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The Fading Face of the Chinese Dragon? The Dispute Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Author: Bc. Martina Šumichrastová

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Supervisor: JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D

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Bc. Martina Šumichrastová

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ABSTRACT

Keywords: the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China vs Japan, The face of nation, two level game theory, Chinese Dream

The emergence of the global-economic crisis of 2008 helped the People's Republic of China to acquire the status of the world's second-largest economy. Not only did it open the doors for more significant opportunities for China in the sphere of commerce, but it allowed the People's Republic of China to be seen differently in the matters of military, diplomacy as well as on their level of domestic politics.

This thesis aims to provide an insight into a smouldering territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands concerning the deeply enrooted concept of the face. The concept of the face is essential mainly for Confucian societies as well as the East-Asian societies. However, slipping of the Chinese Dream, the People's Republic of China seems to be challenged in socio-political terms. Is the face of Chinese Dragon fading away?

As it is well known, both sides involved in the conflict, China, and Japan have had a turbulent history of disputes and quarrels. What makes the Chinese Officials to get involved in the territorial dispute, to strengthen the face of Chinese Dragon? The reasons for quick and renewed interest in the East China Sea are going to be examined in three main chapters, *The Face of Nation*, *In the name of politics* and lastly *The Strategic Point*. The first chapter will give an insight into the notion of the face in Confucian and the East Asian societies. Following the second chapter, which is tightly bounded to the national face and socio-political theme, the concept of the Chinese Dream comes in handy as well as the analysis of the Sino-Japanese relations during the history of the conflict. In addition, the two-level game theory will be beneficial to this chapter. The last chapter will be focused on the islands itself from the strategical and geographical point of view. In conclusion, the purpose of the thesis is summed up and points out the main reasons for China's impetus to renew the territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands.

Abstrakt

Kľúčové slová: Súostrovie Senkaku/ Tiao-jü-ťao, Čína vs. Japonsko, Tvár národa, Dvojstupňová teória hier, Čínsky sen

Vznik globálnej hospodárskej krízy v roku 2008 pomohol Číne získať status druhej najväčšej svetovej ekonomiky. Nielenže kríza otvorila pre Čínu dvere do nových sfér obchodu, ale umožnila jej byť inak vnímanou vo veciach vojenských, diplomatických ba aj na úrovni domácej politiky.

Cieľom tejto diplomovej práce je poskytnúť náhľad na stupňujúci sa teritoriálny spor o súostrovie Senkaku /Tiao-jü-ťao so zreteľom na hlboko zakorenený koncept tváre. Koncept tváre je nevyhnutný predovšetkým pre konfuciánske spoločnosti, ako aj pre východoázijské spoločnosti. Avšak, vymykajúc sa Čínskemu snu, zdá sa že, Čínska ľudová republika čelí výzvam sociálno-politického rázu. Vytráca sa tvár čínskeho draka?

Ako je známe, obe zúčastnené strany konfliktu, Čína a Japonsko mali turbulentnú históriu plnú nezhôd a hádok. Čo vedie čínskych funkcionárov k tomu, aby sa zapojili do teritoriálneho sporu, aby posilnili tvár čínskeho draka? Dôvody pohotového a obnoveného záujmu o vody Východočínskeho mora budú skúmané v troch hlavných kapitolách: *Tvár národa*, *V mene politiky* a v neposlednom rade *Strategický bod*. Prvá kapitola prinesie pohľad na koncept tváre v konfuciánskej a východoázijských spoločnostiach. Nasledujúcou druhou kapitolou, ktorá je úzko spätá s tvárou národa a sociálno-politickou témou, koncept čínskeho sna, ako aj analýza čínsko-japonských vzťahov počas teritoriálneho konfliktu budú prínosnými. Posledná kapitola sa zameriava na samotné ostrovy zo strategického a geografického hľadiska. V závere je zhrnutý účel práce poukazujúci na hlavné dôvody, prečo Čína podnietila znovuoobnovenie územného sporu s Japonskom nad súostrovím Senkaku/ Tiao-jü-ťao.

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THE FADING FACE OF THE CHINESE DRAGON

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the global-economic crisis of 2008 helped the People's Republic of China to acquire the status of the world's second-largest economy. Not only did it open the doors for more significant opportunities for China in the sphere of commerce, but it allowed the People's Republic of China to be seen differently in the matters of military, diplomacy as well as on their level of domestic politics. With this newly acquired ability, China could improve its image namely in East Asia however, the current territorial disputes, especially the maritime ones, may not be playing in favour of China. China is having territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In the South China Sea, the parties involved are the Philippines, Vietnam, and China, trying to claim the sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Another unsolved dispute over the islands is in the East China Sea- the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands.

To further understand the concept as well as the essence of the applied Chinese strategy, regarding the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, it is vital to look at the roots of the discord and the matter of legality. While examining the concept of legality, we come across three types of legal title that are accepted internationally. To process and validate a claim on the disputed part of the territory with uncertain territorial status, historical references, such as discovery, followed by 'continuous occupation, and effective authority (government) (Chung, 2004, p. 28),' are taken into consideration. Before the 1970s, the newly established the People's Republic of China had not drawn much of its attention to the disputed Islands in the East China Sea. In 1951, according to San Francisco Treaty, 'the Senkaku Islands were not included in the territory that Japan renounced under Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which legally defined Japan's post-war territory. Under the treaty, the Senkaku Islands were placed under the administration of the United States of America as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands (following the Article III) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012).'

Moreover, concerning the post-war Sino-Japanese relations based on the San Francisco Treaty, China had no objections regarding the territorial sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Later, in 1971, the Senkaku Islands which were at that time part of the Nansei Shoto Islands, as well as the Ryukyu and the Daito Islands, were given back to Japan as a part of the Agreement between Japan and the US.

The dispute over several rocky, uninhabited islands had ignited in 1971 when China had claimed that the Diaoyu Islands, were first discovered in the 14th century. Moreover, their reaction to Japanese claims of the Senkaku/Diaoyu being *terra nullius* (referring to the official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) is false, since according to the Chinese firm belief, 'the Diaoyu Islands have never been *terra nullius* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2012).'

Therefore, China's claim over the Diaoyu Islands is 'largely based on historical discoveries documented in the journals of Ming- and Qing- dynasty sea-captains and envoys to the Ryukyu kingdom, and the customary use of the rocks as shelters by Taiwanese fishermen facing inclement weather (Chung, 2004, p. 28).'

Nonetheless, they had pushed their claims, even more, stating that 'Japan seized them from Taiwan under Article Two of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 after Japan won the first Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895 (Tian & Chao, 2013).'

However, we can speculate that the renewing spark of the Chinese interest can be traced back to 1968, when 'the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) conducted an academic survey which indicated the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources on the East China Sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012).'

Since the dispute over the islands has started, the conflict has witnessed a regularly used military and diplomatic threats from the Chinese side.

For instance, 'in September 2005, China deployed five naval ships in the vicinity of the disputed waters, including a guided missile destroyer with its guns pointed at a Japanese P3-C surveillance aircraft (Wiegand, 2009, p. 170)', is an undoubtful act of provocation from China. In following years, there have been a few clashes counted between Chinese activists, who have been heavily supported by the Chinese government, and the Japanese military.

These clashes have had a goal to stimulate a political tension between both sides involved in the conflict. However, the dispute had embarked on a new era of growing tension in 2012, when the Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture's governor, Shintaro Ishihara, pledged to

purchase three of the islands. Not to mention the fact that the governor Ishihara is a well know Japanese nationalist and exceedingly critical towards China (The Japan Times Editorial, 2017). Additionally, these exact three islands had been previously under the ownership of private Japanese subjects. 'Despite the protest from China, the Japanese government itself then purchased them, in effect nationalizing them (Moore, 2014).'

China perceived the Japanese steps of nationalizing the islands as a disrespectful move, which could have as well be understood as a portrayal of greater sovereignty over the islands and China. With the growing power of China, which we can refer to as one of the world's superpowers, Japan is taking reasonable steps in the solving the dispute or at least lower the tension between the sides involved.

With Ishihara's *nationalisation* of the three of the Senkaku Islands, China's leadership felt disgraced, stripped of their face. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China shared a very explicit and emotional statement where they claim that 'the "purchase" of the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated Nan Xiaodao and Bei Xiaodao¹ and the implementation of the so-called "nationalization" of the islands. The nationalisation constitutes a gross violation of China's sovereignty over its territory and is highly offensive to the 1.3 billion Chinese people (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2012).'

From this statement, it is more than obvious, how disgraced and offended the People's Republic of China feels. The perception of the face which is tightly bound to honour and self- portraying before the others, is still present and deeply enrooted as noted from the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, it is vital to highlight the importance of the face in East Asian Societies when it comes to the territorial dispute over the islands.

The concept of face, deeply enrooted in the Chinese nation's hearts and minds, lies precisely at the core of the renewed territorial dispute. To put it differently, we might pose a question, to what extent has 'the concept of face' influenced political behaviour of the People's Republic of China and the direction of the unsolved dispute over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands? What are the different reasons, except for 'the notion of face', that has made China to intervene and re-open its claims over the uninhabited islands in the East China Sea?

¹ Nan Xiaodao and Bei Xiaodao refer to Minami Kojima and Kita Kojima

In the first chapter, this thesis will examine the concept of face, its importance and essential features, depicting vital needs of an individual as well as the whole group, to reflect their face that is shown on various levels. The very cornerstone of Chinese society lies in the principles of Confucianism which manifests the importance of two faces *lien* and *mien-tzu* that an individual, as well as the community, can *wear*. Moreover, it describes the cardinal pillars on which Chinese society stands. These basic principles will be followed by their application to East Asian Societies, namely China and partly Japan. Therefore, the crucial role in this chapter will be portrayed by the face of the nation which is critical in understanding the second chapter. Moreover, the concept of face combined with Galtung's theory of the Chosenness- Myths-Trauma (CMT) will allow us to see their importance reflected in the politics of the People's Republic of China.

In the second chapter, to understand the steps taken by the Communist Party, it is vital to delve into Xi Jinping's rejuvenation of great China put into the concept of Chinese Dream which is tightly linked with China's interest in the disputed islands. Besides, historical narrative (the Century of Humiliation) will come in handy to explain the strong desire of China to legitimise its right for the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. Another clue to understand the dispute emerges in the concept of China Dream, and the face of the nation will lead us to a broader understanding of the decision making in the conflict concerning foreign policy. With the Chinese Dream, rejuvenating narrative in Chinese politics, the notion of a future glorious China is becoming essential for the political actions that the Chinese Communist Party is taking today. In a similar manner, the importance of intra-national and international level will serve the purpose to analyse this, such as China's coercive diplomacy, done in the territorial dispute by the Chinese leadership.

Finally, the third chapter will depict the strategic position of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. These paragraphs will examine the location of the disputed Islands in the East China Sea from various points of view. In this chapter, we will explore new possibilities that would symbolise bittersweet fruits of victory for either China or Japan. It is crucial to mention that not only the face of the nation matters, from the socio-political perspective, but there are other significantly influential factors such as the lucrative location of the islands which are overflowed with natural resources to get engaged in the dispute and settling it for good. With the

understanding of the Chinese position towards the disagreement on several levels, whether it is social or political, we can draw a definite conclusion.

1.THE FACE OF THE NATION

To understand China's reaction towards the Japanese nationalization of the disputed islands, with the utmost importance it is essential to analyse the concept of the face. The concept of the face was primarily developed based on three fundamental principles of Confucianism. Therefore, to precisely and truly understand the essence of the concept of the face, its impact on the relationships in the Chinese society, we will explore Confucianism and its cardinal principles primarily described by Chung-Ying Cheng. To understand the value of face, we will examine two faces found in the concept of the face, *lien*, and *mien-tzu*. It will enlighten us on the matter of the importance of keeping the face, related to the socio-political issues surrounding China and Japan. Moreover, it will depict a more excellent picture of nationalism and its role as a tool of the China Communist Party, that will be discussed in the following chapter.

维护民族尊严

'Protect our National Self-respect!'

As previously mentioned, the Japanese act of nationalization of three islands, was indeed perceived by the Chinese as an act of Japan to purposefully disrespect them. Disrespect their face. At this moment, the face of the nation is at stake. Chinese nationalism is entangled with Chinese national identity. Focusing now on Chinese nationalism, it has several crucial features, starting with its great power and intensity. As of the concept of Chinese nationalism, it has been constructed by the Communist Party of China; therefore, it is an object of the communist elites ruled by the Peking government, to legitimise and strengthen the position of the rule of the Communist party. Chinese nationalism, even if it might seem a bit ambiguous is

indeed a part of everyday life. In the crucial moments of the modern-day era of China, it manifested its power in many ways, such as were ‘the demonstrations against the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, the EP3 incident in April 2001, the denunciation of the Japanese Prime Minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the virulent criticisms of Taiwanese leaders (Cabestan, 2005, p. 1).’ Moreover, in the last decades, there has been a significant shift when it comes to the direction of Chinese nationalism; the initial focus on communism was substituted by the ordinary Chinese people, who now play a central role in the domestic politics of China (Gries, *Saving Face*, 2004, p. 18). Not to mention, the fact that the Chinese people are now demanding a firm say in China’s national politics. Primarily, Chinese nationalism has started to focus on its people and their passions. Therefore, we can assume that both Chinese society and the Peking government share the same value represented in Chinese nationalism. In addition, as Cabestan puts emphasis on the importance of Chinese nationalism, as a shared value, adding that ‘the government, which is perfectly aware of this, and has repeatedly instrumentalised it with the aim of strengthening its hand in the face of its foreign partners and also of preventing any “peaceful evolution” of the regime towards democracy (Cabestan, 2005, p. 1).’

Furthermore, as Peter Hays Gries explains in his work *China’s New Nationalism*, ‘Chinese nationalism cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be understood in its international and historical context (Gries, *Saving Face*, 2004, p. 18).’ Thus, reflecting on the international and historical context, we must highlight the importance of Chinese national identity of which these two contexts are vital parts. Based on Gries’ reference, Chinese national identity which is still deeply enrooted emotional attachment, comprises of narratives of the national past (e.g., a Century of Humiliation) and evolves in a dynamic relationship with other nations and their past. In other words, the national identity, the past, the people and their passions are four vital aspects of nationalist politics.

1.1 The Concept of Face

The concept of the face is an exclusive phenomenon for Confucian and East Asian Societies. Thus, the notion of the face is widely spread across the world, and it has a different yet not so active form as it would be perceived in the Western cultures. Since the face is deeply enrooted in these Asian societies, it has an even higher scale of its impact. To the scope of the face, we will examine the essential features of the face, with the focus put on China. In following paragraphs, the concept of the face will be explored by various scholars, thus giving as at first a general notion about face. Secondly, each of the scholars offers a unique insight into this matter which will allow us to see much broader, yet detailed picture of the concept and its importance in the dispute.

To begin with, the concept of the face, David Yau- fai Ho offers an insight to the matter by quoting renowned Chinese writer Lu Xun, who belongs to the most influential writers and most importantly, he is the founder of modern Chinese literature (Hsun, 1960). Xun put his thoughts on the face as follows: 'But what is this thing called face? It is very well if you don't stop to think, but the more you think, the more confused you grow (Ho, 1976, p. 867).' The concept of the face is with no doubts hard to define, yet people have a general notion about face itself. Moreover, this concept is distinguished and clarified from other very similar socially constructed terms such as authority, behaviour dignity and honour are (Ho, 1976, p. 867). Another insight into the concept of the face is depicted in words of Lin Yii-tang who describes face as being 'abstract and intangible, it is yet the most delicate standard by which Chinese social intercourse is regulated (Ho, 1976, p. 876).'

To decipher the mystery of metaphorical significance of face, one must look at the visual side of the face as well. Therefore, the face is a self-image, something that presents us in front of the other individuals as well as us themselves. It is a mark of identification, and it is tightly bound to the face as a value. Moreover, the face is vital for the development of a person on social as well as individual level. Chung- Ying Cheng delves into the concept of the face as value stating that 'face clearly plays a crucial role in development and maintenance of social relationships. A society of persons is a society of faces which is based on the individuation of faces, and a society of faces is no doubt a society of recognizable values (Cheng, 1986, p. 330).' Not to mention another unique character of the face as the value.

The notion of the face of a human is bound together under the two features of the face. The latter is psychological features of a person and the mental aspect of life depicted in emotive

and intellectual fields of life. In following paragraphs, we will explore limits of human dignity, social respectability, and acceptability of a person in a society based on *mien-tzu* and *lien*. With this definition in mind, we can move to face as the concept present in the Chinese community. As of the utmost importance, we must carefully distinguish between two terms describing face *lien* and *mien-tzu* in a grammatical sense. While *lien* is 'always used as a noun referring specifically to the concrete physiognomic face (Cheng, 1986, p. 331).' On the other hand, *mien* can also be used as a noun as well as a verb. However, it 'can also be used to refer to an aspect of an abstract entity such as a theory or a discussion or a game (Cheng, 1986, p. 331).' It is also necessary to point out the fact that the meanings of *lien* and *mien-tzu* vary from the context. Looking back to previously mentioned struggle to define what exactly the concept of face is, Goffman offers his understanding of face as 'the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. A face is an image of self-delineated concerning approved social attribute (Ho, 1976, p. 868).' Therefore, we can assume that *lien* as a concept is more limited and robust term than *mien* which is less tangible, yet when it comes to its content meaning it has more to offer.

In opposition to *lien*, *mien-tzu* 'stands for the kind of prestige that is emphasized in this country [America]: a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation (Ho, 1976, p. 867).' By this definition, we see that Goffman emphasizes an on-going social interaction reflecting immediate recognition of one's face and respect shown during social interaction with other individuals.

Cheng also stresses out that this is the reason 'why *mien* essentially has more social, moral, civil as well as valuational content than *lien* (Cheng, 1986, p. 332).' So, to say, *mien's* importance lays in grammatical as well as metaphorical significance, in other words, *mien* is not a mere face; it is a presentation of a human being adjoined with the social status and major implication. Focusing on the social encounter and face as *mien-tzu*, a person might lose his face; however, there are two dimensions included. The latter can be divided into subjective and the objective dimension of *mien-tzu*. Both terms include a high level of social respectability or could refer to a social place of an individual in a group or a society. As Cheng explains the subjective dimension reflects a face with this regards to *mien-tzu* (losing face) as 'the value and importance of oneself in one's self-esteem with regard to social relationships and society at large (Cheng, 1986, p. 332).'

It is vital to manifest a difference in perceiving subjectively *mien-tzu* by the one, who is directly affected by losing his face and another person's objective insight on the matter. As Cheng explains, 'from the subjective point of view the person whose *mien-tzu* is at stake may say that he loses *mien-tzu*, while objectively from another person's point of view, the *mien-tzu* of the person in question is simply not weighty or powerful ... (Cheng, 1986, p. 332).' This analysis of subjective and objective value indicates that the subjective notion of *mien-tzu* is a personal pretension to social authorities, while the objective dimension symbolises authority recognized on the social level. Besides, recognition plays an essential role in the objective dimension of the face. Moreover, it is set to demonstrate how relative is the objective *mien-tzu* to a relationship between a person that owns the face and the other which is in a position of 'recognizing or disallowing the *mien-tzu* of the owner (Cheng, 1986, p. 333).' Besides the subjective and the objective dimension of the face, the owner and the recognizer of *mien-tzu*, it is necessary to also differentiate between salient characteristics of the face in social interaction.

Among these characteristics, we list the value of the face which we can find in smaller or larger measures. To put it just, larger face depicts larger social influence as well as respectability. This feature 'carries specifically more powerful impetus and authority to achieve a goal (Cheng, 1986, p. 333).' Opposing to larger *mien-tzu* stands smaller feature which indicates smaller influence as well as respectability. Nonetheless, there are also cases where there is no *mien-tzu*, which depicts null influence, respect and no appeal to personal authority whatsoever. The whole process of recognition and acceptance of one's *mien-tzu* as well as the relationship between them, is highly complicated and complex process, especially when more recognizers are involved in the matter.

Moving forward to another prominent characteristic of the face, we find that '*mien-tzu* is not only attached to a person because of what he has achieved but is attached to the office or station that a person officially occupies or is in charge of (Cheng, 1986, p. 333).' When a person occupies a high position in the office, his *mien-tzu* is automatically larger thus respectable and has a higher appeal to personal authority. Another essential aspect of *mien-tzu* is to voice your request for your face to be recognized by the others. Recognition of one's face is crucial. In addition, you can express your request for the face as follows: 看在我的面子上 (for the sake of my face). The result of your request regarding one's recognition of *mien-tzu*

can lead to three possible outcomes. Either you will have *mien-tzu*, save or lose *mien-tzu* based on social interaction and relationship between the owner who makes a request and the one who recognizes the face. Reflecting on *mien-tzu*, Cheng states that it plays 'a role in preserving, promoting, or degrading social relationship and mutual respectability (Cheng, 1986, p. 334).' Moreover, we can claim based on Cheng's insight that you can gain, lose, keep *mien-tzu* as well as be given it or taken. With these terms, a crucial one emerges- an honour. The face entails honour in a way where one's recognized face depicts a personal credit as well as worth. It is the essential feature of the positive value of the face.

Moreover, if one's face is recognized 'the positive value of giving *mien-tzu* is to warrant (call for) gratitude and appreciation (Cheng, 1986, p. 334).' As every coin has two sides, so does the value of the face. The negative value reflects disgrace and depreciation of one's personal status. Therefore, it breaks the face of the owner. The effect of loss of the face can lead to feelings of wrath, resentment and even hatred followed by shamefulness. However, as Cheng explains 'to lose *mien-tzu* need not be regarded as a personal *affront*, it is to lose something extending from one's basic dignity and sense of shame and therefore in proportion and in comparison need not to be taken as so seriously as a crime as breaking one's face in the sense of *lien* (Cheng, 1986, p. 334).'

In Ho's point of view, *lien* can be described as a face that 'represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego's moral character the loss of which makes it impossible for him to function properly within the community. Lien is both a social sanction for enforcing moral standards and an internalized sanction (Ho, 1976, pp. 867-868).' In addition to Ho's definition, Cheng adds that *lien* 'signifies the basic dignity and respectability that one has (Cheng, 1986, p. 334).' However, we can say that *lien* is the face we use to face the other individuals as well as the world. *Lien*, as well as *mien-tzu*, is identified with the sense of honour. However, the gap between *lien* and *mine-tzu* appears concerning losing one's face.

To lose *lien* is below one's dignity. If a person loses *lien*, then he will 'not be able to face society and other people, just as when one's physical face is damaged and deformed (Cheng, 1986, p. 335).' To manifest the power of one's losing *lien*, Figure 1 serves as an excellent example. To lose *lien* (*t'iu lien*) has a much more significant impact on an individual as it is a bringer of dishonour and disgrace. The feeling of indignity, shame and humiliation can influence

a person in the same way as the King of Chu, Hsiang Yu for whom it was unbearable to be stripped of his face.


FIGURE 1 THE DEFEAT OF THE KING, HSIANG YU

The most well-known historical example of this sense of indignity is the defeat of the King of Chu, Hsiang Yu, in the 3rd century B.C. After his troops collapsed on the west side of the Han River, he refused to cross the river to go back to his people in the East. He said, 'I have no face (yen-lien) to face my people on the east side of the River. 'And then he committed suicide.

Note: Source: Chung-Ying Cheng, The Concept of Face and Its Confucian Roots, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 13 (1968), p.329-348, Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A

While losing face as in *lien* term, it also symbolizes that one's honour is not valuable and recognized. Looking at *lien* from another perspective, we can claim that it plays a vital role in protection as a wearing mask. It allows communicating with other members of society while wearing this protective mask. Same as with the king Hsiang Yu,' one way in which one may feel to lose *lien* is where one is made to be ashamed of one's conduct or the conduct of one's close relative or in-group colleague or comrade (Cheng, 1986, p. 335).' The importance of *lien* and losing it lies in the moral dignity; thus, it reflects respect for oneself as well as respect shown towards others. Analysing *mien-tzu* and *lien* with Cheng's insight lead us to another logical conclusion and that is that *lien* is the essential element. Cheng explains that 'everyone should possess equal *lien*, but not everyone should have *mien-tzu* or have equal *mien-tzu* (Cheng, 1986, p. 336).' His statement can be depicted in a diagram (see Figure 2) where the starting line or position is represented by *lien* from which various rays of *mien-tzu* come out. The rays represent the sphere of influence of *mien-tzu*. Thus, it varies in size based on smaller or larger *mien-tzu* of an individual.

FIGURE 2 THE RELATION OF LIEN AND MIEN-TZU



Note: Source: Chung-Ying Cheng, *The Concept of Face and Its Confucian Roots*, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 13 (1968), p.336, Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A

1.2 Confucianism and Roots of the Concept of Face

With basic principles of *lien* and *mien-tzu* already set and explained, we can focus on the philosophical background of the concept of face in Confucianism. To understand the importance of the face in nowadays Chinese society, it is vital to explore the cultural legacy of very influential Confucianism. As we know and understand, East Asia with Confucian societies have a deeply enrooted notion of the face. Looking at Confucianism, we grasp from the very beginning how strongly concerned it is with the problems reflecting perfection on an individual as well as public-social level (Cheng, 1986, p. 337). In addition, 'Confucianism also holds that perfection of an individual is an essential way of achieving social and political harmony and ordering which in their turn should have preserved and encouraged individual perfection (Cheng, 1986, p. 337).'

By this, we can see how an individual, as well as society, are closely connected. Moreover, the sense of perfection in individual lays in moral self-cultivation which is a vital must. One's moral self-cultivation bears yet another important function, it is a cornerstone of

virtues built and thus cultivated in a person. As Cheng describes, 'the harmonization of society by the government must be an extension of individual virtues from oneself to one's family and then to the society at large (Cheng, 1986, p. 337).' Seeing one's self-cultivation throughout various forms of Confucianism, whether it was right through Confucius or through the Neo-Confucianism, we may highlight the fact that an individual can't reach perfection nor to exercise it and concentrate on the process of cultivation outside of the society and relationships within the community. The impetus of Confucianism besides perfection can be found in the traditionally described in five-relationships in society or *wu lun*. But before we delve into *wu lun*, it is necessary to mention three fundamental principles of Confucianism.

The first principle depicts a process of self-cultivation of a person creating social relationships. The second principle is described as the successfulness of self-cultivation. The principle of successfulness of one's cultivation arises with the development of social relationships under a rule of government and is judged by it. Lastly, Cheng explains 'the ultimate form of successfulness of development of social relationships is a good government under which everyone is well and properly placed in order of social relationships (Cheng, 1986, p. 337).' Moreover, it emphasises the improvement and cultivation not only of one's self but the society as well. Not to mention, how this principle highlights the worth of the moral achievement of socio-political cultivation.

With the definition of these fundamental principles of self-cultivation and the society, we can finally move on to the concept of the face (both *lien* and *mien-tzu*). The following relationships are the essential part of the Confucian societal order as well as government.

- i. The ruler to subject relationship
- ii. The father to son relationship
- iii. The elder brother to younger brother relationship
- iv. The husband to wife relationship
- v. The friend to friend relationship

It is described in the Confucian ethics that 'the self-cultivation of a person begins with observing filial piety (Hsiao) and brotherliness (ti) (Cheng, 1986, p. 338).' To reflect on the latter, it all begins with being a good son as well as a good younger brother. The goodness in one's self is vital and usually referred to as propriety or (li). Based on the statement of the good son and brother, therefore we presuppose that one can be good friend to a friend and so forth. By

these five cardinal relationships, one can lead itself to greater cultivation, manifested in both private and public sphere of life. As the relationship grows within a given society, a person is increasing his scope of proprieties, therefore 'a person can be said to increase his given *lien* to a larger and larger achieved *mien-tzu* (Cheng, 1986, p. 339).' Significantly, from the increased domain of one's relationship and larger achieved *mien-tzu* transforms into the recognised image of a person due to his successful self-cultivation. A person's prestige and influence then represent the fruits of victory.

Additionally, focusing on virtue (*te*) will illuminate a path to the face and the power it holds. As mentioned above, a virtue or *te* is an outcome of successful self-cultivation bonded with the strength that others can feel based on one's moral achievements. Cheng's analysis of the virtue and the face shows *te* as a moral power that illuminates those within the society and forms sort of a social power that can influence the others. In other words, with regards to *te*, when *lien* is at its minimum, then *te* 'is the personal honour that one can always exercise on one's relation to other's; at its maximum (i.e., as *mien-tzu*) it is the power to rally others and to command others (Cheng, 1986, p. 339).' Therefore, a person, in this case, a ruler or a leader, who has the maximum limit of his *te* has an immense source of power. Moreover, Cheng emphasises the importance of face in regards with *te* 'we can see how face has even required a moral significance (Cheng, 1986, p. 339).'

Another thing worth to mention is *te* and its moral feature in the Confucian system as well as the fact that the ruler is treated as a father figure. Therefore, the relationship between the father and his kids can be displayed as the relationship of the ruler with his subjects. Carefully examining the relationship between the father or the ruler and his kids and subjects, the way of how loyalty and obedience are formed is rather impressive. It holds the virtues gained during the process of self-cultivation as well as during the social interaction. But individually, in this case, those are the virtues of governing built via the father-son relationship. After all, it was Confucius himself who claimed that 'within the four seas all men are brothers (Cheng, 1986, p. 340).' Among other essential features defined within the range of the social interactions and the interactions within the family, the sense of trust and shared understanding, good human relationships, harmony and mutual dependence is more than vital.

The features of family relationships are easily applied to the involvement of a government and society. There is a strong need for these features found in the human relationships on

various, yet the concept of the face still connotes them. Cheng emphasizes that 'the face is both the goal and the means for strengthening and expressing the harmonization of human relationships among men in society (Cheng, 1986, p. 340).' Not to mention the influence of the social encounter among family, a friend that appeals in some influence to others. To influence others counts as an element of *mien-tzu*. The scope of *mien-tzu* holds the key to a human capability to embrace as well as to forge any relationship. It is *mien-tzu* that has the healing properties for social conflicts, thus keeping the community together and allows it to grow strong. Besides, the feelings on which the face relies on also play a crucial role in the human encounters and cultivates the society in a very harmonious way. Therefore, it is fair to comment on the *wu lun* as a cornerstone of the face. *Wu lun*, the cardinal relationships in the Confucian society supplemented with the virtues gained from one's self-cultivation are the face producers which acquired its solid, unshakeable grounds within the Confucian society. Moreover, *mien-tzu* is regarded as an enlargement of the meaningful relationships springing from *wu lun*, while *lien* is the base of *wu lun* concerning a social growth as well as the self-cultivation. Thus, as Cheng explains 'to break *mien-tzu* is a lesser evil than to break *lien* which means losing stand on the net equilibrium of the five relationships (Cheng, 1986, p. 341).'

Another significant feature of *lien* lies in keeping the balance of the five cardinal relationships. Therefore, as *lien* expands, it transforms to *mien-tzu*. The scope of *mien-tzu* expands and can extend to the extent when it covers the entire community. The ideal scenario reflecting ideally expanded face demonstrates 'the face of a ruler who governs a harmonious society by harmonizing them through appeal of human relationship and his own virtues (Cheng, 1986, p. 342).' Lastly, there is a vital part of the concept of face in the form of the *name (ming)* what gives the power of determining a human value and proper position in society is a name. Thus, names are essential for governing and social order. By the definition of one's name, he should act accordingly to his status.

To put it differently, face in one sense is 'the affirmation and the assertion of one's position in society. *Lien* is the position of the basis of one's nominal position for affirming or reinforcing a relationship which will strengthen one's position (Cheng, 1986, p. 343).' Furthermore, Cheng points out that '*mien-tzu*, in brief, is the way of extending one's *name* by applying the *name* itself (Cheng, 1986, p. 344).' Looking at *mine-tzu* and *name*, we find similarities, in fact, both share the moral desirability. With this in mind, we can see the importance of saving one's face.

Its moral significance is displayed in fear of losing face as it would be considered as a moral failure.

Regardless of the fact, that every community has its own specific needs and norms, East Asian communities have deeply enrooted notion of face. National identity plays an essential role in the national politics. The identity is formed through the variety of international relations. It is not a mere tool or an instrument (e.g., for the propaganda of the Communist Party). It has the deeper meaning that is emotionally attached to every single citizen. As Peter Hays Gries describes, Chinese national identity 'evolves in the dynamic relationship with other nations and the past (Gries, Saving Face, 2004, p. 19)'.

In addition, he mentions that the Chinese Nationalism includes the Chinese people and their passions (Gries, Saving Face, 2004). Previously mentioned Japanese act of nationalization of the three islands were perceived by the Chinese as an act of Japan to disrespect them purposely, right in their face. So far, the events between Japan and China from the past formed the present tension in the question of sovereignty over the islands. The face, or in other words the self- displaying of the nation is imprinted on the people through the past, passions, and interactions.

For Asian countries with an active Confucian social order, 'respecting one another's face and giving the face to the other side is expected and is an important part of the relationality that holds the society together (Moore, 2014, p. 4).' Moreover, the concept of the face can have various roles and aspects. You can deny, give, receive face as well as ignore or disrespect or dishonour the face.

Hwang, referring to the Confucian societies and the concept of face, puts an emphasis on their importance for Sino-Japanese relations. His definition of the face is described in two terms; situated identity and social reputation. Hwang introduces three kinds of interpersonal relations that are found in Confucian societies, therefore applicable to China and Japan relations (Hwang, 2012). These inter-groups relations are:

- i. Vertical in-group relations- close relations, expressive ties
- ii. Horizontal in-group relations- friends, co-workers, known non-family members, mixed ties

- iii. Horizontal out-group relations- strangers, people contacted to accomplish low iteration instrumental goals, instrumental ties (Hwang, 2012)

The out-group horizontal category fits best to Sino-Japanese relations, whether it is on individual or group/national level as foreign states, from the cultural point of view are included in the category.

Following his distinction and how inter-groups relations works, he concludes that 'Chinese emphasize the distinction between in and out-group. They value the importance in-group harmony, while they are more likely to pursue conflict with a disputant from an out-group (Hwang, 2012).' Besides this conclusion, a comparative study revealed that between China and Japan, 'Chinese people had more self-face concern... than Japanese (Hwang, 2012).'

The concept of face is undoubtedly one of the ways how to strengthen the national identity and cannot be stripped of the East Asian Society or Confucian society relations, especially the one dominating in China.

1.2.1 Galtung's Theory of CMT

A general notion of identity pays attention to history (historical myths) and memory. However, when it comes to the collective memory and identity, they are formed based on strong ties of being related by blood, a sense of kinship, the same language and thus, by a shared history. Among one of the scholar dealing with the collective memory and identity, Gong describes that 'transferring from generation to generation, history and memory issues tell grandparents and grandchildren who they are, give countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that chart the future in the name of the past (Wang, 2008, p. 785).' Another insight offered by Volkan identifies two elements significant for the development of group identity. The first element, a chosen trauma, depicts 'the horrors of the past that cast shadows onto the future (Wang, 2008, p. 785),' while a chosen glory represents 'myths about a glorious future, often seen as a re-enactment of a glorious past (Wang, 2008, p. 785).'

Moreover, Volkan elaborates on the element of chosen trauma as follows: 'A group's chosen "trauma" consists of experiences that come "to symbolize this group's deepest threats and fears through feelings of hopelessness and victimization (Wang, 2008, p. 785).' The notion of the chosen trauma leads us to the Galtung's theory of syndrome- the CMT complex (Chosenness, Myths, and Trauma). Chosenness in Galtung's perception is presented as an idea

of 'being a people chosen by transcendental forces (Wang, 2008, p. 785).' The main components of the CMT complex can be described as crucial historical events that have shaped up the identity of a given society, and it reflects how the complex behave in times of conflict situations. Also, the term of chosen trauma demonstrates how a large group of people define its identity based on the trans-generational image of their injured selves carrying a legacy of their ancestors' traumatising memories. Speaking of trauma being passed from old generations to the younger ones, and the concept of chosenness, the most significant legacy is the narrative of the Century of Humiliation which has a far-reaching impact, which we will discuss in the following chapter as well as with the CMT complex. Focusing on the concept of face and its empirical value to the unsolved dispute, we may assume that, based on the narrative, Chinese people were stigmatized, numerous times disgraced throughout their history. Therefore, they have experienced the feeling of being stripped of their 'faces' so many times that it has left a scar on their national identity.

As the notion of 'face' is still present, we can apply this concept directly to the unsolved dispute over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands. If we compare the territorial dispute to the case of the King Chu and his unbearable defeat which symbolised losing of his *lien*, we could claim that losing the Diaoyu Islands to Japan would be below Chinese dignity. Thus, the People's Republic of China would not be able to face and process such damage done to their national *lien*. Their 'face' would be damaged to the extent that the international and intranational identity of China would be at stake, but most importantly, by this defeat, they would bring dishonour and disgrace. However, if the tides of this dispute would change in favour of China, it would maximise *te* (virtue) of the Communist Party as well as the People's Republic of China; therefore, it would illuminate a path to 'face' and its source of power. To put it differently, the CCP would strengthen its position and its sphere of influence among Chinese people. Additionally, China would strengthen its status of being a superpower that is not afraid to solve problems that are standing in its way to global victory.

2. IN THE NAME OF POLITICS

Moving forward to another chapter, we will examine how the Communist Party has been operating, what are the primary tools used by the party to meet their ends. Moreover, this chapter will scrutinise Xi Jinping's rejuvenation of China, the so-called Chinese Dream which is depicted as a standing pillar of today's China. With Zheng's insight to the patriotic education in the Party-State system, we will observe how party clings to the memory of the traumatising history of the past, thus manifesting the party struggles to hold the reigns to successfully arrive at the days of a new found glorious China. To maintain the legitimate power over the Diaoyu Islands can be perceived as, yet another victory in the battle against a cruel fate which has cast a dark cloud of misfortune on China in the past.

In addition, the second chapter reflects the importance of the face of the nation with the Chinese National Identity, that is tightly bonded to the narratives of the national past. Along the Chinese Dream, the Century of Humiliation is the essential feature of China's rejuvenation. These will come in handy regarding the unsolved dispute as well as China's behaviour on the international level. Therefore, it allows us to see the bigger picture concerning China's strategy in the territorial dispute from the domestic political point of view too. Besides, the two-level game theory introduced by Robert Putnam as well as Chinese coercive diplomacy will cover the theoretical part of this chapter.

2.1 The Century of Humiliation and Patriotic Education

洗雪国耻

'Wipe away the national humiliation!'

As mentioned above, one of the vital roles in nationalist politics in the past, the history of a nation. The past events shape the image of a country. It leaves a trace of the lessons learned and how the country has managed to evolve. However, not every country or a state is locked in a prison of historical events as it is in the case of China. The impact of history casting a shade over the future can be demonstrated on the following example which made the Chinese and the Japanese relations even sourer than they were. At that time, prime minister Koizumi Junichiro stirred anger with yet another visit of Yasukuni shrine, a Tokyo war shrine which is said to harbour more than 2.5 million of warrior souls as well as civilians who died in wars during

the 19th century. Among the innocent souls are also war criminals including Gen. Hideki Tojo. Koizumi's visit 'has sharply heightened tensions with China and South Korea, both countries where memories of Japanese imperial aggression still run deep (Faiola, 2006).' The exchange of high-level visits not only from China but also from South Korea were interrupted. The Chinese Foreign Ministry commented on the visit to Yasukuni shrine as follows: 'We strongly protest against an action that has greatly hurt the feelings of the victims of Japanese military aggression and destroyed the political foundation of the China-Japan relationship (Faiola, 2006).' Moreover, the weight of the history and its impact on the nationalism in China differs from the other countries. Thus, we seek to explain the effect of the Century of Humiliation, a historical narrative of the national past, presented by the Communist party, on domestic as well as on the international level. The historical narrative or a narrative, in general, has a purpose to deliver stories about our past. It is vital to mention that 'these stories, psychologists have argued, infuse our identities with unity, meaning and purpose (Gries, Saving Face, 2004, p. 46).' While our identities are infused with the unity, meaning, and purpose, it is uneasy to change the content in radical measures. Due to this historical narrative, the way how China is interacting with the Western world is framed. It is mainly due to this specific historical narrative which starts with two significant losses for China.

On the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held on October 18th, 2017, Xi Jinping, China's president as well as the Communist Party General Secretary delivered his speech with a powerful legacy for the future. The second part of his speech was dedicated to the historic mission of the Party. The Chinese Communist Party has many tools playing in their favour, but regarding the dispute, we will focus on the patriotic education that touches the Century of Humiliation as a part of the Chinese Dream concept. As we already mentioned, after the collapse of the communism as a leading ideology, an ordinary Chinese citizen has become the primary objective. Not to mention the fact that patriotism swiftly substituted the old doctrine. Yanan He reflects on the change in narrative as follows: 'the new history no longer centred on the ideological and political conflict between the Communist CCP and capitalist KMT. Instead, the "defending fundamental fissure" for Chinese national identity was now drawn between the Chinese nation and those foreign nations that had invaded and humiliated China in the past (Wang, 2008, p. 791).'

As mentioned above, there are four vital roles in the nationalist politics which shape up the directions of a country. These are national identity, the past, the people and lastly the passions. Every each of them is equally important. With this on the mind, we can proceed to the crucial part of this thesis- Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream. We already covered most of them, yet we shall explore the past based on the Century of Humiliation narrative which depicts a panoply of historical events that have shaped China as we can observe and experience it in today's form. As the years and leaders had been changing so has the narrative. As a contrasting example, during the era of Mao, the emphasis was put on China playing the role of a victor or a hero, whether we apply it to the victories of the Communist party over the nationalist party Kuomintang. This narrative had an immense mobilising impact on the society; thus, it made the party more popular among the citizens. However, this heroic narrative had to be changed to influence the next generations and their negative attitudes regarding the two most significant and influential archenemies of Great China, the Western powers, and Japan.

Thus, the concept depicting the bitter humiliating past of the country was designed and had been implemented as a part of patriotic education. Moreover, as Wang explains, 'the patriotic education campaign was designed to present the Chinese youth with detailed

FIGURE 3 HISTORY TEXTBOOK EXCERPT

Chinese modern history is a history of humiliation that China had gradually degenerated into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society; at the same time, it is also a history that Chinese people strived for national independence and social progress, persisted in their struggle of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, and was also the history of the success of New-Democratic Revolution under the leadership of the CCP.

Note: Source: Ministry of Education 2002. "Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang [Teaching Guideline for History Education]. Beijing: People's Education Press.

information about China's traumatic and humiliating experience in the face of Western and Japanese incursion (Wang, 2008, p. 791).' With substituting the victor narrative with the victim narrative, there had been several changes not only in the textbooks for students at schools, but it had also changed the official documents, popular culture as well as the history itself. As mentioned in the first chapter, the chosenness of trauma, the so-called Galtung's CMT

syndrome is depicted in the change of the narratives by the Party. The new official victim narrative has provided us with an insight into Chinese Modern and Contemporary History Textbooks (see Figure 3). Moreover, the historical narrative of the humiliation has become the essential part as well as a subject in the national educational system of China. Delving deeper into the issue of the historical narrative, we must ask what exactly the whole Century of Humiliation about is? What are the main key features? We will seek to find the right answers based on the analytical work of Alison A. Kaufman in her work *the "Century of Humiliation" and China's National Narratives*.

In this work, Kaufman starts to list five key points regarding the Century of Humiliation narrative at the beginning. As the first crucial point of the narrative, she puts the Century of Humiliation on a timeline between years of 1839-1849. Between these years, China had lost a significant part of its territory due to the great foreign powers. A cornerstone of the modern historical narrative emphasising the century of humiliation was created on the rubbles of lost control. Reflecting on the first chapter, we can see assume that taken land and government stripped of its legal power and sovereignty over territory had been very harmful to the Chinese face (*mine-tzu*). The second point depicts how the Western powers, as well as Japan, tend to behave from the historical point of view.

The third aspect of the Century of Humiliation reflects 'the intellectual debates about the nature of international relations that took place during the Century of Humiliation underpin similar elite debates that are taking place in China today (Kaufman, 2011, p. 1).' As the most important part of the third point we can include a prognosis of interstate competition, future opportunities for issues as equality among nation states or questions regarding the international system and its progress in creating a peaceful environment. As for the fourth point and the Century of Humiliation, there is still much to do to successfully recovery of China from the very unfortunate period that ended by the victory of Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil war. However, it is contemplated that the only immutable and non-negotiable fact or event is the return of Taiwan to the Chinese mainland. Lastly, Kaufman points out that 'there is significant lack of consensus among present-day Chinese elites about what the lessons learned from the Century of Humiliation mean for China's future trajectory in the global arena (Kaufman, 2011, p. 1).' With this in mind, we assume that the historical narrative of humiliation

serves as the key framework on which a path of China's future observations, whether it concerns politics or economy, can be built.

The Century of Humiliation is referred to 110 years extended period of the Chinese history that starts in 1839, when the British Empire 'sent gunboats up the Yangtze River to compel China's rulers to open their ports and markets to the opium trade, at the beginning of what came to be known as the First Opium War (Kaufman, 2011, p. 2).' However, the list of events that turned out to be unfortunate for China is quite long. Not only the Westerners had been involved in this narrative, but the Japanese played their crucial role too. The first Opium War followed by the second Opium War (1856-1860) has its regular place on the list of the events included in the Century of Humiliation.

With an immense exposure to the Western world, China had felt how weak its military and diplomatic skill were comparing them with the Westerners.

This abrupt change and the attitude of the Western world toward China had changed everything. China had its stable centre place in the Asian world, where an individual familiarity was kept, thus making China think that the same case will be with the Westerners. However, their expectations were not met at the slightest chance. Therefore, with the change in the circumstances, China's humiliating era, whether we speak about the political, cultural or military sphere, had begun. The list of the most influential indignities starts with China ceding control over several so-called treaty ports located at the Chinese coast and along the Yangtze River. Moreover, a very significant loss regarding the territory in the Century of Humiliation is the fall of Hong Kong to the hands of the British Crown in 1842 (Gries, *Saving Face*, 2004). A vast number of foreigners enjoyed the perks of extraterritorial privileges.

With regards to Japan and the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands dispute, the significance of their relationship during the Century of Humiliation has a tremendous impact on nowadays perception of Japan in the Chinese eyes. The stigma of the past has been cast upon China. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) profoundly damaged their relationship. As Kaufman explains, 'Japan, which the Chinese historically had regarded as an inferior, "younger brother," was also challenged by the West, but its rulers proved to be far more adept than China's at remaking their political and military system to meet these new challenges (Kaufman, 2011, p. 2).'

With the quick Japanese adaptation to the challenges posed by the West, their military capabilities were strong enough to gain control over Taiwan as well as part of Manchuria. Moreover, Japanese managed to thrust outward to Chinese grounds in the 1910s as well as in the 1930s.

Of a great significance, massive rebellions swept China throughout the 19th century which led to the millions of casualties.

As Kaufman describes, ‘these uprisings were frequently fanned by popular opposition to the growing foreign presence and by the imperial government’s acquiescence to foreign demands (Kaufman, 2011, p. 2).’ Among the most known rebellions, we can list the Boxer rebellions that took place in 1900. The uprising was led by a Chinese secret organization that called themselves the Society of Righteous and Harmonious

Fists. Yet, they were not as harmonious as their name suggests. The rebels were attacking foreigners regularly, and besides foreigners, they also targeted Chinese Christians. The aftermath of the rebellion was too pricey for China as we can see in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4 AFTERMATH OF THE REBELLION

By terms of the agreement, forts protecting Beijing were to be destroyed, Boxer and Chinese government officials involved in the uprising were to be punished, foreign legations were permitted to station troops in Beijing for their defense, China was prohibited from importing arms for two years, and it agreed to pay more than \$330 million in reparations to the foreign nations involved.

Note: Source: History.com. ‘Boxer Rebellion; Facts& Summary. March 25, 2018. A+E networks.
<https://www.history.com/topics/boxer-rebellion>.

Not only Japanese military actions and ceding of the territory by the Westerners lessen the land that was ruled by China. The independence movements also played its vital role in the

Century of Humiliation. These movements occurred in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang in periods between the 1910s, 20s, and 30s.

In 1911, another significant change came towards China in the way of a collapse of the old imperial system. The country was vexed in chaos. Due to its large area, it was extremely hard for nominally republican government to control what has left from China.

Going back to feuds with Japan, the so-called War of Resistance against Japan (1931/37-1945,) 'the eight-year-long war against Japan (World War II) and the multi-decade Chinese civil war between the Chinese Communist (CCP) and Nationalist (KMT) Parties devastated the Chinese landscape and tore its people apart (Kaufman, 2011, p. 2).' Another significant event, as well as a case on which China can manifest how badly they were treated in the past, is the Cairo Declaration. Cairo Treaty was signed on December 1, 1943, by leaders of three states, the US, Great Britain and China. The purpose of Cairo Treaty 'was intended to punish the aggression of Japan, to strip it of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, , and to restore to China all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and The Pescadores (Austin, 2013).' However, looking at the post-war treaties, 'the Senkaku Islands are not named specifically in any of the post-war treaties but could be embraced by conflicting heads in various treaties (Austin, 2013).' In 1949, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and its Red Army led to the end of the Century of Humiliation. They successfully 'drove Chiang Kai-shek's KMT off the mainland, and established the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 (Kaufman, 2011, p. 2).'

But the patriotic education has not been the finish line for the communist party regarding the narratives and historical facts. With Jiang Zemin, they have pushed it to the limit where the Party is portrayed as the saviour of the national independence and sovereignty. In 2001, while attending the celebrations of 80th Anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang voiced his beliefs about the role of the CCP in the history, claiming that 'the fundamental and most important conclusion'' drawn from Chinese modern and contemporary history is that "without the Communist Party, there would have been no New China (Wang, 2008, p. 793).' Within the speech, Jiang managed to address the significant accomplishments of the Party, mainly emphasising the fact that they were the one who ended

the Century of Humiliation, and returning the national independence which seems to be the main reason of their legitimate claim on the ruling power in China.

Revitalization of China!

振興中華

Moving forward to the most popular slogan during the 1980s and 90s, *zhenxing zhonghua*, Jiang has followed his predecessors and expressed that there is a need for rejuvenating China. The slogan was used for the first time by Sun Yatsen, then by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and in the present time by Xi Jinping. Jiang explained that the rejuvenating China is 'a grand mission that history and the era have entrusted to our Party. 'To understand what the rejuvenation itself mean, it is vital to explore the roots of this term. In words of Yan Xuetong, the term of rejuvenation 'refers to the psychological power contained in the concept of China's rise to its former world status which can be seen in two common assertions (Xuetong, 2001, p. 34).' The first one is focused on regaining the lost international status of China, rather than to create a brand new one. We can relate this feeling to restoring of one's face. The second assertion is bound to the restoration of China as a synonym for the restoration of fairness in the eyes of the Chinese. Their focus is put on the integrity instead on the idea of gaining advantages over others.

One of the critical features of rejuvenation is to open up policy which allows economic boost. To open up to the world has become a holy doctrine in the CCP. After the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Jiang Zemin stands the ground of openness to the world by saying, 'We should firmly continue reform and opening up (Xuetong, 2001, p. 35).'

2.1.1 Chinese Dream and Xi Jinping

We can refer to the Chinese Dream under Xi Jinping's vision as to the New Era. He himself sees the Dream as the concept of great national rejuvenation. As Xi Jinping is a man who has the fates of the Chinese people in his hands, he wants to 'dedicate his power and energy to turning China into a global power and the world's preeminent nation (Spross, 2017).' Moreover, on the 12th National People's Congress, Xi stressed out the importance of the

rejuvenation as 'it embodies achieving prosperity for the country, renewal of the nation and happiness for the citizens. Only when the country is doing well, can the nation and people do well (ChinaDaily, 2014).' Moreover, the dream is not targeted just for the society as whole but to every individual included in the system. We can analyse the concept of the rejuvenation from five basic points of views which are targeted at various dimensions. These are national, personal, historical, global and lastly antithetical (ChinaDaily, 2014). As already mentioned above, the notion of a world order dictated by the Western world still plays a role of an influential factor. Xi expressed his thoughts on the global concept of the dream saying that 'the Chinese Dream will change the global landscape, which was shaped by Western countries over the past two centuries during industrialisation (ChinaDaily, 2014).'

With this in mind, he expressed his assumptions about the change in the global landscape to be established through a blend of the international rules as well as experiences of the countries that are at their peaks regarding their development and nations that are yet emerging. Reflecting to the 19th National Congress, of which the principal theme was to 'remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation (Xinhua, 2017).' The primary objective in the introduction was again depicting the century of humiliation and heroic deeds done by the Communist Party, yet it upholds the era of changes coming forward, not only for China but other countries as well.

The whole speech emphasised the development of China under the rule of the Party and positive changes for its people as well as the steps taken to grasp the transformation of the rejuvenation. Xi also pointed out that the idea of the rejuvenation, therefore the Chinese dream has been warmly embraced by the people. Although it is evident for Xi as well as the others, including the people that to fully achieve rejuvenation, it is going to be an extremely challenging subject.

Moreover, in his speech, Xi pointed out the importance regarding sovereignty, security and development interests. He stated that 'We must do more to safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and development interests, and staunchly oppose all attempts to split China or undermine its ethnic unity and social harmony and stability (Xinhua, 2017).'

Reflecting on the matter of safeguarding China's sovereignty, security, and interests, we might link this matter directly to the territorial dispute, which based on the concept of the face as well as from the political point of view depicts the issue of the face. If China acquires the legal status over the Diaoyu islands, it would only push them forward to reach the Chinese Dream. If the islands end up in the hands of Japan legally, China will lose its *lien* and *mien-tzu*.

2.2 Two Level Game Theory

Based on the notion of face, it is essential for China, as well as other countries that have the concept of the face deeply enrooted in their cultures, to keep their faces on both domestic and international level. The level of domestic relationship refers to the relationship between the state and the public. It is a vertical face of political analysis, which includes relationships between society and the state. Another level is bilateral and horizontal, in other words, it describes the relationship between countries. It is necessary to mention that the states also have their faces and their individual needs as well as societies that live in a state.

To illustrate the importance of levels and the concept of face in the Sino-Japanese relationship, we are offered by Robert Putnam's framework of two-level game theory (Putnam, 1988). Putnam notes that 'foreign policy decision makers must consider factors at two levels-... that of domestic politics and that of international or bilateral politics (Moore, 2014).' To put it just, if there is any solution to the dispute, decision-makers from both sides of the issue must take into consideration the domestic as well as the bilateral factors. They need to focus, observe, and analyse with the utmost importance what is beneficial for their nation (international level) as well as for the domestic public good.

The face and domestic politics in China are very fragile, the concept of the face is repeating itself, despite the Japanese explanations over the issue of buying three of the islands, Beijing perceived it as a move to disgrace the face of Chinese nation which would again bring the narrative of the Century of Humiliation. The nationalism still plays an essential role here, not to mention protest waves filled with patriotism and national anger toward Japan. Indeed, these protests were maintained to be always beneficial for the ruling party of the Chinese Government. Besides the demonstrations, the Chinese society is being filled 'with too many narratives of national humiliation and the glories of the present military build-up to expect anything less than a robust response to what has been presented to them as encroachment on

their territory, whether that be in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or anywhere else (Moore, 2014).¹ The face, the Chinese Government, and the ruling Chinese Communist Party lead with Xi Jinping, that must be kept is crucial for their survival in the future as well as for the survival of the national face.

Without a doubt, bilateral relationship between Japan and China suffers on various levels such as the narrative, atrocious history, and national dignity, which all of them are related to the concept of face and the Century of Humiliation. In the case of the dispute, we can point out that increasing pressure from the people on the leadership for its foreign policy is depicted as a belief of the nation that their face needs have not been met yet with respect to their economic triumph (Moore, 2014).

2.2.1 Coercive Diplomacy and Issue Linkage

When it comes to the steps taken by China to solve the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China is using issue linkage and coercive diplomacy. The concept of coercive diplomacy is based on backing 'one's demand on an adversary with a threat or punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand (George, 1991, p. 4).'² In other words, it is a strategy that threatens an adversary to get him to halt an action the adversary initiated.

Moreover, it is not a traditional military strategic, coercive diplomacy can be labelled as a political strategy that manipulates just enough of a credible threat to demonstrate resolve, thus achieves adversary's objective. The issue linkage holds its importance in linking two or more distinct foreign policy issues together. In addition, it claims 'that resolution of one issue cannot occur without resolution of the other. (Wiegand, 2009, p. 171)'

In the territorial dispute with Japan, China has used not only coercive diplomacy but also a strategy of issue linkage. Combining these strategies, China adopts threats as bargaining leverage in the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute to compel the Japanese adversary to shift its policy to other issues. We can list some of them for illustration as follows: economic aid, Japan-US security agreements and lastly potential troops deployments. It might look like the issues have nothing to do with each other but for China, it has its own significance. In other words, China often takes measures in diplomatic or militarized threat in the dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu

islands. Moreover, China then implicitly connects the threat to Japan's compliance with its claim about other disputed issue. Therefore, 'China has been able to take advantage of the endurance of its territorial dispute with Japan and use it as bargaining leverage to achieve shifts in Japanese policies regarding other disputed issues that it otherwise would not be able to influence (Wiegand, 2009, p. 171).'

However, China is not the only one in the dispute involved who has more territorial disputes on its table. If we look at the situation of Japan and Russia, we will see that there is one unresolved dispute over the Northern Territories/ the South Kurils, the islands off Hokkaido. The conflict remains unsolved for 73 years, since the end of the WWII. However, in 1956 after the USSR and Japan managed to establish diplomatic relations, 'Moscow was then willing to cede control over the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, Japan insisted on the return of all four islands and refused to conclude a peace treaty (Mälksoo, 2007).'

To achieve the ultimate rejuvenation of China, that lays in the hands of Xi Jinping, there is still much to be done as well as when it comes to the unsolved dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu. The Century of Humiliation narrative has an immense impact on the domestic, international sphere as well as on the functioning of the Communist Party and the country itself. Regarding the unsolved dispute and the narrative, it would portray gaining a greater prestige and recognition not only within the Chinese society but on the international scene as well. However, it is highly unlikely that one of the sides, whether it is China or Japan, will cede their legal claims on the disputed rocky islands. We can see the Japanese determination to take it all as it is in the case of the South Kurils in the dispute with the Russian Federation. Similarly, based on the report by Guo Jiping, China will take any necessary steps to 'uphold China's territorial sovereignty, and they embody the strong will and determination of the Chinese nation to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests (Jiping, 2012).'

3. THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

By this chapter, we delved into the Chinese psyche embodied in *lien* and *mien-tzu*, supported by the Confucian tradition that is deeply enrooted in today's Chinese societal structures. Moreover, with having the concept of face in mind, we were able to examine the chosenness of trauma depicted by compelling historical narrative- the Century of Humiliation,

being a vital fragment of the programme as well as propaganda by the Chinese Communist Party. With an insight of Xi Jinping on the history of China as well as the Party, we explored the essence of the Chinese Dream, a legacy of Xi's predecessors. Even more, we can understand, based on the two previous chapters, the primary impetus powering China to resolve the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and gaining a legal status of sovereignty over the rocky islands. Therefore, the last standing question to conclude the reason for renewing the dispute lays in the location of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands.

The examination of the islands as the strategic point will allow us to see not only its geographical position, but it will show the commercial importance and the maritime operations in the East China Sea. Moreover, in Robert Kaplan's chapter, *China's Two-Ocean Strategy* which is solely focused on China and its naval operations, he claims that 'particularly in the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the dispute does carry the benefit of providing Beijing with a lever to stoke nationalism, whenever it might need to (Kaplan, 2010, p. 284)'.

Following Kaplan's words, the Islands in the East China Sea could be presented as a strategic point for both, China and Japan. If we look out from China's coast oriented to the Pacific Ocean, there is a formation of 'well-organized line of American allies, with the equivalent of guard towers on Japan, the Ryukyus, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia (Kaplan, 2010)'. All these countries, with a powerful ally in Kaplan's eyes, could be potentially blocking the access to the more significant ocean for China. Another point is that the Japanese see a potential of the disputed islands, which are currently under their control, to be a threat to the Chinese influence which would be transformed into the military facilities.

The Japanese defence officials seem to view China's advances in the East China Sea alarming. They argued in 2012 white paper that China's navy is seeking to protect and consolidate maritime interests in the East China Sea (Smith, 2013, p. 74). Japanese stated following: 'It is believed that its naval vessels operated near the drilling facilities of the Kashi oil and gas fields in September 2005, partly because China tried to demonstrate its naval capabilities of acquiring, maintaining, and protecting its maritime rights and interests (Smith, 2013).' But what is more to the islands that make them a crucial strategic point for both China and Japan?

3.1 The Case of Continental Shelf, Oil and Gas

Starting with the description of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands, Chung states that the Islands and rocks 'were never recorded as having supported or being capable of supporting permanent inhabitation (Chung, 2004, p. 29).' However, they had served as a shelter for fishermen during storms. Even herb gatherers were roaming the islands collecting herbs.


One of the explanations for the claim over the territory is backed up, according to China in its most geographical sense. Under the United Nation Treaties, there is listed Chapter XXI, which covers Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has an impact on the dispute as well. In April 1958, in Geneva, with 43 signatories and 58 parties involved, under the auspices of the United Nation Convention, the Continental Shelf Convention (CSC) was finished. Despite the fact that China has not been among the signatories, 'the Beijing government of mainland China immediately announced its claim to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the economic resources in and under the entire East China Sea (Chung, 2004, p. 29).'

Moreover, China asserted their territorial claim' on the basis of its sea-bed being a continental shelf or the natural prolongation of the Chinese continent, in accordance with the CSC (Chung, 2004).' To better understand the claim based on the East China Sea Continental Shelf and how it extends from the Chinese coast see Figure 5. In addition, the East China Sea Continental Shelf 'thus extends from the Chinese coast measured at low tide all the way for some 350-400 miles to the Okinawa Trough just east of the Diaoyu/ Tiaoyutai rocks, where it plunges into the Pacific Ocean (Chung, 2004, p. 29).'

Besides, China pointed out that 'trough between the continental shelf and the Ryukyu Islands (and between the Diaoyus and the Ryukus) makes it evident that the Ryukyus are attached to Japan. However, Taiwan and the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands are part of the Chinese continental shelf (Moore, 2014).'

Another insight to the waters of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea is offered by a geophysical survey conducted between 12th October and 29th November 1968. The primary objective of this survey was to search for mineral resources (oil and gas) in Asian offshore areas. Based on the results of the survey, there are two most favourable parts of the region when it

FIGURE 5 THE EAST CHINA SEA



Note: Source: Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, The Diaoyu / Tiaoyutai /Senkaku Islands dispute, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes, 2004, p.29, Routledge Curzon, London

comes to oil and gas reservoirs 'is the 200.000 sq. km area mostly northeast of Taiwan (ECAFE, 1969, p. 39).'

It is vital to mention that the sediments are believed to be from Neogene period. As stated in the survey, 'nearly all of the oil and gas that is produced on land in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan comes from Neogene strata (ECAFE, 1969, p. 41).' Also, Neogene strata lay a thick blanket under the East China Continental Shelf. Not to mention the fact that Neogene rocks, based on the survey were found on the Senkaku islands as well (ECAFE, 1969, p. 33). Yet, the most crucial region when it comes to the potential of oil and gas is located beneath the Continental Shelf as well as the Yellow Sea. Under the Yellow Sea, there are found three

interconnected basins, from which two are centred near the Chinese mainland. The remaining basin is centred near to Korea.


After the surveys are done, therefore, we can claim that the energy-rich ocean bed is hiding a treasure in the form of oil and gas fields. Looking at it from another point of view, the sea holds a lucrative fishing grounds, especially for tunas. Not to mention, that in the past there was a tuna processing factory (Graham-Harrison, 2017). Combined all these precious cargoes, there is a need for commerce; therefore, it would become a strategic shipping route since the islands are located in between China, Japan, and Taiwan.

3.2 Fishing in the East China Sea

Fishing in the East China Sea has the utmost importance since, not to mention the fishing policy of China that has an immense impact on Asian as well on the international fishing markets. Moreover, as Hui- Yi Katherine Tseng claims in her book *Lessons from the Disturbed Waters: The Diaoyu/ Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands Disputes*, that 'fishing can be of referential value to help fortify China's sovereign claims over certain disputed islands (Tseng, 2015, p. 75).' We must take into consideration the future challenges such as protection of the Chinese fishermen in maritime zones with overlapping claims of exclusive economic zones as well as the matter of unsolved sovereignty.

With the reforms adopted by the CCP, in the form of opening up policy included in the Rejuvenation of China, the fishing industry in China has been through a quite remarking growth as we can see in Figure 6. Besides, it is essential to highlight the significant role of the fishing industry concerning the national economy. As it is stated, 'in the Chinese agricultural GDP, the fishing sector portion was hiked from 1.6% in 1978 to more than 9.3% in 2010 (Tseng, 2015, p. 84).' Moreover, China's ranking in the Chinese fishing industry is at the top among the Asian countries.

FIGURE 6 CHINA'S ANNUAL FISHERY PRODUCTION, MILLION TONS



Note: Source: Hongzhou Zhang, China's Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Working Papers 246, 16 August 2012, 4

In addition, the fishing industry opens numerous opportunities for securing more significant social, economic stability, which is also envisioned in the China Dream. Based on Figure 7 we can see China's ranking in the top ten exporters on the international fishery trade scene. In other words, 'over 13 million people were working in the fishing industry in 2010 (Tseng, 2015, p. 85).' However, the growing number of the marine catch has its toll in the form of rapid sea overexploitation with few fishery resources being already depleted. For China, three central regions serve as rich fishing grounds. The first and the largest one is the East China Sea, the second region that yields valuable catch is located in the Bohai/ Yellow Sea waters.

FIGURE 7 INTERNATIONAL FISHING TRADE, USD 1.000

Top 10 Importers			Top 10 Exporters		
Country	2008	2009	Country	2008	2009
USA	14,952,379	13,858,165	China	10,114,324	10,245,527
Japan	14,947,418	13,258,134	Norway	6,936,644	7,072,742
Spain	7,101,147	5,907,780	Thailand	6,532,404	6,235,867
France	5,835,957	5,579,174	Vietnam	4,550,333	4,300,877
Italy	5,453,104	5,060,193	USA	4,463,052	4,144,623
China	5,143,432	4,976,220	Denmark	4,601,250	3,980,695
Germany	4,501,743	4,570,607	Chile	3,930,969	3,606,328
UK	4,220,392	3,593,968	Canada	3,706,192	3,239,530
Netherlands	2,919,792	2,774,296	Spain	3,465,473	3,142,891
Denmark	3,110,650	2,734,798	Netherlands	3,394,073	3,137,993

Note: Source: Hongzhou Zhang, China's Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Working Papers 246, 16 August 2012, 3

The last fishing ground can be found in the waters of the South China Sea. When it comes to the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU) in the disputed waters, the East China Sea fishing grounds are being well protected due to the fact that both exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Japan and China are overlapping. As Tseng highlights, 'due to the lingering territorial disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and regular stationing of the US troops on the Okinawa Islands, the East China Sea is routinely under close monitoring by China, Japan and the US army (Tseng, 2015, p. 79).'

3.3 Fishing Rights and the Concept of Sovereignty

As it was demonstrated above, the fishery industry has an immense impact on China's escalating marine production reflected in GDP of the country. However, fishing itself can have a potential to unleash a conflict in neighbouring seas. As an example of a crisis based on fishing run-in, with this, we list recent standoff between China and Philippines. The dispute appeared in April 2012 in the Scarborough Shoal between China Marine Surveillance and Philippine Coast

Guard. Tseng reflects on the conflict, highlighting that ‘after months-long stalemate, despite welcomed interruption due to stormy weather, the area came into almost solely Chinese control, when Philippine civil enforcement ships and fishing vessels were excluded from the adjacent waters after mid-2012 (Tseng, 2015, p. 97).’

This case demonstrates that marine resources are perceived not only as a vital part of the national asset. Moreover, it holds a notion of sole proprietorship and most importantly, national sovereignty. Also, as Tseng states ‘fishing can be deemed as an important piece of evidence to fortify proclamations of sovereignty and effective administration of waters where fishing takes place (Tseng, 2015, pp. 97-98).’ As mentioned in the introduction there are the three main conditions under which sovereignty can be claimed. With regards to fishing, we can focus now on the historical references in a way that fishing in the East China Sea has a long-standing tradition that can be seen practised through centuries and is still present in today’s Chinese fishery. It has its specific customs and behaviours. Hence, ‘the right of resource utilisation constitutes a quintessential dimension of China’s historical rights in this area (Tseng, 2015, p. 98).’

Therefore, logically we can assume that China will include in their claim over the Diaoyu Islands the historical reference of fishing in the East China Sea. The most convincing case of factual allegations of China in the East China Sea can be depicted on a fishery dispute between them and Japan. The conflict lasted from 1925-1935, and the grapes of wrath, in this case, were the fishing grounds off the coast of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. These waters were rich on a species are known as yellow croaker, and the competition between Japan and China aroused dramatically. However, ‘the Chinese government intervened, upon strong requirement from the Chinese fishing industry, by claiming a three-mile territorial water zone along the coast (Tseng, 2015, p. 99).’

Delving deeper into the concept of sovereignty and fishing rights, we can reflect on the second chapter of this thesis, where we discussed the Communist Party blueprint of the rejuvenation of China. With a promise to the Chinese people, the CCP vowed to transform its maritime power as well as the economy. Moreover, the fishing industry and its expanding have its apparent parallels with the Chinese dream, where China found itself steady going on its path to becoming a prosperous, modern state, thus to fulfil the promise made. All this is going hand in hand with the notion of sovereignty.

Therefore, we can refer to the fishing industry to be closely related to the matter of the Chinese sovereignty and thus the face that is shown to not only on the international level but also on the equally important, domestic level. Tseng elaborates on the idea that 'fishing has become a handy means for fishermen, coast guard agency and the Chinese government, to work of their contestations of sovereignty over disputed maritime spaces (Tseng, 2015, p. 104).' Everything is interconnected and directly linked to the concept of face, whether it is through the booming fishing industry, EEZs, oil and gas reservoirs in the East China Sea or the Chinese Dream. Thus, with no doubt, we can claim that the East China Sea plays its crucial role in the dispute reflecting on the matter of the face.

CONCLUSION

Based on the evidence collected and presented throughout this diploma thesis and its chapters, I hereby present findings on the renewed dispute between the People's Republic of China and Japan in the matter of the territorial claims over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, located in the East China Sea. With very detailed examination of mainly the Chinese society as well as other East Asian Societies which still has deeply enrooted tradition and values of the Confucianism philosophy, it is undeniable to emphasize that the notion of face plays a quintessential role in the dispute.

To begin with, a face can be described as an image of a social attribute. In the Chinese society, there are discernible two primary forms of face a person or even a greater group of individuals can behold, *lien* and *mien-tzu*. They have a crucial role in development as well as in the maintenance of social relationships. *Mien* is a face representing reputation achieved through getting on in life, success, and ostentation as well. *Mien-tzu* is targeted on immediate recognition of one's face and respect shown during social interaction. It possesses more social, civil and valuational content. Moreover, it is a presentation of a human being, an individual adjoined with the social status. Among the most prominent attributes of *mien-tzu* is the fact that it can be attached to an office or a station that a person occupies or is in charge of. In other words, it means the more significant position, the more substantial *mien-tzu*. Besides, *mien-tzu* is promoting, preserving, or degrading social relationships and mutual respectability, therefore we can claim that face entails honour.

The second face, *lien*, signifies the fundamental dignity, respectability, thus to lose *lien* is bellow one's pride, and it brings unbearable dishonour and disgrace. When *lien* is lost, one's honour is not valuable and recognised anymore. Besides that, *lien* is described as a moral dignity which keeps the balance of five cardinal relationships (*wu lun*) which are regarded as the face producers with the virtues gained from one's self-cultivation, presented in Confucianism. Reflecting on Confucianism, its primary objective is to achieve perfection represented by a moral self-cultivation. If *lien* is broken, the society that stands on the five cardinal pillars of Confucianism will collapse. Since China is still heavily influenced by Confucianism, it is highly essential for the Chinese Communist Party to preserve their face shown to the outer world, as well as to keep their face on the domestic level.

With Galtung's theory of CMT (Chosenness, Myths, Trauma), we can see how the face is being projected in everyday life of the Chinese society. Looking closer to the CCP and the historical narrative of the Century of Humiliation, we can highlight the importance of the CMT in this study case. The CPP has chosen to build on the trauma of the past, to safeguard the history to a glorious future of China and its great nation. Having great propaganda, not only in the form of the patriotic education, China has managed to survive as we can see and experience it today, even after the fall of the ideology followed by a swift shift of its primary interest onto the Chinese citizens.

China being led by Xi Jinping is at a brink of a new era which seeks to wipe out the national humiliation and be done with all the sorrows of the past. With China's rejuvenation, the Chinese Dream, there is a new spark of hope to make China great again, especially in the economic terms. Being the dominant country in the Asian society, China feels that it can acquire more, thus to strengthen its face is a mere essential need for the country. Japan, being China's neighbour and lost brother from the past, damaged the face of China yet again. Reflecting on the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands of which Japan nationalised three rocky islands under Tokyo's governor Ishihara, was a direct blow to their sovereignty, honour, and *lien*. Therefore, the dispute was renewed quickly.

Looking at the dispute from another point of views, concerning what China might gain from obtaining legal status over the Diaoyu Islands is depicted as follows. The Islands are located in the East China Sea which is rich in natural resources, mainly oil and gas, due to the Neogene era sea-bed laying under the East China Continental Shelf. However, there are other

more prosperous areas enriched with natural resources such as in the Yellow Sea. Additionally, the fishery industry would achieve a greater scope of fishing grounds if the islands were under the full Chinese jurisdiction. It is essential to mention that the Chinese fishery has a long-time history of tradition which is also another point on their list of reasons why they have a greater right to exercise power over the islands, based on the historical reference. Moreover, the fishing industry and all the job opportunities revolving around the Chinese fishery are a stable part of the CCP's blueprint manifested in the Chinese Dream. Additionally, the exclusive economic zones also play a vital role in the dispute, since the East China Sea constitutes an area for international maritime commerce routes.

Therefore, with the evidence presented, we can assume that the renewed dispute lays primarily in the Chinese psyche, the deeply enrooted notion of face and honour, the historical narrative, and the chosen trauma of the Century of Humiliation, where the Chinese nation suffered one loss after another, whether it was in the form of ceding land (mainly ports and Taiwan) and the occupation of crucial economic zones by the Westerners, or wars with Japan which had betrayed them and made their relationship turning sour during and after the WWII. To possess the territorial rights over the Diaoyu Islands would represent yet another great victory for the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping and for the People's Republic of China. In order to secure the face of the Chinese nation, having the Diaoyu Islands would only strengthen their *lien* which is a quintessential part of their national identity.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this diploma thesis, *the Fading Face of the Chinese Dragon? The Dispute Over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands*, is to demonstrate the importance of the concept as well as the notion of the face, that is deeply enrooted in the Confucian and East Asian societies, in the ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands located in the East China Sea as the primary reason for the dispute. With detailed examination of the concept of face, and the Chinese society, based on the principles and virtues of Confucianism, the importance of face in the society is depicted in the first chapter, *The Face of the Nation*.

The concept of face and its roots in Confucianism is supplemented by Galtung's theory of CMT (Chosenness, Myths, Trauma) which is tightly interlinked with the primary objective of the second chapter *In the Name of the Politics*.

The second chapter examines the political background of China, its leading Communist Party with Xi Jinping at power, their tools essential for securing the ruling power, such as is the patriotic education portraying the Century of Humiliation which left a stigma on the Chinese nation and their face especially during the period between 1839-1949 marked by the victory of the CCP. Moreover, it was targeted on the historical narrative of the humiliation and its immense impact on nowadays politics and tactics used by China concerning the dispute. The theoretical part of the second chapter is defined by the coercive diplomacy and issue linkage as well as by Robert Putnam's two-level game theory.

Lastly, the third chapter, *The Strategic Point*, of this thesis aims to probe yet another interesting point regarding the disputed Islands, mainly the waters of the East China Sea, where the Islands are located. It seeks to explain the strategic value of the islands regarding maritime commerce, exclusive economic zones and its sea-bed enriched with natural resources such as gas and oil. Besides, this area includes excellent fishing grounds which are the essential part of the long-time history of the traditional Chinese fishery. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence provided in this thesis, it can be concluded that the primary reason for the dispute renewal is the strong notion of face, deeply enrooted in the Chinese society throughout the centuries continuing in the modern days of China, supported by the vital part of the historical narrative, the Century of Humiliation.

The fishery, underground natural resources, and EEZs can be depicted as the fruits of possible victory for China, yet they will never be that valuable as the face of the Chinese nation. Alas, it does not seem likely to resolve the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands anytime soon, since the relationships between China and Japan have turned sour a long time ago. What may serve as a comparative example to this dispute is the case of the South Kuril Islands. The countries involved in this territorial dispute are the Russian Federation and Japan, yet they have not found the common ground to resolve the problem lasting over 73 years. What is needed to be done in order to start negotiation over the disputed rocky islands is to get through the shadows of the WWII and to commence the process of healing and reconciliation which would open a new door for the future cooperation between long lost brothers.

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