the EU loses a decisive player, they also agree that British withdrawal might be badly needed opportunity to eventually improve security and defence cooperation, taking into account the fact that London had profiled itself as fiercely critical voice to closer EU defence integration. (Major and Mölling 2017)

Indeed, British decision to leave the union, in combination with other external pressures created significant momentum in the EU's Security and Defence Policy. Brexit's most immediate impact on CSDP area has been to give impetus to ideas on reforming EU defence policy which have been in circulation for some time. (Whitman 2016) Furthermore, the referendum vote brought a rare moment of consensus between the EU institutions and member states over the need to protect and strengthen their shared project (Martill and Sus 2018) Indeed, the push for a select group of like-minded EU countries to strengthen their defence cooperation has quickly taken root, however, EU's future ability to deepen integration is still in question, given the fact that the achievement of an EU defence and security policy has been modest to date. (Whitman 2016)

Ongoing discussions among scholars and policy-makers surround not only the nature of the post-Brexit developments within the union, but also the United Kingdom's future commitment to the European security. Even though, EU-UK relations are somewhat complex and the negotiations on the terms of British withdrawal have been characterized by damaging rhetoric on both sides, both countries share great deal of common interests and priorities when it comes to the security and defence. For centuries, London has invested in maintaining a peaceful continental Europe and given the deteriorating regional security situation, both the UK and the EU have strong incentives to cooperate and tackle issues such as terrorism, extremism, instability, cyber threats and so on. (Martill and Sus 2018) However, despite of the geographical proximity, shared history, or interests, the key questions, whether the UK's commitment to European security after Brexit will diminish or whether EU will be prepared to offer the UK strong role in its post-Brexit security policy remain unclear.

2.3.1 Analysis

Brexit is an opportunity but also a threat for Germany, as well as for France. The British Withdrawal can substantially hurt the export-oriented German economy. While on the one

hand, German companies, large and small, worry about possibility of disruptions to supply chains and the movements of raw materials, on the other hand, Berlin increasingly fear that if other member states follow the path of the UK, its stability but also union's stability will be substantially threatened. Amid the Trump's protectionist policies, which have led to a global trade slowdown, Brexit still has been a main factor in weakening German exports. (Rutter 2019) Furthermore, According, to a study by the European Committee of the Regions, the UK's withdrawal from the European Union will put a particular strain on the Germany, therefore, Germans are reasonably worried that if other states leave the union, their economic/political stability will be on a stake. (Beswick 2018) So far, France's economy is holding up, despite of the German slowdown. However, French policymakers are getting increasingly anxious how their German counterparts will manage to pull Europe's biggest military back from the recession and what will be the implications for French economy. (Leigh 2019)

Both France and Germany, fear that Brexit might lead to further increase in populist nationalism in many member states. According to the Conan Fischer, leading authority on modern European history and an author of a Vision of Europe, any weakening of European Union will give more power to right-wing populist nationalists across the continent and post-Brexit increased rivalries and identity politics driven separatism would be very disruptive in many cases. Furthermore, the proximity of Russia to many potential instabilities constitutes a major, additional problem. (Keys 2019) Over the past decade, Russia has boosted right-wing populists across Europe. Putin has been openly supporting far-right leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France and helping financially to keep her presidential campaign alive. President Putin sees populist, far-right movements as useful tools to manipulate people and to create divisions in the European politics which he can effectively exploit. Such trend is possible to accelerate after Brexit - a campaign Russia's propaganda channels highly promoted. (Foer 2016) Indeed, in the recent years, the upsurge of populism in Europe has provided Russia with an ample supply of sympathetic political parties that poses direct threat to EU's stability. These parties are mainly from the far-right but also from the far-left groups, who are increasingly trying to saw divisions in the EU and advance Russian agenda in Europe. While Russia is not responsible for the emergence of the pro-Russian parties, Kremlin embraced them as they are useful tools to shift Europe's domestic debates in Russia's favour, legitimise Moscow's policies and amplify Russian disinformation. (Wesslau 2016)

Indeed, the exit of a key member state will have a strong and lasting impact upon the European union. However, it also gives an opportunity to France and Germany to further reinforce their positions in the union and advance key issues, such as security and defence. Both, Paris and Berlin, already seized the opportunity to strengthen the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and proposed number of important initiatives. However, while they agree, some major differences still remain in their strategic cultures. France as a nuclear-armed permanent member of the UN Security Council is more decisive and has a special sense of responsibility for global security, meanwhile Germany is ready to take more responsibility but remains cautious and more reluctant to deploy robust military forces abroad. (Koehane 2017)

However, France and Germany in particular openly admit that CSDP might finally prosper without the UK's opposition to it. This explains the strong Franco-German commitment since 2016 in launching a set of proposals that have been made for deepening existing defence collaboration between the EU's other member states. (Major and Mölling 2017) Furthermore, Germany realizes very well the necessity to cooperate more closely with France, in order to counter any potential destabilizing effects coming from Russia – especially in times of uncertainty with their transatlantic ally.

2.4 The threat of jihadi terrorism and 'Migration Crisis'

Terrorism is far from being a new phenomenon in Europe. Some EU member states, such as Spain, Italy, France and the United Kingdom have long history of fighting terrorist groups and individuals. However, in the post 9/11 world, the terrorist threat has evolved to a more global scale and more European countries have become the target of the jihadist terrorist attacks. (Immenkamp, et al. 2019)

More recently, the intensification of the civil war in Syria, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the establishment of the Islamic State (IS) motivated numerous young people from around the world to join terrorist organizations. Among them are thousands of radicalized citizens of European countries who openly declared their hostility to Europe. Indeed, since early 2014, a gradual trend has appeared with Islamic state activists returning to Europe and taking part in their planning and enactment. Although the vast majority of terrorist attacks are elsewhere in the world, an unprecedented number of attempted or

successful operations have taken place in European states in the last few years - including France, Belgium, Germany, Finland, the UK, Spain and Sweden. (Schweitzer 2018)

While the United States has experienced no attacks directed by foreign terrorist organizations since 9/11, the threat in Europe is more severe - consisting of a mixture of attacks directed by ISIS and its affiliates, as well as, homegrown ISIS-enabled and ISIS-inspired attacks. (New America n.d.) In the period of 2015-2017, large-scale terrorist attacks were carried out in the European Union, which proved the severity of the threat. Well-known examples are the attacks in Paris (January and November 2015), Brussels (2016), Nice (2016), Manchester (2017) and Barcelona (2017). (Zuijdewijn and Sciarone 2019) It is important to mention, that Europe has not seen an ISIS-directed attack since May 2017, sophistication decreased in attack plots and the number of arrests for jihadi terrorism also declined in 2017 and 2018, after increasing every year from 2013 through 2016. (New America n.d.) Furthermore, by December 2017, the ISIS caliphate had lost its 95 per cent of the territory, that was followed with the seize of its last holdout in 2019. On March 23, the fall of Baghouz formally ended the caliphate's claim to any territory. (Glenn, et al. 2019) However, despite these promising signs, Europe faces a continued and substantial threat. A United Nations Security Council Report recently concluded that threat from Islamist extremist groups remain high and with the demise of ISIS' territorial state in Syria and Iraq, ISIS-enabled or ISIS-inspired attacks are still likely to occur in many locations. (The United Nations Security Council 2019)

Removing ISIS from its caliphate appears to have positive consequences for European security. However, despite the fact that ISIS now carrying out less-directed attacks, there is ongoing concern about future extremist landscape among Western officials, practitioners and analysts alike. A UN Security Council Report further notes that even though the geographical caliphate of Islamic State has ceased to exist, underlying ideology and factors that gave rise to Islamic State still persist and that the threat from it or other similar groups is unlikely to decline. (Burke 2019) Moreover, Europe is simply closer in geography to the parts of the world where revolution and war have opened opportunities for jihadist organizing and any repercussions of instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can have substantial impact on the member states. (New America n.d.)

The latest crisis in Syria highlights the fact that the EU still faces serious cross-border security threats. The surprise withdrawal of U.S forces in Syria and the subsequent commencement of Turkish military operations against Kurdish-led forces who have been a key U.S ally in the fight against ISIS - has ensued chaos in the region. Kurdish officials' reports, that amid the Turkish offensive, hundreds of IS supporters have escaped from prisons have sparked fears that extremism could rise from the ashes in Syria. Indeed, after U.S disengagement the reality is that there is no force left in the region to counter an extremist revival. Further conflict will only fuel radicalization and give ISIS another possibility to seize swaths of territory for a new caliphate and send foreign fighters to Europe in order to carry out terrorist attacks. (Katz and Carpenter 2019)

Since 2015, the challenges of terrorism have also become increasingly interlinked with migration both in European public debates and on political agenda. The influx of more than 1.5 million refugees and migrants fleeing war and persecution in the Middle East and Africa created deep divisions in the EU and fuelled anti-immigrant rhetoric across the continent. A number of European policy-makers expressed concerns over Islamist terrorists exploiting refugee channels to enter to EU, meanwhile attacks carried out in Paris (2015) and in Brussels (2016) further intensified public fears about terrorism.

Although possible policy reactions to the migration crisis were immediately discussed at the European level, it became clear from the very beginning that EU Member States' reactions and approaches differed significantly. While some countries strengthened borders and implemented restrictions, others openly welcomed the refugees. These differences have highlighted a clash of interests between member states and led chaotic responses by the EU as a whole. During this period, the question of security became particularly important for the union, especially after some of the attackers had managed to enter the EU posing as refugees. (Hassel and Wagner 2016)

The crisis and the lack of preparedness made it very difficult for the EU to absorb the large influx of migrants and refugees and to manage its external borders. Furthermore, it extremely divided the tone of the debate among 28 EU members. If Germany and Sweden welcomed

refugees, France and the United Kingdom took more cautious stance, while Eastern and Central European countries adopted anti-immigrant policies. (Larivé 2015)

2.4.1 Analysis

Both Germany and France consider jihadi terrorism and migration crisis as a substantial threat to the EU's stability and security. Since the start of 2015, jihadists have killed over 300 people and injured thousands more in different European cities. However, French political scientist Gilles Kepel, argues that among other countries, France experienced the worst this new wave of terrorism. (Klausen 2017) Not surprisingly, French President believes that NATO's biggest threat is Terrorism and not Russia or China. In his recent interview with The Economist, Macron stated the following: "In my discussions with President Trump when he says 'It is your neighbourhood, not mine', when he states publicly 'the terrorists, the jihadists that are over there, they are Europeans, they are not American'", when he says, "It's their problem, not mine" – we must hear what he is saying." (The Economist 2019) Obviously, France and Germany both have a strong incentive to closely cooperate with each other in security and defence issues to successfully deal with potential terrorist threats, especially when United States seem disinterested in European problems.

The migration crisis is also major threat to European stability, as it represents one of the most complex issues in the recent history of the European Union. The arrival millions of migrants has birthed a political earthquake that promises to reshape European politics. (Schindler 2016) Indeed, the East-West divide on the migration crisis has resulted in the resurgence of populism across the continent and has altered the political reality in the EU. Some politicians are making the most of the new threat, closely interlink migration and terrorism with each other. In France the far-right National Front (FN) has surged in polls because of its tough lines on migrants and terrorism, while in Germany the far-right parties are also on the rise. Particularly, important has been the breakthrough of the Alternative of Germany (AfD) in the state level elections. The level of xenophobia and nationalism which significantly intensified right after the migration crisis, seem unlikely to disappear any time soon and the rise of such far-right movements pose a serious threat to EU's internal stability. (Schindler 2016) Over the last few years, Russia has been very active in exploiting migration crisis with its customary propaganda games. Already in 2016, when the refugee crisis was still ongoing, US general Philip Breedlove, Head of

NATO forces in Europe, accused Russia of working actively to exacerbate refugee flows in an attempt to destabilize, overwhelm European structures and break European resolve. (Schoemaker 2019) Russian state-owned outlets such as RT, or Sputnik prominently feature fake stories on violent migrants to the EU in order to stoke European fears. (Schindler 2016)

Indeed, Russia alongside with Syria, deliberately using migration as an aggressive strategy towards Europe. Since the crisis strained the NATO alliance, provoked domestic distrust in European governments, spread right-wing nationalist movements across the continent and the debate over refugees thought to be partially responsible over the UK's decision to withdraw from EU, Putin increasingly tries to wisely exploit such vulnerabilities, make Europe effective target for Russia and finally destabilize the European Union. (Shinkman, 2019)

For Germany this is a very serious problem, as it is a country that took more than one million refugees and which is currently experiencing populist and nationalist uprising. Berlin knows that Russian attempts can significantly destabilize the region and unleash the new migrant crisis or strengthen far-right movements and internally divide the EU. In the current geopolitical environment – when the EU's main ally U.S does not seem very interested in Europe's own neighbourhood, Germany has to closely cooperate with France in order to be able to deal with potential threats. France also realizes that without Germany, the EU will not be able to become more assertive and effective in defence and security matters.

CHAPTER 3 – Strengthening of the CSDP

The following chapter aims to demonstrate the various stages of the CSDP development since the EU has been challenged by a series of crises. The empirical evidence available so far, a number of new initiatives, policy projects and stated intentions certainly document that stronger cooperation in the area of security and defence is certainly gaining momentum and Franco-German couple has the main role in it. (Krotz and Schild 2018)

In June 2016, four days after Brexit, the French and German foreign Ministers published a nine-page document entitled “A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties”. Acknowledging that the EU is “being severely put to the test” French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and German Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated that the bloc is challenged

by series of crises in its southern and eastern environment. The France and Germany – two countries which are at the core of the EU recognised their responsibility to reinforce cohesion and solidarity within the Union. As part of this Franco-German “recommitment” to “a shared vision of Europe as a security union, based on solidarity and mutual assistance between Member States in support of common security and defence policy” foreign ministers urged the EU to strengthen their defence efforts. In order the EU to face a deteriorating security environment they suggested the creation of European Security Compact “which encompasses all aspects of security and defence dealt with at the European level”. (Ayrault and Steinmeier 2016) Furthermore, the document suggested making use – for the first time ever – of the Lisbon treaty’s clause on permanent structured co-operation (PESCO) (Articles 42 [6] and 46 of the TEU) in military matters. “It allows for the creation of a subgroup of Member States committing themselves to strict criteria with regard to the development of their defence capacities, as well as, their participation in European equipment programmes and multinational forces”. (Krotz and Schild 2018) With this document French and German foreign ministers formed the basis for the further discussions and expressed their shared commitment to stronger security and defence cooperation. Following the EU’s strongest military power - the UK’s decision to leave the union, France and Germany both recognized their responsibility to take a leadership role in times of European turmoil and strong internal and external challenges.

In June 2016, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) has been presented by High representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Federica Mogherini. Long awaited and very much needed the EUGS is one of the most ambitious EU documents on defence to date. The EUGS recognizes that the EU is under the existential threat. To the east European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plugged the Europe to the south. Managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge. The document calls on Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security. “We must be ready to able to deter, respond to and protect ourselves against external threats” and to implement the “comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises through coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal” (European Union External Action Service 2016) Furthermore, the EUGS states that “the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO”. (European Union External Action Service 2016) As Grevi argues the essence of the EUGS is about protecting and promoting Europe’s interests in the face of multiple external and internal threats.

The document does a good job as “it provides an overall rationale for EU foreign policy; selects priorities in ways broadly consistent with EU interests; points to shortcomings in capabilities and procedures; and it offers quite a bit of guidance for further action”. (Grevi 2016) Yet, the EUGS may still sound ambiguous, particularly, its proposal to seek ‘an appropriate level of strategic autonomy’. Among the EU member states, considerable differences exist on the overall rationale and support for the concept. (Johnston 2019) The EUGS is a good starting point to make CSDP more effective. It does contain a large number of proposals, that are not spelled out in details, but defined precisely enough to point toward action. (Techau 2016)

In September 2016, French defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his German counterpart, Ursula von der Leyen laid out a roadmap towards a revitalized CSDP. After Brexit vote, France and Germany put on the table a six-page report, which contains a real action plan to relaunch European defence. (Barluet 2016) France, the EU’s leading military power and Germany, in search of growing international involvement expressed their will to introduce some concrete proposals for the “comprehensive, realistic and credible Defence in the European Union”. (Drian and Leyen 2016) In the context of a degraded security environment and armed attacks in Paris and Brussels, the document calls other EU member states to strengthen solidarity and European capacities in defence. Besides calling for PESCOs, the proposal introduced plans for closer defence cooperation and advocated joint EU military headquarters and swifter deployment of overseas mission. Furthermore, authors proposed incentives for member states to increase their defence budget and expressed an aim at expanding the scope of common financing benefitting CSDP military missions and operations. (Drian and Leyen 2016) Overall, with this document, France and Germany once again confirmed their leading role and shared commitment to the future development of the EU’s security and defence cooperation.

At the 19th Franco-German Ministerial Council, in 2017, France and Germany announced the launch of European initiative in favour of PESCO and defined a common approach to the criteria allowing partner states to participate. (Krotz & Schild, 2018) Shortly, on 13 November, 2017 Foreign and Defence ministers agreed on launching a PESCO and acknowledged the need for enhanced cooperation, increased investment and more cooperation in developing defence capabilities. On 11 December, Council adopt the decision establishing PESCO and its list of participants, a total of 25 Member States. “PESCO is a treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military

operations. This will enhance the EU's capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending.” (European External Action Service, 2019) PESCO is an important development in the history of the European security and defence cooperation, as it is designed to stimulate European defence and seeks to assist the EU in becoming more efficient and capable of providing greater output. (Sudreau, et al., 2019) Germany and France have been main drivers behind the PESCO. However, Berlin's main motivation was not primarily to increase union's defence capabilities but instead to maintain and even strengthen the EU as the central political framework in face of various threats, whereas France had a different approach and wanted to strengthen defence capabilities. (Major & Mölling, 2019) However, the German engagement towards PESCO can be seen as an important step towards the goal of creating stronger union.

PESCO was followed by another important development. In June, 2017, the European Defence Fund (EDF) was launched by European Commission. It is a first time when the EU budget is used to co-fund defence cooperation and the EDF functions as a key enabler for the future of European defence. In 2016, Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker stated the following: “For European defence to be strong, the European defence industry needs to innovate. That is why we will propose before the end of the year a European Defence Fund, to turbo boost research and innovation.” (Juncker, 2016) The EDF consists of a “research window” to fund innovative defence research projects and “capability window” to support joint development of defence capabilities – meaning that member states will pool financial contributions to jointly acquire key defence capabilities. (European Commission, 2017) Since 2016, Juncker Commission has made an unprecedented effort to protect Europe and Europeans. Most recently, the Commission adopted work programmes to co-finance industrial projects in 2019-2020 up to €500 million and already from 2021, a fully-fledged EDF will promote an innovative and competitive defence industrial base. (European Commission, 2019) EDF is an important step towards stronger security and defence cooperation, as for the first time, there is a programme devoted to boosting innovation in European defence industry.

In order to address union's defence planning shortcomings, member states instituted a new process to ensure a systematic monitoring and get a comprehensive picture of existing, developed and planned military capabilities of participating countries – Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). (Mazurek, 2018) The objective of the CARD is to develop on a voluntary basis, a more structured, transparent way to deliver identified capabilities.

Furthermore, for Card to provide a real added value, it is important the member states to introduce the most up-to-date and detailed information. (European External Action Service, 2017) Even though, CARD is an important development, its voluntary character means that the whole mechanism is based on the “intergovernmental method”, meaning that participating states retain full sovereignty on the information transferred within the CARD. (Mazurek, 2018)

In 2017, French President gave a speech at Paris’ Sorbonne university and provided an ambitious and detailed reform agenda for a more protective EU. He called on Germany to enter into a “partnership” in order to address the long-term threats. “In Europe, we are seeing a two-fold movement: gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States, and a long-term terrorist threat with the stated goal of splitting our free societies.” Furthermore, Macron stated “In the area of defence, our aim needs to be ensuring Europe’s autonomous operating capabilities, in complement to NATO.” During his speech, he also called on member states to build and develop common strategic culture by proposing European Intervention Initiative (EI2). (Macron, 2017)

Macron’s speech draw mixed reactions in Berlin and reinforced widespread sense, that the European project is rather fragile. On the one hand, outgoing foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel hailed French proposals saying that: “Emmanuel Macron today held a courageous, a passionate plea against nationalism and for Europe – a Europe which he wants to reform, strengthen and unite with our help.” While on the other hand, Merkel’s conservative base met the proposals with scepticism and fear. (Neinaber, 2017) However, despite of the initial confusion and vagueness, Germany and France continued working on a number of initiatives.

The European Intervention Force which was signed by 9 EU members was launched on 25 June, 2018. The overarching goal of the initiative is to equip Europe by the beginning of the next decade with a ‘common intervention’ force, a ‘common defence budget’ and a ‘common doctrine of action’. (Mauro, 2018) EI2 aims to bring together willing European countries to prepare themselves better for the future crises – by creating shared strategic culture. In essence, European security interests can be better and faster protected within chosen institutional frameworks. Developing common doctrine and further enhancing interoperability between the armed forces are important steps to realise this goal. (Zandee & Kruijver, 2019)

On 22 January, 2019, Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel signed in Aachen a new Franco-German treaty on cooperation and integration. The treaty has been signed against a significantly deteriorated security environment, amid international tensions, Brexit and the resurgence of the nationalist and populist movements. The treaty laid down the groundwork for important cooperation projects. Berlin and Paris agreed on a mutual Franco-German defence clause, by which both countries pledge to lend each other assistance by all available means, including armed forces if their territories come under armed attack. (GOUVERNEMENT.fr, 2019)

While Emmanuel Macron presented his geopolitical vision in an interview with *The Economist* on 7 November 2019, he also stated the following “ So I think the first thing to do is to regain military sovereignty. I pushed European defence issues to the forefront as soon as I took office, at European level, at Franco-German level. At the Franco-German Council on Ministers on 13 July 2017, we launched two major projects: the tank and the aircraft of the future. Everyone said: ‘We’ll never manage that.’ It is very tough, but we are making progress, it is possible. We launched the European Intervention Initiative that I announced at the Sorbonne and which is now a reality.” (The Economist, 2019) Indeed, since 2016 France and Germany both managed to take a lead on a number of initiatives. Even though they have different views on a number of issues, they are still committed to collaborate closely and advance EU’s security and defence role.

Most Recently, France and Germany reached arms export deal. Paris and Berlin have long clashed over arms export policies and licensing rules and that was significantly hindering developing closer defence cooperation and developing the European defence industry. However, they have managed to reach a “legally binding agreement” that will provide predictability and reliability in the future. Agreement on common rules for weapons and defence exports also paves the way for the development of new tanks, fighter jets and drones. (dw.com, 2019)

The strong Franco-German partnership, their commitment to strengthen the EU’s security and defence role, as well as, the overall number of initiatives and proposals introduced, confirms my hypothesis that the myriad of threats which emerged in the last decade gave CSDP new power and led to a faster development. However, these developments are not without their

limitation and its future progress highly depends not only on Franco-German couple but also other members' commitment and support.

CONCLUSION

The analysis shows that much has happened in the context of CSDP in the last few years. Challenges such as Brexit, increasingly assertive Russia, threat of jihadism and migration crisis, as well as, the US' isolationist politics all substantially affected on the German and French strategic thinking. While some EU member countries are still divided in terms of threat perceptions and general will for stronger EU security and defence role, the overall number of initiatives and proposals introduced in the last few years indicates that EU is slowly strengthening the CSDP. As Sven Biscop, a CSDP expert summarized, since 2016 "everything was happening at once: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF)." (Biscop, 2017) Even though the scope of initiatives that we have seen are arguably much more limited in operational terms than what public discourse indicates, the moment of breakthrough has arrived. Indeed, in the last decade, significant changes have been made and all the major initiatives have been launched as the risk of UK veto vanished. France and Germany are the two main driving forces behind the Common Security and Defence Policy. Changing international environment and simultaneous crises have put German foreign policy under considerable pressure. Brexit, U.S isolationist politics and threats such as migration and terrorism have compelled Berlin to find a reliable ally, such as Paris in order to strengthen EU's security and defence role and to balance a threat coming from Russia. Both France and Germany remain indispensable and irreplaceable allies for each other and continue to take a leading role in security and defence area. Recent developments show that even though the EU remain divided on different issues, they still have managed to overcome some old hurdles and agree on concrete deliverables concerning the planning, financing and conducting CSDP operations. However, these developments are not without their limitation and its future progress highly depends not only on Franco-German couple but also other members' commitment and support.

REFERENCES

AGGESTAM, L. & PRICE, A. H., 2019. Double Trouble: Trump, Transatlantic Relations and European Strategic Autonomy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 57, pp. 114-127.

Andrew, N., 2018. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.press.jhu.edu/news/blog/putin%E2%80%99s-new-russia-fragile-state-or-revisionist-power>

Ayrault, J. M. & Steinmeier, F. W., 2016. *A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties*. [Online]

Available at: https://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/DokumentUE-2.pdf?_cfchljschltk=&ba39b0bbb1ac1953a6e2af7614762807806e26dc-1578095764-0-AVfGOWYmehZxIP77JWRmLDSCUkvR0GCxSKpLOnMtTCbjlchpRJ7E4soEMGM5VPPe9544dV17FKVTL8RvSvN-r1tuYM-WDU53u2rYGcY21OfFv-M-lauTozabNMv5ww

Barluet, A., 2016. *The Franco-German roadmap to relaunch defense Europe: With Brexit, Paris and Berlin want to develop operational and industrial cooperation within the EU.* [Online]
Available at: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/09/11/01003-20160911ARTFIG00140-la-feuille-de-route-franco-allemande-pour-relancer-l-europe-de-la-defense.php>

Bendiek, A., 2017. *A Paradigm Shift in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Transformation to Resilience*, s.l.: s.n.

Beswick, E., 2018. *What do people in other countries think of Brexit?*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.euronews.com/2018/10/17/what-do-people-in-other-countries-think-of-the-brexit>

Biscop, S., 2017. *European Defence: What's in the CARDS for PESCO?*, s.l.: s.n.

Bowen, G., 2009. *Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method.*

Brest, M., 2019. *Macron says Russia is no longer NATO's enemy.* [Online]
Available at: <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/macron-says-russia-is-no-longer-natos-enemy>

BRUSTLEIN, C., 2018. *European Strategic Autonomy: Balancing Ambition and Responsibility*, s.l.: s.n.

BRYMAN, A., 2008. *Social Research Methods*. s.l.:Oxford University Press.

Burke, J., 2019. *New wave of terrorist attacks possible before end of year, UN says.* [Online]
Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/03/new-wave-of-terrorist-attacks-possible-before-end-of-year-un-says>

Carbonnel, A. d., 2018. *Trump tells NATO leaders to increase defense spend to 4 percent.* [Online]
Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-trump-spending/trump-tells-nato-leaders-to-increase-defense-spend-to-4-percent-idUSKBN1K12BW>

Carpenter, T. G. & Tupy, M. L., 2010. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-defense-spending-subsidizes-european-freeriding-welfare-states>

Caspani, M., 2019. *U.S soldiers who fought alongside Kurds blast Trump's Syria retreat.* [Online]
Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-usa-military/u-s-soldiers-who-fought-alongside-kurds-blast-trumps-syria-retreat-idUSKBN1X00ZO>

Chimombo, M. & Roseberry, R. L., 1998. *The Power of Discourse: An introduction to Discourse Analysis*. s.l.:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

- Cohen, L., Manion, L., Morrison, K. & Wyse, D., 2010. *A Guide to Teaching Practice*. s.l.:s.n.
- Daehnhardt, P. & Handl, V., 2018. Germany's Eastern Challenge and the Russia-Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik in the Making?. *German Politics*, 27(4), pp. 445-459.
- Deighton, A., 2002. The European Security and Defence Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, November, 40(4), pp. 719-741.
- Dennison, S., Franke, U. E. & Zerka, P., 2018. *THE NIGHTMARE OF THE DARK: THE SECURITY FEARS THAT KEEP EUROPEANS AWAKE AT NIGHT*, s.l.: EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
- Denscombe, M., 2014. *The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects*. s.l.:McGraw-Hill Education.
- Dent, M., 2018. *EUROPEAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: GOING IT ALONE?*, s.l.: s.n.
- Denzin, N. K., 2012. Triangulation 2.0. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 6(2), pp. 80-88.
- Dijk, T. A. v., 1997. What is Political Discourse Analysis?. *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*, 11(1), pp. 11-52.
- Dijk, T. A. v., 2006. Principles of critical discourse analysis.
- Drian, J.-Y. L. & Leyen, U. v. d., 2016. *Revitalizing CSDP: towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible Defence in the EU*. [Online]
Available at: <http://club.bruxelles2.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/let-fra-all-defensefeuileroute@fr160911en.pdf>
- Droul, E. M., 2017. *Retinking Franco-German relations: a historical perspective*, s.l.: s.n.
- Drury, C., 2018. *European leaders 'scared to death' Donald Trump will pull US troops out of the continent*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/trump-us-troops-europe-leaders-scared-eu-panetta-germany-uk-france-baltic-a8437111.html>
- dw.com, 2019. *Germany, France reach arms export deal*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-france-reach-arms-export-deal/a-50862381>
- Dyck, I., 2018. *EUROPEAN DEFENCE INTEGRATION AS A RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT TRUMP'S FOREIGN POLICY*, s.l.: s.n.
- Dyson, T., 2013. Balancing Threat, not Capabilities: European Defence Cooperation as Reformed Bandwagoning. *Contemporary Security Studies*, 34(2), pp. 387-391.

European Commission, 2017. *The European Defence Fund: Questions and Answers*. [Online]
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/pl/memo_17_1476

European Commission, 2019. *European Defence Fund*. [Online]
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/european-defence-fund-2019-mar-19_en

European External Action Service, 2017. *Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)*. [Online]
Available at: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/36453/Coordinated%20Annual%20Review%20on%20Defence%20\(CARD\)](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/36453/Coordinated%20Annual%20Review%20on%20Defence%20(CARD))

European External Action Service, 2019. *Permanent Structured Cooperation- PESCO: Deepening Defence Cooperation Among EU members*. [Online]
Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_november_2019.pdf

European Union External Action Service, 2016. [Online]
Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en

European Union External Action Service, 2016. [Online]
Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

European Union External Action Service, 2016. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. [Online]
Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

Fiott, D., 2018. *STRATEGIC AUTONOMY: TOWARDS 'EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY' IN DEFENCE?*, s.l.: s.n.

Fischer, S., 2019. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/05/what-the-new-eu-leadership-should-do-about-russia-a68482>

Flick, U., 2008. *Triangulation: Eine Einführung*. s.l.:s.n.

Foer, F., 2016. *Putin's Pupper*. [Online]
Available at: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2016/07/vladimir_putin_has_a_plan_for_destroying_the_west_and_it_looks_a_lot_like.html?via=gdpr-consent

Forsberg, T., 2016. From Ostpolitik to 'frostpolitik'? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia. *International Affairs*, 8 January, 92(1), pp. 21-42.

Fortmann, M., Haglund, D. & Hlatky, S. v., 2010. INTRODUCTION: France's 'return' to NATO: implications for transatlantic relations. *European Security*, 19(1), pp. 1-10.

Franke, U. & Varma, T., 2019. *INDEPENDENCE PLAY: EUROPE'S PURSUIT OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY*, s.l.: EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Gedmin, J. & Muravchik, J., 2018. *The Trump Effect in Europe*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/06/05/the-trump-effect-in-europe/>

Gegout, C., 2002. The French and British change in position in the CESDP: a security community and historical-institutionalist perspective. *Politique Européenne*, pp. 62-87.

Giegerich, B. & Mölling, C., 2018. *The United Kingdom's contribution to European security and defence*, s.l.: s.n.

Gifkins, J., Jarvis, S. & Ralph, J., 2019. Brexit and the UN Security Council: declining British influence?. *International Affairs*, 01 November, 95(6), pp. 1349-1368.

Glasser, S. B., 2018. *HOW TRUMP MADE WAR ON ANGELA MERKEL AND EUROPE*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/how-trump-made-war-on-angela-merkel-and-europe>

Glenn, C., Rowan, M., Caves, J. & Nada, G., 2019. *Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state>

GOUVERNEMENT.fr, 2019. *Treaty of Aachen: a new treaty to strengthen Franco-German cooperation and facilitate convergence between the two countries*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/treaty-of-aachen-a-new-treaty-to-strengthen-franco-german-cooperation-and-facilitate-convergence>

Grevi, G., 2016. *A Global Strategy for a soul-searching European Union*, s.l.: s.n.

Hales, D., n.d. *An introduction to Triangulation*. s.l.:s.n.

Hamilton, D. S., 2017. *Trump's Jacksonian Foreign Policy and its Implications for European Security*, s.l.: THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

Haroche, P., 2017. Interdependence, assymetric crises, and European defence cooperation. *European Security*, 26(2), pp. 226-252.

Hassel, A. & Wagner, B., 2016. *The EU's 'migration crisis': challenge, threat or opportunity?*, s.l.: s.n.

Herszenhorn, D. M. & Aries, Q., 2017. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-negotiation-the-uk-hostage-eu-budget/>

Hodges, B. D., Kuper, A. & Reeves, S., 2008. *Discourse Analysis*. 6 September. Volume 337.

Howorth, J., 2001. European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union:

Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, November, 39(4), pp. 765-789.

Howorth, J., 2018. *EU-NATO Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy: Logical contradiction or Ariadne's Thread?*, s.l.: s.n.

Howorth, J., 2019. *Autonomy and Strategy: What Should Europe Want?*, s.l.: s.n.

Immenkamp, B., Sgueo, G., Voronova, S. & Dobрева, A., 2019. *The fight against terrorism.*

[Online]

Available at:

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635561/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)635561_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635561/EPRS_BRI(2019)635561_EN.pdf)

Jackson, R. L., Drummond, D. K. & Camara, S., 2007. What is Qualitative Research?. *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication*, 11 October, 8(1), pp. 21-28.

Jankovski, L. M., 2007. The Interconnection between the European Security and Defence Policy and the Balkans. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 7(1), pp. 139-157.

Janning, J., 2017. *Trump and Europe: Dilemmas of discontinuity*, s.l.: EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Johnston, S., 2019. *A Europe that Protests? U.S. opportunities in EU Defense.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/europe-protects-us-opportunities-eu-defense>

Joint Declaration on European Defence, 1998. [Online]

Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/3/31/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/publishable_en.pdf

Juncker, J. C., 2016. *State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe- a Europe that protects, empowers and defends.* [Online]

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3043

Kapitonenko, M., 2016. Managing the Ukrainian crisis: a challenge for European security. 2(2).

Katz, B. & Carpenter, M., 2019. *ISIS Is Already Rising From the Ashes: Turkey's Invasion of Syria Will Fuel a Jihadi Resurgence.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-16/isis-already-rising-ashes>

KEMPIN, R. & KUNZ, B., 2017. *France, Germany, and the Quest for European Strategic Autonomy: Franco-German Defence Cooperation in A New Era*, s.l.: ifri.

Kernic, F., 2006. *European Security in Transition*. s.l.:s.n.

Keukeleire, S., 2009. European Security and Defence Policy: from Taboo to a Spearhead of EU Foreign Policy. In: *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*. s.l.:s.n., pp. 51-72.

Keys, D., 2019. *Brexit will ultimately destabilise Europe, historians fear*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-europe-general-election-war-germany-france-stability-a9233181.html>

Klausen, J., 2017. *Terror in the Terroir: The Roots of France's Jihadist Problem*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2017-08-15/terror-terroir>

Klebanov, B. B., Diermeier, D. & Beigman, E., 2008. Lexical Cohesion Analysis of Political Speech. *Political Analysis*, 16(4), pp. 447-463.

Koehane, D., 2017. *Three's company? France, Germany and the UK and European defence post-Brexit*. [Online]
Available at:
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit

Koenig, N. & Franke, M. W., 2017. *FRANCE AND GERMANY: SPEARHEADING A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION?*, s.l.: s.n.

Kratochvil, P., 2004. *THE BALANCE OF THREAT RECONSIDERED: CONSTRUCTION OF THREAT IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA*, Praha: s.n.

Krotz, U. & Schild, J., 2018. Back to the future? Franco-German bilateralism in Europe's post-Brexit union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(8), pp. 1174-1193.

Krotz, U. & Schild, J., 2018. France: Germany's indispensable ally in European policy-making. *German European Policy Series*.

Lain, S. & Nouwens, V., 2017. *The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security*, s.l.: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.

Laipson, E., 2017. *Why Trump's Bilateral Approach to Foreign Policy is Necessary but Not Sufficient*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/21356/why-trump-s-bilateral-approach-to-foreign-policy-is-necessary-but-not-sufficient>

Larivé, M. H. A., 2015. A Crisis for the Ages: The European Union and the Migration Crisis. *The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series*, October, Volume 15.

Larres, K., 2017. Donald Trump and America's Grand Strategy: U.S foreign policy toward Europe, Russia, China. *Global Policy*, May.

Leigh, T., 2019. *Never mind Brexit, German slowdown is a bigger worry in France*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-germany-economy/never-mind-brexit-german-slowdown-is-a-bigger-worry-in-france-idUSKBN1W31VK>

Liik, K., 2018. *Winning the normative war with Russia: An EU-Russia Power Audit*, s.l.: s.n.

Lobell, S. E., 2010. Structural Realism/ Offensive and Defensive Realism. In: *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. s.l.:Oxford University Press.

Lord, E. M. & Thompson, A. L., 2019. [Online] Available at: <https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1073-19-5-1-02-letter-to-hrvp-moghe/6cdebd319d226b532785/optimized/full.pdf>

Macron, E., 2019. *Ambassadors' conference - Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic*. [Online] Available at: <https://lv.ambafrance.org/Ambassadors-conference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-Macron-President-of-the-Republic>

Macron, M. E., 2017. *Sorbonne speech of Emanuel Macron*. [Online] Available at: <http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html>

Major, C. & Mölling, C., 2017. *Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one*, s.l.: Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Major, C. & Mölling, C., 2019. *PeSCo: The German Perspective*, s.l.: s.n.

Martill, B. & Sus, M., 2018. Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or 'French connection'?. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 20(4), pp. 846-863.

Mauro, F., 2018. *STRATEGIC AUTONOMY UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT: The New Holy Grail of European Defence*, s.l.: s.n.

Mauro, F., 2018. *The European Intervention Initiative: Why we should listen to German Chancellor Merkel*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.iris-france.org/115776-the-european-intervention-initiative-why-we-should-listen-to-german-chancellor-merkel/>

Mazurek, K., 2018. *European offensive in defense sphere - EDF, PESCO, CARD*, s.l.: s.n.

Merriam, S. B., 1988. Case study research in education: A qualitative approach. *The Jossey-Bass higher education series*.

MILLER, A. D. & SOKOLSKY, R., 2019. *Trump's Betrayal of the Kurds? U.S Allies Will Get Over It, and Soon*. [Online] Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/23/trump-s-betrayal-of-kurds-u.s.-allies-will-get-over-it-and-soon-pub-80166>

Nünlist, C. & Thränert, O., 2015. *Putin's Russia and European Security*, s.l.: s.n.

Neinaber, M., 2017. *Macron's Europe speech draws mixed reaction in Berlin*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-eu-macron-germany/macrons-europe-speech-draws-mixed-reaction-in-berlin-idUSKCN1C128B>

Neinaber, M., 2019. *EU's Tusk: Trump is 'perhaps the most difficult challenge' for Europe*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-tusk/eus-tusk-trump-is-perhaps-the-most-difficult-challenge-for-europe-idUSKBN1Y11BT>

New America, n.d. *Terrorism in America 18 Years After 9/11: What is the Threat to Europe?*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/terrorism-america-18-years-after-911/what-is-the-threat-to-europe/>

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 2019. *Joint press point by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany*. [Online]
Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_170640.htm

Olsen, W., 2004. Triangulation in social research: Qualitative and quantitative methods can really be mixed. In: *Developments in Sociology*. s.l.:Causeway Press .

Paltridge, B., 2012. *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction (2ND edition)*. s.l.:Bloomsbury Publishing.

Paravicini, G., 2017. *Angela Merkel: Europe must take 'our fate' into own hands*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-europe-cdu-must-take-its-fate-into-its-own-hands-elections-2017/>

Paul, F. & Sweeney, K., 2004. The (de) Limitations of Balance of Power Theory. *International Interactions*, 30(4), pp. 285-308.

Perthes, V., 2018. *Withdrawing from the nuclear deal is a major blunder - the E-3 must pick up the baton*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.german-times.com/withdrawing-from-the-nuclear-deal-is-a-major-blunder-the-e-3-must-pick-up-the-baton/>

Pezard, S., Radin, A., Szayna, T. S. & Larrabee, F. S., 2017. *European Relations With Russia: Threat Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis*, s.l.: s.n.

Pifer, S., 2017. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-growing-russian-military-threat-in-europe/>

Popescu, N., 2015. *Hybrid tactics: Russia and the West*, s.l.: s.n.

- Popescu, N., 2018. [Online]
Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russian_cyber_sins_and_storms
- Raik, K., 2019. [Online]
Available at: <https://icds.ee/impossible-security-policy-choices-for-the-baltics/>
- Riddervold, M. & Newsome, A., 2018. Transatlantic relations in times of uncertainty: crises and EU-US relations. *Journal of European Integration*, 40(5), pp. 505-521.
- Rielly, J. E., 2019. Can President Donald Trump Destroy the Liberal International Order?. *Politique américaine*, 32(1), pp. 215-227.
- Rudolf, P., 2017. The US under Trump: Potential consequences for transatlantic relations. In: *Peace Report 2017: A Selection of Texts*. s.l.:s.n.
- Rumer, E., 2016. *RUSSIA AND THE SECURITY OF EUROPE*, s.l.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Rutter, C., 2019. *Brexit 'caused Germany's economic downturn'*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.publicfinanceinternational.org/news/2019/08/brexit-caused-germanys-economic-downturn>
- Schindler, J. R., 2016. *How the Kremlin Manipulates Europe's Refugee Crisis*. [Online]
Available at: <https://observer.com/2016/04/how-the-kremlin-manipulates-europes-refugee-crisis/>
- Schoemaker, H., 2019. *Allegations of Russian Weaponized Migration against the EU*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.militairespectator.nl/thema/internationale-veiligheidspolitiek/artikel/allegations-russian-weaponized-migration-against-eu>
- Schweitzer, Y., 2018. *The Current Terrorism Threat in Europe*, s.l.: The Institute for National Security Studies.
- Shapiro, J. & Pardijs, D., 2017. *The transatlantic meaning of Donald Trump: a US-EU Power Audit*, s.l.: EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
- Shinkman, P. D., 2019. *Russia Positioning Itself in Lybia to Unleash Migrant Crisis Into Europe*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2019-11-08/russia-positioning-itself-in-libya-to-unleash-migrant-crisis-into-europe>
- Smith, J., 2019. *the EU-US relationship in crisis*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.german-times.com/the-eu-us-relationship-is-in-crisis/>
- Steinberg, J. B., 1992. *The Role of European Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons from Yugoslavia*, s.l.: RAND.

Stokes, D., 2018. Trump, American hegemony and the future of the liberal international order. *International Affairs*, January, 94(1), pp. 133-150.

Sudreau, L. B., Efstathiou, Y. S. & Hannigan, C., 2019. *Keeping the Momentum in European Defence collaboration: an early assessment of PESCO implementation*, s.l.: s.n.

Techau, J., 2016. *The recently unveiled EU global strategy is an unusually thoughtful and rich document. The EU's leaders would be well-advised to study it.* [Online]
Available at: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=63994>

Tertrais, B., 2018. *Trump is wrong over Iran, but Europe can't afford to divorce the US.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/16/europe-cant-afford-full-divorce-iran-nuclear-deal-trump-europe-antagonism>

The Economist, 2019. *Donald Trump's betrayal of the Kurds is a blow to America's credibility.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/10/17/donald-trumps-betrayal-of-the-kurds-is-a-blow-to-americas-credibility>

The Economist, 2019. *The French president's interview with The Economist.* [Online]

Available at: <https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-english>

The United Nations Security Council, 2019. [Online]

Available at: <https://undocs.org/S/2019/570>

Thompson, J., 2017. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/02/04/donald-trump-and-the-emergent-dominant-narrative-in-us-foreign-policy/>

Thompson, J., 2019. *European Strategic Autonomy and the US*, s.l.: s.n.

Trachtenberg, M., 2012. The de Gaulle Problem. *Cold War Studies*, 14(1), pp. 81-92.

Trenin, D., 2018. *RUSSIA AND GERMANY: FROM ESTRANGED PARTNERS TO GOOD NEIGHBORS*, s.l.: CARNEGIE MOSCOW CENTER.

USLU, M. M., 2004. *THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: BEFORE AND AFTER SAINT MALO DECLARATION*, s.l.: s.n.

Walt, S. M., 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security*, 9(4), pp. 3-43.

Walt, S. M., 1990. *The Origins of Alliances*. s.l.:Cornell University Press.

Wesslau, F., 2016. *Putin's friends in Europe.* [Online]

Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_friends_in_europe7153

Whitman, R. G., 2016. THE UK AND EU FOREIGN, SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER BREXIT: INTEGRATED, ASSOCIATED OR DETACHED?. *NATIONAL INSTITUTE ECONOMIC REVIEW*, 238(1), pp. 43-50.

XAVIER, A. I., 2018. THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE MULTILATERALISM: MORE COOPERATION OR OVERLAPPING INTERESTS?. *MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES*, 26(1).

Zandee, D. & Kruijver, K., 2019. *The European Intervention Initiative: Developing a shared strategic culture for European defence*, s.l.: s.n.

Zuidewijn, J. d. R. v. & Sciarone, J., 2019. Convergence of the Saliency of Terrorism in the European Union Before and After Terrorist Attacks. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 30 September.

