

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies
Department of Security Studies

Master's Thesis

2019

Nátalia Sudakovová

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies
Department of Security Studies

**Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons:
Case Study of Norway and the Netherlands**

Master's thesis

Author: Natália Sudakovová

Study programme: Security Studies

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Smetana, Ph.D.

Year of the defence: 2019

Declaration

1. I hereby declare that I have compiled this thesis using the listed literature and resources only.
2. I hereby declare that my thesis has not been used to gain any other academic title.
3. I fully agree to my work being used for study and scientific purposes.

In Prague on

Natália Sudakovová

References

SUDAKOVOVA, Natalia. *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Case Study of Norway and the Netherlands*. Praha, 2019. 90 pages. Master's thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Department of Security Studies. Supervisor PhDr. Michal Smetana, Ph.D.

Length of the thesis: 205 056

Abstract

Master thesis analyzes two NATO Member States, the Netherlands and Norway, and their approach to the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Research aims to explain why some countries refuse to ban nuclear weapons and what factors influenced the positions of the States on the TPNW. For this purpose, a model-based approach with three models (security, domestic and norm model) developed by Scott Sagan is being applied in each case. These models reflect three international relations theories: neo-realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism. The security model takes into consideration the security environment that a state is in, whether regionally or globally. It considers security threats to be the fundamental cause of nuclear proliferation. The second model focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb, public society and domestic institutions. The last model examines the norms which prevail in the society and form state identity of the State. Based on these three different levels of analysis, the thesis explains what factors were critical in formulating the Dutch and Norwegian positions on the TPNW. The thesis examines whether their positions correspond with the three models and which model has the strongest explanatory power.

Abstrakt

Magisterská práca vysvetľuje prístupy dvoch krajín, Nórska a Holandska, k Dohode o zákaze jadrových zbraní, ktorá bola prijatá na pôde OSN v roku 2017. Obe krajiny sa rozhodli dohodu nepodporiť. Výskumným cieľom práce bolo vysvetliť prečo niektoré krajiny nemajú záujem na tom, aby boli jadrové zbrane zakázané. Na tento účel boli aplikované tri modely, ktoré navrhol Scott Sagan na klasifikáciu motívov pre zisk jadrových zbraní. Prvým modelom je bezpečnostný model, ktorý predpokladá, že jadrové zbrane sú nutné k posilneniu bezpečnosti štátu. Druhým modelom je vnútropolitický model, ktorý sa zameriava na domácich aktérov a ich vplyv na politiku štátu voči jadrovým zbraniam. Tento model bližšie analyzuje rolu domácich inštitúcií, občianskej spoločnosti a tretieho sektoru. Posledným modelom je model normatívny, ktorý zdôrazňuje rolu prevládajúcich noriem v spoločnosti. Tieto normy následne formujú identitu štátu a ten následne koná v súlade so svojou štátnou identitou. Magisterská práca sa na základe týchto troch modelov snaží vysvetliť, ktoré faktory boli rozhodujúce v prípade Nórska a Holandska, a ktorý z týchto modelov najlepšie vysvetľuje ich prístupy k dohode o zákaze jadrových zbraní.

Keywords

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear weapons, non-proliferation regime, the Netherlands, Norway, nuclear disarmament

Klíčová slova

Dohoda o zákaze jadrových zbraní, jadrové odzbrojovanie, protiproliferačný režim, jadrové zbrane, Holandsko, Nórsko

Title

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Case Study of Norway and the Netherlands

Název práce

Dohoda o zákaze jadrových zbraní: prípadová štúdia Nórska a Holandska

Content

- I. Introduction..... 1**
 - Aim of the Thesis 2
 - Literature Review 3
- II.Theoretical approaches and methodology 9**
 - Research design and methodology 14
 - Methods 16
 - Structure of the thesis 17
- III.The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 18**
 - The Nuclear Disarmament Obligation..... 19
 - The Power of Civil Society 23
 - ‘Destructive’ and ‘Hasty’ Initiative 25
 - Areas of disagreement 29
- IV.Security Model 31**
 - Norway 33
 - The Netherlands..... 38
- V.Domestic Model 43**
 - Norway 44
 - The Netherlands..... 51
- VI.Norm Model..... 57**
 - Norway 58
 - The Netherlands..... 62
- Conclusion..... 66**
- Bibliography 71**

I. Introduction

In 2017, nuclear disarmament group known by the acronym ICAN (the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) based in Geneva won the Nobel Peace Prize for its decade-long campaign to rid the world of the atomic bomb. As the President of the Norwegian Nobel Committee Berit Reiss-Andersen noted, “we live in a world where the risk of nuclear weapons being used is greater than it has been for a long time.”¹ Whether the nuclear weapons will be ever used again is a subject of endless debates since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Theoretical discussion led by both military strategists and scholars provide arguments for each side of the debate. Proponents of nuclear weapons can justify their assumptions based on the decades of balance of military power with no major conventional wars.² On the contrary, those who are opposed to the idea of nuclear weapons as a legitimate strategic and military tool have built their argumentation on a moral imperative that makes their sole existence completely undesirable and unacceptable.³

Arguably, all nuclear weapons-possessing states that are Parties to the NPT verbosely express their commitments to full and complete disarmament. In 2009, Former US President Barack Obama stated in his speech that “the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War,” and there is probably hardly anyone who would disagree with him.⁴ In spite of wishful thinking, it has been almost impossible to find a common strategy

¹ Patrick Galey, “Anti-nuclear campaign ICAN wins Nobel Peace Prize,” *phys.org*, 6 October 2017, available at: <https://phys.org/news/2017-10-anti-nuclear-campaign-ican-nobel-peace.html#jCp>.

² Gideon Rachman, “A nuclear-free world? No thanks,” *The Financial Times*, 3 May 2010, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/a30e936e-56dd-11df-aa89-00144feab49a>; see also Barry R. Posen, “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran,” *The New York Times*, February 27, 2006; Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998); Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal, “Winning with the Bomb,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.53, no. 2, April 2009; Christine Leah and Adam B. Lowther, “Conventional Arms and Nuclear Peace,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 14-24.

³ Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4, March 2005, pp. 5 – 49; see also Mitsuru Kurosawa, “Stigmatizing and Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons,” *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 19 December, 2017, p. 35 – 38, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2017.1419453>; Beatrice Fihn, “The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons,” *Survival*, vol. 59, no.1, January 2017, pp .44-45; Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Weapons,” *The Nonproliferation Review* vol. 15, no. 3 (November 2008), p. 421-439 and “How nuclear realists falsely frame the nuclear weapons debate,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May 2015, <https://thebulletin.org/2015/05/how-nuclear-realists-falsely-frame-the-nuclear-weapons-debate/>; Thomas E. Doyle, “The moral implications of the subversion of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime,” *Ethics and Global Politics*, vol. 2, 2009, pp. 32-48; Ramesh Thakur, “The Ethical Imperatives and Means to Nuclear Peace,” *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, vol. 28, no. 3 (August 2016), pp. 288-295.

⁴ *Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered*, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 April, 2009, available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

for disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. Each country has already decided whether nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence will be part of their military doctrines or not. The current global security environment is becoming more and more challenging while the relations among major international players are deteriorating. Tensions between the Russian Federation and the West have raised new concerns and Russia's increasing confidence has far-reaching implication for transatlantic security. Finding mutual interests has become difficult and one of the significant consequences is having no bilateral talks on possible nuclear arms reduction in the future between Russia and the United States.⁵ In addition, many states started calling for strengthening nonproliferation regime in the wake of nuclear developments in North Korea and Iran. Absence of disarmament talks and the global nuclear nonproliferation regime which according to many is not effective and unable to guarantee further reductions in nuclear arsenals, led to the nuclear ban treaty proposal which resulted in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the first globally applicable multilateral agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons. Adopted by a United Nations diplomatic conference on 7 July 2017, the primary objective of the ban treaty is to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world. After weeks of negotiating the TPNW, there were 122 States which voted in favor, 1 State that voted against and 1 abstention. The rest of the international community, more exactly 69 States, completely abstained from the UN negotiations. The nine countries generally recognized as possessing nuclear weapons - the U.S., Russia, Britain, China, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel - were noticeably absent from the negotiations, as were most members of NATO.

Aim of the Thesis

Based on a comprehensive analysis of international and domestic factors, the thesis tries to explain the reasons behind the states' positions on the nuclear prohibition in form of the TPNW. By applying three conceptual models that correspond to three major international relations theories, each case will be assessed carefully in order to understand the role of security, domestic politics and norms in their approach to the ban treaty. I believe that better understanding of the states' positions based on such comprehensive theoretical approach could

⁵ Mathieu Boulegue, "The US – Russia Relationship Is Likely to Deteriorate Further in 2018," *chathamhouse.org*, 25 January 2018, available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/us-russia-relationship-likely-deteriorate-further-2018>.

contribute to the non-proliferation debate by analyzing nuclear abolition attitudes from different points of view.

I argue that in order to understand why some NNWSs decided not to support the ban treaty, it is critical to look at both international and domestic politics of the States. For this purpose, I will analyze two countries that do not possess NWs: Norway and the Netherlands, which are both NATO Member States. Neither of these countries joined the TPNW, yet they have assumed different positions with respect to the Treaty: whereas Norway completely ignored the UN negotiations, the Netherlands actively participated and contributed to the debate on the TPNW. Therefore, I argue that the membership in the Alliance can only partially explain their attitudes to the ban treaty. Domestic factors and other normative factors such as state identity or role must be also taken into consideration.

Why the NATO membership is not a self-explanatory argument in the Dutch case? Firstly, the Netherlands has been for a long time actively promoting multilateral efforts on global nuclear disarmament. It has actively participated in the three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that were held in 2013 and 2014. Although the Netherlands refused to subscribe to the Humanitarian Pledge which contains a strong language condemning NWs, it participated in the UN negotiations on the TPNW in 2017.⁶

Norway represents to some extent a very similar case. The country which hosted the first international conference on NWs and their humanitarian consequences, decided to not back the TPNW. It was a surprising moment for many because Norway has long been at the forefront of international peace and disarmament issues. The country is committed to full elimination of NWs, however, it did not accept the ban treaty as a right instrument to do so.⁷

Diploma thesis should provide explanations on why the Netherlands participated in the UN negotiations when it eventually voted against the ban treaty, and why Norway refused to take part in the negotiation process at all. It will look beyond the official political statements on the TPNW of both countries to examine a role of other elements such as domestic audiences, domestic institutions and state identity.

⁶ Ekaterina Shirobokova, "The Netherlands and the prohibition of nuclear weapons," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 25, Issue 1-2, July 2018, pp. 2-3, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1487600>.

⁷ *Statement by Norway in Cluster I Debate at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference*, April 2018, pp. 1, available at: <http://statements.unmeetings.org/media/2/18559383/norway-clusterstatement.pdf>.

Literature Review

Nuclear proliferation debate is closely connected to the discussion on nuclear weapons ban. In order to understand both advocates and opponents of the Ban Treaty, one should pay attention to the fundamental arguments of the debate from its very beginning. Since the first use of the nuclear bomb, scholars and academics have been leading endless debates about how society should approach such an invention, and what is the future of nuclear weapons both in the military and diplomatic field. Despite of vast amount of literature on forecasting nuclear proliferation, readers can only hardly find any publication issued during the Cold War that would suggest an option of banning nuclear weapons. Nuclear arsenals became an integral part of the military and strategic doctrines of the major superpowers.⁸ The central question was not whether nuclear weapons proliferation will continue, but rather how fast and in what amount. For instance, in the late sixties it seemed that proliferation is out of control and some scholars concluded that by 1970 civil power reactors in nine countries will be producing more than 900 bombs' worth of plutonium annually. ⁹ Nevertheless, it must be noted that author of this assumption, Leonard Beaton, was to the great extent influenced, as many others, by the Cuban Missile Crisis and the global military development.

In the contrary to the classical approach, David E. Lilienthal, the first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, came to the conclusion that the bomb is an inanimate object unless implemented by man. He also argues that people should focus their attention not on weapons, but on methods for eliminating causes of international "disharmonies."¹⁰ This idealistic approach was rather unusual in the 60s and certainly not supported by the majority.

A growing body of literature in the 70s and 80s examined the implications of nuclear weaponry on military environment. So called nuclear balance and increasing number of states which became possessors of nuclear arsenals created a multinuclear world. These subjects became central to the military strategists and scholars who already started to analyze the key drivers of nuclear proliferation. Authors started to be more critical toward the vicious arms race and some even doubted whether it is possible to achieve a stable military environment in the nuclear age because constantly changing international and technological setting does not guarantee long-

⁸ Betty Goetz Lall, *Nuclear Weapons: Can Their Spread be Halted?*, (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1965), pp. 28-31, see also Richard Rosencrance, *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

⁹ Leonard Beaton, *Must the Bomb Spread?*, (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966), pp. 48-50.

¹⁰ David E. Lilienthal, *Change, Hope, and the Bomb*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 42-50.

term security to anyone.¹¹ Strategists Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn published in 1976 a systematic study which introduced scenarios for nuclear weapons spread from 1975 – 1995 based on the assumption that one state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt several other states to follow suit.¹² Surprisingly, although their report was published almost a half century ago, arguments introduced by authors are still part of the contemporary debate on nuclear proliferation. Dunn and Kahn were suggesting that it should be given more attention to how we should think and talk about nuclear weapons. In addition, importance of adoption of a no-first-use policy and adoption of no-nuclear-use against non-nuclear-weapon countries (what is now called negative security assurances) were underlined in their report altogether with the creating and implementing nuclear free zones which could lead to the domino effect and more regions would follow suit.¹³

A recent review of the literature on the nuclear proliferation found that proliferation has proceeded much slower than almost all observers expected. According to Jacques Hymans, from the number of countries which could have developed nuclear weapons is much greater than the nine, which has done so. Author partially accepts that usually countries which are under threat go nuclear. However, nuclear-weapon-free states are also not free from security concerns. Therefore, he developed a concept of “national identity conceptions” (NICs) which are according to Hymans driving leaders’ choices for or against the bomb. Through different “decisional settings” and various types of NICs which are taking into consideration psychological dimensions of the leaders and leadership as such, author is explaining top-down political decisions which are leading to either acquisition or non-acquisition of nuclear weapons.¹⁴

Other scholars consider a positive level of economic development and external threats as causes of nuclear proliferation. Scholars Sonali Singh and Christopher Way tried to validate this hypothesis by testing existing theories using for their assessment a new data set on nuclear weapons proliferation and hazard models. ¹⁵ The results of this analysis supported the theory

¹¹ Colin. S. Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory is Possible,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 39 (Summer, 1980), pp. 17-18, available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148409>; see also George R. Pitman, *Arms Races and Stable Deterrence*, (Los Angeles: University of California, 1969).

¹² Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, *Trends in nuclear proliferation, 1975-1995: projections, problems, and policy options*, (New York: Hudson Institute, 1976), pp. 122 – 123.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 142-143.

¹⁴ Jacques E. C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹⁵ Authors have tested hypotheses derived from three broad approaches to nuclear weapons proliferation: (1) technological determinants, emphasizing the role of economic development and the declining costs of weapons; (2) external determinants, emphasizing incentives provided by the security environment; and (3) internal determinants, emphasizing a variety of domestic factors ranging from regime type to economic policies.

advocated also by Scott Sagan, which says that states pursue the development of nuclear weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security.¹⁶ Nonetheless, it is very difficult to objectively evaluate the term “external threat” and one could argue that even South Africa, which abandoned its nuclear weapons, was to some extent under external security threat before deciding to give up their nuclear arsenal.¹⁷

Domestic politics and internal factors represent another part of the nuclear proliferation debate. Analyzing national factors which contributed to the specific nuclear posture requires detailed knowledge of a specific region or country. For instance, Etel Solingen argues that in order to understand nuclear choices of states, one must grasp the relationship between internal and external political survival. That means examining a state’s leadership regime and the effects of internationalization on domestic politics.¹⁸ Combining security concerns, economic capabilities and domestic politics, researchers Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke conducted a study where they evaluated variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. Conclusion drawn from this quantitative examination of proliferation showed that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons program or not. On the other side, security concerns, economic capabilities and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons.¹⁹

Nuclear ‘de-proliferation’ and abolition of nuclear weapons

During the last decade, a nuclear-weapons abolition debate has been gaining more and more attention. Growing body of literature on this subject provides readers with arguments why the world with no nuclear weaponry could be, in spite of practical complexities, the right option. George Perkovich and James M. Acton are explaining in their book general conditions and steps that would need to precede nuclear abolition. They seek to facilitate a debate about how complete nuclear disarmament could be achieved safely and securely while arguing that nuclear-weapon states have political and moral obligations to seek to eliminate all nuclear

¹⁶ Sonali Singh, Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 48, issue 6, 1 December 2004, pp. 869-870, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704269655>.

¹⁷ Uri Friedman, “Why One President Gave Up His Country’s Nukes,” *The Atlantic*, 9 September, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-south-africa/539265/>.

¹⁸ Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 15-18.

¹⁹ Dong-Joon Jo, Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51, no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 186-187, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706296158>.

arsenals. Examining political conditions which must be established in order to enhance the feasibility of abolishing nuclear weapons, authors claim that nuclear-weapons possessors should choose freely whether they want to give up their nuclear programs or not. In case they judge that they will not become more endangered as a result, then a complete nuclear disarmament is possible.²⁰

Analyzing the cases of the US, Russia, China, France, the UK, Israel, India, and Pakistan, it is difficult to imagine how and when it would be achieved. All the examples just showed how unrealistic it is to achieve a world without nuclear weapons as they would expose themselves to enormously increased risk.

Point on which most of the scholars can agree is the fact that the Ban Treaty cannot guarantee the elimination of nuclear weapons. But as Beatrice Fihn states, this can be neither achieved by the NPT, CTBTO or other arms-control treaties. Perception of nuclear weapons as central to states' security won't change until there is some paradigm shift. In her article she stresses that the Treaty can also have a legal impact despite of absence of the nuclear-armed states in the negotiations. Fihn maintains that the past experience in the development of international norms strongly suggests a ban treaty would affect the behavior even of states that do not join.²¹ Whether the "nuclear-zero" norm will be developing in the future is a question of the future security environment which is difficult to forecast. And it is even more difficult to imagine the Russian Federation or China to adjust their military strategies to some international norms.

Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer called the Ban Treaty "nothing less than a heart-felt cry for nuclear abolition." According to the authors, the Treaty is a result of gradually weakening global non-proliferation regime and its constant ignorance from the nuclear-weapon states. As they underline, this situation can lead to a disaster.²² Both Meyer and Sauer are not suggesting anything innovative. They stress importance of further elimination of nuclear weapons before the next NPT RevCon in 2020 and admit the strong normative character of the TNPW. Normative symbolism of the Treaty is underlined in most of the pro-ban articles. Main arguments are resting upon the premise that the stigma of nuclear weapons is a part of the abolition process that could eventually resonate not only with the political leaders and military strategists, but also with the private-sector firms which are investing and funding nuclear-

²⁰ George Perkovich, James M. Acton, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), pp. 21-46.

²¹ Beatrice Fihn, "The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons," *Survival*, vol. 59, no.1, January 2017, pp. 44-45, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282671>.

²² Paul Meyer, Tom Sauer, "The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience," *Survival*, vol. 60, no.2, March 2018, pp. 68-70, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1448574>.

weapons industry. A key problem with much of the literature is the ambiguity of the direct implications on the countries. Currently, more and more states are acquiring a realist approach to the international politics. National interests and national security are becoming a central point to many of them. Whether the stigmatization of nuclear weapons can be a successful process depends solely on the will of states.

Another argument raised by the proponents of the TPNW is a domino effect. As Marianne Hanson in her article admits, the Treaty has no immediate impact on nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, it is more important what actions will follow over the 20 or more years. She suggests that “evolving normative aspect may lead a greater number of states to join [the Ban Treaty].” To normalize zero nuclear weapons, Hanson proposes the necessity of re-framing the discourse which has been created by the leaders and strategists within the nuclear states. According to the author, they transformed these ‘abnormal’ military tools into something what in the end started to be considered as central elements of the security doctrines. ²³ Hanson’s article provides an interesting analysis of the three elements which have compounded the growth and sustenance of “nuclearism”²⁴ Absence of humanitarian frameworks in strategic discourses, extremely restrictive nuclear-policy making practices, and privileged position accorded to the P5 state under the NPT are considered to be the key causes of the current nuclear disarmament stalemate not only according to Hanson, but also according to the Humanitarian Initiative Movement.

On the contrary, critics of the Ban Treaty tend to focus more on the current security challenges and on the deterioration of the international relations. Most of the articles are offering realistic and well-grounded objections and scenarios. That is something what the publications praising the abolition of nuclear weapons miss. Proponents of the Ban Treaty are usually suggesting hypothetical scenarios and potential implications of the Act. In addition, they lack solid empirical background.

For instance, Gideon Rachman, a British journalist and fierce critic of nuclear abolition, concludes that nuclear weapons kept the peace among the world’s main powers. He considers it to be a sufficient proof that the “balance of terror” works. Condemning the idea of scrapping nuclear weapons, Gideon claims that most countries would retain the knowledge and the ability

²³ Marianne Hanson, “Normalizing zero nuclear weapons: The humanitarian road to the Prohibition Treaty,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol.39, no.3, February 2018, pp. 465-469, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1421344>.

²⁴ Term “nuclearism” is used by the author to describe the central role of nuclear weapons to the state’s security.

to build a nuclear weapon quickly.²⁵ One can hardly contest this argumentation as nuclear latency has drawn a considerable academic interest in the recent years.

Similar views are shared by Michal Onderco who suggests that the “nuclear-zero” world would give rise to conventional armaments. Besides, it would constitute a world with high readiness to produce weapons what would eventually give the countries many incentives to cheat on international commitments. It has been also suggested that a public opinion is not universally opposed to the nuclear weapons. In the countries which remain outside the Treaty decision-makers believe in the military utility of the nuclear arsenal and this is very often reflected by the public opinion as well. Onderco’s research also provides alternative proposals for both countries and international organizations which are readily available and have not been tested yet.²⁶

Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino called the Ban Treaty a “symbol of missed opportunities.” Author see serious problems with the claims that the treaty will intensify the stigma against nuclear weapons and will discourage states from building them. Article is being critical to both the Treaty as such and to the voices of abolition campaign. As authors maintain, there is no evidence of how stigmatization based on the Treaty can be an effective path to disarmament. In addition, they see no development in educating the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons in general. And this can be a crucial element when trying to stigmatize any issue. ²⁷

²⁵ Gideon Rachman, “A nuclear-free world? No thanks,” *The Financial Times*, 3 May 2010, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/a30e936e-56dd-11df-aa89-00144feab49a>.

²⁶ Michal Onderco, “Why nuclear weapon ban treaty is unlikely to fulfil its promise,” *Global Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 4-5, December 2017, pp. 395-399, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1409082>.

²⁷ Scott Sagan, Benjamin A. Valentino, “The nuclear weapons ban treaty: Opportunities lost,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 16 July 2017, available at: <https://thebulletin.org/2017/07/the-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-opportunities-lost/>.

II. Theoretical approaches and methodology

Selected case studies will be analyzed by using a model-based approach developed by Scott D. Sagan in his article entitled “*Why Do State Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.*” He develops a broader view on why states develop nuclear weapons, which is based upon three models: security, domestic politics and norms. The security model adheres to neo-realism and takes into consideration the security environment that a state is in, whether regionally or globally. It considers security threats to be the fundamental cause of nuclear proliferation. The second model focuses on individual leaders and bureaucratic organizations of a country. It takes into consideration the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb. The last model examines the norms variable of the international community and the symbolic functions of nuclear weapons.²⁸

Security Model

The main theoretical assumption of this models is based on an idea that the international system is a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other. Constant struggle for power forces all the actors in the system to gain the most powerful position so they can maintain they sovereignty. In the anarchic international system, all states must first safeguard their own survival.²⁹

Kenneth Waltz, a founder of neo-realist theory, assumes that states are they key actors in international politics and their primary motive is to survive. However, this survival should not be achieved by leading wars but by maintaining the status quo. Waltz also stresses that great powers should not attempt to gain hegemony since there is no benefit of accumulation of power. Instead, states should balance and ensure that other states will not gain power at their expense.³⁰

According to Waltz’s neo-realism, nuclear weapons and rational deterrence is the ultimate guarantor of the global survival and stability. As rational deterrence implies, it is very unlikely that any was will escalate into a nuclear conflict because the costs and risks of doing so clearly outweigh the geopolitical benefits. Unfortunately, Waltz’s vision of an anarchical world where self-help is the best prescription for state survival has become a major rationale for nuclear

²⁸ Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do State Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security*, vol. 21, no.3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54 – 57, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.21.3.54>.

²⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 9-13, available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078>.

³⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, “War in Neorealist Theory,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 617-619, available at: <http://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/Waltz.pdf>.

proliferation. 31 Waltz also strongly disagreed on the idea of having a world without nuclear weapons. He suggested that abolishing the weapons which are responsible for decades of peace would among other things make the world safe for the fighting of World War III.³²

In regard to the ban treaty, neo-realist theory assumes that countries would not choose to ban nuclear weapons even if their foreign policy is based on humanitarian approach. Main reason for this is the anarchic structure of the international system which ensures that most states at last occasionally will feel threatened by one or more other states. Constantly changing security environment makes the governments to feel very hesitant when it comes to the complete disarmament.³³ Furthermore, states are rational actors that adapt their behavior to the structural constraints of the international system. A system's structure is defined first by the principle by which it is organized, then by the differentiation of its units, and finally by the distribution of capabilities (power) across units (states).³⁴

This model assumes that states which possess nuclear weapons or those which are in alliance with NWSs would never ban them since they are source of relative stability in today's anarchic system. Countries are not willing to take the risk of fully disarming when there is no confirmation that the rest of the nuclear states are doing the same.

Domestic Politics Model

The second model is based on domestic bureaucratic interests and focuses primarily on state-society relations. Domestic conditions can offer several additional layers when examining the cases. In comparison to the security model, domestic perspective takes into account also other key players that are influencing foreign policy. For example, Sagan in his model emphasized the role of nuclear energy establishment and the military. Interdependence which has developed between the government and individuals allow them to exert different pressures on national governments. Besides, two tenets of liberalism are that international organizations and non-

³¹ William T. Tow, "The nuclear Waltz: Rational actors, deterrence and non-proliferation," *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, Issue 3, 2014, pp. 543-544, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2014.937371>.

³² Robert W. Merry, "A TNI Classic: Kenneth Waltz on Nuclear Zero," *The National Interest*, 20 May 2013, available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/tni-classic-kenneth-waltz-nuclear-zero-8488>.

³³ Mark Kramer, "Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, And East-Central European Strategies," *Harvard University*, May 1998, pp. 9-10, available at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/ruseur_wp_005.pdf.

³⁴ Volker Rittberger et al., *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 38-39.

governmental actors are key in shaping state preferences and policy choices and that mutual benefits and international cooperation are necessary for global societal progress.³⁵

With regard to the domestic groups and their role in formulating the national interest, this model is based on two theoretical concepts. The first concept draws from Putnam's perception of international negotiation being a 'two-level game.' Putnam explain his ideas as following: "At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these groups." In accordance to this theory, the national governments are looking for an approach how they can maximize their own ability to "satisfy domestic pressure" while "minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments."³⁶

The second concept which is critical to the domestic analysis is a theory developed by Andrew Moravcsik - liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik explains how exactly domestic pressure results in the formulation of national interest by emphasizing the role of domestic groups. He suggests that these groups compete for political influence through process of domestic political conflict. As a result, new policy alternatives are recognized by governments and adopted as the national interest. Furthermore, there is no particular hierarchy of interests such as high and low politics, but national interests reflect sectorial and issue specific areas of concern to domestic constituents.³⁷ As Moravcsik stresses in his theory, social actors define state behavior by selecting state preferences. State preferences then determine how a state acts - various social groups produce different state preferences that determine how a state ought to act, which are analytically prior to its international environment. In practice that means that domestic elements can shape state behavior by influencing the social purposes.³⁸

Liberal institutionalism focuses could explain why countries do not want to ban nuclear weapons from a different perspective, taking into consideration internal factor. There is no

³⁵ Elizabeth Goldstone, "Analyzing the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Through Realism," *Foreign Affairs Review*, 7 December 2017, available at: <https://jhufar.com/2018/02/28/analyzing-the-un-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons-through-realism/>.

³⁶ Robert D. Putnam, "The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 434, available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785>.

³⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 25-27.

³⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organizations*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 516-519, available at: <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf>.

distinction between high and low politics and the non-state actors who are usually marginalized in other mainstream theories are being considered as central entities.³⁹

Influential societal groups play a great role in the domestic model since the likelihood that governments engage in international cooperation is predominantly driven by the demands of those groups, and by the variations in institutional structures across countries.⁴⁰ This model can provide alternative point of view on why countries do want to ban NWs by looking closer at the domestic politics, civil society and prevailing domestic political attitude to NWs.

Norm Model

The third model is based on the constructivist point of view. Constructivism has challenged rationalism as the dominant ontology in foreign policy analysis by arguing that social action is rooted in intersubjectively shared value-based expectations of appropriate behavior. Constructivists believe that political actors themselves construct international relations out of their own ideas about how these relations should be shaped - the world is primarily seen as socially constructed. Social facts are approached by actors “in terms of the meaning, significance, value and beliefs these actors ascribe to such fact.” This process results in the construction of social practices based on mutually constructed norms, rule and institutions to engage with this social fact.⁴¹

Conventional constructivists are considering state to be a principal unit of analysis for political theory.⁴² The state systems are made of social relationship and international relations are being influenced continuously by developments which are occurring both on the internal and external level. To be more specific, external level refers to an international system as a whole where interactions between states are central. In this perspective, a state’s behavior should be influenced by the way this state perceives other states. Internal level represents state’s norms and values and their subsequent influence on the way a state views the world around it. On this level, identities of the actors are constituted by the institutionalized norm, values and ideas of

³⁹ Rebecca Devitt, “Liberal Institutionalism: An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo?” *e-ir.info*, 1 September 2011, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/>.

⁴⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, “Why the European Union Strengthen the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation,” *Center for European Studies*, Working Paper Series no. 52 presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science, September 1994, pp. 3-5, <http://aei.pitt.edu/9151/1/Moravcsik52.pdf>.

⁴¹ Jo Ansie van Wyk et al., “The International Politics of Nuclear Weapons: A Constructivist Analysis,” *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol. 35, Nr. 1, 2007, pp. 1-3, available at: <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/28/54>.

⁴² Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), pp. 172-173, available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539267>.

the social environment in which they act. As a result, interests of a state are a consequence of identity acquisition.⁴³

One of the principal claims of the structural theory is that “state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.”⁴⁴ The concept of norm is used to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. According to a constructivist Peter Katzenstein, norms can operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such instances norms have "regulative" effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both.⁴⁵ How is this theory projected into practice? States that conform to a certain identity are expected to comply with it. This idea also comes with an expectation that some behavior and actions are more acceptable than others. In the context of non-proliferation regime, there are certain countries which have been traditionally anti-nuclear.⁴⁶ These states have been actively promoting the norms of non-possession and no testing, and those beliefs are also projected into their foreign policies. To this group belong countries such as Kazakhstan, Mexico, New Zealand, Austria and many others.

Another constructivist theory which is central to this model is a role theory. Role theory argues that decision makers' conception of their state's role on the world stage influences that state's foreign policy behavior. Roles are defined as social positions which are constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group. Roles are derived from existing norms in the actor's social environment, conveyed by other actors through role expectations for appropriate behavior. Role conception can provide consistency to foreign policy behavior since they are embedded in social relationships.⁴⁷ This model can therefore

⁴³ Max Eleveld, “Russia, the Bomb, and IR theory. Explaining Russian nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era,” Master Thesis, Leiden University, 2016, pp. 9-11, available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43504079.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994), pp. 385, available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944711>.

⁴⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 4-6, available at: <http://www.fb03.uni-frankfurt.de/45503391/Introduction-from-Katzenstein-1996---The-Culture-of-National-Security.pdf>

⁴⁶ This is a reference to the countries which took a stand against nuclear weapons, not against nuclear energy.

⁴⁷ Niklas Nilsson, “Role conceptions, crises, and Georgia's foreign policy,” *Sage Journals – Cooperation and Conflict*, 3 November 2018, pp. 2-3, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010836718808332>.

explain how the state's decision not to endorse the ban treaty is consistent with its role or whether this role is critical at all.

Research design and methodology

The Dependent Variable: Position on the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Position on the legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons represents how selected countries approached the ban treaty. There are four possible positions: a country voted in favor of the TPNW; a country voted against the TPNW; a country abstained from voting; and a country abstained from the whole process of negotiating the ban treaty.

It is based on the voting outcomes of the TPNW that took place on 7 July 2017 in the UN General Assembly. There were 122 countries which voted in favor, one abstention and one vote against the ban treaty. The rest, 69 countries, did not vote and completely abstained from the negotiations.

Level of Analysis: Security Model, Domestic Model, and Norms Model

There are three levels of analysis included in my research – security model, domestic model and norm model. Goal of the thesis is to evaluate the explanatory power of the above-mentioned models. Based on the case study findings, I should be able to explain why some countries do not support the idea of banning nuclear weapons and what the crucial reasons for that specific state behavior are.

The security model's variable takes into consideration the security environment of a state. It focuses on existing or emerging threats that could potentially endanger its existence. The model then analyzes a role of nuclear weapons in protecting the state. Presumably, prohibiting NWS would weaken the state's military capabilities and defense. The TPNW is therefore unacceptable and from the strategic point of view also dangerous.

The domestic model takes into account a role of domestic politics and public society. It assumes that there was no pressure from political parties, civil-society organizations or NGOs to support the treaty. This model analyzes to what extent these internal factors influenced a state foreign policy on the TPNW, whether it played a significant role or not.

The norm model examines how state role and identity impacted the decision making on the TPNW. This model focuses on prevailing norms and beliefs in the society which eventually form a state identity. It will examine whether a state acted in accordance with its identity and role.

Case Selection

Three criteria were applied during the case selection process. The first criterion was to have a set of cases which eventually did not adopt the TPNW. I have selected only countries which either voted against the ban treaty or completely boycotted the UN negotiations.

The second criteria applied to the case selection was geographical location. I assume that countries from the same region have a very similar geopolitical realities and therefore it would be easier to also compare these cases. I have decided to have countries which are located in the European region since there is a higher probability that they would not radically differentiate in respecting the common democratic values, norms and ideas. In general, this homogeneity enables researcher to compare the cases as the countries are usually influenced by very similar external and internal factors.

Third criterion was to analyze countries which are NATO member states. I assume that countries which are NATO members have similar strategic doctrines which are heavily based on the NATO policies. While applying this criterion, I was looking for a member states with slightly different approaches to the ban treaty to see whether and how NATO influenced their positions. For this purpose, I have selected Norway and the Netherlands which are both NATO founding countries with strong ties to the US. Nonetheless, both Norway and the Netherlands approached the TPNW slightly differently.

Data

In respect of data collecting, research is based on extensive review process of primary sources. In the Norwegian case, the key information can be found in the reports issued by the Norwegian Intelligence Service (*forsvaret.no*) or from official governmental webpage (*regjeringen.no*). Dutch governmental databases also offer reports on the current national security interests (*government.nl*) which explain the Dutch position on the nuclear weapons ban. Other important sources of information are official statements and speeches of the Dutch and Norwegian political representatives, e.g. minister of foreign affairs, delegations etc., which are also available at the above-mentioned webpages.

I have also reviewed reports and documents issued by various NGOs such as ICAN or PAX as one of the main sources for this part of analysis. They are published on their official webpages: *icanw.org* or *paxforpeace.nl*.

Secondary sources were also examined to better understand contextual relations between dependent and independent variables. Since many sources were available only in the Dutch or Norwegian language, additional data were also collected by conducting interviews with the experts from the field.

Methods

I chose congruence method to indicate the degree of consistency between the predicted and the observed values of the dependent variable. It enables a researcher to evaluate the explanatory power of the three models. The essential characteristic of the congruence method is that the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case. As George and Bennett explain, “the analyst first ascertains the value of the independent variable in the case at hand and then asks what prediction or expectation about the outcome of the dependent variable should follow from the theory.”⁴⁸

The congruence method has several advantages and offers considerable flexibility and adaptability. For instance, the method does not require an excessive amount of data about the studied cases as the researcher does not have to trace the casual process that leads from the independent variable to the case outcome. According to George and Bennett, “an important general standard for congruence tests is ‘congruity’ - similarities in the relative strength and duration of hypothesized causes and observed effects“.⁴⁹ The goal is to determine whether I can find congruence between the independent variable in the theory (security model, domestic model, norms model) and outcomes on the dependent variable (position on the TPNW).

Structure of the thesis

Master thesis is structured into the six chapters. The first two chapters, Chapter I and II, introduce the thesis goals, define research objective and strategy. Based on a broad overview, the first chapter is trying to shed a light on the current challenges in nuclear non-proliferation regime. It specifies different positions from both academic and political point of view. Chapter II explains further how the research design; what theories will be applied and what methods suit the best for this purpose. It also briefly introduces three main theories and their core arguments which could help explain the states behavior during the UN negotiations on the TPNW.

⁴⁸ Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004), pp. 181-182.

⁴⁹ Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 183.

Chapter III examines in details the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, its purpose and complexities. The primary objective of this part is to introduce the ban treaty and its provisions. It provides reader with the background of Humanitarian Initiative, a role of civil society and analyzes major areas of disagreements among the negotiators.

Chapters IV-VI introduce three models of analysis (security model, domestic model and norms model) which are applied to two case studies, Norway and the Netherlands. In Chapter IV, the cases are analyzed through the neo-realist theoretical concepts. It examines to what extent these countries are dependent on NWs and whether security can be considered as a cause of voting against the ban treaty. Chapter V examines role of domestic institutions and public society in the states' foreign policies. Chapter VI discusses what role play social norms, state identity and role as an independent variable.

The last chapter entitle Conclusion summarizes the findings and compares the explanatory power of each model.

III. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

On 7 July 2017, the United Nations negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons resulted in the adoption of the TPNW. Treaty was supported by 122 nations, 1 voted against (the Netherlands) and 1 abstained (Singapore). The first legally binding international agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons was initiated by the Humanitarian Initiative which was pursued by both states and civil society groups in order to refocus attention on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ In regard to the negotiations, all of the nuclear weapons states and all NATO members, except the Netherlands, decided not to participate. As the UN ambassadors from the United States, Great Britain and France suggested, “[the humanitarian] initiative clearly disregards the realities of the international security environment,” and as they mentioned in their joint statement, the current conditions do not allow international community to work toward the world without nuclear weapons. Similar argument has been shared by other countries and one can only assume what conditions would represent ideal environment for signing and implementing the TPNW.

Before moving to the case studies, this chapter will briefly analyze the main points and principles of the TPNW, its preamble and articles, how it was initiated and what were the main motivations of initiators. This part will also provide additional details on civil society involvement, and what is the Humanitarian Initiative. Knowing a background of the treaty is substantial in order to understand how it differs from the NPT, CTBT, or other nuclear weapons control agreements. It is worth noting that many of the key prohibitions envisaged for the ban treaty already are captured by the NPT. Nevertheless, a common goal to reduce the numbers and salience of nuclear weapons is being expressed in almost every cornerstone non-proliferation agreement. In spite of a good will, many are calling the treaty controversial or ‘ineffective’ as it “will do nothing to advance real-world efforts to make the world a safer place.”⁵¹ There are voices calling the ban treaty to unrealistic and not thinkable given to the current security environment. This section will explain why there are so many areas of disagreement among the countries and why they all support different approaches to the global nuclear disarmament.

⁵⁰William Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, *Survival*, Vol. 59, No. 4, 16 July 2017, pp. 77, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1349786>.

⁵¹ *Conclusion of UN Negotiations on Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons*, Press Statement, July 2017, U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/272429.htm>.

The Nuclear Disarmament Obligation

The preamble to the TPNW states its primary goals and underlines the importance of “achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world,” which should be supported by every country and government in the world. From the first statements it is clear that humanitarian context is a cornerstone of the TPNW, as it is claiming to be “deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences” and about “the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons.” Furthermore, these “ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament” should create a sense of urgency in the states’ attitudes towards the current stalemate on nuclear disarmament. Initiators express their concerns with regard to “a slow pace of nuclear disarmament” as many countries are still relying on nuclear weapons and their military doctrines are considering them to be a basis of their policies and doctrines. According to the preamble, “any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, [...] and rules of international humanitarian law.”⁵² From the very first page is clear that the treaty is trying to constitute a general norm claiming that nuclear weapons are in their nature illegal and cannot be accepted as potential military tool for a civilized world. Even considering them to be a battlefield weapon is inhuman and intolerable.

The treaty’s preamble also puts emphasis on the “the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects” and this is also another aspect which makes the treaty distinctive from any other disarmament agreements. It is not relying on decision-makers and government strategists to make a change and accelerate the process of disarmament. For the first time, a disarmament treaty encourages civil society to express its concerns and ideas and actively participate in the debate on nuclear weapons.⁵³ Given the fact that the TPNW is a result of cooperative actions of civil society, it should not surprise us. Stressing the role of public conscience is one of the goals of the treaty’s supporters. Whether public could really impact its country’s military strategy – that is highly debatable issue. Nevertheless, the general awareness should not be undermined and people should understand that nuclear weapons are not a virtual military tool, but a real deadly weapon with many unknown consequences.

⁵² *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, United Nations, July 2017, pp. 1-2, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2003-42%20PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf

⁵³ *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 3.

There are fifteen articles on which have countries agreed. *Article 1* specifies what activities are prohibited under the treaty – it prohibits each State Party “to develop, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Furthermore, countries are prohibited from transferring or controlling NWs and nuclear explosive devices both directly and indirectly. And it also contains prohibitions against assistance and encouragement to the prohibited activities.⁵⁴ All the above mentioned requirements should not cause any difficulties for any state that is already a party to the NPT. Article I of the NPT creates exactly the same obligations for each State Party.⁵⁵ What makes the first article of the ban treaty slightly different from the NPT provisions, is additional obligation that does not allow “any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.” As I will explain later, this made many countries, especially NATO Member States, very hesitant and left them with just one option – ignoring the UN negotiations.

Article 2 of the TPNW requires each party to “declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme.” In accordance with this article, State Parties to the treaty are obliged to submit a declaration to the Secretary-General of the UN about all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. Furthermore, they have to declare all NWs in their territories or “in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.” This provision primarily aims at the countries which are under nuclear umbrella and serve as a host countries for stationing foreign nuclear weapons.

Article 3 continues with verification procedures which are carried out by the IAEA in case that the State Party maintains its IAEA safeguards obligation in force “at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.”⁵⁶ It is worth noting that the IAEA Safeguards are embedded in legally binding arrangements and the Agency has to date concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with 174 states. The Agreement provides the IAEA with “the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all nuclear material in the territory, jurisdiction or control of the State for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”⁵⁷ Countries which do not apply IAEA Safeguards, in

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3.

⁵⁵ *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*, Article I, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>.

⁵⁶ *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 4.

⁵⁷ *IAEA Safeguards Agreements*, [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements), available at: <https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements>.

accordance with *Article 3*, should accept them based on the model for non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT.⁵⁸

Article 4 consists of six paragraphs which sets out general procedures for negotiations with an individual nuclear armed state becoming party to the treaty, including time limits and responsibilities. Each State Party that possessed any NWs or explosive devices is required to cooperate with the competent international authority “for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme.” State must also conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to provide credible assurance that it has not diverted nuclear material and has no undeclared nuclear material or activities. Conversion must be reported to each meeting of States Parties and the whole process must be reviewed in details. The State Parties should designate “a competent international authority” which will supervise the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-related facilities.⁵⁹ Given the complexity of the task and the fact that disarmament verification is already controversial subject to the IAEA, it would be probably necessary to go into greater detail on how this would be implemented in practice. *Article 5*, which talks about national implementation, does not provide any additional information.

Article 6 obliges each State Party to provide assistance including medical care and psychological support to those “who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons.” Country should also take “necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation” of areas which were contaminated as a result of testing or use of NWs. Article does not further specify any concrete steps of how this should be implemented. *Article 7* further encourages the states to assist each other and cooperate in order to facilitate the implementation of the treaty.

From *Article 8* to *Article 16*, the treaty provides additional details on meeting of the State Parties, the costs which are shared by the states, and it specifies how amendments to the treaty should be communicated to the Secretary-General. In regard to the process of settlement of disputes, it refers to the procedures which are constituted by Article 33 of the Charter of the UN. *Article 17* states that the treaty is not limited in duration and also reaffirms that each State

⁵⁸ For more details see Laura Rockwood, *Legal Framework for IAEA Safeguards* (Vienna: IAEA, 2013), <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/12/legalframeworkforsafeguards.pdf>; Safeguards are implemented in three States that are not party to the NPT – India, Pakistan and Israel – on the basis of item-specific agreements they have concluded with the IAEA.

⁵⁹ *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 5-6.

Party has “the right to withdraw” in case of “extraordinary events” that jeopardize the “supreme interests of its country.”⁶⁰

The preamble to the TPNW pays tribute to the continued role of the NPT, reaffirming “its vital role [...] in promoting international peace and security,” and recognizes the “vital importance” of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a “core element of the nuclear disarmament.”⁶¹ Yet, some of the provisions of the TPNW are not consistent with NPT, for instance, the distinction between states entitled to possess NWs and non-nuclear weapon states. The ban treaty questions the privileged status granted to the five nuclear armed states and also prohibits states parties from conducting nuclear tests.

The Power of Civil Society

The ambitious plan to prohibit nuclear weapons has been primarily led by the civil society and non-partisan groups such as International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IIPNW) which was founded already in 1980. The group describes itself as a “non-partisan federation of national medical organizations [...], representing tens of thousands of doctors, medical students, other health workers, and concerned citizens,” and altogether with other NGOs were at the forefront of establishing a new global movement that came to be known as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). ICAN currently cooperates with international partners such as Abolition 2000, PAX or Pugwash, and encompasses different civil society organizations (CSOs) in 103 countries.⁶² It can be said that the pressure for banning NWs in the world has been here since the Cold War. But this time, the global civil society has managed to get a treaty. How is this possible?

From 2010, a diverse range of CSOs and other NGOs have been actively and very loudly engaging in a ‘fight’ for a nuclear-weapons-free world. Until that moment, nuclear weapons had been mostly discussed among decision-makers from NWS and strategists in the military field. There was no place for a public involvement or even for a public opinion. The 2010 NPT Review Conference have laid the foundation for what has become a surprisingly successful effort to achieve a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons. It gave an impetus for future actions as it expressed in final document its “deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic

⁶⁰ *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 8-10.

⁶¹ *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 2.

⁶² *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*, [iipnw.org, https://www.iipnw.org/mission.html](https://www.iipnw.org/mission.html).

humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons,” and this was enough for the countries which were frustrated with a disarmament stalemate.⁶³

William Potter in his article entitled “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty” explains how this humanitarian language became a part of the final document and provides some practical clarification. Besides a powerful speech made by the President of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to a diplomatic audience in Geneva, Potter also stresses the fact that the US and other NWS were preoccupied with other issues such as a potential nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Potter points out here a very interesting observation – “[...] few, if any, representatives of the NWS appreciated the novelty of the reference to humanitarian consequences or the potential for that language to serve as a catalyst for a broader movement.”⁶⁴

In November 2011, the international Red Cross and Red Crescent movement adopted a landmark resolution appealing to all states “to ensure that nuclear weapons are never again used, regardless of their views on the legality of such weapons,” and to take a firm stand on this issue in form of a legally binding international agreement. According to the resolution, to utilize the framework of “humanitarian diplomacy,” awareness among the public, scientists, health professionals and decision-makers should be raised. The goal was to get these groups involved because they all are able to influence different sectors which are directly or indirectly connected to the development of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of NWs and the “unspeakable human suffering” has become a central argument to every group advocating the nuclear weapons ban.⁶⁵

In May 2012, first humanitarian statement has been delivered on behalf of 16 nations by Switzerland and later it was supported by 159 nations – four-fifths of all UN members. Afterwards, the three international conferences on the humanitarian consequences were held, and although they varied in their emphasis, each highlighted findings in the global impact of the use of nuclear weapons on climate, health, environment and food security. Starting in Oslo in March 2013, where the first-ever intergovernmental conference on the humanitarian impact of NWs was hosted, and followed by conference in Mexico in 2014, countries called for the

⁶³ 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume I, New York, 2010, pp. 12, available at:

[https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).

⁶⁴ Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, pp. 76-77.

⁶⁵ Council of Delegates 2011: Resolution 1: Working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, 26 November 2011, available at: <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/council-delegates-resolution-1-2011.htm>.

development of new international standards on nuclear weapons, including a legally binding document.⁶⁶ The third conference in Vienna in December 2014 resulted in endorsement of the document issued by Austria, which became known as Austrian Pledge and was later renamed ‘Humanitarian Pledge’.

Humanitarian Pledge is considered by international community that fights for nuclear weapons ban to be an important document that “provides governments with the opportunity to move beyond fact-based discussions on the effects of nuclear weapons to the start of treaty negotiations.”⁶⁷ It again underlines the risk of nuclear weapons use with their unacceptable consequences and it calls “on all state to the NPT to renew their commitment to the urgent and full implementation of existing obligations under Article VI [...]”⁶⁸ The Pledge also urges all nuclear weapons possessor states to take “concrete interim measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon detonations,” and it reaffirms the will to cooperate with SCOs, NGOs and civil society to achieve goals which were set in the statement.⁶⁹

One can argue that this whole development would not be possible without an active involvement of civil society groups and their constant efforts to see a change in the world. However, I argue that unless there would not have been countries which share the same ideas and beliefs as above mentioned SCOs, these initiatives would not have resulted in the TPNW. A group of countries which decided to be very involved in this issue and are funding the humanitarian disarmament-focused initiatives, are the ones who made it happened. Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director of ICAN, explained how they got countries like Canada or Norway to support the initiative. She clarifies that they were trying to build the same kind of relations with governments as in the case of with landmines and cluster munitions.⁷⁰ Other countries which joined the initiative were for example Mexico, Chile, Denmark, South Africa, Switzerland and

⁶⁶ *Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons – Chair’s Summary*, 14 February 2014, available at: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nayarit-2014/chairs-summary.pdf>.

⁶⁷ *Humanitarian Pledge: Stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons*, icanw.org, available at: <http://www.icanw.org/pledge/>.

⁶⁸ *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*, Article VI, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>.

⁶⁹ *Humanitarian Pledge*, bmeia.gv.at, available at:

https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf.

⁷⁰ The Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty are also a humanitarian imperative-driven legal instruments which prohibit both mine arsenal and cluster munition. They were both initiated by human rights activists and civil society groups. Norway organized the independent Oslo process which resulted in issuing the “Oslo Declaration.”

others.⁷¹ Looking at the list of nations, it is clear that those are states which are usually actively support any civil society movements, or have already been involved in some kind of anti-nuclear initiative in the past. For instance, Mexico strongly supported and initiated the *Treaty of Tlatelolco* which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and in the Caribbean. Nevertheless, Fihn also notes that each government “has the opportunity to change,” and she is referring to countries which are hesitant to support the treaty. She adds that it is going to require “some brave politicians to change NATO states.”⁷²

‘Destructive’ and ‘Hasty’ Initiative

Not surprisingly, the Humanitarian Initiative provoked a debate which unfolded how countries perceive NWS and their role in both national and international security. The divergence of P5 perspectives and inability to agree on joint statement showed why nuclear disarmament is not progressing any further. France, the United States and the United Kingdom emphasized the need for a “progressive step-by-step approach” that would not diminish security for all. These P3 countries based their opposition on the belief that the treaty is “incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence” and “clearly disregards the realities of the international security environment.”⁷³ The Russian spokesperson characterized the initiative as ‘destructive’ and ‘hasty’ as it would also undermine the NPT. According to Dr. Potter who observed the negotiations, Russia did not understand the idea of discussing the ban treaty without NWS, and considered such a move to be ‘catastrophic’.⁷⁴

Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister and a very eloquent critic of the TPNW, named number of reasons explaining why the ban treaty has no place in the current international system. Firstly, he was criticizing the form of the treaty that is pushing for unilateral solutions. This approach is not acceptable and according to Lavrov, if one wants to reform something that has been already in place for decades, it should be done very carefully and with understanding of the real-life consequences of such a step. Secondly, he stresses that both official and unofficial NWS agreed on the NPT to be the cornerstone of global security and strategic

⁷¹ For the complete list of supporting countries, please see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom12/statements/2May_IHL.pdf.

⁷² Motoko Mekata, “How Transnational Civil Society Realized the Ban Treaty: An Interview with Beatrice Fihn,” *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 1:1, pp. 85-87, available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1441583?needAccess=true>.

⁷³ *Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons*, usun.state.gov, available at: <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7892>.

⁷⁴ William Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, pp. 93.

stability, and therefore they cannot accept the TPNW which contradicts it in several points.⁷⁵ And lastly, Lavrov explains that Russia completely understands the idea of achieving the world without NWS, however, complete disarmament is possible only when *all* countries will disarm, what is highly improbable. So eventually, the TPNW does not contribute to non-proliferation regime but causes frictions among countries and destabilizes the NPT regime.⁷⁶

The most responsive of the P5 countries was China. Unlike the other NWS, China gave a positive signal when it abstained from a resolution authorizing negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons, instead of voting against it. Furthermore, Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the Chinese goal of a “final comprehensive ban on and total destruction of nuclear weapons” was “fundamentally in line with the purposes of negotiations on the nuclear weapons ban treaty.” In spite of more positive attitude, the ban treaty appears unacceptable to China at this point. First of all, Chinese small nuclear arsenal is part of its nuclear strategy of assured retaliations, which is not compatible with the core principles of the ban treaty. Secondly, the issue which can affect China even if it does not join the TPNW is the issue of transit and stationing. Since China has a growing fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) which are being used to conduct patrols outside China’s territorial waters.⁷⁷

In this regard, the position of NNWS plays a vital role since many of them are either under nuclear umbrella of one of the P5 countries or they constitute a crucial link in transit networks. In prior to the UN negotiations in 2017, Tom Sauer published an article where he assumed that NATO’s non-nuclear members would cast a vote based on domestic public opinion. As voting later showed, this was not utterly correct assumption. Nonetheless, Sauer very precisely described the situation in which all nonnuclear allies found themselves. He wrote that “if they [NATO’s non-nuclear members] support the ban, they also call into question NATO’s nuclear policy, from which some believe that they have greatly benefitted in the past, and if they oppose it, they weaken the pressure on nuclear states to eliminate their doomsday weaponry.”⁷⁸

The Alliance itself published several articles explaining why the treaty is not acceptable tool for nuclear disarmament. Michael Rühle wrote for the NATO Review magazine an article

⁷⁵ “Сергей Лавров объяснил отказ России присоединиться к договору о запрете ядерного оружия,” *Kommersant*, 18 March 2018, available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3577211>.

⁷⁶ “Россия отказалась от договора по запрету ядерного оружия,” *Pravda*, 19 January 2018, available at: <https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/19-01-2018/1366561-russia-0/>.

⁷⁷ Tong Zhao, Raymond Wang, “China and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty,” *Carnegie-Tsinghua*, 21 September 2017, available at: <https://carnegietsinghua.org/2017/09/21/china-and-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty-pub-73488>.

⁷⁸ Tom Sauer, “How will NATO’s non-nuclear members handle the UN’s ban on nuclear weapons?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 177, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1315039>.

naming few “reasons for skepticism” in regard to the TPNW. Article points out that the treaty has nothing to do with President’s Obama ‘Prague Agenda’ from April 2009 because a ban that seeks to stigmatize NWs immediately is fundamentally incompatible with Obama’s measured approach. Rühle also criticizes the ambiguity of the TPNW stating that although it aims to delegitimize nuclear weapons, the treaty says nothing about how to abolish them. It cannot be ignored that NWs still do have a security value because they prevent war by inducing political restraint. In addition, author claims that there is a high possibility of nuclear abolition making “major war and [...] mass casualties more likely,” and therefore it could be considered immoral. Besides, the article heavily criticizes the treaty for being too radical and “pulling the rug from under the NPT” as it pushes for outlawing NWs instead of their regulation.⁷⁹ The last point which author makes is an asymmetrical outcome caused by the fact that the ban would only affect Western democracies. The tightly controlled ones like Russia, North Korea or China would in the end only militarily benefit from it since civil society movements in those countries will not be pressuring their governments to make reductions or to halt existing modernization programs.⁸⁰

Many scholars and theorists, who were watching the negotiations closely, had to also admit that the ban treaty has many weaknesses. For instance, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova wrote for Arms Control Association that the practical implications of the treaty “in the near term remain uncertain,” and no one can expect that it will change the politics of nuclear-armed state overnight, or even make them disarm in the near future. It has been also heavily criticized for its “insufficiently robust safeguards provisions.” She again stresses that the key idea underlying the calls for negotiations was that it would establish “a strong normative prohibition against possession and use” of nuclear weapons, and there is still a long way to go for the treaty.⁸¹

The above mentioned explanations of opponents must be kept in mind when looking into specific cases. A global nuclear restraint regime is badly needed but it must be negotiated with the active participation of at least several of the nuclear-armed states. Argumentation of P5 countries and other treaty opponents are to the great extent reasonable. Nonetheless, particularly

⁷⁹ Michael Rühle, “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: reasons for skepticism,” *NATO Review magazine*, 19 May 2017, available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-scepticism-abolition/en/index.htm>.

⁸⁰ Matthew Harries, “The Real Problem With a Nuclear Ban Treaty,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 15 March 2017, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/15/real-problem-with-nuclear-ban-treaty-pub-68286>.

⁸¹ Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond,” *Arms Control Association*, armscontrol.org, September 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/features/nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty-negotiations-beyond>.

these countries are responsible for disarmament stalemate and growing frustration among other states. They can keep criticizing the Humanitarian Initiative and its outcomes, but they are neither able nor willing to come up with any solution in this regard.

Michael E. O’Hanlon, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy, on the other hand argues that “a nuclear-abolition treaty could constructively contribute to global stability if done right, but it could be hazardous if done wrong.”⁸² Taking into consideration O’Hanlon’s point, is it better to have no treaty banning nuclear weapons than having a bad treaty? For the states which called for “progressive” approach the answer is clear. So called “progressive approach group” consisted of nuclear-reliant states who rejected the idea of having other nuclear non-proliferation framework than the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to this group, disarmament should be achieved only under the NPT regime through the process of “building blocks” that would consist of parallel and simultaneous effective measures. The group issued a document which introduces these effective practical measures.⁸³ Nevertheless, most of their proposals have already been implemented by the countries which are the parties to the NPT. It is understandable that the international community has no interest in creating any parallel non-proliferation regime to the already existing one. Many countries during the negotiations expressed their fear about ban treaty undermining the whole NPT regime that has been building for decades. But this is somehow a very flawed perception. Jakob Kellenberger, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, underlined in his statement that “the currency of this debate [on nuclear weapons] must ultimately be about human beings,” and this was the primary goal of the ban treaty – to open a discussion on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons which was never a part of the NPT.⁸⁴

Areas of disagreement

Not only nuclear-weapon states, but also other countries which were actively participating in the negotiations had some serious disagreements on how the treaty should look like. In June 2017, the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* published a very interesting comparative analysis of statements that indicates specific areas which were more controversial or difficult to compromise on. It focuses on four highly debatable issues: (1) core prohibitions, (2) assistance,

⁸² Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Possible?” *brookings.edu*, 4 May 2010, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-really-possible/>.

⁸³ *A progressive approach to a world free of nuclear weapons: revisiting the building blocks paradigm*, Disarmament Commission, 30 March 2016, available at: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/documents/library/A%20CN.10%202016%20WG.I%20WP.3.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Jakob Kellenberger, “Statement: Bringing the era of nuclear weapons to an end,” 20 April 2010, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons-statement-200410.htm>.

nuclear weapons use, sharing, (3) verification, and (4) relationship with other international instruments. Authors of the analysis stress a fact that in spite of remarkable participation of more than 115 states, only some of those countries contributed to the debate in March. Not all delegations have invested the “same amount of energy” in a ban treaty and the various levels of engagements were notable.⁸⁵

Core prohibitions of the ban treaty were endorsed without any particular disputes. More problematic aspect is the part which bans transfer and stockpiling of NWs. Weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purpose could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. The ban treaty is trying to mitigate this risk by prohibiting states from permitting the transit of NWs through territorial waters or airspace. As Alyn Ware, a co-founder of Unfold Zero, suggests “states opposing a ban on transit argue that it would be impossible to implement, verify or enforce such a prohibition.” Countries argue that the nuclear armed States are not transparent about which vessels (ships, submarines, and airplanes) are carrying nuclear weapons, and whether vessels carrying nuclear weapons are transiting the waters and airspace of other countries.⁸⁶

The second area is assistance, nuclear weapons use and sharing. Of all the major issues raised during the debate on the scope of a ban treaty, nuclear sharing and nuclear modernization are among those that received the least support. This provision was problematic for few reasons. Firstly, countries were not sure about how to define the term “assistance,” and what activities it includes. Tricky definitional issues could make it very difficult for the countries to monitor such activities. Secondly, the treaty prohibits the threat of use of NWs “under any circumstances,” what eventually could “undermine and delegitimize” policies of nuclear deterrence. For countries such as the Netherlands, this provision is fundamentally incompatible with NATO’s nuclear posture and therefore cannot be accepted.⁸⁷ It is noteworthy to say that this provision includes also a prohibition on financing of nuclear weapons production as it is

⁸⁵ Oliver Meier, Sira Cordes, Elisabeth Suh, “What participants in a nuclear weapons ban treaty (do not) want,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 9 June 2017, available at: <https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/what-participants-in-a-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-do-not-want/>.

⁸⁶ Alyn Ware, “UN nuclear ban treaty negotiations: transit, threat and nuclear weapons financing,” *Unfold Zero*, 25 June 2017, available at: <http://www.unfoldzero.org/un-nuclear-ban-treaty-negotiations-transit-threat-and-nuclear-weapons-financing/>.

⁸⁷ Heather Williams, “A nuclear babel: narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” *Nonproliferation Review* 2018, Vol. 25, No. 1-2, pp. 58-59, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1477453>.

“one of the most significant drivers of the nuclear arms race,” according to a working paper submitted during the negotiations.⁸⁸

The third area of disagreement is verification and control mechanisms that would ensure complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament. There was a serious and long debate on how a ban treaty should be linked to verifiable nuclear weapons reductions and whether the treaty should contain a “stand-alone verification instrument” or should it be purely based on the IAEA verification system. Countries such as Ireland, the Philippines and Sweden were in favor of specifying the disarmament obligations of nuclear weapon possessors. On the other hand, as Heather Williams explains in the article, verification was left out not because of lack of technical understanding or lack of seriousness, but because “negotiations on verification would have significantly slowed momentum for the treaty.”⁸⁹

Last issue that authors underlined in the article are relationships with other international instruments. General confusion caused by the ambiguities of how the treaty is related to the NPT was another highly debatable issue. Both proponents and opponents of the treaty claimed that the TPNW should complement and support the existing non-proliferation regimes such as NPT, CTBTO, UN Charter and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. According to ban opponents, establishing a new competing norm that would just create “an alternative forum” and undercut states’ verification commitments, what is not acceptable.⁹⁰

Critique also aimed at a very short negotiation timeframe – a bare four weeks for actual negotiations. Author of the article reminds that continuing talks beyond July would carry the risk of losing the drive behind the treaty. Especially when the NWS had been putting “immense pressure” on NNWS not to support the treaty. Fear of losing an opportunity for successful outcome forced participating countries to conclude the talks in a very short time period.⁹¹

⁸⁸ *United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination*, 17 March 2017, New York, pp. 2, available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/tpnw/pdf/A%20CONF.229%202017%20NGO%20WP.6%20Working%20paper%20on%20prohibiting%20the%20financing%20of%20nuclear%20weapons%20production.pdf>.

⁸⁹ Heather Williams, “A nuclear babel: narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 55.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 58.

⁹¹ Oliver Meier, Sira Cordes, Elisabeth Suh, “What participants in a nuclear weapons ban treaty (do not) want,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 9 June 2017, <https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/what-participants-in-a-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-do-not-want/>.

Case Studies

IV. Security Model

Scott Sagan's security model is based on a premise that states exist in an anarchical international system where their only goal is to survive. In order to secure the survival, countries have to rely on self-help which enables them to protect their sovereignty and national security. He recognized two kind of states: strong and weak. While strong states pursue a form of international balancing by adopting a policy of developing their own nuclear weapons, weak states can join a balancing alliance with nuclear power.⁹² Being a part of nuclear umbrella and relying on nuclear deterrence is for the weak state the only way how they can effectively secure their own national survival. It could be especially problematic for countries with weak conventional forces since the probability of conventional war could increase and there would be no guarantee that one day the government would lose control over its own people and territory. This horrible scenario can be avoided since nuclear weapons exist and they are keeping a balance of military capabilities of countries.

So why would 122 states be in favor of the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons when it can be considered as dangerous in the context of both national and international security? Answer to this is that the security argument can be flipped around very easily. The reevaluation of security threats may reverse nuclear weapons programmes, and countries such as Argentina, South Africa or Sweden serve as a nice example. Sagan also asks the same question, and hence "why would any state give up such powerful sources of security?"⁹³ Central argument of the security model is based on a premise that states decide to reverse their nuclear weapon programmes once the external security threats are reduced.

How this model can be applied to the TPNW? Ban treaty promotes an idea that only a world without nuclear weapons can be safe. Once this kind of weapons of mass destruction is banned, a process of active disarmament and dismantlement can be carried out. No nuclear weapons would mean not only absence of a direct existential threat to all countries, but also to human beings and environmental systems. Nevertheless, this is not what realists and neo-realists

⁹² Sagan, "Why Do State Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," pp. 57.

⁹³ Ibid., 60.

advocate when they discuss NWs and security. For them, nuclear weapons are very valuable to states as they are perceived to be the strongest and the most reliable tool how to achieve stable secured environment. With regards to the NNWSs, national security can be ensured by the existence of extended nuclear deterrence. Once nuclear weapons are banned, there is no possibility for the countries to rely on nuclear deterrence, and that makes them vulnerable to conventional attacks and conflicts.⁹⁴

This model will examine whether the position of these countries towards the TPNW corresponds to the logic of the security model. How are nuclear weapons linked to the national security of these countries? The security model assumes that banning NWs would radically weaken the countries' defense capabilities and therefore the ban is not desirable. Military and strategic utility of NWs is critical to these nations because they are facing such security threats which cannot be deterred with conventional forces. Adopting the TPNW would not be beneficial for state security and it could even hamper state's existing military capabilities. All these assumptions are highlighting the main idea of the security model which argues that the foreign policy is primarily influenced by external factors.

Norway

Before evaluating Norway's case through the application of security model, it is important to briefly introduce its security situation and most current security challenges to which Norway faces. Given to its role in NATO, in case of a direct existential security threat, Norway can rely both on its own conventional military capabilities and on the help of allied forces. What role play nuclear weapons in Norwegian military strategy? How would the TPNW influence it?

In this case, it is necessary to remind that Norway is one of the founding members of NATO and also stands out as one of its most reliable allies. It contributes to both regional and global stability through actively supporting NATO's missions and conducting military exercise drills on its soil. At the same time, Norway shares a 1967 kilometer land border and a 23 kilometer marine border with Russia, which is also the NATO's northernmost border. Norway's strategic importance is demonstrated by its plans to upgrade both armed forces and also entire submarine fleet. As *Foreign Affairs* magazine suggests, "Norway's upgraded naval capabilities clearly enhance its relevance for Washington, as Oslo is uniquely positioned to provide cutting-edge

⁹⁴ Bruce Martin Russett, "Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?" *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1988), pp. 282-283, available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1407651>.

intelligence and enhanced situational awareness of Russia's large Northern Fleet." Norwegian intelligence capabilities to better track Russian submarines are crucial since Russia has upgraded class of nuclear-powered submarines that are "highly sophisticated and increasingly difficult to detect."⁹⁵

Nonetheless, according to Prime Minister Erna Solberg, Russia is not considered to be a direct threat to Norway. In her speech in May 2018, she stressed that Russia has "significantly modernized its military capabilities," in both nuclear and conventional forces. It is capable of "threatening Europe without entering European territory," since Moscow has increased its military power which is manifested through "greater mobility, more flexibility, longer range, stronger firepower and higher precision." As she added afterwards, all these facts are not worrying for Norway for two reasons: firstly, there is no military activity in immediate proximity to Norwegian borders. So it is more a matter of a Russian force projection. Secondly, Solberg expressed a complete trust in NATO and states that its membership is "essential when it comes to our relations with Russia."⁹⁶

To other security challenges mentioned in the speech by Prime Minister belongs the current situation in the neighborhood southern from Europe and instability that "stretches from Sahel to Afghanistan," cybersecurity, and threat of nuclear proliferation in the context of unfolding events in North Korea, Middle East and Iran on which international community is not able to react effectively.⁹⁷ Solberg's statement was in line with the outcomes represented in *Focus 2018 - The Norwegian Intelligence Service's assessment of current security challenges*, which analyzed six main areas that influence Norway's national security both directly and indirectly. It is noteworthy to say that Norwegian Intelligence Services closely analyzed Russia in terms of domestic and foreign activities, cyber security and weapons of mass destruction. This obvious preoccupation with Russian activities implies that Norway is very careful when it comes to Moscow and its intentions.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Sigurd Neubauer, "Norway, an Exemplar of NATO Burden-Sharing," *Foreign Affairs*, 2 January, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/norway/2017-01-02/norway-exemplar-nato-burden-sharing>.

⁹⁶ *Security policy challenges facing Norway and Europe today*, Speech by Prime Minister Erna Solberg to The Royal United Services Institute in London, 6 May 2018, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/security-policy-challenges-facing-norway-and-europe-today/id2603739/>.

⁹⁷ *Security policy challenges facing Norway and Europe today*, Speech by Prime Minister Erna Solberg to The Royal United Services Institute in London, 6 May 2018, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/security-policy-challenges-facing-norway-and-europe-today/id2603739/>.

⁹⁸ *Focus 2018 - The Norwegian Intelligence Service's assessment of current security challenges*, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1 February 2018, available at: https://forsvaret.no/fakta/_ForsvaretDocuments/Fokus2018_engelsk_Enkelt sider_Godkjent_med.pdf.

What is the role of nuclear weapons in Norwegian security policy? The *Norwegian Academy for International Law* published in September 2018 a paper where it examines implications of the ban treaty for Norway. Authors analyzed five command papers on foreign policy since 2008 – two white papers on foreign affairs and security, prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and three long-term plans for the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF), prepared by the Ministry of Defense – to see what they say about nuclear weapons policy and nuclear deterrence as such. A long-term plan for the NAF from 2008 does not mention any role for NWs, furthermore, MWDs are identified here as a source of insecurity. The 2009 white paper on Norwegian foreign policy does not explicitly identify any role for NWs in Norwegian security policy, but again emphasizes the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation. The next long-term plan for NAF from 2012 continues in the same fashion when it makes several references to the risks posed by NWs and urges the nuclear-weapon states to take “greater responsibility for disarmament.”⁹⁹

In 2016, the long-term plan for the NAF slightly changed its tone from the previous command papers when it put less emphasis on disarmament and highlighted the importance of NATO’s deterrence strategy. Document stressed the critical importance of NWs stating that “the most important function of nuclear weapons is to avert threats or use of nuclear weapons against NATO’s member states.” Following white paper on defense and foreign policy from 2017 reaffirms that Norway is part of the Alliance’s nuclear weapons policy while it reiterates its longstanding policy against hosting nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory. It is noteworthy that authors are criticizing several terms that has been used in these documents, such as ‘NATO’s nuclear policy’ since NATO membership does not necessitate support for NWs, it is clear that changing global security environment forced Norway to convey the message of loyalty to NATO’s strategies.¹⁰⁰

Defining the relations between Norway and NATO is in this context very important. The Alliance is seen as a cornerstone of Norway’s security and defense, and the government is committed to helping ensure NATO is capable of facing current and future security challenges. In comparison to the Netherlands, Norwegian government decided in the past that it won’t host any NWs on its soil in peacetime.¹⁰¹ Additionally, Norway also rejected to host any foreign

⁹⁹ Gro Nystuen, Kjolv Egeland, Torbjem Graff Hugo, *The TPNW and its implications for Norway*, Norwegian Academy of International Law, September 2018, pp. 20-21, available at: <https://legermotatomvapen.no/filer/tpnw-implications-for-norway-25-sept-2018.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ Gro Nystuen, Kjolv Egeland, Torbjem Graff Hugo, *The TPNW and its implications for Norway*, pp. 22.

¹⁰¹ Fredrik Lie, “Saying no to nukes,” *ILPI Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Background Paper No 10/2014, 4 September 2014, <http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=2665>.

bases unless Norway is under attack or under the threat of being so. It has slightly shifted from this policy in 2016 when Norway decided to accommodate 330 U.S. Marines in Værnes as a part of “rotation-based training.” The Norwegian government expressed its willingness to expand collaboration with the U.S. and NATO in order to strengthen Norway’s borders and to support Army units in the High North which are experiencing personnel shortages in specialized skills areas.¹⁰² The arrangement will continue beyond 2018 with aim to improve communications and interactions between the Norwegian military and Norway’s military allies.¹⁰³

This gradual shift from being a neutral member of the Alliance to more ‘assertive’ one has been noticed by other Norwegian politicians that do not really agree with current development. How this goes hand in hand with Norway’s humanitarian approach to disarmament is not clear at this point.

With regard to the Norway-NATO relations, Minister of Foreign Affairs Borge Brende explained the rejection of the ban treaty as following: “[...], it is essential for Norway to choose an approach that is in line with our obligations as a NATO member. A fundamental premise of NATO’s deterrence policy is that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance. It is not appropriate for NATO countries to embark on a process of unilateral disarmament on the basis of a ban, as long as nuclear powers such as Russia, Pakistan and North Korea keep their weapons.”¹⁰⁴ Norway’s commitment to be part of the nuclear umbrella is probably even stronger than it was few years ago. But using term ‘nuclear alliance’ is in this case very inaccurate. It must be remembered that NATO on its own does not possess any NWs – the UK, US and France do. It is important to distinguish since this narrative can be used against the TPNW claiming that the ban treaty is undermining NATO, what is in fact not true.

How signing the ban treaty would change the Norway’s position in NATO? Accession to the TPNW would not legally rule out continued NATO membership. In case of a direct existential threat, Norway could ask for a conventional military support and assistance. The ban treaty does not require states to abandon existing security alliances with nuclear-armed states, neither

¹⁰² Gerard O’Dwyer, “Norwegian leaders want to know why US Marines are stationed in the country,” *Defense News*, 27 October 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/10/27/norwegian-leaders-want-to-know-why-us-marines-are-stationed-in-the-country/>.

¹⁰³ Bill W. Williams, “Norway to Host 700 American Soldiers,” *Norway Today*, 16 August 2018, <http://norwaytoday.info/news/norway-host-700-american-soldiers/>.

¹⁰⁴ *Norway votes against nuclear disarmament resolution in the UN*, Press release, 28 October 2016, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-votes-against-nuclear-disarmament-resolution-in-the-un/id2518168/>.

would it interfere with joint military operations with nuclear-armed states.¹⁰⁵ A more difficult case relates to the sharing of data and intelligence. If Norwegian intelligence services would decide to share satellite data with US nuclear submarines, this could be potentially considered as an “assistance” to the United States in carrying out acts prohibited under the TPNW.

In addition, NATO member states bear no legal obligation to support extended nuclear deterrence. Authors of a report entitled *The TPNW and its implications for Norway* remind that there two types of “alliance commitments” – legal and political commitments. Legal obligations are described for instance in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. On the other hand political commitments are “shared understandings designed to guide policy,” and violation of political commitments incurs no legal consequences. And lastly, NATO member states bear no legal obligation to support extended nuclear deterrence or the retention of nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁶

Taking into consideration above mentioned facts, how can security model explain the Norway’s approach to the ban treaty? First of all, a general assumption of this model is that the TPNW is weakening country’s security because it prohibits military tools which are responsible for a stable security environment. Although Norway does not possess any nuclear weapons, it is a strategic partner to those who do possess them. The current security environment, which is being described by many Norwegian decision-makers and politicians as rather challenging, requires every country to be cooperative as much as possible. Given to Norway’s strategic position, it is important to have all military strategies available to protect it in case of extreme circumstances.

Secondly, although Norway does not accept nuclear sharing and hosting NWs on its territory, it does not mean that this policy cannot be changed in the future. Currently, Norway is fully embracing the possibility of being part of the US nuclear umbrella, and this fact has been stressed by Norwegian strategists and politicians many times.¹⁰⁷ In case of signing the TPNW, state is required to step out from under the nuclear umbrella, and that would mean losing one of the security assurances provided by NATO.

Next factor that could help explain Norway’s disapproval of the treaty are more assertive Moscow political actions. Looking at the Russian posture in the High North, it is understandable

¹⁰⁵ *Harvard Law Review: joining Nuclear Ban Treaty will not violate existing security agreements*, ICAN, 19 June 2018, <http://www.icanw.org/action/harvard-law-review-nuclear-ban-treaty-compatible-existing-security-agreements-nato-eu-umbrella/>.

¹⁰⁶ Gro Nystuen, Kjolv Egeland, Torbjem Graff Hugo, *The TPNW and its implications for Norway*, pp. 16-18.

¹⁰⁷ Orde Kittrie, “What’s the Matter With Norway?” *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 January 2018, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/01/16/whats-the-matter-with-norway/>.

why Norway wants to have close relations with the Alliance. Moscow has developed a fleet of sophisticated submarines and aircraft, which are being tested in the North Atlantic alongside new high-precision long-range missiles. In spite of not being in conflict with Russia, Oslo changed its political posture after the events in Ukraine.¹⁰⁸ In this regards, the TPNW could tie Norway's "hands" when providing intelligence and strategically important information to the countries which possess nuclear weapons.

Another aspect that should be taken into consideration are relations between Norway and the three nuclear weapons states – the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Understandably, these countries did not accept the ban treaty since it would leave them without their most strategically important military tools. By embracing the TPNW, Norway would send a signal of disapproval to its close allies. This would be problematic especially in the US case since Norway has decided to expand military collaboration and welcomed an extended deployment of US Marines. First time from the World War II, it is clear that Norway is gradually shifting from its military neutrality to more assertive strategies.

Lastly, supporting the treaty would not change anything because countries which actually possess nuclear weapons did not participate. This would make Norway almost defenseless in case that Russia, its imminent neighbor, would decide to use tactical NWs to threaten Norway. As Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in this regards, "Norway will not support proposals that would weaken NATO's role as a defense alliance. A process to achieve a ban on nuclear weapons that is not supported by any of the countries that actually have weapons of this kind will not, unfortunately, advance the disarmament agenda."¹⁰⁹ According to Norway's statement in October 2017, Oslo calls for persistence, realism and patience in achieving the total elimination of NWs.¹¹⁰ It is very likely that Norway and other NATO member states would react more positively to the TPNW if the timing was different. Threats that emerged between 2010 and 2017 altogether with general unpredictability of international environment caused fear and insecurity among states. Even countries like Norway, which do have reliable

¹⁰⁸ Patrick Wintour, "Troubled waters: Norway keeps watch on Russia's Arctic maneuvers," *The Guardian*, 13 March 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/13/troubled-waters-norway-keeps-watch-on-russias-arctic-manoeuvres>.

¹⁰⁹ *Norway votes against nuclear disarmament resolution in the UN*, Press release, 28 October 2016, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-votes-against-nuclear-disarmament-resolution-in-the-un/id2518168/>

¹¹⁰ *Statement by Mr. Atle Midttun, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway*, UN General Assembly, 3 October 2017, pp. 1-2, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/statement-by-norway.pdf>.

conventional forces and are investing to defense sector, started to wonder whether it is enough to be able to defend their territories.

Nonetheless, there are few aspects which cannot be fully explained by security model. It is noteworthy to say that Norway organized the international Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in 2013 and also has been actively advocating total elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore many would expect Norway to fully endorse the ban treaty. This attitude change cannot be sufficiently explained from the security point of view. Despite of emergence of new security challenges, Norway is not directly threatened by any country or regional conflicts. It maintains good relations with both neighbors and NWS, and there has been no imminent danger posed by any state actor so far. Looking at the *Annual Threat Assessment 2018*, Norwegian security forces are more concerned with extreme Islamism, right-wing and left-wing extremism that is posing a direct threat to its citizens.¹¹¹

To better understand Norway's case, I will apply domestic model to provide alternative explanations and to understand why Norway voted against the proposal, and withdrew from the negotiations.

The Netherlands

The second case study differs fundamentally from the Norway's analysis in two aspects – firstly, the Netherlands is the EU member state, and secondly, it has agreed on hosting the US tactical nuclear weapons on its soil. It must be noted that being a part of the EU did not have any impact on how countries voted. Although European Parliament adopted a resolution welcoming the idea of negotiating a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, since its adoption on 7 July 2017, Parliament has not taken a position on it.¹¹² During the negotiations it became clear that the EU member states' views on the TPNW are divergent and there is no possibility to agree on a common position. In spite of expressing “deep concern about the deterioration of the security environment around the European Union and beyond its neighborhood” that could lead to “the re-emergence of nuclear weapons as an active deterrent

¹¹¹ *Annual Threat Assessment 2018*, Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, pp. 16-20, available at: <https://www.pst.no/globalassets/artikler/trusselvurderinger/annual-threat-assessment-2018.pdf>.

¹¹² *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – the ‘Ban Treaty,’* Briefing – January 2018, pp. 4, available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614664/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)614664_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614664/EPRS_BRI(2018)614664_EN.pdf).

and possible proliferation among state and non-state actors,” the EU did not impose any pressure on its members to vote for or against the ban treaty.¹¹³

The second aspect, hosting nuclear weapons on Dutch soil, is a part of broader context. In 1959, the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the United States of America signed agreement that established a framework for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. The 1959 Agreement was concluded for the purpose of “exchanging information [...], and the transfer of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving restricted data,” and in practice this was part of strategic communication that was necessary for the development of defense plans and for the training of personnel. As authors of the Clingendael Policy Brief stress, the exact scope of the agreement is ambivalent as it “facilitates the transfer of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems but leaves the question open as to what is agreed, if at all, on the nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems”.¹¹⁴

Although the existence of NWs in the country has never been officially acknowledged, in 2013, former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers confirmed that some 22 US nuclear weapons are stored on Dutch territory and called them “an absolutely pointless part of a tradition in military thinking.” BBC diplomatic correspondent also noted that the location of the remaining US tactical nuclear bombs in Europe is “one of the worst kept secrets in NATO,” and it is not entirely clear what military role these weapons now perform. As he added, there has been little recent effort to negotiate further reductions.¹¹⁵

Is there any chance that the United States would decide to withdraw its TNWs from the Netherlands? Not really. Instead of reductions, it is very probable that the US would like to rather enhance its nuclear capabilities in Europe. In 2013, the US administration initiated a Life Extension Programme for the current B61 models deployed in Europe which should extend their life by up to 30 years. The B61 nuclear gravity bomb is one of the oldest and most versatile weapons in the US stockpile and the Programme aims to improve the effectiveness of the US

¹¹³ *European Parliament resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation*, 27 October 2016, Strasbourg, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2016-0424>.

¹¹⁴ Onur Güven, Sico van der Meer, “A treaty banning nuclear weapons and its implication for the Netherlands,” *Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, May 2015, pp. 7-8, <http://www.asser.nl/media/2582/a-treaty-banning-nuclear-weapons-2015.pdf>.

¹¹⁵ Jonathan Marcus, “US nuclear bombs ‘based in Netherlands’ – ex-Dutch PM Lubbers,” *bbc.com*, 10 June 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22840880>.

nuclear deterrent.¹¹⁶ So can the Dutch government decide whether the US bombs will continue to be stored on its soil? Answer is again negative. The Netherlands is bound to respect and fulfil the 1959 Agreement since it can expire only when both parties agree to terminate its agreement. This means that the Netherlands is unable to terminate the 1959 Agreement unless US agrees to it.¹¹⁷

What direct security implications would signing the ban treaty have on the Netherlands? Would it create a direct security threat for the country? It is both yes and no. The ban treaty would cause troubles for both the Netherlands and NATO. Undoubtedly, the 1959 Agreement is in direct conflict with the TPNW since exchange of information and the transfer of non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems have obligatory nature in this instance. On the other hand, the TPNW prohibits both stationing and installation of NWs on a territory of a state party. In addition, it prohibits the state party from assistance and encouragement to prohibited activities. For the Dutch government that would mean negotiating the withdrawal with the US Administration and asking for assistance to remove the TNWs from its soil. This step could possibly increase the national security of the Netherlands because there would be no threat of nuclear accident caused by these gravity bombs.

The question is why the Netherlands decided to vote against the TPNW and did not push for the TNWs withdrawal when it in fact creates dangerous security environment for the country. In this case, it is important to look how the country perceives its role in the international community and what are the real threats that could be more difficult to target as a signatory party to the TPNW. I will assess three areas which would be impacted by the ban treaty: NATO membership, tactical nuclear weapons and current security threats.

In the official statement of the Netherlands, country explains its vote stating that it is “unable to sign up to any instrument that is incompatible with [its] NATO obligations,” highlighting the Article 1, which according to the Dutch government, is incompatible with its commitments as a NATO state.¹¹⁸ In the Norway’s case, I have already explained the difference between legal and political obligations as a NATO country. This is also applicable to the Netherlands as well – the country is not legally obliged to support NATO’s nuclear strategy. However, since it hosts

¹¹⁶ *B61-12 Life Extension Program*, National Nuclear Security Administration, [nnsa.energy.gov](https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/04/f50/B61-12%20LEP%20factsheet.pdf), pp. 1, <https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/04/f50/B61-12%20LEP%20factsheet.pdf>.

¹¹⁷ Onur Güven, Sico van der Meer, “A treaty banning nuclear weapons and its implication for the Netherlands,” pp. 10.

¹¹⁸ *Explanation of vote of the Netherlands on text of Nuclear Ban Treaty*, 7 July 2017, <https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/latest/news/2017/07/07/explanation-of-vote-of-ambassador-lise-gregoire-on-the-draft-text-of-the-nuclear-ban-treaty>.

TNWs on its soil, the implications would be more complex, and I will explain later why. Focusing again on its NATO membership, the Netherlands has traditionally been a close ally to the US and the UK. Signing the ban treaty could to a certain degree damage these ties. Allies, and especially the two above mentioned countries, may consider the Netherlands to be unreliable and not more 'neutral' ally. To some extent it would also mean a loss of influence in the Alliance. Taking such an explicit anti-nuclear stance as the only country among all NATO members would send a clear signal to the US that the Dutch government is no longer fully supporting the NATO's policy.

Weakening position in the Alliance is not acceptable since NATO is the cornerstone of Dutch external security policy, and is also a priority for the armed forces in terms of activities, procedures and doctrine. In the document issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NATO is described as of "fundamental importance" for the Netherlands' security, and the "key to the government's fulfillment of its constitutional duty" to guarantee Dutch security. Furthermore, the document also reaffirms that the Netherlands supports a NATO nuclear policy that "combines nuclear deterrence with arms control measures, in a way that provides the best possible guarantee for Dutch security." Meeting its commitments in regard to the NATO's nuclear tasks is one of the top priorities for the country.¹¹⁹ In case of signing the TPNW, the Dutch defense policy would need to be reformulated and explained to the both allies and the US which counts on its cooperation. For the Netherlands that would mean being prepared for ending up in symbolic isolation in the context of NATO.

The second area which would be directly impacted are tactical nuclear weapons stored in the Netherlands. Given to the fact that the TPNW directly prohibits any state party from stationing and installing NWs on its territory, this would be very problematic aspect. Before signing the ban treaty, it is necessary to have a plan on how the weapons would be removed from the Dutch territory. This would require both consent and active assistance of the US and NATO. Helping to station these weapons somewhere else would be again considered as a violation of the TPNW. Moreover, dismantlement or deactivation of the bombs is not possible since the Netherlands is not possessor and is not allowed to manipulate with them. If the Netherlands decided to take no action, it would paradoxically undermined both NATO and the TPNW. Furthermore, the US would have probably difficulties to find another country that would accept

¹¹⁹ *Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands: An Integrated International Security Strategy 2018-2022*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. 31.

https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/reports/2018/05/14/integrated-international-security-strategy-2018-2022/NL_International_Integrated_Security_Strategy_2018_2022.pdf.

the nuclear bombs. It must be also remember that moving the TNWs anywhere closer to Russian borders could be evaluated as a military move towards Moscow.

Nonetheless, this hypothetical scenario still does not explain voting of the Dutch delegation. It is very improbable that the withdrawal of old-fashioned gravity bombs would seriously damage the Dutch alliance with the US in longer term. The country is not under any direct external security threat and it relies mostly on its own conventional forces since it does not directly possess the weapons. State survival is not secured by the existence of the TNWs on its soil, neither is the NATO's security and existence.

The third area is focused on the current security environment. Dutch assessment of the possible security threats is very similar to the Norwegian perceptions. The country is not threatened by any regional conflicts, it has no territorial disputes and is located in a very stable region. Again, Dutch government is concerned by tensions and conflicts in the Middle East and Africa which have far-reaching implications for European security. Similarly, it pays increasing attention to cyberattacks and hybrid operations conducted by other states. As the Advisory Letter issued by the Advisory Council on International Affairs suggests, Russia's actions gives to the Netherlands also cause for concern. The report concluded that Russia is "intent on changing the status quo in Europe and increasing its coercive power." Therefore, mutual solidarity and unity within NATO is very crucial for the Netherlands.¹²⁰ Withdrawal of the TNWs could be perceived in Moscow as a small, rather symbolic, victory. It would not dramatically change the global military balance, however, it could be interpreted as a start of internal division in the Alliance what is always beneficial for Putin's political rhetoric.

These security concerns can partially serve as an answer to the question why the Netherlands decided to vote against the TPNW. Country is focusing on the NATO cohesion and on the maintaining its role in international security community. Open support for the TPNW could to some extent erode the status quo and the Netherlands could be held accountable for it. Looking at the domestic political situation, it is clear that the Netherlands wants to keep up with tis military commitments. In 2016, Dutch government announced a rise in defense spending so it is capable to retain and rebuild the capabilities their existing formations, and also to strengthen European defense within NATO.¹²¹ This rather small country wants to be taken seriously when

¹²⁰ *Russia and the Defense Efforts of the Netherlands*, Advisory Letter, Advisory Council on International Affairs, No. 31, March 2017, pp. 14, <https://aiv-advies.nl/download/fb4c5029-277f-4285-9494-b9a5e3439f90.pdf>.

¹²¹ Marc Bantinck, "Why the Dutch Military Punches Below Its Weight," *Carnegie Europe*, 8 February 2018, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/75484>.

it comes to the military performance and military contribution. Nevertheless, this model fails to explain why Dutch government did participate in the negotiations in the first place. It could have decided for the same approach as Norway and withdrew from the negotiations when it became clear that they probably will not support the TPNW. To get a more complete picture, I will apply domestic model to understand the Dutch diplomatic actions.

V. Domestic Model

The second model that Sagan developed is focusing on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb. He talks about three kinds of actors who are influencing the state's decisions in this regard: the state's nuclear establishment; important units within the professional military; and politicians in states in which individual parties or the mass public strongly favor nuclear weapons acquisition. Attention is paid to the domestic coalitions and scientific-military-industrial complex which have (or have not) an interest in bomb acquisition for different reasons. This bottom-up approach offers alternative explanations since it is opening the black box of the state that prevails in security model. He examines bureaucratic battles between political elite and nuclear energy establishment to find out why state decides to build nuclear weapons. Sagan is looking for the explanations in other important elements such as domestic support for the government or the actions of newly empowered actors.¹²²

Applying this logic to the TPNW, domestic model would assume that country acts in accordance with the opinions of domestic audience. The head of government has to consider domestic sentiments since his/ her political future depends upon it. Maintaining a good face locally is very important for the governments, especially in the Western countries. So in the case of ban treaty, one cannot look only at the military-industrial complex, but also at the social groups and influential NGOs.

From a domestic-political perspective, public opinion is the primary influence on policy, domestic and foreign. It matters especially in the countries where democracy has a long tradition and the public is actively engaged in political debates. With a development of new technologies and various open platforms, it is even easier for non-state actors to reach wider

¹²² Sagan, "Why Do State Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," pp. 63-68.

audience and put government under the pressure. Interests of social groups can determine state's actions in the multilateral negotiations and can be crucial in shaping the state preferences.¹²³

As Professor Moravcsik stresses, “political action is embedded in domestic and transnational civil society”. According to liberal theory, the state is not an actor but a representative institution subject to capture and recapture by coalitions of social actors. Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences.¹²⁴

Governments are accountable to their electorate, however, they are not obliged to listen to public opinion and social groups. In spite of that, their existence is necessary to provide a counterweight to the communities which support NWS. Scientists, physicians, engineers, civic leaders and others are motivated by a sense of duty to protect humanity.¹²⁵ It is noteworthy to say that particular domestic groups will probably not benefit directly from the fact that their country decided to ban nuclear weapons. In regard to the TPNW, it is indeed very relative and abstract victory.

So can domestic factors influence whether the country will endorse the ban treaty? Is government willing to take into consideration a public opinion when global security is being discussed? This model will analyze domestic situation and key drivers that could have influenced Norway and the Netherlands during the UN negotiations. It looks closely at the domestic institutions, both governmental and opposition voices, non-state actors and social movements which are also playing a role in the states' foreign policy choices.

Norway

Norway has long been at the forefront of efforts to promote disarmament on humanitarian grounds. One of the best examples of its active efforts is the Mine Ban Treaty which was signed by Norway in 1997. The country became a global leader in banning antipersonnel mines and was also one of the most important members of the pro-ban “core group” of governments. What is very interesting in this case, anti-personnel landmines (APM) used to be part of the

¹²³ Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 36.

¹²⁴ Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 51, Issue 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 517, <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf>.

¹²⁵ Kennette Benedict, “Most likely to succeed against nuclear weapons,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 17 September 2013, <https://thebulletin.org/2013/09/most-likely-to-succeed-against-nuclear-weapons/>.

Norwegian defense system. Given Norway's geographical location, they were considered to be crucial in defending the country's territory. But while Norway has been an active player on the issue of landmines for many years, it did not always support a total ban on APMs. During the expert meetings in 1994 and 1995 leading up to the Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, the official Norwegian view was that a total ban position would be too radical. The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that such a move would be hardly supported by international community and instead he suggested to strengthen the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Nonetheless, despite the lack of governmental support for banning the landmines, Norway eventually signed the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. What has changed the Norway's position on this matter? It was the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a coalition of non-governmental organizations, which has grown and spread to become a network with active members in some 100 countries. The Norwegian Campaign to Ban Landmines was very active in lobbying various political parties and Parliamentary committees and eventually succeeded in promoting the issue domestically. In spite of a very hesitant Norway's position, the Parliament was supporting the initiative and asked the government to support the total ban on APMs.¹²⁶

Looking at the successful story of APM ban, we can see a parallel between the campaign on banning landmines and the campaign on nuclear weapons ban. However, in this case, a story line is slightly different. In March 2013, Norway organized an international Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons to discuss the humanitarian effects of nuclear war and to begin the process to ban all nuclear weapons. The Norwegian Government's initiative to convene a conference on this matter was welcomed with excitement. Civil society and NGOs were encouraged by this step - it gave them hope that leading state actors can influence other countries to join their battle for nuclear weapons free world. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Espen Barth Eide, who chaired the conference, endorsed in his opening statement the involvement of international organizations and civil society organizations. As he noted, broad engagement is the first step how the discourse on NWs can be revised and reframed.¹²⁷ At that time, it looked like Norway would take a lead in the new humanitarian initiative against nuclear weapons.

¹²⁶ Norway – Mine Ban Policy, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, <http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/1999/norway.html>.

¹²⁷ *Opening Statement at Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons*, Speech at the Conference on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo, 4-5 March, 2013, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/opening_humimpact/id715948/.

That would not be a surprising move. For a long time, Norway has been actively working on achieving a safe nuclear environment by supporting both the SCOs and international cooperation such as the UK/ Norway Initiative (UKNI) on nuclear warhead dismantlement verification. In early 2007, representatives from UK Ministry of Defense, the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, several Norwegian laboratories and the non-governmental organization VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre) began work on the technical verification of nuclear arms control. It was also the first time that a NWS and NNWS and independent NGO have collaborated in this field of research. According to the official UKNI report, both countries are supporting the idea that “any future disarmament process would need to be underpinned by a verification regime that can demonstrate with confidence that nuclear disarmament has taken place.”¹²⁸ Besides, Norway as an active member of the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), supports the development of a culture of cooperation and trust and seeks to promote a common understanding of the technical issues of nuclear disarmament verification among a large group of states.¹²⁹

All these efforts show that Norway has been committed to the nuclear disarmament not only rhetorically, but also practically. The Norwegian Government is providing funding for research projects which are exploring ways in which NNWS can obtain the necessary assurances without acquiring sensitive information. While trying to play a leading role in efforts to promote non-proliferation and disarmament, it was very surprising for both international community and civil society when Norway abruptly abandoned its previous support for the humanitarian approaches to nuclear disarmament. This shift was disappointing also for the parliamentary majority and Norwegian NGOs. In 2015, three UN resolutions on nuclear weapons were adopted at the UN General Assembly in New York by an overwhelming majority – the UN resolution on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons; resolution on a humanitarian pledge to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons; and resolution on ethical

¹²⁸ *The UK – Norway Initiative: Report on the UKNI Non-Nuclear Weapon States Workshop (7-9 December 2011)*, pp. 1-2, available at:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/28423/120426_2011_ukni_workshop_final_rpt.pdf.

¹²⁹ *Norwegian report on General Assembly resolution 71/67 on nuclear disarmament verification*, 22nd meeting, 27 October 2016, pp.3,

[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/187E579426350611C125816E003F22D3/\\$file/2017+N DV+Norway.pdf](https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/187E579426350611C125816E003F22D3/$file/2017+N DV+Norway.pdf).

responsibility to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. Norwegian Government did not support any of the three resolutions.¹³⁰

Moreover, Norway was the very first NATO country, besides the USA, that rejected the idea of negotiating a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Looking at the Norway's political history, such a dramatic shift is rather very rare. How can it be explained? In order to understand this radical change in, it is crucial to understand how the domestic political scene developed since 2010.

From 2005 to 2013, the Norwegian Government consisted of three parties: Labor Party, Socialist Left Party and Centre Party. So called Stoltenberg's Second Cabinet or red-green coalition.¹³¹ In February 2010, the 45th Annual Conference of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee took place in Oslo. Former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, in his opening statement stressed that "disarmament is an integral part of the Norwegian Government's foreign and security policy." He underlined three main ambitions that were being actively pursued by the Government: (1) working for a world free of nuclear weapons, in close cooperation with NATO allies; (2) promoting further efforts of humanitarian disarmament, such as following up on the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions; and (3) pursuing a comprehensive approach, acknowledging that disarmament and arms reduction are at the core of both security policy and development policy. As Støre concluded, "a process towards full elimination of nuclear weapons" should be initiated immediately since "we cannot afford any more years of nuclear complacency." He called for "broad-based, international political determination to achieve total nuclear abolition."¹³²

The Norwegian humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament has been later underlined by the Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen, Permanent Representative of Norway at the Conference on Disarmament in March 2011. Angell-Hansen emphasized Norway's position stating that the "top priority should be given to nuclear disarmament with the objective of a total elimination of such weapons." She made clear that placing the humanitarian imperative is at the center of Norwegian disarmament efforts and added that the use of NWs should "be illegal under

¹³⁰ *Norway did not support UN Resolutions on Nuclear Weapons*, Norwegian People's Aid, 2015, <https://www.npaid.org/News/News-archive/2015/Norway-did-not-support-UN-Resolutions-on-Nuclear-Weapons>.

¹³¹ Jens Stoltenberg was a Head of government and a member of Labor Party.

¹³² *Disarmament – reframing the challenge*, Speech by Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, the 45th Annual Conference, 1 February 2010, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/disarmament/id592550/>.

international humanitarian law.”¹³³ These words were welcomed with excitement by countries which are actively engaged in disarmament efforts pushing for more progressive development in this field.

As it was already mentioned, Norwegian active involvement resulted in organizing the international conference on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in March 2013. Unfortunately, this tone has quickly changed in October 2013 when Norway shifted from supporting the prohibition process to actually counteracting it. Looking at the domestic political scene, a change took place which is explaining a lot about Norwegian foreign policy choices. In October 2013 a new government has been formed, headed by Conservative Party leader Erna Solberg. A center-right coalition consisted of the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, and later it was joined by the Liberal Party. Solberg’s Cabinet is also being referred as a blue-blue coalition.

As Kjølvs Egeland explains, the source of the dramatic change lies in the different governments and their understanding what it means to be a “good country.” While the previous red-green coalition was supporting the picture of “humanitarian Norway” in international arena, the blue-blue coalition started pushing forward an idea of “Atlantic Norway” that primarily seeks recognition from the great powers.¹³⁴ When the Austrian Pledge on nuclear disarmament launched at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in December 2014 was launched, foreign minister Børge Brende (Conservative Party) stated that Norway will not join it on the grounds that the pledge is incompatible with NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons for collective security.¹³⁵

After Norway did not support three UN resolutions on nuclear weapons in 2015, many started to wonder what approach Norway is planning to pursue next. Brende explained it as following: “It is not correct to claim that Norway has changed its position on disarmament this year. On the contrary, it is my impression that other countries are now attempting to change the substance of the humanitarian initiative, so that it in reality becomes a matter of banning nuclear weapons. All countries, both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, have a responsibility

¹³³ *Statement to the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen*, 17 March 2011, pp. 1-2, available at: http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2011/statements/part1/17March_Norway.pdf.

¹³⁴ Kjølvs Egeland, “Forvandlingen: Om atomvåpen, anerkjennelse og utenrikspolitiske linjeskif,” *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, vol. 34, no. 2, (2017), pp. 123, available at: https://www.idunn.no/nnt/2017/02/forvandlingen_om_atomvaapen_anerkjennelse_og_utenrikspolit.

¹³⁵ Richard Lennane, “Norway’s conflicted relationship with nuclear weapons,” *wildfire-v.org*, 24 February 2015, pp. 1, http://www.wildfire-v.org/Norway_conflicted_nuclear_24_Feb_2015.pdf.

to work for joint solutions and compromises that can bring real, genuine disarmament. Norway will continue its broad engagement to promote disarmament with this in view.”¹³⁶

The Norwegian right-wing coalition started to sending clear messages that banning nuclear weapons is not a top priority for Solberg’s cabinet. Nonetheless, this rhetorical shift is rather unique statement in Norwegian foreign policy history. Of course, whether this was really a shift is highly disputable issue. It is being suggested that Norway has never supported the idea of banning NWs until all nuclear weapons states participate in the process.¹³⁷

Are there any actors that could have possibly changed the Government’s position? Hypothetically, yes there are certain actors that could have impacted it. Norway has a strong civil society and also audible opposition in the Parliament. So why was there no similar development like in the Dutch case when NGOs put pressure on the politicians to participate in the UN negotiations? There are several reasons for that.

Firstly, it is true that Norwegian civil society is very active in promoting peace and practical solutions to the current global challenges. ICAN website lists almost thirty partner organizations which are based in Norway. Many of them, such as The Norwegian Peace Council or Norwegian Red Cross, have a very long tradition in developing approaches in peacework and scientific debate. Egeland noted that the general public showed a huge support for the ban treaty in the public polls as well. Nonetheless, there are two crucial distinctions between Norway and the Netherlands. According to Egeland, Norwegian citizens will be always endorsing humanitarian approach and nuclear weapons ban, however, they are equally supportive of the NATO. Their opinions are very balanced and that could be one of the main reasons why they were not pushing for any public initiative. The second distinction is related to the structure of NGOs which are operating in Norway. Egeland reminds that those are rather small organizations with a limited budget and influence. Although they are able to reach wide audience since the humanitarian sector is a traditional part of Norwegian identity, they are not influential enough to put the Government under pressure.¹³⁸ Furthermore, the blue-blue government decided to partially silenced the critique when it withdrew funding from a range of SCOs that are working to advance nuclear disarmament on humanitarian grounds, including Norwegian People’s Aid, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN),

¹³⁶ *Active support for disarmament and non-proliferation in the UN*, Government.no, 11 March, 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/support_disarmament/id2459977/.

¹³⁷ Kjølvs Egeland, “Forvandlingen: Om atomvåpen, anerkjennelse og utenrikspolitiske linjeskif,” pp. 117.

¹³⁸ Kjølvs Egeland, researcher at the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) in Oslo, 15 November 2018, Telephone interview.

and the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).¹³⁹

Besides the civil society, there is another actor who could serve as a counterweight to the Norwegian Government and that is Storting. Already in June 2014, a debate in the Parliament on the issues of nuclear disarmament took place and was initiated by the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament's Co-President Marit Nybakk. The goal of the discussion was to ensure that the government continued to lead on nuclear disarmament initiatives. During the debate, it became clear that the parliamentary opposition would like to see the Government taking concrete steps. Kåre Simensen from Labor Party argued that "the time has come to achieve a global ban on nuclear weapons," while a leader of Christian Democratic Party noted that it is critical to achieve concrete results in this matter.¹⁴⁰ Also in 2016 the opposition presented a document that was calling for taking a more pro-active line in nuclear disarmament. Although the document did not suggest any specific strategy to the Government, it was very important political statement for the parliamentary majority.¹⁴¹

Nevertheless, according to analyst based in Oslo, it was highly improbable that the Government would have changed its foreign policy as a result of external pressure. First of all, the Storting has never instructed the Government what to do in foreign policy, and it will never do so since it is a constitutional tradition. Second of all, the Labor Party which advocated the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament, did not want to be perceived as being anti-NATO party. Their critique was therefore expressed very carefully.¹⁴² And the last point which also influenced the Government's unwillingness to re-define their approach to the TPNW is a special relationship between the two foreign ministers, Børge Brende and John Kerry. Brende called the US for being "the most closes ally," and the current Norwegian Government would probably not like to risk these special ties by endorsing a treaty that was so resolutely rejected by the USA.¹⁴³

To sum it up, domestic model very plausibly explains why Norway decided not to participate in the UN negotiations. Countries cannot be analyzed as black-boxes. Foreign policy is not conducted solely on the basis of external threats and international relations. Domestic

¹³⁹ Richard Lennane, "Expediency wins as Norway abandons its humanitarian principles," *Wildfire*, 30 November 2015, pp. 2, http://www.wildfire-v.org/Norway_shame_30_Nov_2015.pdf.

¹⁴⁰ *Norwegian parliament – time to prohibit nuclear weapons!* Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 7 June 2014, <http://www.pnnd.org/article/norwegian-parliament-%E2%80%93-time-prohibit-nuclear-weapons>.

¹⁴¹ Kjølsv Egeland, 15 November 2018, Telephone interview.

¹⁴² Kjølsv Egeland, 15 November 2018, Telephone interview.

¹⁴³ *Remarks by Secretary of State Kerry and Norway's Foreign Minister Brende*, U.S. Embassy in Norway, 26 February 2015, <https://no.usembassy.gov/remarks-secretary-state-kerry-norways-foreign-minister-brende/>.

institutions, general public and domestic political ambitions of various actors must be also taken into consideration. For many who have hoped for Norway to be a leader in the camp of pro-ban countries, its political shift was very disappointing. Therefore the last model will examine the Norwegian case from a normative perspective - it will look closer at the Norwegian identity and the shared norms which are constituting its image of 'humanitarian superpower'.

The Netherlands

The Dutch serves as a nice example of how domestic institutions can shape foreign policy. As Susi Snyder from PAX noted, the Dutch Parliament may be the only parliament in a nuclear-weapons-reliant country in the world that managed to democratize this part of their security dialogue.¹⁴⁴ In spite of the Dutch Government's hesitant position on the ban treaty, Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders agreed to adhere to the wishes of the Dutch Parliament and civil society to take part in the negotiations. Although the Netherlands eventually voted against the TPNW, its participation was a clear sign that the Netherlands takes public opinion into consideration. What factors enabled the SCOs to impact Dutch foreign policy? What role played the Parliament and how the debate looked like? Why was a debate on the domestic level so critical to the Dutch position on the ban treaty and what are the main arguments of the debate?

There are two domestic factors which are crucial in forming the Dutch position on nuclear weapons: Dutch society and the Dutch Parliament. Both are closely interconnected since the Dutch political system introduced a citizen initiative right in 2006 which allows any item that has not been previously discussed to be placed in the parliamentary agenda once 40 000 signatures are gathered.¹⁴⁵ The right empowers especially third sector and other non-governmental entities who are trying to draw more attention to various problematic issues. Willingness of the Parliament to listen to its own citizens and discuss directly their proposals is partially a result of traditionally good relationship between the state and a non-profit sector. According to the Working document 70 on *The non-profit sector in the Netherlands*, this relationship can be characterized by cooperation rather than conflict. In general, there has been a positive government attitude towards private initiatives for a very long time. As the document claims, the government has encouraged the non-profit sector in different ways such as the

¹⁴⁴ Susi Snyder, the Nuclear Disarmament Programme Manager for PAX, 3 December 2018, E-mail Conversation.

¹⁴⁵ Arjen Nijeboer, Ronald Pabst, "The Netherlands Introduce Citizen's Initiative," *Democracy International*, 7 February 2006, <https://democracy-international.org/netherlands-introduce-citizens-intitiative>.

favorable tax treatment or the special legal status of a nonprofit which qualifies them for public or government subsidies and grants.¹⁴⁶

As Snyder explains, success of the campaign on nuclear weapons ban in the Netherlands is based on a long history of the Dutch people opposing nuclear weapons. It was therefore not difficult to gather more than 45 600 signatures and persuade the Parliament that it must be inevitably part of the political debate. PAX campaign called “Teken tegen kernwapens” (Sign Against Nuclear Weapons) started in 2014 and was coordinated with other partners such as the Dutch Red Cross or ASN Bank. The campaign has been successful in bringing the dangers of nuclear weapons to the attention of the general public and eventually it was strongly supported by the Dutch citizens. Consequently, public efforts resulted in official proposal to Parliament calling for a national ban on nuclear weapons. According to this document, a national ban is defined as a “comprehensive ban on use, possession, development, production, financing, stationing and transfer of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and on assistance with or encouragement of these illegal acts.” The proposal is explaining why it is the right time to introduce national ban on NWs, and what would a national ban for the Netherlands and NATO look like.¹⁴⁷

The document is following the ideas that were raised during the international conferences on humanitarian consequences of NWs. Besides, it is referring to opinion polls conducted by the Red Cross in 2012, the 'National Voters Investigation' (Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek) in 2010, and 'EenVandaag' (Dutch TV show) viewers' panel in 2014. They all show that an active approach to make the world nuclear weapon free is widespread in all segments in Dutch society, regardless of age, political interest or affiliation and belief, while this support remain immune to international political developments. Campaigners see this as a clear message for the government that there is a mandate for a national ban.¹⁴⁸

Why were the NGOs focusing primarily on the national ban rather than pressuring the Dutch government to directly adopt the TPNW? As Snyder explains, given that the Netherlands would be immediately in violation of the text of the treaty, it was expected that they would not support

¹⁴⁶ Ary Burger, Paul Dekker, “The nonprofit sector in the Netherlands,” *Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau*, April 2001, Den Haag, pp. 62-63, available at: <https://www.scp.nl/dsresource?objectid=316d28b5-799a-4acb-8392-cca00cdfb86b&type=org>.

¹⁴⁷ *Ban Nuclear Weapons in the Netherlands: Proposal to Parliament*, Citizen’s Initiative “Teken tegen kernwapens”, September 2015, PAX, pp. 4, <https://nonukes.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PAX-proposal-citizens-initiative-2016-ENG.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7.

it.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the focus on domestic mobilization was in the Dutch case a critical factor. It relied on the fact the Dutch citizens has always been opposed to the existence of tactical nuclear weapons on their territory. The proposal suggests that the removal of these weapons offers multiple advantages and, at the same time, it would minimize the chance that the Netherlands would become a military target.¹⁵⁰

How the proposal explains the national ban with regard to the relationship between the Netherlands and NATO? In case of adopting the national ban, both NATO and the American government should show flexibility towards national considerations with regards to nuclear policies. According to the campaigners, the proposal would not explicitly mean that the Netherlands cannot be a member of a military alliance which counts among it states with nuclear weapons.¹⁵¹ Whether this is a real scenario or just a wishful thinking of the campaigners is highly debatable.

Proposal is concluded with a very strong message for the Parliament and representatives of the government which are encouraged to finally make a choice. Campaigners are asking very directly whether the politicians “are in favor of a ban on nuclear weapons” or whether they are “in favor of [the Netherlands] continuing as we have done for decades: a slow and difficult process and with an almost guaranteed increase in the risks of nuclear weapons as the reward.” They are being reminded that it is up to them to decide, after having banned biological and chemical weapons, landmines and cluster ammunition, to also ban this inhumane weapons system.¹⁵²

The PAX initiative wanted the politicians to realize that they are the ones responsible for disarmament stalemate. Krista van Velzen, a campaign leader, stressed that the 85% of the Dutch population believe that nuclear weapons should be banned. And this is the main reason why both the House of Representative and the Dutch government should come up with a plan on the national nuclear weapon ban. During her speech in the Parliament, she criticized the existing nuclear disarmament forums which have not been able to make any progress towards nuclear-weapon-free world. She suggested that the Netherlands should take more proactive

¹⁴⁹ Susi Snyder, the Nuclear Disarmament Programme Manager for PAX, 3 December 2018, E-mail Conversation.

¹⁵⁰ *Ban Nuclear Weapons in the Netherlands: Proposal to Parliament*, pp. 9.

¹⁵¹ *Ban Nuclear Weapons in the Netherlands: Proposal to Parliament*, pp. 11.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 13.

stance on these matters. Furthermore, Van Velzen criticized the Government for its attitude that accepts nuclear weapons as an important tool in the current military and diplomatic relations.¹⁵³

Message delivered by Krista van Velzen from the civil society and the Dutch citizens had a great impact on the House of Representatives. It triggered an active political debate on the national level and resulted in the Parliament pushing for the Dutch participation in the negotiations. How the debate looked like and what parties were crucial in initiating it?

It is noteworthy to say that the House of Representative has often discussed nuclear disarmament. Since 2010, it has passed several motions which called for a concrete steps to be taken in nuclear disarmament both on national and international level. The website *No Nukes* lists 14 motions that has been introduced in the Dutch Parliament. The motion proposed in 2010 by GroenLinks, a green political party, called for the Government to openly discuss a potential withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe with the American government. Similar proposal was introduced by the CDA party (Christian Democratic Apparel) in 2012. A year later, the Socialist Party (SP) proposed a motion to protest against the nuclear capabilities of the Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16 warplanes, which are designed to deliver tactical nuclear bombs. In 2014, the social-liberals (D66 party) called in their motion for the government to advocate the termination of the Dutch nuclear task.¹⁵⁴ D66 was also one of the major supporters of the TPNW and together with the SP and Labor Party, they initiated a motion calling on the Government to participate without prejudice in any international discussions on a nuclear weapons prohibition.¹⁵⁵ This initiative, also widely known as ‘Motion- Sjoerdsma’, demonstrated a widespread parliamentary support for national action in nuclear disarmament, and showed a general dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in this field among parliamentarians.

The very last motion that was discussed in the Parliament was initiated by the Christian Union (CU) on 15th November 2018. It asks the Government to prepare a legal analysis in order to assess compatibility between the existing national legislation and the ban treaty.¹⁵⁶ Such

¹⁵³ Krista van Velzen Speech at the House of Representatives on 19 April 2016, pp. 1-2, available at:

<https://nonukes.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/20161904-speech-burgerinitiatief-Krista-van-Velzen-PAX.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴ D66 is a social-liberal political party that was formed in 1966 by a group of politically unaligned young intellectuals. Its political agenda is primarily focused on education and innovation, environment and sustainable energy.

¹⁵⁵ Krista van Velzen, “Wat heeft de Tweede Kamer gedaan voor nucleaire ontwapening? (een overzicht van aangenomen moties)”, *nonukes.nl*, 21 September 2015, <https://nonukes.nl/overzicht-van-aangenomen-moties-in-de-tweede-kamer-over-nucleaire-ontwapening/>.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

analysis would show which parts of the Dutch legislation are in compliance with the TPNW and what changes in the national legislation would be necessary to undertake.

How the Dutch Government reacted to the public and parliamentary discussions? A debate that took place on 28 April 2016 with regard to the PAX initiative showed how carefully the Government approaches this issue. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Albert Koenders who was addressing the questions raised by pro-ban parties, said that he welcomed the initiative since it raised awareness of humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons among both general public and political elites. Although Koenders wants the Netherlands to play a leading role in the international disarmament debates, he stated that these efforts must be based on the existing non-proliferation framework, primarily the NPT. While reaffirming the Parliament that the Dutch government is deeply committed to any efforts which are trying to reduce the role which NWs play in the international security, Koenders was referring to the Alliance as an actor which cannot be overlooked. He stressed that NATO should be a part of the dialogue and only then it would be possible to effectively achieve Global Zero.¹⁵⁷

Koenders was presenting a very similar rhetoric during the Conference on Disarmament in February 2016. In spite of perceiving the NPT as the “the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,” he expressed his disappointment at the outcome of the NPT Review Conference. Setting a nuclear-weapon-free world as a priority, Koenders assured the international community that the Kingdom of the Netherlands wants to be seen as a reliable partner.¹⁵⁸ Despite these assurances, the Dutch government eventually did not support the TPNW. The Netherlands explained it as following: “Notwithstanding these positive aspects of the ban treaty movement, the Netherlands could not support the draft that was put before us. We have signaled at the beginning of this session that we would be unable to sign up to any instrument that is incompatible with our NATO obligations, that contains inadequate verification provisions or that undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”¹⁵⁹

As Selma van Oostwaard, PAX program officer for humanitarian disarmament, explained the Dutch public society “knew that the Dutch government would be a follower in the negotiations

¹⁵⁷ *Burgerinitiatief Tegen kernwapens*, parlementairemonitor.nl, 28 April 2016, <https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvi5epmj1ey0/vk3mu2xtiby2>.

¹⁵⁸ *Statement by Foreign Minister Koenders to the Conference on Disarmament*, Statement by Foreign Minister Bert Koenders to the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 29 February 2016), <https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2016/02/29/statement-by-foreign-minister-koenders-to-the-conference-on-disarmament>.

¹⁵⁹ *Explanation of vote of the Netherlands on text of Nuclear Ban Treaty*, 7 July 2017, <https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/latest/news/2017/07/07/explanation-of-vote-of-ambassador-lise-gregoire-on-the-draft-text-of-the-nuclear-ban-treaty>.

on the nuclear ban treaty, doing what other NATO allies do, so we wanted The Netherlands to actively join the process and not to be neutral or block it.” It must be remembered that the Netherlands took part in the first session of negotiations in late March, the only country under the American nuclear umbrella to do so. This is because Dutch civil society acted as a counterweight to international pressure, pushing the Hague to operate as a bridge builder between the different stakeholders.¹⁶⁰

Looking at the Dutch position through the lenses of domestic model, it is clear the Dutch active involvement in the ban treaty negotiations was influenced by the long term frustration of the Dutch society. Anti-nuclear debate is not new. It has been a part of political agenda for decades since various parliamentary parties are constantly requesting an access to the treaty that was concluded between the Netherlands and the USA on hosting tactical nuclear bombs. This time, the Dutch SCOs and NGOs which have been fighting for nuclear-weapon-free world saw a great potential in emerging international humanitarian initiative. They decided it is the right time introduce the will of the Dutch citizens to the Parliament.

After the huge PAX campaign, if the Dutch government would have ignored the negotiations as Norway did, it could be a politically harmful move for the current cabinet. Nevertheless, the Netherlands as a host country has a certain obligations towards NATO. The Dutch position in the Alliance must be sorted out before the Government adopts anything what would be in the direct conflict with its legal obligations.

From the domestic point of view, reason why the Netherlands voted against the TPNW cannot be fully explained through this model. Government decided to send a delegation to New York to show the civil society that their concerns are taken into consideration. At the same time, it was clear that the Netherlands will not eventually sign the treaty. Security obligations are preventing the Dutch government from accepting any other legally binding provisions on nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, statements given by the Dutch delegations during the Conference on Disarmament or the UN General Assembly demonstrate that the country wants to be seen both as a credible military ally, and a reliable partner in global nuclear disarmament.

¹⁶⁰ Lionel Fatton, “Dutch role as bridge builder in nuke talks should inspire Japan”, *Kyodo News*, 10 June 2017, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/06/dcb8affee16b-focus-dutch-role-as-bridge-builder-in-nuke-talks-should-inspire-japan.html>.

VI. Norm Model

A third model that Sagan developed in order to explain why countries build nuclear weapons is the norms model. It focuses on norms concerning weapons acquisition and examines symbolic functions of NWs. According to this perspective, state behavior is determined by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations. This assumption is based on the constructivist argument that the reality is not given but constructed by human beings. Shared norms and beliefs embedded in society have a great power in constraining behavior even when it comes to the state actors. Consequently, a group of states who share the same values and principles can work together on establishing an international norm or set of norms. Once the international norm is constituted, it has enough power to influence foreign policies of other countries.¹⁶¹

Normative pressures can have significant influence on powerful state actors, for example, normative beliefs about chemical weapons were important in creating legal restrictions against their use in war. Looking at the nuclear proliferation through the lenses of the norms model, Sagan explains that the possession and testing of NWs during the certain time period was widely seen as a symbol of international prestige. But once the NPT regime has been developed, testing nuclear weapons started to be considered as illegitimate and irresponsible.

Sagan applied his model to two cases: France and Ukraine. He argues that the French decision to build nuclear weapons in 1960s can be explained when one focuses on the bomb's symbolic significance. On the other hand, Ukraine's decision to give up almost 4 000 nuclear weapons that were stored on its territory after dissolution of Soviet Union was highly influenced by emerging NPT non-proliferation norms. The NPT regime created a history in which the most recent examples of new or potential nuclear states were called "rogue states," and Ukraine definitely did not want to end up losing its international prestige by "joining a nuclear club."¹⁶²

How can this logic be applied to the selected case studies? Adopting or rejecting the ban treaty is also to some extent about norms which are dominating foreign policies of the countries. According to constructivism, states follow norms not just because it is in their interest, but also when they have internalized those norms in their identities.¹⁶³ Therefore, analyzing state identities is critical in order understand why they have either rejected or endorsed the nuclear-

¹⁶¹ Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb ", pp. 77-78.

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 80-82.

¹⁶³ Maxym Alexandrov, "The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis," *Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation*, Hiroshima University, pp. 36-37, available at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.503.2088&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

weapon ban. The TPNW is particularly supported by the countries that have a long and strong tradition of anti-nuclear approach. These countries managed to incorporate negative perception of NWs into their foreign policies, and have chosen nuclear abstinence because their citizens and political elites overwhelmingly abhor the bomb as deeply immoral.

Applying the normative model on both Norwegian and Dutch case provides alternative explanations on why these countries rejected to support the TPNW. The model looks closely on the norms and their role in foreign policies of both countries. Is there any strongly embedded anti-nuclear norm in the states' identities? What other normative aspects have influenced their behavior?

Norway

When in March 2011 Norwegian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament stated that Norway believes in developing norms against the use of nuclear weapons which could result in outlawing them globally, no one was surprised by this statement.¹⁶⁴ Norway is often being described as a “humanitarian great power” or a global “moral entrepreneur.” These associations have become a part of both the Norwegian and international consciousness. As a country guided by “ideational and normative conceptions of politics,” Norway provides very generous international support and is actively involved in humanitarian projects. It also funds influential international NGOs and provides bi-lateral development assistance in economic development and trade, health and education, societal sectors, or emergency relief. A long tradition of helping poor and conflict-ridden countries impacted Norwegians and Norwegian national identity as such.¹⁶⁵

Norway belongs to one of the largest contributors of fund to the UN development efforts and the breadth and depth of Norwegian development, humanitarian assistance, and peacemaking have significant global political economic as well as cultural implications. It is noteworthy to say that Norway emerged as a sovereign country in 1905 after a conflict with Sweden and became very active in humanitarian assistance after the Second World War. Majority of the biggest Norwegian NGOs emerged after 1945 and consequently, in 1968, Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) which

¹⁶⁴ *Statement to the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen*, 17 March 2011, pp. 3, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2011/statements/part1/17March_Norway.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ Asoka Bandarage, “The ‘Norwegian Model’: Political Economy of NGO Peacemaking,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, Spring/Summer 2011, pp. 222-224, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590809>.

financially supports NGO activities in developing countries, contributes to the management of development funds to ensure that the Norwegian development cooperation is evaluated and efficient. Thanks to Norad, thousands of Norwegian citizens have acquired international field experience by working with the government development cooperation agency.¹⁶⁶

Furthermore, Norway is a world leader in research and development and knowledge management in international conflict resolution. So called “Norwegian Model” refers to Norway’s work in facilitating peace process and conflict resolution, and is founded on four pillars: (1) relationship and cooperation between the state, research institutions and NGOs; (2) Norway’s reputation as a peacemaker and peace mediator; (3) important key people within NGOs, research institutions and the state; (4) the link between emergency relief and long term development aid. These four pillars summarize more or less the characteristics of Norwegian foreign policy, as they show the relationship between state and civil society with a common ground in the tradition for peace making and aid.¹⁶⁷

What has the humanitarian assistance to do with nuclear weapons and the TPNW? Norwegian approach to humanitarianism and engagement in peaceful activities demonstrate strongly embedded humanitarian norms and values in its society. According to scholar Halvard Leira, Norwegian foreign policy culture had been characterized since the late 19th century by a strong emphasis on conceptions of the peaceful nature of Norway and its people. As a result, powerful peace discourse in the foreign policy realm meant that defense issues were seen as something apart from foreign policy.¹⁶⁸

Leira’s article published in the *Swiss Political Science Review* on the “Norwegian foreign policy of peace” which is, as he argues, rooted in an historical self-understanding of Norway and Norwegians as particularly peaceful. Identity-driven foreign policy based on a liberal belief that Norway can make the world a better place is a main reason why has been Norway engaged in peace promotion since its foundation. Leira explains that in terms of liberal ideas, “Norwegians were inspired directly by the international thinking on peace through law and international solidarity”. This liberal international discourse on peace worked differently in other countries.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 223.

¹⁶⁷ Anne Margrete Slaaen Omtveit, “Soft power through Responsibility to Protect: a small state’s foreign policy strategy – A study of Norwegian foreign policy and R2P in the context of the civil wars in Libya and Syria”, Master Thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2015, pp. 37, <https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2359546/Omtveit%2c%20Anne%20Margrete%20Slaaen.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

¹⁶⁸ Håkon Lunde Saxi, *Norwegian and Danish Defense Policy: A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold era* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Defense Studies, 2010), pp. 95.

Why Norway adopted it so easily? According to the author, in the established states of Europe, the liberal position was articulated as opposition against the perceived Realpolitik of the kings and the nobility. On the other hand, Norway lacked any carriers of a foreign policy discourse and had no established domestic Realpolitik-position. Therefore, the dominant-liberal discourse was adapted as the baseline for Norwegian foreign policy.¹⁶⁹

With regard to Norwegian behavior in international arena, a historian Olav Riste pointed to a “missionary impulse” and a strong moralistic strain in Norwegian foreign policy. The intimate relationship between mission and politics has an old history in Norway. Missionaries often acted as diplomats and they are definitely one of the elements which contributed to the peace tradition in Norwegian foreign politics.¹⁷⁰ This demonstrates that religious aspect in the Norwegian identity also plays some role and cannot be completely ignored.

These peaceful ideas were not abandoned after the Second World War. The former minister of foreign affairs Knut Frydenlund followed traditional ideological statements by stressing that the supreme Norwegian interest is peace, and that the government would do its best to ensure that peace, goodwill and co-operation is maintained in the relations between states and people. In spite of security-issues being high on the agenda throughout the Cold War, Norway never abandoned its adherence to peace and co-operation. This rhetoric was intensified after the end of Cold War when leading figures in the Norwegian politics presented the country as a peace-nation. As Leira points out, Norway can greatly benefit from this peace activism by increasing the status of country.¹⁷¹

Norwegian perception of nuclear weapons is also influenced by the idea of Norway as a peace-loving nation. Even during the Cold War when political tensions were present in every aspect of political life, Norway adopted a stance which strongly opposed to nuclear weapons deployment on its territory. In 1957, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen declared at the NATO summit that Norway would not introduce, store or build bases for nuclear weapons in peacetime. Later in 1961, a majority of the Norwegian Parliament supported the government’s decision and it also became actively engaged in discussions on nuclear-weapon-free zones in

¹⁶⁹ Halvard Leira, “ ‘Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace’: The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace,” *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol 19, Issue 3, 11 August 2013, available at:

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/spsr.12044>.

¹⁷⁰ Roald Berg, “The Missionary impulse in Norwegian history”, *University of Stavanger*, Department of Cultural Studies and Languages, pp. 5, available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43167535.pdf>.

¹⁷¹ Halvard Leira, “ ‘Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace’: The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace,” <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/spsr.12044>

Europe and nuclear weapons testing. Besides, Norway was especially involved in two Polish suggestions to remove or freeze all NWs in East and West Germany.¹⁷²

Undoubtedly, there are more reasons why Norway took such a radical stance on nuclear weapons. Explaining its position from normative point of view, Norway's attitude was heavily influenced by self-ascribed identity as a nation of peace. Strong public opposition to NWs was also a proof for Norwegian politicians that citizens do not want their government to change the humanitarian approach in foreign politics. The country acted in accordance with norms that are still strongly embedded in its society and national identity.

What is the current attitude of Norwegian political elites to nuclear disarmament and to NWs as such? In 2009 Støre at the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly, a Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre called for a “specific agenda for the elimination of existing nuclear arsenals and for ensuring that nuclear technologies are only applied peacefully, [...]” He also added that “Norway is committed to humanitarian disarmament” motivated by the “unacceptable harm that these weapons cause to civilians.”¹⁷³ The fact that Norway did not participate in the UN negotiations on the ban treaty does not imply that it completely abandoned its humanitarian approach. Nonetheless, it is more pragmatic than it was presented in the past. In October 2018, Norway delivered a speech at the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly reaffirming the international community that it is “fully committed to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” however, this can be only achieved through “the balanced, mutual, irreversible and verifiable eliminations of these weapons.” According to the speech, Norway wants to achieve global zero through existing pillars and tools such as the NPT, the IAEA, the CTBT, and various bilateral cooperation.¹⁷⁴

When explaining the Norway's vote on the TPNW in October 2016, Special Representative Knut Langeland reaffirmed international community that Norway is fully committed to achieve “the full elimination of nuclear weapons,” and pledged to “intensify [Norway's] efforts.”¹⁷⁵ The idea of complete disarmament has not vanished from Norwegian political agenda. Nonetheless,

¹⁷² Frederik Lie, “Saying no to nukes,” *ILPI Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Background Paper No 10/2014, 4 September 2014, <http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=2665>.

¹⁷³ *Statement made by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway Jonas Gahr Støre*, United Nations General Assembly 64th session, 13th plenary meeting, 29 September 2009, New York, A/64/PV.13, pp. 11-12, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/PV.13.

¹⁷⁴ *Nuclear weapons – Thematic discussion*, General Assembly, Seventy-third session, 18 October 2018, First Committee, Delivered by Mr. Jorn Osmundsen, pp. 1, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/statement-by-norway-nw.pdf>.

¹⁷⁵ *Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations*, Explanation of Vote by Norway's Special Representative for Disarmament Mr. Knut Langeland, 27 October 2016, pp. 1, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/eov/L41_Norway.pdf.

Norwegian political identity is also based on a neutrality. The country sees itself as a bridge between Russia and the USA. Keeping this delicate balance is not only a matter of security, but also a matter of Norwegian identity. Embracing the Treaty would mean that Norway has to reframe its support of NATO's documents which are openly endorsing possession and use of NWS.

Although Norway is working on various practical initiatives which are reinforcing the non-proliferation norm, it also wants to behave as a reliable ally. According to Egeland, Norwegian government reflects to the great extent a public opinion by balancing its position both on the TPNW and NATO.¹⁷⁶ I argue, that keeping the status quo by not adopting any radical stance on nuclear weapons is a way how Norway demonstrates its political neutrality in practice. Even though the normative model cannot fully explain its abstention from the UN negotiations, it provides an interesting insight to the Norwegian national identity which also impacted its foreign policy choices.

The Netherlands

From the normative point of view, Dutch foreign policy can be described as a balance between moralist/ pacifist tradition and an equally strong strain of rationalism and pragmatism. Regarding the UN negotiations on the ban treaty, there were two critical normative aspects which influenced the Netherlands: existence of a traditionally strong anti-nuclear norm and a Dutch image in NATO as a "faithful ally".¹⁷⁷ The Netherlands as a relatively small wants to stay relevant in both diplomatic and military field. To maintain this position, it has always been a strong proponent of international organizations. It is one of the founding members of the forerunners of the present-day European Union, NATO, the UN, OSCE or the World Bank.¹⁷⁸ Similarly, seeking the right balance was very important for the Dutch representation during the UN negotiations. This case study will examine how both anti-nuclear norm and political pragmatism in the Dutch foreign policy can explain its vote on the TPNW. What made the Dutch government to support all three international conferences on nuclear weapons? Despite the conflictual nature of the TPNW, why the Netherlands considered it necessary to participate in the negotiations?

¹⁷⁶ Kjølsv Egeland, 15 November 2018, Telephone interview.

¹⁷⁷ Ramses A. Wessel, "The Netherlands and NATO" In *Legal Implications of NATO Membership - Focus on Finland and Five Allied States* (Helsinki: The Erik Castrén Research Reports 24/2008), pp. 141-143, <https://www.utwente.nl/en/bms/pa/research/wessel/wessel53.pdf>.

¹⁷⁸ Rob de Wijk, "Seeking the Right Balance: NATO and EU in Dutch Foreign and Defense Policy," *Outono-Inverno* 2007, No. 118-3, pp. 149-150, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/62685444.pdf>.

Dutch foreign policy was once characterized as based on “peace, profits and principles”. According to Professor Rob de Wijk, it refers to Dutch preference of strengthening the international rule of law and multinational organizations to create stable and peaceful international relations. Constructive multilateralism has been a dominant feature in foreign and defense policy. In this regard, the Netherlands never considered the offensive use of its armed forces to be the first choice. Additionally, a certain degree of anti-militarism and pacifism is being considered as one of the leading principles in Dutch foreign policy. Although it is not purely pacifist country by nature, state behavior is strongly influenced by humanist and Christian traditions.¹⁷⁹

Have these principles and norms impacted also Dutch position on nuclear weapons? Yes, to some extent they have. To better understand the anti-nuclear norm that has developed in the Dutch society and later also influenced the political decisions, one should look back to the late 70s when the US decided to deploy cruise missiles in the Western Europe. This decision provoked many negative reactions on the European continent. One of the strongest social movements opposing the deployment was mobilized in the Netherlands. Consequently, the audible opposition led to a spread of general anti-nuclear norm across the country.¹⁸⁰ It had mobilized public opinion so successfully that the Dutch Government postponed a decision whether to accept the missiles.

Crucial role was played by the civil society, specifically by the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) – an official church body with representatives of nine churches sitting on the board. IKV began discussions about a campaign against the nuclear arms race, which was launched in 1977 under the slogan “Help rid the world of nuclear weapons, beginning with the Netherlands”.¹⁸¹ Mient Jan Faber, a Dutch peace activist and the head of IKV, told to the *New York Times* that this movement is not in any way anti-American. All they were fighting for was a nuclear-free Europe, not withdrawal from NATO.¹⁸²

These ideas of a peaceful but militarily reliable country have been also adopted by the Dutch politicians. In 1983, Dr. Richard C. Eichenberg published an article analyzing norms and shared beliefs that traditionally influence foreign policy of the Netherlands. “Dutch disease” –

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 151.

¹⁸⁰ Susi Snyder, the Nuclear Disarmament Programme Manager for PAX, 3 December 2018, E-mail Conversation.

¹⁸¹ Ruud van Dijk, Joppe Schaaper, “The Inter-Church Peace Council and the Nuclear Arms Race,” *Wilson Center*, 14 September 2015, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-ikv-and-the-nuclear-arms-race>.

¹⁸² “ ‘Ban the Bomb’ With a Strong Dutch Accent,” *The New York Times Archive*, 21 February 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/21/weekinreview/ban-the-bomb-with-a-strong-dutch-accent.html>.

Hollanditis, describes a variety of neutralist and pacifist symptoms in state behavior. According to Eichenberg, the foreign policy traditions of the Netherlands were rather complex stating that “there is a strong pacifist-some would say anti-militarist-tradition, a result not only of the influence of law and religion on Dutch thinking about international affairs, but also of the historical antipathy of commercial interests to the costs, and presumably the influence, of a large standing army.” Nonetheless, despite the strong pacifist tradition, the Netherlands has been supporting NATO by a broad consensus since 1949.¹⁸³ According to the latest polls from 2017, roughly 79% of the Dutch people have a positive view of NATO.¹⁸⁴

Even though the Netherlands had been working on an image of a faithful ally from the very beginning of NATO’s existence, this has slightly changed over time. In regard to the nuclear disarmament issues, specifically to the current deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, the Netherlands can be characterized rather as a “critical ally”. In comparison to most NATO member states, the debate on non-strategic nuclear weapons has become relatively well developed. Nevertheless, maintaining the cohesion within the Alliance has a higher priority than the removal of obsolete nuclear weapons, and that explains why the Netherlands is carefully choosing its rhetoric on this matter.¹⁸⁵

This approach is partially influenced by the existence of so called “Atlanticism” that had been for a long time pervasive in Dutch foreign policy. Atlanticism is defined as the perception that NATO, with active American leadership, is the central institutional component of European security.¹⁸⁶ It was particularly strong during the first decades of the Alliance when the Netherlands acted as a particularly staunch ally and a loyal supporter of US leadership in the Alliance. As already mentioned, Atlantic orientation of Dutch foreign policy was weakened as a result of the US proposal on stationing its missiles on Dutch territory.¹⁸⁷

Although the Netherlands has not completely rejected the American leadership in the Alliance, it has taken more critical position. In 2010, a former foreign minister Maxime Verhagen summarized it as following: “The Netherlands thinks for itself. It assesses every partnership

¹⁸³ Richard C. Eichenberg, “The Myth of Hollanditis,” *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall 1983, pp. 144-145, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2538599.pdf>.

¹⁸⁴ Moira Fagan, “NATO is seen favorably in many member countries, but almost half of Americans say it does too little,” *Pew Research Center*, 9 July 2018, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-member-countries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little/>.

¹⁸⁵ Wilbert van der Zeijden, “A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics,” *European Security*, Vol. 23, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.856302>.

¹⁸⁶ <https://warontherocks.com/2013/12/atlanticisms-revenge/>.

¹⁸⁷ Rudy B. Andeweg, Galen A. Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (4th Edition)*, Red Globe Press, 2014, pp. 253.

and every request for support on its merits. That includes its partnership with and support for the United States. Yes, we work willingly and frequently with the US around the world. We work for economic growth, security, and welfare. Sometimes we don't agree with one another, and then we express our criticism clearly.”¹⁸⁸ According to this statement, the Dutch government does not want to be perceived as an uncritical US ally who is too afraid to express its own opinions on political issues. Nevertheless, it also does want to be the one country among all NATO members who is contesting the status quo.

This partially answers the question why the Dutch government sent the delegation to participate in the UN negotiations on the ban treaty and also supported all three conferences in Norway, Mexico and Austria. It wanted to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the lack of dialogue on nuclear disarmament within NATO, not to undermine the Alliance. The Netherlands found it necessary to participate not only because of the domestic pressure, but also because of the strong moral dimension that exists in the Dutch foreign policy. It is so called ‘internationalist idealism’ that forces the Dutch government to play an active role in multilateral humanitarian initiatives.¹⁸⁹ Besides, it has always aspired to be a leading country in international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts - the Netherlands is part of the group of 10 countries known within the NPT context as the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), whose central aim is to promote a holistic approach to a stepwise process of disarmament.¹⁹⁰

Given to the “two-fold strategy” which is being pursued by the Netherlands, the government often faces criticism for being hypocritical. In fact, this strategy is a result of both pragmatic and pacifist elements in Dutch thinking about foreign policy. It enables the country not only comment on global politics but also actively participate in it. Taking into consideration strong anti-nuclear norm and humanitarian element in the Dutch foreign policy, signing the ban treaty would be a logical step for the country which is a great supporter of disarmament and non-proliferation internationally. In 2015 during the NPT Review Conference, the former foreign minister Koenders openly endorsed the idea that nuclear weapons must be eventually banned.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ *The Netherlands, Europe and Transatlantic Relations*, Speech by foreign minister Maxime Verhagen at the CDA Conference on ‘The Future of Transatlantic Relations’, The Hague, 27 January 2010, <https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2010/01/27/speech-by-verhagen-at-the-cda-conference-on-the-future-of-transatlantic-relations>.

¹⁸⁹ Rudy B. Andeweg, Galen A. Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (4th Edition)*, pp. 267.

¹⁹⁰ Wilbert van der Zeijden, “A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics,” pp. 48-49.

¹⁹¹ *Speech of H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands at the NPT Review Conference, General Debate, 27 April 2015, New York, pp. 3, available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/NL_en.pdf.*

On the other hand, signing and adopting the treaty would be harmful with regard to the Dutch status in the Alliance and to the relations between the US and the Netherlands.

From the normative point of view, balancing both moral dimension and pragmatism in foreign policy allows the Netherlands to act as a bridge-builder in various forums and organizations. In spite of voting no on the ban treaty, the Dutch government sent out a strong political statement that cannot be ignored. It has always been ready to contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons even though there are currently legal obligations which make it for the country more difficult to act accordingly. Whether the Netherlands will ever adopt more radical position on nuclear weapons is highly disputable.

Conclusion

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the first globally applicable multilateral agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons. Adopted by a United Nations diplomatic conference on 7 July 2017, the primary objective of the ban treaty is to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world. For decades, non-nuclear armed states have been asking the nuclear armed states to fulfill the promise they have made under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to actively work towards complete nuclear disarmament and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Latent frustration of NNWSs has been projected into the final document adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). Parties to the NPT expressed their “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” and emphasized “the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”¹⁹²

After weeks of negotiating the TPNW, there were 122 States which voted in favor, 1 State that voted against and 1 abstention. The rest of the international community, more exactly 69 States, completely abstained from the UN negotiations. Based on this outcome, I have developed a research question asking *why some countries are refusing to ban nuclear weapons*. The primary goal of the research was to specify external and internal factors which could potentially influence a country’s position on the TPNW.

To understand why some countries do not want to ban nuclear weapons, I decided to apply a model-based approach developed by Scott Sagan which explains why countries build nuclear weapons. There are three levels of analysis: security model, domestic model and norm model which are based on three major theories – neo-realism, liberalism and constructivism. These three models are independent variables while the position on the TPNW serves as dependent variable. I chose congruence method to indicate the degree of consistency between the predicted and the observed values of the dependent variable to evaluate the explanatory power of the models. Firstly, I needed to define what are the specific theoretical assumptions of each model and how they explain the country’s position. As the second step I tried to predict the outcome in my two cases. After examining each case carefully, I was able to evaluate which model has the strongest explanatory power of my two cases.

¹⁹² 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document Volume I, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), pp. 19, available at: [https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).

I chose two countries which bear some common characteristics: Norway and the Netherlands. Both countries are founding members of NATO with the close relations to the USA. In the Alliance, they are perceived as faithful allies with strong conventional military capabilities and with relatively advanced defense sector. With regard to the Humanitarian Initiative, both countries actively supported the humanitarian approach to the nuclear weapons and called for progress in nuclear disarmament. Norway organized the very first international conference on this matter and openly advocated for nuclear ban. Similarly, the Netherlands supported all three conferences and resolutions which UN General Assembly adopted with regard to nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the Netherlands participated in the UN negotiations on the ban treaty as the only NATO member State. Eventually, both Norway and the Netherlands did not support the TPNW. Norway abstained from the negotiations while the Netherlands voted against the ban treaty.

Explanatory power of each model varies from case to case. Security model assumes that a country would not ban NWs since they are source of stability and balance in the current international environment. Realists argue that nuclear weapons make a major conventional conflict less probable and therefore the existence of a state is not threatened. Applying the security model to the Norwegian case, its refusal to ban nuclear weapons can be explained by so called emerging Russian threat. Given to the current political tensions, Norway is very careful when it comes to Russian activities in the North Atlantic. Besides, the TPNW does not only require banning nuclear weapons per se but it also prohibits cooperation with other countries on the activities which could be related to the nuclear weapon program. This would complicate Norwegian intelligence activities which are critical to not only to Norway, but also to the USA and the Alliance. Potentially, it could weaken NATO security, however, it is not clear how Norway would be endangered by not sharing its intelligence with the USA or the Alliance.

On the other hand, security model failed to explain two facts. Firstly, the model would assume that a country which refuses to ban NWs for security reasons would be more eager to host NWs. This assumption does not apply in Norwegian case since it has a strict policy against hosting NWs on its territory in peacetime. Secondly, the security model does not explain why Norway hosted the international conference on the humanitarian consequences of NWs in 2013 and strongly supported the idea of eliminating the NWs. Between 2013 and 2017 there were no radical changes in international security that could be interpreted as a cause of altered

Norwegian position on nuclear weapons. Besides, Norway is not directly threatened by any state actor and it is primarily relying on its conventional military capabilities.

Security model was more successful in explaining the Dutch position. The Netherlands has been hosting the US tactical nuclear weapons for decades and there are legal obligations which conflict with the TPNW. This country is not only relying on nuclear umbrella - the Netherlands is directly participating in the US nuclear deterrence infrastructure. From the realist point of view, signing the ban treaty could endanger NATO's nuclear deterrence policy because these tactical NWs would need to be removed after adopting the ban treaty. Costs would outweigh the benefits since the Dutch cooperation with NATO would be hampered and the Alliance members would be weakened by this move.

Nevertheless, looking at the Dutch case through the lenses of security model, there exists no logical explanation on the Dutch participation in the UN negotiations.

Domestic model presented the second level of analysis – domestic politics. This model assumed that the foreign policy choices of a country are heavily influenced by domestic institutions such as parliament, domestic audience and public society. I argue that domestic politics played a significant role in forming Norwegian position on both humanitarian initiative and the ban treaty. From 2005 to 2013 the Norwegian Government was represented by center-left coalition led by the Labor Party which is an active proponent of the nuclear disarmament. In October 2013 a major change occurred when the government was formed by the Conservative Party and the Progress Party – a center-right coalition. The new government started actively working on closer transatlantic relations and gradually abandoned its humanitarian approach to NWs. Eventually, transformation in political leadership appeared to be a significant component.

The Norwegian Government was not pressured to attend the UN negotiations since both politicians and domestic audience took a very balance stance on the TPNW. Vocal criticism of NATO and their policies which are relying on nuclear weapons would not be supported neither by Norwegian Parliament nor by the citizens. Nevertheless, I argue that if there had been no political change in 2013, the Norwegian Government would have been more willing to at least attend the UN negotiations as the Netherlands did. Given to its role which Norway played in the dialogue on nuclear disarmament between 2010 and 2013, for the abrupt change in its rhetoric is primarily responsible the political change at the domestic level.

In regard to the Dutch case, domestic model also successfully explains why the Netherlands decided to participate in the UN negotiations despite its legal obligations to host nuclear

weapons. I argue that the most critical factors were public society and the Dutch Parliament. The Netherlands has a long tradition of anti-nuclear movements that were fighting against the idea of deployment of NWs. One of the most influential Dutch NGOs PAX launched an initiative for introducing a national ban on nuclear weapons. This initiative received a great support from civil society and the Dutch citizens. Furthermore, a substantial number of political parties is also frustrated with a lack of transparency in nuclear sharing arrangements. As a result, the Dutch Parliament is being actively engaged in the political debates on nuclear weapons. Political parties which are endorsing the idea of nuclear weapons prohibition are regularly issuing so called ‘motions’ asking the Dutch Government to take more active stance on nuclear disarmament.

In comparison to the domestic model, the norm model’s explanatory power was quite problematic. In both cases role of the norms and state identity is less clear. Based on constructivism, this model assumes that countries and their foreign policies are not based on the security threats or domestic response, but on a state identity. The state identity constitutes a role which country plays in the international arena and thus is expected to behave in accordance with it. Both Norway and the Netherlands are perceived as faithful and reliable Allies. This can partially explain why they rejected the TPNW – being the only NATO Member States which would sign the ban treaty despite American disapproval could be harmful to their state roles and identities. On the other hand, Norway is perceived as a “humanitarian superpower” what would suggest that Norwegian adherence to the humanitarian norms in foreign policy is stronger than anything else. Regarding the ban treaty, I argue that Norway decided to take on a role of pragmatic and reliable partner for its Allies.

Explaining the Dutch case through the norm model is equally difficult. I argue that the Netherlands supported the Humanitarian Initiative and participated actively in the UN negotiations because it wants to be perceived as a bridge builder between two camps – between the opponents and proponents of the TPNW. Nevertheless, humanitarianism is not the core element of the Dutch foreign policy. There is also a strong ‘Atlanticism’ which constitutes a bigger part of the Dutch identity and therefore it would not go against the Allies by signing the ban treaty.

Although the explanatory power of each model varied in both cases, the model-based approach enabled me to examine the Dutch and Norwegian positions from different angles. I argue that application of these models to a larger set of cases would help to further refine the role of each model in determining the choice not to ban nuclear weapons. The most successful in answering

the research question was the domestic model. Better understanding of the links between foreign policy choices and domestic factors, which are otherwise not visible, helps to explain state's decisions that do not seem to be completely logical from the international perspective. Adding more layers to the analysis was critical in order to have a complete picture of why some countries do not want to ban nuclear weapons even though they consider those weapons for being immoral.

This thesis contributes to the debate on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear weapons abolition by explaining the importance of various factors which have impact on state behavior. The outcomes of the research showed to what extent a dialogue on nuclear weapons has been democratized and how civil society managed to influence it. Nuclear weapons are not discussed anymore exclusively among high-level officials or military strategists. I argue that it is critical to conduct further research on how abolition of nuclear weapons is perceived in other countries, especially at the domestic level. Due to the time constraints I could not analyze more than two cases, however, it would be useful to include more countries which abstained from negotiation such as Ukraine or Uzbekistan that are not part of any nuclear umbrella. It would be also interesting to seek for an explanation of the positions of Iraq and Iran that both endorsed the ban treaty. Given to the current political and security tensions, it is important to keep the debate on nuclear weapons alive. Looking at various national debates on NWS could help us to understand how the debate will develop further at the international level. Nowadays, not only NWSs are shaping the nuclear discourse but also civil society and small countries.

Finally, taking into consideration all important factors and aspects that can potentially influence state behavior, it is important to say that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is not a perfect treaty. But there is no such a thing as a perfect treaty. Most of the countries in the world would agree on a statement that nuclear weapons are deeply immoral, and their use is illegitimate. However, since 1945 they are being used as an important strategic weapon for deterrence. It is therefore understandable that many countries are very unsure about the consequences of prohibiting these weapons. Eventually, no matter which countries voted in favor or against the TPNW, this treaty and its initiators managed to achieve one important thing – they were able to reframe the debate on nuclear weapons. Adopting a humanitarian approach to something what is considered to be a purely strategic tool is a turning point. And although the Netherlands and Norway refused to sign the ban treaty, it does not mean that their positions cannot be altered in the future. Countries are organisms which are changing and developing. This model-based approach showed that foreign policy choices are not static based only on the

state identities and roles. There are external and internal factors which influence political statements of the countries. The TPNW presents another strong political statement and it will be interesting to see how it will get more powerful in future with increasing number of signatories and ratifications.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume I, New York, 2010, available at: [https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20\(VOL.I\)](https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)).

Active support for disarmament and non-proliferation in the UN, Government.no, 11 March, 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/support_disarmament/id2459977/.

Annual Threat Assessment 2018, Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, pp. 16-20, available at: <https://www.pst.no/globalassets/artikler/trusselvurderinger/annual-threat-assessment-2018.pdf>.

A progressive approach to a world free of nuclear weapons: revisiting the building blocks paradigm, Disarmament Commission, 30 March 2016, available at: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/documents/library/A%20CN.10%202016%20WG.I%20WP.3.pdf>.

B61-12 Life Extension Program, National Nuclear Security Administration, [nnsa.energy.gov](https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/04/f50/B61-12%20LEP%20factsheet.pdf), <https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/04/f50/B61-12%20LEP%20factsheet.pdf>.

Ban Nuclear Weapons in the Netherlands: Proposal to Parliament, Citizen's Initiative "Teken tegen kernwapens", September 2015, PAX, <https://nonukes.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PAX-proposal-citizens-initiative-2016-ENG.pdf>.

Burgerinitiatief Teken tegen kernwapens, parlementairemonitor.nl, 28 April 2016, <https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vk3mu2xtiby2>.

Conclusion of UN Negotiations on Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons, Press Statement, July 2017, U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/272429.htm>.

Council of Delegates 2011: Resolution 1: Working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, 26 November 2011, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/council-delegates-resolution-1-2011.htm>.

Disarmament – reframing the challenge, Speech by Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, the 45th Annual Conference, 1 February 2010, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/disarmament/id592550/>.

European Parliament resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation, 27 October 2016, Strasbourg,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2016-0424>.

Explanation of vote of the Netherlands on text of Nuclear Ban Treaty, 7 July 2017,
<https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/latest/news/2017/07/07/explanation-of-vote-of-ambassador-lise-gregoire-on-the-draft-text-of-the-nuclear-ban-treaty>.

Focus 2018 - The Norwegian Intelligence Service's assessment of current security challenges, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1 February 2018, available at:
https://forsvaret.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/Fokus2018_engelsk_Enkeltsider_Godkjent_med.pdf.

Harvard Law Review: joining Nuclear Ban Treaty will not violate existing security agreements, ICAN, 19 June 2018, <http://www.icanw.org/action/harvard-law-review-nuclear-ban-treaty-compatible-existing-security-agreements-nato-eu-umbrella/>.

Humanitarian Pledge, bmeia.gv.at, available at:
https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna_Pledge_Document.pdf.

Humanitarian Pledge: Stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, icanw.org, available at: <http://www.icanw.org/pledge/>.

IAEA Safeguards Agreements, iaea.org, available at: <https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements>.

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, iipnw.org,
<https://www.ippnw.org/mission.html>.

Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons, usun.state.gov, available at: <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7892>.

Krista van Velzen Speech at the House of Representatives on 19 April 2016, available at:
<https://nonukes.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/20161904-speech-burgerinitiatief-Krista-van-Velzen-PAX.pdf>.

Norwegian parliament – time to prohibit nuclear weapons! Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 7 June 2014, <http://www.pnnd.org/article/norwegian-parliament-%E2%80%93-time-prohibit-nuclear-weapons>.

Norway votes against nuclear disarmament resolution in the UN, Press release, 28 October 2016, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-votes-against-nuclear-disarmament-resolution-in-the-un/id2518168/>.

Norwegian report on General Assembly resolution 71/67 on nuclear disarmament verification, 22nd meeting, 27 October 2016,

[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/187E579426350611C125816E003F22D3/\\$file/2017+NDV+Norway.pdf](https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/187E579426350611C125816E003F22D3/$file/2017+NDV+Norway.pdf).

Nuclear weapons – Thematic discussion, General Assembly, Seventy-third session, 18 October 2018, First Committee, Delivered by Mr. Jorn Osmundsen, available at: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/statement-by-norway-nw.pdf>.

Opening Statement at Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Speech at the Conference on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo, 4-5 March, 2013, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/opening_humimpact/id715948/.

Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 April, 2009, available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

Remarks by Secretary of State Kerry and Norway's Foreign Minister Brende, U.S. Embassy in Norway, 26 February 2015, <https://no.usembassy.gov/remarks-secretary-state-kerry-norways-foreign-minister-brende/>

Russia and the Defense Efforts of the Netherlands, Advisory Letter, Advisory Council on International Affairs, No. 31, March 2017, <https://aiv-advies.nl/download/fb4c5029-277f-4285-9494-b9a5e3439f90.pdf>.

Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons – Chair's Summary, 14 February 2014, available at: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nayarit-2014/chairs-summary.pdf>.

Security policy challenges facing Norway and Europe today, Speech by Prime Minister Erna Solberg to The Royal United Services Institute in London, 6 May 2018, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/security-policy-challenges-facing-norway-and-europe-today/id2603739/>.

Speech of H.E. Mr. Bert Koenders, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands at the NPT Review Conference, General Debate, 27 April 2015, New York, available at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/NL_en.pdf.

Statement by Foreign Minister Koenders to the Conference on Disarmament, Statement by Foreign Minister Bert Koenders to the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva, 29 February 2016), <https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2016/02/29/statement-by-foreign-minister-koenders-to-the-conference-on-disarmament>.

Statement by Mr. Atle Midttun, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, UN General Assembly, 3 October 2017, available at: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/statement-by-norway.pdf>.

Statement by Norway in Cluster I Debate at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, April 2018, available at: <http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/18559383/norway-clusteristatement.pdf>.

Statement to the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen, 17 March 2011, available at: http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2011/statements/part1/17March_Norway.pdf.

Statement to the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador Bente Angell-Hansen, 17 March 2011, available at: http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2011/statements/part1/17March_Norway.pdf.

Statement made by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway Jonas Gahr Støre, United Nations General Assembly 64th session, 13th plenary meeting, 29 September 2009, New York, A/64/PV.13, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/PV.13.

Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, Explanation of Vote by Norway's Special Representative for Disarmament Mr. Knut Langeland, 27 October 2016, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com16/eov/L41_Norway.pdf.

The Netherlands, Europe and Transatlantic Relations, Speech by foreign minister Maxime Verhagen at the CDA Conference on 'The Future of Transatlantic Relations', The Hague, 27 January 2010, <https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2010/01/27/speech-by-verhagen-at-the-cda-conference-on-the-future-of-transatlantic-relations>.

The UK – Norway Initiative: Report on the UKNI Non-Nuclear Weapon States Workshop (7-9 December 2011), available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/28423/120426_2011_ukni_workshop_final_rpt.pdf.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Article I, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, July 2017, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2003-42%20PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – the 'Ban Treaty,' Briefing – January 2018, available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614664/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)614664_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614664/EPRS_BRI(2018)614664_EN.pdf)

United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, 17 March 2017, New York, available at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/tpnw/pdf/A%20CONF.229%202017%20NGO%20WP.6%20Working%20paper%20on%20prohibiting%20the%20financing%20of%20nuclear%20weapons%20production.pdf>.

Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands: An Integrated International Security Strategy 2018-2022, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at: https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/reports/2018/05/14/integrated-international-security-strategy-2018-2022/NL_International_Integrated_Security_Strategy_2018_2022.pdf.

Secondary Sources

ALEXANDROV, M., "The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis," *Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation*, Hiroshima University, pp. 36-37, available at: <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.503.2088&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

ANDEWEG, R., IRWIN, G.A., *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (4th Edition)* (Red Globe Press, 2014).

"'Ban the Bomb' With a Strong Dutch Accent," *The New York Times Archive*, 21 February 1982, <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/21/weekinreview/ban-the-bomb-with-a-strong-dutch-accent.html>.

BANDARAGE, A., "The 'Norwegian Model': Political Economy of NGO Peacemaking," *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 17, Issue 2, Spring/Summer 2011, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590809>.

BEATON, L., *Must the Bomb Spread?*, (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).

BENEDICT, K., "Most likely to succeed against nuclear weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 17 September 2013, <https://thebulletin.org/2013/09/most-likely-to-succeed-against-nuclear-weapons/>.

BENTNICK, M., "Why the Dutch Military Punches Below Its Weight," *Carnegie Europe*, 8 February 2018, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/75484>.

BERGE, R., "The Missionary impulse in Norwegian history", *University of Stavanger*, Department of Cultural Studies and Languages, available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43167535.pdf>.

BOULEGUE, M., "The US – Russia Relationship Is Likely to Deteriorate Further in 2018," *Chatham House*, 25 January 2018, available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/us-russia-relationship-likely-deteriorate-further-2018>.

BURGER, A., DEKKER, P., "The nonprofit sector in the Netherlands," *Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau*, April 2001, Den Haag, pp. 62-63, available at: <https://www.scp.nl/dsresource?objectid=316d28b5-799a-4acb-8392-cca00cdfb86b&type=org>.

DEVITT, R., "Liberal Institutionalism: An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo?" *e-ir.info*, 1 September 2011, <https://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/01/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-or-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/>.

DIJK, R., SCHAAPER, J., "The Inter-Church Peace Council and the Nuclear Arms Race," *Wilson Center*, 14 September 2015, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-IKV-and-the-nuclear-arms-race>.

DUNN, L.A., KAHN, H., *Trends in nuclear proliferation, 1975-1995: projections, problems, and policy options*, (New York: Hudson Institute, 1976).

EGELAND, K., "Forvandlingen: Om atomvåpen, anerkjennelse og utenrikspolitiske linjeskif," *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, vol. 34, no. 2, (2017), available at: https://www.idunn.no/nnt/2017/02/forvandlingen_om_atomvaapen_anerkjennelse_og_utenrikspolit.

EICHENBERG, R.C., "The Myth of Hollanditis," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Fall 1983, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2538599.pdf>.

ELEVELD, M., "Russia, the Bomb, and IR theory. Explaining Russian nuclear weapons policy in the post-Cold War era," Master Thesis, Leiden University, 2016, available at: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/43504079.pdf>.

FAGAN, M., "NATO is seen favorably in many member countries, but almost half of Americans say it does too little," *Pew Research Center*, 9 July 2018, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/09/nato-is-seen-favorably-in-many-member-countries-but-almost-half-of-americans-say-it-does-too-little/>.

FATTON, L., "Dutch role as bridge builder in nuke talks should inspire Japan", *Kyodo News*, 10 June 2017, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2017/06/dcb8affee16b-focus-dutch-role-as-bridge-builder-in-uke-talks-should-inspire-japan.html>.

FIHN, B., "The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons," *Survival*, vol. 59, no.1, January 2017, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282671>.

FRIEDMAN, U., "Why One President Gave Up His Country's Nukes," *The Atlantic*, 9 September, 2017, available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-south-africa/539265/>.

GALEY, P., "Anti-nuclear campaign ICAN wins Nobel Peace Prize," *phys.org*, 6 October 2017, available at: <https://phys.org/news/2017-10-anti-nuclear-campaign-ican-nobel-peace.html#jCp>.

GARZKE, E., JO, Dong-Joon, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51, no. 1 (February 2007), available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706296158>.

GOERGE, A., BENNETT, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004).

GOETZ, B.L., *Nuclear Weapons: Can Their Spread be Halted?*, (New York: Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1965).

GOLDSTONE, E., "Analyzing the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Through Realism," *Foreign Affairs Review*, 7 December 2017, available at: <https://jhufar.com/2018/02/28/analyzing-the-un-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons-through-realism/>.

GRAY, C.S., PAYNE, K., "Victory is Possible," *Foreign Policy*, no. 39 (Summer, 1980), available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148409>.

HANSON, M., "Normalizing zero nuclear weapons: The humanitarian road to the Prohibition Treaty," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol.39, no.3, February 2018, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1421344>.

HOPF, T., "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer, 1998), available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539267>.

HARRIES, M., "The Real Problem With a Nuclear Ban Treaty," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 15 March 2017, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/15/real-problem-with-nuclear-ban-treaty-pub-68286>.

HYMANS, J.E.C., *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

KATZENSTEIN, P., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1996), available at: <http://www.fb03.uni-frankfurt.de/45503391/Introduction-from-Katzenstein-1996---The-Culture-of-National-Security.pdf>.

KELLENBERGER, J., "Statement: Bringing the era of nuclear weapons to an end," 20 April 2010, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons-statement-200410.htm>.

KITTRIE, O., "What's the Matter With Norway?" *The Wall Street Journal*, 16 January 2018, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/01/16/whats-the-matter-with-norway/>.

KRAMER, M., "Neorealism, Nuclear Proliferation, And East-Central European Strategies," *Harvard University*, May 1998, available at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/ruseur_wp_005.pdf

LENNANE, R., "Norway's conflicted relationship with nuclear weapons," *wildfire-v.org*, 24 February 2015, pp. 1, http://www.wildfire-v.org/Norway_conflicted_nuclear_24_Feb_2015.pdf.

LEIRA, " 'Our Entire People are Natural Born Friends of Peace': The Norwegian Foreign Policy of Peace," *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol 19, Issue 3, 11 August 2013, available at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/spsr.12044>.

LILIENTHAL, D.E., *Change, Hope, and the Bomb*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

LIE, F., "Saying no to nukes," *ILPI Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Background Paper No 10/2014, 4 September 2014, <http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=2665>.

MARCUS, J., "US nuclear bombs 'based in Netherlands' – ex-Dutch PM Lubbers," *bbc.com*, 10 June 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22840880>.

MEARSHEIMER, J., "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078>.

MEER, S., “A treaty banning nuclear weapons and its implication for the Netherlands,” *Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations*, May 2015, <http://www.asser.nl/media/2582/a-treaty-banning-nuclear-weapons-2015.pdf>.

MEIER, O., et al, “What participants in a nuclear weapons ban treaty (do not) want,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 9 June 2017, available at: <https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/what-participants-in-a-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-do-not-want/>.

MERRY, R.W., Robert W. Merry, “A TNI Classic: Kenneth Waltz on Nuclear Zero,” *The National Interest*, 20 May 2013, available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/tni-classic-kenneth-waltz-nuclear-zero-8488>.

MEKATA, M., “How Transnational Civil Society Realized the Ban Treaty: An Interview with Beatrice Fihn,” *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 1:1, available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1441583?needAccess=true>.

MEYER, P., SAUER, T., “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience,” *Survival*, vol. 60, no.2, March 2018, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2018.1448574>.

MILNER, H.V., *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997).

MORAVCSIK, A., *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

MORAVCSIK, A., “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organizations*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), available at: <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/preferences.pdf>.

MORAVCSIK, A., “Why the European Union Strengthen the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation,” *Center for European Studies*, Working Paper Series no. 52 presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science, September 1994, <http://aei.pitt.edu/9151/1/Moravcsik52.pdf>.

MUKHATZHANOVA, G., “The Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Negotiations and Beyond,” *Arms Control Association*, armscontrol.org, September 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/features/nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty-negotiations-beyond>

NEUBAUER, S., “Norway, an Exemplar of NATO Burden-Sharing,” *Foreign Affairs*, 2 January, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/norway/2017-01-02/norway-exemplar-nato-burden-sharing>.

NIJEBOER, A., PABST, R., “The Netherlands Introduce Citizen’s Initiative,” *Democracy International*, 7 February 2006, <https://democracy-international.org/netherlands-introduce-citizens-intitiative>.

NILSSON, N., “Role conceptions, crises, and Georgia’s foreign policy,” *Sage Journals – Cooperation and Conflict*, 3 November 2018, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010836718808332>.

Norway did not support UN Resolutions on Nuclear Weapons, Norwegian People's Aid, 2015, <https://www.npaid.org/News/News-archive/2015/Norway-did-not-support-UN-Resolutions-on-Nuclear-Weapons>.

Norway – Mine Ban Policy, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, <http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/1999/norway.html>.

NYSTUEN, G., EGELNAD, K., *The TPNW and its implications for Norway*, Norwegian Academy of International Law, September 2018, pp. 20-21, available at: <https://legermotatomvapen.no/filer/tpnw-implications-for-norway-25-sept-2018.pdf>.

O'HANLON, M., "Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Possible?" *brookings.edu*, 4 May 2010, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-really-possible/>.

O'DWYER, G., "Norwegian leaders want to know why US Marines are stationed in the country," *Defense News*, 27 October 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/10/27/norwegian-leaders-want-to-know-why-us-marines-are-stationed-in-the-country/>.

ONDERCO, M., "Why nuclear weapon ban treaty is unlikely to fulfil its promise," *Global Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 4-5, December 2017, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1409082>.

OMTVEIT, A.M.S., "Soft power through Responsibility to Protect: a small state's foreign policy strategy – A study of Norwegian foreign policy and R2P in the context of the civil wars in Libya and Syria", Master Thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2015, <https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2359546/Omtveit%2c%20Anne%20Margrete%20Slaaen.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

PERKOVICH, G., ACTON, J.M., *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).

POTTER, W., "Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty", *Survival*, Vol. 59, No. 4, 16 July 2017, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1349786>.

PUTNAM, R.D., "The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785>.

RACHMAN, G., "A nuclear-free world? No thanks," *The Financial Times*, 3 May 2010, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/a30e936e-56dd-11df-aa89-00144feab49a>.

RITTBERGER, V., et al., *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

RUHLE, M., "The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: reasons for skepticism," *NATO Review magazine*, 19 May 2017, available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-scepticism-abolition/en/index.htm>.

- RUSSETT, B. M., “Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?” *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1988), available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1407651>.
- SAGAN, S.D., “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No.3 (Winter, 1996-1997), available at: <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.21.3.54>.
- SAGAN, S., VALENTINO, B.A., “The nuclear weapons ban treaty: Opportunities lost,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 16 July 2017, available at: <https://thebulletin.org/2017/07/the-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-opportunities-lost/>.
- SAUER, T., “How will NATO’s non-nuclear members handle the UN’s ban on nuclear weapons?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 73, No. 3, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1315039>.
- SAXI, H.L., *Norwegian and Danish Defense Policy: A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold era* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Defense Studies, 2010).
- SHIROBOKOVA, E., “The Netherlands and the prohibition of nuclear weapons,” *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 25, Issue 1-2, July 2018, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1487600>.
- SINGH, S., WAY, Ch., “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 48, issue 6, 1 December 2004, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704269655>.
- SOLINGEN, E., *Nuclear Logics Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
- TANNENWALD, N., “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4, March 2005.
- TOW, W.T., “The nuclear Waltz: Rational actors, deterrence and non-proliferation,” *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, Issue 3, 2014, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2014.937371>.
- VELZEN, Van K., “Wat heeft de Tweede Kamer gedaan voor nucleaire ontwapening? (een overzicht van aangenomen moties)”, *nonukes.nl*, 21 September 2015, <https://nonukes.nl/overzicht-van-aangenomen-moties-in-de-tweede-kamer-over-nucleaire-ontwapening/>.
- WALTZ, K.N., “War in Neorealist Theory,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1988, available at: <http://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/Waltz.pdf>.
- WARE, A., “UN nuclear ban treaty negotiations: transit, threat and nuclear weapons financing,” *Unfold Zero*, 25 June 2017, available at: <http://www.unfoldzero.org/un-nuclear-ban-treaty-negotiations-transit-threat-and-nuclear-weapons-financing/>.
- WENDT, A., “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *American Political Science Review* 88 (1994), available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944711>.

WESSEL, R.A., “The Netherlands and NATO” In *Legal Implications of NATO Membership - Focus on Finland and Five Allied States* (Helsinki: The Erik Castrén Research Reports 24/2008), available at: <https://www.utwente.nl/en/bms/pa/research/wessel/wessel53.pdf>.

WILLIAMS, B.W., “Norway to Host 700 American Soldiers,” *Norway Today*, 16 August 2018, <http://norwaytoday.info/news/norway-host-700-american-soldiers/>.

WILLIAMS, H., “A nuclear babel: narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” *Nonproliferation Review* 2018, Vol. 25, No. 1-2, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1477453>.

WINTOUR, P., “Troubled waters: Norway keeps watch on Russia’s Arctic maneuvers,” *The Guardian*, 13 March 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/13/troubled-waters-norway-keeps-watch-on-russias-arctic-manoevres>.

WJIK, R., “Seeking the Right Balance: NATO and EU in Dutch Foreign and Defense Policy,” *Outono-Inverno* 2007, No. 118-3, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/62685444.pdf>.

WYK, J.A., et al, “The International Politics of Nuclear Weapons: A Constructivist Analysis,” *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol. 35, Nr. 1, 2007, available at: <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/28/54>.

ZEIJDEN, W., “A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics,” *European Security*, Vol. 23, Issue 1, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.856302>.

¹ <https://warontherocks.com/2013/12/atlanticisms-revenge/>.

ZHAO, T., WANG, R., “China and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty,” *Carnegie-Tsinghua*, 21 September 2017, available at: <https://carnegietsinghua.org/2017/09/21/china-and-nuclear-weapons-prohibition-treaty-pub-73488>.

“Сергей Лавров объяснил отказ России присоединиться к договору о запрете ядерного оружия,” *Kommersant*, 18 March 2018, available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3577211>.

“Россия отказалась от договора по запрету ядерного оружия,” *Pravda*, 19 January 2018, available at: <https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/19-01-2018/1366561-russia-0/>.

Interviews

Kjølv Egeland, researcher at the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) in Oslo, 15 November 2018, Telephone interview.

Susi Snyder, the Nuclear Disarmament Program Manager for PAX, 3 December 2018, E-mail Conversation.