

## APPENDICES

### Appendix n.1. – Graphs from Yale Programme on Climate Change, GALLUP




Figure n.1. GALLUP – Americans' preference for prioritizing environmental protection vs. economic growth, 1984 – 2019. Available at: <https://news.gallup.com/poll/248243/preference-environment-economy-largest-2000.aspx>




Figure n.2: Yale Programme on Climate Change: Estimated % of adults who are worried about global warming, 2018. Source: <https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2018/?est=worried&type=value&geo=county>




Figure n.3: Yale Programme on Climate change: “I have personally experienced the effects of global warming”. Source: <https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/climate-change-in-the-american-mind-april-2019/5/>




Figure n.4: Yale Programme on Climate Change: “Do you think climate change is happening?” Source: <https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/climate-change-in-the-american-mind-april-2019/3/>

**Appendix n.2 – Diploma Thesis project**

**CHARLES UNIVERSITY**  
**Faculty of Social Sciences**  
Institute of Political Sciences

Diploma thesis project

**Foreign policy of Trump's administration: Revisiting agreements through the lenses of two-level games theory**



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**Year of project submission:** 30.9.2018

## **INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC**

The presidency of Donald Trump brought up many controversial opinions as well as not many guarantees in terms of relations with other members of international community. As Ikenberry (2017) claims: *“U.S. President Donald Trump’s every instinct runs counter to the ideas that have underpinned the postwar international system. Trade, alliances, international law, multilateralism, environmental protection, torture and human rights – on all these core issues, Trump has made pronouncements that, if acted on, would bring to an end the United States’ role as guarantor of the liberal world order.”* (p.2) His approach to treaties was clearly given already during the presidential campaign when he pledged to withdraw from agreements such as Paris Accord, Iranian Nuclear Deal or even NATO structure. (“Trump-O-Meter: Tracking Trump’s Campaign Promises,” 2018)

President Donald Trump already partially fulfilled his promises, firstly by announcing on 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2017 the withdrawal from the so-called Paris Agreement within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (Trump, 2017b) Secondly, on 8<sup>th</sup> of May 2018 President Trump delivered a speech with his remarks to the Comprehensive Plan of Nuclear Protection, also known as Iranian Nuclear Deal, in which he condemned the deal and announced the withdrawal with the aim of re-negotiating the agreement. (Trump, 2018) In my diploma thesis I aim to analyse these two cases via the lenses of two-level game theory introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 which was further elaborated by other scholars and became very important tool in the field of International Relations as it provides interesting view on actors’ positions in negotiating processes and its overall effect on the result.

The analysis of these two cases may become crucial for understanding of the further development of Trump’s administration’s foreign policy. On the other side, this work may contribute to the theoretical frameworks of two-level games by evaluating its usefulness in these very topical and up-to-date cases.

## **RESEARCH TARGET, RESEARCH QUESTION**

The aim of my analysis is to provide one possible view on Trump’s administration withdrawals from agreements with special attention to interaction of domestic and international level factors. The research target is therefore detailed

analysis of the two cases (withdrawals from Paris Accord and Iranian Nuclear Deal) using two-level game theory. My research question is:

***RQ: How can we explain the decisions of the Trump's administration to revisit the Paris Accord and Iranian Nuclear Deal?***

## **CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS**

In my diploma thesis I will work with the two-level game theory introduced by Robert Putnam (1988) and apply the framework on the two selected cases. This approach is based on the assumption that the domestic and international levels of negotiations are necessarily interconnected. Putnam identifies different actors at each of the levels; at the national level domestic groups pressure the government to adopt policies of their preferences, on the international level the governments seek to satisfy the domestic groups as well as minimize the adverse consequences of foreign developments. (Putnam, 1988, p.434)

The negotiations therefore take place simultaneously at the two levels – Level I (international) and Level II (national). “Nevertheless, the requirement that any Level I agreement must, in the end, be ratified at Level II imposes a crucial theoretical link between the two levels.” (*Ibid*, p.436) This brings up the question of voluntary and involuntary defections which could be understood as failed ratification processes. Putnam defines the voluntary defection as the situation when rational egoist reneges in the absence of enforceable contracts. Involuntary defection describes the situation when the agent is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification. Putnam also adds that it is usually very difficult to identify which type of behaviour is present in many cases, thanks to the policy makers' general incentive to cheat. (*Ibid*, p.438)

Keisuke (1996) elaborates on the notion of strategic behaviour in order to achieve better deal in the next round of negotiations. This seems to be the case as President Trump emphasizes already in his speeches in 2017 and 2018 when announcing both of the withdrawals. He puts emphasize on the unfairness of the deals, and if he was to sign new ones, they would have to be much better for the USA. This could be explained by the voluntary defection with the strategic thinking with regards to the subsequent negotiations in order to achieve better position and greater possibilities to push their win-sets.

***H1: Withdrawals from agreements are based on the preferences of some important domestic societal actors (represented by President Trump and his administration).***

***H2: Withdrawals from agreements primarily represent the distinctive preferences of President Trump and his administration (largely independent on the domestic societal demand).***

The first hypothesis works with the notion of important domestic actors (interest groups, political parties, activist groups) and the public being able to affect the negotiations and in some cases may work as a constraint. According to Trumbore (1998) there are three main factors:

- a) “The preferences of the public relative to those of decision-makers and other domestic constituents
- b) The intensity of the issue under negotiations
- c) The power of the public to ratify a potential agreement” (*Ibid.*, p.548)

The analysis of the preferences of the domestic actors should provide better view on this question.

## **SELECTED CASES**

### **CASE A: PARIS AGREEMENT**

The Paris Agreement was adopted on 15th of December 2015 and came into force on 4th of November 2016. It was seen as a “historic” achievement as it was supposed to step up the Kyoto Protocol from 1997. It was aiming to unite the whole world in order to tackle the climate change and avoid the catastrophic scenarios. However, the great initiative and effort of France which was in the beginning met with great appreciation from the U.S. side as well, was disturbed and partly failed when President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal from the Treaty on 1st of June 2017.

The decision to withdraw was supported by 20 Republican Senators who sent a letter to the President urging him to exit the agreement. In the announcement speech President Trump highlighted the unfairness of the agreement and his aim to revisit it, in order to strike a better deal for the USA. (Trump, 2017b) The decision may have different consequences; for example, reduction of other countries’ emission space and raise of their emission costs. Not only it undermined the universality of the Paris

Agreement, but it also set bad precedent for international climate change cooperation. (Zhang et al., 2017, p.220)

### **CASE B: JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION**

Generally, the relations between U.S. and Iran have gone through a series of ups and downs since the 1950s. The main change in the course came with the Obama administration which brought to successful end the negotiations with “freeze-for-freeze” Agreement or the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA was reached on 14<sup>th</sup> of July 2015 followed by Security Council Resolution 2231 unanimously adopted on 20<sup>th</sup> of July 2015

On 8<sup>th</sup> of May 2018 President Donald Trump announced that the USA would no longer participate in the JCPOA and the intention to reimpose sanctions. Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany opposed the US decision and continue dialogue with Iranian officials and keep implementing the Agreement. President Hassan Rouhani pledged to keep implementing the Agreement as well. Subsequently, Secretary Pompeo delivered a speech on 21<sup>st</sup> of May in which he listed a number of essential elements for the new agreement. (Kerr and Katzman, 2018, p.24)

President Trump’s actions resulted in *Joint Statement from Prime Minister Theresa May, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron Following President Trump’s Statement on Iran* in which they stated their intention to remain party to the JCPOA. However, after several multilateral meetings (without the USA), Iranian President Rouhani reflected on the lack of confidence that the countries can preserve economic benefits of the JCPOA when the US sanctions are imposed. (*Ibid.*, p.28)

### **PLANNED THESIS OUTLINE**

Introduction

Foreign Policy of Trump administration

Theoretical framework – Two-level games

Case A: Withdrawal from Paris Accord

Case B: Withdrawal from Nuclear Deal

Conclusion

## **EMPIRICAL DATA AND ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE**

In the diploma thesis I will mainly use qualitative approach in analysis of the two cases – multiple-case study. The hypothesis will be examined on the two examples of withdrawals and followed by synthesis.

The empirical data collection, I will mainly draw on the original treaties and public statements of officials as the primary resources. I will also utilize the public opinion polls and examine the possible changes in support of these decisions. As for the possible lack of data caused by the fact that the withdrawals are very recent issues, I will supplement the primary resources by scientific analysis of the treaties and negotiations' development.

The analytical technique in the diploma thesis will consist of the application of the theoretical framework of the two-level game theory by Robert Putnam. After the separate analyses of the two separate cases, I aim to provide synthesis of them.

Amongst the weaknesses of this diploma thesis may be the relative novelty of the decisions and the possible lack of insight into the decision-making process. Moreover, two-level game theory represents the liberal mainstream view in the field of International Relations which could be a point of criticism as well. Another weakness may appear in the choice of the cases, as they from very different areas of international cooperation which may be extremely important in the part with synthesis or any comparison at all.

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