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**Radical Islamists: Trojan horse of terrorism or
just criminals**

Master's Thesis

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Declaration

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References

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Abstract

This work focuses on analysis of radical Islamist (jihadist) terrorism in EU with specific focus on refugees. The basic aim of this work is to determine, whether refugees are more prone to radicalization, criminal activity or terrorism. Special attention will be given to refugees that has come to EU since 2015 and the special aim is to determine, whether they can be considered as trojan horse of terrorism, criminals or they pose no threat in topic of either terrorism or criminality. This work is divided into three main chapters and numerous subchapters. In the first part of the work, the phenomenon of terrorism is closely analysed. This chapter concentrates on difficulties of achieving a common definition of terrorism, provides various definitions and their critique, looks on definitional elements and roots of terrorism, discusses theories of terrorism and presents various types of terrorism. The second chapter lists out the occurrence of jihadist terrorism in EU since 2015 and reviews it. A special view is offered by listing out successful jihadist attacks committed by refugees since 2015. The third chapter focuses on the analysis of three things – radicalization among refugees, criminal activity among refugees and the possibility of the occurrence of migratory terrorism. The main research question of the work is: Do refugees that came to EU in refugee crisis pose an increased risk of terrorism?

Abstrakt

Táto práca sa zameriava na analýzu radikálne Islamistického (džihádistického) terorizmu v EÚ so špeciálnym zameraním na utečencov. Hlavným cieľom práce je určiť, či sú utečenci viac náchylní na radikalizáciu, kriminalitu alebo terorizmus. Špeciálna pozornosť je venovaná utečencom, ktorí prišli do EÚ po roku 2015 a jedným z našich cieľov bude zistiť, či je možné týchto utečencov považovať za trójske kone terorizmu, kriminality alebo či nepredstavujú žiadnu hrozbu či už v oblasti terorizmu alebo kriminality. Práca je rozdelená na tri hlavné kapitoly a viacero pod-kapitol. V prvej časti práce sa venujeme podrobnej analýze terorizmu. V tejto časti sa zameriavame na ťažkosti s dosiahnutím všeobecne akceptovanej teórie terorizmu, poskytujeme rôzne definície terorizmu a ich kritiku, prezentujeme definičné elementy a motívy terorizmu, popisujeme rôzne teoretické koncepty terorizmu a poskytujeme pohľad na viaceré del'by

terorizmu. V druhej kapitole prezentujeme informácie o radikálne Islamistickom terorizme v EÚ od roku 2015. Špeciálny pohľad je venovaný teroristickým útokom, ktoré boli vykonané utečencami od roku 2015. Tretia kapitola sa zameriava na analýzu troch vecí – radikalizácia medzi utečencami, kriminalita medzi utečencami a fenomén migračného terorizmu. Našou hlavnou výskumnou otázkou je: Predstavujú utečenci, ktorí prišli do EÚ počas utečeneckej krízy, zvýšené riziko terorizmu?

Keywords

terrorism, refugees, refugee crisis, radicalization, migration, migratory terrorism

Klíčová slova

Terorismus, uprchlíci, uprchlická krize, radikalizace, migrace, migrační terorismus

Název práce

Radikální Islamisti: Trojský kůň terorismu nebo jenom kriminálnici

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Introduction

Terrorism is a unique phenomenon of its own characteristics. It is not just a political violence, neither only a use of force. It is different than extremism and yet it is very close to it. Throughout the history, societies around the world have encountered various types of terrorism, motivated by different factors, aiming on different targets, using different modus operandi under the desire of achieving very diverse goals. Even when terrorism has begun as a local or regional phenomenon, throughout the years, it has rapidly become a global issue. Currently, terrorism can be considered as one of the main threats of modern societies. To combat terrorism properly, means to combat it in early roots and prevent terrorism from happening. Once the attack is committed, there is no way back. Thus, counter-terrorism measures must focus on fighting terrorism as early as possible. This, however, can be achieved only when there is a general consensus between everyone on the question of what exactly terrorism is. As it is a very complex phenomenon, it requires also a complex research. The research on phenomenon of terrorism lasts for decades, involving thousands of authors, scholars and academics who have written thousands of articles. Yet, there is still no general consensus of definition of terrorism.

Throughout the history, EU has seen various types of terrorism, from anarchist, through separatist, to the current phenomenon of radical Islamist (jihadist) terrorism, currently being the most vicious type of terrorism from point of casualties. With EU also experiencing one of the largest refugees' flows in its recent history, some politicians, such as Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán, claim that these refugees, coming from conflict zones such as Iraq or Syria, are terrorists or future terrorists. Moreover, he claims that the migration is the trojan horse of terrorism (Financial Times 2017). This statement is backed also by US president, Donald Trump, who repeatedly used connection between refugees and terrorism as a motivation to build the wall on southern border with Mexico (The Atlantic 2018). Another European politician, Marine LePen, states that mass migration brings terrorism (Washington Times 2017). Additionally, far right parties in EU use anti-refugees policy as a mobilization factor. With majority of refugees coming to EU from conflict zones being Muslims, the anti-Islam mobilization factor is also on rise. European society's opinions in the question of links between refugees and terrorism is

mixed. A research in numerous countries by Pew Research Centre shows that results significantly vary in EU countries. The assumption of the poll is that ‘immigrants increase the risk of terrorism’. In France, 39% agreed while 59% were against, in Spain 41% agreed and 55% were against and in UK 43% agreed and 50% were against. However, in Hungary, 66% agreed while only 19% were against the assumption and in Poland 52% agreed while 28% were against¹ (Pew Research Centre 2018). By these means, the question here is that whether we can truly consider refugees as some kind of ‘trojan horse of terrorism’ in EU.

The aim of our work is to analyse the occurrence of radical Islamist (jihadist) terrorism in EU with a special focus given to refugees, meaning we will try to examine, whether they are more prone to radicalization and whether Europe, with large amounts of welcomed refugees coming from conflict areas, is more likely to experience the phenomenon of migratory terrorism. For this goal, we must firstly properly analyse terrorism and its roots, so we can use this knowledge when determining, whether some of analysed roots are applicable on refugees. Secondly, we must also look closely on radical Islamist (jihadist) terrorism in EU in past years, so we can clearly state, whether refugees already perpetrate terrorist attacks or not. We shall cover this work by one main research question and three additional research questions. The main research question of this work is: ‘Do refugees that came to EU in refugee crisis pose an increased risk of terrorism?’ We will try to get a proper answer to this question by answering three additional research questions: ‘Are refugees more prone to radicalization? Are refugees more prone to criminal activity? Is migratory terrorism observable?’

From methodological point of view, this thesis is an interpretive policy analysis and it focuses on examination of theoretical concepts of radicalization and terrorism that are used in later parts of work. The design of our research is built upon five steps. We have created these five steps as a design of our own, only for this research. Each step represents a move forward in our research towards the goal of answering our main research question. Each step means a necessary phase of our work to properly analyse the aim of our research and result with an answer to our main research questions.

¹ Full results on http://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-immigrants-are-a-strength-than-a-burden/pgmd_2019-03-14_global-migration-attitudes_0-07/

First step of our research is to properly analyse terrorism from various points of views. Analysing its definition shall give us insight in the difficulties of creating a common interpretation and current shifts towards positive outcomes. Evaluating roots, determinants and theories of terrorism should give us specifics of what drives and motivates terrorism. This step is necessary to create a common theoretical conception of terrorism and look on current challenges in field of theory of terrorism. Additionally, this step shall give us insight on roots and determinants of terrorism, that will be used in later parts of work, when analysing, whether these roots are applicable on refugees.

Second step is to provide data about occurrence of jihadism in EU since 2015. We have chosen the starting point of our analysis the year 2015 as it marks the year when the highest number of arrivals (more than one million) was detected (BBC 2018). Firstly, we shall focus on overall occurrence of jihadism in EU. For this purpose, we will use the information provided by European Police Office and their Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT). These reports include information about terrorism in EU, its trends, shifts and changes. Secondly, by using news sources, TE-SAT and Global Terrorism Database, we shall list out successful jihadist attacks committed by refugees in EU since 2015. Our focus will be to find out, whether any of these attacks were committed by a refugee that has entered EU since the beginning of 2015. Thus, the selection criterion is the background of the refugee, concretely his/her year of arrival. Necessity of this step lies in its comprehensiveness as it will be able to provide us with an answer, whether refugees already perpetrate radical Islamist attacks in EU or not. By this, we can have a clear view on past or present experience of refugees with radical Islamist terrorism.

Third step is to examine radicalization. A special view must be dedicated to radicalization among refugees. By this step, we aim to examine, whether refugees are more prone to radicalization and whether there are some aspects, that make refugees more susceptible for radicalization, compared to non-refugees. This is a crucial step as it can give us insight into the basic concept of “refugees being trojan horses of terrorism” – meaning whether they pose a threat of being radicalized in next years but currently they pose no major threat. At the end of this point, we aim to have an answer for the first additional research question.

Fourth step is to look closer on the relationship between criminality and terrorism. We aim to investigate, whether criminal activity is a kind of precondition of

terrorism. Based on this result, we shall analyse criminal activity among refugees. Outcome of this fourth part shall give us an answer, whether there is criminal activity among refugees that could potentially lead to terrorism. Moreover, this shall also answer our second additional research question.

Last step is focusing on the phenomenon of migratory terrorism, as called by Mieke Bal, or migratory terrorism nexus, as called by Colette Mazzuceli with Anna Visvizi and Ronald Bee. Here, we aim to closely examine, whether we have observed a phenomenon, where increasing influx of migrants meant increased risk of terrorism. This step is crucial as it will give us an answer, whether refugees' displacement into a state may potentially mean a threat of increasing terrorism. This result is essential for answering our research question. Based on results of this step, we aim to answer the third additional research question and at the end of the fifth step, we should be able to answer the main research question.

Resulting from the first and the third step, we aim to determine roots and motivational factors of terrorism and radicalization in general. Additionally, we intend to conclude with specific motivations for radicalization among refugees. Coming out of the second step, we should be able to conclude, whether refugees that has come since 2015 already stand behind jihadist attacks. Based on the fourth step, we aim to have an answer on two statements – if the crime-terror nexus is observable; and if large displacements of refugees into an area come with increase in criminality. By the last step we hope to have the major part of our work answered – whether migratory terrorism is truly observable in world and whether this phenomenon can occur in EU. In conclusion, we should be able to properly present our arguments and answer the main research question. Even though our work focuses on refugees in EU since 2015, we shall provide information about researches from countries outside of EU under the purpose of wider perspective.

We have divided this work into three separate categories with each having its own unique subchapters. The first chapter is dedicated to analysis of terrorism from various points of view. In the first part, we analyse the difficulty of creating a common definition of terrorism, what stands in its way and why it cannot be achieved. In addition, we shall analyse definitions of terrorism – provide various interpretations and certainly,

their critique. Lastly, we analyse also a specific and unique way of looking at the definition of terrorism through definitional elements. In the second part of the first chapter we discuss roots and determinants of terrorism. Here we shall provide a closer look on driving factors of terrorism. The third part of the first chapter focuses on the theoretical perspective of terrorism. Here we provide a look on theoretical approaches, trying to define terrorism. Lastly, we dedicate the last part to listing out and shortly defining various types of terrorism.

The second chapter serves for provision of data on occurrence of jihadist terrorist attacks in EU since 2015. Firstly, we provide information on overall attacks and trends of jihadist terrorism in EU year by year, since 2015 to 2018. Secondly, we list out successful jihadist terrorist attacks in EU perpetrated by refugees.

The third chapter is the last one and is divided into three parts, each trying to answer one of the additional research questions. The first subchapter focuses on radicalization from overall point of view and radicalization of refugees. The second subchapter focuses on two things - the criminal activity among refugees and the so-called crime-terror nexus focusing on analysing if criminal activity can be considered as a precondition for terrorism. The last subchapter is devoted to analysis of migratory terrorism, which is crucial for this work. By answering, whether migratory terrorism is a phenomenon with increasing occurrence, we can strongly shift the answer to our research question into one or another way.

We aim to find out, whether refugees that came to EU since 2015 pose an increased threat of terrorism. We hope to find a comprehensive answer on this phenomenon that was mentioned by various political subjects in EU and became one of the main topics of right-wing and extremist groups.

1. What is terrorism?

1.1. The complicated definition of terrorism

Term “terrorism” and its forms are widely used in current society. They are used as fear factors, mobilization factors and they are used especially as a description of the enemy. Terrorism may be the most politicized term in the political vocabulary used for demonization and de-legitimization of opponents and is comparable with usage of terms such as ‘racist’ or ‘fascist’ (Schmidt 2011). There are various types of terrorism such as right-wing, separatist or jihadist. Every single type differs in principles such as modus operandi, targeted audience or perpetration of the attack. It may seem that every kind of terrorism is different, which is true. And this is the reason for the difficulty of creation of common consensus of definition of terrorism. The accepted definition must bring together various principles, views and perspectives but especially, it must be generally applicable to every terrorist act, be it jihadist attacks, right-wing attacks or separatist attacks.

1.1.1. Difficulties creating a common interpretation

When the subject of terrorism reappeared in the late 1960s, various professionals noted and pointed out difficulties that a common interpretation may bring to the subject of terrorism (WEINBERG et al. 2004). There are various issues that scholars, academic and professionals meet with, while trying to find the most suitable definition of terrorism. The proper interpretation is important as without it, it would not be possible to distinguish a terrorist act from a violent act.

For Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, one of the issues with definition is the so-called border problem. Where is the border between terrorism and other types of violence such as guerrilla warfare? (WEINBERG et al. 2004). This difficulty may be one of the most serious ones as it is needed to properly draw the border between terrorism and other violent acts so violent riots will not be labelled as terrorism acts and political assassinations will not be considered “just” as criminal acts. One of the views on this topic is in the form of Boaz Ganor’s definition of terrorism, in which he draws the line between terrorist act and for example guerrilla warfare in the deliberate targeting of civilians in order to achieve political objectives (Sinai 2008). Due to every definition being

different, there is no common consensus, where is the proper border between terrorism and other violent actions as it depends on numerous factors.

Another issue lies in the targeted audience. Who are targets of terrorism? From this point of view, we can divide people into two groups – combatants and non-combatants. Joshua Sinai in his short analysis in 2008 states in regard to definition of terrorism by U.S. State Department, that non-combatants include civilians and besides that, also unarmed military personnel and personnel not on duty. However, it may be difficult to draw a perfect line between a combatant and a non-combatant. The usage of term ‘non-combatant’ could be problematic due to its ignorance of circumstances – violent acts against non-combatants during armed conflicts are label as war crimes, not terrorism (Schmidt 2011). Walter Laqueur’s and Paul Johnson’s definitions solved this issue from one side of view, when they used the term of “innocent” meaning that an act of terrorism is targeting people that usually are not responsible or accountable for motives leading to terrorism (Whittaker 2007).

According to Jeff Goodwin, there is no consensus also in the question of who can practice terrorism. The question in this area is, if states can also engage in terrorism just as oppositional groups or is state terrorism just a specific combination of things that needs to be analysed in its own right (Goodwin 2006). Another difficulty of common definition brought by Jeff Goodwin is, if terrorism necessarily brings terror, fear or anxiety. Some authors claim that terrorism is intended to install fear into a large audience but only this definitional factor is not enough as it would be indistinguishable from other instances of violence such as violent riots (Senechal de la Roche, Roberta 2004). On the other hand, Carr is more ambiguous and claims that terrorism is intending to destroy the will of civilians, thus terrorism may not only terrorize but it may influence audiences by other means (Goodwin 2006). The analytical community focuses on the usage of terrorism to influence the audience by spreading fear beyond the incident (Sinai 2008). The factor of fear in various definitions is also described in later parts of the work.

1.1.2. Definitions and their critique

There are numerous scholars, organizations, academics and authors that have brought their own definition of terrorism into the subject of the study. It can be claimed that neither one of these interpretations were perfect enough, to be accepted as the general consensus. In this part of the work, we will go through various definitions by academics, authors or organizations and besides that, we will also look on the critique of these definitions.

One of the widely used definitions of terrorism came in 1983 from the Department of State of United States of America in 1983. It refers to terrorism as *“premediated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”* (U.S. Department of State 2004). The usage of this description was widely accepted especially due to its short composition and yet wide ranged application possibility. Advantage of this definition lies also in its usefulness in legal reasons due to its provision of legal basis for arrest (Sinai 2008). This definition was also the target of a survey in 2006, when a team of scholars under the leadership of Alex Peter Schmidt decided to undergo an analytical operation of three most widely used definitions of terrorism. Definitions of U.S. State Department, United Nations and the academical consensus from 1988 were sent out to numerous academics, who responded with their critique towards these definitions. The definition by U.S. State Department was the same as in 1983 in time of the survey, with a small addition of mentioning that terrorism is usually intended to influence an audience. The shortness of the definition was criticised by respondent D. Gressang who claimed that it is too narrow and it focuses too much on political motive, thus excluding other motivations such as religious or issue-specific terrorism (Schmidt 2011). However, it is needed to say that religious motives for terrorism are usually accompanied with political goals. Religion is in many ways' inseparable from politics, thus many religious terrorist goals can be interpreted as political ones. Some respondents also mentioned the lack of “fear” in this definition, meaning that terrorist attack is supposed to also spread fear (Schmidt 2011).

Element of fear is present in various definitions. Walter Reich describes terrorism as *“a strategy of violence designed to promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the public at large”*, Brian Jenkins described it as *“the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change”* and Paul Johnson claims that terrorism is *“the deliberate, systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear in order to gain political ends...”* (Whittaker 2007). In addition, Bruce Hoffman describes terrorism as *“the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change”* and Austin Turk mentions fear in his definition – *“... organized political violence, lethal or nonlethal, designed to deter opposition by maximizing fear, specifically by random targeting of people or sites”* (Goodwin 2006). The necessity of the element of fear was stressed by David Whittaker, when he said that objectives of terrorism differ it from other criminal activities. Even though the element of influence on government may seem as the key one, some drug cartels also seek to influence the government and that is why the aspect of inducing fear in someone other than victims, is considered as the most relevant one (Whittaker 2007).

Interesting and unusual definition of terrorism came from a literature survey by National Research Council panel, which states that there is no precise general definition of terrorism but rather a multiplicity of overlapping efforts and while none of them are analytically sufficient, combined they may bring satisfying results (Sinai 2008). By those means, NRC decided to bring their own definition of terrorism in a special way – by listing four components that terrorism includes. These components are *“(a) illegal use or threatened use of force or violence (b) with an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their populations (c) typically with political and /or ideological motives and justifications and (d) an ‘extra-societal’ element, either ‘outside’ society in the case of domestic terrorism or ‘foreign’ in the case of international terrorism”* (Sinai 2008). Joshua Sinai criticized this definition due to its limited utility as it overlooked various variables that may not be specifically violent but they should be characterized as terrorism, such as running websites with terrorism related content, mobilization of terrorism support or provision of radicalization efforts.

Short and yet comprehensive definition was presented by David Whittaker who stated that “... *deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political change ... perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity*” (Whittaker 2007). One of the major definitions should lie in United Nations. However, due to UN being an organization concluding almost every state in the world, it cannot propose a universal definition of terrorism easily. After UN’s creation, definition of terrorism was not a major subject to be concerned about. UN could built on the definition by League of Nations which defined terrorism as ‘all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public.’ (Schmidt 2011). However, this definition never gained enough support among member states to enter into force. The topic of terrorism in UN was re-opened in 1972 after the occurrence of two major terrorist attacks – Munich Olympic Games in which 11 people were killed, and Lod Airport in which 28 people were killed (Schmidt 2011). UN decided to establish a committee regarding the question of definition of terrorism. In time, when Alex Schmidt was in process of analysing various definitions, the UN’s one was long and uncommon:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this [the present] Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

- (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
- (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or
- (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this [the present] article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act

The critique of this definition was especially due to usage of the term “unlawfully”. For example, respondent D. Gressang raised the question of ‘Who determines the legality or illegality of an act?’ and besides that, other respondents pointed out the lack of

clarification of the term “unlawfully” as they consider it unclear, if it is unlawful to break UN Charter, Geneva Convention, Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other states’ laws (Schmidt 2011). Additionally, other parts of the definition were criticised. Christine Fair and other respondents said that this definition does not even distinguish criminal activity and terrorism and F. Shanty claims that the part ‘death or serious bodily injury’ means that taking hostages or hijacking, which were previously widely used as a terrorist tactics, mean no terrorism (Schmidt 2011). The UN definition have met with wide criticism in various points, however, it is needed to state that it truly has a very difficult position in topic of creation of universally applicable definition of terrorism.

Short analysis of not just terrorism but also terror itself was presented by Charles Tilly who claims that *“social scientists who attempt to explain sudden attacks on civilian targets should doubt the existence of a distinct, coherent class of actors (terrorists) who specialize in a unitary form of political action (terror) and thus should establish a separate variety of politics (terrorism)”* (Tilly 2004). Instead, he thinks that terror itself is a widely recurrent bounded political strategy, meaning that *“we can reasonably define that strategy as asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime”* (Tilly 2004). This definition also became a target of criticism, mainly from side of Roberta Senechal de la Roche who claims that even though it excludes bilateral forms of violence such as conventional warfare and feuding, this definition still covers wide range of violent behaviour that cannot be labelled as terrorism, such as guerrilla warfare or violence by states (Senechal de la Roche, Roberta 2004).

So far, one of the most generally accepted definitions came from the initiative of academics, the so-called Academic consensus definition. It was first published in 1984 after a questionnaire led by Alex P. Schmidt who came with a first conclusion sounding:

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics, which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose members’ sense of security is purposefully undermined, is the target of terror. The

victimization of the target of violence is considered extra-normal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity, the time (e.g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (e.g., a government), or targets of attention (e.g., public opinion) to changes of attitudes or behaviour favouring the short or long-term interests of the users of this method of combat.

After a series of comments and remarks to the first definition, another one was presented in 1988 (Schmidt 2011).

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

This definition received widely positive responses and reviews. Adrian Guelke called it 'probably the most rigorous effort there has been', Frank Shanty claimed it is 'the most comprehensive and the most widely accepted among scholars' and Bram Van der Liere concluded that even though it is rather description than definition, it 'is the most accurate description of the phenomenon of terrorism in the literature' (Schmidt 2011). On the other hand, even this definition received criticism. Besides calling it too long and

too academic, the critique lied in the exclusion of assassination², the inclusion of criminal reasons³ or in the question, if property damages should be included in terrorist targeting (Schmidt 2011). Finally, in 2011, based on the result of three rounds of academic consultations, critique of two academic definitions and due to continuing absence of legal definition, the Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism was presented (Schmidt 2012). Its full text is in the attachment 1. This definition is considered to be the general academic consensus on proper definition of terrorism.

However, the debate on the proper and generally accepted definition of terrorism does not end there. Even though academic society may have found the consensus, Schmidt claims it is not the end of debate as academic society is just one of arenas of discourse. Schmidt identifies four arenas of discourse, where definition of terrorism is debated – academic society, states’ statements including laws or judicial rulings, public debate including mass media and the last one being the discussion of those who oppose current societies and their values (WEINBERG et al. 2004). Even when academic society possibly reached its consensus and states define terrorism in their own way, public debate may never reach its unity in interpretation of terrorism, thus leaving this issue unanswered.

1.1.3. Definitional elements

Definitional elements and their analysis is an alternative way on how to look for explanation of terrorism. Its principle lies in listing out various definitional elements that should be included in the description of terrorism. One of the widest researches in this area was done by Alex Schmidt who claims that *“the art of making a good definition is to include as few elements as possible but also as many as necessary”* (Schmidt 2011). In 1984, Alex Schmidt analysed 109 definitions of terrorism and created a table of frequencies of definitional elements.

² Adrian Guelke: *Schmid argues that ‘while assassination aims at having the victim dead, terrorism does not care about the victim itself’. This is an attempt by Schmid to meet the point that there is often no reasonable basis for inferring intent to cause terror to others in the case of an assassination (Schmidt 2011).*

³ Boaz Ganor: *This is one of the worst problems of the proposed definition. By including criminal motivation as one possible reason of terrorism, the definition includes so many acts that have nothing to do with the phenomenon of terrorism such as criminal Mafia activity, or criminal extortion, etc. (Schmidt 2011).*

Table 1. Schmidt’s table of frequencies of definitional elements in 109 definitions of terrorism

<i>Element</i>	<i>Frequency (%)</i>
1 Violence, force	83.5
2 Political	65
3 Fear, terror emphasized	51
4 Threat	47
5 (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
6 Victim-target differentiation	37.5
7 Purposive, planned, systematic tactic	32
8 Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5
9 Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules	30
10 Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
11 Publicity aspect	21.5
12 Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character, indiscrimination	21
13 Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
14 Intimidation	17
15 Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5
16 Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
17 Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5
18 Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
19 Clandestine, covert nature	9
20 Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence	7
21 Criminal	6
22 Demands made on third parties	4

Source: Alex P. Schmid *et al.*, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature*. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984.

This analysis was based on the first academic consensus published in 1984. Review of the second academic consensus made also by Alex Schmidt resulted in 16 definitional elements.

A similar analysis was also done by a trio of authors, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. They decided to analyse 73 definitions from 55 articles and divide them based on three journals. In addition, results of their analysis of definitional elements went even further as it analysed these elements and their occurrence based on writer’s professional affiliation, writer’s region, year of publication and academic field. Results of the basic analysis of definitional elements are listed below.

Table 2. Frequencies of definitional elements of “Terrorism” according to the three journals

Elements violence	Terrorism	Studies in conflict and terrorism	Terrorism and political
1. Violence	68%	80%	72%
2. Political	63%	50%	60%
3. Fear	21%	20%	24%
4. Threat	50%	0%	44%
5. Victim	16%	50%	28%
6. Tactic	13%	70%	44%
7. Civilians	16%	30%	28%
8. Movement	24%	40%	32%

Source: WEINBERG, LEONARD; PEDAHZUR, A. M.I.; HIRSCH-HOEFLER, SIVAN (2004): The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism. In *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (4), pp. 783.

Based on this analysis, trio of authors were able to come on with their so-called minimalist definition of terrorism: „*Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role*” (WEINBERG et al. 2004). However, even this definition have not escaped the criticism, mainly from Alex Schmidt who listed 5 shortcomings of this definition due to its generality: no reference to perpetrators or victims, no mention of fear or terror, motive or goal, non-combatant targets and finally no mention of criminal and immoral tactics (Schmidt 2011).

Finally, as it was mentioned earlier, the analysis of Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler went even further with additional investigation. For example, they have discovered that country of origin has a role, when 0% of scholars from Middle East mentioned the element of “civilians” while Western European and North American scholars mentioned this element in 40% and 21% of cases. On the other hand, 50% of scholars from Middle East mentioned the element of fear while Western European and North American scholars mentioned this element in 20% and 17% of cases. Interesting results were also assembled regarding the writer’s academic field. In this part, definitions coming from field of political science included every listed element, with element of “violence” having the highest frequency. In contrast, definitions coming from

field of psychology absented elements of “victim” and “movement”, and definitions from law absented elements of “victim”, “tactics” and “civilians” (WEINBERG et al. 2004). This comprehensive analysis enriched the topic of terrorism as it provided a new view on the academical and scholar study of the field of terrorism.

1.2. Roots and determinants of terrorism

What is the reason for terrorism? Why do terrorists decide to engage in such activity? Numerous academics and scholars are trying to find answers for questions like this as it would be possible to prevent terrorism from escalating. Thus, the question is – what are the roots of terrorism? What determines terrorism?

Various authors are providing interesting analyses of roots and motives for terrorism from different points of view. For example, Luis de la Corte created a comprehensive analysis evaluating terrorism from a psychosocial view. However, one of the most wide-ranged analyses was provided by Sebastian Wojciechowski. He claims that reasons for terrorism are an example of system of communicating vessels, meaning that it is a kind of plethora of different elements, their relations and conditions that influence them (Wojciechowski 2017). Martha Crenshaw states that there are four motives for terrorism: necessity to belong to a group, attempt to improve social status, hope to change the status quo and the desire to gain reward (Crenshaw 1985). Paul Wilkinson provides also his view on determinants of terrorism and names them as: ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts, poverty, negative aftermath of modernization, injustice, revolutionary sentiments among society, weak governments, internal power struggle. Additionally, he separates them into five categories – political, social, economic, cultural and psychological determinants (Wilkinson 1974). Another view from pre-1990s era is offered by Claire Sterling who listed seven main motives for terrorism activity: single or group-forced initiative, desire to attract attention on a certain issue, demonstration of aversion against existing order (legal, religious, etc.), attempt to delegitimize current authorities, attempt to coerce governments, revenge for a certain activity and lastly justification by ideology (Sterling 1981). Wojciechowski also analysed the opinion of Raul Kosta who also provided classification of sources of terrorism into four groups: socio-economic, historic-political, sociological and psychological. First group contains such phenomena as economic crisis or uneven

distribution of wealth. Second group includes motivations coming out from dissatisfaction with political regime or historical events. Third group is called as “atmosphere of violence” and refers to social tensions visible in Muslim countries. Last group embraces psychological roots such as imbalances or excessive self-esteem (Wojciechowski 2017).

A different level-based aspect was contributed by Audrey Cronin who created four groups in which all reasons for terrorism can be inserted. The first group is the individual level which includes various external factors that lead an individual to perform an act of terrorism. Second level is organizationally based as it includes the nature of group dynamics and group identification. Third level is related to state activities and needs to be analysed in its own way. The last level focuses on the international system and includes the dissatisfaction with globalization and issues regarding international community (Cronin 2004). Tore Bjorgo also contributed to this topic with his view and creates four groups of reasons for terrorism. First group includes structural reasons, such as demographic imbalance, globalization, urbanization, migration and others. Second group is called as accelerators meaning that these are not main reasons for terrorism activity but serve an enhancing role – weakened state structure or easy access to weapons. Third group of motivational reasons serve as group concluding reasons that may motivate to perform a terrorist attack but also do not have a primary role. Last group is called as detonators, meaning that they serve as initial spark for terrorism activity (Bjorgo 2005).

Very vast and far-reaching analyses were done by Sebastain Wojciechowski for his chapter analysing main determinants of terrorism in book *Radicalism and Terrorism in 21st century*. His six groups start with the first one – Religious and cultural sources, consisting of reasons such as multicultural agenda, Samuel Huntington’s idea of “Clash of civilizations” or hostile position towards other religions. Group of territorial and ethnic sources is described by author as: “*There are approximately 200 recognized states in the modern world, and around 3,500 large nations*” (Wojciechowski 2017) meaning that the larger amount of nations combined with the principle of self-determination may lead to hostile activities. Third group includes socio-economic conditions and even though according to author, various experts disagree on the importance of this category,

it is needed to acknowledge the role of reasons such as dissatisfaction with uneven distribution of wealth, poverty due to economic regime or poverty. Fourth group of politico-historical reasons could be considered as the largest one as historical memory of injustice or hostile position towards a state are even currently one of the main fuels for terrorism activity. Fifth group includes psychological sources that are mainly coming out of individual issues such as sense of non-belonging, intolerance, trauma or hatred. Last category is listed by author as "Other selected reasons" and consist of motives such as globalization and its consequences, migration process, domino effect or the role of media (Wojciechowski 2017).

Luis de la Corte offered a specific view on the topic of motivations of terrorism. He claims that *"in sum, neither the individual psychology of terrorists, nor the social environments provide a complete explanation of why individuals become involved in terrorism. For this reason, more and more researchers are turning toward a psychosocial perspective in their studies"* (Corte 2007). He decides to explain motivations for terrorism through seven psychosocial principles with each defining other psychosocial aspect. First principle states that *"terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome but as a method of social and political influence"*. This means that for many terrorists, the attack is a chance to promote their cause, it is considered as a type of propaganda by the fact. Second principle says that *"the attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of social interaction"* meaning that the social interaction plays a significant role in creating a future terrorist as socializing in radicalized groups creates a type of group identity. Third principle states that *"terrorist organizations can be analysed by analogy with other social movements"* and the fourth claims that *"terrorism only is possible when terrorists have access to certain resources"*, highlighting the role of funding, campaigns and necessity of gaining resources. This is mostly the reason, why terrorist groups and its members engage in illegal criminal activity such as kidnappings, drug trafficking and other illegal activities. The fifth principle, *"the decision to begin and sustain a terrorist campaign is always legitimized by an extreme ideology"*, highlights the necessity of an extreme ideology which can be considered as a driving power to either start the terrorist campaign, or to perform the terrorist attack. Sixth principle, *"every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals but the rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is*

imperfect”, has its roots in a Rational Choice Theory⁴. However, it builds upon its critique, as author’s view is, that individual’s rationality tends to be limited, and thus, imperfect. Additionally, this becomes even more problematic in rationality of collective actors. The last principle, *“the activity of terrorists partly reflects the internal features of their organisations”*, focuses on the internal organization of the terrorist group, which is according to the author, observable from their activity (Corte 2007).

David Whittaker divided types of terrorist motivation into three groups: rational, psychological and cultural. Rational terrorist act based on a rational thinking, including the potential efficiency of the desired attack, its cost, the possibility of achieving the desired purpose or the capability of the group to sustain the effort. Rationally thinking terrorists ask the question – can this act of terrorism induce enough anxiety to achieve the goal without creating a backlash that may destroy the cause and maybe even terrorists themselves? Psychological motivation derives mainly from personal dissatisfaction with life and accomplishments in life. This combined with an extremist ideology may lead to engagement in terrorism activity. Terrorists usually categorize their surrounding and create a polarized view ‘we versus they’. This helps them to overcome the possibility of sympathy with victims of their attack – they do not see them equally but as someone lower who is wrong. The hatred resulting from this helps them to be constantly in rage what drives terrorists. Last category, the cultural, has an important similarity with the previous, psychological category. Terrorists tend to differentiate themselves from members of other culture by labelling them as “they”, thus making them enemy. This is visible especially in the fourth wave⁵ of terrorism which is driven by religious ideology. However, the basic principle of this category is the terrorists’ hatred towards members of other culture. Overall, the statement ‘It’s not us – it’s them, they are the cause of our problems’ provides (mostly) a psychologically satisfying explanation on the question of ‘what drives the mind of some terrorists’ (Whittaker 2007).

⁴ Theory that assumes that people always try to act as rational as possible and human rationality tends to be almost perfect.

⁵ Based on David Rapoport’s work „Four waves of modern terrorism“.

An interesting analysis was constructed by Nina Musgrave, who analysed based on other authors, three possible causes of terrorism from a different perspective – poverty, education and failed states. From one point of view, poverty and failed states can be considered as linked, based also on George Bush’s statement from 2002 who said: *“Poverty does not transform poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, corruption and repression are a toxic combination in many societies, leading to weak governments that are unable to enforce order or patrol their borders and are vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels.”* (Bush 2002). Firstly, Nina Musgrave analysed the poverty as a root cause of terrorism. It cannot be claimed that terrorism is always preceded by it. However, the assumption here is that it provides some conditions that may lead to emergence of terrorism, such as lack of education, hatred towards government for not being able to properly support the poor person, or hopelessness leading to accommodation of radical or extremist ideology. James Piazza also studied the question of poverty and socio-economic ties in regard to terrorism and concluded that there is no empirical evidence that supports the poverty-causes-terrorism hypothesis. Second factor by Nina Musgrave was the education. As it was mentioned, the assumption is that poverty brings lack of education which can be a stepping stone to terrorism. Very comprehensive analysis on this topic was created by Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova who analysed education in regard to support for terrorism. Their survey was conducted on a sample of 1357 Palestinians and the result claims that there is no evidence that individuals with higher education are less supportive to terrorist attacks, compared to illiterate or poorly educated. Additionally, they observed that support for attacks against Israel correlates with higher educational achievement. However, as they both state in the end of their work: *“The evidence we have assembled and reviewed suggests there is little direct connection between poverty, education and participation in terrorism and politically motivated violence”* (Krueger, Maleckova 2003). Lastly, the cause of failed states seems to have strong foundation. The assumption here says that terrorists seek failed states as their institutions cannot properly apply counter-terrorism measures and fight against terrorism. This also gives to terrorist groups a breeding ground for illegal activity. Support for this claim can be found in Lebanon, which became a host of Hezbollah, or Pakistan and Afghanistan which became the home of FATA (Musgrave 2015).

However, some scholars decided to look wider on the question of terrorism regarding the state's regime. In Nina Musgrave's essay "The root causes of terrorism" she argues by numerous publications that failed states are linked to terrorism. Nilay Saiya on the other hand, supports the assumption that terrorism is more likely to occur in democracy than in totalitarian or autocratic regime. This is based on the fact that democracies are very likely to be based on the rule of law and respect to individual rights such as freedom of speech or freedom of movement. This enables terrorists or potential terrorist to freely move across country (in case of Schengen area even between countries) and get radicalized or gain support, be it financial or weaponry. Additionally, terrorists usually seek media coverage, so their message is spread among the widest possible audience. Free media enables this as in democracies, it is common to have hundreds of media subjects. Besides that, democracies are also more burdensome from judicial point of view as they require longer judicial processes. Thus, to perpetrate a terrorist attack in democracy has lower cost than in other regimes. Authoritarian regimes may be less vulnerable to terrorism due to their limited freedom from side of media coverage, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and capacities to monitor society. Thus, authoritarian regimes have higher cost for terrorism activity as it is needed to overcome more restrictions and the result may not be as expected in terrorist plans (Saiya 2015). This assumption was also backed by James Piazza, who resulted in his empirical study concluded on 19 Middle Eastern countries, that democratic regimes are more prone to terrorism than autocratic regimes. Additionally, the same argument was proposed by Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, who claimed that it is the political and civil freedom that makes democracy such a vulnerable regime to terrorism, as they create a favourable environment (Musgrave 2015). However, it is needed to differentiate between authoritarian states and failed states. It is required for the authoritarian state to be fully functional and not failed as those states make even more susceptible host for terrorism activity due to its regime failure.

However, it is courageous to claim that behind every terrorist attack stands a terrorist who had only one motivational factor. It is more than possible that every terrorist has a variety of reasons to perpetrate an attack, be it psychological, existential or political. Sebastian Wojciechowski analysed this phenomenon and calls it as the

hybridity of reasons. To properly analyse it, author specified three components: reasons for terrorism, relations among reasons, and factors not directly linked but influencing terrorism. He assumes that there are four key reasons for terrorism. First reason is according to Wojciechowski the territorial range, meaning that reasons for terrorism activity are coming out from territorial range. This reason is divided into three categories – local, regional and global causes. Second reason is coming out of subjective motivations, meaning that the nature of motives for terrorism activity results from subjective opinions. Authors lists eight motives: political, economic, religious, psychological, historical, social, single issue and other reasons. Third reason is based on the time of occurrence of the main motivational principle. Author's concept lies in three time-related views – permanent, temporary and cyclical reasons. The fourth reason concerns the evolution of reasons divided into three categories - sources of terrorism undergoing continuous change, reasons undergoing occasional change and lastly, factors that do not change. As author claims, *"The first category is illustrated by the influence of technology on terrorism. Category "b" is characterized by ideological concepts, e.g. nationalism, anarchism, and so on, and their transformations, while the third one is reflected in the assumptions of anti-abortionist terrorism"* (Wojciechowski 2017). Based on his own theory of hybridity of reasons, Sebastian Wojciechowski designed his own three main determinants that are the basic causes of modern terrorism. The first one includes various ideas and ideologies, including political, ethnic or religious ones that lead to nationalism, racism, separatism, antisemitism or religion fundamentalism. Second determinant is based on selected socio-economic conditions, such as poverty leading to frustration, lack of education or disproportional wealth redistribution in the world. Last determinant lies in various psychological processes and factors, including hatred, personal trauma or intolerance. According to author, the hybridity of these three main determinants, enriched by potential external factors, properly defines the question of causes and reasons for terrorism (Wojciechowski 2017).

1.3. Theories of terrorism

It is also needed to provide a view on theoretical concepts of terrorism. These theories are trying to describe terrorism and political violence from different points of views. One of the widest researches in this area were provided by Alex Schmidt and Bradley McAllister in *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. They have divided the study of theories of terrorism into three sections based on their focus. First section concentrates on the individual level, second on the organizational level and third on systematic level.

1.3.1. Individual level

The individual level results from the individual factors that influence the life and the personality of the attacker, be it currently or earlier in his/her life. First category by authors are psychological theories. The reasoning behind this is that majority of the theory of terrorism was focusing on observable empirical evidence while terrorism can also result from psychological factors. The psychological study of terrorism focuses on answering questions such as 'why someone joins terrorist group' or 'what are the effects of joining a terrorist group'. John Horgan observed in this field three psychological theories that are applicable as terrorists' psychological evaluation: the frustration-aggression theory, narcissism and narcissism-aggression, and lastly the effect of childhood experience. On the other hand, there are also critics of this perspective. For example Martha Crenshaw criticizes this approach because a terrorist attack is rarely a result of single person based only on its psychological determinants, there are other, better explaining factors (McAllister and Schmidt 2011).

The second theory within individual level is the rational choice theory. When looking on terrorism, from one point of view, it seems irrational for human being to take its own life in order to achieve numerous deaths through planned terrorist attack. The rational choice theory suggests that human beings tend to behave as rational as possible, however, this rationality is not perfect. McAllister and Schmidt are not only ones who have dedicated their time to relation between rationality and terrorism. Luis de la Corte in his work '*Explaining terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach*' also includes rational choice theory in his assumptions. However, as it was mentioned in earlier parts of this work, Corte's work is based around the critique of this assumption. He claims that

rationality of terrorists is severely affected either by emotions, ideological motives, other psychological elements or even by a combination of all of these. These distractions of rationality serve as a changing factor for a subjective perspective of a terrorist, thus persuading themselves that perpetrating a terrorist attack is appropriate (Corte 2007). McAllister and Schmidt practically claim the same and criticise the rational choice theory, as in field of terrorism it does not explain much because it is too fixed on the assumption of perfect rationality, while in terrorism, other circumstances play crucial roles (McAllister and Schmidt 2011).

1.3.2. Institutional level

Institutional level is based around the research of terrorist groups, how they operate, in what environment they operate in and also how do they affect the individual. These theories are trying to find answers relating to functionality of terrorist groups and terrorist cells.

Organizational process theory is one of the primary theories in field of institutional research and is mostly based around the work of Martha Crenshaw, who defines organizational theories by comparing them with agent-based theories. She is looking for answers on the possible end goals of terrorist groups and she found out that usually the starting goal of the terrorist group does not suffice with its practical experience, and desires of members usually differ from the overall desire of the whole group. Crenshaw's work in this field is based on comparison of violent groups with basic voluntary organizations and pointing out differences. Terrorist groups have defined and strict structure that must be adhered. This structure is usually tolerated as violent groups are functioning through manipulation of its members, who react to incentives when joining or when evaluating their continuance in the group. These incentives include mostly desire to properly belong to a group that recognizes them, necessity for social status, adventure or hatred. Incentives are used and promoted by leaders to maintain the support. These incentives are created by a strong leadership in the terrorist organization and leaders are usually described as the embodiment of the goal of the group and the leader comes with great prestige. In cases when the organization starts to lose its goal, they are even able to sabotage various circumstances to prolong the cause and maintain the support. Moreover, goals of violent organizations differ in the

basic principle – they are harsh, strict and enormous. These goals usually seek to redefine the current situation, regime or status quo through any means necessary. And lastly, exactly those means are the biggest distinction between violent and voluntary organization, as means of terrorist groups include violence and illegal activities (Crenshaw 1985). Even though the work of Martha Crenshaw was published in 1985, her findings are easily applicable even nowadays.

Another part of the institutional sphere of theories of terrorism is the so-called theory of asymmetrical conflict. This focuses on presentation of terrorism as a type of asymmetrical conflict and brings similarities between terrorists as it is, and demonstration of violence. It is divided into two sections: “...*those theories that look at terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric conflict, drawing from the military sciences in order to understand tactics and strategies of terrorist organizations, and those theories that broaden the scope of the term ‘asymmetry’ in ways meant to elaborate the nature of the conflict between states and terrorist groups*” (McAllister and Schmidt 2011). Authors focused more on the first category and based on the work of researcher John Arquilla from RAND, they listed some positive differences between army-like hierarchical structure and terrorism-like horizontal structure. Under ‘horizontal-like structure’ it is meant that the terrorism organization has a very weak hierarchy and it works mostly on a horizontal base what means that every cell shares all the information, there is just a one or two-level leadership and every part of the organization is even in its position. The main advantage of this structure lies in the resistance against destruction. In purely hierarchical structures, the organization can be easily defeated through destruction of leadership. Without it, the organization struggles in its direction. In horizontal-like structure, the destruction of a part of the organization can be easily overcome as every part, cell, body of it has the same level. Other positive points lie in the possibility of a higher efficiency in information sharing or a better adaptability to change of scopes or natures of the conflict they are involved in. While hierarchical organizations must adapt on every level, horizontal-like organizations can do the same in a much shorter time period, thus gaining a serious advantage over the opponent. The horizontal-like structure influenced the creation of so-called concept of ‘leaderless resistance’. This idea by Louis Beam states the creation of a radical movement that should be composed

of atomic cells, with every single cell being filled by like-minded activists. However, the absence of leadership makes it harder to defeat them than classic horizontal-like organizations and much harder to defeat than typical hierarchical organization (McAllister and Schmidt 2011).

Terrorism can be also considered as a form of communication. It may be labelled as a violent communication. It seeks to send out a message to a broader audience through implying fear, to highlight their message. *“Violence often aims at behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion. Terrorism can be seen as a combination of the two”* (McAllister and Schmidt 2011). However, it is needed to differentiate between targets and audience. Targets may be chosen or random, they are victims of the terrorist attack. Audience plays a crucial role as it is the one, to whom the message is sent, those to whom is addressed the fear coming out of the attack. The message as it is, plays a very crucial role in communication theories of terrorism, the whole theory is based around it. Schmidt with Janny de Graaf claimed that terrorism is a sort of communication since 1980s and emphasize the necessity and the high role of message while casualties are considered as those, who generate the message to audience (Archetti 2015). The message itself varies based on the type of terrorism, audience it should be sent to or even choice of targets. In a hypothetical case, when terrorists attack a governmental subject and the audience is the people of the state, the message may be ‘your government cannot protect you as we have showed, make your governments change their policies or else we will repeat it’. In a case, where terrorists stand against a clearly specified rival, the message can be ‘this is what we can do, there is more to come unless you yield’. The message to victims’ families may be ‘you have been warned and did not listen, now pay the price.’ Message to those who were not victims but sympathize with victims’ ideologies can be ‘you saw what we are capable of, change or you will be next’. As it was mentioned in earlier parts of the work, terrorists are usually radicalized to the point of polarization of their ideology combined with hatred – ‘it is us, the good ones, and them, the bad ones’. That is why terrorist attacks may have a message also to neutral people – ‘There is no neutral, you are either with us or with them.’ This polarization is fairly dangerous as it targets a large amount of population, thus being secure from terrorism is hard. However, there are always

sympathizers among population and to them, the attack says, 'join us, we are doing great and make an impact in the world.' Lastly, the message is also sent to the media – 'we just gave you a story, write about us, spread out the word to vast audience or else your journalists will pay for it' (McAllister and Schmidt 2011). The relationship between media and terrorism is particularly interesting, especially in the field of communication theory of terrorism. It could be very sufficiently described by scholar and journalist, Brigitte Nacos who says that terrorism and media are not in love and yet, they have a strange marriage-like relationship of convenience (Nacos 2010). In other work, Nacos approaches terrorism as a sort of mass-mediated phenomenon and creates the so-called 'calculus' of perpetrators – terrorists' anticipation of consequences of their actions, the likelihood of gaining media attention and the possibility of entering the dialogue between media, policymakers and the public (Nacos 2003). Also, Walter Laqueur dedicated parts of his work to topic of media and terrorism. He claims that media, with their inbuilt sensationalism, have always magnified terrorist attacks, sometimes even more as it was necessary, or he states that media are terrorists' best friend as terrorist attack without media is nothing – publicity is all (Laqueur 2007). Cristina Archetti also dedicated a work on topic of relations between terrorism and media. She claims that there is a clear dependence of terrorism on media as they publicise their message and this has led to various assumptions that media and terrorism are linked in a type-of-its-own causal link where terrorists need media to spread their message and media needs breaking and interesting news to increase its following (Archetti 2015). It is not necessary to go deeper into the question of why media follow these stories, if they practically serve the purpose of the terrorist attack. It is described in a appropriate way as "*good news is bad news, and bad news is good news*" meaning that bad news draw bigger attention and thus raise the following or sell more newspaper (McAllister and Schmidt 2011).

Another type of institutional theory of terrorism is the social identity theory. This concept assumes that the resort to terrorism is based on acquirement of social identity within the group. Belonging to this group means gaining the identity of those already within. In case of terrorist groups, this identity leads to becoming a terrorist by inspiring themselves from already radicalized members. The group belonging is determined by

three components. Firstly, there is the sense when the one identifies itself as the member of group. Secondly, there is the realization of either the negative or the positive impact on the one. Lastly, there is the adoption of feeling of hate or love towards other members as well as rivals. The group differentiation is an outcome of two elements. First element is the process of creation of similarities between members of the group combined with creation of distinctions between those out of the group. The second element is the creation of positive image for the group and its members combined with creation of negative image for those not included (McAllister and Schmidt 2011). Even though this theory offers an interesting view of radicalization leading to terrorism, it presumes that one can be radicalized to terrorism only through group. It does not consider the so-called lone wolfs - terrorists who do not belong to terrorist organization and are radicalized through other means, such as internet.

1.3.3. Systemic level

The base of systemic level theories of terrorism lies in finding the root causes of terrorism – what enables terrorism, what is the determinant of it, what factors are behind terrorism activity etc. We have got through analysis of main determinants of terrorism in previous parts of the work. However, now we are looking on them through theoretical perspective as theories of terrorism. It cannot be claimed that only one of these concepts is the one perfectly describing the phenomenon of terrorism. It is always a combination of various concepts.

Economic theory assumes that various economic-related factors stand behind terrorism. One of the first broad economic theories of terrorism were presented by Ted Gurr. He stated that behind terrorism and result to it stands the political frustration that was evolved from the gap between the perception of one's rights and the reality of the goals achieved (Gurr 1970). As a proper example for this claim is the Egypt's Islamist problems in 1980s which were linked to rising numbers of college graduates entering into depressed labour market in 1960s and 1970s (McAllister and Schmidt 2011). Both authors also further analysed the question of poverty and its possible causes related to terrorism. In earlier parts of this work we analysed poverty as a potential cause of terrorism based on works of other authors. This is closely analysed in the chapter dedicated to root causes of terrorism.

Political theories of terrorism are mainly concentrated around the democratic / authoritarian state regimes and their link with terrorism. The basic concept here is that democracies are more susceptible to terrorist attacks than authoritative regimes. This is due to higher amount of freedom in democracies – freedom of speech, gatherings, media, movement etc. These freedoms enable terrorists to freely and stealthily move within country and in case of Schengen area, even between countries. Freedom of media means that democratic regimes have numerous free sources which attract terrorists due to high potency of media coverage. Authoritative regimes control the media, thus control what is broadcasted to audience. Besides that, the freedom of movement is also limited. Thus, democracy on one hand serves in its best way to inhabitants but on the other hand, it is more likely to encounter domestic terrorism. This phenomenon was closely analysed in the end of chapter dedicated to roots of terrorism.

Lastly, the globalization theories of terrorism can be considered as a new chapter in theorizing in terrorism. It is claimed that globalization stands behind the creation of transnational terrorism as its features enabled it. However, when we look not only on terrorism but violence itself, globalization is not only the cause but also a motivation for transnational violence due to its promotion of cultural and economic interpretation. The key assumption behind this lies in Brynjar Lia's statement, as she says that mass-casualty terrorism is a consequence of terrorism as violence is more likely to happen when the social distance between affected groups is higher, meaning that homogenous societies rarely experience terrorism. However, Quan Li and Drew Schaub decided to quantitatively analyse the relation between globalization and terrorism through various nation-level indicators such as FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) or trade and their effect of transnational terrorism. Their analyses resulted in a counter-productive outcome for globalization theories of terrorism. They have found no correlation between transnational terrorism and economic globalization. Moreover, they have detected negative correlation between them. Thus, as globalization enables development, the extension of global market could have an indirect effect on lowering levels of transnational terrorism (McAllister and Schmidt 2011).

1.4. Types of terrorism

There are various types of terrorism. They vary especially on the defining thing of the division, e.g. historical era, motivation, type of weapon used, targeted audience. In this shorter part, we will go through types of terrorism based on their ideology with an addition of unconventional types of terrorism. This means that this categorization of terrorism is based on the overall ideology combined with its goals. It is possible to categorize terrorism also through motivation, however this would produce numerous categories and it may not be as clear as following division since there are various and numerous motivations for terrorism activity.

This division is based on the work of European Police Office (EUROPOL) which annually publishes the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) since 2007. This report collects data through the year, analyses it and summarizes them into outcomes of trends of terrorism in the particular year – overall terrorist attacks, number of casualties, prevented attacks, foiled attacks, numbers of arrests for terrorism related activity etc. This report was launched after the terrorist attack on WTC on 11 of September 2001. Until 2006, it was a reporting mechanism for the Terrorism Working Party of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament. In 2006, EUROPOL took over the TE-SAT report and publishes it ever since. EUROPOL recognized in its reports 5 types of terrorism – jihadist, right-wing, left-wing and anarchist, ethno-nationalist and separatist and lastly single-issue terrorism (EUROPOL 2018).

By jihadist terrorism, EUROPOL understands “... acts are those that are committed out of a mind-set that rejects democracy on religious grounds and uses the historical comparison with the crusades of the Middle Ages to describe current situations, in which it is believed that Sunni Islam is facing a crusader alliance composed of Shi’is, Christians and Jews” (EUROPOL 2017). It includes organizations such as Al Qaeda or ISIS.

The right-wing terrorism is a bit more complicated. It comes out from desire to change the political agenda towards extremist, right-wing system. It has bases in nationalism, racism, xenophobia or anti-immigration. The underlying concept is the idea of racial, national, cultural or other superiority towards those not included and the desire to rule them. Right-wing extremists have their ideological roots in Fascism and

Nazism and re-opened the popularity of these ideologies as neo-fascism and neo-Nazism. Among neo-Nazi groups reported by EU states are for example Soldiers of Odin from Belgium or Blood & Honour from Portugal.

The category of left-wing terrorists includes those, who seek to change the political, social and economic system of the state towards communist or socialist classless society. It has roots in Marxist-Leninist ideology. Left-wing terrorism has a sub-category of anarchist terrorism which promotes a revolutionary, anti-authoritarian and mostly anti-capitalist agenda. Among well-known left-wing terrorist groups are Red Brigades or the group called 17 November.

Ethno-nationalist and separatist groups are focusing on nationality or ethnicity and build upon that. It may draw similarities with right-wing extremism, however, the latter one is more intense and builds upon the superiority and the desire to be dominant in an authoritative political scope. Separatist groups can be considered as a type of ethno-nationalist groups. Their main driving force is the desire to create their own state based upon cultural, religious, ethnical or other bases. The desire may be also driven by former historical annexation of their territory and the current aspiration to reclaim sovereignty (IRA, ETA).

Last category by EUROPOL is the single-issue terrorism. This type does not focus on an overall change in political, territorial, economic or social structure of the state. It concentrates on a single issue within the system such as animal rights or abortions (Earth Liberation Front, Animal Liberation Front).

Certainly, there are also other types of terrorism that EUROPOL's TE-SAT report does not include in its analyses. The reason behind this is probably their low or none occurrence in EU. This includes for example ecoterrorism, narcoterrorism, bioterrorism, radiological or chemical terrorism. As it was mentioned in 2018 TE-SAT report, *"there is no evidence of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weaponry being used by terrorists in the EU"* (EUROPOL 2017).

Ecoterrorism is a phenomenon of last 30-40 years but have not got as serious as for example right-wing or anarchist terrorism. Its origin could be traced to 1977, when disaffected members of the Greenpeace formed the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and attacked commercial fishing operations with acts such as cutting nets (FBI 2002).

One of the leaders in this area have become the Animal Liberation Front in USA. FBI defines eco-terrorism as *“the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature”* (FBI 2002).

Narcoterrorism is a specific type that has went through various definitions. One explanation by Amy Zalman says that it is a violent activity by groups under intention to coerce governments to stop their action against drug trade (Thoughtco 2018). Emma Björnehed claims that the term was first used to describe campaigns by drug traffickers against anti-drug police using terrorism-like methods such as car bombings in Colombia or Peru. She defines it as *“the attempts of narcotics traffickers to influence the policies of government by the systematic threat or use of violence”* (Björnehed 2004). Lastly, US Drug Enforcement Agency defines narcoterrorism as *“(it) may be characterized by the participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavours in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities”* (Björnehed 2004). This modern definition brings the attention to the drug trafficking as a popular type of funding of terrorism activities.

Bioterrorism is one of the more dangerous ones due to its difficult limitation once it has been perpetrated. This type of attack uses biological, toxic substances aimed on harming the population under the desire of achieving political goal. It uses bacteria or virus-based substances and once this type of attack is perpetrated, it is difficult to prevent the spreading of the toxins. U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention classified three categories of biological agents used in bioterrorism. The most dangerous one is the Category A with characteristics such as easy dissemination, high mortality and requirement of serious medical help. This category includes agents such as anthrax, smallpox, plague, Ebola fever, Lassa fever or botulism (US CDC 2011).

Chemical terrorism differs from bioterrorism in one major thing – while bioterrorism is based on usage of viruses, bacteria and toxins, chemical terrorism uses various poisonous chemical compounds in a form of vapor, aerosol, liquids or solids. The main danger point of chemical terrorism stands in the chemical agents that may be tasteless, odourless, thus victims do not usually realize they have been hit by the compound, until effects arrive. Moreover, many of these compounds have an

immediate effect from few seconds to few minutes what makes this type of terrorism even more dangerous. On other hand, many of these chemical compounds are difficult to deliver in lethal dozes as outdoors they deplete very quickly. In addition, it is very difficult to produce these types of agents. Pittsburgh University defines six types of chemical agents: lung-damaging, cyanide, blister agents, nerve agents, incapacitating agents and riot-control agents (UPMC).

Lastly, radiological and nuclear terrorism can be put into same category as it is based around the same concept – usage of nuclear or radioactive material. However, it is still needed to differentiate between these two terms. Nuclear terrorism refers to a type of terrorism that is focused on acquiring a nuclear weapon, either through gaining it from a nuclear-armed state or by acquiring enough material (enriched uranium or plutonium) to build an improvised nuclear device. It is possible to claim that the threat from a nuclear terrorism is low due to always-increasing security around nuclear facilities and due to necessity of high expenditure to acquire material to build an improvised nuclear device. Radiological terrorism is easier to perpetrate, thus increasing on its danger. First threat is attacking a nuclear facility such as power plant or nuclear waste storage. This type of threat has higher possibility due to massive amount of nuclear facilities worldwide with weaker security systems compared to nuclear arsenal facility. Second type of threat is the so-called ‘dirty bomb’. This term refers to the usage of radioactive material dispersed by conventional explosives. Even though the radiological terrorism may not have as destructive consequences as nuclear terrorism, it has the higher possibility of occurrence due to larger amount of commercial used radioactive materials (Federation of American Scientists).

Somewhere between “conventional” types of terrorism, as described from EUROPOL’s TE-SAT report, and “unusual” types of terrorism, lies the phenomenon of the modern era – cyberterrorism. It cannot be considered as a typical, conventional type of terrorism due to its low occurrence, however, it has occurred in past years more than, for example, radiological or nuclear terrorism. It is a phenomenon of a modern era due to its focus on cyber-sphere. It concentrates on usage of computers to perpetrate a terrorist attack. Based on the current world’s rising tendency and dependence on computer related machines and internet, this type of terrorism is likely to be on rise.

With this type of terrorism on rise, it is visible that terrorism trends are very able to adapt to changes. Positive thing for cyberterrorism is also the increasing interdependence, or the so-called 'internet of things'. This means the growing interdependence between platforms and internet – e.g. phones, laptops and tablets connected to each other through internet. Thus, cyberterrorists are easily capable of getting information from all the victims' devices. The FBI defines cyberterrorism as *“premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”* (FBI). The current NATO definition for cyberterrorism states: *“A cyberattack using or exploiting computer or communication networks to cause sufficient destruction or disruption to generate fear or to intimidate a society into an ideological goal”* (NATO). However, Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald have raised some questions about the cyberterrorism and its validity – should cyberterrorism be approached as a sub-species of terrorism, as an application of something old (terrorism) to something new (computers)? Or should it be approached differently as a phenomenon of its own characteristics? They also claim that it is difficult to properly define cyberterrorism on its own as there is still no general consensus on definition of terrorism (Jarvis and Macdonald 2015).

There is one work that left a huge impact on study of terrorism and its terminology is still used in current fields of studying terrorism. It is the work of David C. Rapoport called 'Four waves of modern terrorism'. Rapoport comes in this work with the concept of waves to describe terrorism and its trends since the beginning of it. He claims that the modern terror began in 1880s in Russia and since then, four different waves of terrorism has tormented the world. He defines the concept of wave as *“a cycle of activity in a given time period – a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases ... with a crucial feature in its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the particular groups' characteristics and mutual relationship”* (Rapoport 2004). Every wave is composed of organizations but both have different life rhythms – organizations usually last shorter than a wave. When a wave is incapable to inspire new organizations, the

wave disappears. However, there are few organizations that “survived” their initial wave – IRA and PLO (Rapoport 2004).

The first wave is called as the ‘anarchist’ wave. Author lists two reasons, why the first wave occurred when it did, in 1880s. First reason is the transformation in communication and transportation leading to easier spread of news, simplification of travel to distant places and emigration, creating diaspora communities. Second reason is the doctrine or culture – Russian writers established strategies for terror which were crucial for their successors to use and improve. First wave of modern terrorism has its roots in conviction that actual conventions need to be changed and terror is the quickest and most effective way to do it. Political reforms were slow, and people had little or no say into speeding the process up, thus, terrorism was considered as a strategy. With unexpected political events came new vulnerabilities and with that came the rebel activity. The highlight of this wave came in 1890s considered as the highest peak of assassinations as monarchs, prime ministers and other high-ranked political subjects were assassinated one after another with perpetrators easily transporting internationally. The end of the first wave is dated with an event – First World War (Rapoport 2004).

Second wave started directly with the end of the first one. The Versailles treaty gave birth to the larger-scale principle of self-determination. The idea was to break up the empires and create the own state and gain independence. With this idea in mind, terrorist groups were created to support the self-determination and get rid of the colonial power. Therefore, the second wave is called as the ‘Anticolonial’. Terrorism activity was crucial in establishment of states such as Ireland, Israel or Algeria. Most of the success came in late 1930s and with the Second World War, this wave got reinforced and enlarged. The strategy changed in comparison with first wave – second wave terrorists used mostly guerrilla attacks on police and military, which were considered as ‘the eyes and ears of the state’. This wave can be considered as a nationalist and includes terrorism activity under the desire of self-determination. It gave birth to terrorist organizations such as IRA, and it also established the phrase “freedom fighters”⁶ which

⁶ Term “terrorist” had gained many negative connotations over the past decades that there was a necessity for a new term. Phrase „freedom fighters“ was used for the first time by Zionist group Irgun and its rival, group called Lehi was the last self-identified terrorist group (Rapoport 2004).

gained popularity among other subsequent groups. The slow ending of this wave came with the increasing role of United Nations, which became the international patron over colonial mandates. UN gained more and more authority in this area and with the increasing amount of successful nationalist movements, this wave slowly ended in 1960s.

Third wave, called as the 'New-Left' substituted the second wave right away in 1960s. More precisely, it has started with the Vietnam war. This war showed the success of Viet Cong's "primitive" weapons against the massive modern army industry of USA. Even though the target of this wave is almost similar as with the previous wave (states), the main thing that changed is the modus operandi. The New-left wave focused on theatrical operations involving symbolic targets, such as kidnappings or hijacking, but it also adopted the sign of the first wave – assassinations. For example, more than 700 hijackings occurred during the first three decades of third wave. The most iconic terrorist activity for third wave would be the red Brigades' kidnapping of Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, in 1979, who was later murdered after refusal from government's side to negotiate. Interesting similarity between first and third wave is the occurrence of women involved in leadership and fighting while in second wave they were limited to being messengers. Interesting feature was detected in third wave – one third of the international attacks in the third wave was aimed against American targets. This could be due to increasing American influence in the world, especially after the end of Second World War. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) became the symbol of the third wave. On the other hand, it was also the reason for the decline of this wave. Third wave's terrorists were defeated in one country after another and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 eliminated PLO's positions in south Lebanon. PLO had to re-group in north Africa and find its new leadership. Even though states cooperated internationally to combat terrorism, UN's role increased even more in the third wave. Freedom fighters was not a popular term anymore and the term 'terrorism' was once again used repetitively (Rapoport 2004).

When the third wave started to decline, fourth wave began to gain on its strength. The 'Religious' wave started in late 1970s and lasts until today. The basic principle of the fourth wave is the religion that motivates terrorists to commit attacks against others. In the heart of this wave stands one religion – Islam. It is involved in

majority of religiously motivated terrorist attacks and Islamic groups have perpetrated the most significant and deadly attacks in the history of terrorism. Three events in the Islamic world launched the fourth wave. First one is the Iranian Revolution that altered relations between Muslims as well as between Islam and the rest of the world. Second reason is connected to the Iranian revolution – even though the revolution was unexpected, many Muslims believed that it is the mark of the new Islamic century. Last event is the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 – Afghan resistance backed by United States was able to force out USSR in 1989, what was eventually a crucial step to disintegration of USSR. Fourth wave's characteristics have changed. It has brought a new modus operandi – suicidal bombings, number of terrorist groups declined dramatically (from 200 in 1989 to 40 in mid-1990s) and yet, the death toll for terrorist attacks has risen. Some similarity with the third wave is visible, especially in the main target – USA. Al Qaeda considered USA as its main antagonist after USSR disintegrated, Iran called USA as the 'Great Satan' and since the beginning, Islamic religious groups strived to destroy American targets and force them out from Middle East. With the continuing increase of relations between USA and Europe and with the rapidly increasing role of EU in the world, Islamic religious groups have included Europe in its war against 'Western culture'. Since the beginning of fourth wave, world has seen one of the deadliest terrorist attacks (attack on WTC, Madrid bombings, London attacks). However, David Rapoport predicts that the religious fourth wave is supposed to end with the beginning of 2020s (Rapoport 2004). If his prediction is right, coming out of historical evidence since late 19th century, the world should prepare on a new wave of terrorism. As it was mentioned earlier, based on the rising dependence on world on internet and technologies, it is possible that cyberterrorism may be the new successor.

We have analysed properly the phenomenon of terrorism from various points of view. There is still no common definition of terrorism, however, the academic consensus by Alex Schmidt might be the closest one to the perfection. On the other hand, it was exactly Alex Schmidt who defined four arenas of discourse while the nearly perfect consensus was reached only in the academic arena. The public discussion or the states' definition may never agree on a common interpretation of terrorism.

We have analysed roots of terrorism, motives, driving factors from different points of views and this will be used in later parts of work devoted to radicalization. We have also analysed the theoretical framework that can be implied on our study in the following part of work.

Next, we will list out the occurrence of radical Islamist (jihadist) terrorism in EU. Besides that, we will also look on jihadist terrorist attacks that were perpetrated by refugees in EU in past years.

2. Jihadist and radical Islamist terrorism in EU

This part of the work will be dedicated to analysis of jihadist and radical Islamist terrorism in EU. We will be analysing data since 2015 as we want to focus on jihadist terrorism occurrence since the beginning of the refugee crisis that struck EU. For the purpose of the analysis we will use the Terrorism Situation and Trend Report by EUROPOL that is published annually for the previous year. We will provide all the data related to jihadist terrorism and later, it will be reviewed. For the proper analysis of this terrorism in EU, it is firstly necessary to properly describe what is jihadism and radical Islamism.

2.1. What is jihadism and radical Islamism?

As it was mentioned earlier, we are currently experiencing the fourth wave of terrorism – religious, as described by David Rapoport. This means that the current “trend” in terrorism has the driving factor of religion and religion-based ideologies. This is mostly dominated by Islamist ideologies that are accountable for the majority of religious attacks in the fourth wave (Rapoport 2004). Regarding Islamist ideologies in the fourth wave of terrorism, the word ‘jihadism’ comes up very often. So, what is it?

It comes from the Arabic word ‘jihad’ that is used by Western society since 1990s but mostly after the major jihadist terrorist attack – the attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001. *“In Arabic, the word means “effort” or “struggle”. In Islam, it could be an individual's internal struggle against baser instincts, the struggle to build a good Muslim society, or a war for the faith against unbelievers”* (BBC, 2014). The word jihad is currently not very popular among Muslims due to its connection to terrorism. However, these two terms should not be connected as, *“in Islam, jihad has been around for more than 1300 years. Terrorism as we know it is, as a doctrine, little more than 200 years old when we take the Terreur phase of the French revolution (1793-1974) as point of departure, or little more than 140 years old when we look at non-state propaganda-by-the-deed type terrorism of the anarchist sort.”* (Holtmann 2014). The term ‘struggle’ regarding description of jihad is commonly used. *“Some modern Muslim scholars claim that the goal of true jihad is to “establish a just social order”; others add that the way to realise this objective is through violent struggle. In addition, some classical and modern Muslim thinkers divide jihad into a “struggle by the heart and soul” (fighting evil),*

“struggle by the tongue and pen” (spreading the word of Islam), “struggle by the hand” (political action or protest), and “struggle by the sword” (armed fighting). Yet the dominant meaning of “jihad” in Sunni Muslim culture remains “Islamic warfare,” which refers to war, more specifically to fighting with the intent to kill (qital)“ (Holtmann 2014). The concept of struggle is present also in definitions by BBC, as it claims that Muslims use the jihad to describe three struggles: believer’s internal struggle to live according to Islam as well as possible, the struggle to build a good Muslim society, and lastly, a struggle to defend Islam even with force if necessary (the Holy war) (BBC, 2009).

According to Nelly Lahoud, there are three key concepts that stand behind the advancement of jihadism. The first one is an idealistic commitment to a righteous cause, meaning that jihadists are free from any political obligation towards their state or any state as they serve only to their God who has their absolute loyalty. The second concept is the individualism in interpreting religion, meaning that jihadists interpret Islam in their own way and usually reject current Muslim leaders or scholars due to their ties on political establishment, which does not follow Sharia law. The last concept is the conviction that Muslims today are engaged in a defensive warfare what makes their jihad lawful. This warfare has two targets. The first target is the near enemy, meaning that jihadism should be targeting their own regimes for not properly following the Sharia law. The second target, the far enemy, is the Western society that supports these regimes, not governing under the Sharia law. The central argument followed by jihadism in this case, is that Muslim world is plagued by grievances and injustices and majority of them are caused by West (Lahoud 2010).

So, what is the place of violence? Jihadism went through many various interpretations over centuries and it was used as a justification for violence in past decades as a part of the religious wave of terrorism. Terrorism or terror are terms that also appear in Quran - *“Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.”* (Holtmann 2014). Two ideas of classical Muslim heritage are important in this case. The first one is the duty to wage an offensive jihad against non-Muslim territories until they either become part of Land of Islam or recognize its authority, and the second is the duty

to re-claim all lands that were historically part of Land of Islam (Hassan 2013). On the other hand, exactly this cherry-picking of passages from Quran and historical heritage is the tactics used by jihadist terrorist groups to justify their violent actions. The approval for violence may come also from the division of world by jihadists. They divide the world into the 'realm of Islam' (dar al-Islam), places where Muslims rule under the Sharia law, and the 'realm of war' (dar al-harb), places where Muslims do not rule and under some circumstances, war can be applied (BBC, 2014). Yet, violence still has its place even if we do not pick certain passages from Quran and interpret them in our own way. Concept of violence is present in the case that was mentioned earlier – defensive warfare. In case when Muslim people are subjects of attack and they are not capable of defending themselves, even legal schools claim that all capable Muslims should assist and attack (Holtmann 2014). In the current world of rising right-wing extremism and anti-Islamism, some jihadists may consider this as a justification for an attack against Western society.

Due to the current and past-decades' misuse of jihadism for mostly terrorism-related purposes, scholars have decided to re-think jihadism and its interpretations. It is necessary to review jihadism, its historical concept and its purpose to achieve that it will not be misused by extremist and terrorist groups to justify their violent actions. The necessity to review jihadism by scholars goes with the spirit of 'itjihad' which calls upon Muslim scholars to generate and create new beneficial ideas for Muslim community and refuse the old ideas (Hassan 2013). These academics stress out the necessity to change the view on violence, which should be only in a case of self-defence. The attempt to re-think and re-evaluate jihad and its meaning in the current world is in-going, however it is difficult to predict what can happen. Abdullahi An-Na'im is one of the scholars who is trying to push forward the idea of re-thinking jihad, as he claims that currently, jihad is understood as *"the unilateral use of force by Muslims in pursuit of political objectives and outside the institutional framework of international legality and the rule of law in general"* and he proposes that it should be abandoned (Hassan 2013). Ideas of cultural heritage were created in a different historical period and Muslims should respect the current world order. These ideas were cherry-picked and misused by extremist organizations and Muslim scholars should push to review and re-think these ideas to

give them new interpretation, replace them or eliminate them in order to achieve lasting peace and proper understanding of jihadism (Hassan 2013).

It is also needed to differentiate between jihadists and Islamists. Islamism is a phenomenon that is convinced that Islamic law and values should play a central role in current public life and it operates within the political regime (Hamid and Dar 2016). Islamists usually form political parties and try to push their agenda and achieve their goal through political means with a respect towards nation-states (Lahoud 2010). It is necessary to add that Islamism operates in the modern era and is a product of modernity. There is however a type of Islamism that tries to imply pre-modern Islam values into current regimes – the so-called mainstream Islamism (Hamid and Dar 2016). Certainly, once Islamism gets radicalised, it may lean towards accommodation of radical means. This includes usage of radical means under the vision of achievement of political goal – idea, that stands very close to basic idea of terrorism. Salafism is another type of Islamism, however, it can be considered as a type of escalation of it. The basic idea of Salafism is that the only true Islam is found in the life of early generations of Muslims, called Salaf, who were closest in time to Prophet Muhammad (Hamid and Dar 2016). Their ideology is considered very conservative and it is an escalation of mainstream Islamism as it tries to imply oldest traditions of Islam into current society. We have already described what is jihadism and thus, we can properly describe the last type, the so-called Salafi-Jihadism. Most jihadist groups can be considered as Salafi-Jihadist. This idea combines selected parts of jihadism, interpreted in their own way, with the base idea of Salafism - the necessity to follow the oldest and purest version of Islam, closest to Muhammad. *“Salafi-jihadists tend to emphasize the military exploits of the Salaf (the early generation of Muslims) to give their violence an even more immediate divine imperative.”* (Hamid and Dar 2016). Due to the current prevalence of Salafi-jihadist groups, the whole idea of jihadism is misused and thus, scholars call for re-interpretation and review of it.

2.2. Jihadist terrorist attacks in European Union since 2015 to 2018

Next part of the work will be dedicated to presentation of data. We will provide data since 2015 until 2017 about the occurrence of jihadist terrorism. Besides terrorist attacks, we will also provide additional information about trends compared to previous years. All the data for this chapter comes from the Terrorism and Situations trend report published annually by EUROPOL. Our starting year is 2015 which is considered to be the beginning of the refugee crisis by European Parliament, as it was the year, when the number of refugees coming to EU has extremely increased.

2.2.1. 2015 and jihadist terrorism in European Union

In 2015, numerous jihadist attacks were perpetrated in EU, and France was the most inflicted country. It has experienced two major attacks, one in January and one in November. Majority of jihadist attacks were performed in the name of Islamic State and jihadism in EU has shown that it is capable of performing mass casualty attacks. One of the main concerns of EUROPOL is the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters returning to their home country (so called returnees). These are people who have been born in an EU country but decided to travel to conflict zones, such as Syria, to radicalize and now are coming back to their home country (TE-SAT, 2016)

Overall, 150 persons were killed in 17 jihadist attacks in 2015. The number of attacks is a significant increase in comparison with previous year, when 4 jihadist attacks occurred. Besides that, there was a significant increase also in arrests for jihadist terrorism, from 395 in 2014 to 687 arrests in 2015. Out of 150 killed people, 130 died in one day – 13 November. On this day, a series of synchronised attacks occurred in Paris resulting in 130 deaths and almost 370 injured people. A series of attacks included a bomb attack in a football stadium, shooting in a theatre and a car shooting on cafés and restaurants. The theatre shooting was the deadliest one as 89 people were killed in Bataclan concert hall where two armed men entered and started shooting into the audience. Paris was targeted earlier during the year when on 7 January, two armed men attacked the editorial staff of the French magazine Charlie Hebdo resulting in 12 deaths and 8 wounded. On the next day, an unarmed police officer was killed and the day after, the same attacker killed four people in a Jewish supermarket. Perpetrator pledged his loyalty to IS and claimed that his attacks were synchronised with those on Charlie Hebdo

magazine. France was the most targeted country from EU in 2015 but few attacks occurred also in other countries. Denmark was also targeted when a gunman attacked a debate resulting in one death and 4 wounded. Additionally, the same gunman later that day attacked a group of people leaving the synagogue, killing one Jewish guard and wounding two police officers. In September, man attacked a female police officer in Germany and seriously injured her. Besides that, in December, a man was arrested by police after he stabbed three people in London subway station. Two major attacks were foiled by authorities that could have resulted in mass casualties. One was foiled by Belgium anti-terror operation and the second was foiled by passengers of high-speed train travelling from Amsterdam to Paris, where an armed man tried to attack passengers, but he was overpowered by others before he could perpetrate the attack (TE-SAT, 2016).

In 2015 we can follow the same trend of past years of rising number of suspects arrested for jihadist terrorism. While in 2011 there were only 122 arrests, next year this number slightly increased on 159, then on 216 in 2013, on 395 in 2014 and on mentioned 687 in 2015. Largest amount of arrests (377) occurred in France, followed by Spain (75), Belgium (60), Austria (48) and Italy (40) while other countries reported lower numbers (TE-SAT, 2016)

In 2015, significant number of people travelled in conflict areas such as Syria and Iraq – around 5000 Europeans. Individuals that went through an experience of training in a camp are significantly more dangerous due to their enhanced expertise in fighting, bomb creation or manipulation of firearms. Perpetrators of the attack in Charlie Hebdo had links to Al-Qaeda in Yemen and numbers of attackers from November Paris attack are believed to have travelled and trained in Syria. Almost 75% of these 5000 Europeans were individuals from Belgium, France, Germany and United Kingdom. Largest jihadist terrorist groups, Islamic State and al-Qaeda, called upon Muslims in western countries to follow their ideas and perform lone wolf attacks in their home countries. Additionally, IS leader Abubakhr al-Baghdadi called upon Muslims to either join IS or perform a lone wolf attacks in their home country or else they will have to justify themselves on the Judgement day (TE-SAT, 2016).

2.2.2. 2016 and jihadist terrorism in European Union

Jihadism in 2016 has shown the capability of performing quick and effective attacks with multiple casualties. This shows an attitude of stronger cooperation between attackers and possible travels to conflict areas under the purpose of training.

Overall 135 people were killed in jihadist terrorist attacks which is a slight decrease in comparison with the previous year. In total, 13 terrorist attacks occurred, most of them (5) were in France, with Belgium reporting 4 attacks, same as Germany. Out of 13 attacks, 10 were completed. Islamic State and al-Qaeda are believed to be the major terrorist groups accountable for jihadist terrorist attacks. 718 people were arrested on suspicion of jihadist terrorism offences what is a slight increase compared to the previous year. Majority of arrested people were in France, 429, what means an increase in comparison to the previous year. Spain reported 69 arrests, Belgium 62 and Netherland 36, with lower amounts in other countries. Jihadist arrests make the largest portion of all terrorism arrests in EU, 718 out of total 1002 arrests (TE-SAT, 2017)

Attack with the most casualties occurred in France. On July 14th in Nice, Tunisian living in France stole a truck, ran into crowd of people and drove 2 kilometres through the crowd. This resulted in 85 deaths and more than 200 wounded people. The attacker was shot dead by police and IS claimed responsibility for the attack. Similar attack occurred in Germany in December, when a truck drove into a crowd of people in Berlin Christmas market, resulting in 12 deaths and more than 50 wounded people. IS claimed responsibility also for this attack. Belgium was also among targeted countries as on March 22nd it was struck by two jihadist attacks. The first one was perpetrated by two suicide bombers that detonated explosives in Brussels' Zaventem Airport resulting in 11 deaths. The second attack, one hour later, was perpetrated by third attacker with the same modus operandi in a subway train resulting in 21 deaths. In June a French policeman and his wife were stabbed to death by a former convict of terrorism-related offences (TE-SAT, 2017).

There was a reported decrease in the numbers of individuals travelling to conflict zones in Syria or Iraq, with most of them travelling from Belgium, France, Germany and United Kingdom. This was possibly due to an increase in air strikes against IS positions in both countries. Additionally, it was harder to get to Syria through Turkey as

neighbouring countries have improved their border security. Numbers of returnees decreased, however, it was expected that these numbers will rise due to slow but steady removal of IS positions and decrease of their efficiency. That meant a possibility that many of these attackers will return home (TE-SAT, 2017).

The call for lone wolf attacks remained the same. Various IS or al-Qaeda leaders called and urged for Muslims in West to perform terrorist attacks as even the smallest attack can have a great impact. One of the main platforms for ensuing contact with lone wolfs, and those who want to radicalize themselves, was the online sphere. Online services were used for communication, recruiting and also for sharing terrorism-related content (TE-SAT, 2017)

2.2.3. 2017 and jihadist terrorism in European Union

Jihadist attacks still remained as those causing the highest amounts of casualties. However, it was detected that there is a decrease in the sophistication of perpetration and execution of these attacks. Al-Qaeda and ISIS remained as main actors of jihadist terrorism in EU. One particular modus operandi is increasingly observed in 2017 – numerous attacks occurred using a vehicle and driving it into pedestrians or other crowd of people.

In 2017, EU countries reported 33 foiled, failed and completed attacks which is more than 100% increase compared to previous year (13). However, the amount of completed attacks⁷ (10) remained the same as in 2016. Other 12 attacks are considered to be failed (meaning that they failed to achieve their objective) and 11 were foiled. Total of 62 people were killed in jihadist terrorist attacks what is a significant decrease compared to 2016. Most fatalities occurred in the United Kingdom (35) followed by Spain (16). One of the most significant attacks occurred in United Kingdom in May, when a 22-year old suicide bomber detonated a bomb in a concert hall in Manchester during a concert. This attack resulted in 22 deaths and more than 500 wounded, making it the deadliest jihadist attack in United Kingdom since 2005 bombing. Attack was immediately claimed by IS. United Kingdom was severely affected by jihadist terrorism in 2017. In

⁷ Completed attack is understood as an attack that *“reached the goals that the perpetrators may have had in mind, which invariably seems to be the killing of what the perpetrators perceived as “enemies of Islam”, as legitimised by jihadist ideology”* (TE-SAT, 2018).

March, a man drove his car into pedestrians in Westminster Bridge and later stabbed a policeman guarding the House of Parliament. In total five people died and at least 50 were injured. Another attack occurred in June, when 8 people were killed and 48 injured when an attacker drove a van into pedestrians. In April a man hijacked a lorry in Stockholm and drove it into a busy pedestrian street, killing five people and injuring 14. In August, a man drove a van into pedestrians in Barcelona, killing 15 people and injuring another 131 persons (TE-SAT, 2018).

The number of suspects arrested for jihadist terrorism slightly decreased in comparison with previous year, from 718 in 2016 to 705 in 2017. Out of all arrests for jihadist terrorism offences, most of them (373) occurred once again in France with Spain (78) in second, followed by Germany (52), Belgium (50) and Austria (46). The trend of France leading the table of arrests in jihadist terrorism-related offences is unchanged (TE-SAT, 2018).

It is believed that around 5000 individuals have travelled to conflict areas in Iraq or Syria. This means that in comparison with previous years, the number of individuals travelling to foreign conflict areas is the same. It is believed that in 2017 about 1500 foreign fighters have returned to EU to their home country. As in previous years, Belgium, Germany, France and United Kingdom were major source countries. Hungary pointed out its worries that in next years, many foreign fighters may return home as according to their intelligence, more than 1000 individuals from Balkan have travelled to conflict areas between 2014 and 2016. Numbers of returnees (those who trained in conflict areas and came back) are significantly lower and according to EUROPOL, this may be due to difficulties leaving the IS camps. Belgium reported low amounts of returnees and highlights the necessity to combat home-grown terrorism (TE-SAT, 2018)

As Islamic State gets weaker, it urges its followers to perform lone wolf attacks and follow their propaganda. It was also noted that the majority of attacks in 2017 were carried out by lone individuals who have not travelled to conflict areas but have been affected by propaganda or by other successful attacks. Internet and online content still remain to keep its position in radicalization efforts and in far-reaching propaganda (TE-SAT, 2018).

2.2.4. 2018 and jihadist terrorism in European Union

EUROPOL have not yet provided its data for the year 2018, thus we have no official numbers from TE-SAT report. However, based on information from news source Politico, in 2018 EU has seen 12 well-documented jihadist terrorist plots with 6 of them resulting in attacks with around 20 fatalities (POLITICO 2018). Compared to previous year this means a significant decrease. Most of the attacks occurred in France and Great Britain. Many of the incidents were amateurish with an exception of a plot that was foiled by Dutch authorities, where a group of seven people were planning a coordinated shootings and bombings in Netherland under the leadership of man with connections to Islamic State (Foreign Affairs 2018). It is expected, that a combination of two factors stand behind this decrease in figures of perpetrated attacks and number of casualties. Decreasing strength of Islamic State and the increasing strength of member states and European Union in counter-terrorism operations (Foreign Affairs 2018).

2.3. Refugees and jihadist terrorism in European Union

In this part of the work, we will list out various completed jihadist terrorist attacks that were perpetrated by refugees since 2015. This means that the specific of the attacker we are looking for is that if he/she was an asylum seeker or refugee in the time he/she carried out the terrorist attack. However, the objective here is to find those attacks that were perpetrated by a refugee that came in midst of refugee crisis, since 2015. We also include those, whose refugee status was either accepted or denied. This chapter will serve to list out perpetrated attacks by refugees and asylum-seekers. The further analysis and evaluation of it will be provided in next part of the work. Our sources are coming mostly from Global Terrorism Database and news sources.

One of the most famous terrorist attacks perpetrated by a refugee took place in Germany in 2016. Anis Amri, 24-year-old asylum seeker from Tunisia was denied asylum in Germany. He decided to carry out what was one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in 2016. He hijacked a truck and decided to run with it into the crowd of people in Berlin Christmas market. This resulted in death of 12 people and 50 injured. He was later shot by Italian authorities as he travelled to Italy. After the attack, authorities found a video in his phone where he pledged allegiance to Islamic State (DIIS, GTD 2017). This attack was the first one with significant fatalities that was carried out by an asylum-seeker. It

was the first time that a feeling of hesitation among German society appeared, whether the acceptance of large amounts of refugees, can lead to terrorism and crime (Nicolescu 2017).

Only 17 years-old Riaz Khan Ahmadzai, Afghan with a refugee status, attacked travellers on a train in the city of Wurzburg with an axe. He severely injured five people and was later shot and killed by police. He arrived in Germany in June 2015 and it was not believed that he was in contact with IS. It is assumed that he was self-radicalized (Scimeca, GTD 2017).

The most severe jihadist attack in Sweden in past few years was carried out by Rakhmat Akilov, 39-year-old Uzbek born man who hijacked a vehicle and drove it into a department store. The attack killed five people and 14 others were injured. Following the assault, an explosive device was also discovered in the car. His Swedish residency application was rejected in 2016 and he was ordered to leave Sweden in December 2016. However, he was able to elude authorities and carry out an attack (GTD, VOA News, 2017).

Mahmmed Daleel was a refugee who was denied asylum in Germany and thus decided to carry out an attack. His suicidal attack wounded 15 people when he detonated a bomb outside a music festival in Ansbach. During the investigation, authorities found his mobile phone, which included a video of him pledging allegiance to Islamic State. It is believed that he was self-radicalized, mostly through internet (Scimeca, GTD 2017).

In July 2017 a failed Palestinian asylum seeker stabbed civilians in a German supermarket in Hamburg. One civilian was killed and at least 6 people, including the assailant, were wounded. Attacker, Ahman Alhaw, pledged his allegiance to Islamic State and later he was sentenced to life imprisonment (BBC, GTD 2017).

A comprehensive study of refugee terrorism in EU was provided by Rob Simcox from The Heritage Foundation. He analysed jihadist terrorism in EU from 2014 to 2017 and found out that there were at least 32 plots featuring refugees or asylum seekers. This includes perpetrated, failed, foiled and prevented attacks. In these 32 plots a total of 44 refugees were involved. There was one attack carried out in 2014, 4 in 2015, majority (18) in 2016 and 9 attacks in 2017. 31 out of these 44 refugees came since 2015

what means that they came to EU in the refugee crisis. Based on the analysis, author concluded with a potential “terrorist profile” of refugee terrorists. 100% of them were male and the profile suggests that the “typical” refugee terrorist is in early to mid-20s coming from Middle East or North Africa and is most likely to be an asylum seeker rather than having a legal refugee status (Simcox 2018).

As we have shown, refugees truly stand behind some jihadist terrorist attacks that have occurred in EU. The most severe refugee jihadist attack occurred in Sweden when 5 people were killed, and more than a dozen were injured. This attack had a simple modus operandi and have not required a difficult preparation. This might have been the motivation for the perpetrator to carry out his attack this way. Additionally, as we have shown by data from EUROPOL, 2016 Nice truck attack have shown this modus operandi to be extremely effective and yet, requiring little skills or preparation in comparison with armed assault or bombing. It is undeniable that refugees, stand behind some jihadist terrorist attacks. However, in case of our research, we can talk about only two terrorist incidents that were perpetrated by a refugee that came after 2015. The Wurzburg train incident, perpetrated by Riaz Khan Ahmadzai, and the Hamburg supermarket attack carried out by Ahmad Alhaw. These were the only ones, where the refugee came in midst of refugee crisis, specifically in this case, both in 2015. In every other listed perpetrated terrorist attack, the refugee came before 2015. In case of Mohammad Daleel it was in 2013, in case of Rahmat Akilov it was 2014 and in case of Anis Amri it was 2011.

We certainly cannot say that there is a new trend of refugees’ terrorism. We cannot talk about the new rising wave in EU that would mean a spread of terrorism in EU. The majority of jihadist terrorist attacks in EU are still carried out by European citizens, or as they are known, homegrown terrorists (DIIR 2017). However, it is necessary to look in the future. Are refugees more prone to be radicalized? Is it possible, that these large amounts of refugees that came to EU in past years, will be radicalized in next years? What is the role of criminality in this context – can criminality mean a stepping stone to terrorism? In the next part of the work, we will examine three things – radicalization among refugees, relationship between criminality and terrorism, and lastly the phenomenon of migratory terrorism.

3. Refugees, radicalization, criminality and terrorism – are they connected?

We have listed some of the questions we will try to answer in this chapter that will be devoted to the analysis. Firstly, we will look at the radicalization and the possibility of radicalization among refugees. Secondly, we will look closer at criminality among refugees and possible connections between criminality and terrorism. Finally, we will analyse the so-called migratory terrorism.

3.1. Radicalization

Radicalization is a special process that could be easily described as a process of change of aspects on the world, adopted by an individual. *“Radicalization refers to a process of ideological socialization of (usually) young people towards effectuating fundamental political changes, usually through the use of violent tactics of conflict waging against the political enemies and their followers”* (McAllister and Schmidt 2011). It is a process of adoption of violent or extreme ideas that are used for description of life and the individual's surrounding. In this case, terrorism is usually the last stage, but it must not be that way in all cases.

One of the most significant theories in area of radicalization was created by Ehud Sprinzak who created the so-called concept of delegitimization. His theory is trying to illustrate the movement of an individual, psychological and also political, from a politically accepted ideology to an extreme one. The first stage of Sprinzak's theory is the 'crisis of confidence'. This means that in the beginning, the individuals find themselves in the position when they no longer support the democratic regime of the country. It must not necessarily be the whole regime, it may be only against selected parts. They think that these selected parts (persons, institutions, etc.) stand behind the worsening situation of the country, the system itself lack legitimacy and thus needs to be changed. They adhere an ideology that is opposed to the status quo. The second stage is the 'crisis of legitimacy' meaning that the demonization of the system surrounds to all those, who were associated with it what creates the tendency towards violence and violent actions. Individuals within this group reject the current society and all those who are in favour of the current regime. The last stage in this case is the political

violence. This is the culmination of the process of radicalization as the individual has adopted radical views towards the issue and decided to change the status quo by using violent means. As it was mentioned, terrorism may be included in this part, however it is not certain in every case (Sprinzak 1991).

Various authors were influenced by Sprinzak's theory and decided to build upon it. One of them was Fathali Moghadam, a psychologist, who created his own illustration of radicalization process. He compares it to a six-storey building where every storey means a step in the process. The ground floor represents a situation, where the individual starts to critically think about the status quo, questions it and results that the circumstances are far from ideal. This is a specific level as the majority of the population may find itself in this position, however it does not mean that the majority of population is starting to be radicalized. This represents a starting point, upon which is built in next stages. The first floor means that the individual is actively looking for possibilities to restore those things that make the status quo unjust. This includes mostly political activism or improvement of material circumstances. On the second floor, individual starts to blame specific groups (out of its group) for the responsibility of the bad situation with status quo. Author compares this floor to the anti-American sentiment that is popular among terrorist groups as they think that USA with their foreign policy in Middle East are responsible for the worsened situation. Third floor represents the starting distinction from the society and growing tendency to moralize with extremist organizations. In this case, values of the individual are slowly constructed by the morality of the group. Fourth floor is the moment when the individual adheres the structure, values and ideas of the chosen group and becomes one with it. The last floor is the adoption of the conviction that violence or acts of terrorism are those, which can help achieve their goal. This theory has its practical strength in the easy illustration of the process of radicalization, thus being easy to understand and apply in the reality (Moghadam 2005).

Previous two theories were moving in a theoretical spectre, offering explanations based on a theoretical framework. A significant study was provided by Mitchel Silbner and Arvin Bhatt who concluded an empirical analysis for New York Police Department. They have resulted in a four-step process of radicalization based on

empirical data from Europe and America on Salafi-jihadism. The first step is the pre-radicalization where an individual has an ordinary life before the process of radicalization takes charge over its life. It is the life situation before the real radicalization begun and researchers include in this step approximately one or one and half year before the beginning of the next step. The second step is the self-identification with the doctrine of Salafi Islam. This means that an individual slowly adopts the ideology, starts to look for like-minded individuals and chooses to meet with them. Prior to the self-identification is a triggering event followed by exploration of the ideology. A triggering event could be various things – loss of the job, death in the family, divorce, personal dissatisfaction or a significant dissatisfaction with the political regime. A triggering event is a thing that changes the scope and vision of surrounding of an individual to radical and extremist ideologies. The third step is the indoctrination. This varies from the process of self-identification as it describes the process when an individual has found “the proper” ideology and indoctrinates it. This means that it adopts not just basic principles of it, but also those in the depth or core of the chosen ideology. By these means, the individual tries to adapt its beliefs into the real world and thinks about the possibilities of realizing them. This is the step, where jihadism occurs as the solution for the problem of realization of beliefs. The last step is the jihadization, meaning that in this step the individual adopted the jihadism and decides to actively participate in it. Individual becomes even more radical and is ready to carry out attacks against those, who were members of the same society as he/she was. Distinctive feature of the last step is the rapidity – first three steps may take two, three or even more years, however the jihadization is a very rapid process and could take months, or even weeks (McAllister and Schmidt 2011).

Marina Eleftheriadou also concluded a research on topic of radicalization. She divided it on the micro, meso and macro levels, each with its own unique specifics. Her research focused mostly on radicalization of refugees and this part of her research will be analysed later. At the micro level, the radicalization process happens around the individual. Negative personal experiences, sense of injustice, discrimination or personal dissatisfaction are few of numerous possibilities that can lead towards radicalization. This is understood in a way of self-victimization that leads to a desire for revenge and

that can create a path to violent actions. The meso level explains the way that individual observes the world and his/her place in it. This observation can be described by four states of mind – superiority (idea of being special in comparison with others), injustice, distrust (against others) and vulnerability. These states of mind cannot be understood as those which immediately culminate into violent acts. There are more necessities in this case that lead to radicalization, such as mobilization networks or structures that collect people with same states of mind. If the micro level creates a potential for terrorism, the meso-level drives this potential to the fullest, yet not achieving the label of terrorist. At the macro level, those in process of radicalization follow the environmental influences during the radicalization and focus of the structural character of it. The main assumption is that radicalization is reciprocal, meaning that not only those in radicalization process are prone to follow extremist view, but this also affects their surrounding society and host state that may slowly adopt extremist views. Radicalization is in this level connected with lack of opportunity for political participation, dissatisfaction with results of peaceful protests what leads to violent means of protesting (Eleftheriadou 2018).

European Union also considers radicalization as an important topic as it is closely tied with terrorism. The European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation published a report where it defines radicalization as *"a socialization into extremism which manifests itself in terrorism"* (European Commission 2008). This group also identified three common objectives of radicalization. First one says that the process of radicalization grows within the enabling environment where those prone to radicalization, hold a sense of injustice. Second objective claims that the process of radicalization begins in the moment when the radicalization-enabling environment crosses the personal life, starts to affect it and slowly 'takes over' it. Third objective is that terrorism itself is a minority-group phenomenon and not a work of a radicalized mass-people (McAllister and Schmidt 2011).

David Webber and Are Kruglanski concluded a research on radicalization from a psychological point of view. They say that radicalization is a process that occurs over an extended time period and authors have resulted in a so-called “3-N approach”.

The first “N” in this case represents ‘needs’, meaning individual motivations of the radicalized one in the process of radicalization. There is not one defined and comprehensive individual motivation of radicalization that can be applied in all cases. We talk about a variety of potential factors of radicalization, e.g. injustice, social status, humiliation, vengeance, loyalty. The important thing here, is the triggering event i.e. the event that triggers the main radicalization factor of an individual. Certainly, there are numerous factors combining on this level, however, one is always the main and is triggered by a specific event. Webber and Kruglanski define three categories of such events – significance loss (event that makes an individual insignificant in any instance), the threat of significance loss (possibility of losing significance in any instance) and significance gain (possibility of gaining significance in any instance) (Webber and Kruglanski 2017).

The second “N” represents ‘narratives’, meaning the role of an ideology. Authors assume that the second psychological factor of radicalization is a cultural one. Individual is looking for an ideology that would justify its violent actions, ideology that would justify radicalization and offers answers that one is looking for. It is indispensable that the chosen ideology justifies violent actions as a proper and necessary response. After an individual adopts this ideology and becomes one with it, it is easier to make itself emotionally distant from consequences of carrying out violent actions towards other people as in its eyes, it is just a simple ideology following and a necessary response. This is usually accompanied by a process of delegitimization of an enemy. One of the most popular delegitimization tactics is the dehumanization i.e. the ideology focusing on making enemies less than human (calling them roaches, rats etc.). An obvious characteristic in this case is the expectation of the ideology’s success. Individual will follow the ideology and adopts it only in case it believes that it is successful and hopes the success will remain in future (Webber and Kruglanski 2017).

The last “N” means the role of ‘networks’, meaning the role of a group. The ideology would not be successful if it would not be adopted and shared by a larger group. Authors assume that the importance of this factor is high as it was proven that

decisions made in group are prone to be more extreme than decisions made by an individual. For an individual, the group may serve as a second family. The group may represent the society it has never belonged into. After one fall within the group completely, it becomes one with the group, its ideology and grows into inability to separate from the group and its members (Webber and Kruglanski 2017).

3.1.1. Radicalization of refugees

The question here remains the same as previously described – are refugees more prone to radicalization? Are there any factors that could potentially mean that refugees that came to EU during the refugee crisis will be radicalized to terrorism? We have previously described some theories of radicalization. Currently, we will look on the theoretical perspective of possible radicalization of refugees. For clarification, this part will be devoted only to radicalization. The phenomenon of migratory terrorism will be analysed later. We will be coming out mostly from two researches. One concluded by Daniel Milton in cooperation with Megan Spencer and Michael Findley and second concluded by Marina Eleftheriadou. Both analysed the possibility of refugees' radicalization.

For starting, it is needed to add what was mentioned earlier and it is that radicalization does not have to lead to terrorism. We will be currently moving in the field of theory of radicalization with a specific focus on refugees, looking for unique characteristics that could make refugees more prone to radicalization.

One of the reasons for radicalization could be the necessity to belong. This was mentioned in first chapter, specifically the sub-chapter devoted to roots of terrorism. Refugees mostly experience a different culture not by choice, but due to life-threatening situation in their home country. As they arrive to other country, unwillingly but necessarily, they are looking for themselves in term of social belonging. They want to belong to a broader society of a host country what is often not that usual, especially during a refugee crisis that is in many European countries perceived negatively. This negative attitude of some countries automatically triggers an enmity that leads to the statement "it's not us, it's them, they hate us" that was previously described as one of the psychological motivations for terrorism.

Daniel Milton with his team concluded a research on topic of refugees' radicalization and what may cause it. They list some of the most usual radicalization factors that relate to a refugee experience – religious education, lack of employment or bad access to education. However, the most significant is the combination of two factors: hopeless conditions refugees find themselves in and the poor treatment by a host country. Not every refugee must find him/herself in a hopeless condition, for some it may be a resurrection. Also, not every host country care about its refugees poorly. However, in this case we assume the worse scenarios. Refugee camps are usually just provisional shelters for those who fled until they wait for the asylum application to be processed. They offer basic amounts of food, sanitation and provisional home. However, in cases when these camps get filled and yet, they must accept more refugees than capacity allows, the sanitation, resources, healthcare and overall shelter gets worse. In these cases, conditions are inadequate to properly care for refugees, thus spreading the dissatisfaction. The physical and mental health are strongly challenged when people must leave their homes, especially because of war or war-related reasons (Syrians, Iraqis). Thus, it is proven that refugees suffer considerably in camps and many of them suffer from post-traumatic stresses. Another reason here is the location of the camp. These camps are usually located far from society. This leads to the crisis of sense of belonging – they are far from society, thus refugees have no sense of belonging to their new society. With more people sharing the same view, they may find themselves in position of socializing and grouping with like-minded individuals that could lead to deepening of distinction against the host country's society. Moreover, the distinct location may easily spread crime activities as with their location, camps are far from authorities. Host states have enough of work with processing the amounts of refugees, thus usually not being able to locate and battle radicalization. In many cases, host country does not allow refugees to stay in contact with external contacts and by doing so, refugees need to fill the social void what gives extremist organizations a unique opportunity (Milton et al. 2013).

Milton and his team further analysed the connection between refugees and terrorism. Their results will be presented in later parts of the work. Milton et al. were mostly coming out from the experience with Palestinian refugees. This means that their analysis was mostly based around it. It is needed to mention that there is a significant

difference between countries that host most of Palestinian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon, Gaza Strip, West Bank)⁸ and countries hosting refugees from refugee crisis in EU (Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden). This means that countries hosting refugees from EU refugee crisis are more developed, thus being able to provide better social services.

Peter Nesser assumes that radicalization comes out of three contexts. The first one is the local, representing events and conflicts in the country of origin. Second one is the global, representing the global jihad as the struggle against enemies of Islam. Lastly, the third one is the diaspora context, meaning the grievances coming out from the experience of being a diaspora in EU. Followingly, Nesser found out that the global and diaspora contexts are far more important than the first one, signalling a distinction between first- and second- generation jihadists (Nesser 2004). However, Eleftheriadou assumes that refugees coming to EU have more in common with first generation jihadists, thus she expects the local context to be the important one in the topic of radicalization of refugees.

We have already presented the radicalization theory by Maria Eleftheriadou and currently we will review it from other perspective. On micro level she assumes that radicalization revolves around the personal experience of the individual. Radicalization seems to grow out from feelings such as fear or isolation. The isolation can be understood as a segregation from identities such as ethnicity or religion. This must be understood as the refugees' isolation from broader society based on their other identity, be it either religion or ethnicity. While ethnicity was preferred in past, religion is currently the popular one. However, author mentions the growing preference of Salafism among youngsters. The isolation and its aggressive perceptions lead to reduced meaningfulness of self, thus being more prone to exploration of extreme views (Eleftheriadou 2018). Unlike the middle class and assimilated Muslim community in United States, European Muslims usually find themselves in a disproportionate underclass, often in segregated neighbourhoods, discriminated in work, harassed by police and very uncertain about their future (Zunes 2017).

⁸ Data concluded from <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>

On meso level, she revolves around the state of mind of the radicalized individual. It was mentioned that the meso level drives the potential for the radicalization to the fullest, meaning that in the meso level the individual meets and explores its radical milieu. Looking on refugees, it is not needed to look for the radical milieu – militants or former fighters are part of the refugee population and it is exactly their presence and connections that are main factors in refugee militarization. With previous mention of the Salafism and its rising preference among youngsters, refugees are suitable candidates for adoption of Salafism with their vulnerability (due to presence in new society), detachment from previous life (due to their necessity to migrate) and their identity shift towards religion. Looking on the refugee population in EU that came in past 4 years, they do not seem to carry along organized military formations. However, the meso level and its characteristics are necessary to be highlighted as those with high potential among refugees (Eleftheriadou 2018).

Lastly, the macro level's assumption lies in the environment and the surrounding of the radicalized individual and is connected to macro factors such as lack of political participation or dissatisfaction with political situation. In the current refugee crisis, this could be represented by growing anti-refugee rhetoric or the anti-refugee policy presented by numerous EU countries. Author states that the level of hostility and violence rests on two pivotal points. The first one is the host state's capacity consisting of economic, organization and human capital, capable of managing the refugees' income. The second point lies in the will to create an effective system that could prevent radicalization that is currently not shared. *"In the current refugee crisis, this translates into a shift towards far-right rhetoric in the debate about Muslims in Europe. From inflammatory rhetoric to semi-official sanctioning of violence, the lack of will in certain parts and political forces in Europe is a significant determinant of radicalization."* (Eleftheriadou 2018).

In refugee radicalization, one should also concern the bilateral relation between the sending and welcoming country. In case of hostile relations, refugees are arriving in a more hostile society that could easily speed up the radicalization. In case of positive relations between countries, coming refugees may find themselves in a positive and welcoming society that accepts them (Eleftheriadou 2018).

In topic of refugees' radicalization, we are looking on many potential elements that could make refugees more prone to radicalization. Anyone can become radicalized, however, refugees are truly more prone to it due to the number of additional potential radicalization elements that they meet with. When looking at provided theories of radicalization, some of them are applicable for the situation of refugees. Fathali Moghadam's theory explained by a comparison with a six-storey building is applicable in its first three phases, as we shall look only on these as starting points of radicalization. Ground floor represents a situation where an individual finds itself in situation that is far from ideal. This can easily happen with refugees arriving to new country during the phase of adjusting to new system. The first floor, representing the search for things that make the status quo unjust, can be possibly found with refugees as they try to look for possibilities, how to enhance their position and improve their lives. The second floor is and escalation of the first one, where and individual starts to blame specific groups for its position. This could be also found with refugees as an end of their quest of search for things, that make their situation wrong. Theory by Mitchel Silbner and Arvin Bhatt is applicable in combination of triggering event (loss of job, death in family, personal dissatisfaction, unjust overall situation) and adoption of Salafi-jihadism. When looking on refugees that entered EU since 2015, many of them came from conflict zones (Iraq, Syria) where they could have met with the ideology of Salafi-jihadism, thus making them more prone to following it. Overall radicalization theory by Maria Eleftheriadou is applicable in the micro level – the one happening around the individual. Mentioned 'negative personal experiences, sense of injustice, discrimination or personal dissatisfaction' are all easily found among refugees. Combined with mentioned self-victimization and the experience of migration can truly mean an increased risk of radicalization. When all these possibilities are combined with a possible strongly unwelcoming society (far-right and right-wing policies, anti-Islamism, anti-refugees), it can create a very likely radicalization scenario. European Law Enforcement Agency have published a report in 2016 focusing on changes in modus operandi of Islamic State. *"A real and imminent danger is the possibility of elements of the (Sunni Muslim) Syrian refugee diaspora becoming vulnerable to radicalisation once in Europe and being specifically targeted by Islamic extremist recruiters. It is believed that a number of jihadists are travelling through Europe for this purpose"* (EUROPOL 2016).

3.2. Criminal activity and terrorism

The relationship between criminality and terrorism is labelled as the 'crime-terror nexus'. Here we will analyse what is a crime-terror nexus and the possible links of criminality to terrorism. We will not look at terrorism from the view of domestic or international law, neither will we apply the theory of criminology on terrorism. We will look at connections of crime activity and terrorism, whether crime activity can be a stepping stone to terrorism.

One of the most interesting works in this field was provided by a group of analysts operating under organization called GLOBSEC. Their research is called "*From criminals to terrorists and back?*" and seeks to find out whether there really is something called crime-terror nexus and investigate what type of criminal activity is connected to terrorism. The research is conducted in 11 EU countries⁹ and is still ongoing, thus we will conclude some remarks from kick-off reports published on their web pages.

Islamic State was able to carry out deadliest attacks in recent years in EU. The Paris-Brussels cells of terrorist were cooperating and were able to perform numerous ruthless attacks in past 5 years, e.g. the coordinated Paris attack in 2015. This cell was later revealed and eliminated. However, after investigations it was concluded that numerous attackers had not only criminal background, but also criminal experience and know-how. Shortly described, they were criminals first and terrorists later. In their case, criminal activity was a significant stepping stone to terrorism. "*As much as the two phenomena differ, however, there exists an inherent connection between them as terrorism is also criminal in nature, and all terrorists are criminals but only few criminals are also terrorists.*" (GLOBSEC 2017). Terrorist groups in pursuit of finding a new source of income adopt criminal methods but this does not mean also following criminal motives. One of the objectives of the research is also to find out, if terrorism and organised crime recruits from the same pool of individuals. Currently, in the age of increasing significance and occurrence of lone actor terrorism, the idea of crime-terror nexus gains a significant popularity and it has become a point of reference in majority of terrorism-related news (GLOBSEC 2017).

⁹ United Kingdom, France, Spain, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Greece, Austria, Italy, Bulgaria.

Austria have reported that numbers of foreign fighters that travelled to conflict areas had criminal background in organised crime. Spain is “used to” individuals shifting between organised crime and terrorist milieu and reports that almost 35% of convicted terrorist have criminal background. Belgium is experiencing a rising phenomenon called “gangster jihad”, meaning a situation when an individual drift from the world of organised crime towards jihadism. This phenomenon is present also in France or Netherlands, where more than 40% of foreign fighters have criminal background. Numbers are highest in Germany where up to 65% of its foreign fighters have criminal background. Other analysed states have either no experience with crime-terror nexus or the experience is occupied with other form of terrorism (GLOBSEC 2017).

When looking closely at some states, we can certainly observe the high occurrence of the crime-terror nexus. In case of Belgium we are looking at one of the most serious issues with crime-terror nexus. The Brussels based Zerkani network works clandestinely as a criminal gang and their recruit’s history in petty crimes made them better supplied with weapons. The ringleader of the November 2015 Paris attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, is an example of a criminal turning into terrorism. Belgium is truly experiencing the new wave of jihadism – *“while in the past authorities had to deal with radical Islamists devoted to Islamist ideology, in the last few years there has been a rising number of so-called “Islamized radicals”—young Muslims around Europe rebelling against their parents by joining street gangs and getting involved in petty crime. Thus, a new “breed” of terrorism is born, with some referring to it as gangster jihad”* (GLOBSEC 2017).

In case of France we may talk about a coordination between Paris and Brussels cells as it was visible during November 2015 Paris attacks. Moreover, according to the French Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit’s analysis of 265 killed jihadists, about 48% of all were known to authorities for various petty crimes (GLOBSEC 2017).

Germany is among those with the highest amounts of foreign fighters that have left to conflict areas and out of them, more than 65% was previously investigated in criminal offenses. Among Dutch foreign fighters and also homegrown jihadists, many have a criminal background, mostly in petty crimes or drug-related crimes. A figure of 42% represents the number of individuals known to Dutch authorities, suspected or

convicted in terrorism-related activity, had previous criminal careers with almost $\frac{3}{4}$ of them with a background in violent crime (GLOBSEC 2017).

Cameron Sumpter and Joseph Franco have also conducted a research in topic of crime-terror nexus overall, but also with focus on EU. They say that it is needed to distinguish from terrorist and criminals, who are driven by selfish motivation, seek material gain with no focus on political message or influence over public. Authors mention an interesting view on, as they call it, the crime-terror continuum. They advise to put crime on the left extreme of the continuum, and terrorism on the right extreme. Moving to the centre from either side means strategical advancement. An organised crime group may begin to use terrorism activity for operational purposes e.g. Italian mafia. Equally, terrorist group may begin to be active in crime to fund its activities. One of the examples in this case could be the 2004 Madrid bombing which was largely funded by crime activities, in this case it was drug trafficking of hashish from Morocco and ecstasy from Netherland to be sold in Spain (Sumpter and Franco 2018).

Sumpter and Franco's mention and description of the continuum gives us a theoretical spectre of how crime-terror nexus works. Terrorism may sometimes get involved with criminal activity and vice versa. However, the GLOBSEC's research gave us a realistic view on criminality among jihadists and based on their research it is possible to claim that criminal activity could possibly mean a stepping stone to terrorism. However, criminal activity alone i.e. without radicalization, does not mean the same.

3.2.1. Criminal activity among refugees

Now we shall look at criminality among refugees. Right-wing parties tend to use the topic of refugees' criminality and refugees' terrorism in their populist propaganda. However, can we say that refugees are criminals? Does an influx of refugees mean increase in criminality?

A comprehensive analysis was concluded by two authors, Markus Gehrsitz and Martin Ungerer, who looked on various aspects of refugees' life in German e.g. their association in labour market, voting behaviour or criminality. Their results say that an increase of refugees in an area means an increase in crime rates. However, results state only a small fraction of an increase in criminal activity caused by refugees. With a mean

of 6417 crimes per 100.000 inhabitants, the crime rate increased by 1.5 %. *“Since 2013, the official crime statistics distinguish between German and non-German crime suspects. While refugees only make up a fraction of the non-German population, increases in the number of crime cases with non-German main suspects would support the hypothesis of immigration induced increases in crime”* (Gehrsitz and Ungerer 2018). Authors have decided to evaluate violent crimes, property crimes and drug offenses separately. In case of violent crimes, including rape, homicides, robbery, assault, their results indicate a weak positive relationship between instances of violent crime and amounts of accepted refugees in area (Gehrsitz and Ungerer 2018).

However, it is also needed to look on the other side of criminality in topic of refugees – criminal activity against refugees. This is also a very important aspect from radicalization point of view as due to increase of crimes against refugees, they may be more prone to radicalization as they do not feel welcome and they feel the hatred towards them. Results of the Gehrsitz and Ungerer analysis speak clearly – *“The number of non-German victims has increased from 41,316 in 2013 to 66,541 in 2016, whereas the number of Germans who became a victim of a violent crime has slightly decreased over the same time period”* (Gehrsitz and Ungerer 2018). This is truly an important factor because as it was mentioned in numerous theories of radicalization, the radicalization usually starts with an individual triggering factor, what in many cases could be an experience of a hate crime.

Overall, the results of this analysis claim, that allocation of 100 refugees in an area comes with an increase of 0.3% in crime (Gehrsitz and Ungerer 2018). Findings are similar with the result of analysis concluded by Brian Bell, Francesco Fasani and Stephen Machin in United Kingdom. Their overall result claims a 0.28% increase in crime with allocation of 100 refugees. They also studied increase in separate areas of criminal activity. They claim that there is no significant relationship between immigrants and violent crime. However, in case of property crime, they found that crime rates were significantly higher in those areas, where refugees and asylum seekers were allocated (Bell et. al 2013).

Similar study was concluded by Catalina Amuendo-Dorantes, Cynthia Bansak and Susan Pozo, however in their case, they were studying the refugee crime in United States. Their overall results show a 0.16% increase in all crimes with allocation of 1000 refugees. As in all cases, the result in property crimes was a little higher, however, overall these results show a very marginal increase in crime rates with an influx of refugees to an area (Amuendo-Dorantes et. al. 2018).

Another study was recently finished by Daniel Masterson and Vasil Yassenov, also in United States. They have analysed the impact of the Executive Order from early 2017 by US president that halted refugees' resettlement. Due to this, the amount of refugees' influx dropped by 65.6%. They have found that across all four analysed crimes (murders, rapes, assaults, burglaries) there was no relationship between the reduction of refugee arrivals and the change in local crime rates, comparing years before and after the Executive Order. *"We find that despite an 65.6% overall drop in refugee arrivals, the Executive Order had no discernible impact of on local crime rates. Instead, the estimates suggest that the reduction in refugee arrivals had a precisely estimated null effect on crime rates"* (Masterson, Yassenov 2018).

In September 2018, the deputy leader of right-wing German political party, Alternative for Germany, have claimed that there were 447 killings and murders caused by refugees in 2017. The German interior ministry had to react, and they mentioned that there were 27 attempted or committed murders by illegal migrants i.e. those who entered Germany without a status of refugee or asylum-seeker. The figure of 447 refers to overall killing attempts by asylum seekers and refugees. Since mid-2000s, Germany was on the decrease in criminal activity. This started to change in 2015. While in 2014, the number of crime offenses in Germany was 6.1 million, in 2016 it was already 6.4 million. We need to bear in mind that during these years, the highest amounts of refugees were coming to Germany (including legal and illegal ones). Within the increase of more than 300.000 crimes we include rise of violent crimes by 13.000 cases, from 180.000 to 193.000. Furthermore, murders increased by 14.6% and rapes by 8%. However, in 2017 the amount of crimes dropped by 10% from 6.4 million to 5.8 million and violent crimes showed a 2.5% decrease in comparison with 2016. Since 2014, the amount on non-German suspects in crime has increased from 24% to 30%. However,

when we count only refugees and asylum applicants, they represented 8.5% of all suspects what is overall just 2% of whole German population (BKA, BBC 2018). This data was concluded from the Federal Crime Police Office in Germany and shows a bit different result as we have shown earlier. Even though it supports the idea of “refugees significantly increase crime”, it cannot be perceived in that way. These numbers were in total overview and do not differentiate between crimes caused by refugees and Germans. They just show the increase and decrease of crimes in a specific time period. These numbers in total also represent increases in crimes by Germans against refugees, and also by Germans against Germans. It is convenient to look on these numbers, however, we are more prone to believe to results concluded by Gehrsitz and Ungerer or by Bell, Fasani and Machin, as their analyses were focusing specifically on crime by refugees against natives of the host country.

We have shown various finding by various authors. We have looked on topic of refugee criminality from the perspective of United States and findings indicate that there is no substantial evidence that refugees are behind significant increasing criminality in region. Even though Federal Crime Police Office in Germany shows other type of data, it was mentioned that this data cannot be perceived as information only about refugees and criminality as it includes overall criminal activity in Germany. We believe that criminal activity can be a stepping stone to terrorism as it was proved by analyses by GLOBSEC. However, we observe that refugees are behind a very small fraction of crimes in the host country. Thus, we believe that criminal activity plays no, or very minor role in possibility of radicalization of refugees towards terrorism. In the last part, we will look closely on the phenomenon of migratory terrorism and we will try to evaluate its existence.

3.3. Migration and terrorism

In this part, we will analyse the possibility of the existence of migration-terrorism nexus meaning that if migration and terrorism are somehow connected from various types of views.

One of the studies on this topic was provided by Alex Schmidt and focuses on an overall analysis of links between migration and terrorism. He has concluded that for countries receiving large numbers of refugees, the risk of terrorist attacks increases. This

was proven based on two studies, Schmidt mentioned. First one¹⁰ analysed a time-series data of 154 countries covering time period since 1970 until 2007 and found that countries that accepted significant numbers of refugees were more likely to experience domestic and also international terrorism. Second study¹¹ also concluded that refugee flows significantly increase the likelihood of transnational terrorist attacks that occur in the host country. This however does not mean, that the increase in terrorism is just terrorism by refugees against host country's inhabitants. Terrorism may be increased in two possible additional ways – *“targeting the asylum seekers and economic migrants on the one hand and targeting liberals and social-democrats who welcome them on the other”* (Schmidt 2016). This means that the rising appearance of terrorism in a state, that accepted large numbers of refugees, occurs in total of three possible terrorism scenarios – refugees against inhabitants, inhabitants against refugees and inhabitants against inhabitants.

As an example, for the refugee contra inhabitants terrorism, serves the 2016 terrorist attack in Berlin Christmas market that left 12 casualties and 50 injured. More about attacks of refugees against inhabitants of the host country is mentioned in second chapter.

The second terrorism scenario is the right-wing terrorism, motivated by xenophobia, anti-Islamism, anti-Semitism or anti-migration. *“The nexus evokes frequently hostile approaches to migrants at the level of society and government resulting in acts of xenophobia, border closings, erecting fences, and confiscating the valuables of migrants”* (Mazzucelli et al. 2016). Sweden accepted in 2015 around 160.000 refugees and seen more than 50 attacks against them. Germany reported in 2015 more than 900 xenophobia-motivated incidents against refugees, what is more than 30% increase compared to 2014. As an example, for this terrorism scenario, serves the right-wing terrorist attack from March 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand, that was aimed against Muslims and Muslim refugees and left 50 casualties and dozens injured. However, in case of right-wing terrorism it is difficult to properly differentiate between

¹⁰ Seung-Whan Choi, Idean Salehyan – No Good Dee Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism.

¹¹ Reinoud Leenders – Refugee Warriors or War Refugees? Iraqi refugees' Predicament in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

right-wing terrorism and right-wing political violence. Even though these incidents may not be labelled as terrorist attacks by some sources, Robin Schroeder clearly states: *“The goal of the attacks is a political one, the selection of victims is random and the purpose of the attacks, namely to communicate xenophobic messages, is very clear. The message is directed as a threat to the social group of refugees, as a violent message of resistance it addresses the political decision-makers and as a call to mobilisation it aims at the politically like-minded in society. That the call strikes a responsive chord is shown by the rising number of arson attacks on inhabited refugee homes. This makes it clear that this deed can, from a social scientific perspective, be called a terrorist act”* (Schmidt 2016).

Lastly, there is a possibility of an occurrence of terrorist incident by an inhabitant of a host country against other inhabitants because of refugees. As an example, serves the attack of Anders Breivik in Norway that resulted in 77 deaths and more than 300 injured. In this case, attacker, who was a right-wing neo-Nazi activist, decided to attack those, who were in connection with Norwegian social-democratic party (Labour Party) because of their welcoming policy toward refugees. He believed that a Muslim takeover is starting in Western Europe and the Labour Party, with its open-refugee policy, had to pay the price for disappointing Norwegian people (Schmidt 2016).

By this analysis we clearly see that with an accession of large numbers of refugees, increases also the occurrence of terrorism. However, this accounts not just for jihadist attacks by refugees, but also for right-wing attacks against refugees and even attacks between inhabitants of the host country.

An interesting research was concluded by Daniel Milton, Megan Spencer and Michael Findley on topic of refugees’ radicalization and terrorism. We have previously described their analysis of radicalization, but their research goes further. *“We find that refugee flows do indeed contribute to a higher likelihood of terrorism in the host state, a result that is robust to different estimation techniques and model specifications”* (Milton et al. 2013). Milton and his team used data from The United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the ITERATE Terrorism Data. Their analysis’ result was that as refugee flows from one country to another increase, the likelihood of terrorism occurrence, committed by individuals with the nationality of the refugee against the host state, also increases. This was proven by their qualitative and also quantitative

evidence. Research team also included the coefficient of rivalry and adds that in case of lasting rivalry between states, the possibility of terrorism increases even more. However, authors had to highlight that their results do not mean that all refugees are terrorists as they have tried to emphasize the possibility of terrorism arising from refugee flows. *“Our argument is not that refugee flows will automatically trigger terrorism, nor that every refugee is a terrorist-in-waiting. To say that all refugees (or even that a large portion of them) are potential terrorists is a misguided interpretation of these results that might lead to attempts by states to implement blanket bans on allowing refugees into their countries ... Not all refugees will become terrorists, but the size of refugee flows could increase the distribution of individuals’ will to engage in terrorism”* (Milton et al. 2013)

Another point of view concerns the usage of migrant flows by terrorist groups. During the refugee crisis in EU, millions of people entered EU from conflict areas such as Iraq or Syria, where numerous terrorist groups are based. It is possible that terrorist, disguised as refugees, used these flows of migrants to smuggle themselves into EU to carry out an attack and follow the jihadism. This topic was discussed since the beginning of migration crisis. However, it became very popular among all societies after it was exposed that at least two terrorists from November 2015 Paris attacks came to EU disguised as refugees. *“In the aftermath of the Paris and Brussels attacks, the migration-terrorism nexus has come to occupy a prominent position in the dominant discourse on migration and its challenges for Europe and its societies”* (Mazzucelli et al. 2016).

Repeatedly mentioned Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) by European Law Enforcement Agency (EUROPOL), mentions the usage of migrant flows in every report since the report for 2015. For 2017 they claim that the terrorists’ usage of migrant flows was observed but not systematic. Austria, Greece and Italy confirmed that they detected terrorist among refugees, however, they cannot affirm whether the usage was systematic (EUROPOL 2018). In 2016, migrant flows were exploited in order to dispatch terrorist operatives in EU. Italy reported numerous refugees with jihadism background, and Austria reported several refugees suspected of terrorism that were either in, or were travelling through, Austria (EUROPOL 2017). For 2015 the report states that there were concerns by some EU states that migrant flows may be used by radical

extremists to influence refugees or to carry out an attack in EU. Even though EUROPOL had no evidence of a systematic use of migrant flows by terrorist, it was later revealed, that at least two attackers from November 2015 Paris attacks got to EU disguised as refugees through Greece. This means that even if there was no evidence of a systematic use, there still was an occasional usage (EUROPOL 2016).

An important perspective is offered by Alex Schmidt who considers as migrants also those, who travelled from European country, to conflict areas and came back to their home country. In our analyses, however, we are looking only on refugees that are inhabitants of country A in conflict (e.g. Syria, Iraq) and migrated to host country B (e.g. German, France). Schmidt however offers an interesting view on another possibility when migrants can become terrorist, which was mentioned several times in our work – *“If they are not fully integrated in host societies, they might develop resentment and with some that anger might become so strong that they – or more likely, their children – turn against the host society”* (Schmidt 2016). He considers this to be the prime reason, why the majority of jihadist terrorists in EU were sons of immigrants (homegrown jihadists). Even though the likelihood of recently arrived refugees becoming terrorists is low, the danger of them being recruited by criminal or terrorist networks is still imminent. The combination of possible personal negative experience with an exploration of radical ideology may easily lead to engagement in political violence (Schmidt 2016).

However, two sources claim a different outcome. According to State Department and the Migration Policy Institute, more than 800.000 refugees were resettled in United States between 2001 and 2016. Out of them, only five have been arrested on terrorism charges (Schmidt 2016). Moreover, there has been little evidence that large numbers of IS supporters came to EU as refugees and *“of the 600,000 Iraqis and Syrians who arrived in Germany in 2015, only 17 have been investigated for terrorist links”* (Neumann 2016). Additionally, Peter Neumann believes that the risk of radicalization possibility of refugees is exaggerated as people who have successfully escaped a conflict area or civil war are unlikely to be interested in attacking the society that gives them an opportunity for fresh start. *“I know of no empirical evidence that would demonstrate that first generation immigrants are particularly rebellious or receptive to extremist messages”* (Neumann 2016). Instead, he states that first generation immigrants are too busy with

building their new life and providing sufficient environment for their children. The historical experience claims that it is the descendants of immigrants – second and third generations – that have proved to be vulnerable to radicalization. *“Unlike new arrivals, they were born and bred in Western societies but failed to develop a coherent sense of identity. They no longer thought of themselves as Turkish, Algerian or Pakistani, but felt uncomfortable being German, French or British. Combined with experiences of rejection and exclusion, this provided fertile ground for the jihadist message of strength, power, and hatred”* (Neumann 2016).

According to Colette Mazzucelli, Anna Visvizi and Ronald Bee, the primary goal should be to decouple the link between migration and terrorism and focus on the fact that terrorism may create migration as they consider it to be the more possible connection between these two. *“Migration on its own does not prompt terrorism. Scholars cannot ignore the fact that migratory movements may, under specific circumstances, be the source of soft security threats, such as illicit drugs, trafficking, the export of regional civil wars or inter-state conflicts”* (Mazzucelli et al. 2016).

Based on this last part of the third chapter we have showed that the idea of migratory terrorism is perceived in various ways. Two researches have proved that refugee flows truly increase the likelihood of terrorism. Furthermore, we shall also look closer on roots of terrorism that may concern refugees. When looking on Martha Crenshaw’s four motives of terrorism, we can apply at least two of them on refugees’ situation. Firstly, the ‘necessity to belong to a group’ and its possible unfulfillment is present, when refugees migrate from their home country alone and find themselves surrounded by unknown environment. Secondly, the ‘desire to gain reward’ can be combined with another motive, ‘attempt to improve social status’ (Crenshaw 1985). When looking on Paul Wilkinson’s determinants of terrorism, at least half of them are applicable. However, Wilkinson used rather wide categories. Ethnic category could mean an ethnic conflict between refugees and society of the welcoming country. Religious or ideological category may include the conflict based on religious or ideological means. Poverty was mentioned in topic of roots and determinants of terrorism various times, however in topic of refugees it may be perceived in negative way. Injustice was mentioned even earlier, in topic of potential radicalization of

refugees, and can be applied also here (Wilkinson 1974). Tore Bjorgo also mentions in his work migration as a potential structural reason for terrorism (Bjorgo 2005). Sebastian Wojciechowski's comprehensive analysis of roots and determinants of terrorism also has some categories that can be applied on case of refugees. The category of 'religious and cultural sources' includes the potential escalation of hostility between refugees and welcoming country as a reason of religious and cultural differences. Category of 'socio-economic conditions' is perceived variously, however ideas of poverty or uneven distribution of wealth are possible determinants of future terrorism among refugees. Group of 'psychological sources' includes individual determinants such as sense of non-belonging, intolerance or hatred. Lastly, in category of 'other selected reasons' author mentions migration as one of the potential reasons. Regarding the research concluded by Sebastian Wojciechowski, it is once again needed to highlight the idea of hybridity of reasons i.e. the variety of reasons that make someone carry out a terrorist attack, not just one single motivation (Wojciechowski 2017). Lastly, it must be once again highlighted, that political regime may have its role as it was shown by Nilay Saiya or Nina Musgrave. They have showed that democratic regimes, due to their freedom of movement, speech, etc., are more prone to experience terrorism (Musgrave 2015).

However, we must be cautious in proper interpretation of results claiming that "increased influx of refugees comes with increase in terrorism", as the increased likelihood of terrorism, may also include other types of terrorism. As it was showed by Alex Schmidt's research, large influx of refugees may come with increase in three types of terrorism when looking on perpetrator-target relationship – refugee against home society, home society against refugees and lastly, members of home society against each other (Schmidt 2016).

Others believe that first generation migrants are very unlikely to carry out a terrorist attack against their home country and a research from USA states also the same. The relationship between migration and terrorism is a complex one and could be perceived from various ways. However, based on this last subchapter we have shown, that large influx of refugees comes very likely with an increase of terrorism in the welcoming country, be it perceived from point of terrorism by refugees, or against refugees.

Conclusion

The aim of our work was to analyse radical Islamist terrorism in EU with a special view on refugees, especially those that has come to EU since 2015. We were aiming to find out, whether refugees are more prone to radicalization and whether they pose an increased threat of terrorism in the hosting country. We have set a research question and three additional questions to better support our findings. For the goal of reaching an answer to the research question, we have designed a five-step plan where each step meant a movement forward towards reaching an answer to our questions.

The first step was to analyse terrorism from various points of views. We have shown many various theories of terrorism and their critique, analysed what are current issues of reaching a general consensus on definition of terrorism and also presented a definition that is considered as an academical consensus. Later, we have analysed roots and determinants of terrorism and resulted with an interpretation of various perspectives by numerous authors. Lastly, we looked closely at the theoretical explanations of occurrence of terrorism. The first step was necessary to examine the theoretical framework of terrorism, be it current or past. Additionally, this step has examined roots of terrorism and explained us, what may be the cause of occurrence of terrorism, what is its driving factor and motive.

The second step provided us data about the occurrence of radical Islamist or jihadist terrorism in EU since 2015. We have found out that jihadist attacks in EU are accountable for majority of terrorism-caused deaths and their modus operandi varies. The amounts of casualties resulting from a jihadist terrorist attack in EU are on a decline, however, the amounts of attacks remain on closely the same number. This trend shows a positive outcome of radical Islamist terrorist not being able to carry out attacks with mass casualties. The number of suspects arrested for jihadist terrorism increased between 2015 and 2016 and since then remain closely the same. Additionally, the second step examined the occurrence of jihadist terrorism by refugees since 2015. We have shown five cases of terrorist attacks that were perpetrated by a refugee since 2015. However, only two of these incidents were carried out by a refugee that entered EU after 2015. The result of our second step is that refugees currently stand behind a very minor fraction of perpetrated jihadist attacks and we cannot claim that refugees are

current terrorists. Nevertheless, the research by Rob Simcox shows a different view on refugees' involvement in terrorism as he has found out that since 2015, there has been 44 refugees involved in 32 terrorist plots, including failed, foiled, prevented and also perpetrated attacks.

The third step was a crucial one as it focused on radicalization, with a specific aim on radicalization among refugees. We have presented various theories of radicalization by authors and examined closely the theoretical perspective of radicalization among refugees. As we have shown, there are truly unique factors that make refugees more prone to radicalization than non-refugees. Necessity to belong and to be accepted by a welcoming society is one of the main ones. The experience of forced migration brings feelings of threat or powerlessness. Daniel Milton's research stresses out the combination of two factors: hopeless condition refugees find themselves in and the poor treatment by a host country. Besides that he mentions poor conditions (sanitation, healthcare, resources) or strong physical and mental challenge of experiencing forced migration (Milton et al. 2013). Even though his research was coming out from the experience of Palestinian refugees and conditions may vary in case of refugees that came to EU, majority of factors are generally applicable. Maria Eleftheriadou highlights other types of factors – isolation from welcoming society, rise of Salafism among youngsters, potential vulnerability to Salafism and especially the rise of far-right rhetoric by welcoming society against refugees (Eleftheriadou 2018). As we have shown, other presented theories (e.g. Moghadam, Silbner and Bhatt, Eleftheriadou) of radicalization are partially applicable on refugees' situation. Thus, the answer to our first additional question is that refugees are truly more prone to radicalization. This is caused by various additional factors that make them more likely to be radicalized in comparison with non-refugees.

The fourth step was aiming on analysis of crime-terror nexus i.e. whether terrorists were engaged in criminal activity before they shifted to terrorism. Moreover, it was intended to find out, whether refugees engage in criminal activity in the host country. Our findings indicate that the crime-terror nexus is present as many EU countries (see chapter 3.2) have experienced jihadist terrorists with previous criminal background e.g. Germany where up to 65% of foreign fighters have criminal background

or Netherland where 42% of individuals suspected or convicted in terrorism-related activity had criminal experience (GLOBSEC 2017). Other presented finding indicate that criminal activity may be a precondition for terrorism. Certainly, many other factors have their role in becoming a terrorist. Followingly, we examined refugees and criminal activity among them. Based on our presented findings it is clear to state that refugees do not cause a major increase of crime in a welcoming state. German political party, Alternative for Germany, claimed that with increasing income of refugees, crime has also increased. However, it is necessary to highlight that their presented numbers included all crimes, even those committed against refugees. For our second additional research question it is clear to state that there is no substantial evidence that refugees are behind significant increase in criminality in region or host state.

The fifth step of our research was very essential as it was focusing on the existence of migratory terrorism. We have presented different researches that concluded with a result that migration can cause increase in terrorism in host country. Choi Seung-Whan with Idean Salehyan and also Reinoud Leenders have concluded their researches with a result that countries that accepted large amounts of refugees are more likely to experience domestic or transnational terrorism. Daniel Milton, Megan Spencer and Michael Findley's research resulted with a same outcome – *"refugee flows do indeed contribute to a higher likelihood of terrorism in the host state"* (Milton et al. 2013). Milton and his team highlighted that their research does not mean that every refugee is terrorist, however *"...the size of refugee flows could increase the distribution of individuals' will to engage in terrorism"* (Milton et al. 2013). On the other hand, research coming from United States claims the opposite and Peter Neumann also states that the concern of refugees causing terrorism is exaggerated. It was also necessary to look on presented roots and determinants of terrorism. Based on presented theories, we may claim that numerous categories, in theories of diverse authors (e.g. Crenshaw, Wilkinson, Bjorgo, Wojciecowski), are applicable on situation of refugees. *"There is yet another way migrants can turn terrorists. If they are not fully integrated in host societies, they might develop resentment and with some that anger might become so strong that they – or more likely, their children – turn against the host society. That has been one of the reasons why so many of the foreign fighters from Europe were the sons of*

immigrants” (Schmidt 2016). Thus, we are more inclined to believe that migratory terrorism is not just existent, but also observable and present.

Each and every step of our research was necessary to reach the aim of this work. Each step had its role in fulfilment of necessary obligations to properly analyse this topic and accurately answer the main research question, which was: ‘Do refugees that came to EU in refugee crisis pose an increased risk of terrorism?’ The answer is yes. However, it is needed to explain the reasoning behind this statement. We have shown that refugees stand behind a very minor fraction of perpetrated jihadist terrorist attacks since 2015 - only two of five cases were perpetrated by a refugee that came to EU since 2015. This indicates that refugees stand behind very low amount of attacks and if things will not dramatically change, this status quo should be maintained. In addition, it cannot be even claimed that refugees increase criminal activity in area they were placed, or a host state. However, we have shown, that numerous unique factors make refugees more prone to radicalization. This means that refugees may pose a threat of radicalization in the future. Given the amount of additional radicalization factors among refugees, their radicalization seems like a possibility. In addition, we have shown that migratory terrorism is not just observable but also present. Even though we proved that refugees stand behind a minor fraction of perpetrated attacks, since 2015 they have been involved in 32 plots in EU, including failed, foiled and prevented attacks. We have shown that there are numerous roots and determinants of terrorism that are applicable for refugees and their situation. Besides that, with rising right-wing ideology among political subjects and right-wing extremism in EU, it is possible that anti-refugee or anti-Islamism will be among the most popular motivation factors. As we have mentioned in Introduction, some leaders of right-wing political parties in EU already motivate people by using populist steps – creating fear from refugees by claiming that they are terrorists. The situation around right-wing political parties and right-wing extremism is a very crucial factor in this area as the hatred towards refugees can play a role of triggering factor of radicalization.

Nevertheless, there is an important thing to be noticed and highlighted. The possible increase in terrorism due to large influx of refugees must not only be terrorism carried out by refugees. We have presented three possible scenarios of terrorism that

can occur due to large influx of refugees into a welcoming country – terrorism by refugees against welcoming society, terrorism against refugees by welcoming society, and terrorism within welcoming society against each other. One of the very likely scenarios, is the second that occurs once the welcoming society has tendencies to far-right or right-wing policies. Once these right-wing policies lean towards extremism, it may result in attacks against refugees as anti-refugee or anti-Islamism are very popular topics among right-wing and far-right extremist subjects. *“Their [refugees’] personal resentment against a society that is unwilling to accept them might motivate some of them to engage in acts of political violence”* (Schmidt 2016). Thus, even when we answer on our research question with a positive possibility, the answer needs a wider explanation. By these means, two subjects play very strong roles in this context – the welcoming society and the state’s attitude.

We have resulted with a comprehensive outcome of our research that refugees that came to EU since the beginning of 2015 during refugee crisis pose a potentially increased risk of terrorism. However, there are large amounts of limitation factors with one of them being that many researches on the topic of migratory terrorism were concluded on the experience of Palestinian refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. The situation in EU is diverse as states that welcomed most of refugees have the potential capacity to control refugee camps and prevent refugees from radicalization among camps. Moreover, by cooperation with other countries and institutions of EU, welcoming states have more resources to combat terrorism in its early phases.

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Attachments

Attachment 1. The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism (Schmidt 2012)

1. Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;

2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in three main contexts: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors;

3. The physical violence or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual- phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining) as well as multi-phased sequences of actions (such as in 'disappearances' involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder).

4. The public (-ized) terrorist victimization initiates threat-based communication processes whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators;

5. At the origin of terrorism stands terror – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety - spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment;

6. *The main direct victims of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenceless persons who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to acts of terrorism;*

7. *The direct victims are not the ultimate target (as in a classical assassination where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims' plight or the terrorists' professed cause;*

8. *Sources of terrorist violence can be individual perpetrators, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams);*

9. *While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is predominantly political – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions;*

10. *The immediate intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, e.g. obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public;*

11. *The motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives;*

12: *Acts of terrorism rarely stand alone, but form part of a campaign of violence which alone can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political process.*

Master's Thesis project

I consider this topic relevant mainly because of its recency. European Union is facing a migration crisis that separated and divided its members into two groups – those who are willing to help and those who think that opening EU's borders come along with problems. The first group involves countries such as Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium or Netherland. These countries were ready to give asylum to those who seek it with a small amount of social allowance to be able to start a new life in these countries. The second group of countries consists of mainly V4 countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The attitude of this group towards this crisis can be defined by the words of Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, who stated that migration is the trojan horse of terrorism. Similarly, president of United States, Donald Trump, has the same opinion as he also stated that refugees from Syria and Middle East are trojan horses of terrorism. In time, when the Europe is facing the so called fourth wave of terrorism (religiously motivated) it is no wonder that the idea of refugees from Middle East being potential terrorists came up in mind of states' leaders. However, the question is, if we can truly talk about refugees as trojan horses of terrorism. For answering this question, it is needed to look especially on numbers – are there any refugees that perpetrated a terrorist attack? If so, how many of them? It is also needed to estimate that there are no terrorist attacks perpetrated by refugees. In this case, can we talk about criminal activity? What is a criminal activity and what is already an act of terrorism?

Firstly, it is required to widely describe what terrorism means. There are many authors, many books, publications or articles on topic of describing terrorism. It can be looked on in many ways – from side of perpetrators, the motive, the target or the goal of terrorism activity or the terrorist attack. It is needed to answer questions regarding radicalization and its core, the possible type of terrorism, its characteristic etc. By this, we should be able to come up with the best possible explanation and description terrorism. Secondly, due to my topic being focused not only to terrorism, but also on criminal activity, it is needed to describe what is the criminal activity. For this purpose, the best serving source is the law of the studied country. However, description is not enough in this case. It will be required to find the border of criminal activity. That means, to find out and describe, what is a criminal activity and what is terrorism. Certainly, we

assume that terrorism is criminal activity, however, it has unique characteristic points which make terrorism a special category. Thirdly, due to this work focusing mainly on refugees in European Union, it is required to describe the background of refugee crisis in EU. Besides only describing what is the refugee crisis and how do EU's members respond, we shall also provide a number of charts and quantitative data showing the numbers of refugees in EU's countries. Based on that, we will be able to pick 2-4 countries that accepted most of refugees and thus, these countries will be the targeted ones for our study. Finally, in the end of first part, we should have a proper, and for this thesis the most suitable, definition of terrorism, definition of criminal activity and by those means, in later parts of the work, we should be able to distinguish terrorism and criminal activity, which will be required in the later parts.

The second part of the work will provide the data. The data will contain the basic information about refugees – numbers in whole, numbers per state, their situation etc. Besides that, it is also needed to look on terrorism incidents that occurred in Europe. This dataset should be widest one, so we can properly analyse and locate these terrorist attacks and find out more about their perpetrators. Moreover, it is needed to assume, that refugees may not be terrorists but “just” criminals. That is why we need to look on countries, that accepted most of refugees and see, if these countries have issues with refugees' criminal activity. Based on provided data in this part of the work, we should be able to analyse what is needed in the third part of the work.

Third part should be devoted to the analysis. According to the data we have collected and presented in the second part of the work, we can properly analyse the illegal activity of refugees. Combining it with the definition, we have provided in the first part of the work, we should be able to define and answer the basic question – are refugees trojan horses of terrorism or are they criminals? Could the possible criminal activity of refugees be a stepping stone to terrorism?

It was needed to draw up a short design of the proposed thesis so in the later parts of the project, it will be easier to get through sources.

Literature review

From point of literature, there is no shortage of books or articles talking about the terrorism, its roots, basic principles or its definition. Many various publications are available. Thus, it was needed to establish criteria for proper selection of books. As we are currently seeing the so-called fourth wave of terrorism, religious, it is required to give the basic principle of "waves of terrorism" by David Rapoport. His idea of dividing modern era terrorism into four waves, each lasting around 40 years meant a fresh and innovative view on modern study of terrorism and its causes. Rapoport's books and articles on waves of terrorism became a dividing factor when studying or analysing terrorism in any way. As this thesis is supposed to analyse Islamic refugees in European Union, we can take as a dividing factor the fourth wave of terrorism, the religious one. Even though, according to Rapoport, it began in 1979, we have chosen as a factor for publication year in literature, post-2001 era. With the terrorist attack on World Trade Centre on 9th of September 2001, the view on religious terrorism has changed. President Bush declared "war on terror", declaring war against terrorism which meant that he was ready, as a country, to fight against a non-state subject, Al-Qaeda. Many various publications and books were written after this incident. Moreover, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and London bombings in 2005 once again meant a focus on publications on topic of terrorism. Thus, we have decided to bring into attention these three attacks and to take into consideration the publication year for not only post-2001 era but mainly post-2005 era, where scholars and authors had to take on mind the Madrid and London attacks.

One of the most basic publications, offering many various theories and explanations of terrorism is *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* edited by Alex P. Schmid. It offers many various definitions, typologies and theories of terrorism. It is a complex book devoted to the theoretical part of terrorism, it brings up many questions and also answers it. One of the wholesome books covering various areas and providing a bit of everything was the publication *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies* by Gus Martin. This publication offers a basic view of author on definition of terrorism, environment of terrorists and the terrorist battleground. First part, focusing on definition of terrorism, explains in basic principles the historical

perspectives, causes of terrorism and its roots. Second part offers a rather interesting division of terrorism based on its environment. In third part, other questions are discussed such as counterterrorism, war on terror or possible future trends. The biggest plus of this publication is its interesting view on terrorism and its division based on environment. The negative may be the shortage of passage devoted to basic understanding of terrorism. As it was mentioned before, radicalisation is an important factor that must be properly defined. For this purpose, a book by Rik Coolset called *Jihadi terrorism and the Radicalisation challenge in Europe* suits properly. It offers a wide view on jihadi terrorism in Europe, its roots, beginnings, its main actors and also the radicalisation process on jihadi terrorists. This publication offers a specific view on one part of terrorism. Due to my thesis being focused only on one form of terrorism, religious / jihadi, this publication is helpful. David J. Whittaker's book called *The Terrorism Reader* offers on its beginning a short introduction to the definition of terrorism coming out from its characteristic, motivation and worldwide occurrence. The main part of this book, and also its biggest positive, is the second part. Here, the author used sixteen terrorism related incidents in a case study. Results of this case study are later presented. In its third part, author focuses on control of terrorism and possible counter-terrorism measures. The negative of this book lies in shortage in definition related part. Besides that, the sixteen incidents are from various waves of terrorism which shows a bit of inconsistency. A very interesting view on terrorism is offered by Fathali Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella in publication *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences and Interventions*. This analysis is focusing on applying psychology and its practice to the issue of terrorism. The main goal of this analysis is to psychologically understand terrorism, what are its roots and causes for radicalisation. The biggest plus of this book are the proposals of international psychology experts on prevention of terrorism and possibility of radicalisation. Certainly, it is worth to mention also the *Global Terrorism* publication by James and Brenda Lutz. This book offers basic views on terrorism. It tries to properly define terrorism of current world, brings up categorization and focuses on causes. The second part is devoted to strategies, techniques and targets of terrorism. It also offers a short focus on weapons of terrorists. One of the most interesting books is the *Defining Terrorism in International Law* by Ben Saul. This publication focuses on an effort to properly define terrorism within international law. In

the era, when terrorism became globalised, it is needed to look on “the bigger picture” and to try to characterize terrorism in International law. Based on that, not only states could cooperate, but also states and international organizations such as UN, under the goal of preventing terrorism from happening. For the end, worth of mentioning are other publications such as *Terrorism and Political Violence* by Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Gordon Clubb and Simon Mabon or *No end to war: Terrorism in the twenty-first century* by Walter Laqueur.

Data collection

As it was mentioned in earlier parts of the project, we need to collect data on refugees, their possible criminal activity and the terrorism in European Union since the beginning of the migration crisis, what could be dated for 2015. For the purpose of an overall view on terrorism in Europe, suits in the best way the Europol database. Europol annually publishes the TE-SAT report (Terrorism Situation and Trend Report). This report always consists of the same characteristics – it is divided into groups based on the type of terrorism. These groups are Jihadist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, right-wing terrorism and finally single-issue terrorism. Europol offers in each and every category a general information, numbers of attacks, prevented attacks and especially, arrests for terrorism related issue. Besides that, Europol looks also on the bigger picture and brings useful information on overall terrorism in Europe. This report is the main source for data on terrorism in Europe. In case of data for refugee crisis, the statistics are done widely by many organizations or think-tanks. However, the most reliable sources are certainly UN Refugee Agency, and as we are talking about crisis in European Union, the institutions of EU. European Parliament and also European Commission provided a large amount of reports on numbers, facts and statistics on refugees since the crisis started. Besides that, institutions of European Union provide also numbers on division of refugees by countries. This information can be back checked by national web sites. When looking on criminal activity, it is a bit harder to access information only for refugees. However, in some cases, governments provide this information, as it is with Sweden. In other cases, newspapers and journal are able to access and put together information from countries’ governments under the goal of writing an article. And lastly, NGOs and think-tanks may

also in some cases acquire this sort of information under the goal of writing a study or a report. Thus, even though we may not be able to easily access the information on refugees' criminal activity, other subjects such as newspapers or NGOs are able to do that, what means that we only need an access to these special articles, reports or studies. As an example, serves *The Irish Times* which provided numerous articles on refugees' criminal activity, *The Telegraph* with its data analysis on immigration and its crime activity in Sweden or the famous web portal *statista.com* with bases in United Kingdom, Germany, France or United States. Lastly, one of the major helps was the long-term study by Slovak think-tank called GLOBSEC. Their study focuses on jihadists in Europe who were criminals. The main goal is to determine, if jihadi criminals had become terrorists, thus identifying that criminal activity among jihadists is a stepping stone to terrorism. Besides that, this study also wants to find out, if those who actually became terrorists, ever decided to get back to "just" criminal activity. This two-year long research is concluded in 11 countries and it seek to determine whether there is an existence of so called "crime-terror nexus".

The second part of the work is dedicated to collection of data from various sources. After the suitable data is collected and presented, it is possible to analyse it by combining it with theoretical background provided in the first part of the work.

Data analyse

The most suitable way to properly analyse these data is their presentation and combination with definitions and theory that was described in the first part. Based on provided information on refugees we are able to locate countries that accepted most of them. Based on information about criminal activity of refugees, we can analyse, if the targeted country truly has an issue with refugees' criminal activity, if there are organised groups or it's just a few "petty" crimes. With the data provided by Europol, we can easily analyse the terrorist activity in European Union and the targeted countries. With the combination of this data from Europol and news articles, we can get possible profiles of perpetrators, thus identifying, if the perpetrator was a refugee or not. Finally, with the data from Globsec, we can further discuss the possible connection between criminality and terrorism. The timeframe for data collection is since 2016 to the end of 2018. The reason behind this is that we have to take into consideration the amount of time, which

took for refugees to arrive into country and get settled. The beginning of the crisis could be dated to June 2015 what means, we have to start the data collection with the beginning of 2016 what is at least half the year after the first large wave of refugees entered Europe. Certainly, it is needed to take into consideration years 2015 and 2014 as in these years, numbers of refugees also entered Europe. However, the largest waves started in 2015.

In the end, we should be able to answer few questions regarding this topic. Mainly it would be, if refugees can be considered as terrorist or future terrorists. Are refugees criminals? Is criminality a stepping stone to terrorism? Many various questions may be asked while working with the specific dataset, regarding some trend. Does European Union face a new wave, a refugee terrorism? Were the words of Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump truthful?