

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies
Department of International Relations

Master's Thesis

2018

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CHARLES UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Social Sciences

Institute of Political Studies

Department of International Relations

Changing perception of peace in postwar Japan

Master's thesis

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Study programme: International Relations

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Academic Year: 2017/2018

Declaration of Authorship

1. I hereby declare that I compiled this thesis independently, using only listed resources and literature.
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In Prague, July 31, 2018

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Bibliographic note

NGUYEN, Dieu Thuy. *Changing perception of peace in postwar Japan*. Praha, 2018. 57 p. Master Thesis (MA). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Sciences. Department of International Relations. Thesis supervisor Mgr. Michal Kolmaš, Ph.D..

Abstract

The thesis aims to illustrate the changing perception of peace in Japan. The development of Japan after the World War II has been an interesting object of study in the field of international relations. The main theme of Japan's foreign and security policy during the postwar period has been its pacifist identity. However, it is possible to observe changing attitude of Japanese towards peace and pacifist identity. What aspects contribute to changing identity of a state? What caused the changing perception of peace in Japan? The work examines approaches of conventional constructivism and poststructuralism. It will be shown, that these approaches are not able to sufficiently explain the identity formation. Therefore, thesis introduces theory of sedimentation of identity layers, which combines aforementioned approaches and adds another feature – the operation of identity entrepreneurs. It will be shown that these actors play a significant role in the changing perception of peace in Japan.

Keywords

Japan, pacifism, peace, identity

Range of thesis: 57 pages, 20 879 words, 131 760 characters

Anotace

Diplomová práce má za cíl ilustrovat změnu vnímání míru v poválečném Japonsku. Vývoj Japonska po 2. světové válce je velmi často zkoumané téma v oboru mezinárodních vztahů. Hlavní prvek japonské poválečné zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky je pacifismus a pacifistická identita. V posledních letech lze sledovat měnící se postoj k míru a pacifistické identitě. Jaké aspekty ovlivňují tvorbu národní identity? Co způsobuje měnící se vnímání míru v Japonsku? Práce zkoumá přístupy konvenčních konstruktivistů a poststrukturalistů. Jak bude ale vysvětleno, tyto přístupy nejsou schopny dostatečně vysvětlit jevy, které vedou k proměně identity. Z tohoto důvodu práce přichází s teorií sedimentace národní identity, která kombinuje přístupy výše zmíněných teorií a navíc přidává další prvek – působení aktérů přeměny (identity entrepreneurs), kteří hrají významnou roli při procesu proměny vnímání míru, což bude v práci ukázáno.

Klíčová slova

Japonsko, pacifismus, mír, identita

Acknowledgements

My enduring appreciation goes to my supervisor Mgr. Michal Kolmaš, Ph.D., who offered me guidance, useful suggestions and advice.

To my family and friends, thank you for encouraging me in all of my pursuits. I would like to especially thank my parents for their unconditional encouragement and support throughout my study.

List of Abbreviations

GOJ	Government of Japan
GHQ	General Headquarters
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
LDP	Liberla Democratic Party of Japan
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
MOD	Ministry of Defense of Japan
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRC	People's Republic of China
SDF (JSDF)	Japan Self-Defense Forces
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
UN	The United Nations
US	The United States of America

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Introduction

Changes in Japan's security policies have been an interesting object of study in the field of international relations in recent years. What attracts scholars to study the Japanese changing security policy is the unique character of this country. Japanese postwar development remains special in many ways. After the World War II, the country adopted pacifism and decided to entirely change its character after decades of imperialism. Tokyo dedicated postwar years to economic development and relied on the US in the security issues. Trying to understand the reasons, which led the shift from militarism to pacifism was a challenging task. Thus, many of scholars started to focus on the aspects, which led to this radical change of Japanese national identity that resulted in the unprecedented adoption of pacifist Constitution, binding the country to renounce war and threat of use of force as a means of settling international disputes and at the same time the country promised not to maintain any military forces. Japan started to be called as “abnormal” state, because of its postwar development.

I've decided to dedicate this thesis to the study of changing perception of peace in postwar Japan. Pacifism is still one of the main theme surrounding Japanese security and foreign policy discussions and current debates around reinterpretation of the postwar Constitution might have ambitions to change the whole postwar development and transform the country into a “normal” state. I will study the aspects leading to the changing perception of “peace” and “pacifism” in the postwar Japan. I also aim to find out, whether the country is going through the transformation from an “abnormal” to a “normal” and what actors play a key role in this transformation.

When it comes to IR theories, I propose that the views of positivists are not able to explain Japanese shift to pacifism, because materialism was not the main reason of Japanese changing identity. Japan for instance did not turn into military power, despite the fact that it became an economic power in the postwar years. Another theory trying to explain this shift was social constructivism. Conventional constructivists (Wendt, 1992, Katzenstein, 1996) believe that identities are products of state's history, traditions

and domestic cultural contexts. Conventional constructivists were challenged by poststructuralists (Hagström, and Gustafsson, 2015 Bukh, 2010, Suzuki, 2009), who, on the other hand, describe the process of identity formation of a result of the process of differentiation (othering) of nation's "Self" from an "Other". This work will attempt to show insufficiencies of these approaches and proposes an alternative approach of sedimentation of identity layers that connects both aforementioned approaches into one. The theory sees the changes in Japanese perception of peace to be a result of interaction of three identity layers. The identity layers combine both conventional constructivists understanding of identity as culturally determined as well as poststructuralists perception of identity as a product of "othering". Moreover, it adds the third feature – the operation of identity entrepreneurs, who influence the other layers by promoting various narratives. This leads me to my research questions:

What factors led to the changing perception of peace in Japan? Was this change caused by the operation of identity entrepreneurs?

Is Japan changing from "abnormal" towards "normal" state as the result of changing perception of peace?

1. National identity in international relations

The concept of identity has been introduced with a greater significance to the study of the international relations with the fourth debate, when the social constructivism started to gain the significance in the IR field and became a part of mainstream theories. The reason, why the positivists theories did not include national identity in their study is that they considered national identity to be too fluid and difficult to grasp. For instance, based on neorealist tradition, there is a presumption that identities are not created by the society. According to them, identities are given by the structure of international politics. We can understand it from their assumption that the motivation of the actors is assumed rather than realistically described. According to Waltz, "whether those units live, prosper, or die depends on their own efforts. The states are driven by the desire of self-help or survival" (Waltz, 1979, 91). In this sense, he proposes that the intentions of states are determined by these material factors and therefore, there is no influence by ideas. In regards the role of ideas and individualism, he adds "patterns of behaviour nevertheless emerge, and they derive from the structural constraints of the system. Actors may perceive the structure that constrains them and understand how it serves to reward some kinds of behaviour and to penalize others" and that "the game one has to win is defined by the structure that determines the kind of player who is likely to prosper" (Waltz, 1979, 94). Similarly, as neorealists, neoliberals also concentrate their research on materialism, one of the examples could be economic interdependence, which according to them brings material benefits to states and mitigates the effect of anarchy in the international politics.

What differentiates these rationalist theories from social constructivism is their emphasis on materialism rather than individualism. Social constructivism considers the concept of national identity to be the crucial element of their research. The element of national identity in the international relations studies helped to explain, for instance, the process of the end of the Cold War. At that time, neither neoliberals nor neorealists could explain properly these changes in the international politics. Constructivism with

its emphasis on the role of non-material factors provided an alternative explanation to the existing rationalist theories. The study of factors such as norms, values or ideas significantly broadened the possibilities to understand the processes such as the end of the Cold war. The term social constructivism derives from the presumption that the reality is socially constructed. Nicolas Onuf one of the leading constructivists wrote that “people and societies construct or constitute each other” (Onuf, 1989, 36). The structure of the international politics is therefore socially created and these structures shape actor’s identities and interests. The constructivist’s evaluation of the processes that led to the end of the Cold War was more accurate in comparison with realists or liberalists. This is one of the example, why norms, ideas, and identity matter in the study of international relations.

1.1 Conventional constructivism

The last decades the constructivist view of identity has evolved into the discussion between conventional (or norm constructivists) view and the poststructuralists. To this account, there exist several questions, which distinguish these two approaches from each other. Firstly, it is a question, to which extent is an actor aware of its identity? Secondly, to which extent the actor creates the identity and lastly, has the identity been formed by the role of actors or is it a result of the process of differentiation? (Kolmaš, 2017a, 55). Conventional constructivists explain the identity formation to be determined by the cultural determination of the national interest formation. For instance, one of the prominent constructivists, Peter Katzenstein, explains the change of the national identity in the postwar German and Japan to be a result of the changes inside of the society (Katzenstein, 1996, 263-265). Similarly, Alexander Wendt, describes state’s interests to be intersubjectively formed by the collective consciousness. He claims that “the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material” and that “states identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics” (Wendt, 1994, 385). Wendt assumes

that “states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent interactions” (Wendt, 1994, 385). In his work he questions the argument of neoliberals, who claims interests to be exogenous or explain interests by reference to domestic politics. On this account, Wendt adds that “a rationalist approach makes sense, when state interests really are exogenous to interaction, which is sometimes the case. When they are not, however, it may ignore important possibilities and/or strategies for cooperation, as well as misrepresent the latter’s dynamics” (Wendt, 1994, 384). We can see, that he questioned the claims of rationalists that the international structure is stable and driven by materialism. From his point of view “intersubjective structures give meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act” (Wendt, 1994, 388). What differs conventional constructivists from poststructuralists is that they believe that the change of identities is not very common and that the changes are very slow, to this account Wendt proposes “even if interaction is initially important in constructing identities and interests, once institutionalizes its logic may take transformation extremely difficult” (Wendt, 1992, 423). The steadiness of the identity might be connected with the fact that constructivists emphasizes the role of the state. According to their study, interests of states are also stable, they do not change and the identity is next to other factors like territory or natural resources only another factor that influence the national interest. There is also potential problem that emerges, conflicts of the identities. The question is, which identity at the end will be the dominant one (Kolmaš, 2017a, 56). The great changes in the international relations were, they argued, one of the moments, when the possibility of identity change might exist. However, this approach was criticized by the poststructuralists, who see the identity formation to be an ongoing, dynamic process.

1.2 Poststructuralism

Conventional constructivists are often criticized for steadiness, emphasis on culture and the clash of identities. The approach of poststructuralism is based on the assumption that the national identity is formed through the process of differentiation

of “self” from otherness and resides only in this practice. The process is, according to them, dynamic and therefore they condemn conventional constructivist’s argumentation that national identity’s change is a rare phenomenon and that when it happens, the process is very slow. On the other hand, poststructuralists claim national identity formation to be a result of process of differentiation against otherness. According to them, the process is dynamic and ongoing. In his work, David Campbell described the process of identity formation as “constituted in relation to difference” and that “difference is constituted in relation to identity” and continued with the claim that “the identity of each is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside” a “self” from an “other” a “domestic” from a “foreign” (Campbell, 1992, 8). He also describes the process to be ongoing, which has been illustrated with his argument which says that “states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed” (Campbell, 1992, 11). He also argued that the states tend to build their identity based on relationship between Self and Other, “which emerges through the imposition of an interpretation, rather than being product of uncovering an exclusive domain with its own pre-established identity” (Campbell, 1992, 24). Campbell illustrates the theory on the case of the US, when he stresses the importance of interpretation of danger, around which state create its Other to differentiate itself from. As an example he mentions the foreign policy of the US during the “war on terror”, particularly the Iraq invasion. In this sense, he adds that “nationalism is a construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy. And in order to secure state’s identity, there is a need to enforce and legitimize an “imagined political community that exists only insofar as it is a cultural artefact that is represented textually”. At the same time poststructuralists refuse to separate identity and national interest. For instance, they see security or wealth through the optics of identity praxis. Based on this logic, these concepts have different meaning for each state and their fulfilments is differ from fulfilment of different identity praxis (Kolmaš, 2017a, 58).

From this point of view, Japanese pacifism after World War II was caused by Japanese desire to differentiate itself from its spatial Other, the US or from its temporal other (the militaristic past). It was not a result of the change inside of the society - Japanese society did not suddenly turn to be pacifist. The explanation of poststructuralist is that the US served as Other to Japan, the pacifist constitution has been written by the US occupation force, the acceptance of the antimilitarist constitution is better to be understood as a desire not to cooperate with its enemy (the US). This is one of the perception of peace in Japan, which will be studied further in this work.

Despite the fact that poststructuralism has developed an innovative approach to the study of national identity formation, there are still certain insufficiencies in their research. Kolmaš points out for instance the praxis on differentiation as the exclusive way of national identity formation and also the fact that states might have multiple identities as well as multiple Selves. Thus, identities might be in the clash with each other. Poststructuralists, however, were not able to explain, how these identities influence each other and which one will prevail and be the decisive one at the end (Kolmaš, 2017a, 58).

1.3 Sedimentation of identities

The insufficiencies in the previous theories are partly attempted to be filled by the theory of a sedimentation of identities. In fact, this theory connects the aforementioned theories of conventional constructivism and poststructuralism. Theory of sedimentation is based on the idea of multi-level system of sedimentation of identity. Ole Wæver speaks about three-level system of identity. According to this theory, “the first (deepest) layer consists of the basic constellation of the concepts of state and nation” (Wæver, 2003, 33). The first layer is dealing with the basic state – nation idea. Kolmaš adds that this layer very much corresponds with the social constructivist’s idea of culture or historical basis of a state (Kolmaš, 2017a, 59). In this regard, it is an elementary imagination a state, based on historical processes and it is unconditionally accepted. This layer has two dimensions, first dimension is external and it contains “a

state's projection of itself onto the world". An example can be Germany or Japan as "power states" in the period of the World war II. The second dimension is internal, which defines "state's idea as projected backwards onto its constituency". The deepest layer could be also characterized as "constellation of state and nation, which provides a specific set of constraints and possibilities, both in terms of how foreign policy has to be presented" (Wæver, 2003, 34).

The second layer is formed on the basis of differentiation vis-a-vis the otherness. At the same time, it specifies the basic constellation from level one. At this point, there is a room for the discourses, which serves as the way of negotiation. Wæver mentions Germany described in the layer one as power state, the negotiation thus should answer "whether one supports a power state or whether one works against it" (Wæver, 2003, 37). This can be applied also for the case of Japan and its image as pacifist state. In this regard, there is a space for the discourse to change the perception of the state's identity. Japanese pacifism, therefore, based on this logic, lies in the second layer.

The third layer can be assumed as the layer, which is prone to be most easily changed. It adds "more specificity to the very general level of abstraction of level 2" and the concrete political actors can be found there (Wæver, 2003, 38). Moreover, level 3 is important in our research because it is the most dynamic element in the multi-level system. Further, "level 1 and 2 consist of the constructions as they are argued within political discourses, level 3 adds specific projects and actors who not only argue their own positions and constructions, but also – because they are engaged in a debate – pass judgement on other positions and constructions" (Wæver, 2003, 38). Hagström and Gustafsson add that the least institutional layer "is where policies and specific political issues are discussed and where agents operate". Issues discussed in this layer are constrained by and have consequences for the identity construction in the other layers "particularly identity constructions in relation to specific others in the middle layer" (Hagström, Gustafsson, 2015, 7). Kolmaš calls this layer a "discursive arena" of actors and in the study of changing perception peace, this will be a key layer. For the purposes of this work, this will be the key layer, because actors in this layer have the ability to change the perception of pacifism through promoted narrative, which give a different meaning

to the word “pacifism” by tying it up with different signifiers.

In sum, by connecting these layers, Wæver describes the relation between agent and structure, where agent operates in the least sedimented layer and the structure in the most sedimented layer. By connecting the theories of poststructuralism and conventional constructivism, it aims to answer to their insufficiencies. The theory says that Japan’s pacifism lies in the middle layer, which goes against the claim of conventional constructivists saying that pacifism lies in the deepest layer and it is not easily change. At the same time, the theory of sedimentation provides the answer to insufficiencies of poststructuralism concerning the clash of identities and the fact that differentiation (othering) is the only way, how to change the national identity. The theory of sedimentation of identities says that it is not only the process of othering, but both the first (deepest) identity layer and actors in the third (the least sedimented) identity layer contribute to the identity change. To the clash of identities, it says that it is the mainstream narrative (promoted by identity entrepreneurs), which determine, which identity will prevail at the end.

1.3.1 Identity change

In order to understand the changing perception of pacifism, it is important to study the way how identities change. There are numbers of factors, which contribute to the identity change. Hagström names entrepreneurs and emotions. As identity entrepreneurs we understand actors, who seek to change identity by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them”. More specifically, in case of study of Japanese national identity, authors like Bukh, Gustafsson, Hagström and Suzuki describe identity entrepreneurs as “political actors, who promote their desired version of Japanese identity through the discursive representation of issues and actors”. It is obvious that these actors operate at the third, least sedimented layer, as they are not constrained by the structure and their existence might have effect on middle layer (Hagström, Gustafsson, 2015, 8). For the purpose if this work, this will be one of the key factor.

In another article, Gustafsson stresses the importance of recognition of state's national identity. In this regard, he proposes "an identity has to be recognised by others in order for an agent to be able to act confidently. Denial of recognition may therefore result in the abandonment of an identity and the construction of a new one" and that denial of recognition may be understood as humiliating and disrespectful (Gustafsson, 2015, 120-122). For the state is important that its image is recognized by other actors, thus, the non-recognition might result in questioning the relevance of certain identity, which has not been recognized. This fact might also contribute to processes of identity change, in my opinion, or at least it can serve as the primary source of a change.

1.4 Methodology

During my research I came to the conclusion that it is theory of sedimentation, which can explain the changing identity most accurately. This is why I decided to apply this theory in this dissertation. The theory is based on the idea of multilevel sedimentation of identity layers and it, in fact, connects conventional constructivists and poststructuralists view on identity. One of the arguments I'm working with is that pacifism lies in the second layer and it can be changed by the interaction with the third layer. That goes against the claim of most of conventional constructivists, who claim that pacifism lies in the deepest layer and it is not easily to change. This is the reason, why I will focus on interaction of the third layer (discourse arena) with the second layer (distinctions and demarcations between Self and Other, the process of othering). I claim that peace narrative in Japan is slowly changing by interaction of these two layers.

To profoundly understand the peace discourse in Japan, this work will be based on narrative analysis of the primary and secondary sources. Primary sources consist mainly of speeches of political representatives, and interviews with them, official governmental documents and statements. These sources will be the most important in my study, since I claim that discourse in the third layer is aiming to change the second

layer. In other words to change the perception of peace in Japan. By studying these sources, I aim to verify, if these discourses contribute to the changing perception of peace and whether the country is transforming from an abnormal to a normal state. Secondary sources will be represented by journal articles, newspaper articles and books.

In order to sufficiently show the changing perception, I will analyse the period from the end of the World War II and today, in the empirical part of this work. By studying this long period, I will be able to show the transformation of the peace discourse in Japan. The birth of pacifism in the Japan's identity could be tracked back to the postwar period, when the country adopted pacifist constitution. The whole postwar period could be characterized as a constant attempt of Japan to portray itself as peaceful. Only in the last years it is visible, that the discourse is changing and that there are attempts to change the understanding of peace in Japan in order to normalize the country. During the research I will mainly work with relations of Japan and its two major spatial Others – the US and China. My goal is to project the perception of peace in the relations with these two Others. However, the work will also touch upon relations with other neighbouring states, which represent a security issues for Japan – it will be mainly North Korea and Russia (Soviet Union).

The work is divided into three periods. The initial postwar period (1950s – 1960s), when the pacifist identity was building – during this period, Japan started the process of differentiation from its prewar military identity. This identity is characterized by Japan's focus on economic development based on Yoshida doctrine, introduced by postwar Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and dominance of *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narrative (or Yoshida Doctrine narrative). The second period I will particularly investigate in the thesis – from 1970s to 1980s is on the other hand characterized by the gradual regaining of Japanese confidence by economic rise, but at the same was Tokyo still careful in its security policies and put a great effort into convincing the international community about its pacifist identity under the rules of Prime ministers Eisaku Sato and Takeo Miki. I claim that this period was dominated by “rich nation, weak army” narrative. The last period – from 1980s until today is characterized by the rise of “normal nation” narrative, which promote a so-called “proactive contribution to peace”. This

period features the significant inclination towards “normal nation” narrative started with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and the current Japanese discussion about pacifism is dominated by Shinzo Abe’s attempts to reinterpret the pacifist Constitution. These periods were chosen, since they show a contrast of how the pacifism has been understood.

Objects of study of the discourse analysis are writings, speeches, communicative event. By studying these objects, it is possible to observe the meaning of language, as it is an actor, who gives meaning to his words. We can apply this logic to the case study of changing perception of peace in Japan. By applying discourse analysis, it is possible to track the changing meaning of the word “peace” and “pacifism” through the studied periods, and therefore, the changing peace narrative. These sources are important in order to show a context, in which a “peace state” identity discourse is formed, maintained and transformed. I will track the process of transformation of postwar *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narrative into today’s “normal nation” narrative by studying the changing meaning of word “peace”, which will serve as a “master signifier” in this work. The work will show that the word “peace” or “pacifism” has been temporarily tied up with another signifiers, which results in a different meaning of this word. A central assumption in discourse theory is that the apparent fixity of the signifiers in a discourse is always temporary and partial and that they can be reshuffled through articulatory practices. In this sense, as new signifiers are included and old ones dropped, other signifiers constituting the discourse also take on new meaning (Howarth, 2000, Phillips and Hardy, 2002). In this work, I aim to use primary source as speeches of Japanese politicians, official governmental documents and statements. However, I find limitation in the period of 1960s – 1980s regarding the language barrier, because there are not many primary source materials in English and therefore this period is covered by secondary sources like books or journal articles. This problem disappears with the period of 1980s – today, here I’m trying to use as many primary sources as possible. An important source of discourse analysis are also newspaper articles. By analysing them, it is also possible to see the changing narrative in Japan.

The reason, why I chose the method of discourse analysis is that it corresponds with

the ideas set by the theory of sedimentation. The main focus of this work is to observe the changing perception of peace in Japan. Since this work claims that Japan's pacifism lies in the middle layer, I will study relation between third and middle layer of national identity. The theory of sedimentation propose that the third layer affect the middle layer by operation and discussions of agents over specific political issues. Thus, the middle layer, where pacifism of Japan lies, is changing through discourse of agents in the third layer.

2. Japan's identity

In the text above, I attempted to examine different approaches on national identity studies. Importantly for the study of Japan's national identity and for the understanding the changing perception of peace in Japan, I would point out Hagström's and Gustafsson's argument, they assumed that "two factors play particularly important roles in bringing about identity change: identity entrepreneurs and emotions" and the same the element of recognition, since I believe that these elements play a significant role in the changing perception of pacifism in post-war Japan. Their research agrees with Wæver's concept of layered identities. They suggest that "the most sedimented layer of Japanese identity construction is an understanding of Japan's position in hierarchical terms, where Japan is constructed through its differentiation from Others, who are alternately understood as superior or inferior to Japan" (Hagström, 2014). In this regard Tamaki argues that Japanese narratives have tended to portray Asia as inferior to Japan and that "identity becomes resilient through reification" and that Japan tend to see itself as unique, more concretely that "Japanese identity, namely, a hierarchic worldview and "associated sense of Japanese uniqueness can be identified within the post-war *heiwa/shonin kokka* [peace/trading state] narratives" (Tamaki, 2010, 63). This idea is broadened by Guillaume, who agrees that *kokutai* has been a "key narrative matrix" in Japanese identity construction" (Guillaume, 2011, 63-99). Hagström points out on the existence of Japanese identity narratives, which put Japan between an "inferior Asia" and a "superior West". Japan wanted to catch up and be recognized by the West (Suzuki, 2005, 137-164). When it comes to the relations of Japan and Asia, authors stress that "these narratives also continue to emphasise Asia's externality to Japan, sometimes as an opportunity that needs to be taken advantage off, but more often in the form of a threat that needs to be handled" (Hagström, Gustafsson, 2015, 6), this point of view will be later elaborated in the Sino-Japanese relations, where Japan nowadays tend to see China as aggressor and on the other side, portrayed itself as peaceful.

The middle layer is where the more exact boundaries between Self and Other are negotiated. Hagström and Gustafsson explain that at this layer, "we find multiple identities that describe the Others and consequently also the Self". In addition, these

identities include specific self-descriptions, such as “rational” or “democratic” and it is the second layer, where Othering is taking place. Therefore, in the post-war Japan, the “peaceful” identity has in a large extent been constructed in relation to its own wartime “aggressive” Self and at the same also possibly in relation to “less peaceful” external Others (Hagström, Gustafsson, 2015, 7). For the purpose of this work, this layer is very important as it includes the identity of peaceful nation. Thus, considering the fact that according to Waewer or Hagström and Gustafsson, the second layer is possible to be influenced by the discussions in the third layer, the perception of pacifism in Japan might be influenced by the operation of actors in the third layer.

The third layer consists of discursive arena, where identity entrepreneurs operate. We might observe attempts of political representatives in the last years to portray Japan as peaceful country, which is being bullied by aggressive China, these narratives have effect on the perception of peace in Japan. Therefore, Japan has to react on this behaviour by promoting “Proactive contribution to peace”. This is connected with what has been discussed above. Japan’s most sedimented layer of identity is the identity of the unique country. Depiction of China or North Korea to be “coercive” and a threat to Japan, the country seeks to emphasise its superiority in the sense that Japan, in comparison with these countries, is peaceful and a victim of the aggressive behaviour.

When applying the theory of sedimentation on Japan’s national identity, it is possible to observe that Japan’s most sedimented layer is closely linked with its perception of itself as a unique nation. From the historical point of view is this perception understandable. Japan was isolated for centuries and only in Meiji Restoration it opened up to the world. There were no foreign influences and the country was independent on the outside world. During two World Wars it tend to portray itself to be superior towards other Asian nations. Japanese perception of itself as unique country results in the fact that in the relation with other Asian countries, Japan imagine itself to be superior. By accepting pacifist constitution, Japan aimed to differentiate itself from less pacifist Others (China, North Korea) and at the same time from its militaristic past. Adoption of the pacifist constitution, which had been written by the US occupation force might be interpreted as that pacifism did not emerge from the culture of Japanese

society, therefore pacifism is not included in the most sedimented layer of national identity, as most of constructivists claim, but in the second layer, where the process of othering is taking place. Japanese pacifism was rather pragmatic way how to maintain state's independence and superiority. Through the process of othering, Japan was creating a narrative of peaceful Self, the superiority was enhanced by economic power in the post-war era. Moreover, Japanese narrative of a peaceful country was not recognized by one of its main Other – China, but in some moments not even from another Other – the US. Because of the non-recognition by and because of the another factors like rise of China and stagnation of Japan, the narrative has changed from victimizing Self to victimized Self. In this work, I will try to firstly verify the arguments that pacifism truly lies in the second identity layer, not in the first, most sedimented layer, which is claimed by conventional constructivists and that this layer can be changed by process of othering and by the influence of actors in the third layer. In order to verify it, I will apply the theory of sedimentation. At the same time, this work's goal is to answer to several research questions. First, I will try to find out, what caused the changing perception of peace in Japan and whether this was caused by operation of identity entrepreneurs. Further, I aim to find out if Japan is changing from “abnormal” to “normal” state as the result of changing perception of peace?

2.1 The postwar period and key identity narratives

In 1941 Japan entered World War II by attacking Pearl Harbour and it was also the last period of the Empire before its defeat. In 1942 Empire experienced several defeats, which turned to be a turning point of the war. This series of losses were then followed by atomic bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This crushing defeat has been the main influencing factor within the development of the country until today. The development of Japan in the post-war period remains to be unique within the field of international relations. The pacifism is the main theme of Japanese postwar development and it is clear that foreign policy of the country had to deal with the fact that the country dedicated itself to this new historical chapter. This chapter is aiming to analyse the

factors, which led to the post-war pacifism. First, it aims to prove that Japan's most sedimented layer of national identity is its perception of unique nation, which it wanted to maintain even after the World War II. The discourse analysis aims to elaborate the leading prewar narrative – *kokutai* and postwar narratives - *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka*. In this chapter I seek to show these narratives on concrete examples and at the same time I want to prove that these narratives have been influencing Japanese foreign policy making, both prewar and postwar. I claim that these narratives can explain following facts - first, the strong desire of Japanese to maintain Emperor system and especially the person of Emperor itself as a source of Japanese uniqueness. Second, the willingness to accept pacifist Constitution was achieved mainly thanks to the Japanese goal to differentiate itself from militaristic past and at the same time from its main Other, the US and therefore pacifism lies in the middle layer of identity sedimentation. Third, there is pragmatic factor in Japanese postwar pacifism. I will try to show that pacifism served for Japan as the way how to slowly get the independence and moreover, for the political representation it served as the way how to stay in power.

Throughout postwar period there was a visible obsession of Japan to portray country as peaceful. On this account, Tamaki suggests that this obsession represents a psychological disjuncture within the ranks of policy makers. At this point, it is important to mention the *kokutai* narrative, which was a leading narrative in the prewar Japan, it was a source of rationale for Japanese continental expansion from the late-nineteenth century onward. *Kokutai* could be translated as “polity”: the polity of the state defined through emperor as the father figure, and the people – the subjects – as his “children”. In this regard, Japanese understand the throne as a source of uniqueness myth and the enduring ethnocentricity and it signifies the continuity of Japanese state. *Kokutai* was an important element within the prewar identity narratives, through which Japanese justified promotion of Japanese superiority over Asia. *Kokutai* was at the same time understood as Japan's divine duty to “liberate” Asia from the West. The acceptance of the Postdam Declaration was justified also in the name of *kokutai no goji* (the preservation of *kookutai*). In this regard, I suggest that *kokutai* also serves as explanation to Japanese strong desire to preserve emperor system and especially person of

Emperor. Tamaki argues that there was a sanctity of emperor as a function of religion or culture, albeit fluid and contingent. *Kokutai* was adopted in the 1889 constitution and it was a defining element of the modern Japan state, in which the security of the state became synonymous with its preservation. *Kokutai* narrative included the following aspects - first, Japan was the only autonomous state in Asia and secondly, Japan was ineluctably a non-western nation, unique in its national resilience. Tamaki also suggests that *kokutai* became linked to the notion of hierarchy, with the emperor at the helm and his children – the subjects - practicing filial piety (Tamaki, 2010, 64 – 66). This system was applied in the relation of Japan and the rest of Asia, where Japan was perceived as the superior and other Asian state to be backward. Further, he points out to the *Heiwa kokka* narratives occurring in 1947 during the adoption of the Constitution. It is the narrative of New Japan, which included a pacifist feature. Already in 1945, a member of the Diet, Togo Minoru urged the House of Representatives that a New Japan must be “cultural, economic, and peaceful”. It is important to mention that postwar narratives *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* replaced the leading narrative *kokutai*, which prevailed in the prewar period. *Heiwa* narrative is according to this author a backlash to the trauma of war, comprising a pledge never to repeat the same mistakes, the *shonin* narrative shares similarities to the economic signifiers inherent in *kokutai*. Tamaki proposes that “*shonin* narrative needs to be couched within *heiwa kokka*, since the postwar pledge is to pursued national interests via interdependence and trade rather than through territorial aggression”. He then adds that “theses narratives combine to represent a New Japan, which at least on the surface, seeks to distance itself from the past” and he illustrates it on Yoshida’s statement that the war was an “aberration brought about by irresponsible and conspirational elements within the imperial military” (Tamaki, 2010, 73). I assume that *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* significantly correspond with the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” narrative, which binds Japan to the focus on economic development and reliance on the US in security issues.

2.2. 1950s – 1960s *Shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narrative

In 15th August 1945, Japanese people witnessed the unprecedented act, the radio broadcast, where Emperor Hirohito delivered speech of surrender. This speech today very well illustrates Japanese initial stance towards peace. In fact, this speech very much proves the point of Hagström and Gustafsson and their theory of the most sediment part of Japanese identity as the sense of uniqueness of Japanese nation. Emperor's surrender speech was broadcasted over the radio and it was also the first time Emperor was heard on the radio by the Japanese people. This was truly extraordinary event. The speech contains several references to the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese nation. For instance, he understood the role of Japan in the World War II as the way, how to preserve stabilization of East Asia and in fact, despite the fact that it is called speech of surrender, the Emperor did not specifically mention the word "surrender", but in opposition, he mainly tries to portray Japan as someone, whose intentions during the World War II had been positive. There are several parts, which can prove this argument, for instance "we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to insure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement", this might be an early attempt to differentiate Japan from Western countries and their former colonial ambitions and who by Postdam Declaration aim to interfere in Japanese development. He also did highlight "gallant fighting of our military and naval forces", despite the fact that these forces committed many war crimes. Further, he again underlines the positive role of Japan in East Asia, when he said that "we cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia". When it comes to the acceptance of peace, he said "however, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the [unavoidable] and suffering what is unsufferable. Having been able to save and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, we are always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying upon

your sincerity and integrity". It is interesting that he refers to peace as to something, which is a result of "dictates if time and fate", therefore he did not understand it as something that the nation had accepted but rather something, which had been forced to Japan. And to the development of the country he proposes, in short, to focus on the reconstruction of the country, this is a pragmatic element that helps to the acceptance of pacifist Constitution. There were also reference to Japanese desire to keep up with the West and maintain the uniqueness of Japan, as he said "unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, nobility of spirit, and work with resolution so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world" (Hirohito, 1945).

Japanese perception of uniqueness after the World War II was strongly linked with the Emperor system. This feeling towards Emperor system is possible to explain by *kokutai* narrative mentioned above. The Emperor system was perceived as the source of uniqueness and superiority of Japan. After the defeat in the World War II it was logical that Japan wanted to gain this sense of superiority again. From this point of view it is understandable that political representative was willing to accept the conditions of SCAP regarding the amendments of the Constitution in return to the guaranteed status of Emperor. At the same time Japanese understood the acceptance of the conditions of SCAP as the opportunity to gain back its independence. In 1947, general MacArthur decided that Meiji Constitution does not fulfil the US requirements on the new development of Japan and that new constitution has to be adopted. The US occupation forces gave Japan chance to somehow amend it, which Japanese government did, however the result was not acceptable for the US, which produced its own version and proposed it to Japanese government with the note that it should be accepted. On 6th March, the draft Constitution was introduced, we know from the historical documents that Prime Minister Shidehara wanted to preserve Imperial system and to ensure the status of Emperor and at the same time he wished a fundamentally pacifist direction (Kazuhiko, 2005, 38-39). Shidehara was inspired by the international legal convention established in Kellogg-Briand Pact. However, he did not want a unilateral renunciation but rather a general aspiration for peace. Dower in this sense points out to the fact that

“the prospect of becoming pure embodiment of Kellogg-Briand ideals – offered a way of retaining a positive sense of uniqueness in defeat” (Dower, 1999, 398). One of the main driving force of the adoption of constitution was the desire to save Hirohito and at the same time the emperor system itself as a source of Japanese uniqueness and continuity. Dower illustrates this idea on the assumption that “Emperor Hirohito remained first and foremost the living manifestation of historical, cultural, and racial continuity and of the ideal of hierarchical and patriarchal society” (Dower, 1999, 555). Beside the goal to preserve Emperor system, there was another element that supported the acceptance of the proposed version of Constitution. The reason, why Tokyo wanted pacifist heading could be also explained by its desire to gain independent policy. Kazihuko in this regard wrote that the adoption of pacifism was a part of the process of gaining back the independence, according to his research “peace could not be achieved without endeavours and sacrifices and in order for Japanese to come back as a full-fledged partner in the international community, Japan had to share a greater responsibility for the maintenance and creation of peace and security” (Kazihuko, 2005, 33). Further, Whitney, the right hand of General MacArthur, convinced Conservatives, that by accepting the propose of the occupation forces will lead to their preservation in power, at the same time MacArthur promised to preserve the status of Emperor. MacArthur needed in this regard to offer a deal that would be acceptable for both sides, thus he came with the idea to constitutionalize unarmed pacifism as a trade-off for saving Hirohito. In order to save Hirohito and preserve the imperial institution, the Article 9 had to go even beyond the conventional form of pacifism, which was included in Kellogg-Briand Pact and embody a much more radical and absolute idea (Hahm, Kim, 2015, 74-79). This strong willingness to secure and maintain imperial institution might correspond with Japan’s deepest layer of identity, which includes the perception of Japan as a unique nation and by losing the imperial institution, this status would be threaten. Hahm and Kim supports this idea saying that “abolition of the military would be the road to the emperor’s redemption and Japan’s rebirth” and also that “it must be understood that it was seen – by both foreigners and locals – as the only viable way to preserve what was considered the essential core of Japan’s constitutional identity,

namely, the emperor system” (Hahm, Kim, 2015, 79 - 80). Moreover, Conservative government hoped that occupation will end soon, if they accepted the US proposition. Further, they believed that accepting the GHQ draft would be the last chance for the entire Japanese “reactionary” establishment to remain in power. Japanese government in order to protect Emperor (and themselves), would have to accept the GHQ constitution including its pacifist principle (Dower, 1999, 375).

Further, Japanese also understood the acceptance of the peace Constitution as the opportunity to become unique - as the “world’s first non-military country”. Moreover, in order to broaden this idea, Hahm and Kim argues that based on “theory of island nation” (*shimaguniron*), Japan sees itself as mono-ethnic nation, which lived peaceful life in near total isolation from outside world. In this regard, the reference to “isolation from the outside world” could be understood as the act of differentiation, where Japan is viewed as unique within Asian countries. Again, peace identity can’t be from this point of view considered to be the most sedimented layer of the identity. Imperialism and militarism during the World War II is a clear example that Japan’s most sedimented layer of identity is its perception of uniqueness, which Japan promoted and according to postwar discourse “wartime militarist expansionism that had undergirded the ideology of the multi-ethnic empire of Japan was castigated as an aberration in Japanese ideology”. This interpretation is, however, criticized by Hahm and Kim, who point out that only after the World War II “peace and culture under the symbol emperor polity had suddenly come to form an interlocking constellation of values that together defined the post-war identity of Japan” and that “it might be criticized as wishful thinking, if not outright cynical manipulation, by which to avoid facing up to the reality of their past” (Hahm, Kim, 2015, 95 – 96). There was clearly a strong desire to differentiate from the militaristic past and to show to the international community that Japan went through a change. In this regard, authors also point out that “Article 9 generally meant to master the past rather than incubate the future” and that the peace provision was not really forward-looking but written primarily to deal with the perceived evils of Japan’s militarist past” (Hahm, Kim, 2015, 86). Strong insistence on new heading of the country was visible during the process of adoption of so called Japan-US Security Treaty in 1951

as well. The process was significantly influenced by the development in the Korean peninsula, the conflict caused that Japan suddenly became a needed partner for the US. The country in a very short time got rid of its label of defeated enemy and become an Asian ally in a fight against communism. At this time, the US change their strategy and were willing, in order to ensure the safety on East Asia, to reinterpret the second paragraph of the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. This moment is very important, when studying the perception of pacifism in Japan. The Treaty included the provisions of the US that Japan would allow the US to have military bases on its soil, which would mean a certain level of rearmament. Article 1 on this treaty states that the bases are there to protect Japan from outside aggressions but also maintain “large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan” caused by a third party or parties, viewed at the time as communist influence. Another part of the Treaty states that “Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression” (Williamson, 2014, 92). Williamson notes that “Japanese sovereignty as mandated in the Constitution violated itself by denying certain rights (collective security and individual self-defense understood in military terms), which defined a key aspect of (full) sovereignty as recognized in international law” (Williamson, 2014, 92). However, the provisions of the Treaty shows a certain level of regain of sovereignty by stating that Japan has in a certain level a responsibility to be involved in its protection. At the same time, Tokyo was recognized as a partner in a fight against communism.

Despite the already mentioned lack of the faith in the Article 9, Japan still preferred to portray itself as a peaceful country. Prime minister Yoshida on this account said that “rearmament is something that Japan is no position to do right now at all. Moreover, the public is not supportive of it... While it might seem cunning, for the time being, we should let America be responsible for Japan’s defense. The Constitution’s forbidding a military is a true blessing. If America says anything, we just show the Constitution. Politicians calling for its revision are complete fools” (Kiichi, 2007, 76). The insistence on Article 9 corresponds with the argument that Japan’s pacifism lies in the middle layer, where the process of othering is taking place. According the studied discourse, there was a clear desire to differentiate from the militaristic past and at the same time from

one of Japan major Other, the US, by pointing to the fact that it is the US, who force Japan to rearmament. Hence, Tokyo played the Article 9 card with great dexterity and Yoshida would be willing to cultivate the general public's support for the peace provision to strengthen his resistance to the American pressure. These negotiations ended up with the establishment of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. All in all, this was a success for Japanese negotiation, since it achieved to portray the US as the negative Other, who is forcing Japan to rearmament. There was also pragmatic aspect of the security cooperation, Japan could be able to focus on the economic development. This idea was declared in Yoshida doctrine, which emphasized mutual relations with the US, Japan would, according to this doctrine, relied on the US in military and security issues. Second aspect of the Yoshida doctrine is economic recovery. This means minimizing Japanese military involvement and allowing Tokyo focusing on economic recovery of the country in order to become once again one of the major power. Not only Japan wanted to differentiate itself from the past and from the US but Yoshida doctrine clearly showed the pragmatism in Japanese foreign policy. According to Tamaki "a large part of Yoshida's non-military stance reflected his pragmatism in seeing the need to divert resources away from defense toward economic development but his purported aversion to the military also played a significant role". This approach corresponds with *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narratives. Yoshida personally strongly promoted the neutrality and pacifism, however his stance should be understood in a pragmatic sense. He, for example, claimed in 1949 that "the only way to guarantee the security of our country is, as we do in the new constitution, to solemnly declare our country an unarmed nation, going before all countries and renouncing war and abandoning armaments in reliance on peace-loving world public opinion and make more and more clear the determination of our people to contribute to civilization, peace and prosperity in the world" (Tamaki, 2010, 73-75). Tamaki adds that "being the only economic superpower in the region; the only country with Peace Constitution; and as the only victim of Atom bomb, these symbols legitimize Tokyo's role as the promoter of peace" (Tamaki, 2010, 76).

When it comes to the argument of conventional constructivists that Japanese

pacifism was a result of the changes in the society, Kazihuko adds that the pacifism was rather passive in the Japanese society and that it has been accepted rather as the way how to get independency and by that to be able to focus on reconstruction of the country. The constitution itself has been very under the direction of occupation force. In this regard, I would like to point out to Emperor Hirohito's speech of surrender. After analysis of the surrender speech I came to the conclusion that Japanese surrender could be understood rather as the pragmatic step than a reflection on the role of Japan in the World War II, which could be supported by the fact that the peace was understood as something, which was forced to Japan by "dictates of time and fate" It correspond with the argument that Japanese society did not suddenly turned to be solely peaceful, but understood peace as the means, which would create the conditions for Japan to able to reconstruct the country. The speech also touches upon the Japanese perception of unique nation and the need to preserve this status. This chapter was dealing with the perception of peace on the post-war period. I suggest that Japanese acceptance of peace was a result of many factors. The negotiations around the form of the post-war Constitution had been influenced by these factors. Japan firstly strived for maintaining the Emperor system. All of these facts can be explained by a leading *kokutai* narrative in the prewar Japan, which strongly emphasized the role of Emperor as the source of uniqueness, also the role of Japan in the World War II is understood within the framework of *kokutai*. The postwar focus on economic development and emphasis on pacifism shows the influence of *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narratives. This chapter proved the arguments that Japan's postwar pacifism is not the most sedimented identity, but it lies in the middle layer, where the process of differentiation is taking place. On the contrary, the most sedimented layer of identity is the perception of uniqueness and superiority. The goal of pacifist heading is to gain back this image, as it was illustrated in the idea of creating "the world first non-military nation". By focusing on economic development and relying on the US in military and security issues, the country sought to become again one of the world's leading power. Pacifism was also the way how to differentiate itself from other – less pacifist countries.

2.3. 1970s – 1980s– “Rich nation, weak army” narrative

The previous chapter was dealing with the immediate couple of years after the World War II, where the priority was to dedicate the country to the new historical role of a pacifist country. This chapter will mainly show how the peace discourse was changing, when at the same time the discourse of a normal country emerged. As it was mentioned, Japan’s pacifist identity aimed significantly to be recognized by the external actors. We can define the period between 1970s to 1980s as the period, when the country’s goal was to strengthen the narrative of a pacifist country in order to receive back the international role and relevancy. Pacifism in this sense, again, served as a tool, how Japan imagine itself to be unique, however the primary goal was rather pragmatic. Moreover, besides the constant need to deny the military ambitions, this period could be also characterized by the efforts to get autonomy through the narrative of the responsible member of international community. This is, nonetheless, linked with the emergence of the “normal” state narrative.

The initiate postwar narrative of pacifist Japan was significantly influenced by Yoshida doctrine, which stated that the country will focus on economic development and minimize the military spending. The Yoshida doctrine narrative or *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narattives tied up the pacifism with signifiers as “rejection of militarism”, “harmony with international community”, “international cooperation” and most importantly “economic power without military power” (Hagström, Hanssen, 2016, 284). In the 1970s, Japan witnessed unprecedented economic growth. Based on this development, a number of commentators claimed that since Japan is slowly becoming economic power, the transformation into a military great power is inevitable. This realistic view was however, strongly denied by Japan. Tokyo wanted to make sure that it is a unique case and that it does not seek to become a military power. The country during this period strongly emphasized that its postwar development is an unprecedented historical experiment. The postwar development was also a result of the process of differentiation from the main Other – the US. Japanese were very careful with their comments about military. They wanted to primarily make sure that their image of

pacifist and responsible nation won't be hurt by any chance. The debate about militarism was at the 1970s a hot topic discussed in the Diet. It is important to say that the leading narrative was the narrative set by the Yoshida doctrine, which emphasized the exceptionalism of the Japanese postwar development. The debates were not only between Japanese politicians, but also between academics. A number of them expected that the economic development would lead to the militarist power, that these two aspects has to be inevitably linked to each other. For instance, Herman Kahn in his book "The Emerging Japanese Superstate" proposed that "Japan's GNP would become the biggest in the world by the beginning of the 21st century, which he forecasted as the Japanese century" (Kahn, 1971, 2). His predictions were based on the relevant facts, Japanese GNP grew by a factor of 10 between 1948 and 1973 and it was two and a half times higher than average growth in the world at that time (Kahn and Pepper 1979).

Despite the efforts of Japan to portray itself as peaceful country, which is focusing only on economic development, there were visible attempts to promote an alternative narrative – "normal nation" narrative. Since the introduction of Basic Policy for National Defense in 1957, Japan dedicated itself to its dependence on the US in security matters and at the same time to "build-up its self-defense capabilities in accordance with national strength and situation" and to "posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution" (MOD, 1957). The document illustrates the "abnormality" of Japan in postwar years, as the national defense strategy was not planned based on external security situation, but on country's pacifist attitude and domestic conditions. However, a new director of JDA (Japan Deefense Agency) Yasuhiro Nakasone, saw a need of revision of this document and proposed to change the clause about the reliance on "domestic conditions" and rather build up Japan's defense strategy on external conditions such as military capabilities of other countries. In addition, he wanted to make Japan one of the top five powers in the world and assigning the security treaty to a secondary role (Momoi, 1977, 347). Furthermore, in the long run, he proposed to replace the security Treaty with a Friendship Treaty and to raise Japan's defense spending to two or three percent of the GDP (Keddell, 1993, 47). Also, he proposed to enlarge the scope of operations of SDF. However, from the Fourth

Defense Build-up Plan (1972 – 1976), it is visible that these plans were not included, also the plan contained only “the prevention of small scale invasion” (MOD, 1976). The country truly built its defense capabilities based on “domestic conditions” rather than on external one, since it Tokyo did not want to show any sign of remilitarization. It has been mentioned that narrative of Japan’s inevitable rise to military great power began to emerge both inside and outside Japan, which was not favourable for Japan obsessed with the need to reassure the world about its pacifism. For instance, South Korea’s Dong-a Ilbo wrote in July 1970 that it “seems correct to say that the day when Japan, the economic great power, becomes Japan the military great power is not distant” (Dong-a Ilbo, 1970 in Hanssen 2018). Also China expressed its fears, China Daily for example wrote that “Japanese reactionary ringleaders, who supposedly yearned for Japan to obtain military power commensurate with its economic great power” and it warned that “this trend in Japan’s militarism cannot but put the peoples of Asia on high alert” (Renmin Ribao, 1970 in Hanssen 2018). Concerns about remilitarization were visible also inside Japan. According to a poll one of the largest Japanese newspaper, Mainichi Shimbun in 1971, as many as 63 percent people felt that militarism had been reviewed or was in the process of being reviewed. Also, Japanese Left expressed its concerns, when claiming that Japanese economic power would lead to exploitation of poorer Asian countries and these sphere of influence might, in the future, be protected by military means. Moreover, Japan’s neighbours expressed their concerns over the fact that Japan would seek to fill the power vacuum, which was expected to occur in Asia after the retreatment of the US from Vietnam (Hanssen, 2018).

Japan put a huge effort to balance the narrative of the normal state, which was visible in the neighbouring countries. This remilitarization and “normal nation” narrative strongly challenged *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narratives, therefore Japanese government sought to counterbalance it. The narrative promoted by Tokyo was aiming to emphasize the denying of remilitarization and Japan’s exceptional historical role as the pacifist country, which make Japan unique (Hanssen, 2018). This attempt was projected also in Defense of Japan published in 1970, which was the first ever defense white paper. This paper visibly was emphasizing the defensive intensions of Japan and

the differences between postwar and prewar Japan. The document, for instance, stated that “some countries have expressed concern that militarism will be revived in Japan [...] the historical fact that Japan in the past used its economic development to propel its military power, has given rise to apprehensions that Japan will again walk down that path. However, the national policy of postwar Japan is to be a peace state”, there was also a reference to a role of Japan in the international community “Japan, which has grown into a economic great power, will occupy a high standing in the international community [...] Japan is not a country that will play a role in international politics as a military great power” (Defense Agency, 1970a in Hanssen 2018). Hanssen noticed that “military great power” was excluded from the Yoshida Doctrine discourse, since it was not compatible with the “peace state” as the term “economic great power”. Another attempt to highlight the uniqueness Japan and at the same time the role of responsible member of the international community is seen here “we are trying to break the historical precedents that have been set thus far, and we are aiming for a new national approach, which is centred on social welfare and global peace, and thus we are embarking on a historical challenge” (Defense Agency 1970b in Hanssen 2018). The term “historical precedents” in this case refers to earlier great powers, which had become military great powers, this is, again, the way how to show the uniqueness (Hanssen, 2018).

But despite reassurance from Japanese side, the doubts were still present. Reactions on the white paper from the Asahi Shimbun for instance said that according to South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo “the white paper was “ambitious” on nuclear armament” and that it also warned Japan against taking over the US military role in Asia. There were also reactions from North Korea, who called the white paper a “codification of a brutal military policy”. Asahi Shimbun itself noticed that the cost of Japan’s fourth defense build-up plan would be more than twice as large as those of the third build-up plan” and it stated that “the build-up plan therefore signalled Japan’s transformation into a military great power” (Asahi Shimbun in Hanssen, 2018).

Emphasis of Japan’s role in economic area in order to highlight its identity as economic great power, rather than “military great power” and unwillingness to identify

potential threats could be seen from “Diplomatic Blue Book” from 1971, Tokyo sought to emphasize its role during the international monetary problem, document states that “Japan played a significant role in the temporary solution of this problem [...] thereby proving that it has a great influence on the world economy”, it continues stating “this country’s growing national strength centring on economic power is becoming the focus of greater interest and attention of the world [...] it can be said that Japan has been increasing its influence in the international political arena. It is also important to point out that fact that Japan was still reluctant to identify its threat. China, which is nowadays very often mentioned in official documents as “coercive” and identified as a threat, was in the 1970s rather praised. The Diplomatic Blue Book mentioned China several times and it mainly emphasized its positive role in the world, for instance it states that “China has positively carried out its African diplomacy”. Despite the fact that China conducted nuclear weapons tests in 1972, document does not specifically identify this event as a potentially dangerous and only inform shortly about this fact. On the contrary, it highlighted the year 1971 as “epoch-making year in the diplomatic history of the PRC” referring to the ping-pong diplomacy, which led to the enhancement of the relations with the US. The document also praises Chinese diplomacy derived “from the standpoint of being “anti-superpowers” (MOFA, 1971). Another event, which would be in today’s “normal nation narrative” highly criticized is concerning Tiananmen incident in 1989. The Diplomatic blue book from 1989 shortly described the event and instead of condemning it as “undemocratic” or “irresponsible” and to distance Japan from it, it choose to rather praised Chinese development, it says “the student democracy movement ended with the armed suppression by the government and the dismissal of General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who was responsible for reforms and the open-door policy, at the Fourth Plenary Sessions of the 13th Central Committee”, in order to alleviate the Tiananmen incident, document states “for China, however, which has been pushing ahead with modernization with the emphasis on building up the economy through reforms and the open-door policy, there appears to be no alternative to this policy, and it will no doubt continue its modernization efforts with many ups and downs”. In the other words, according to Japan, incidents like these might occur, but it

is not fault of China, but rather a potential outcome of its reforms (MOFA, 1989).

In case of reassurance on the peaceful development and the dedication to become a responsible member of international community, it is possible to observe the special emphasis on the foreign audience. One of the examples is the speech delivered by Prime Minister Sato on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the UN, he said “Japan is determined to use the power it has amassed from its economic growth to contribute to building peace [...] we have no intention whatsoever to use large parts of our national power for military purposes” (Sato, 1970). For the same audience was dedicated the MOFA’s annual Diplomatic Blue Book it stated, among others, that “Japan is determined not to follow the road to becoming a big military power, although it is economically capable of doing so. This is, so to speak, a challenging experiment, unprecedented in history” (MOFA, 1971). Hanssen assumes that Japanese relation to peace based on Yoshida Doctrine narrative is truly special. He points out to the fact that “the responsibility formed a central part of postwar Japan’s differentiation from destruction wrought by prewar and wartime Japan” , moreover, he adds that “peace was almost always linked to Japanese self-constraint and military moderation [...] peace, it was asserted, would be achieved by not acquiring nuclear and other powerful weapons, by not transforming economic might into military might”, another fact is that the means to achieve peace were therefore mainly defined in the negative rather than positive content. In the other words, by avoiding certain weapons and practices Japan would serve world peace. In this sense, it is again important to point out that pacifism in case of Japan doesn’t lie in the most sedimented layer of identity, it is a result of differentiation. He broadened this idea by saying that “Yoshida Doctrine discourse’s conceptualization of peace, if taken to its logical conclusion, indicated that Japan not only held they key to achieving peace, but it also harboured the potential to make it unravel [...] the greatest threat to peace was the disintegration of Japanese self-constraint and steps towards remilitarization”(Hanssen, 2018). This claim supports the argument that discourse arena might significantly influence Japanese perception of peace, this will be, nonetheless, shown in the next chapter. This period, however, witnessed the emergence of normal nation discourse, because of the emergence of

perceived threats to Japanese security (the USSR, North Korea and China) despite Japan's own peaceful behaviour.

As peace was strongly linked to Yoshida's doctrine, the Japanese were promoting the idea of so-called "rich nation, weak army", in this sense, for instance, Kenneth B. Pyle proposes that western countries failed to recognize that "Japanese realism was as strong as ever. It was simply being exercised in a different fashion" (Pyle, 2007, 256). According to him, "Japanese were still trying to maximize power, but the instruments of power had been reconceptualised and now referred to things like productive efficiency, market control, trade surplus, strong currency rather than soldiers and arms" and that "trading state had replaced the armed state" an instead of departing from realism, he would call it as "the triumph of economic realism" (Pyle, 2007, 256). There is an interesting point of view of Hanssen, who assumes that this prioritization was as much a confirmation of Japan's identity as a peace state as it was a pursuit of material gains. In fact, he continues, "the prioritization of economic over military power would itself be impossible if it was not based in some discursively constructed conception of what Japan, as a peace state, should consider more and less important. The rejection of excessive military power served to demonstrate postwar Japan's exemptionalism as a new historical experiment" (Hanssen, 2018). This is also reference to prewar Japan, which clearly invested its economic power into military power. In fact, one of the purpose of Meiji restoration was to increase national wealth in order to strengthen the military and therefore avoid colonization by the Western powers (Kosaka, 1992, 33, Suzuki, 2003, 25) and in this sense, prewar Japan is characterized as "rich nation, strong army" [fukoku kyōhei]. There were visible efforts of Japanese to differentiate from "rich nation, strong army" narrative, however, the rest of goals from Meiji period were achieved during the postwar period, Prime Minister Fukuda said in 1977 that "postwar Japan had in fact achieved most of the goals set by the Meiji oligarchs, such as 'catching up with and overtaking' [oitsuki, oikose] the West, and becoming civilized [bunmei kaika] and for the goal of "rich nation, strong army", he stated that "we have abandoned the 'strong army' component" (Hanssen, 2018).

One of the most striking example of Japan's understanding of peace in this period

was its attitude towards nuclear weapons. The anti-nuclear policy has been set in the period between 1967 - 1969, during negotiations over the return of Okinawa from the US and it declares in the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, that Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory. These principles were introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in his speech to the House of Representatives in 1967. In another speech, Sato introduced Four-Pillar Nuclear Policy, which include the following principles:

1. To promote the peaceful use of nuclear power;
2. To work toward global nuclear disarmament;
3. To rely on the extended US nuclear deterrent;
4. To support the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

It is possible to observe a number of remarks, which correspond with Japanese postwar development and understanding of peace from these principles. Second and fourth point summarize Japanese desire to contribute to the international community as its responsible member and to follow the rules set by this community. Third point very much corresponds with Yoshida Doctrine narrative. First point is the most interesting when we take into consideration the period, when these principles were introduced. In 1964 China made a nuclear test. This fact caused a great concern to Tokyo. Prime Minister Sato then told to President Johnson that if Chinese had nuclear weapons, then Japanese should also have them and that "Japanese opinion will not permit this at present, but I believe that the public, especially the younger generation, can be educated" (Komine, 2017, 47). Not only this quote shows that Sato was, in fact, secretly supportive of nuclearization. However, Japan by this step not only differentiate itself from the prewar Japan but at the same time from militaristic China. Moreover, the fourth pillar contains a condition, which states in case of the change of circumstances, Japan might be allowed to develop a nuclear program. This condition pretty much supports the fact that these four principles were introduced also because Sato was afraid that the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" would be, in the future, too restrictive to Japanese military defense options and in order to lessen the effect of these principles,

he introduced additional four pillars. There we can see the slowly emerging narrative of a normal country, when Japan might have been counting with the ambitious defense plans in the future. Thus, Japanese politicians did not truly acknowledge this policy, but introduced principles based on a strong public anti-nuclear sentiments and based on its desire to be portrayed as the country, which has a special responsibility to fight for the abolishment of nuclear weapons, since Japan is the first and only nuclear victim (Hanssen, 2018).

This chapter was aiming to show how the perception of peace in Japan was evolving in 1970s – 1980s. At the start I showed the presence of *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* or we can also call it Yoshida doctrine narrative. Japan in this period wanted to focus on economic development and put a huge effort on showing that it does not have ambitious to become a military power, this was demonstrated on “rich nation, weak army” narrative, which was aiming to differentiate from prewar “rich nation, strong army” narrative. At the same time, Japan’s goal was to be perceived as a respectful and responsible member of the international community, which was demonstrated for instance in joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty, declaring its anti-nuclear policies or promoting the image of unique “first world pacifist country”. However, these efforts received lukewarm response from abroad, especially from neighbouring countries. The non-recognition element might be one of the aspects that contributed to the emergence of a “normal country” narrative, which will be strengthening in the next period. Peace was in this period perceived and fulfilled in a passive way and Japan aimed to achieve it by constrains in its security policy, for instance by building its defense strategy based on domestic condition rather than external situation.

2.4. Normal nation narrative

The last period touches upon the emergence of the “normal nation” narrative. The period of 1960s and 1970s could be perceived as the period of Yoshida doctrine, characterized by the focus on economic development. Security issues of Japan were relied mainly on the cooperation with the US. Japan, in order to show that it is pacifist country was reluctant in case of pointing out to the security threats, Hanssen called this fact as “hypothetical enemy taboo”. This chapter will discuss the strengthening of “normal nation” narrative, which occurred based on several factors. First, I will claim that one of the Japan’s goal was to be recognized, pacifism in the postwar period was among others a way, how to achieve the recognition within international community. Japan, therefore, assumed that pacifism and peacefulness in the region would be guaranteed by Japan’s own pacifism, which would be recognized by neighbouring countries. However, the growing military tensions in the region changed Japan’s attitude. Japan’s pacifism suddenly started to be perceived as a weakness and the “normal nation” narrative very often portrayed Japan as “weak” and “abnormal” country, which needs to gain back its pride by becoming “normal” again. Thus, this period of “normal nation” narrative witnesses an emergence of another Other – the prewar Japan. I also claim that Japan in this period was trying to differentiate itself from another Other – China, which will serve in this part as an example of Japan’s changing peace narrative. I will apply the normal state narrative in relation to China, as I see that China is truly a focal point of Japan, when Beijing is often portrayed as “coercive” “undemocratic” and “aggressive” in relation to Japan. Based on this fact, it is possible to observe the pressure on the change of the perception of pacifism in Japan. “Normal nation” narrative aims to reformulate security policy of Japan, which would be formed based on the security policy and military capabilities of other states. There is a pressure to be more independent in security policy. I identify several aspects that led to the emergence and strengthening of “normal nation” narrative. It was a desire to gain autonomy and independence and to be more visible and respected within international community, these aspects had showed up after several Japanese failures in its attempts

to make impact in the international community, which was not recognized. This will be demonstrated on the example of Japanese role in the Gulf War and Japanese responses to the invasion of Soviets in Afghanistan. In addition, this chapter will also demonstrate that perception of pacifism is changing through the influence of actors from the third layer – discursive area, therefore pacifism lies in the middle layer. This will be illustrated mainly on the current narrative, when prime Minister Abe`s goal is to reinterpret the Article 9 of Japanese Constitution.

“Normal nation” narrative is a successor of Yoshida Doctrine and work with an idea of independent and strong Japan. Where previous narrative saw uniqueness in pacifism, the normal nation saw only abnormality. Proponents identified irresponsibility in current security policy, which was reluctant to identify the security threats. They argued that since Japan is economic great power, it should also be responsible in the issues of security. I would especially emphasize the fact that proponents did not want to differentiate from prewar Japan, but rather highlighted the need to conserve Japanese traditions like national anthem, flag and institution of Emperor (Hanssen, 2018). The main promoter of normal state discourse was Yasuhiro Nakasone, who served as Prime Minister of Japan from 1982 – 1987, who turned the normal nation discourse into mainstream position. It is possible to see many parallels with the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. From his stance, which will be illustrated later, we can also observe his emphasis on breaking with postwar security taboos and promoting a greater confidence in the mindset of the Japanese people. His policy aimed for “settling the accounts of postwar politics, which among others means transforming Japan into an “international” state, which would be more active in contributing to world peace”. According to Pyle, Nakasone was determined to create a new national consensus, which would replace Yoshida Doctrine, by this he meant an activist foreign policy, since he regarded Yoshida Doctrine to be passive and demeaning (Pyle, 1992, 88). His desire to transform Japan was regarded as “an attempt to turn the historically unique “peace states” into a “normal nation” (Dian, 2015, 372).

One significant factor, which led to the rise of “normal nation” narrative was a feeling of non-recognition. As it has been mentioned, Japan always sought to be

recognized by other nations, the decision to become pacifist country was a demonstration of it. After the World War II was the pacifism a distinguishing feature of Japan's identity, it served as way how to deal with the prewar identity and how to become a respectable member of international community. In this regard, I would like to mention two cases, where Japan failed to play a significant role and therefore it led to the frustration. First case is Gulf war, during which Japan showed very reluctant response. Japan could not contribute militarily, since there were not legal provisions, which would allow Japan's SDF to be sent outside the country. Thus, Japan decided to provide only material and financial aid. This step was strongly criticized by the US, who expected a more significant role of Japan. This, according to Japanese, was a sign of weakness, since despite the fact that Japan had a status of economic superpower, its role in the conflict was not recognized, since only the material help was not sufficient. International community expected Japan to play more significant role, which was not fulfilled. Moreover, Japanese ally, the US criticized Japan's steps and for instance, Washington Post released a poll, showing that 30 percent of Americans surveyed had lost respect for Japan, which was a shock for Japan. Even though, Japanese contribution was higher than contributions from, for instance, Germany, Japan was not invited to visit Washington and was not mentioned in a list of friendly nations thanked in a public letter of gratitude from the Kuwaiti government (Purrington, 1992, 169). The lesson Japan learnt is that the country needs to transform its postwar mercantilist narrative into more proactive and "normal nation" discourse. The trauma from the Gulf War could be seen from several speeches, Prime Minister Naoto Kan in one speech said that "Japan tends to have suffered a bit of trauma at the fact that in the First Gulf War Japan sent money but failed to dispatch any people" (Kan, 2011). The second example would be the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979. This case is an illustration of Japanese reluctance to define its security threats. Thus, Soviet threat is a demonstration that Japan's unwillingness to use military power did not result in peace and stability on the region and at the same time, Japanese weakness rather led to USSR's desire for military hegemony (Hanssen, 2018). Tokyo's response to the Soviet invasion was again criticized by the US, in the document called "Afghanistan: Soviet invasion and US Responses"

written by US Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division specifically mentions Japanese “cautious” actions. The document recommends Japan “to take more tangible actions against the Soviet Union”, since “rhetorical unity and substantive passivity is not acceptable”. Further s states that even though Japan refused the invasion and is considering a number of additional steps, it appears to be “‘hesitant’ to go along with the US economic countermeasures, because officials believe trade sanctions might end up hurting Japan economically more than Soviet Union” (Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 1980). Japanese attitude could be illustrated by comments of Prime Minister Ohira, he delivered a speech to the Japan Press Club, where he said that “Soviet Union is a defensive, cautious, diplomatically skilful and experienced country – not a reckless country”, concerning Japan’s possible boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, he commented “for the time being, the government intends to observe the reactions of Western and other countries” (Ohira, 1980 in Kimura, 2000, 209) These examples are the illustration of Japanese reluctance to pointing out to the security threat, which was, in the other words, still a taboo in Japan. Moreover, a hesitant attitude towards sanctions is, in my view, linked with Japanese identity of country “poor on natural resources”.

It was not only the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, but Soviet threat, which Japan was facing at this time, was significantly connected with growing violations of Japanese waters and airspace and also the improving military capabilities. This caused a great concern, however at the beginning, Japan still wanted to deal with it diplomatically. Foreign Minister Sonoda Suano was, for instance, very critical of the increasing threat perceptions within the Japan Defense Agency, but when the USSR deployed troop on the Japan-claimed islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan – MOFA’s attitude started to be more critical (Otake, 1983, 275 in Hanssen 2018). The invasion to Afghanistan was a peak of Japanese frustration and MOFA even stopped trying to stop JDA from projecting USSR as a threat. What did normal nation discourse highly criticized was thus the naivety of the previous narrative. Faith in economic relations as a security guarantee and also in “the region of peace through unarmed neutrality” was criticized and condemned by “normal nation” narrative, which proposed to take security threats

seriously (Nakasone, 2004, 107). Nakasone delivered a speech at an LDP seminar, where he said “I want defense issues to be given a normal treatment, and I want the people to calmly judge through a normal way of thinking. We should deal with defense issues, as an important national policy, in the same way as education and social welfare” (Nakasone, 1985 in Hanssen 2018). Further, JDA Director general Imura Joji also contributed to a labelling an enemy, however there was still visible a kind of constrain, which did not allow him to label Soviets as “hypothetical enemy” but rather used the term “potential threat”, in his speech he said “it is an objective fact that lately the USSR’s land, sea, and air military power has grown dramatically in the Far East. We interpret this as an increased potential threat. However, our national policy is peace diplomacy based on the philosophy of our constitution. In that sense, we are not permitted to regard any country as an enemy, as a hypothetical enemy” (Imura Joji in Hanssen 2018). Labelling the USSR as a “potential threat” could be seen also in the 1980 JDA white paper, this is a move from the Yoshida Doctrine narrative, which was reluctant to designate other countries as hypothetical enemies. The identification of the USSR as a potential threat made it easier to justify changes in Japan’s defense posture, therefore, there was a concrete issue, against which Japan should determine its defense policy. Labelling potential threat was reflected in Japanese strengthening of military capabilities in the 1980s. The reflection could be also seen in statement made by Kato Koichi, JDA Director General, who said that “we are modernizing our defense capabilities, matching the progressing technological standards of other countries” (Kato Koichi, 1986). Also Nakasone argued that Japanese Self Defense Forces are like “reclining dragon”, which might refers to a great man who had no opportunity to display his real talents (Nakasone 1985 in Johnson, 1986). In addition, the 1986 Mid-Term Defense Program estimate states that “in consideration of changes in the international military situation and in the level of technology in other countries [...] efforts will be made to carry out a throughout review of the functions of the Ground, Maritime and Airs Self Defense Forces and to deploy resources in line with priorities”. It was not unacceptable to show Japan’s military capabilities and to identify threats anymore. Moreover, there were visible efforts to raise “defense consciousness” among the public and to instilling

a realistic view of defense, which considered threats to be external rather than internal (Hanssen, 2018).

Military capabilities was a huge topic in this period. One of the issue related to this was Japanese defense plans fixed to one percent ceiling without consideration of external threats. This discussion was present also within economists, one of them wrote that “it is useless to argue about what percentage of GNP will make us feel safe. What we need to do is to decide in concrete terms the level of military power necessary to meet the potential threat to Japan from other countries” (Takeuchi, 1986, 73). The condition that defense spending would be fixed emerged from the fear that Japan would use its economy power to become military power. The “normal nation” discourse sought to divide the links between economic great power and military great power and rather to interpret the need for higher spending as a result of the reality surrounding Japan. However, it is important to say that the narrative also states that it does not mean that Japan would turn into military great power, but the goal is only to turn Japan into “normal nation”. Thus, what Nakasone in this period was trying to achieve, is to rearticulate the meaning of a peace state. According to Hagström and Hanssen, in the normal nation rearticulation, Japan was still “peace state”, but the peace state was chained completely new signifiers, such as “defense spending” and “international responsibility”, which gave it a rather different meaning than it had in the Yoshida Doctrine discourse”, they also pointed out that the rearticulation signalled more “active, international, an ostensibly “normal” role for Japan in the field of security” (Hagström, Hanssen, 2016). Also even the public and leftist politics started to accept this discourse, for instance, JSP chairman Ishibashi Masashi stressed that “Japan’s external environment had to be conducive to disarmament and non-alignment” (Ishibashi, 1984). In other words, he argues that Japan should take into consideration external threats in its defense plans and spending.

Changing perception of peace by differentiation from postwar narrative is visible in the increasing trend of questioning Japan’s war crimes. One of the most controversial issue is politician’s visit of Yasukuni Shrine. For instance, document called “Basic Position of the Government of Japan Regarding Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visits to Yasukuni

Shrine” states “Prime Minister Koizumi is of the firm conviction that Japan’s present peace and prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in the war. He visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and offer his respect and thanks to those who had to lay down their lives on the battlefield against their will; to reaffirm the importance of ensuring the present peace and prosperity of Japan” (MOFA, 2005). I propose that this is not only a form of differentiation from postwar Japan peace narrative, but at the same time it is one of the aspect of re-emergence of Japanese confidence, which should lead to normalization of country. The emphasis on the fact that peace, which Japanese enjoying today, exists thanks to ones, who died in war could be found in statement by Shinzo Abe as well. Abe claims that “the peace and prosperity Japan enjoys today is not created only by those who are living today. The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious sacrifices of numerous people, who perished on the field” (Abe, 2013). Abe in an interview with the Economist again questioned the historical crimes of Japan. When the reporter asked him about the issue of “comfort women”, he replied that “there was no evidence proving that there was an outfit abducting women or coercing the women in that way”, he even makes light of women’s abuse by Japanese by saying “the 20th century was a century in which women’s human rights were much undermined and hurt, particularly during times of conflict and war” (Abe, 2014c). Japanese peace narrative therefore was clearly inclinating towards “normal nation” narrative, which features the differentiation from postwar victimization of nations, which suffered from Japanese militarism, but instead of that, narrative contains the relativization of Japanese war crimes and even an effort to interpret period of imperialism as something positive, which led to today’s peace.

2.4.1 Shinzo Abe and Proactive contribution to peace

I would like to dedicate this chapter to the current peace narrative in Japan held by Prime Minister Abe. A special emphasize will be put on Abe’s ambitions to reinterpret Article 9 and his promotion of “Proactive Contribution to Peace”. I propose that his efforts are a continuation of what has been started during Prime Minister Nakasone.

The shift in peace narrative is illustrated in signifiers chained with term “peace”, Hagström and Hanssen identified the following - “international responsibility”, “proactive pacifism”, “strengthening of defense capabilities” or “adherence to international norms” These signifiers will be found in the current status of Sino-Japanese relations and their conflict over Senkaku islands. I argue that it is China, who is serving as an Other to Japan and that Shinzo Abe is using Beijing as an object of differentiation, based on which Abe strengthen the normal nation narrative. China is portrayed as “unlawful”, “bully”, “arrogant” and “undemocratic”, on the other hand, Japan’s image in the current narrative is “democratic”, “victimized”. “weak” and “bullied”. The process of differentiaton in this case, again, serve as a way how to transform Japan into “normal nation” and change the perception of peace in Japan. Similarly, as in the previous period, Abe is now using external threat as a justification of his constitutional changes ambitions. Further, I propose that depiction of Japan as a “weak” state very much correspond with its ambitions throughout the postwar period to be recognized. The feeling that the country looks “weak” in relation with China, which used to be less developed than Japan could be a humiliating factor. Labelling itself as “weak” very much corresponds with “normal nation” narrative, which sees a current status of pacifism, as a demonstration of weakness, which leads to the decrease of Japan’s international status. At the same time, China achieved to be the biggest economy in the world. For Japan, it is not easy to deal with the fact that country, which used to be a receiver of its ODA is now becoming stronger than Japan. This period witness a changing attitude of Japanese towards China, now there is bigger consensus on the fact that China is bullying Japan and that Tokyo should response firmly. There is visible move in a way, how Japanese identify threats, while not only China, but also North Korea are in several governmental papers identified as a threat. Perception of pacifism is, therefore, in this period changing through an activity of actors in the third layer, the so-called “discursive arena”. This is another argument that pacifism is not in the deepest layer of Japanese identity, as it is claimed by conventional constructivists like Katzenstein.

Sino-Japanese relations were always difficult and went through many conflicts, which left a certain sentiment on both sides. Japan’s perception of China was changing

throughout the centuries and the last two centuries, the relations were influenced mainly by the Japan's role in the World War II. Japan's militarism caused a significant anti-Japanese sentiment within Chinese. After the World War II, Japan put a huge effort into changing this perception by portraying China as a victim of its war crimes and by efforts to provide China developmental help. Victimizing China was a way, how Japan was trying to differentiate from a prewar Japan. However, when even after years of ODA helps, China did not recognize Japanese pacifism, which led to the turn of attitude towards China. Beijing used to be portrayed, for instance, by Japanese Left as a state, which managed to maintain independence. In the postwar period, it was rather the US, who served as a negative Other to Japan, since it was perceived as the one, who push Japan into remilitarization. On the other hand, during the postwar period, China was often portrayed as a victim, developed, a model role state, which Japan should follow. Any criticism of China was perceived as an attempt to identify with prewar attitudes, therefore Tokyo was very cautious in this regard. However, currently, we are witnessing the changing narrative on China, when Japanese old attitude is perceived as an act of weakness. Suzuki points out that China's depiction as "arrogant", high-handed" and "irrational contribute to Japanese construction of "Self", which is described as "weak", which damages Japan's own autonomy and makes Chin even more arrogant than before. I claim that this as a part of "normal" nation narrative (Suzuki, 2015, 110).

One aspect of Japanese changing perception of peace is its willingness to identify the threats that surrounding it. This fact could be seen from several governmental documents as well as from speeches of political representatives. As an example, I would choose "Defense Programs and Budget of Japan", which is released every year by Ministry of Defense. In 2010, there could be found a reference on China only in regard of mutual cooperation, defense exchanges, but it is not possible to find any note about China as a threat. However, the Defense Program from 2011 mentions China as a concern, country listed in a section "Security environment surrounding Japan" and the document mentions specifically "military modernization by China and its insufficient transparency are of concern for the regional and global community" . Beijing is listed next to North Korea and Russia as a potential threat of Japan. Documents also

emphasize the alliance with the US and says that the Alliance is “indispensable in ensuring for Japan’s peace and security”. Moreover, there is a visible effort to accommodate Japanese defense spending on an actual security situation, document states that “Japan will study measures to respond to changes in the international environment regarding defense equipment” and that “Japan will procure equipment more efficiently by improving its contract and procurement systems” (MOD, 2011, 44). The same document from 2014 mentions China even more, China is according to the document, increasing activities in Japan’s vicinity. China and North Korea are listed in security environment threats, the document emphasizes China’s lack of transparency in its broad and rapid military modernization (MOD, 2014, 2-3). In addition, in 2016 report, there is also a note about establishing “China Studies Office” in order to enhance the structure of research concerning China’s military and security issues” (MOD, 2016, 28). I claim that this is a clear demonstration of normal nations discourse, since Japan not only does not hesitate to identify a concrete threat, but at the same time, it is developing a concrete measures in order to fight against these threats. Not only Ministry of Defense, but also Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concerns about China’s development. In “Diplomatic Bluebook 2017”, MOFA mentioned Chinese increase defense expenditures, enhanced missile and nuclear capabilities and also unilateral activities by the Chinese military in the sea and airspace around Japan. MOFA points out to the “rapid expansion of military capability lacking transparency” and claims that China is trying to “unilaterally change the status quo in the region”. Japan, in order to differentiate itself from non-transparent China, is suggesting “dialogue for an improvement of China’s transparency and encourage China to be positively involved in the international order based on the rule of law, in cooperation with the countries concerned” (MOFA, 2017). This part shows Japanese attempt to show a sense of superiority, while pointing to the fact that China is not such responsible member of international community as Japan, because it is Japan, who encourage China to be more “involved in the international order based on the rule of law” and that it is Japan, who wants to solve tension peacefully by urging it “through dialogue”.

The ability to identify threats is linked with the new role of Japan in the security

issues. The Diplomatic Bluebook also partly deals with this issue. It notes that the environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe and that there are threats like North Korea and China. When mentioning China or North Korea, document often links the words like “coercion”. China is being described as “lacking transparency” and its action as “inconsistent with international order”. Japan is conversely described as “peace-loving nation”, always reacting “calmly” and as a country, which proactively contributed to the peace and prosperity of the international community through cooperation with the international community. It also says that Japan enjoyed an appreciation and respect from international community and that international community expects Japan to play more proactive role for peace and stability in the world in a way “commensurate with its national capabilities”. By using word “commensurate” Japan probably wanted to refer to the fact that as an economic power, it should from now on be also a commensurate military power. Further, document states that “continuing to adhere to the courses that it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will advance vibrant diplomacy under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of cooperation, and will contribute even more proactively to the peace and security of the international community in order to respond to the request from the international community” (MOFA, 2017). This could be understood as a reference to a fact, that previous Japanese involvement in the conflicts were not recognized, since Japanese involvement was mainly material support, therefore, it is the international community, which is expecting and at the same time pushing Japan into more active involvement. The document says that in order to achieve proactive contribution, Japanese government adopted “Legislation for Peace and Security”, which took effect in March 2016. This legislation caused a great controversy, since it allows Japanese Self-Defense Forces to be involved in a larger scale of operation abroad. The legislation and even the ability to identify threats is in opposition to what Japan did in the postwar period, when peace was pursuing in passive way by limitations and reluctance to react to threats.

Japan’s government at the beginning of Legislation for Peace and Security names reasons, which led to the adoption of Legislation, document says that fundamental

transformation of the security environment surrounding Japan is happening and that “no country can secure its own peace only by itself”. Moreover, it again states that “the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world in a way commensurate with its national capability” and therefore there is need to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses. The legislation should, in short, enable seamless responses to any situations to secure lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people, “the SDF will be able to provide necessary logistics support and search and rescue to armed forces of foreign countries collectively addressing the situation which threatens the international peace and security” and to “provide necessary logistics support and search and rescue to armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s peace and security”. Japan did not forget to mention the importance of the Japan-US Alliance, which contribute to the stability in Asia-Pacific region and also the fact that Japan will “continue to make best efforts to promote deeper understanding of countries concerned and ensure transparency” (GOJ, 2016). Proactive pacifism is thus the Japanese new perception of peace. Shinzo Abe in the Press Conference on the “Legislation on Peace and security” emphasized the need to react to the security threats, he was not reluctant to name specific threats and that Japanese were a victim of them, while saying “we live in an era, when no country can secure its own security only by itself. In the past two years, Japanese nationals have fallen victim to terrorism in Algeria, Syria and Tunisia. Most of Japan is within the range of hundreds of North Korea’s ballistic missiles [...] this is the reality. We must not avert our eyes from this harsh reality [...] I’ve been carrying our proactive diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map. Disputes of any kind shall be settled peacefully based on international law, not by force or coercion”, he then questions the postwar perception of pacifism by saying that if Japan would be attacked “we cannot do anything, we will not do anything, unless Japan itself is attacked. That has been Japan’s position to date. Does this really make sense?”, postwar narrative and passive pacifism are questioned again, when he said “we should be proud of the path we have followed. However, it was not realized by simply proclaiming the word “peace”. I strongly believe that it is the fruit of the efforts of our

forebears who adapted to the changes in the environment and turned their wish for peace into action, such as establishing the SDF, revising the Japan-US security treaty, and participating in international peace cooperation activities". He also tries to emphasize the fact that Japan is in real danger by saying "our lives and peaceful daily lives are in clear danger. There is no other appropriate means available to repel the danger". According to Abe, labelling this legislation as "war legislation" is "irresponsible". He ends up his speech by an attempt to encourage people, when saying that Japanese should be "confident and no longer turn blind eye to the changes in the environment and remain idle" (Abe, 2015). The fact that he highlighted revision of Japan-US security treaty and establishment of SDF is an obvious departure from postwar perception of pacifism, since these two issues were highly controversial and received a strong public rejection during the time of their adoption. Now Abe is calling these steps as a "fruit", which Japan is enjoying nowadays. Not only he praises the existence of SDF and Japan-US alliance, which was in the past regarded as an aspect of militarization, but he encourages public to be proud of this fact.

Abe is often identifying as the reason form constitutional amendments the need to secure Japanese nationals abroad, for instance, the one operating in the UN peacekeeping missions. This is one of the aspect of Japan's proactive policy – to response to the changing security environment. Abe on this account says that "even if such people were to be suddenly attacked by armed groups, the JSDF conducting missions in that region or country cannot rescue them. Even if the forces of other countries working hard with the JSDF for peace-building request JSDF to rescue them, the JSDF has no choice but to abandon them. That is the reality". As it was mentioned, Legislation for Peace and Security would allow Japan to engage in this situation. Abe calls this as a "responsibility to secure the lives of the people under any circumstances" and that the current status in the Constitution "require to renounce this responsibility to secure loves of people in such situations". He adds that these "situations" are not theory anymore and that "the conflict in the South China Sea continues due to unilateral actions backed by coercion". Abe also emphasized in his speech the fact that Japan will further strengthen responses to such so-called "grey-zone situations", referring to the

disputed territory with China. He claims that debates over constitutional amendments are held in order to “secure the lives and livelihood of Japan’s nationals”, but at the same time emphasizes that it is not deviation from path of “peace-loving nation”, however, according to him, only promoting peace passively and expecting other states to be peaceful is not enough, he adds “such assurances are nowhere to be found nowadays, with terrorist lurking around the world. I believe that we and the Government must all face up to this reality head-on” and “to secure our lives and to ensure that we can live in peace, Japan must regularly make seamless preparations to be able to respond to every possible situation” (Abe, 2017).

Normal nation narrative thus uses the Japan’s ability to identify its threats as a way how to legitimize Japan’s policy changes. Japan’s identity entrepreneurs are using the image of coercive China, which bullies weak and subservient Japan that has to rely on the protection from outside (Kolmaš, 2017b, 268). Suzuki in this regard writes that this image of a weak and bullied Japan might be linked to the fact that “in Japan exists a persistent fear that Japan had a weak or subservient identity that allowed it to be dominated by foreign powers”, in the past it has been an image of weak Japan in relation to the strong US, today the US has been replaced by China, Suzuki continuous claiming “what is often missed is the fact that the fundamental issue undergirding these discussions has frequently been about constructing an identity of Japan as an autonomous state” (Suzuki, 2015, 100) and the discussions surrounding Article 9 were linked to this fear, that Japan had a weak or subservient identity, which allowed it to be dominated by foreign powers (Kolmaš, 2017b, 271). Asahi Shimbun in its editorial dealing with island dispute with China wrote “the inconsistency of that policy has ended up both exposing Japan to suspicious eyes of western nations and allowing Moscow to exploit Tokyo’s weakness”, the editorial was criticizing negotiation of Japanese government with Russia over the Northern Territories, overall editorial criticize Tokyo’s naivety, when it believed that Russia would make concessions to Japan on the territorial dispute (Asahi Shimbun, 2018a). By the inconsistency, the editorial meant Japanese attitude, which promote bold economic partnership and at the same time it imposed sanctions on Russia because of its annexation of Crimea (Asahi Shimbun, 2018a). The

way of handling the territorial disputes with Russia is not the only issue, which is criticized by Japanese media to be “weak”. Senkaku island dispute is also often criticized as an example, where Japan showed its weakness. In 2010, Prime Minister Kan Naoto came under a strong criticism for his handling of the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu incident. His successor Noda Yoshihiko was also criticized for being differential to China (Sankei Nyusu, 2013 in Suzuki 2015). Suzuki notes that there is a trend of these criticism, which according to her, brings political points by criticising and highlighting the government’s failures in its foreign policy towards China. Not only media, but also Left has also criticising the government’s allegedly “weak” China diplomacy, especially with regards to Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute (Suzuki, 2015, 110).

Japanese inclination towards normal nation narrative is, among other factors, significantly caused by non-recognition of its pacifist identity. This fact is visible in Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict, while many Chinese statements shows Beijing’s efforts to question Japanese pacifism. On the account of the historical claims of these island, China Daily wrote “the Diaoyu Islands have been recorded in Chinese historical documents as Chinese territory since the Ming Dynasty [...] China had friendly relations with the Ryukyu Kingdom for about 500 years, before Japan annexed it. And more importantly, China was the first to discover and name the islands Diaoyu”, the article also emphasized the fact that Japan don’t want to solve issue peacefully and commented the arrest of Chinese fisherman, who entered the conflicted waters surrounded islands by stating that Japan did not feel a need “to take recourse to diplomacy” (China Daily, 2010). Another article in China Daily dealing with the same topic called Shinzo Abe’s position as “hawkish” and steps of Japan as “illegal” (Zhang, China Daily, 2013). The scepticism over Japan pacifism had been expressed already in 1971, when islands were returned to Japan by the US, Peking on this account released “Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic Of China”, Beijing commented it by saying “the fraud of the revision of Okinawa to Japan is a new grave step to strengthen US-Japanese military collusion and to accelerate the revival of Japanese militarism” (MOFA PRC, 1971).

The image of civilized Japan, which has to act firmly as the reaction to the activities of coercive China could be seen in several speeches and official governmental

documents. One of the most striking event in Senkaku island dispute was the establishment of Air Defense Identification Zone, Shinzo Abe reacted to this event by claiming “Japan can under no circumstances accept any attempts to change the status quo through coercion. We will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner”, he did not forget to highlight the Japan-US Alliance as the “cornerstone” and that “Japan will play a more proactive role for the peace and stability of the world, working hand in hand with the United States” (Abe, 2014a). Abe’s speeches feature several references to Japan’s efforts to “catch up with West” as an aspect of superiority over Asian countries. In his speech called “Japan and NATO As “Natural Partners” he named as the reason, why is Japan a natural partner of NATO “the shared common values with Europeans and Americans” and that “NATO is an alliance that transcends the Atlantic Ocean to connect the United States and Europe, espousing the principle of “an alliance based on values”. Further, he stated that NATO is a natural ally of Japan regarding its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” and at the same time he mentioned the struggle Japan is going through because of coercion in East and South China Sea and therefore “as a responsible major power in the region, Japan will continue to exercise restraint as we address such situation in a level-headed manner, while exhibiting our firm determination” (Abe, 2014b). Shared values with the West is also emphasized in “National Security Strategy” from 2013, document also emphasizes Japan’s role in Asia by claiming that “Japan has contributed to realizing stability, economic growth and democratization in many counties, especially those in Asia, including the member states of the ASEAN”, another reference to Japan’s contribution to the international community and the uniqueness of Japan is visible in part, where document states that Japan is complying with the UN Charter, cooperation with the UN and other international organizations and contributed to their activities. Further, is mentions the fact that Japan is the only state, which suffered from atomic bombings and that Japan is thus playing a leading role in international initiative to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons”. As in almost every official document dealing with security issues, Tokyo never forget to characterize itself as “peace-loving nation”, however, the document after this traditional proclamation continues by stating that Japan wants to consolidate the position as the peace-loving

nation, but it is now surrounded by “an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges”, Japan, because of that, has to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation (National Security Strategy, 2013). This is again a way, how to legitimize the changing narrative and changing security policy. The document includes all features of normal nation narrative – by stating that Japan is surrounded by “increasingly severe security situation” or by saying that Japan is the only country, which suffered from atomic bombing, it achieved to victimize Japan and to legitimize its security policy changes. Further we can see the effort to highlight Japan’s contribution to the international community, which is linked with the Japanese obsession to be recognized by others and since the recognition was not significant, because of military constraints, which did not allow Japan to be involved in several military missions – Japanese started questioning Yoshida doctrine narrative. Moreover, it promotes a “proactive role” of Japan by describing new orientation Japan based on “Proactive Contribution to Peace”. The document includes the mention about coercive China as well, therefore it is another feature of normal nation narrative – an ability to identify threat and differentiate Japan from coercive states, which does not respect international law by emphasizing the fact that Japan is a respectable member of international community.

Changing perception of peace and inclination to the normal nation narrative is visible also in Japanese media. I have already mentioned increasing criticism of government’s “weak” handling of disputes. But it is also interesting, how Japanese media comment Abe’s attempt of constitutional amendments. In the past, the discussions over constitutional amendments were immediately condemned as an effort to remilitarize. Today, we see changing trend, the government is not criticized for remilitarization, but rather for the way, how it handles these discussions and for the form of government’s proposal. Left-oriented Asahi Shimbun in one editorial commented Abe’s promotion of change of status of SDF. It firstly criticized it by saying “we cannot agree with Abe’s claim that the addition of such wording would not change SDF’s tasks and powers [...] there is the possibility that the scope of the SDF’s mission could be gradually expanded through ambiguous legal language” but at the same it

recognize the need for a debate, when stating that “we don’t deny need for debate on the Constitution. But this is clearly not the time to make a headlong rush into a constitutional amendment” (Asahi Shimbun, 2018b). Another editorial has the same comment, as it states that Government is handling this issue “with the haste and rashness” (Asahi Shimbun, 2018c). Another editorial from 2018 is dealing with documents scandals, related, among others, to SDF. At the beginning the editorial criticized government as well, but again, it did not reject the discussion over Article 9 of the Constitution and in fact advised Abe to solve these scandals first and then to start the discussion. According to the list “Abe should deeply realize that there can be no meaningful debate on an amendment to Article 9 based on broad public understanding unless these issues and concerns are satisfactory addressed” (Asahi Shimbun, 2018d).

This chapter aimed to show the current narrative in Japan. It is possible to observe a visible rise of “normal nation” narrative. The continuing trend of inclination towards normal nation narrative is seen in governmental documents, which regularly refer to the security situation surrounding Japan as “increasingly severe” and Japanese neighbours like China or North Korea to be “coercive”, “lacking transparency”, “bully” or “undemocratic”. By this labelling, Japan shows its willingness to identify security threats, which was not possible in the past, since it could be seen as a sign of militarization. Nowadays, these steps are regarded to be normal and the labelling could be seen not only in governmental materials, but also in newspapers, which in the past were not in favour neither of criticizing China nor of support of constitutional changes. Abe’s attempts to reinterpret Article 9 is rather criticized for its form than for the need for reinterpretation as such. The debate over Constitution is not considered as a sign of remilitarization, but rather as a natural reaction on the security situation, which needs to be reflected. Shinzo Abe is promoting “proactive contribution to pacifism”, which aims to differentiate itself from postwar passive pacifism and it is characterized by more proactive role of Japan, which is reacting to the changing security environment.

Conclusion

Japanese peace identity is very often considered to be unique topic in the field of international relations studies. Many theories failed to sufficiently explain, what led to the adoption of pacifism and what caused the changing perception of peace in Japan. I have decided to use the theory of sedimentation of identities, which, according to my research, provides the best explanation of national identity formation. The theory connects the approaches of conventional constructivists and critical constructivists (or poststructuralists) and builds up on the idea of three-layered identity.

The most sedimented identity corresponds with the conventional cultural and historical basis of a state, the second layer is constructed in the process of differentiation against otherness and it specifies the constellation from the level one. Level three could be called a discursive arena. This level is most prone to be changed through the operation of identity entrepreneurs. The issues discussed in this layer are constrained by and have consequences for the identity construction in the other layers particularly identity constructions in relation to specific others in the middle layer.

I claim that Japanese pacifism lies in the middle layer and the goal of this work was to demonstrate the change of the perception of peace on the interaction of the middle and third layer. I argue that the changes in peace narrative are a result of the operation of identity entrepreneurs, who operate in the least sedimented layer. The methodology used in this work is discourse analysis. Therefore I mainly studied primary sources as speeches, governmental documents, publications and statements in order to monitor signifiers tied up with the word “peace” or “pacifism”. This method gave me the ability to understand the changing perception of peace through the study of peace identity narratives. My goal was to prove that pacifism truly lies in the middle layer and that it is not a most sedimented identity as claimed by conventional constructivists. Further, I wanted to show the interaction of middle layer and the least sedimented layer by studying the key postwar narratives and demonstrate to changing perception of peace through these narratives. Lastly, I wanted to find out, whether the country is going through transformation from “abnormal” to “normal” state.

The work was divided into three periods. Each period dealt with one mainstream

narrative. The postwar period was characterized by the dominance of *shonin kokka* and *heiwa kokka* narratives (or we can use Yoshida doctrine narrative), which promoted pledge never to wage a war again and the focus on economic development. Japan put a huge effort into reassuring the international community about its pacifist development. Pacifism was understood as a new source of uniqueness of the country and the new identity was very often highlighted. However, I showed that pacifism was not a most sedimented identity of Japan, but rather as a result of differentiation against prewar militaristic Japan. Pacifism served as a tool, how to create a new image of unique country, which is “the world’s first pacifist country”. Yoshida doctrine narrative emphasized the pledge that Japan will never turn into military power again and promoted the narrative of “rich nation, weak army” narrative. Because of that, defense strategy were planned based on domestic conditions rather than external situation. In this regard, we speak about “passive peace” characterized by constraints in Japanese security policy as defense budget tied up to 1% of GDP, reluctance to identify threats or pledge not to maintain nuclear weapons. Understanding of peace was also connected with the idea that other states will accept Japanese pacifism, which would create a peaceful environment.

The period of 1970s witnessed an economic rise of Japan and regaining of national confidence. Japanese status as economic power was perceived as a new source of superiority. Though, the cautious security policy was still present. However, Tokyo in this period experienced a disillusion, which was caused by incapability to be significantly involved in Gulf War and reluctance to response to the Soviet threat. Both events were criticized by the international community and that left the room for questioning postwar perception of peace and overall postwar defense strategy. Non-recognition of Japanese involvement in the Gulf War and incapability to respond to security threat was understood as failure of Yoshida Doctrine narrative. This development led to the rise of “normal nation” narrative, which promotes “proactive contribution to peace”. According to this narrative, peace has to be protected by proactive involvement or by defense strategy responding to external threats. Pacifism in the previous form started to be perceived as weakness. Normal nation narrative tied up “peace” with new

signifiers like “international responsibility”, “proactive pacifism” or “strengthening of defense capabilities”. It promotes a greater confidence in the security policy of Japan demonstrated by a refunded ability to identify threats or changing security legislations. All of these aspects are features of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” promoted today by Shinzo Abe.

I have shown that by questioning postwar development, Japanese identity entrepreneurs are slowly changing the peace narrative towards a “normal nation”. Security threats like China, which are portrayed as “coercion”, “lacking transparency” or “aggressive” serve as a legitimization of Japanese security policy changes. China now serves as an object of differentiation, as Japan portrays itself as a victim and Japanese responses as “calm” and “based on international law”. Abe’s efforts for Constitutional amendments are accompanied by comments highlighting “severe security situation” surrounding Japan. Constitutional amendments are not criticized neither by the Left nor by Japanese media, both recognize the need for reinterpretation of Japanese security strategy. This is a clear demonstration of “normal nation” narrative. Peace is now understood as something, which has to be protected actively, not by constraints as in the postwar period.

In this work, I proved that pacifism lies in the middle layer of Japanese identity and that it is a result of the process of differentiation against the otherness. I have mentioned two major Others – China and the US and demonstrated the changing perception of peace on the discourse dealing with these two Others. To answer the research questions - I have demonstrated that Japanese perception of pacifism is changing through the operation of identity entrepreneurs. The change is achieved by promotion of different peace narratives and linking different signifiers to the word “peace” and “pacifism”. I have demonstrated it on the postwar evolution of peace narratives. The current narrative of “normal nation” is pushing Japan towards “normal state”, which should protect peace and pacifism by “Proactive Contribution to Peace”. Normal nation narrative also promotes security policy changes and reinterpretation of the Constitution. However, the efforts to reinterpret the Constitution were still not achieved to the level that would transform country to a “normal” state, as the

discussions are still ongoing. The fundamental aspect of an “abnormal” state – Article 9 of the Constitution is still present.

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Projekt diplomové práce

Dieu Thuy Nguyen

Téma: Changing perception of peace in post-war Japan/Proměna vnímání míru v poválečném Japonsku

Jazyk práce: angličtina

Výzkumné otázky:

What caused a changing perception of peace in Japan and how is Japan's peace identity represented in the debates?

Is Japan becoming a normal country thanks to Abe's policy of proactive pacifism and is pacifism still present in Japan?

Metodologie:

Práce bude založena na diskurzivní analýze primárních a sekundárních zdrojů.

Primárními zdroji se rozumí vládní dokumenty, rozhovory a proslovy vládních činitelů a předních politiků. V období po 2. Světové válce budu muset čerpat ze sekundárních zdrojů (knihy, odborné články), jelikož jen velmi malé množství je k dispozici v angličtině.

Diskurzivní analýza má za úkol zjistit, v jakých situacích, v jakém kontextu a k jakému účelu se koncept míru používal. Dále se budu snažit zjistit, jak se diskurz měnil a co na změnu diskurzu mělo vliv.

Práce bude rozdělena na teoretickou a analytickou část.

V teoretické části se budu zabývat konceptem pacifismu, kde budu zkoumat, jakým způsobem se formuje identita státu, v tomto konkrétním případě pacifistická identita. Tvorbu identity budu zkoumat z post-strukturalistického hlediska, jež se zaměřuje na tvorbu Self a Other v procesu tvorby identity státu. V teoretické části rozeberu tvorbu národní identity procesem vymezování se vůči jinakosti (other). Teorii chci porovnat s jinými přístupy (konvenční konstruktivismus, realismus, liberalismus).

Analytická část bude založena na případových studiích, budu zkoumat období od r. 1945 až po současnost. Plánuji práci rozdělit na etapy:

- 1945 – 1960
- 1972 – 1980 (tohle období mi přijde důležité z hlediska normalizace vztahů s ČLR, kdy se určitým způsobem také definoval pohled na pacifismus)
- 2012 – 2017

V analytické části se budu snažit pomocí diskurzivní analýzy ukázat, jak se tvořilo japonské pacifistické Self, především se budu věnovat jeho vztahem s Čínou a USA, jelikož to byly především tyto dva státy, které definovaly japonský pohled na pacifismus. Budu se snažit ukázat, že se japonské Self tvořilo a zda to skutečně bylo procesem vymezování se, jak to vysvětluje kritický konstruktivismus. Úkolem bude zjistit, jak se měnilo vnímání míru v japonském diskurzu a zda je mír vnímán dnes stejně jako v poválečném Japonsku a pokud ne, tak co tuto změnu způsobilo. Dalším úkolem bude zjistit, zda se díky současným změnám předsedy vlády Abeho stává země normální zemí nebo je pacifismus v Japonsku stále přítomen, jen jinak vnímán.

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Analytická část:

V této části se budu snažit opírat se o primární zdroje (vládní dokumenty, proslovy, rozhovory), novinové články a sekundární zdroje - články z odborných časopisů a knihy. Autoři, kteří se tímto tématem zabývají jsou například Linus Hagström, Karl Gustafsson, Shogo Suzuki, Jerden Björn či Alexander Bukh.

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