

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA

FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD

Institut politologických studií



Bc. Kryštof Houdek

**Analysing the alteration of strategic
subcultures: the case of Israel**

Diplomová práce

Praha 2019

Autor práce: **Bc. Kryštof Houdek**

Vedoucí práce: **JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.**

Rok obhajoby: **2019**

Bibliografický záznam

Houdek, Kryštof. *“Analysing the alteration of strategic subcultures: The case of Israel.”* Praha, May 9, 2019. 52 s. Diplomová práce (Mgr.) Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta Sociálních věd, Institut politologických studií. Katedra mezinárodních vztahů. Vedoucí diplomové práce JUDr., PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D.

Abstrakt

Diplomová práce se zabývá strategickými subkulturami v Izraeli a jejich vlivem na strategické rozhodování. Práce navazuje na corpus literatury zabývající se strategickou kulturou. Strategická kultura má vliv na to kdy, jestli a jak bude použita síla. Tři případy v této diplomové práci se zabývají použitím síly ve vztahu k Íránu, Hizballáhu a Syrské občanské válce. Strategická kultura nabývá podoby specifické strategické subkultury, která se projevuje jako tendence ke konkrétnímu strategickému chování. Izraelská strategická kultura je detailně zkoumána v průběhu svého historického vývoje v kontextu strategické kultury. Strategická kultura a její aspekty jsou popsány na pozadí vývoje „*národní bezpečnostní doktríny*.“ Posuny v strategické kultuře souvisí se změnami v strategickém prostředí a s vývojem nových vojenských technologií a strategií vedení války.

Abstract

The thesis examines altering of Israeli strategic subcultures and their influence on strategic decision-making. It expands the body of literature on strategic culture. The strategic culture influences the decisions regarding when, if and how to use force. The three cases in this thesis encompass strategic decision-making in regard to Iran, Hezbollah and the Syrian civil war. The strategic culture takes a form of particular strategic subculture, which expresses a preference for a particular kind of strategic behaviour. Israeli strategic culture is examined thoroughly throughout its history in the context of strategic culture. The strategic culture and its aspects are described on the background of evolving “*national security doctrine*.” The changes in the strategic culture are correlated with the shifts in the strategic environment and with the evolution of new military technologies and strategies of waging war.

Klíčová slova

Izrael, strategická kultura, strategické subkultury, použití síly, konflikt

Keywords

Israel, Strategic culture, Strategic subcultures, Use of force, conflict

Rozsah práce: 99073 znaků

Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval samostatně a použil jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
2. Prohlašuji, že práce nebyla využita k získání jiného titulu.
3. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účel

V Praze dne 9. května 2019

Kryštof Houdek

Poděkování

Chtěl bych tímto poděkovat především svému vedoucímu práce, JUDr., PhDr. Tomáši Karáskovi, Ph.D., za četné rady a věcné připomínky, bez nichž by tato práce nemohla vzniknout.

Univerzita Karlova
Fakulta sociálních věd
Institut politologických studií

Diploma thesis project

Analysing the
alteration of
strategic
subcultures: the
case of Israel



Name:
**Kryštof
Houdek**

Academic advisor:
**JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš
Karásek, Ph.D.**

Study programme:
Security Studies

Year of project submission:
2019

Introduction

The diploma thesis theoretical background is based in the ongoing debate over the nature of the concept of strategic culture. Strategic culture itself focuses on inter-state cultural differences as an explanatory factor, something what have been ignored by most of other theories of international relations. Most of the scholars agree, that strategic culture undergoes an evolution, which causes its alteration in time.

However, the timeframe of this progress presents an opportunity for contest. The change in strategic culture is usually a slow process, in which its bearers absorb new experience and conceptualize new knowledge. Yet, in some cases a sudden reversal appears, when political elite rejects the most significant features of the previous strategic culture and adopts nearly opposite regime. Alan Bloomfield brought into this schism third alternative with his concept of strategic subcultures. Strategic subcultures are part of concept, which divides national strategic culture into number of variants, or subcultures. These subcultures are competing on the virtual battlefield of ideas. One of them is the dominant, which defines leading narrative of the course of events and it dictates strategic behaviour of the country. Other subcultures are waiting in reserve for the opportunity to assume leadership. Such opportunity presents itself through another notion of “*strategic surprise*.” The surprise comes in a form of security crisis, which alters the elite’s view of the world.

In the diploma thesis, strategic subcultures are connected to the concept of epistemic communities. This concept helps to mitigate the vagueness and sheds light on social mechanism of the alteration of the strategic subcultures by providing it with a concrete form and shape. Davis Cross brings strategic subcultures together with

epistemic communities, defined as groups of individuals who share the same professional background. At this point she clearly distinguishes her understanding of the concept from more traditional definition of epistemic communities as groups of individuals who share the same worldview.

Tamir Libel builds up his own work about the competition of subcultures in Israel on this theoretical background. He examines four conflicts involving Israel between 1982 and 2014. Each conflict represents an international crisis, that shook the hierarchy between epistemic communities. His goal is to explain the change in Israeli security policy through thorough analysis of official documents and record of the debate. For this he uses "*theory-testing process-tracing methodology*," which is trying to prove the presence of the casual mechanism in the selected case.

Research target, research question, research hypothesis

The diploma thesis plans to build on previous work of Tamir Libel and unravel the conundrum of alteration in Israeli security policy in years succeeding the end of his analysis. During this period Israel conducted several operations inside of Syria and continued to face Hamas on its southern border. Due to rapidly changing balance of power in Syria, Israel has to face new challenges, which could be identified as another international crisis. The goal of the thesis is to investigate the potential impact of this latest crisis on the competing epistemic communities. The work will seek to identify the key actors representing each community and investigate, whether the latest crisis led to any changes in the balance of power between them. The

hypothesis does not expect any other major reform to be discovered. Rather, it expects some implications of change or activity with a potential to alter the current balance of power to occur. It is expected, that other subcultures do not merely “wait on the wings,” but they are actively reproducing their understanding, if not challenging the hegemonic subculture.

Literature review

As a background for the thesis serves an article of Tomáš Karásek “*Tracking shifts in strategic culture.*” It lays down the theoretical fundamentals for the whole work. It introduces evolution of the academic debate related to the strategic culture and provides contextual understanding of the concepts used in the analysis.

The key point of departure is the Tamir Libel’s article “*Explaining the security paradigm shift: strategic culture, epistemic communities, and Israel’s changing national security policy.*” The thesis succeeds the article in time, and it is drawing upon its methodological operationalization. The thesis seeks to draw on conclusions of the article and expand its knowledge.

Among other, less important sources, there is “*The culture of military innovation*” by Dima Adamsky. The book is focused on strategic culture and innovation in the military affairs. As such, it can provide meaningful insights into the nature of the problems faced by Israeli strategists.

On the similar note is also the article of Raphael Marcus “*Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s Improvised Military Adaptation to Hamas Tunnel Warfare*” and “*Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF.*” Additionally, the first article is also focused on the latest challenge, which IDF had to cope with, and could shed a light on the processes parallel to the observed competition among the epistemic communities.

Avi Kober’s “*What Happened to Israeli Military Thought?*” is concerned with the flaws of overall strategic culture of the IDF. Such view is important for comparison of the theoretical approach applied by the thesis. The fundamentals on which it lays, the general strategic culture should be always kept in mind. The epistemic communities representing each of the subcultures all operate in the same cultural environment and are based on shared historical background. Furthermore, Kober is directly touching one of the epistemic communities and his assessment can add significant insights into the thesis.

Conceptual and theoretical framework

The thesis departs from *constructivist* tradition, notably from the notion of *strategic culture*. Within the realm of strategic culture, the thesis focuses on its alteration, utilizing the concepts of *strategic subcultures* and *strategic surprise*. During the operational phase of the analysis, concept of epistemic communities is linked to the concept of strategic subcultures to gain measurable variable.

Empirical data and analytical technique

Empirical data are expected to consist of primary documents and records of debate. Theory-testing process-tracing methodology is going to be applied in a manner as much similar to that of Tamir Libel's article as possible in order to maintain continuity with his conclusions. However, it seems to be clear, that his article describes already concluded reform of the Israeli security policy and it is unlikely, that a similar reform is going to take a place within the timeframe observed in this thesis. Therefore, it remains to be seen, whether simply shortened variant of the methodological process could be sufficient, or there is a need for additional adjustments into its components.

Planned thesis outline

- Introduction
- Conceptual/Theoretical framework
- Methods and data
- Empirical-analytical section
- Conclusions

References

Adamsky, Dima. "The Culture of Military Innovation." Stanford University Press, 2010.

Karásek, Tomáš. "*Tracking Shifts in Strategic Culture.*" *Obrana a Strategie*, Vol. 2016, No. 1, January 2016.

Kober, Avi. "*What Happened to Israeli Military Thought?*" *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 5, October, 2011.

Libel, Tamir. "*Explaining the Security Paradigm Shift: Strategic Culture, Epistemic Communities, and Israel's Changing National Security Policy.*" *Defence Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, March 2016.

Marcus, Raphael D. "*Learning 'Under Fire': Israel's Improvised Military Adaptation to Hamas Tunnel Warfare.*" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, April 12, 2016.

Marcus, Raphael D. "*Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF.*" *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2015.

OBSAH

Introduction.....	1
1 Theoretical background.....	2
1.1 Strategic culture.....	3
1.1.1 Strategic subcultures	5
1.1.2 Strategic and military culture and the revolution in military affairs.....	7
1.2 Societal cognitive styles	8
1.3 Methodology and data	11
2 Israeli strategic culture: the alterations and development	11
2.1 Israeli strategic culture.....	12
2.2 Israeli strategic subcultures	18
2.3 Israeli military culture	21
2.3.1 Battlefield decision	22
2.3.2 Early warning system	27
2.3.3 Deterrence	28
2.3.4 Low intensity conflict	31
3 Israeli strategy and strategic culture in Syria.....	42
3.1 Israeli strike on Iran	43
3.2 Strategic early warning	44
3.3 Israeli intervention in Syria	47
3.4 Summary: the alteration of strategic subcultures.....	50
Conclusions	51
Bibliography.....	53

Introduction

Strategic culture, altered into strategic subcultures, influences the decision when, if and how the force should be applied in foreign security relations. On the backbone of the “*national security doctrine*,” the thesis is trying to describe how various subcultures influence the strategic decisions. The three cases selected for this study are all connected with Syria, Iran and the Israeli decision regarding the use of force. The work should expand the literature on strategic culture and the concept of strategic subculture. Israel with its history of wars and permanent conflict has become a subject of multiple studies on strategic culture. Permanent uninterrupted use of force allows for thorough examination of the phenomena. More complicated and harder to observe phenomena of strategic subculture can be also analysed better with multiple conflicts presenting different opportunities for application of power. The work describes how changes in geopolitical environment and development in technology affect the military and strategic thinking. The transition from the conventional wars to asymmetric guerrilla style warfare and low intensity conflict presented Israel with strategic dilemmas, which affected its military thought and as well strategic decision-making. The latest developments in technology triggered debates about potential new conceptualizations of waging war. The culture played an influential role in the application of power and consequent lesson learning. The plentiful use of force in various circumstances throughout the time and multiple factors involved in the innovation and lesson learning create from Israeli strategic thought intricate conundrum. Therefore, the thesis identifies specific cultural traits and observes them throughout the history. The “*national security doctrine*” as the main summary of Israeli way of war encompasses all important operational aspects of Israeli deployment. Other cultural traits are closely observed as to provide an

explanation for any irregularity. The Israeli culture is very special. The Israeli geopolitical situation is unique. The timeline of Israeli survival in hostile region is unprecedented. All these factors make of Israel premium subject of academic research.

1 Theoretical background

This section of the thesis seeks to provide a theoretical background not only for the analytical framework of the thesis itself, but also for the concept of strategic culture as an academic field of research. First, the chapter outlines the evolution of the concept of strategic culture. It presents the challenges that the field encountered and the progress which the scholars of the strategic culture have made throughout the years. The development of the field is centred around two basic components of the field, namely “*culture*” and “*strategic behaviour*.” The chapter then continues by introducing an extension of strategic culture, the concept of “*strategic subculture*.” The development of the entire concept is a reaction to the debate about continuity and change in the strategic culture. Finally, the challenges posed to the strategic culture by revolution in military affairs (RMA) are addressed. Military affairs affect significantly strategic thinking and vice versa. The way how innovation and invention is conceptualized is heavily impacted by strategic culture. At the very end of the section the methodological note provides definitions of key concepts and presents the conception of the thesis.

1.1 Strategic culture

The origins of the concept of strategic culture lie in the 1970s. Jack Snyder first used the concept as a theoretical tool in his study of strategic behaviour of USSR in 1977.¹ The “cultural turn” was a movement among scholars of social sciences of the time, who aimed to make culture the central focus of their research. The key belief behind the concept of strategic culture was that of mainstream schools in international relations neglecting inter-state cultural differences as an explanatory factor.² Their more material-oriented theories all share one fundamental assumption. The states in international relations are all presumed to be rational actors. Yet, cultural factors such as beliefs, values or natural dispositions, propensities towards certain strategic behaviour may leave an unmistakable footprint on national security strategy.

The concept of strategic culture encompasses two basic components: “*culture*” and “*strategic behaviour*.” The development of the study of the concept is usually described chronologically via Johnson’s prism of three generations.³ The first generation, coming out of debate about nuclear deterrence, understood strategic culture as a constructed context, which provides a special explanation for varying form of strategic behaviour. The field in the time was lacking in methodology and theory. The concept of strategic culture was described only vaguely. What is strategic

¹ Tomáš Karásek, “Tracking shifts in strategic culture: analysing counterinsurgency as a rise of strategic subculture,” *Obrana a Strategie*, Vol. 2016, No. 1, October 27, 2016. <https://www.obranaastrategie.cz/en/archive/volume-2016/1-2016/articles/tracking-shifts-in-strategic-culture.html>

² Tamir Libel, “Explaining the security paradigm shift: strategic culture, epistemic communities, and Israel’s changing national security policy,” *Defence Studies*, Vol. 2016, No. 2, March 10, 2016, 138.

³ Karásek, “Tracking shifts in strategic culture.”

culture and how does it change remained unspecified. The link between the “*culture*” and the “*strategic behaviour*” was not clear. Furthermore, the concept was automatically linked to the nation and was treated as a homogenous construct.

The second generation, which emerged in 1990’s from debates about hegemony did not provide an answer to the field deficiencies. It understood “*culture*” as a milieu in which discourses and narratives appear only to justify “*strategic behaviour*” of the hegemonic power.

The “*third generation*”ⁱ of scholars followed soon after. It realised some of the deficiencies in the field and provided bold solution, which led to a schism between leading scholars in the field. The schism, known as the “*Johnston-Gray debate*” concerned the core deficiencies in methodology and theory. Johnson defined “*culture*” positivistically, as an independent variable influencing “*strategic behaviour*,” a dependent variable. He developed a new methodology. It seeks to identify determinants of “*culture*” responsible for repetitive patterns in state’s “*strategic behaviour*.” This was met with Gray’s critique claiming that “*culture*” is inseparable from “*strategic behaviour*.” However, The *Johnston-Gray debate* left unaddressed the issue of mutation of strategic culture in time. Furthermore, it still perceived it to be homogenous.⁴ In Gray’s account the change in strategic culture occurs only slowly. Gray went as far as to advise his fellow scholars studying the cultural change to “*change concepts*.”⁵

To the Johnston’s original three generations of strategic culture scholars was later added yet another one, the fourth. Its definition of strategic culture goes back to the roots, sharing fundamental assumptions with Snyder’s work from 1977. In the

⁴ Libel, “*Explaining the security paradigm*,” 139.

⁵ Karásek, “*Tracking shifts in strategic culture*.”

view of this latest generation, “elites” express distinct “*culture*” of strategic affairs. This “*culture*” is socialized into a certain strategic thinking, which stands directly behind concrete “*strategic behaviour*.” Also, the fourth generation has more favourable view on change in strategic culture.⁶ Karásek paints three distinct ways in which the shift in strategic culture occurs. First is the continuous adaptation, as described by Gray. Second, the shift in the strategic culture can under certain circumstances occur rather rapidly. Often, the rapid change is a reaction to a dramatic reconstitution of the entire regime and break up with the previous dominant belief system. The answer of the new elite to such change is then almost absolute opposition to the preferences held in the past. The first two options can be supported by multiple examples. Yet, there might be a third option as well. According to Karásek, the shift too prominent as to be discarded as “*adaptation as usual*,” yet not so radical as to represent a reconstitution of the entire elite’s belief system, can occur as well. Such a change would have to be triggered by an extraordinary event, presumably a negative one, which would leave the “*culture*” seriously shaken. The “*elites*” would then reform their “*culture*,” to address new experience. Consequently, the shift of emphasis within the new reformed “*culture*” should be observable on reformed “*strategic behaviour*.” The manifestations of such shift in “*strategic behaviour*” should be found among other things in alternated modes of operation.⁷

1.1.1 Strategic subcultures

The concept of strategic subcultures as a subset of the strategic culture is as old as the original concept of strategic culture itself. The founder of the field, Snyder, first

⁶ Libel, “*Explaining the security paradigm*,” 140.

⁷ Karásek, “*Tracking shifts in strategic culture*.”

introduced subcultures alongside with the strategic culture in his original 1977's study.⁸ According to Johnson, the elites' ideational milieu would be shaped by one subculture, yet others could exist along its side as a part of the same strategically cultural block.⁹ Bloomfield points out that the other subcultures would be held in subordinate position and thus their influence would be only limited. These subcultures would exist in opposition to the "*leitkultur*" and they would be "waiting in the wings" for their opportunity to assume leading position.¹⁰ Further, according to scholars of the fourth generation, these subcultures would differ between each other by different understanding of its strategic environment. Bloomfield states as an example a diverging definition of who the state's friends and foes are. Johnson explains, that adopting certain subcultural discourse automatically excludes certain policy options as unacceptable.¹¹ Karásek discusses the concept of strategic subcultures in context of shifts in strategic culture. In his view, the shift in strategic culture is caused by *strategic surprise*, which forces upon elites a fundamentally different perspective. Importantly, the subcultures are not in absolute disagreement with the dominant culture. They represent its supplement. They are part of the mainstream culture, the leading strategic culture, yet they have additional ideas or cultural traits, which differentiate them from the rest of the pool. Strategic surprise represents for these subcultures an opportunity to present solution. For them the mainstream culture failed to produce measures, which would prevent the strategic surprise to harm state's interests. The subculture then presents solution derived from its more distinct strategic outlook.¹²

⁸ Rafał Kopeć, "The determinants of the Israeli strategic culture," *Review of Nationalities*, Vol. 6, No. 1, December, 2016, 137.

⁹ Libel, "Explaining the security paradigm," 140.

¹⁰ Karásek, "Tracking shifts in strategic culture."

¹¹ Libel, "Explaining the security paradigm," 140.

¹² Karásek, "Tracking shifts in strategic culture."

1.1.2 Strategic and military culture and the revolution in military affairs

Military culture can be conceptualized as a special branch of strategic culture. As such it is logically restricted to military matters. Military culture and military matters were a primary concern of the first two generations of scholars of strategic culture concept. It was the later generations, who widened the reach of strategic culture and expanded the notion of security beyond military matters.¹³ Strategic culture encompasses broader context of politics and society. Wisniewski conceptualizes military and strategic culture within a hierarchical scheme. On the top there is a culture of politics, which encompasses the culture of national security and related foreign policy affairs, including political aspects of the use of military force. In the spirit of Clausewitzian *“continuation of politics by other means”* follows the strategic culture. It is essentially concerned with international relations and connected to the use of military force as a part of a foreign policy. Military culture on the lowest level is then focused on specific *“national way of waging war.”* Military culture is due to its narrowly defined focus more homogenous and tends to be more consistent. It is culture of organization of armed forces.¹⁴

“Revolution in military affairs” is a matter of particular importance for military culture. It is a source of change in the military affairs in general and therefore it stands at the core of shifts in military culture. The latest rapid development of new technologies has revolutionized modern military warfare. The advancement of information technology opened new opportunities for joint use of force coordinated in real time. The development of long-range precision-guided munitions (PGM) and

¹³ Libel, *“Explaining the security paradigm,”* 139.

¹⁴ Kopeć, *“The determinants of Israeli culture,”* 137.

other technologies increased the accuracy on long distances and made frontlines an obsolete concept. The revolutionized warfare changed the military planning, operational concepts, organizational structure and required reconceptualization of military thought. Components of the army, such as artillery or air force gained on importance at the expense of ground formations. The military aims shifted from attempts to attrite the enemy or hold the territory to cause shock and induce specific effect upon the enemy.¹⁵ *“Revolution in military affairs”* requires conceptual adaptation and reorganization of the military force with the vision of future warfare in mind. Culture can play a significant role in the way innovations are adopted. The potential of various innovations can be understood differently among various social actors.¹⁶

1.2 Societal cognitive styles

Strategic culture at its core is rooted in and transmitted by human behaviour and human psychology. Cultural psychology studies societies and can be useful to describe their qualities. The current cultural psychology offers several divisions among societies along the lines of their communication styles, perception of time, relation to power and to other members of the society. The cognitive styles are congruent with preferred strategies, management and organization as well as processing of information. It can be directly linked to human behaviour or to the behaviour of the society as a whole. It should be recognized, that general patterns that can be linked to the society, do not have to apply to all individuals within it.

¹⁵ Dima Adamsky, *“The culture of military innovation: the impact of cultural factors on the revolution in military affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel,”* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 8-9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

Actually, even the general description of a culture along the lines of cognitive styles serves primarily just for orientation and it should be analysed carefully.

The processing of the information precedes the communication style. Cultural psychologists differentiate between “*analytical thought*” and “*holistic thought*.” The “*analytical thought*” is categorical, focused on the object of its attention, analysing it separate from its environment. It relies on formal logic to predict object’s behaviour. It does not work with contradictions and it is looking for clear cut conception. The approached object is decontextualized and categorized. Rules are applied to its behaviour. The causal relations with its environment are explained by referring directly to the object. Some scholars suggested a link between the “*analytical thought*” and “*inductive thought*.” “*Inductive thought*” derives patterns from individual cases, while patterns derived from multiple cases are product of “*deductive thought*,” which parallels with the “*holistic thought*.” Contrary to the “*analytical thought*,” the “*holistic thought*” considers object of its attention in context of its environment. It relies on experience-based knowledge and intuition to establish causality between the object’s behaviour and its environment. It reflects the contradictions and it seeks amorphous conceptions to create a link between the two outlooks. By its nature, “*holistic thought*” is better suited to spot changes in the referent object’s interactions with its environment and conceptualize them.

The communication styles divide societies on “*low-context*” and “*high-context*”. In “*low-context*” societies, an individual is prized for his directness and openness. The content of his speech is emphasized at the expense of the context. There is a substantive proximity to “*analytical thought*” as a preferred line of reasoning. On the contrary, in “*high-context*” societies, an individual is valued for his tact and nuance.

His speech is indirect and vague, relying on the audience's ability to interpret it.

"Holistic" reasoning is his preferred choice.

Closely interconnected with levels of context is the perception of time. *"Low-context"* societies tend to be *"monochronic"*. They are focused on one thing at a time, until it is accomplished. Meanwhile, the *"high-context"* societies encourage *"polychronic"* perception of time. In *"polychronic"* societies many things are considered at one time, but the attention is not devoted too long to a particular matter.

The relations between individuals in *"low-context"* societies tend to be more independent with stronger emphasis on individualism. *"Individualistic"* society encourages assertiveness, self-interest and achievement. It also uses *"analytical thought"* to make its argument. In opposition stands *"collectivistic"* society, with hierarchical structure, where people are highly interconnected and interdependent on each other. The *"holistic thought"* places the emphasis upon shared values, and collective goals. The group promotes conformity among its members. The *"high-context"* societies tend to have a strong welfare mentality.

"Power distance" refers to acceptance of power inequality among individuals. *"Low-context"* *"individualistic"* societies tend to have flat hierarchical structures. *"Low power distance"* manifests itself in more consultative and participatory decision-making. The competences have higher tendency to be diffused through the organizational structure. *"High power distance"* is usually accompanied by sheer hierarchical structure with more authoritative leadership and clean division of power. It tends to be more present within *"high-context"*, *"collectivist"* societies.¹⁷

¹⁷ Adamsky, *"The culture of military innovation"*, 16-18.

1.3 Methodology and data

The strategic culture of the thesis is understood as an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) The thesis uses two different categorizations of strategic subcultures within Israeli military and society. One categorization comes from Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling and the other is used by Tamir Libel in his analysis of Israel's security policy. The thesis understands subculture as a form, which the strategic culture can take. The assumption is, that the strategic culture is present in the entire society. It can take a particular shape, emphasizing different aspects thereof. The different subcultures represent various points of contemplation, which an individual or group of individuals can take when considering strategic issue. The sources of different points of contemplation cannot be traced in the field of strategic culture. The strategic culture comes from within, while the point of contemplation originates from the environment.

The thesis is supported by a body of literature contending with deterrence, low intensity conflict and RMA. This literature deals with selected issues mostly from the perspective of strategic culture and does not identify strategic subcultures. The analytical part draws its information in most parts almost exclusively on news reports.

2 Israeli strategic culture: the alterations and development

This section focuses on particular traits of Israeli strategic culture and its development through the history until today. First, the character of the Israeli society is described as to shed a light on Israeli individual and his treatment of reality around

him. The emphasis is placed on the role of security in Israeli society. The influence of the military and the role it plays in the Israeli culture is highlighted. The high value of Jewish lives in the Zionist ideology is also implied. Second, the two distinctive categorizations of the subcultures are identified within Israeli society. They describe two alternative ways of contemplation of the subcultures and their personification in concrete agents. Third, the main attention is devoted to Israeli military culture. After outlining the main stratagems, the subsection focuses on three parts of the *“national security doctrine.”* The *“battlefield decision,”* *“early warning”* system and the *“deterrence”* are examined in the context of their development. The strategic culture interweaves through their evolution. The role of particular cultural traits in the alteration of the military culture is stressed. The main drivers of the transition, the low intensity conflict assisted with the RMA, represent the changing environment in which the Israeli military culture strives for security. They are displayed in chronological order and show how the *“national security doctrine”* has transformed.

2.1 Israeli strategic culture

Israeli culture represents a shared heritage of European, American and the Middle Eastern culture. The Jewish history and traditions are reflected in the nation’s narratives and its understanding of the world. Multiple diverse cultures were brought into the country with several immigrant waves from all over the world. The Israeli *“melting pot”* and the years of shared narratives and history created a distinct culture with specific cultural traits. The Israeli society has developed a strong sense of in-group solidarity. In the same time, Israelis have a very casual attitude towards rules

and regulation. The social relations show only a very small “*power distance*.”¹⁸ The collectivist ideology of the “*founding fathers*” of the Israeli state is mingled with the individualist, self-reliant, pioneering attitude of the first “*sabras*” (native born). The individualism is only slowly taking roots and replacing the previously dominant collectivist mentality. The social transition is following an economic one, which had elevated Israel from the country with hyperinflation, unbearable deficit and a huge public debt to the one of the most important technological powers with a booming economy and a vibrant investment environment. The individualistic traits of Israeli culture, as the “*chutzpah*” (insolence, audacity, tendency to question everything), found their use in this social transition. In parallel to that, the in-group solidarity and the shared identity are boosted by ongoing waves of immigration. Here, the IDF serves as a unifying factor. The military service helps to socialize not only the new immigrants but brings together young people from all the social classes. Furthermore, the Israelis remain in reserve duty until the age of 54, with an annual call-up for training. This institutionalization helps to unify the Israeli strategic culture.¹⁹

The low *power distance* and egalitarian social norms produced the direct communication style (“*dugri*”). The more diplomatic and conciliatory communication styles did not take roots in Israeli social context. Israelis value directness and openness as signs of honesty and authenticity. Therefore, we can speak of Israeli society as about “*low-context*” society.

Israelis also tend to do more things at once, therefore they could be classified as polychronic. However, it remains an open question, whether this could be said about their thought patterns. This dilemma can be a product of insufficient devotion to

¹⁸ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*”, 69.

¹⁹ Gregory F. Giles, “*Continuity and change in Israel’s strategic culture*,” (McLean: Science Applications International Corporation, 2002), 4.

Israeli culture from the side of anthropologists and cultural psychologists. In terms of various kinds of thought, the Israeli society seems to be divided between “*holistic thought*” on the side of oriental Jews (“Mizrahim”) and “*analytical thought*” on the side of European Jews (“Ashkenazim”). Despite of that, evidence suggests that “*analytical thought*” has an edge over the “*holistic thought*.” Israeli “*anti-intellectualism*” and “*to do*” approach clearly favour inductive thought patterns.²⁰

The securitized nature of Israeli strategic culture has been clearly identified as an aspect of Israeli identity. Security presents an utmost concern for Israeli society. The history of the establishment of the Jewish state in the middle of the sea of hostile nations left its footprint on the way Israelis perceive security today. The “*siege mentality*” brought Israelis to adopt realist policies such is *deterrence, self-reliance, maintaining of military status quo* or *keeping strategic advantage*.²¹ The “*siege mentality*” is a product of geopolitical isolation of the country.²² Israel is surrounded by states deeply hostile to it. The Israeli survival depended for years on Israel’s military strength. The Israeli culture is burdened by permanent “*fear of annihilation*.” The pressing feeling of vulnerability translated in Israeli security culture into strong preference of offensive actions. The first initiative was seen as necessary for ensuring the safety of the nation. The more defensive approaches were seen as cowardly and self-destructive.²³

The army was always crucial to ensuring viability and security within the Jewish state. The prominent role which the IDF plays in Israeli society affects the perspective public has on matters of security. The army has a significant influence on

²⁰ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 69-70.

²¹ Hassan A. Barari, “*Israel’s security: another perspective*,” *Dirasat, Human and Social Sciences*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2006, 631.

²² Kopeć, “*The determinants of Israeli culture*,” 137.

²³ Barari, “*Israel’s security*,” 633-634.

a public opinion. Apart from mandatory reserve duty and the military service, Israeli army is also a prerequisite for state welfare benefits and a route to professional career in civilian life. It plays a significant role in the public sphere. A high military rank is a sign of prestige. The army is also engaged in non-military activities such as the broadcasting of Army Radio, etc. Military commemoration plays a significant role in nation's collective memory. Many national holidays and ceremonies are connected with the military.²⁴ The Jewish history is sometimes described as a history of mourning. The burden of "*galut*" (exile) and repetitive persecution altered in Israel into history of salvations. After the establishment of Israel, the same waves of violence which beset the "*Am Yisrael*" (the Jewish nation) throughout its history kept coming and shattering over the walls of the Israeli Defence Force. The history of the Jews changed from the history of oppression into history of wars. The military victories become the new milestones, replacing massacres and expulsions. This way of reading history entrenched in Israelis the periodic perception of violence and threat.²⁵ The military-industrial complex further strengthens the perception of the "*nation in arms*." The state institutions are all designed to serve all the one purpose: to help to protect the nation. The educational system prepares children for the service in the army. The IDF remains deeply respected in Israel, polling frequently on the highest positions, among the most trusted institutions. Should it become once an all-volunteer force, the polling shows widespread willingness of the Israeli youth to join the ranks. This complex role, which the IDF plays in the Israeli public sphere, and its impressive record in efforts to protect Israel, built up a significant trust in Israel's national security ethos.²⁶

²⁴ Giles, "*Continuity and change*," 4.

²⁵ Barari, "*Israel's security*," 632.

²⁶ Giles, "*Continuity and change*," 4.

The informal civil-military network dominates the sphere of national security. The military perception overshadows other non-military points of view and disqualifies other options from consideration. For instance, the public assigns much lower importance to public relations and diplomacy. The soft power is being neglected in favour of the hard power. The military viewpoint is connected to the strategic fatalism. There is no belief, that the soft power can actually deliver any results. The engagement in the soft power policies is plausible as far as it does not step in the way of security. The military position is to always prepare for the worst case scenario. When it comes to the question of security, such an attitude results in a stubborn entrenchment on the current position and disables any future chance for a compromise.²⁷

The transition from European Jew into the Israeli one altered many aspects of Jewish strategic culture. The first Zionists sought to forge a new Jew, who would be represent a clear separation from the past. The state of Israel was intended to create a clear break. The diasporic Jew was considered weak and fearful. The new modern Israeli Jew was to be his anti-thesis. He should be strong and independent. He should not fear to stand up to his own defence and to safeguard his interest. His purpose was not to complain but “*to do*”. This attitude bred in new Israelis initiative and innovativeness. The attitude shifted the Jewish culture rather dramatically. From the *nation of philosophers* become a *nation of practitioners*. The socialist ideology left a strong mark on Israeli culture. The Zionist socialist ideology also mirrors the strong desire of the Jews to fit in among the nations. To be like every other nation. The new

²⁷ Kopeć, “*The determinants of Israeli culture*,” 137-138.

nation therefore had to have a strong working class led by a handful of leaders from ranks of intelligentsia.²⁸

Israeli culture also casts a strong emphasis on Jewish national solidarity. The state of Israel was found to provide safe haven for the Jewish people. It was the decision of the first Israeli Zionists to take upon themselves the responsibility for their protection abroad as well. It can be considered natural, for the nationalist movement, to take up the responsibility for the rest of the nation. However, it is also important to realise the trauma, which the Zionist movement suffered throughout the Second World War. While the Jews in Europe were being systematically annihilated, the Jews in Palestine could have done nothing to save them.²⁹ Israel vigorously chased after the perpetrators of the holocaust. The most famous example is the abduction of Adolf Eichmann and his consequent trial in Jerusalem. It also conducted numerous policies on behalf of Jews around the world to promote their well-being, e.g. in Soviet Union.³⁰ Yet, it is a truth as well, that the Zionist ideology is strongly dependent on the Jews in diaspora. They are the source of the migration into Israel, the sole purpose of the Zionist movement. Many Israeli policies aimed at bringing the part of the Jewish nation remaining in “*exile*” home. The emphasis on continuing immigration and therefore the unity with the Jewish community abroad is further strengthened by the demographic threat.

²⁸ Kopeć, “*The determinants of Israeli culture*,” 142.

²⁹ Tom Segev, “*Sedmý milion: Izraelci a holocaust*.” (Praha: Paseka, 2014), 74.

³⁰ Barari, “*Israel’s security*,” 633.

2.2 Israeli strategic subcultures

Several scholars attempted to identify subcultures within Israeli context. A faction of them follows distinction made by Baruch Kimmerling, renowned Israeli sociologist. Kimmerling identified three factions within Israeli society. These factions share fundamental beliefs upheld by the leading faction. However, they have also substantial differences on basic issues, like who the enemies are and when and how the military force should be used against them. Tamir Libel distinguishes subcultures within Israeli military culture based on epistemic communities. Epistemic communities lay at the core of each subculture and are key for its advancement into the hegemonic position.

As a leading subculture Kimmerling designates “*security orientation*.” The security oriented culture is concerned with the threats to the nation. It serves as the backbone for the other two subcultures. The main defining subject and unifying issue is the threat stemming from the second layer of Israeli “*threat perception circle*”. The threat coming from this layer is perceived as a fundamental danger to the survival of the whole Israeli society. The central countermeasure against the “*fear of annihilation*” is considered the IDF. The political incarnation of this worldview are the two mainstream parties, Likud and Avoda. It is important to note, that the “*security orientation*” is not entirely detached from the other two subcultures. They are mutually interwoven, and their moderate supporters are set along the spectrum. They also could be found among the supporters of the two above mentioned parties.

The subculture, which represents a variant of the “*security orientation*” and doubles down on security issues is the “*conflict orientation*.” This orientation views

the threats to Israeli security to be omnipresent. The chasm between the Arabs, either those within Israeli zone of control or behind its borders, and the Jews is insurmountable. The peace settlement is not possible in the near future and Israel should seek sort of basic, immediate answers to the security challenges. This subculture views the world through realist lenses. Raw power and military strength are all what matters in the Middle East. The sectarian divide of the communities in the region causes periodic wars and the next war is just a matter of time. The adversaries are essentially implacable. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main battleground for this subculture. The land, which Israel possesses, should be kept and the country should not dodge to the enemy threats, nor false believes in their humanity. That is why it is better for Israel to prepare itself for the future regardless of what the interaction with the country's neighbours might bring. This orientation is rooted within the conflict between the ethnicities and religions and has a strong connection to Jewish/ethnoreligious identity. The land is therefore considered holy. At the centre of this orientation are the people who connected with the land their livelihood, the settlers.

In opposition to the "*conflict orientation*" is the "*peace orientation*". This point of view supports a long term strategy. It looks at the Israeli conflicts with its neighbours from the perspective of conflict resolution. For this perspective, the back doors for negotiation are paramount. This perspective does not blend together the Jewish identity and Israeli current conflictual relations. Every conflict can be resolved, and it is just a matter of negotiation over the interests. The land, the boundaries and the sources of water are just a negotiable article. Furthermore, the peace settlement is the tantamount to the quest for the ultimate Israeli security. In line with peaceful settlement and weaker connection to the ethnoreligious Jewish identity, this

orientation leans more towards universal values and secular heritage of the Israeli founders. This orientation expresses itself via many protest, or anti-war movements and has considerable support among the intellectual elite. The ultimate institutionalization of this worldview is the Ha'aretz newspaper. The political party at the core of this orientation is the Meretz.³¹

Libel defines leading epistemic community as “*traditionalist*.” Traditionalists in Israeli army were proponents of a direct experience as the only real way to become successful commander. The group gradually lost its power during 1990s in context of change of military strategy face to face low intensity conflict.

The alternatives to the traditional education by combat were presented by the “*military professional*” community. The proponents of this community envisioned long-range changes in the military not based on any concrete operational strategy. They emphasized education and professionalism of the soldiers. Their educative programme was supposed to indirectly solve the command and control deficiencies in the IDF.

The competitor of the “*military professional*” community was the “*Operational Theory Research Institute*”, the so called OTRI group. The OTRI group was trying to develop distinctive operational concept, a strategic document, which would define the national security policy of the IDF. The group was inspired by the early Soviet military thought and the post-structuralist philosophy.³² It was developing its theories in the context of the RMA.

³¹ Giles, “*Continuity and change*,” 5-6.

³² Libel, “*Explaining the security paradigm*,” 145-147.

2.3 Israeli military culture

Current Israeli military and political thought divides the threat perception into three categories sorted approximately according to geographic distance into three concentric circles. At the heart of the “*threat perception circle*” lies the Palestinian and Israeli Arab population and threats confined within the Israeli borders. In the next ring lies the threat directly bordering Israel. Here belong the border incursions and the activities of Hamas and Hezbollah as well as other regular Arab armies. In the outer ring belong states, which do not share a border with Israel, but can pose a threat and inflict a damage. In this last ring are located nuclear programs of hostile states, long-range missiles, but also Israeli adversaries sponsoring its proxies in the direct vicinity to the Jewish state.³³

The low power distance in the IDF manifests itself in its organizational culture. The structure is flat, and the ideas can quickly spread from the bottom up without many bureaucratic obstacles standing in the way.³⁴ The innovations usually come from the lower-ranking officers who challenge the old ways of the higher-ranking echelon. The command culture, where the orders are left for interpretation, favours innovativeness and adaptation.³⁵ In the same way, the loose command structure is expected to open a dialogue between the political echelon and the military leadership.³⁶

The Israeli military strategy is grounded the “*national security triangle*.” The three components constituting the strategy are the quick “*battlefield decision*,” the

³³ Giles, “*Continuity and change*,” 12.

³⁴ Kopeć, “*The determinants of Israeli culture*,” 142.

³⁵ Raphael D. Marcus, “*Military innovation and tactical adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah conflict: the institutionalization of lesson-learning in the IDF*,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2015, 506-507.

³⁶ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 65.

system of strategic “*early warning*” and the concept of “*deterrence*.” In practice, first the “*deterrence*” prolongs the peace and manages the balance of power between the wars. Second, the “*early warning*” should provide the time for the deployment of the reserve forces, while the regular army is fighting the enemy on its own. At last, after the reinforcement force joins with the defenders, they together attempt to achieve a decisive victory. Consequently, the military victory produces deterrence and the whole cycle starts again.³⁷ The doctrine relies on two basic assumptions. First, the security has a top priority, because Israel can lose a war only once. Accordingly, the second assumption considers the conflict with the Arab states as a given. Any future resolution is irrelevant for the current security considerations.³⁸

2.3.1 Battlefield decision

On strategic level, Israeli security approach against its enemies is defensive. It operates on the predicament given by geopolitical conditions of its enemies. The Arab states can afford to lose every war. They have the resources. They cannot be ultimately defeated. Their armies can be destroyed, but Israel cannot occupy their territory, nor prevent them from rearming in the period following the war due to its own scarce resources.³⁹ Therefore, the predicament of every war is a goal to preserve the “*status quo*.”⁴⁰

On tactical level, the first ever Israeli military strategy had its roots in the War of Independence, and it was consolidated in 1949. Israel posited that IDF would first

³⁷ Dima Adamsky, “*From Israel with deterrence: strategic culture, intra-war coercion and brute force*,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2017, 165.

³⁸ Shay Hershkovitz, “*A three-story building: a critical analysis of Israeli early warning discourse*,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2017, 766.

³⁹ Adamsky, “*From Israel with deterrence*,” 165.

⁴⁰ Kopeć, “*The determinants of Israeli culture*,” 138.

of all have to fight defensive battles before it transfers the warfare to the enemy's territory. This conceptualization was a product of Israeli geopolitical conditions. The Arab armies were preparing for another war and it was likely, that the attack would come by surprise. The assumption of a surprise attack was a condition, created by the Israeli lack of human and material resources. Israel could not afford to maintain regular army sufficiently strong to win the war against the Arabs. Therefore, it relied on rapid mobilization of the reserve forces. Yet, the mobilization requires time. Due to the lack operational debt, Israel could not tactically withdraw in order to delay confrontation. Thus, the regular forces would fend off the enemy until the reserve force is called to action. To support the regular army before the mobilisation is completed, Israel relied on paramilitary units (*Nahal*) and a concept of "*territorial defence*" (*hagmar*), when the fortified civilian settlements would slow down enemy advance. The IDF kept this "*defensive-offensive*" strategy until 1953.⁴¹

The shift in the military strategy was initiated by the IDF in 1953. It's Planning Department released the document "*The Wartime Order of Battle: Situation Assessment 1953-1960.*" The document introduced a new "*offensive-defensive*" strategy. The document assessed the contemporary military situation as following. Although, Israel had a quantitative disadvantage over the enemy, it held a "*qualitative edge.*" Geographically speaking, Israel was surrounded, and it was threatened on its southern and northern border as well as in the central region, where the country could have been effectively cut in two. The surprise attack was still a distinct possibility, claimed the document. Furthermore, Israel could not afford to wage a war, its economy was contending with an economic crisis and the IDF had to struggle with

⁴¹ Amiram Oren, Oren Barak and Assaf Shapira, "*How the mouse got his roar: the shift to an 'offensive-defensive' military strategy in Israel in 1953 and its implications,*" *The International History Review*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2013, 358-359.

budget cuts. Therefore, the eventual war had to be decided quickly. The IDF needed to achieve “*battlefield decision*” and achieve its goals as fast as possible. The IDF proposed changes, placing the emphasis on “*early warning*,” Air Force, armoured offensive corps and special operations forces consisting of paratroopers.⁴² The plan was adopted without much resistance from the political echelon, nor from the Chief of General Staff. Although the military planners had an alternative, to keep the current plan and wait for the improvement of demographic situation, it did not present it to the government. Later on, three scenarios in case of an all-out war were drawn, the so called *Lavi* plan. One counted with successful Arab surprise attack, the two others relied on the Israeli initiation. In general, the plans favoured pre-emptive strike over defensive anticipation, in line with the new strategy. During the whole process, the IDF took upon itself the full responsibility for providing the national threat assessment. The civilian agencies such is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not take part in the process and left upon IDF to define the existential threats to the country.⁴³

The option for offensive strategy is no surprise given the geographical conditions. The limited strategic depth prevents adopting strictly defensive approach.⁴⁴ The strategic imbalance between the Arab and Israeli armies influenced the Israeli understanding of mutual confrontations. Israel lacked the resources to conduct warfare of such intensity for long time.⁴⁵ The lack of strategic depth and, during the Cold War, the pressure from great powers, prevented Israel from achieving its strategic goals. These factors made from a preference for a short war a

⁴² Oren, Barak and Shapira, “*How the mouse got his roar*,” 362-363.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 367-369.

⁴⁴ Kopeć, “*The determinants of Israeli culture*,” 138.

⁴⁵ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 165.

distinct trait of Israeli military culture. In modern day, the international pressure might have a different character, yet it still plays a considerable role.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the domestic public's sensitivity towards the casualties has also become a factor. The "*casualty awareness*" was always a characteristic of the Israeli strategic culture. The casualties, or absence thereof, were always reported in the media covering the military operations. The casualties were also one of the criteria, on which basis the success of the military operation was evaluated.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, in 1982, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon marked a significant hallmark. Israeli strategic culture, informed by the biblical tradition, distinguishes between the two categories of war. The one category is undisputed. The "*war of no choice*", imposed by the enemy is fully justified. Up until the Yom Kippur war, all of the wars that Israel fought were forced upon it by its enemies. However, the war in Lebanon fitted the second category. The "*war of choice*" is subjected to a moral criticism. It is not outright illegal from the perspective of the Halakha (the Jewish religious law). There are principles supporting it, such is "*an eye for an eye*," but there are also other perspectives.⁴⁸ Such perspectives become more popular in light of the mounting casualties. The academia and part of the public became increasingly critical of the war. The media, previously playing a supportive role in the war efforts, started to publish reports on military failures and also its casualties.⁴⁹ The political leaders were in denial. They attempted to paint the war as a "*war of no choice*," but they were unsuccessful.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Kopeć, "*The determinants of Israeli culture*," 138.

⁴⁷ Avi Kober, "*From heroic to post-heroic warfare: Israel's way of war in asymmetrical conflicts*," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2013, 104.

⁴⁸ Kopeć, "*The determinants of Israeli culture*," 141.

⁴⁹ Giles, "*Continuity and change*," 8.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

However, the high “*casualty awareness*” penetrated even into the military culture. The chief instigator of the war in Lebanon, Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, has prioritized the casualty avoidance over the quick “*battlefield decision*” during the initiating campaign.⁵¹ The “*casualty awareness*” has become a reason for change in strategy. The IDF avoided large manoeuvring in order to prevent casualties in Lebanon. It started to prefer massive fire and air force. The casualties started to be a major determining factor for a victory. The military presence in Lebanon sustained a high support of the public as long as the casualties remained relatively low. Once the casualties increased, as it happened in 1997, the public become discontented. The public anti-war campaign was led in the name of fallen soldiers. The army was reacting directly to the public pressure. The risk of casualties has become the only criteria, which would overshadow any other. No goal was important enough to risk the lives of the soldiers, and consequently public negative reaction, because of it. Nonetheless, the public protest gained a momentum. The Prime Minister Ehud Barak was elected with a public promise to end the war. He did not hesitate to oppose recommendations of the military, nor the intelligence community and pressed ahead with the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Therefore, the public pressure was added to the factors restraining the military.⁵²

The Israeli strategists understood, that the “*battlefield decision*” would serve at most the operational purpose. The victory achieved in the current war had to be capitalized upon, as it was considered to be the background for the next round of confrontation. The “*battlefield decision*” was not supposed to ultimately defeat the

⁵¹ Kober “*From heroic to post-heroic warfare*,” 105.

⁵² Clive Jones, “*A reach greater than the grasp: Israeli intelligence and the conflict in south Lebanon 1990-2000*,” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn 2001, 22.

enemy. It was supposed to decrease his “*capabilities*” and create a deterring effect, which would in turn prolong the following period of peace.⁵³

2.3.2 Early warning system

To complement the shift in the military strategy from “*defensive-offensive*” to “*offensive-defensive*,” the Israeli security establishment yet had to address the possibility of a surprise attack, which the Israeli leadership was painfully aware of. The strategic “*early warning*” became a central component of the national security doctrine after the 1956 Suez war. Israel was attempting to avoid all risks and prepare even for the worst case scenarios. In charge of providing the intelligence was broader Israeli intelligence community. The primary responsibility laid upon the military intelligence (AMAN). In fact, the provision of the “*early warning*” is widely considered the primary task of the intelligence community in Israel.⁵⁴

In 1956, in light of the previous intelligence failures, first revision of the Intelligence services was conducted. First conceptualizations of the “*early warning*” appeared soon thereafter. Some figures of the IDF’s intelligence community developed a distinction between operational, tactical and strategic levels. Others distinguished between levels defined on the basis of how the intelligence was collected. Thus, the typology on “*research-based*,” “*agent-based*” and “*device-based*” warning has been developed. Despite of all these attempted conceptualizations, the discourse of Israeli “*early warning*” remains vague. Israeli discourse treats the knowledge merely as facts on the ground. It does not make a

⁵³ Adamsky, “*From Israel with deterrence*,” 165.

⁵⁴ Hershkovitz, “*A three-story building*,” 766-768.

difference between abstract and concrete knowledge. From the same perspective, the consumer of the intelligence is not expected to garner any knowledge on his own. He is simply being delivered the objective intelligence as if it would be some kind of a product. The product can be correct or incorrect, yet any more complex understanding of the intelligence is missing. The dichotomy between the “*intentions*” and the “*capabilities*” of the opponent is perceived as an identical quest for the exploration of the one objective truth. In reality, the Israeli discourse lacks the link between these two dimensions, which would connect the strategic abstraction with the tactical accuracy. Furthermore, the intelligence is understood separately from the operational logic. Unlike on the strategic level, where the “*early warning*” is a part of the “*national security triangle*,” the doctrine, which conceptualizes it, the parallel doctrine on the operational level is absent. The “*early warning*” is understood as a matter of “*clean*” intelligence, without further conceptualization.⁵⁵

2.3.3 Deterrence

Deterrence is the last component of the “*national security triangle*”. As a concept, contemplated within the Israeli military culture, it has a specific form and shape. Curiously enough, unlike in other militaries, the deployment and the use of force does not signify the policy failure. Rather, it is a central part of the strategy. It’s defining role since the early military history was to postpone the next round of violence. It was understood, that the Arab armies cannot be deterred for long. The cyclical understanding of the conflict with neighbouring states is closely linked to the idea of deterrence. The Israeli conceptualization of violence as something repetitive, what

⁵⁵ Hershkovitz, “*A three-story building*,” 769-771.

cannot be eliminated, did not regard absolute deterrence as relevant. It presumed, that the deterrence failure is simply a matter of time. Therefore, its purpose was not to avoid violence, but to postpone it and reduce its intensity. To achieve that, the violence itself was considered a method, rather than undesirable outcome. The violence would be used to maintain a regime of deterrence on a certain level.⁵⁶ In the context of the “*national security triangle*,” the deterrence would be an automatic by-product of the battlefield decision. In the 1960’s, the preference for this kind of deterrence was firmly established. It was directly linked to the “*offensive-defensive*” strategy adopted in 1953. It has become a part of wider “*cult of the offensive*,” which had developed in Israel as a consequence of Israeli military victories. The concept of deterrence brought into Israeli culture an “*excessive attack*” ethos. The Israeli realist lenses and low importance attached to diplomacy created a mistrust towards “*softer*” forms of deterrence, such are declaratory threats. The threats had to be accompanied by deeds. The credibility was considered a centrepiece. The more restrained strategies were commonly associated with weaknesses of European pre-Israeli Jews, their inability to act and their perceived lack of courage. The modern Israeli Jew was not afraid to act and not restrained. The deterrence had to be achieved in a dramatic showdown, which would inflict a heavy damage upon the enemy. The successful practice of Israeli “*offensive-defensive*” strategy only strengthened these believes and further downplayed the importance of defensive operations. The “*siege mentality*,” accompanied by “*fear of annihilation*,” gave a rise to the quest for “*absolute security*.” In relation to deterrence, it meant a constant race for superiority. The deterrence could be truly effective only in the moment, when the opponent cannot apply the same strategy on Israel. Israel must not be deterred, and

⁵⁶ Adamsky, “*From Israel with deterrence*,” 162-163.

it has to prevent its enemies from achieving deterrent capacity. This approach changes any confrontation with the enemy in the race for escalation dominance. Furthermore, not only the escalation dominance is enough. The enemy has to be shocked and surprised by the severity of Israeli attack. In line with the cyclical view of the conflict, the “batteries” of the deterrence had to be frequently “recharged.” Therefore, the threats had to be accompanied with their periodical execution. By this practice, the credibility of Israeli threats is upheld, and the resolve and capability are demonstrated clearly to the enemy. The lack of the use of force on behalf of the military results in decreased deterrence and a breach in security. In Israeli military culture’s view, this practice of deterrence would create a serial effect. The “*serial deterrence*” would be a product of systematic long-term use of the above described deterrent mechanism, which altogether should have a cumulative effect on the enemy’s perception of the IDF. Thus, the concept in a long run aims at creation of a dreadful reputation, which would decrease the intensity of the next round of violence and prolong the peace time.⁵⁷

The development of the Israeli strategic thought has been traditionally in the hands of the military. The civilian strategists started to gain influence after the serious vulnerabilities in Israeli defence mechanisms have been exposed during the Yom Kippur war. They focused on a range of non-operational issues, including the deterrence. While these civilian thinkers had close to no military experience, the military thought had been left to the military commanders, who valued the experience above all. They preferred to study tactical, operational and doctrinal issues. The theoretical aspects of the military thought have been neglected.⁵⁸ The IDF lacked a

⁵⁷ Adamsky, “*From Israel with deterrence*,” 165-167.

⁵⁸ Avi Kober, “*What happened to Israeli military thought?*” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 5, October, 2011, 709.

systematic military education and the commanders did not understand the deterrence concepts. Thus, their application of the deterrence mechanism has changed in a “*conceptual salad*.”⁵⁹ The military approach has been conservative and limited to the operational aspects of warfare. The series of victories in the Arab-Israeli wars led to adoration of practitioners over theorists. Military theory was marginalized in favour of ethos of improvisation and innovation. It well corresponded with the “*to do*” approach already at place. The military experience was viewed as more important than military education.⁶⁰ The culture of “*anti-intellectualism*” prevented the Israeli army from revising its theoretical approaches. Furthermore, the commanders were illiterate as to the application of their own army’s concepts. The university education was not required for promotion on higher military positions. Additionally, the most praised degrees were in civilian sphere with practical orientation such is engineering or management. The lack of formal education was replaced by fast innovation and adaptation to the new conditions on the battlefield. However, IDF lacked the ability to learn from its mistakes.⁶¹

2.3.4 Low intensity conflict

The Israeli military thought traditionally did not provide low intensity warfare with much recognition. It distinguished between the fundamental security threats (*bitachon bbsi*) and the current security threats (*bitachon shotef*). Only after the war in Lebanon was the insurgency of the Palestinian guerrillas recategorized as a fundamental threat. Yet, after the breakout of the Palestinian Intifada, the IDF was caught by

⁵⁹ Adamsky, “*From Israel with deterrence*,” 167.

⁶⁰ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 75.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

surprise. It lacked a strategy tailored for curbing this kind of a threat.⁶² In case of less fundamental threats and lower intensity warfare, the deterrence was to be maintained via retaliatory attacks.⁶³ The strategy of reprisals was the IDF's main response to the threat presented by infiltrations of refugees and "*fedayeen*" (insurgent militants) in the decades following the establishment of the state of Israel. Reprisals were limited military actions aimed at showing resolve and capability. It was designed to deter Arab states from launching an all out war. The reaction to the infiltration had to be quick and disproportionate. The target was the enemy military.⁶⁴ The effect of the deterrence may have well compelled the government of the Arab states to prevent the Palestinian Arabs from launching the infiltrations, yet the use of the strategy was not always successful.⁶⁵ After the Six-Day War, the attacks from the newly occupied territories were added to the cross border attacks of the "*fedayeen*." The attacks increasingly targeted plains and foreign based diplomatic missions. As a response, Israel improved its defensive measures. The IDF put up fences and roadblocks and established border patrols. The increasing reliance on defensive measures testifies to the limitations of the reprisal strategy to deter the attacks.⁶⁶

The Lebanese war, which revealed further deficiencies in IDF's performance, triggered a debate about existing national security paradigms.⁶⁷ The shortcomings in strategy were resolved by placing a strong emphasis on technology and the so called qualitative edge. Israel made a great use of the new technologies in Lebanon. The technologies have traditionally been a natural counterbalance of the quantitative

⁶² Nicolló Petrelli, "*Deterring insurgents: culture, adaptation and the evolution of Israeli counterinsurgency, 1987-2005*," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2013, 668.

⁶³ Adamsky, "*From Israel with deterrence*," 165.

⁶⁴ Zeev Maoz, "*Evaluating Israel's strategy of low-intensity warfare, 1949-2006*," *Security Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, July-September, 2007, 327.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 331.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 325.

⁶⁷ Libel, "*Explaining the security paradigm*," 145.

advantages of the Israeli adversaries. Driven by “*siege mentality*,” the Israeli military culture favoured quick adaptation to current threats over longer process of military reform.⁶⁸ The Lebanese battlefield presented a new challenge: a guerrilla warfare. The hit-and-run tactic compelled Israel to place a significant emphasis on the use of artillery and air-force. In line with the Israeli deterrence thought, Israel used a scale of alternative policies. Towards the insurgent groups’ leaders Israel used the targeted assassinations and towards the population Israel used a coercive approach.⁶⁹ In 1982, Israel encountered the Syrian air-defence system SAM in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, which threatened its air-superiority. Israel collected the intelligence from the targeted area using the most modern surveillance technology, data from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) fused with airborne radars. It jammed the Syrian communication and incapacitated enemy radars. The Israeli air force (IAF) attacked the Syrian ground forces by laser-guided missiles. Israel destroyed nineteen SAM batteries and ensured its air-superiority. However, the innovative use of modern weaponry did not produce any qualitative leaps in terms of strategy. The debate on doctrine effectiveness was triggered by the *Wald report*, which declared existing doctrines as anachronistic. The reformist voices argued against traditional “*offensive-defensive*” strategy in favour of a stand-off PGM and air-force based strategy. Yet, the reformers were still weak, and the new weaponry was incorporated into the old force structure, designed for the “*offensive-defensive*” strategy.⁷⁰

Facing the First Intifada, the IDF sought to create a cumulative attritional effect in order to wear down the uprising. After the initial shock, the IDF slowly employed police-style anti-rioting techniques. It focused on the most radical factions of the

⁶⁸ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 71-72.

⁶⁹ Maoz, “*Evaluating Israel’s strategy*,” 326.

⁷⁰ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 61-62.

uprising and introduced economic restrictions and other non-military measures. The operational logic of the IDF sought to deter the insurgents and coerce the population. The strategy seemed to have worked, as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) softened its stance and the intifada slowly abated between the 1991 and 1994. In the same time, the changes in the geostrategic situation played into the hands of the IDF. The dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the decades long support of the communist bloc for the Palestinian cause and the defeat of Saddam Hussein would inflict yet another blow to the Palestinian self-confidence. The IDF decided to change its operational logic and introduced a new operational concept of restraint (*Havlagah*). The concept essentially follows the “*hearts and minds*” logic. The pressure on the population was replaced by coordinated health, education and infrastructure programs. The insurgent groups were still a target of an ongoing Counterterrorism campaign.⁷¹

In case of Hezbollah, Israel opted for more active defence. It realized the new challenge to its forces and reconceptualised the threat posed by Hezbollah and its guerrilla tactics. Special Operation Forces were created to tackle with the insurgent group.⁷² The IDF engaged in numerous limited operations. Among them, two operations took a larger scale. In 1993 the operation “*Accountability*” and in the 1996 the operation “*Grapes of Wrath*” intended to coerce the population into abandoning its support for the insurgents. The Hezbollah, alongside with Amal, was targeted by SOF operations combined with massive aerial bombardment of its infrastructure and the infrastructure of the Lebanese state.⁷³ The strategy did not seem to deter Hezbollah nor Amal and compel them to end their operations. The population did not

⁷¹ Petrelli, “*Deterring insurgents*,” 668-670.

⁷² Marcus, „*Military innovation and tactical adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah conflict*,” 509.

⁷³ Petrelli, “*Deterring insurgents*,” 669.

prove to be a good tool for compelling the insurgents to seize the struggle. Neither the bombardment of the Lebanese infrastructure proved to be effective in compelling the Lebanese government to take action against Hezbollah.⁷⁴ Furthermore, Hezbollah learned how to counter Israeli use of the advanced RMA weaponry to avoid decisive military defeat.⁷⁵ The inability to achieve “*battlefield decision*” reoriented IDF towards pursuing different goal during its counterinsurgency operations. The next campaign should have aimed at containing enemy through “*influence operations*.”⁷⁶

The dissatisfying performance of the IDF in the Lebanese and other campaigns led to the creation of the OTRI group in 1994. It was a response to the shift from the conventional to the asymmetric conflict.⁷⁷ The OTRI group sought to create a new concept of operations. They have identified the anti-intellectual trait in the IDF military culture, which prevented it from adapting to the emerging challenges and adopting new conceptualizations on the operational level. The group criticised the ethos of the “*excessive attack*” and the “*cult of the offensive*.”⁷⁸ The ideas of the OTRI group were based in part on the early Soviet military thought and in part on the post-structuralist thought. One of the key concepts promoted by the OTRI was the “*de-territorialisation*,” which disregard the importance of the space for the perception of the battle and focuses on the rear of the enemy.⁷⁹ The OTRI proposed operational doctrine had a form of the triple strike. First, the “*fragmentation strike*,” would interrupt the communication lines and paralyze the commanding centres. Second, the

⁷⁴ Maoz, “*Evaluating Israel’s strategy*,” 332.

⁷⁵ Iver Gabrielsen, “*The evolution of Hezbollah’s strategy and military performance, 1982-2006*,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2014, 261.

⁷⁶ Adamsky, “*From Israel with deterrence*,” 168.

⁷⁷ Phillippe Beaulieu-B. and Phillippe Dufort, “*Introduction: revolution in military epistemology*,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2017, 12.

⁷⁸ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 63.

⁷⁹ Libel, “*Explaining the security paradigm*,” 147.

“*simultaneity*” concept would lead to the coordinated attack on the enemy forces, which would create a chaos and disable any kind of action on the part of the enemy. Third, the concept of “*momentum*” capitalizes on the created chaos and disruption and attempts to exploit it. The last step does not necessarily seek to provide the traditional “*battlefield decision*.” It does not seek to capture the land, nor destroy the enemy forces. The ultimate goal is to disrupt the organizing logic of the enemy forces. The doctrine is designed for the use of RMA weapons and it is considered to be applicable to the low intensity conflict.⁸⁰

The first opportunity for the ideas of the OTRI group to be employed in practice occurred during the Second Intifada. Nonetheless, the IDF Training and Doctrine Division (TOHAD) was the first institution to publish the doctrine of the low intensity conflict. The “*Limited conflict*” (Ha-Imut Ha-mugbal) doctrine was inspired by the Israeli collected historical experience with the low intensity conflict. The document recycled the approach used during the First Intifada and the war in Lebanon. It envisioned the attrition of the enemy, society and the insurgent groups alike, through the combined “*physical, economic and psychological damage*.” Initially, the IDF applied the concept of “*containment*” (Hachala). However, the application of the concept led to a spiral of violence further enhanced by the “*escalation dominance*” logic of the IDF hidden under the new concept of “*leverage*” (Minuf) designed to coerce the Palestinian Authority (PA). Later on, the IDF turned back to the “*Limited conflict*” doctrine and employed various non-military measures in order to exert pressure on the population supporting the insurgents. In the same time the increased military presence on the territory and the practice of targeted killing should have ensured the defeat of the insurgency. Yet, the failing attempts to cope with the

⁸⁰ Adamsky, “*The culture of military innovation*,” 64.

insurgents in line with the *“Limited conflict”* doctrine persuaded the new Chief of General Staff Moshe Ya’alon to look for answers elsewhere. He was intrigued by ideas of the OTRI group. Since 2003 up until the end of the uprising, the IDF followed the outline of the new Concept of Operations (CONOP), which was directly inspired by their ideas.⁸¹

The CONOP was drafted in 2005 for the first timeⁱⁱ. However, it was officially published in April 2006. Only three months later, the second war with Hezbollah broke out.⁸² The CONOP rejected offensive strategy with its manoeuvres, which would expose the army to guerrilla tactics of the enemy. Instead, it gave a clear preference to the stand-off firepower provided by the air-force. It disregarded *“battlefield decision”* and capturing territory and emphasized *“casualty awareness”* instead. The control of the enemy territory was to be executed from afar. The PGM in cooperation with real-time information provided by Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance network was intended to save the lives of the soldiers and decrease collateral damage. The need for permanent presence in the territory was to be replaced with only occasional manoeuvre in case of need. The manoeuvring units would be semi-autonomous, coordinating themselves primarily between each other in real time. Such arrangement would enable immediate response to the threat based on opportunity and facilitated by the loose command structure. In order to achieve *“simultaneity,”* the concept of *“jointness”* was responsible for synchronization of all units across the branches.⁸³

⁸¹ Petrelli, *“Deterring insurgents,”* 671-673.

⁸² Libel, *“Explaining the security paradigm,”* 149.

⁸³ Adamsky, *“The culture of military innovation,”* 67.

Despite massive firepower in its support, the CONOP did not help the IDF to achieve decisive victory. The barrage of rockets on the north of the country continued and Israel was not able to achieve its strategic goals. The military failure was ascribed to the new CONOP and admitted by its proponents.⁸⁴ The Chief of General Staff Dan Halutz also accepted the blame and resigned.⁸⁵ However, the OTRI group did not repudiate its core ideas. They have associated the failure with intricate language used by its proponents, which made it difficult for the rest of the officers to identify with it.⁸⁶ Moreover, the CONOP was introduced shortly before the war and could not have ingrained properly within the corps. As a result, it was not fully utilized during the war and its implementation lacked a doctrinal guidance. The complicated terminology did not make things any better. The commanders did not understand the orders and were left to interpret them in line with insufficient training, which they have received. The critics saw in the chaos ensuing the implementation of the OTRI group's ideas a proof of their defectiveness. However, the improper understanding and messiness was at least from a part the responsibility of the new Chief of General Staff Dan Halutz. He replaced a long time proponent of the OTRI group ideas Moshe Ya'alon and declared a change in the direction the IDF was heading. Yet, in the same time he approved the new CONOP without changes. It was not clear what role should the document play.⁸⁷ Furthermore, Halutz dissolved the OTRI group in April 2006. He made it clear that he has a different vision for the IDF operations, further undermining the document's bearing.⁸⁸ His vision consisted of

⁸⁴ Libel, *"Explaining the security paradigm,"* 149.

⁸⁵ Hanan Greenberg, *"IDF chief Halutz resigns,"* Ynetnews.com, January 17, 2007. <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3353269,00.html>

⁸⁶ Libel, *"Explaining the security paradigm,"* 149.

⁸⁷ Adamsky, *"The culture of military innovation,"* 68-69.

⁸⁸ Ofra Graicer, *"Self-disruption: seizing the high ground of systemic operational design (SOD),"* Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2017, 26.

coercive campaign designed to force Lebanese government to start a war against Hezbollah. It was in its essence the same strategy applied against Hezbollah in the 1990s. Thus, it was destined to fail. Further mistakes included overreliance on airpower and reluctant deployment of reservists.⁸⁹ Hezbollah learnt lessons from the previous campaigns and was deeply entrenched in its positions. The villages have been made into fortresses and was increasingly difficult to conquer without heavy casualties. The IDF become deterred from attacking them out of “*casualty awareness*.”⁹⁰ The Israeli air-force was also powerless and could not force the Hezbollah out of its position and soon did not have enough targets, which it could hit. The decision was to deploy relatively small units on the ground, which were unable to achieve a “*battlefield decision*.” As strategic goals were considered symbolic targets, in line with American concept of “*effect based operations*” (EBO). These targets become impossible to achieve and the lack of results turn the tables against Israel. The Israeli public and the international community became increasingly critical of the war.⁹¹ The international mediators were finally let to end the war with mixed results and conflicting sings of victory and defeat for both sides. The final interpretation and attribution of victory remained in symbolic domain.⁹²

Following the resignation of Dan Halutz, another opponent of the OTRI group, Major General (Ret.) Gabi Ashkenazi, has been appointed to the post of the Chief of General Staff.⁹³ Ashkenazi capitalized on the criticism, which mounted against the OTRI reforms following the campaign in Lebanon. He hailed to return IDF to its

⁸⁹ Raphael D. Marcus, “*Israel’s long war with Hezbollah: military innovation and adaptation under fire*,” Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018, 190-191.

⁹⁰ Gabrielsen, “*The evolution of Hezbollah’s strategy*,” 265.

⁹¹ Iver Gabrielsen, “*Military strategy and the conduct of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war*,” *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 32, No. 5, 2013, 436.

⁹² Shmuel Tzabag, “*Ending the Second Lebanon war: the interface between the political and military echelons in Israel*,” *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2013, 653-654.

⁹³ Libel, “*Explaining the security paradigm*,” 149.

conceptual roots. He improved training of reservists. His new plan emphasized the role of ground manoeuvre and the importance of heavy armour formations. The IDF under his command returned back to its traditional heavy and offensive orientation.⁹⁴ Ashkenazi enhanced the doctrinal bodies in order to create an alternative to the OTRI group. Despite his opposition, the OTRI group ideas have been preserved in other military departments and continued to influence new officers. Furthermore, the Ashkenazi's tenure failed to produce an alternative to the operational concept of the OTRI group.⁹⁵ The next conflict, which put the skills of the IDF to the test was the Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009. It was apparent, that the IDF was reluctant to commit its reserve force in fear of increased casualties. The indecisive manoeuvring, which brought unnecessary casualties at the end of the campaign, further emphasized the need for change.

The following period of time witnessed a revival of the former OTRI group. The Minister of Defence has become one of its proponents, Moshe Ya'alon. Also, the new Chief of General Staff appointed in 2011, Benny Gantz, supported their ideas and provided them with a new opportunity to compile a key conceptual document for the IDF. The work on the new document was further stimulated by the operation Pillar of Defence in Gaza in 2012. The ideas of the former OTRI group were clearly represented in the document, when it was finally released in late 2013. The "IDF Strategy – the Operational Concept" sustained of three phases. First, the analytical phase explores the environment and develops an extensive knowledge of military capabilities of the enemy. Furthermore, it also takes into account the non-military dimension of the war. It analyses the socio-political and economic environment in

⁹⁴ Marcus, *"Israel's long war with Hezbollah,"* 235.

⁹⁵ Libel, *"Explaining the security paradigm,"* 150.

which is the enemy forced to function. In parallel, the same attention is also devoted to the IDF's own operational environment. Second, the IDF reviews its own capabilities, its strategic readiness, its doctrines and it designates areas, which require further improvement. Third, the decision whether and how the forces should be developed and deployed is passed.⁹⁶

The IDF under Gantz's command started to realize, that it would be impossible under the circumstances of asymmetric warfare to reach a decisive "*battlefield decision*." To achieve the victory, it would have to find a substitute. As the "*battlefield decision*" had a deterring function in the Israeli "*national security triangle*," its replacement had to "*recharge the batteries*" of the deterrence as well. To that purpose served the concept of "*campaign between wars*." The operations Cast Lead (2009), Pillar of Defence (2012) and the latest Protective Edge (2014) were all part of one line of strategy. The deterrence was reconceptualized as a product series of smaller military engagements dubbed in Israeli military jargon "*mowing the grass*." The military operation is a mean of last resort aimed at restoring deterrence. However, the non-belligerent period under the "*campaign between wars*" virtually does not exist. The concept is based on a permanent and continuous elimination of a threat. The means to combat the threat outside the scope of a small campaign include special operations targeting the capabilities of the enemy and preventing it from replenishing its military arsenal. These operations should keep the self-confidence of the enemy on a relatively low level, so it would not dare to challenge the status quo. In case of deterrence failure, the constant elimination of threat facilitates strategic advantage in the next limited campaign. Concurrently, the new concept enhanced both active and passive defensive measures. The costs of

⁹⁶ Libel, "*Explaining the security paradigm*," 150.

deterrence failure were reduced by multi-layer anti-missile defensive system, which were for long time disregarded in favour of more offensive strategies. The passive defence, the civilian bunkers, security fences and other supplementary installations were fostered since the war in Iraq threatened to spillover to Israel with weapons of mass distraction (WMD). *“IDF Strategy – the Operational Concept”* significantly altered the *“national security triangle.”* The *“Early warning”* remained unchanged. The *“campaign between wars”* replaced *“battlefield decision”*, which in turn modified *“deterrence.”* Furthermore, the *“fourth leg”* was added to the trinity with enhancement of *“defence”*. The *“defence”* also has an influence on *“deterrence,”* supplementing deterrence by punishment with deterrence by denial.⁹⁷

3 Israeli strategy and strategic culture in Syrian civil war

In this final section, three instances of Israeli use of force are examined. The strategic culture serves as a background for their examination. First, the clash between the government and the military and secret services over the use of air-strikes against Iranian nuclear program is subjected to analysis. Second, the strategic surprise of the Arab Spring and the following surprise emanating from the culturally tinged understanding of strategic *“early warning”* is analysed consequently. Third, the Israeli involvement in the Syrian civil war is analysed. The last, an examination is conducted, and the results of the examination summarized.

⁹⁷ Adamsky, *“From Israel with deterrence,”* 168-171.

3.1 Israeli strike on Iran

Iran has become one of Israel's greatest enemies after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The mutual relations remained strained ever since. The two countries clashed over Iran's nuclear program, which in Israelis arises "*fear of annihilation.*" This fear is only enhanced by inflammatory rhetoric of Iranian leaders who openly threaten Israel with genocide. Israeli aversion to nuclear programs of its adversaries is codified in the so called "*Begin Doctrine,*" which outlines Israeli counter-proliferation policy.⁹⁸ The Iranian program has become a target of multiple clandestine operations from the side of Israel. As the program continued uninterrupted, some Israeli decision makers started to consider an air strike, which would end the Iranian nuclear ambitions once and for all. The alternative to this variant was continuous sabotage by secret services. In 2010, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Minister of Defence Ehud Barak ordered the IDF to go on high alert in a preparation for possible military operation. In charge of planning of the air strike was the Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. Ashkenazi believed the military operation to be too risky. The lives of the pilots would be at stake. In his view, the IDF lacked the intelligence and needed more time for logistical preparation. Barak had a different opinion yet did not press the issue and ordered the necessary preparations to be made. Ashkenazi was not the only opponent of the military option. The heads of Israeli secret services, Meir Dagan from Mossad and Yuval Diskin from Shabak were both proponents of the clandestine operations. They argued that the air strike would cause a harm to

⁹⁸ Amos Yadlin, "The Begin Doctrine: lessons of Osirak and Deir ez-Zor," The Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1037, March 21, 2018. <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-begin-doctrine-the-lessons-of-osirak-and-deir-ez-zor/>

relations with the United States. Furthermore, strike would be ineffective, and it should be used only as a mean of last resort. They believed that Netanyahu's decision to strike Iran was motivated by political considerations, or in Diskin's words by "messianic feelings." Dagan and Netanyahu shared a view of Iran as a mortal threat to Israel. They have both believed that the matter of Iranian nuclear program is a matter of survival of Jewish nation. But Dagan and Diskin were both appointed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Their opposition to Netanyahu was not only professional, it was also personal. Sharon was Netanyahu's political opponent. The relations between the two were not good. Dagan and Diskin shared resentment for Sharon's successor. A few months after Ashkenazi postponed the air strike, Netanyahu and Barak have asked him again to ready the military. Ashkenazi demanded an approval from the full Cabinet, challenging the legality of the order. Dagan and Diskin joined his side. Dagan allegedly leaked the details about the operation to CIA. Ashkenazi confronted Netanyahu publicly. He warned of risk of retaliation from Iran through its proxy Hezbollah, which could cause unprecedented casualties on civilian population. Public showdown divided society over the issue along the political lines. Those on the right took a side of Netanyahu and those on the left defended Ashkenazi. The air strike was eventually rejected.⁹⁹

3.2 Strategic early warning

The Arab Spring was a series of revolts and protests that occurred across the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010. The first protests have begun after a produce

⁹⁹ Anshel Pfeffer, "The Israelis who prevented a war with Iran," *Foreign Policy*, May 11, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/11/the-israelis-who-prevented-a-war-with-iran/>

vendor in Tunisia set himself on fire in front of a government office. This event sparked a revolution in Tunisia. Then, protests spread quickly across the entire Middle East. The protestors used social media to organise themselves and quickly passed the message across the region. The intelligence community of the respected countries was caught by surprise. Yet, it was not only the domestic intelligence community, who was caught unprepared. The Arab Spring shocked Israeli intelligence as well. On 25. January 2011, the director of the Israeli military intelligence service AMAN General Aviv Kochavi presented to the relevant Knesset committees his assessment of the current situation. In the time, when the protests in Tunisia already settled and the upheaval just spilled over to Egypt, General Kochavi strongly overestimated the stability of the Middle Eastern regimes. He assured the Knesset committees, that the Egyptian government was stable, and it has the situation under control. Shortly thereafter, the Egyptian regime have collapsed. The committee members called for an investigation of what they understood as an *"intelligence failure."*¹⁰⁰ The AMAN was able to provide Israeli decision makers with better estimate of the general direction of the uprisings. Thanks to the accurate analysis, Israeli the decision makers refrained from treating the Arab Spring as a single phenomenon and focused more closely on particular situation in neighbouring countries.¹⁰¹ AMAN accurately predicted the emergence of more conflicts in the region. The Iran was regarded as a threat number one. It supplied the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Hezbollah with modern weapons, finances and military advisors. It also supported the Syrian regime of president Bashar Al-Assad. The

¹⁰⁰ Eyal Pascovich, *"Intelligence assessment regarding social developments: The Israeli experience,"* International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 26, No. 1, November 30, 2012, 99-100.

¹⁰¹ Amichai Magen, *"Comparative assessment of Israel's foreign policy response to the 'Arab Spring,'"* Journal of European Integration, Vol. 37, No. 1, December 12, 2014, 116.

Israeli intelligence predicted that the Arab Spring would augment the conflict with Iran and increase the insecurity on its northern border.¹⁰² Yet, AMAN was unable to provide strategic “*early warning*” of possible spillover of the protests on its northern border. On 15. May 2011, several hundreds of Syrians, likely of Palestinian decent, breached the border fence on the Golan Heights on the occasion of the anniversary of the “*Nakba Day*.” The protesters, inspired by the Arab Spring, organized their activity on Facebook. The insufficient attention of the AMAN to the small emerging social network in Syria resulted in a blow to Israeli deterrence. The IDF’s faulty deployment harmed its reputation. The infiltrators remained on Israeli territory for several hours.¹⁰³ The blame was casted upon Israeli intelligence community. Former Aman’s chief Amos Yadlin referenced lack of experience with impact of social media on toppling of regimes. Yet, there are many opinions that claim, that intelligence should not be expected to predict such complex phenomena such are popular uprisings. The decision-makers should prepare for the worst case scenario.¹⁰⁴ The revolutionary events unfold gradually and have a cumulative impact. Intelligence analysts cannot be expected to connect the dots between the isolated events and processes. They cannot focus on all marginal actors who appear to be insignificant.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Eran Zohar, “*Israeli military intelligence’s understanding of the security environment in light of the Arab Awakening*,” *Defence Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 1, 2015, 210.

¹⁰³ Pascovich, “*Intelligence assessment regarding social developments*,” 101.

¹⁰⁴ Zohar, “*Israeli Military Intelligence’s Understanding*”, 208 - 209.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*.

3.3 Israeli intervention in Syria

The Syrian civil war left Israel with ambiguous feelings. On one hand, the Syrian Arab Army, Israel's most powerful enemy, was severely weakened. On the other hand, the area near the Israeli border has become infested with hostile Islamist groups, which could attempt to harm Israeli security. The threat of these groups was relatively minor. Their lack of heavy military equipment enabled them to conduct raids into Israeli civilian communities near the border at most. The bigger threat for Israel represented the influence of Iran, which started spread rapidly across Syria. Its proxy group Hezbollah entered the Syrian battlefield to aid Assad. The dissolution of rule of law across Iraq and Syria enabled Iran to supply Hezbollah with advanced military equipment directly. Furthermore, tens of thousands of Iranian troops appeared in Syria as well. Israel was worried, that Hezbollah could establish its base near the Golan heights. It selected an approach in line with its military doctrine. Initially, Israel responded to mostly accidental fire from the Syrian side in a proportionate yet determined manner.¹⁰⁶ Israel tried to keep low profile in confrontation with the Syrian army and focused narrowly on targeting the capabilities of Hezbollah and preventing it from establishing a base near the Golan heights. It rejected direct involvement and open confrontation with the Syrian regime, avoiding getting caught in protracted conflict similar to the war in Lebanon. Israel rejected establishing a no fly zone above the Syrian part of the Golan heights and reject to aid rebels by targeting the Syrian regime forces directly. The accidental fire was reciprocated in a proportionate way just so it would show a resolve. The Israel feared establishing a no-fly zone, which

¹⁰⁶ Ehud Eilam, "*Israel's military doctrine*," Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018, 2-5.

could attract refugees to seek a shelter near its borders, or potentially in Israel itself. It provided concealed humanitarian aid to the desperate civilian population and treated thousands of Syrians in its hospitals. Israel hoped that Obama administration would take the lead.¹⁰⁷

In summer 2015 it became clear, that Obama's focus pivoted away from the Middle East and Israel will have to look after its own interest. When the fighting was taking place on the Golan heights, Israel considered military intervention. It could have toppled Assad several times. Syrian regime presented Israel with a convenient opportunity for intervention, when it used chemical weapons against civilians. The dilemma involved an impact which the Israeli intervention would have on other warring parties. Israel could get caught in a protracted conflict with the Islamic state and Al-Kaida. What decided the matter was reportedly the "*casualty awareness*." The Israeli decision-makers concluded, that the known threat of the Syrian regime is preferable. Soon thereafter, the Russian intervention put a stop to any such considerations.¹⁰⁸

In order to combat the threat of the Islamist groups and preventing Hezbollah from establishing a base in the vicinity of its border, Israel allied with several secular rebel groups and secretly supplied them with weapons. The IAF frequently conducted airstrikes deep within Syrian territory aimed at preventing convoys of advanced weaponry to reach Hezbollah. Israel hoped that the Russian presence could help to secure its interest and contain Iran. The Moscow agreed only to prevent the Shia fighters from entering the close strip of 5-7 kilometres alongside the Israeli Golan

¹⁰⁷ Elizabeth Tsurkov, "*Israel's deepening involvement with Syria's rebels*," War on the Rocks, February 14, 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/israels-deepening-involvement-syrias-rebels/>

¹⁰⁸ Ariel Kahana, "*Israel considered intervening in Syrian civil war before Russia stepped in*," Israel Hayom, September 6, 2018. <https://www.israelhayom.com/2018/09/06/israel-considered-intervening-in-syrian-civil-war-before-russia-stepped-in/>

Heights. This was not nearly enough. Israel reacted by striking Iranian targets deep within Syrian territory in the military bases of the Syrian regime. It changed the rear of the enemy into battlefield. Close to its border, Israel increased its support for the allied rebel groups.¹⁰⁹ Israel discarded its low profile and started to send its aid into Syria in original packaging, while publishing data about its aid in the program “*Good Neighbour*.”¹¹⁰ It also treated large numbers of rebels in its hospitals. Israel hoped that these rebels can prevent Hezbollah from getting close to its border, but it was also concerned with the small ISIS held enclave right next to its border. Israel conducted air-strikes against the ISIS in the support of these rebels. Yet, all their offensives have failed. However, Israel was able to negotiate a “reconciliation” between the regime and some of its allied rebels, who from the time on acted as a pro-government militia on Israeli border.¹¹¹ Later in 2018, Israel negotiated with Russia the takeover of the area by the regime forces in exchange for 80 kilometres long distance, which the Iranian backed militias will have to keep from the Golan heights.¹¹² In the last episode so far, the Iran launched several rockets into Israeli held Golan heights, which were shot down by the Israeli air defence system Iron Dome and Israel retaliated afterwards. The both countries are setting red lines, while Russia is acting as a moderating actor.¹¹³ In January 2019, within the context of US

¹⁰⁹ Tsurkov, “*Israel’s involvement with rebels*.”

¹¹⁰ Elizabeth Tsurkov, “*Inside Israel’s secret program to back Syrian rebels*,” Foreign Policy, September 6, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/in-secret-program-israel-armed-and-funded-rebel-groups-in-southern-syria/>

¹¹¹ Tsurkov, “*Israel’s involvement with rebels*.”

¹¹² Tsurkov, “*Inside Israel’s secret program*.”

¹¹³ Joseph Hincks, “Israel and Iran are waging a secret war in Syria. Here’s how it finally went public,” Time, January 25, 2019. <http://time.com/5513411/israel-iran-secret-war-syria/>

announced withdrawal from the region, Israel admitted its air-strikes in Syria as well as funding of the rebels.¹¹⁴

3.4 Summary: the alteration of strategic subcultures

The conflict between proponents and opponents of the air strike on Iranian nuclear facilities in terms of strategic culture can be best understood as a competition between the “*security orientation*” and the “*conflict orientation*.” Netanyahu and Barak, pursued a policy of force. Netanyahu has been accused of pursuing the strike for political reasons. This view emphasizes the role of his political basis. Barak, who was at the time a leader of the Labour Party, could not rely on the support of his political basis. Whether his support was mere political game or genuine persuasion about the appropriateness of this political course remains an open question. Nonetheless, he opted in favour of the “*conflict orientation*.” Dagan, Diskin and Ashkenazi preferred more subtle solution, which would not put the lives of military personnel, nor the lives of civilians into jeopardy. Being political descendants of Sharon, “*hawk*” who at the end of his career pursued a withdrawal from Gaza, they could have followed his legacy and take a moderate stance towards the Iranian threat. They could also oppose Netanyahu out of pure animosity or personal antipathy. The fact remains, that among the military planners and decision makers the opinions about the right course of action varied.

The Israeli tendency to rely on the “*early warning*” had a negative impact on the deployment of the IDF, infringing on its deterrent capability. The treatment of the

¹¹⁴ Judah Ari Gross, “*IDF chief finally acknowledges that Israel supplied weapons to Syrian rebels*,” The Times of Israel, January 14, 2019. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-chief-acknowledges-long-claimed-weapons-supply-to-syrian-rebels/>

information as *“clean intelligence”* mislead the decision-makers and could have cause a potential harm to national security through their inaccurate assessment of the geostrategic security environment.

From the start of the Syrian civil war Israel kept low profile, while protecting only its immediate interests in the close vicinity of its border. The *“casualty awareness”* was among the reasons why Israel did not follow its tendency for offensive approach and did not attempt to achieve the *“battlefield decision”* as proposed some voices in the military. Instead, when its interests were not upheld by the US neither by Russia, it relied on proxy rebel groups in the area and conducted air-strikes deep within enemy territory, turning its rear into the battlefield. The ideas of the OTRI group and their *“campaign between wars”* prevailed after initial hesitation. Israeli targeted Iranian convoys to Hezbollah in order to prevent it from decrease its capabilities in the next confrontation. It repetitively struck Iranian targets in an attempt to create a deterrence and establish red lines. Israeli air-defence system Iron Dome effectively worked as an active defence, and thus Israel did not have to escalate its response in order to uphold its deterrence.

Conclusions

The thesis attempted to redefine the concept of strategic subcultures as an aspect of strategic culture. The three cases of Israeli use of force have been examined and different subcultures identified.

The conflict between proponents and opponents of the air strike on Iranian nuclear facilities in terms of strategic culture can be best understood as a competition

between the “*security orientation*” and the “*conflict orientation*.” The Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defence Ehud Barak represented the “*conflict orientation*,” while the chiefs of Israeli intelligence community Meir Dagan and Yuval Diskin and Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi represented the “*security orientation*.” While Netanyahu and Barak pursued more confrontational approach, the opposing trio emphasized the security and risks entailed in the operation.

The Israeli tendency to rely on the “*early warning*” had a negative impact on the deployment of the IDF, infringing on its deterrent capability. The treatment of the information as “*clean intelligence*” misled the decision-makers and could have cause a potential harm to national security through their inaccurate assessment of the geostrategic security environment.

In the war in Syria, the approach of OTRI group epistemic community defined the Israeli way of war. The “*casualty awareness*” alongside with the experience with the new ways of war prevented the return of the previous approach to Israeli defence. The new approach to waging war proved satisfactory.

Bibliography

Adamsky, Dima. *“From Israel with deterrence: strategic culture, intra-war coercion and brute force.”* Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2017.

Adamsky, Dima. *“The culture of military innovation: the impact of cultural factors on the revolution in military affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel.”* Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2010.

Barari, Hassan A. *“Israel’s security: another perspective.”* Dirasat, Human and Social Sciences, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2006.

Beaulieu-B., Phillippe and Phillippe Dufort. *“Introduction: revolution in military epistemology.”* Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2017.

Eilam, Ehud. *“Israel’s military doctrine.”* Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018.

Gabrielsen, Iver. *“Military strategy and the conduct of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.”* Comparative Strategy, Vol. 32, No. 5, 2013.

Gabrielsen, Iver. *“The evolution of Hezbollah’s strategy and military performance, 1982-2006.”* Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2014.

Giles, Gregory F. *“Continuity and change in Israel’s strategic culture.”* McLean: Science Applications International Corporation, 2002.

Graicer, Ofra. *“Self-disruption: seizing the high ground of systemic operational design (SOD).”* Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2017.

Greenberg, Hanan. *“IDF chief Halutz resigns.”* Ynetnews.com, January 17, 2007.
<https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3353269,00.html>

Gross, Judah Ari. *“IDF chief finally acknowledges that Israel supplied weapons to Syrian rebels.”* The Times of Israel, January 14, 2019.

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-chief-acknowledges-long-claimed-weapons-supply-to-syrian-rebels/>

Hershkovitz, Shay. "A three-story building": a critical analysis of Israeli early warning discourse." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2017.

Hincks, Joseph. "Israel and Iran are waging a secret war in Syria. Here's how it finally went public." *Time*, January 25, 2019. <http://time.com/5513411/israel-iran-secret-war-syria/>

Jones, Clive. "A reach greater than the grasp": Israeli intelligence and the conflict in south Lebanon 1990-2000." *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn 2001.

Kahana, Ariel, "Israel considered intervening in Syrian civil war before Russia stepped in." *Israel Hayom*, September 6, 2018. <https://www.israelhayom.com/2018/09/06/israel-considered-intervening-in-syrian-civil-war-before-russia-stepped-in/>

Karásek, Tomáš. "Tracking shifts in strategic culture: analysing counterinsurgency as a rise of strategic subculture." *Obrana a Strategie*, Vol. 2016, No. 1, October 27, 2016. <https://www.obranaastrategie.cz/en/archive/volume-2016/1-2016/articles/tracking-shifts-in-strategic-culture.html>

Kober, Avi. "From heroic to post-heroic warfare: Israel's way of war in asymmetrical conflicts." *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2013.

Kober, Avi. "What happened to Israeli military thought?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 5, October, 2011.

Kopeć, Rafał. "The determinants of the Israeli strategic culture." *Review of Nationalities*, Vol. 6, No. 1, December, 2016.

Libel, Tamir. *"Explaining the security paradigm shift: strategic culture, epistemic communities, and Israel's changing national security policy."* Defence Studies, Vol. 2016, No. 2, March 10, 2016.

Magen, Amichai. *"Comparative assessment of Israel's foreign policy response to the 'Arab Spring.'"* Journal of European Integration, Vol. 37, No. 1, December 12, 2014, 116.

Maoz, Zeev. *"Evaluating Israel's strategy of low-intensity warfare, 1949-2006."* Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, July-September, 2007.

Marcus, Raphael D. *"Israel's long war with Hezbollah: military innovation and adaptation under fire."* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018.

Marcus, Raphael D. *"Military innovation and tactical adaptation in the Israel-Hizballah conflict: the institutionalization of lesson-learning in the IDF,"* The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2015.

Oren, Amiram, Oren Barak and Assaf Shapira. *"'How the mouse got his roar': the shift to an 'offensive-defensive' military strategy in Israel in 1953 and its implications."* The International History Review, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2013.

Pascovich, Eyal. *"Intelligence assessment regarding social developments: The Israeli experience."* International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 26, No. 1, November 30, 2012.

Petrelli, Nicolló. *"Deterring insurgents: culture, adaptation and the evolution of Israeli counterinsurgency, 1987-2005."* Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2013.

Pfeffer, Anshel. *"The Israelis who prevented a war with Iran."* Foreign Policy, May 11, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/11/the-israelis-who-prevented-a-war-with-iran/>

Segev, Tom. *"Sedmý milion: Izraelci a holocaust."* Praha: Paseka, 2014.

Tsurkov, Elizabeth. *"Inside Israel's secret program to back Syrian rebels."* Foreign Policy, September 6, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/in-secret-program-israel-armed-and-funded-rebel-groups-in-southern-syria/>

Tsurkov, Elizabeth. *"Israel's deepening involvement with Syria's rebels,"* War on the Rocks, February 14, 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/israels-deepening-involvement-syrias-rebels/>

Tzabag, Shmuel. *"Ending the Second Lebanon war: the interface between the political and military echelons in Israel."* Israel Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2013.

Yadlin, Amos. *"The Begin Doctrine: lessons of Osirak and Deir-ez Zor."* The Institute for National Security Studies, No. 1037, March 21, 2018. <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-begin-doctrine-the-lessons-of-osirak-and-deir-ez-zor/>

Zohar, Eran. *"Israeli military intelligence's understanding of the security environment in light of the Arab Awakening."* Defence Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 1, 2015.

ⁱ The term "generations" can be slightly misleading as can be seen on the case of the *"third generation,"* whose leading representative is former second generation scholar Johnson. Viz. libel 139

ⁱⁱ The CONOP was drafted in 2005 according to Libel as well as Adamsky. According to Graicer, it was published in 2004.