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**Citizenship Rhetorics in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Enacting Citizenship and Nationality in a Divided Country**

Rétorika občanství v Bosně a Hercegovině:
Ustanovení občanství a národnosti v rozdělené zemi

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Abstract (in English):

This thesis deals with the rhetorical dimension of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The disputed legitimacy of Bosnian statehood, ethnicization of every-day life, and a multilayered citizenship regime which leaves little space for purely civic loyalties to the state, pose an important challenge to the symbolic dimension of Bosnian citizenship. Drawing upon rhetorical approaches to citizenship, this thesis analyses how citizenship was crafted on the discursive level; how various actors formulated the question of ‘who is a Bosnian citizen’, how their narratives interacted and influenced each other. The thesis specifically focuses on two series of protests, the so-called ‘JMBG protests’ that took place in June 2013 and the ‘Social uprising’ which arose in February 2014. The protests challenged the dominant ethno-national framework and represented periods of intensive debates on fundamental questions of citizenship. The analysis has shown that the emptiness of the notion of Bosnian citizenship makes its discursive constructions largely context-dependent and shifting. The boundary between ‘the citizens’ and ‘the elites,’ however, appeared as a salient societal cleavage that can in the short-term overshadow ethno-national divides. Yet deep divisions within the society proved to leave little space for articulations of all-encompassing notions of Bosnian citizenship and even struggles to override the ethno-national cleavage therefore lead to discursive constructions of new sharp boundaries within the Bosnian polity.

Abstrakt (česky)

Diplomová práce se zabývá rétorickou rovinou občanství v Bosně a Hercegovině. Rozporovaná legitimita bosenské státnosti, etnicizace každodenního života a víceúrovňový režim občanství, který nenechává mnoho prostoru pro čistě občanskou loajalitu ke státu, představují výraznou výzvu pro symbolickou rovinu bosenského občanství. Práce vychází z rétorických přístupů ke studiu občanství a analyzuje, jak bylo občanství vytvářeno na diskursivní rovině, jak jednotliví aktéři formulovali otázku ‚kdo je bosenský občan‘ a jak se jejich narativy navzájem ovlivňovaly a spoluutvářely. Diplomová práce se konkrétně zaměřuje na dvě vlny protestů, takzvané JMBG protesty, které se odehrály v červnu 2013, a sociální revoltu, která proběhla v únoru 2014. Protesty zpochybnilly dominantní etnonacionální společenský rámec a představovaly období intenzivního vyjednávání o otázkách občanství. Analýza ukázala, že prázdnota představy o významu bosenského občanství vede k tomu, že diskursivní formování občanství je proměnlivé a z velké míry určované konkrétním kontextem. Významným společenským štěpením se nicméně ukázala být dělící linie mezi občany a elitami, které mohou krátkodobě zastínit etnonacionální kategorie. Hluboké rozdělení bosenské společnosti však nechává velmi málo prostoru pro artikulaci všezahrnujících představ bosenského občanství, takže i pokusy překonat etnonacionální štěpení vedou k diskursivnímu konstruování nových ostrých hranic probíhajících napříč bosenskou společností.

CONTENT

1	INTRODUCTION	7
2	CITIZENSHIP THEORY	11
2.1	THE IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP	11
2.2	BROADENING THE CITIZENSHIP AGENDA	14
2.3	TOWARDS A RHETORICAL CITIZENSHIP	16
3	THE CONTEXT OF POST-DAYTON BIH	18
3.1	THE BOSNIAN QUESTION DURING THE BREAK-UP OF THE SFRY	18
3.2	THE BOSNIAN WAR AND THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS	20
3.3	POST-DAYTON BOSNIA	22
3.3.1	<i>Restoration of peace</i>	22
3.3.2	<i>Fragmentation of the state and competing narratives</i>	23
3.3.3	<i>Socio-economic problems, corruption and protests</i>	25
4	THE BOSNIAN CITIZENSHIP REGIME	28
4.1	FROM YUGOSLAV TO BIH CITIZENSHIP	28
4.2	CITIZENSHIP REGIME AFTER DAYTON	29
4.3	CITIZENS, ETHNIC DETERMINISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS	30
4.4	CLASHING NOTIONS OF STATEHOOD AND NATIONHOOD	32
4.5	LEGITIMACY QUESTION	33
5	RHETORICAL CITIZENSHIP IN BIH	35
5.1	METHODOLOGY	35
5.2	‘GRADANIN’, ‘DRŽAVLJANIN’ AND ‘NAROD’	37
5.3	THE PROTESTS AND NEW CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP	39
5.4	THE JMBG PROTESTS	42
5.5	THE BOSNIAN SPRING	47
5.6	DISCUSSION OF MAIN OBSERVATIONS	51
6	CONCLUSION	55
7	BIBLIOGRAPHY:	59
7.1	PRIMARY SOURCES	59
7.2	SECONDARY LITERATURE	60
8	LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:	68

1 Introduction

This thesis deals with the rhetorical dimension of citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH or Bosnia). BiH is simultaneously a multinational, a post-socialist and a post-conflict country, which remains deeply divided and still struggles for its legitimacy. Conflicting visions on the ideal organisation of the Bosnian polity and its territorial and citizenry boundaries, which fuelled the Bosnian war (1992–1995), have persisted in the post-war era. Different preferences on fundamental issues of allegiance and identity among the three Bosnian constituent peoples—Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats—are largely shaped by Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats attachments to neighbouring Serbia and Croatia, which result into their repeated questioning of their ‘Bosnianness.’ This has important consequences for the concept of citizenship, which establishes a relationship between citizens and the state, and is concerned with the symbolic or territorial boundaries of membership and belonging.

Citizenship has become the central feature of the modern socio-political structure, and is intrinsically tied to democracy and nationalism, as it defines boundaries of a polity and encompasses the question of the rights and duties, as well as symbolism of membership (Džankić 2015, p.4). In contemporary scholarly discourse, citizenship is conceived as a multidimensional concept which entails civil, political, social, or cultural rights, and encompasses also identity, emotional attachments, and belonging. It is understood as lived and experienced, and as a subject of constant negotiations as to who will count as ‘the people’ (Asen 2004; Berlant 1997, p.20). Recent scholarship has called for rhetorically oriented approaches to citizenship to better understand how individuals and groups negotiate various aspects of memberships, and how broader social, political, and cultural contexts determine their multiple and shifting identities and belonging (Štiks 2015, p.10; Kock & Villadsen 2017).

The Bosnian citizenship regime is contained in the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and defined a new institutional design for the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina was created as a highly decentralized state, which combines the principle of territorial autonomy comprised within its division into two entities: the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). This is in addition to a consociation through power-sharing among Bosnia’s three constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The citizenship regime

mirrors this complicated set up of post-Dayton BiH, making it two tiered (federal and entity), and highly complex. The disputed legitimacy of Bosnian statehood, reification of ethnicity as the primary marker of one's identity, and a multilayered citizenship regime which leaves little space for purely civic loyalties to the state, pose an important challenge to Bosnian citizenship.

Drawing upon the rhetorical approaches to citizenship, this thesis seeks to analyse how citizenship has been enacted and crafted on the discursive level; how various actors have made sense of Bosnian citizenship and how they interpreted, and at the same time constituted, the question of 'who is a Bosnian citizen.' This thesis identifies two recent events with most intensive debate on fundamental questions of citizenship, which opened a new space for the formulations of citizenship and the contestation of dominant narratives. The events were two series of approximately month-long demonstrations and protests – the so-called 'JMBG protests' that took place in June 2013 and the 'Social uprising' which arose in February 2014. Both protests are also widely considered to be the most important civil awakenings in post-Dayton Bosnia.

The meaning of the events for the citizenship debate has been already reflected upon in scholarly literature. This thesis, however, argues that the existing analyses focus too narrowly on narratives articulated by the protesters and other public figures supporting their cause, and tend to see them in isolation, overlooking that they were not universally shared, but constantly contested by competing visions proposed by other actors. This thesis, in contrast, understands the citizenship debate as an open and dynamic field where multiple and shifting narratives of membership and belonging articulated by various actors interact, and are constitutive of each other. It focuses on contestations, tensions and negotiations between the constructions of 'we – the citizens' versus 'them' made by various actors from political, civil society, or media sphere.

The thesis tests the following hypotheses:

- There is a lack of consensus over the meaning of Bosnian citizenship, and the emptiness of its notion make the discursive constructions of the question 'who is a Bosnian citizen' highly context-dependent.
- Despite acclamations of unity of all Bosnian citizens in opposition to the elites, many Bosnian Serbs and Croats distanced themselves from new conceptualizations of Bosnian citizenship transcending ethno-national boundaries, which were formulated during the protests.

- Given the ethnicization of every-day life and deep divisions within the society, there is little space for an articulation of all-encompassing notions of Bosnian citizenship. Narratives challenging the dominant ethno-national frame, therefore, draw new sharp boundaries within the Bosnian polity.

Through testing these hypotheses, this thesis aims to provide a better understanding of how various actors make sense of Bosnian citizenship, how they interpret and at the same time constitute what it means to be a Bosnian citizen, and how their conceptualisations reflect and challenge the symbolic level of BiH citizenship and citizens' loyalties to the state. It aims to enrich existing research by bridging the top-down and bottom-up approaches, and analysing the citizenship debate as an open and dynamic field wherein multiple and changing narratives about citizenship articulated by both elites and 'lay citizens' intersect, and influence each other. It thus aims to contribute to the ongoing scholarly and political debates on what bonds Bosnian citizens together, inherently connected to the question of legitimacy of the Bosnian statehood.

This thesis is structured as follows: following this introduction, the second chapter lays out a theoretical framework of the thesis, grounded in theories of citizenship. It describes how the notion of citizenship has shifted and broadened over time, so that it is today largely understood as a multidimensional concept. Citizenship, therefore, encompasses not only a legal relationship between a citizen and a state, but also an emotional attachment to the state and a willingness to take part in the day-to-day functioning of the polity. The chapter also introduces rhetorical approaches to citizenship studies understanding citizenship as discursively enacted and crafted.

The third chapter positions the debate in the Bosnian context. The first subchapter mentions the clashing visions of ideal solutions of the Bosnian question during the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which eventually led to the Bosnian war. The war and its impacts are briefly outlined in the next subchapter followed by an overview of post-war developments, and a discussion of the major problems facing today's BiH, such as dire socio-economic conditions, state fragmentation, and constitutional stalemates.

The fourth chapter describes the current citizenship regime of BiH, and analyses its specificities and major contestations, including the violation of human rights resulting from ethnic determinism, and the sidelining of the non-constituent people. Its last two subchapters elaborate on the clashing notions of statehood and nationhood, which are

sources of reappearing debate regarding Bosnian legitimacy, and discuss possible solutions to the legitimacy question proposed in the theoretical literature.

The fifth chapter turns to the rhetorical citizenship in BiH and thus represents the central part of the thesis. The first subchapter provides an overview of the chosen methodology drawing on discourse theory and the next subchapter introduces a discussion of the main terms associated with citizenship in the Bosnian context. Following subchapter briefly mentions already existing analyses on the protests' role for citizenship which serve as a spring board for this thesis' own analysis presented in the last three subchapters – first covers the debate during the JMBG protests, the second during the social uprising and the third one discusses key observations. The main findings of the thesis are summarized in the Conclusion which also proposes idea for further research.

2 Citizenship theory

2.1 *The idea of citizenship*

The idea of citizenship has its roots in ancient Greece and Rome. While for ancient Greeks the notion of citizenship was grounded in active political participation in the name of civic virtue, Romans introduced the concept of citizenship as a legal status involving certain entitlements (Yuval-Davis 2007, p.562; Chen 2017, p.23). The modern liberal citizenship aggregates these two dimensions, and entails equal and universal rights based on the idea of individual liberty that are bound within a sovereign state. It was born from the ideas of enlightenment and was further informed by the radical changes of the socio-economic organisation of polities in Western Europe in the 18th century, eventually crystallizing during the French revolution (Chen 2017, p.23). The concept of citizenship as a direct relationship between citizens and the state has since then become the central feature of the modern socio-political structure, as shown by the fact that nowadays 97 % of the world population are citizens at birth (Heater 1999, p.4). Since individuals' lives are profoundly shaped by citizenship and by the status and rights it grants them, the notion of where, when and to whom we are born decisively influences our life chances (Štiks 2015, p.2; Carens 1987, p.26). Shachar (2007, p.280) stresses that this 'birthright lottery' represents a major source of disparities and unequal distribution of privileges across the globe.

Regardless of its central position in the modern world, however, citizenship is a contested and shifting concept responding to, and shaped by, changing societal conditions and discourses. Citizenship is essentially a legal bond between an individual and a state, which endows an individual with certain entitlements and duties and defines his/her relations to other citizens and non-citizens. Over time, its scope and meaning have been significantly reconfigured, broadened, and challenged by newly emerging historical contexts (Joppke 2007, p.37; Deiana 2013). As Chen (2017, p.39) observes, the general direction of the evolution of citizenship led to an extension of content of citizenship rights and responsibilities and to deepening demands of participation from formal, such as voting or military service, to informal such as active involvement in civil society. The notion of citizenship today is therefore often linked to activities that previously seemed distant to its concern (Bosniak 2006, p.23).

Traditionally, entitlements bestowed upon citizens were associated with the ‘civil rights’ necessary for maintaining individual freedom, and with the ‘political rights’ related to participation and the exercise of political power. The first significant extension of the concept of citizenship towards the way it is predominantly conceived today was put forward by British sociologist T.H. Marshall. In his seminal work, Marshall (1950) proposed a concept of ‘social citizenship,’ encompassing ‘social rights’ as a third dimension of citizenship rights. Social rights according to him, also contained the right to economic welfare and security, or a right to live the life of a civilized being according to prevailing societal standards (Marshall 1998, p.94). Regarding citizenship preoccupation with equality, strictly limited to within a state’s borders however, social rights received prominence over time and, despite some criticism, the basic notion of Marshall’s concept of social citizenship is widely accepted by recent scholars (Yuval-Davis 2007, p.562; Chen 2017, p.27; Isin & Turner 2007, p.5).

Citizenship is intrinsically tied to the concept of democracy since it defines who ‘the people’ who rule are. It delineates boundaries of a polity, sets rules for inclusion and exclusion, and construes an ensemble of equal citizens as a unit of democratic deliberation and decision-making (Taylor 2001, p.xiii). As Brubaker (1992, p.21) argues, this bound citizenry has come to be typically perceived as a nation, as something which is more cohesive than just a set of individuals who, by historical coincidence, happen to be legally bound to the state. The idea of nation and national identity has become an important feature of modern citizenship based on a belief that some citizen solidarity is necessary for a democracy to flourish. The process which Delanty (2000, p.91) calls ‘the coupling of nation and state’ resulted into the equation of nation, state, and people in modern political thought and discourse (Hobsbawm 1992, p.19).

The politics of citizenship usually mirrors specific ideas of nationhood and is often used as an effective tool of nation-building (Štiks 2006, p.484). Habermas (1995, p.259), however, points to a paradox inherent to the intersection of citizenship and nationalism; while national identity represents the socio-psychological connection between citizens and the state, it is not tied to modern liberal citizenship (defined as legal membership in purely civic terms) conceptually. In line with this argument Džankić (Džankić 2015, p.4) suggests that citizenship regimes reflect the dynamic between state— and nation—building projects which might not necessarily overlap and encompass the question of the rights and duties, as well as symbolism of membership.

The question of membership is also closely related to territory, which represents another essential aspect of the nation–state relationship managed by the citizenship regime. A state’s delineated territory presupposes membership to distinguish who belongs and has free access to it, and in turn the right to enter, remain and not to be deported from a state represents a crucial component of citizenship rights (Brubaker 1992, p.22). Recent scholarship has, however, asserted that we must not conceive citizenship as confined within a state’s territorial border since the citizenship boundaries extend beyond them and are also drawn within them. (Bosniak 2006, pp.5, 9; Soysal 1998). Citizenship is intricately tied to boundary maintenance and alienage; yet bordering, which symbolically and sometimes also physically separates population into ‘us’ and ‘them,’ works both externally as well as internally, within the national society (Cisneros 2014, p.377). Bosniak (2006, p.4), therefore, asserts that a tendency to clearly differentiate between citizenship’s outside and inside is untenable.

Citizenship regimes are not self-contained realms but they influence each other, extend beyond states’ borders, and work within a context in which many citizens are simultaneously embedded in multiple political communities (Vasiljević 2012, p.325; Štiks 2015, p.10). Yuval-Davis (2007; 1999) introduced a concept of ‘multi-layered citizen’ to grasp the reality of citizens’ lives “shaped by their rights and obligations in local, ethnic, religious, national, regional, transnational and international political communities,” and encompassing multiple senses of identity and belonging. Baubock (2010, pp.848–850) proposed to study ‘citizenship constellations,’ understood as structures in which individuals are simultaneously anchored in several political entities to bring into view how decisions taken by states influence other states and their population.

Awareness of existing and emerging transnational ties of many citizens was first raised by migration scholars in the 1990s. As a result of globalisation and progress in information and transport technologies, these ties have become more visible and easier to maintain. Increasing acknowledgement of this reality has triggered changes in citizenship policies of many countries, manifested by more and more widespread toleration of dual or even multiple citizenship across the globe (Bauböck 2010, p.853). For multiple passports holders, passports are no longer necessary attestations of citizenship, in the larger sense of the word, let alone of loyalty to a nation-state. Rather than conceiving a relationship between the state and an individual as an exclusive bond, we should instead talk about gradual sovereignty (Ong 1999, p.7).

Transformation of citizenship has been further stimulated by the expansion of international norms and conventions, most importantly in relation to human rights. Contrasting ideas of universal human rights as applying to all human beings, and the exclusivity of citizenship rights granted only to members of a polity have posed an important dilemma to any justification of rights (Isin & Turner 2007, p.12). In reaction to these developments which to some extent challenge the traditional state's role, some scholars have proposed new citizenship concepts such as 'transnational citizenship,' 'post-national citizenship' and 'global citizenship,' or revived the classic notion of 'cosmopolitan citizenship' (Bosniak 2006; Joppke 2007; Soysal 1998). Critics of these approaches have argued by the apparent continuing relevance of nation-states for citizenship and pointed out that, notwithstanding the global human rights regime, the state has so far remained the authority to implement and enforce human rights legislation (Isin & Turner 2007, p.12; Bosniak 2006, p.25).

2.2 Broadening the citizenship agenda

As it follows from these debates, citizenship is a fluid, contested, and constructed concept intrinsically connected to the altering of societal contexts. Many scholars, often coming from feminist studies, have recently sought to rethink and expand the idea of citizenship and argued for understanding it as a multidimensional concept transcending the domain of formal politics, and also encompassing symbolic or psychological dimensions (Deiana 2013, p.184; Bosniak 2006). Joppke (Joppke 2007) proposed a three-dimensional concept of citizenship as 'status', 'rights' and 'identity,' in which the identity refers to behavioural aspects of citizenship or an individuals' enactment and conception of themselves as members of a collective. The identity dimension was stressed also by Yuval-Davis (2007, p.562) who called for situating "citizenship in the wider context of contemporary politics of belonging which encompass citizenships, identities and the emotions attached to them." Citizenship, in this view, also involves emotional ties, belonging and solidarities and is linked to narratives that inform one's subjectivity and relations with others (Yam 2018; Štiks 2015; Bornman 2013; Milton et al. 2013).

By bringing the identity dimension of citizenship into focus, the postmodern shift has opened up a large field of new challenges and contestations, especially with regard to minority rights and requests for recognition (Habermas 1995, p.107; Chen 2017, p.31).

Kymlicka and Norman (2000) suggest that a fourth aspect of citizenship, which they call ‘citizenship as cohesion’, occurred in reaction to minority ethno-cultural rights and demands for accommodation of cultural differences.

The identity dimension of citizenship also poses an essential challenge to all multi-national democracies in which the troubling nexus of ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ has deepened with the recent surge of ‘ethnic politics’.¹ Kymlicka (2011, p.8) claims that goals of citizenship and its means of promotion must take into account the existing levels of ethnic and religious pluralism among the citizenry (and also resident non-citizens). If anything, he suggests, multi-ethnic countries are in critical need of a high level of mutual respect and solidarity, tolerance, public reasonableness, willingness to participate in politics, and forums of deliberation (Kymlicka 2011, p.11).

There has been a long debate on whether or not, and to what extent, a common citizenship identity is necessary for the functioning of a polity and state legitimacy. Some hold that institutions cannot keep a country together unless there is some social cohesion. According to this view, a healthy democracy is hardly imaginable without at least a minimal notion of common citizenship identity bridging and transcending various group identities. Federalism is then predicated by a notion of multiple or nested identities allowing to maintain multiple loyalties (Kymlicka & Norman 2000, pp.34–35)).

Other scholars argue that in cases of deep diversity, citizenry can be held together by loyalty to the country rather than to other people living in it (Bornman 2013, p.442). The state’s ability to deliver goods and ensure equality of the citizens then, however, comes to the fore as a core condition for maintaining state’s legitimacy (Taylor 2001, p.xiii). Habermas (1995, p.135) proposed another way out of the multinational democracies’ legitimacy problem by suggesting that, in complex societies, the citizenry cannot be held together by a consensus of values, but only by a consensus of procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws and exercise of power. Kymlicka and Norman (2000, p.35) also remind us that citizenship identity and the motivation to act as a citizen must not necessarily be so closely related as we would assume, thus further complicating the question of citizenship identities and the state’s legitimacy.

Irrespective of a how citizenry is held together, it remains a fact that people may significantly “differ in the way they belong or wish to belong to—or be citizens of—a

¹ And the replacement of the concept of nationalism, a state-bound idea, as a dominant concept of socio-political organisation of today’s society with ethnicism as coined by Tamas.

particular country” (Bornman 2013, p.434). Even though this difference in belonging is often normatively framed within the political discourse, it is crucial to underscore that there is nothing illegitimate or ‘politically sinful’ about it (Kymlicka & Norman 2000, p.34; Bornman 2013, p.434). Nor should we, according to Kymlicka (2011), understand these ambivalent feelings and contested commitments as an evidence of failure of citizenship, but rather as challenges to which citizenship must respond.

2.3 Towards a rhetorical citizenship

Ordinary people’s association with citizenship has gained increasing attention in recent scholarly debates, underscoring that we should not understand citizenship as a top-down or fixed and stable phenomenon, but as experienced, lived by people on a daily basis, and as being a subject of constant negotiation (Džankić 2015, p.339; Štiks 2015, p.10; Džankić et al. 2015, p.341). Rather than focus on what citizenship is, we should ask instead how people enact it (Asen 2004, p.91)

The actual functioning of citizenship is shaped by informal ideologies, social practices and rituals, and personal and collective narratives that serve as signifiers of citizenship by ascribing to it particular meanings, identity, status, and values (Fairclough et al. 2006, p.101). On some occasions, citizenship acts can even challenge and break with hegemonic citizenship practices (Deiana 2013, p.187). Isin and Nielsen (2008, p.2) introduce a distinction between ‘active citizenship’ including voting, taxpaying or conscription, and ‘activist citizenship’ to describe instances when citizenship acts go beyond its legally defined boundaries and ‘rupture socio-historical patterns’ to bring about change.

It is important to pay attention to the way in which individuals and groups negotiate various aspects of memberships, and how broader social, political and cultural contexts, reflecting for example contestations between titular nation and minorities, determine their multiple and shifting identities and belonging (Štiks 2015, p.10; Deiana 2013, p.187). As Berlant (1997, p.20) puts it, “citizenship is continually being produced out of a political, rhetorical and economic struggles over who will count as ‘the people’ and how social membership will be measured and valued.” Asen (2004, pp.191, 207) also draws attention to the process of citizenship making and suggests the use of a discursive theory to

recognize fluid, mundane and multimodal enactments of citizenship conceptualized as a mode of public engagement.

Following in a similar vein, Kock and Villadsen (2017, p.571) introduce the notion of ‘rhetorical citizenship’ as a fourth dimension of citizenship added to Joppke’s concept of citizenship as status, rights and identity. They consider citizenship as discursively enacted and crafted, simultaneously reflecting and affecting the way we see our place in a community and the nature of that community (Kock & Villadsen 2017, p.578). They argue for rhetorically oriented studies of citizenship analysing “how we ‘speak’ citizenship” and see how discursive formulations of citizenship contribute to, or alter, societal identity and cohesion (Kock & Villadsen 2017, pp.573, 582). In correspondence with calls for a more bottom-up approach to citizenship, they assert that one should study not only how citizenship is constituted in communicative practices by elites, but also by ‘lay citizens’ whose participation can range from active communication with a greater public to more ‘passive’ ways of making sense of citizenship (Kock & Villadsen 2017, p.571). The media has gained an increasingly important place within contemporary theories of citizenship since they have the potential to bring dominant discourses and their contestations into “the intimate spaces of ordinary citizens” (Bornman 2013, p.434; Milton et al. 2013, pp.406–407).

To help us better understand the relationship between particular aspects of citizenship and citizenship constellations, any rhetorical study of citizenship should, according to Cisneros (2014, p.386), engage with connections between a citizenship’s substance, subjects, domain, and manifestations. On a similar note, Fairclough calls for focusing specifically on the tensions between normative, social or institutional pre-constructions of citizenship meanings, and what is actually achieved in communication and participation (Fairclough et al. 2006, p.102).

In sum, citizenship, as it is predominantly conceived in contemporary scholarly discourse, consists of several dimensions. It contains civil, political, social and cultural rights, encompasses identity, emotional attachments and belonging, is continually being negotiated by context-dependent discourses and practice and entails agency, empowerment and participation.

3 The Context of Post-Dayton BiH

3.1 The Bosnian question during the break-up of the SFRY

The political system of the late Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was highly decentralised; the (con)federation was composed of six republics that enjoyed high, almost state-level, degrees of autonomy. Despite acclamations of the Yugoslav idea and ‘brotherhood and unity,’ the institutionalisation of ethnicity and nationality was deeply embedded in the SFRY political system, especially with new constitutional arrangements introduced by the 1963 and 1974 constitutions. Tito’s reformulation of the Yugoslav idea, mirrored by these constitutions, was that of brotherhood and unity of Yugoslav nations, as “an organic unity where different groups would live together in harmony” (Hromadzic 2012, p.37). The constitutional system differentiated between nations (*narodi*), nationalities (*narodnosti*) and ethnic groups (*etničke grupe*) but the terms, as they were used in the Yugoslav discourse, had quite different meanings than how they are largely understood today. The political system recognized six institutionalised nations: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims, who were recognized as ‘*narod*’ only in the 1960s. Nationalities referred to other national minorities (Germans or Czechs), and ethnic groups to minorities without an ethnic kin state such as Roma (Hromadžić 2015, p.110; Hromadzic 2012, p.37).

The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH) was the most ethnically heterogeneous republic of the SFRY. While all other Yugoslav republics were defined as ‘national’ and belonging to one titular nation, the SRBiH was multinational, declared as a republic of Muslims, Serbs and Croats (Štiks 2011, p.246). According to the census from 1991, Bosnian Muslims represented 43,5 %, Serbs 31,2 % and Croats 17,4 % of the population along with 5,6 % of people declaring themselves as Yugoslavs (Bieber 2006, p.15). BiH constituent nations were also highly territorially intermixed. As Bieber (2006, p.14) notes, the demographic map of Bosnia could be likened to a leopard’s skin. In all the largest towns, all three nations were significantly represented and, despite the greater distance of the communities in rural areas, at the administrative level of municipalities almost none of the units was mononational.

The multi-national character and demographic structure of BiH have proven to be critical for the republic’s fate during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The break-up of SFRY was caused by a combination of political and socio-economic factors, as well as by

the emptiness of the communist idea replaced by nationalism. It was triggered by the democratisation process developing with different speeds, and moving in different directions in each of the republics, but with nationalism and nationalist rhetoric dominating the political discourse and course of action in all of them.

In SRBiH, the first multiparty elections took place in November and December 1990. Three nationalist parties—the Muslims' SDA, the Serbian SDS and the Bosnian branch of Croatian HDZ party—claiming to protect and stand for interests of their respective nations won the elections at all levels and together got control of over more than 84 % seats in the parliament (Bieber 2006, p.21). Each of the parties, however, took a very different stand on the question of whether Bosnia's future was to lay within Yugoslavia or outside of it, which became essentially unavoidable after the proclamation of the independence on SFRY by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Muslim political elites called for the independence of BiH in its existing territorial borders. Bosnian Croats, influenced by Croatian president Tuđman, also purposefully supported independence, though being driven less by a determination to maintain BiH in its current borders, than by visions of the possible integration of parts of Bosnia into Croatia (Bieber 2006, pp.26–27). Bosnian Serb representatives vehemently opposed independence and aimed to stay in the framework of ramp, and essentially Serb dominated, Yugoslavia. They demanded that nations rather than republics should have a right to decide, interpreted calls for independence of BiH as calls for secession and portrayed them as threatening the security of Bosnian Serbs (Bieber 2006, p.24). Given that the war in Croatia was underway and news about Serbo-Croatian atrocities, often utilised and blown up by propaganda, filled the media space, these fears widely resonated among Bosnian Serbs (Campbell 1998, p.270).

The contradictory positions on the fundamental question of the future status of BiH within the post(?)-Yugoslav space, which was intimately related to the question of its territorial and citizen-based boundaries, was crucially shaped by neighbouring Serbian and Croatian nation-building projects extending beyond their republican borders. Belgrade's and Zagreb's nationalist policies were reaching out to their respective ethnic kins in BiH, more or less overtly aiming to incorporate them into their Greater Croatia or Serbia projects (although the latter within the Yugoslav framework). Many of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats felt (quite naturally in an environment where most societal cleavages shrank to the national question) emotional attachments to their 'external national homelands' (to use

Brubaker's (1995) term) and thus also posed an internal challenge to legitimacy of Bosnia's claim to statehood (Štiks 2011, p.246; Solioz & Vogel 2004, p.19).

The contradictory visions of Bosnia's future were not only expressed in parliamentary debates, but also translated into the central government's losing control over the republic's territory. Following the same strategy as previously in Croatia, the SDS in autumn 1991 had already begun forming the so-called Serb autonomous regions, and the Republic of Serbs in Bosnia was proclaimed in January 1992. HDZ dominated regions often followed quite independent policies from the central government as well (Bieber 2006, p.25).

In this atmosphere, on February 29 and March 1 1992, a referendum on the independence of BiH was held. Despite the SDS's call for a boycott of the referendum, the referendum met the EC criteria and was officially recognized. 99,44 % of voters voted in favour of independence, and the turnout rate of 64 % of the electorate roughly corresponded to the proportion of Muslims and Croats in the population (Bieber 2006, p.26). Though it is assumed that people voted (or not) along ethnic lines, given a lack of data, the extent to which this correspondence was indeed a result of a Serb boycott, or to which it was just interpreted in that way, remains unclear. The independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (R BiH) was declared on 5 March 1992 against the Bosnian Serbs protests, and internationally recognized on 6 April 1992. The very same day, Serb forces began their siege of Sarajevo and thus marked the formal beginning of the war in Bosnia (Campbell 1998, p.266,270).

3.2 The Bosnian war and the Dayton Peace Accords

The conflict in BiH started with aggression of the Yugoslav People's Army, effectively controlled by the Serbs, and the Serbs paramilitary units against the newly declared Republic of BiH, but evolved into a full scale civil war. The war raged for three and half years, involved the Yugoslav People's Army (which later withdrew), the newly established armies of the Republika Srpska and the Republic of BiH, the Croat Defence Council, and various paramilitaries, and brought about massive atrocities against the civilian population. Fights between the Serbian forces and the Army of the R BiH in uneasy collaboration with the Croat Defence Council extended in 1993 when the 'Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna' was announced (Campbell 1998, pp.265–266).

The boundaries between the warring parties were drawn along ethno-national lines and the war has been therefore predominantly perceived and interpreted as an ethnic conflict between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims who adopted the name Bosniaks in 1993. War aims of the individual parties to the conflict were to a large extent shaped by the interests of neighbouring Croatia and Serbia—involved in the conflict either directly or through their proxies—that were at certain periods openly planning to divide the RBiH and incorporate it into Croatia and Serbia respectively (Bieber 2006, p.27).

Overall, the aims reflected differing and mutually contradictory visions of Bosnian statehood, clashing mainly over the question of the ideal citizenry and territorial boundaries described in the preceding paragraphs. Attempts to redraw citizenry boundaries by force, so that the situation on the ground would approach these visions and made their implementation more likely, led to the involvement of massive atrocities against the civilian population, including ethnic cleansing and forced population expulsions. War crimes that were committed following territory acquisitions were thus not by-products of the fighting, but an inherent part of the warring parties strategies, mainly by Serb and Croat forces, in their pursuit of ethnically pure states (Subotic 2007, p.106; Catic 2011, p.19). Consequently, the war caused the flight of half of the Bosnian population, and resulted in the total redrawing of the ethnic composition map; most Serbs were driven out from the Federation of BiH, and reciprocally, nearly all Bosniaks and Croats from the Republika Srpska (Passage 2011, pp.64–65). According to estimates, 100,000 people were killed and some 2 million people, half of them internally and half externally, displaced (Jansen et al. 2017, p.5; Passage 2011, p.64). The war left the country devastated, largely ethnically segregated, and fragmented.

Fighting was ended by the internationally brokered Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) negotiated at a military base in Dayton in October 1995, and officially signed by the presidents of RBiH, Serbia, and Croatia (Alija Izetbegović, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, respectively) a month later. Besides bringing the war to an end, the DPA also defined the institutional design of the post-war BiH stipulated in the Annex IV of the treaty, which contains the constitution. The Bosnian state was created as a loose federation composed of two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, itself consisting of ten cantons, and the Republika Srpska. In 1999 the international arbitration decided on the status of the Brčko region, which divides the territory of the RS into two halves, and was

left undetermined by Dayton, and established it as a self-governing district held in the condominium of both entities. The entities and cantons enjoy a high degree of autonomy while the central institutions, though gaining more power over the years, remain weak. The level of decentralization of the system is manifested through the existence of fourteen parliamentary assemblies and governments.

The DPA system combines two typical techniques of ethnic conflict management. The principle of territorial autonomy, manifested in the division of entities, is complemented with the consociation of power-sharing among the constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs (Sarajlić 2012; Bose 2002; Štiks 2011). The ethnic logic, probably most visible by the three-member presidency, is deeply entrenched in the institutional set up and determines the allocation of positions on almost all levels of the state administration. In this way, the DPA endorsed ethnicity as the primary dimension of citizens' identity, enabling the continued dominance of ethnic politics and leading to the 'ethnicization' of almost all spheres of life (Hromadzic 2012, p.32).

3.3 Post-Dayton Bosnia

3.3.1 Restoration of peace

The peace in BiH was overseen by a large body of international organisations that still maintain their presence in BiH (e.g. NATO, OSCE, UNDP). Following the DPA, a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) comprised of fifty-five countries and agencies and an Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established to control the peace implementation. The steering board of the PIC (among its members are France, Russia, UK, USA or the Presidency of the EU) provides the OHR with political guidance. The OHR has exclusive powers and can overrule decisions taken by BiH politicians (e.g. block laws going against the DPA or impose laws) and even remove legitimately elected representatives who obstruct the implementation of the DPA, thus making BiH a de facto international protectorate (Subotic 2007, p.12; Stefansson 2010, p.65). The OHR's powers were significantly extended during the first post-war years and especially in the early 2000s, the OHR actively stepped in the political developments to impose laws or remove some politicians from office. Since 2006, however, the OHR restrained from using their exclusive powers to increase the accountability of local political representatives.

The international peace-building mission was not limited to post-war physical reconstruction, but encompassed broader activities and programs aimed at political and social reforms, yielding more power to the central institutions and ensuring stability, increasing economic performance, or promoting reconciliation (Belloni 2007). Much of the agenda has, however, met only limited success. As one of the largest failures is considered the lack of displaced persons returning, which remained low despite the fact that restoration of the pre-war, multi-ethnic demographic map and forms of life was perceived as a key element for rebuilding peace. As a result, most Bosnian citizens today live in ethnically segregated areas (Stefansson 2010, pp.65–67; Hooper & Schwartz 1999, p.85).

3.3.2 Fragmentation of the state and competing narratives

The institutional design of post-Dayton Bosnia, combined with territorial segregation, has created room for continuing competition between Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and Bosniak nationalism and cultural fundamentalism based on claimed distinctiveness of cultural identities (Hromadžić 2015, p.10). The war flattened the fluid, complex and contextually negotiated identities. Even those who did not consider themselves ‘Bosniaks’, ‘Croats’ or ‘Serbs’ before the war were ascribed these categories during its course, and their identity was often reduced to this dimension (Hromadžić 2015, p.13; Deckard 2009, p.128). The civil war made the ethno-national categories more salient, rigid, and closely linked to religious markers and institutions, and the post-Dayton era cemented them as the primary dimension of people’s identities (Bieber 2006, p.56; Deiana 2013, p.189). The shared public space was destroyed by the war, and has been consequently further emptied, and emotional distance between the groups has grown (Deckard 2009, p.132; Hromadžić 2015, pp.10, 107).

The media space has remained largely segregated along ethnic lines as ethnicity plays an important role in the composition of audiences of the main television and radio broadcasters, as well as newspapers (Scancariello 2017, p.72). The education system has been for the most part also divided along ethnic lines, as best manifested by the infamous cases of two-schools-under-one-roof when children share the same school building but attend separate classes and follow different curricula (Johnson 2012, p.14; Bartulovic 2006, p.67; Clark 2009, pp.365–366). There is no state-wide curricula, so Bosniak, Serb and Croat children therefore learn different versions of the history of their country, if they learn about Bosnian history at all. In the after-war years, it was especially common for

Bosnian Serb and Croat schools to use curricula and textbooks from Serbia and Croatia (Torsti 2007, pp.77–78; Bartulovic 2006).

Historical narratives and myths of origins and continuity are important markers of a group identity as they help to define boundaries between the in-group and out-group, bind a nation to a certain territory, and support a sense of coherence and solidarity. During war-time, propaganda within the context of competing nationalisms in post-Dayton BiH, memory has been therefore highly politicised and manipulated to support particular political ends and legitimize discourses and claims of individual ethnic groups (Macdonald 2002; Paez & Liu 2009; Catic 2011; Miller 2006).

Nationalist Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak historical narratives differ in interpretation of almost all aspects of Bosnian history (Okey 2010, pp.349–352). The most sensitive and conflicting issue has become the memory of the two latest wars – the Bosnian war and WWII. There is no consensus on basically any aspect of them, including when, why, or how they started (Cohen 2014, p.21). The mutually contradictory representations of the wars and atrocities fill the public space, and are often utilised to stir up tensions. Political representatives tend to deny or downplay crimes committed, and accentuate the victimhood of the ethnic group for whom they speak. Memory politics and contestations serve to legitimize the need to protect the identity of their own ethno-national group, and each side builds demands for the recognition of its experience and status as a victim, on the basis of suffering and trauma (Moll 2013, pp.911–915).

Fragmentation of the Bosnian memory landscape is further solidified by an absence of a common framework and coordination on the state level, given that cultural issues belong to an entity or to the cantonal administration (Lovrenović 2000, p.202). Commemorations of important events are mostly held separately and memorials are most often also built along ethnic lines (Cohen 2014, p.85). Battles over historical narratives also resulted in a lack of consensus on state symbols; the Bosnian flag had to be imposed by the OHR, the anthem remains without lyrics, and national holidays remain contested and often are not recognized by representatives of one of the ethnic groups and not celebrated in one of the entities (Moll 2013, pp.911–920; Lovrenović 2007).

The dominant ethno-national narratives are far from uniform or uncontested, and they are challenged by alternative narratives which try to escape the ethnically based interpretations and provide other interpretative frames (Bougarel et al. 2007, p.19; Moll 2013, p.922). Counter-discourses are, however, unorganised, themselves contested, and

rather context-dependent. The three dominant ethno-national narrative frames are therefore still clearly prevalent in the public space (Deckard 2009, p.132).

3.3.3 Socio-economic problems, corruption and protests

Nationalist political parties, which mobilize voters through politics of fear and anxiety, have dominated the political scene in the post-war era. In the last couple of years, the possibility of another ethnic conflict in BiH has been accentuated as a vehicle to secure votes by nationalists. However, the main nationalist parties' grip on power runs deeper in the system, particularly in the form of nepotistic bureaucratic structures, and control of the main media outlets and businesses (Arsenijević 2014; Bieber 2017, p.158). Voting for the main nationalist parties, as many anthropological studies have shown, is therefore often motivated by more prosaic aims such as to secure one's own or one's relatives' positions in the excessive state administration system that consumes 60 % of the country's budget (Kurtović 2017, p.154; Čelebičić 2017, pp.134–135; Jukić 2011).

The concurrent processes of post-war reconstruction and post-socialist transformation, accompanied by a high level of corruption and clientelism, resulted in the enrichment of a small segment of war profiteers and political elites, often linked to paramilitaries and criminal networks (Bieber 2006, pp.34–35). The overall performance of BiH's economy, destroyed by the war and suffering from lack of foreign investments, has been very poor. Consequently, social and economic inequalities have substantially increased in the post-war era (Bieber 2006, p.34). The dire economic situation resulted in persistently low wages and high unemployment, especially among the youth where unemployment often reaches above 50 % (Stipić 2017, p.100; Bieber 2006, p.34). Hromadžić (2015, pp.156–180) stresses that among 'ordinary citizens,' the pervasive corruption increases sentiments of a unique level of detachment from the state, and is often perceived as nearing a distinct Bosnian characteristic.

Even though the post-Dayton years have been largely marked by a lack of interest in politics, citizens' lethargy, and a fragmented civil society, frustration over the economic situation and unresolved constitutional issues have led to two major waves of protests in 2013 and 2014. The first protests known as JMBG or Babylution (Bebolucija) took place in June 2013 in reaction to the failure of MPs to pass a law allowing newborn babies to obtain a citizen identification number (JMBG). The protests began with a blockade of the Parliament building by few protestors after a story was shared by an activist on Facebook

of a terminally ill baby who was prevented from travelling to Germany for medical treatment as a result of not obtaining a JMBG and a passport (Stipić 2017, p.98). In just a few days, some ten thousand protesters gathered in the square in front of the Parliament, and a series of protests continued throughout June supported by protesters gatherings in many other towns across the country, and resulting in a major demonstration that took place on the 1st of July 2013 (Chiara 2017, p.1352; Mujkić 2016, p.225).

In February 2014, the second wave of protests broke out. Protests were started by factory workers in Tuzla—and later joined by the wider public—demanding the resignation of the local government for its inability to deal with the effects of corrupted privatisation. Within a few days, they spread to several other Bosnian towns, though only in the Federation of BiH, to develop into what is now known as the ‘Social uprising’ or ‘Bosnian spring’. Protests eventually turned violent, for example, governmental buildings in several towns, including the building of the Presidency, were set on fire, and thus attracted massive attention from foreign media (Mujkić 2016, p.226). These events are often interpreted as the most significant bottom-up challenge to the ethnically defined post-Dayton order (Arsenijević 2014; Stipić 2017, p.91; Majstorović et al. 2015, p.663; Kurtović & Hromadžić 2017, p.263). In several towns, citizens’ plenums were established and served as forums for discussions, engagement and articulation of demands. Plenums were perceived as experiments of direct democracy for giving “voice to those whose voices have so far been politically marginalized and repressed” (Kurtović & Hromadžić 2017, p.277). The protesters achieved the resignation of several cantonal governments, but the initial enthusiasm over awakening of the society and expectations of a brighter future have appeared to have been overstated. Looking back, the protests did not achieve any tangible change. According to some, they are rather seen as a wasted opportunity that, in the long-term, brought even greater disillusionment and apathy.²

Regarding all the flaws inherent to the BiH constitutional arrangement and all social, political and economic problems that BiH currently faces, the DPA framework has been subjected to significant criticism from all sides, local or international, expert or lay people. The criticism seems, however, somewhat unfair since the DPA’s first and foremost goal was to stop the fighting and not to provide a long-term solution (Hooper & Schwartz

² Personal interviews with two civil activists and known public figures: Goran Bubalo, Coordinator of Network for Peace, and Darko Brkan, Director of Zašto ne. The interviews were (separately) held in Sarajevo, BiH, on April 19, 2018.

1999; Džankić 2015, p.540). In the following years, various EU-backed initiatives to negotiate the possible amendment of the Dayton arrangement were launched, and although several alternative solutions have been put on the table, none have been successful (Majstorović et al. 2015, p.662).

Despite a wide consensus that at least some reforms are necessary for the better functioning of the polity, their extent and nature remain sources of high tension and conflict. While Serbian and Croatian representatives would like to further deepen the decentralisation of the state, the Bosniak elites promote recentralisation. Furthermore, political elites that are well embedded within the current system show great reluctance to make compromises and carry on any substantial reform which would negatively affect them (Džankić 2015, p.527). Key issues related to the regime seem unsolvable, as any amendment to the Dayton constitution would change the power balance among the three major ethnic communities. In the precarious situation of the post-Dayton BiH, such a change can be easily portrayed as implying the threat of a new war and thus ruled out of the debate.

4 The Bosnian Citizenship Regime

4.1 *From Yugoslav to BiH citizenship*

The relationship between citizenship, state, nation, and territory proved to be of critical importance during the democratisation process when state-building and defining its citizenry became central in the SFRY (Džankić 2015, p.528; Štiks 2015; 2011). Štiks (2011, p.251) claims that some of the fundamental questions of citizenship—“To what state do I owe my loyalty? [and] Which state guarantees, or promises to guarantee my rights and protection?”—constituted one of the most salient factors in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. These questions became of the utmost importance, given that the political contests in the late Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav contexts were dominated by the ethno-national cleavage but the national, territorial and citizenship boundaries often did not overlap.

Yugoslav republics were formally organised along the ethno-national principle but significant parts of the population lived outside the borders of their national republics. Furthermore, the citizenship boundaries did not necessarily overlap with the national or territorial boundaries. The citizenship regime in the SFRY was two-tiered, and people therefore had both the SFRY and Republican citizenship, acquired based on their place of origin, the citizenship of their parents, or through naturalization (Štiks 2015, p.3). As a result of freedom of movement, people very often did not have the citizenship of the republic of their long-term residence because they simply did not feel any need to obtain it. The situation, however, dramatically changed during the disintegration of the SFRY when the republican citizenship became a decisive factor in determining the citizenry of the newly independent states. No matter their ethnicity, all former republic's citizens were usually automatically transferred into new registers (Štiks 2015, p.20). Yet incongruence of citizenship, national, and territorial boundaries provided political elites with significant room to manoeuvre for using the citizenship laws as an effective tool of nation-building and ethnic engineering. Long-term residents outside the ‘ethno-national core group’ without republican citizenship, such as was the case for many Serbs in Croatia, thus often found themselves excluded from the new polity while members of the ethnic majority gained full citizenship, or privileged status regardless of their place of residence (Štiks 2006, p.484; Štiks 2015, p.151).

Regarding BiH's multinational character, its post-independence citizenship regime differed from other post-Yugoslav states in terms of its inclusiveness. A decree on citizenship issued during the war granted citizenship to all holders of the BiH republican citizenship, and was very inclusive and liberal towards all the SFRY citizens residing in BiH (Štiks 2015, p.158; Štiks 2011, p.254). Almost simultaneously, however, a parallel citizenship regime was declared by the Serbian war-time statelet of the Republika Srpska, which had many ethnocentric features and aimed at including only Serbs into its citizenry (Sarajlić 2012, p.369). During the conflict, citizenship was also offered to some people involved in the defence forces (e.g. Serbs in the RS and some foreign fighters in the RBiH) but all war-time naturalizations were cancelled by the DPA (Štiks 2015, p.158).

4.2 Citizenship regime after Dayton

The citizenship legislation of BiH is contained in the constitution of BiH, defined by the Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Paragraph 7 of the Article 1 of the Annex IV, DPA, 1995), and was thus externally imposed rather than being an outcome of domestic political bargaining (Džankić 2015, p.531). Political priorities that shaped the destructive reality of the Bosnian war and the institutional legacy of the former Yugoslav citizenship regime determined its highly complex and multi-layered structure (Sarajlić 2012, p.371).

Unlike the citizenship regimes of other post-Yugoslav states, that of BiH is two tiered: state-level and entity-level. The citizenship provision states: "There shall be a citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be regulated by the Parliamentary Assembly, and a citizenship of each Entity, to be regulated by each Entity" (Article 1 (7), Annex IV, DPA, 1995). Although the Constitutional Court on 1 July, 2000 confirmed the sovereignty of BiH over the entities, and supremacy of the BiH constitution over the entities' constitutions, the real power, including management of citizenship registers and issuing of passports, lies within the entities (Štiks 2011, p.256). As Sarajlić (2012, p.371) points out, "the definition of citizenship followed the path determined by the need to stop the war and achieve a minimal consensus between conflicting sides, rather than by the aim to create a viable and democratic citizenship regime, with full-scale civil rights and liberal membership provisions."

The principle of territorial autonomy, manifested by the division of the state into entities (the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska), is complemented with a consociation through power-sharing among the constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs). The Preamble of the Annex IV of the DPA, as well as the entities' constitutions, clearly differentiate between "Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina." This phrasing is according to Guzina (2007, p.226) "far from insignificant," as it defines the rightful owners of the country as members of the constituent nations, others (read national minorities) and citizens, "in apparently descending order." Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats and others are not jointly categorised as citizens, but citizens rather represent an "additional fifth group of people in the state," which is "barely worth mentioning" (Hooper & Schwartz 1999, p.57). Who is meant by this vague category of 'citizens' remains unclear, and together with the 'others,' they go largely unmentioned in the constitution and are left without a clear status in the ethnically-defined institutional arrangement.

4.3 Citizens, ethnic determinism and human rights

A citizen thus emerges as a residual category while priority is given to ethnic collectivities and their rights. Citizenship as a link between an individual and the state is largely understood through the prism of ethnicity, leaving little space for purely civic loyalties to the state (Stipić 2017, p.95). The constitution codifies ethnic determinism since, although in theory being inclusive of all societal groups, it ethnically stratifies the 'demos' and prioritizes community rights to individual rights (Džankić 2015, p.531).

The particular constellation of entity citizenship, and the codification of ethnicity has a key consequence for liberal democratic values of individual rights, since it legalises discrimination based on ethnicity. It contradicts and restricts the potential for individual political, and civic rights to be respected, despite all constitutional references to the full recognition of human rights (Guzina 2007; Sarajlić 2012; Deiana 2013; Džankić 2015; Štiks 2011). Ethnic determinism is further reinforced by the DPA system in the provision of ethnic communities' veto rights in case their 'vital national interests' are endangered. The veto rights apply to the state, the entities and most cantonal levels of administration, and can be expanded to include virtually any issue (Bieber 2006).

The negative influence on the overall status of human rights is manifested particularly in the sidelining of the non-constituent peoples (others and citizens) from active political participation, which becomes most evident in the uneven distribution of voting rights. The non-constituent people are prevented from holding major state positions. In particular they cannot run or be appointed for the Presidency and the House of Peoples (Dom naroda), the upper chamber of the Parliament wherein power sharing among the three constituent nations is anchored in the constitution (Chiara 2017, p.1351). The three-member Presidency consists of one Serb elected in the RS, alongside one Bosniak and one Croat elected in the FBiH. The House of People that approves all new legislation consists of fifteen members, five from each of the constituent nations, appointed by entity (and cantonal) Parliaments. As Džankić (2015, p.532) sums up, “such a combination of territorial and consociational elements has a major exclusionary effect on: (1) those who are not members of the constituent peoples; and (2) constituent peoples who are citizens of an entity different from that where their ethnic group forms a majority.”

A Bosnian Jew, Jakob Finci, and Roma Dervo Sejdić have successfully challenged discriminatory provisions within the BiH constitution preventing them from standing for the Presidency and House of Peoples at the European Court for Human Rights. In the famous ruling, *Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia Herzgovina* issued in 2009, the court found the BiH constitution discriminatory against minorities and thus violating some provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. The verdict was later followed by three similar rulings: *Zornić v. BiH* corroborating discrimination against those who do not wish to declare their ethnic belonging in 2014, *Šlaku v. BiH* re-confirming the *Sejdić and Finci* verdict in 2016 and *Pilav v. BiH* finding the constitution discriminatory against members of constituent people who do not live in an entity where they represent majority in 2016 (Serbs living in the FBiH and Bosniaks and Croats living in the RS) (Džankić 2015, pp.533–534; Anon 2018).

The rulings have resurrected and intensified debates about a constitutional reform. Nonetheless, all attempts to amend the constitution have been so far unsuccessful, despite significant pressure from the EU, which made it a main precondition for accession talks, as well as other international actors and civil society. Given that the resolution of the problematic provisions imply the disruption of the delicate balance of power among constituent nations anchored in the DPA, any amendment to the constitution seems very unlikely in the foreseeable future. The EU has therefore rethought its approach, and

withdrawn the precondition for the time being, though leaving its meeting as a prerequisite for a potential EU membership (Majstorović et al. 2015, p.662).

4.4 Clashing notions of statehood and nationhood

Stalemates in constitutional reforms and the impossibility to change key problematic issues of the current Bosnian citizenship regime again point to the precariousness of the post-Dayton BiH. Since there is not even a basic consensus on possible solutions, the status quo represents the only model more or less willingly accepted by all parties, and therefore has become essentially untouchable. The clashing notions of ‘peoplehood,’ understood as the appropriate territorial and citizenship boundaries of the Bosnian polity, and ‘nationhood’ that fuelled the Bosnian war have, however, persisted. As the Dayton compromise has satisfied none of the belligerent parties’ war aims, these clashing notions still cause disputes and contestations of the legitimacy of the Bosnian statehood to resurface.

The notion of Bosnian ‘peoplehood’ is challenged both internally and externally, although these two dimensions are intimately intertwined (Džankić 2015, p.3). Internal challenges stem from the fact that two of the BiH constituent peoples repeatedly contest and question their ‘Bosnianness’ and approval of the state (Solioz & Vogel 2004, p.18; Bose 2002; Hromadžić 2015). External challenges are posed by the neighbouring Serbian and Croatian states to which these communities feel attachments, and which have widely practiced policies of granting citizenship to their ethnic kin across borders. As a result, large numbers of BiH citizens are simultaneously Croatian or Serbian citizens. It is, for example, estimated that up to 800.000 people—almost all Bosnian Croats and many other Bosnian nationals entitled to acquire them (e.g. thanks to Croatian relatives)—hold Croat passports that have been highly valued for opportunistic reasons, especially since Croatia’s accession to the EU (Štiks 2015, p.157; Shaw 2011, p.50). BiH citizenship law allows dual citizenship only if there is a bilateral agreement between the countries approved by the Parliament. Until mid 2012, however, there was no such agreement signed between BiH and Croatia and all BiH citizens with Croat passports thus effectively violated the law of their home country.

In consequence of the overlapping citizenship regimes, Bosnian Serbs’ and Bosnian Croats’ loyalties to their external national homelands have become, in many cases, institutionalized, and thus sources of new divisions and blurred loyalties in BiH (Štiks

2015, p.168). Bose (2002, pp.47–48), however, stresses the internal dimension of the challenge to BiH's legitimacy, and claims that different preferences of Bosnian constituent peoples on fundamental issues of allegiance and identity are ultimately endogenous to BiH. Although this view is often disputed and subject to ongoing debates, a certain relevance of the argument cannot be denied. Bose furthermore makes an important remark, calling for a greater understanding of the differences in citizens' ways of belonging to the state outside any normative judgements. He notes that we should acknowledge the differing and opposing views of the three Bosnian communities on issues of identity, allegiance, sovereignty and the ideal organisation of the Bosnian state as more or less equally legitimate (Bose 2002, p.48). State consolidation in such a situation becomes largely dependent on efficient management of group identities and relations, and on maintaining a balance between them (Taylor 2001; Vasiljević 2012).

4.5 Legitimacy question

The crucial question for BiH statehood and citizenship, namely "What is there that bonds the people together?" however, remains, and none of the proposed solutions dealing with legitimacy in multinational democracies seems to provide a satisfactory answer. Kymlicka suggests that a high level of mutual respect, tolerance, public reasonableness and willingness to participate in politics is critically needed in multi-ethnic democracies. None of these requirements seem applicable to present-day Bosnian politics, which is characterized by a high level of distrust and emotional distance between communities, deep alienation of many citizens from the state and its elites as a result of pervasive corruption, and clientelistic networks, politics of fear, and nationalist mobilization used to secure votes or repeated calls for secession by representatives of the RS.

A state's ability to deliver goods and ensure the equality of its citizens, as another condition for maintaining state's legitimacy, is also highly dubious given the dire economic conditions of BiH resulting in some workers not obtaining their salary for years, high unemployment, ethnic discrimination, and the inability to remove constitutional provisions harmful to the overall status of human rights in the country. Not even the consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of laws proposed by Habermas (1995) is unproblematic. A necessary amendment of electoral law which is currently on the

agenda is likely to end up in a dead lock, thus posing one of the most serious challenges for the post-Dayton BiH framework in years (citovat rozhovor s Brkanem a Bubalem).

If we consider the identitarian solution to the question of legitimacy, according to which a certain extent of common citizenship identity is based on the notion of the multi-layered nature of identities, is necessary for the functioning of a polity, then BiH's legitimacy would depend on the existence of an overarching 'Bosnian identity.' Whether and to which extent such an identity exists has been a matter of endless debates among scholars, politicians, and the wider public. Views on this issue differ significantly and can be found all across the spectrum from defenders of the existence of a common Bosnian idea, pointing, for example, to the historical continuity of Bosnian statehood or distinctly Bosnian cultural patterns developed throughout centuries of multicultural coexistence, to those who claim any Bosnian identity is absent (Filandra 2012, p.300; Lovrenović 2000, pp.202–203; Šušnica 2015, p.2).

To conclude, none of the proposed approaches to the problematic relationship of citizenship identity and statehood legitimacy in multinational democracies outlined in the theoretical chapter seems to provide a satisfactory solution for BiH. The purpose of the thesis is, however, not to draw any conclusions and evaluations with regard to the question of Bosnian identity and state legitimacy. It aims to avoid any 'either-or' positions and instead approach the contested and disputed questions as subjects of analysis. Very valuable contributions to existing debates have proved to be anthropological studies looking at the issue from a different angle, thus aiming to bring a more nuanced understanding of various ways how Bosnian citizens make sense of themselves, their multiple identities and loyalties and how they experience the country they live in, and are citizens of, on a daily basis. This thesis partly draws on this strand of literature, although using different methods, and maps how various actors (both elites and lay citizens) interpret and at the same time constitute what it means to be a citizen of BiH.

5 Rhetorical citizenship in BiH

5.1 Methodology

The thesis draws on discourse theory considering reality as constructed through discourses and therefore never fixed but subject to constant contestations and negotiations. Discourses are understood as ways of representing the world from particular perspectives. By constructing meaning discourses have ability to make and unmake groups and influence what is considered a legitimate definition of the social world (Fairclough et al. 2006, p.104; Stipić 2017, p.94). Laclau (2005, p.45) points to centrality of the act of naming, embodiment and representing of reality for creation of objectivity as it ascribes it a meaning which previously did not have any form of a discursive representation. Naming also draws boundaries between the named and its outside (the rest of totality). The named becomes something only when contrasted with what it is not (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p.43). In this sense, we can also understand constructions of identity and conceptualizations of citizenship in citizenship debates as always relationally organised – definitions of ‘we – the citizens’ are always constructed in contrast to those who are excluded.

The notion of ‘empty’ and ‘floating signifiers’ proposed by Laclau (2005, p.133) is also useful for understanding the citizenship debate. Empty and floating signifiers are words or terms such as ‘people,’ ‘democracy,’ or ‘citizenship’ that we use to describe reality but which have no agreed upon meaning and content or do not point to any actual object. Categories of empty and floating signifiers are analytically different but in reality mostly overlap – signifiers are empty when their meaning is never ultimately fixed but contingent and changing and they are floating when they can fluctuate between various meanings (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p.24). Through hegemony, however, some meanings can be temporarily fixed as it creates a social consensus which makes the particular meaning considered as natural (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002, p.26).

In the context of post-Dayton BiH, ethno-national discourses have largely become hegemonic in the social field. This hegemony has flattened multiple layers of citizens’ identity and established the ethnicity as its primary dimension. The ethno-national frame has become dominant for interpretation of post-war BiH politics and society and has made organisation of the society along the ethno-national boundaries seem natural. At certain times, however, the hegemony of the ethno-national frame might be challenged and space

might open for reframing of narratives. The thesis first identifies events that intensified the citizenship debate through an analysis of occurrences of relevant terms in selected local newspapers. Citizenship debates are broadly understood as debates concerned with boundaries of membership and belonging or formulations and negotiations of constructions of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ which constitute essential questions of citizenship. The thesis subsequently analyses if and how various social conceptions and practices of citizenship developed during that time of opening, how they interacted, were mutually constitutive of and positioned themselves in relation to the hegemonic ethno-national frame.

For both the identification of the relevant events and the subsequent discourse analysis, it is critical to minimize the effect of unequal and coincidental access to sources. To gain comprehensive account of the citizenship debates, the digital archive of articles of four major BiH printed newspapers run by Mediacentar Sarajevo (Anon n.d.) has served as the main source. The composition of archived sources is well balanced as it aggregates newspapers aiming at all three ethnic communities as well as people who oppose dominant ethno-national narratives, which are furthermore located in three major urban centres in the country (in both entities). The analysed newspapers are two are Sarajevo-based – Dnevni Avaz, the most read daily newspaper in BiH targeting predominantly Bosniak audience, and Oslobođenje which is popular among liberal and higher educated urban population and presents itself as anational. The other two newspapers are Dnevni List which belongs to the Croat media scene in BiH and is based in Mostar, and Nezavisne, one of the major daily newspapers read by Serbian audience and based in Banja Luka (Scancariello 2017).

By measuring occurrences of various forms of the term ‘citizen’ or ‘citizenship’ over past six years, two major events for the citizenship debate were identified – series of demonstrations and protests so-called the JMBG protests and the the ‘Bosnian spring’ that took place in Bosnia in June 2013 and February 2014, respectively. In each of the cases, the monthly number of occurrences of citizenship-related terms has increased to more than 400% of the remaining period’s average. The content of the archive has proven more than sufficient for the identification of these periods of intensified citizenship debate. But because the archive does not capture the newspapers in its entirety and because the article selection method has changed over time, it would be difficult to draw conclusions based solely on quantitative analysis.

Consequently, the analysis of selected time periods builds on the discourse theory and concepts described in the preceding paragraphs and finds inspiration in the discourse-

historical approach to critical discourse analysis proposed by Reisigl and Wodak (Reisigl & Wodak 2015). On top of the printed newspaper articles mentioned above, the analysis uses sources of data from a range of other genres and texts: online media articles, television coverage of the events and related debates with politicians and political analysts, manifestos and written demands issued during demonstrations and by plenums, videos from demonstrations or commentaries on the events circulating on Youtube, Facebook pages of the protests, information about happenings and calls for participation.

Analysis of primary sources was complemented by study of scholarly articles dealing with the protests or Bosnian citizenship. In order to understand and explain the complex issue of discursive construction of citizenship, empirical observations were considered together with citizenship theory, knowledge of present day Bosnian context and history or dominant narratives and concepts related to citizenship in BiH and their historical legacy. The analysis took into consideration linguistic variables as well as broader social variables, situational frames and historical legacies, as suggested by (Reisigl & Wodak 2015, pp.27–28). Study of linguistic aspect of citizenship debates and various utterances of the term ‘citizen’ mainly followed Wodak and Reisigl (Reisigl & Wodak 2015, p.32) who outlined the following patterns: how persons, events and processes are named and referred to, what characteristics and features are attributed to them, what arguments and argument strategies are used, from what perspective are these arguments expressed. Attention was also put on recontextualization and reframing of particular narratives by various actors.

5.2 ‘Građanin’, ‘državljanin’ and ‘narod’

Prior to any analysis of citizenship talk in BiH, it is necessary to take a closer look at the terms associated with citizenship, identify various meanings they bear, and deal with some terminological complexities. The English term ‘citizenship’ has two equivalents in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language – it can be translated as ‘državljanstvo’ or ‘građanstvo’. The term ‘državljanstvo’ is closely related to citizenship as a status and a legal bond between a state and an individual. It refers to the formal and administrative meaning of citizenship for which, in legal international documents, the term ‘nationality’ is often used. The term is utilized in the citizenship legislation of BiH, but outside the administrative and legal sphere its utterances are very rare. In contrast, the term

‘građanstvo’ has a much broader meaning, and is used in many different contexts; it can be considered as both a floating signifier (because it is connected to different contexts and moves between them) and an empty signifier (it loses direct reference to its meaning) as defined by Laclau (2005).

Besides the formal and administrative meaning referring to citizens of a state, the term ‘građanstvo’ is used when speaking about people living in a country, regardless of their formal citizenship status, or even about people in general. The term is, however, often linked with more specific aspects of citizenship such as with public activities of citizens and active engagement in civil society (Anon 2016). The term can be also connected with certain socio-economic, political or class connotations and ‘građanstvo’ then implies ‘ordinary people’ as opposed to the rich, politicians or other elites. Furthermore, in the ethno-national order of BiH, ‘građanstvo’ is often claimed by those who do not wish to identify themselves in ethnic terms, and interpreted as a universal term which escapes the ethno-national categorization. At the same time, ‘građanin’ also denotes an inhabitant of a town or an urban area.

In addition to the significant terminological confusion, the term ‘građanstvo’ also creates an ideological polemic. As Štiks (Štiks 2015, p.11) points out, a literal understanding of the political role of citizens and the idea of civil society is in the context of former Yugoslav countries confronted with leftist and Marxist understanding of class struggle and emancipation. Citizens were often mentioned as a specific category alongside other categories such as working people, or working class in the SFRY political discourse and legal documents, thus implying their specific role in the self-managing socialist community (Štiks 2015, p.11). In the Yugoslav constitution from 1974, the term ‘građani’ appears in two main contexts: either in relation to the rights and freedoms of ‘man and of the citizen’ (‘čoveka i građanina’) or in formulations of “working people and citizens” in some cases further mentioned alongside “nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia” (‘radni ljudi i građani i narodi i narodnosti Jugoslavije’), which together define the citizenry of the state (Anon 1974). The peculiar definition of citizens as a specific category of people alongside Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats and Others in the Dayton constitution therefore draws on this institutional legacy and confusing historical usage of the term ‘građanin’ in Yugoslav political discourse.

Moreover, any analysis of rhetorics of citizenship must also pay attention to the term ‘narod’ which besides ‘građanstvo’ and ‘državljanstvo’ very often enters the

citizenship debates and further complicates the terminological ground. The term ‘narod’ is a multi-layered category with a rich history of various usages in legal documents and vernacular language (Hromadžić 2012, p.36). Similarly to ‘građanstvo,’ ‘narod’ can acquire multiple and conflicting meanings, and can be used in various contexts. During the Yugoslav times, ‘narod’ was used to either refer to all Yugoslav people, or to the six main Yugoslav nations. In today’s discourse about BiH, the second meaning of ‘narod’ largely overlaps with the terms ‘nation’ or ‘ethnic group,’ while the first is close to some dimensions of ‘građanstvo.’ In her analysis of the usage and meanings of the term ‘narod,’ Hromadžić suggests to understand it as “a discursive transient category without a politically articulated essence” which often connotes ‘all normal people’ and thus transcends, and challenges, ethnic identification (Hromadžić 2015, p.132; Hromadžić 2013, p.266). She also shows that although ‘narod’ is usually understood as an inherently apolitical category, it is largely used to criticise the establishment and politics, and thus indeed acquires a political or metapolitical meaning (Hromadžić 2015, pp.132–133). This observation is also significant for the definition of citizenship as it is exactly this usage of the term ‘narod’ where it largely overlaps with the rhetorics of citizenship.

The preceding paragraphs illustrate the point made by Štiks (2015, p.11) that the translation of political concepts, and their historical legacies and trajectories should not be neglected. We should not underestimate the power of language as it is the only thing we have with which to express ourselves. Existing concepts, and meanings they have been traditionally associated with, therefore crucially influence present-day discourses and shape political and social imaginary.

5.3 The protests and new conceptualizations of citizenship

Two of the single most important events for the citizenship debate over the past couple of years were two series of protests: the so-called ‘Babylution’ or ‘JMBG protests’ from June 2013, and the unrests labelled as ‘Social uprising’ or ‘Bosnian spring’ that took place in February 2014. The importance of these two events for the discursive articulation of what it means to be a Bosnian citizen is not only reflected in scholarly literature, of mostly local provenience, but also becomes evident when measuring occurrences of various forms of the term ‘citizen’ or ‘citizenship’ in the digital archive of articles from four major BiH printed newspapers, which is run by Mediacentar Sarajevo (Anon n.d.).

Both in June 2013 and February 2014, the number of utterances of citizen-related terms approximately doubled compared to the average of preceding months, and reached by far the highest levels over the past several years, thus clearly highlighting the protests as times of heated citizenship debate.

Besides the time of the two protests, a few other periods stand out, albeit to a lesser extent: September and October in 2013 when the first post-war census was carried out, May 2014 when severe floods struck the country, and September 2016 when regional elections took place. The flexibly changing number of occurrences of terms related to citizenship and ease with which it is possible to link these variations with major events involving ‘ordinary citizens’ point to the dynamic and context-dependent nature of discursive negotiations of citizenship.

The periods of increased interest in citizenship matters can be perceived as the opening of a space for new formulations of citizenship, contestations of dominant narratives, and redrawing of citizenry boundaries (Asen 2004, p.207; Milton et al. 2013, p.407). The protests of 2013 and 2014 have been, for this reason, often interpreted as windows of opportunity for societal change considered mainly as a redefinition of the ethno-national post-Dayton order, and new conceptualizations of citizenship. Several local scholars, often themselves actively taking part in the protests and plenums, engaged in analysing the meaning of protests for the citizenship debate (Chiara 2017; Stipić 2017; Mujkić 2016; Majstorović et al. 2015; Murtagh 2016; Arsenijević 2014; Kurtović & Hromadžić 2017). As they come from similar ideological positions, their reading of the events is largely consensual but was criticised on several accounts by other local and international scholars and public figures for being too idealistic and ideologically driven (Hronesova 2015; Armakolas & Maksimovic 2013). The debate, nonetheless, serves as a good starting point for an analysis of the discursive crafting of citizenship presented in this thesis, and is therefore outlined in the following paragraphs.

Stipić (2017, p.91) proposes to understand the protests as times when the new narrative and the prospect of citizen solidarity entered the political space and “symbolized a real earthquake.” Chiara (2017, p.1357) draws on Isin’s (2008, p.2) concept of acts of citizenship as “collective or individual deeds that rupture social-historical patterns” and elaborates on the transformative power of protests. He perceives them as moments of rupture in which people expressed citizenship by occupying public space and “enacting an ‘alternative world’ in the present.”

As Mujkić (2016, p.231) suggests this alternative world was embodied by reclaiming the political space “from which citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were expelled quite a while ago.” By protests and plenums, citizens in his view radically broke away from the post-Dayton ‘ethnocracy’ in which citizenship had been lost, and called forth “the Demos as opposed to the dominant Ethnos” (Mujkić 2016, pp.222, 231). Stipić follows a similar argumentation and claims that “the narrative of people crossing the well-entrenched borders of ethnic hatred brought down the ethnically painted facades of this polis, in which citizens are held as prisoners of the political class.” The new notion of ‘people’ constructed by the discursive practices of protesters and plenum participants, according to him, effectively “managed to convert ethno-national subjects into fully-fledged citizens“ (Stipić 2017, pp.102, 108). By strictly distancing themselves from the ethno-nationalist divisions the new ‘people’ were to be ‘the citizens of BiH’ as opposed to ‘political elites.’

The notion of return of the citizens into the public sphere and politics, which is widely thematised in the analyses, is also deeply connected to the notion of the return of ‘real’ democracy, linked particularly to the establishment of plenums. Kurtović and Hromadžić (2017, p.278) note that “while actively staging a return of the socialist models of political participation that once constituted the Yugoslav doctrine of self-management, the plenum also understood and represented itself as a space of direct, authentic democracy.” All authors stress that protests and plenums established a horizontal network which opened space for building social and class solidarity. The social and class dimension, transcending inter-ethnic lines and sidestepping ethno-national identities, is highly accentuated, particularly for its potential to serve as a source of cohesion providing for new organisation of the Bosnian polity (Mujkić 2016, p.230; Arsenijević 2014; Stipić 2017, p.107; Kurtović & Hromadžić 2017, p.277).

A closer analysis of the sequence of the protests and of the narrative field, however, reveals that claims of the ‘bridging effect’ of the protests seem rather idealistic. Both series of protests were largely confined to the FBiH, and the often emphasised expressions of support coming from the RS were in fact very limited in its scope. Armakolas and Maksimović (2013, p.10) assert that “the feeling of solidarity – mostly expressed through social media – remained latent in the Serb-dominated RS.” They understand it as a confirmation of “the thesis that a widespread cross-ethnic mobilisation in BiH is still unrealistic.”

The presented interpretations of the civic mobilisation in 2013 and 2014 are further criticised for their idealistic depictions of the transformative power of the protests. While Mujkić (2016, p.238) claims that “in the long run, the protests might have much better consequences than is usually speculated by the Bosnian public,” others see the legacy of the civic awakenings with less optimism. Political analysts and civil activists, Bubalo and Brkan, in personal interviews expressed similar concerns that protests rather than bringing a positive change, closed the citizenship debate for some years to come since many people have fallen into lethargy in consequence of seeing how the seeming potential for change has passed everyone by.³

Furthermore, as they clearly stand out from the analysed accounts of the protests, the boundaries of citizenship have been radically redrawn during their course. The citizens-politicians dichotomy according to them emerged as a new dividing line within the Bosnian polity, as expressed for example by Mujkić’s (2016, p.226) evocation of “an unbridgeable gap between them [ethno-national oligarchies] and their citizens.” This thesis, however, argues that such interpretation captures only one specific vision of boundaries of membership and belonging put forward by the protesters, which was not widely shared but contested by competing visions proposed by various actors. The analysis presented in this thesis draws on the existing interpretations of the protests, but aims to approach them critically, and further analyse their propositions, rather than simply accept them. It sees the citizenship debate as an open and dynamic field where multiple and changing narratives about citizenship articulated by various players intersect, interact, and constitute each other. Boundaries of membership and belonging, which constitute the essential questions of citizenship, are therefore never stable, but fluid and contested. It is these contestations, tensions, and negotiations present in citizenship related debates during the protests in 2013 and 2014 that become the main focus of this thesis’ analysis.

5.4 The JMBG protests

When mapping discussions surrounding the almost month-long series of demonstrations and gatherings of ‘Babylution,’ a particular asymmetry in various groups

³ Personal interviews with two civil activists and known public figures: Goran Bubalo, Coordinator of Network for Peace, and Darko Brkan, Director of Zašto ne. The interviews were (separately) held in Sarajevo, BiH, on April 19, 2018.

articulations of their positions in the media arena is revealed. The debate, demanding that political representatives pass a new law enabling issuing of personal identification numbers to babies, was dominated by what I call protesters' discourse, meaning protesters consisting of a variety of individuals and groups who either directly participated in demonstrations or agreed with and supported their cause and aims. Although the protesters encompassed a very diversified group of people, and a plurality of opinions, main narrative constructions and its framing was quite consistent. The dominant discourses were articulated mainly by protest organisers and speakers, locally known public figures, civil activists, political analysts, as well as journalists and shared widely by media, though predominantly in the FBiH.

The attention put to the events in the RS was rather limited, and alternative narratives of the events proposed by some RS-based journalists or commentators, therefore, did not get much space. Furthermore, given the peaceful character of the protests, and the human and universally understandable nature of the demonstrators' demands, politicians against whom the protests were aimed, largely retreated to short comments and retreated from the public space. A blockade of the Parliament Building that took place during the first major demonstration on June 6 when Bosnian MPs, other staff and around 250 participants of an international conference present in the building were prevented from leaving it until the evening, however, sparked some debates and contestations of the demonstrators' discourse and claims. The incident, in particular, served as the justification of a counter-narrative put forward by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat representatives, which entered and influenced the debate as described later in the text (Tim 2013).

The manifesto issued by organisers of the JMBG protests nicely outlines the main discursive frames and narrative constructions related to the concept of citizenship that dominated the debate about the JMBG protests. It states:

“We are citizens of this country – parents with children, students, housekeepers, workers, unemployed, pensioners, regardless of our ethnic or religious background or any other status, and we share the common interest that rights of all persons, above all the rights of children, are fully observed. We represent no organisation or political party, nor we want for any of the 191 political parties, the countless local and foreign NGOs and associations, international and local institutions, initiatives, formal and informal groups to speak in the name of

citizens. (...) we want to make a clear distinction between you and the citizens. We have no organizers and everybody is welcome to support the #jmbg initiative, but only as individual citizens (...).“ (Anon 2013)

As the manifesto makes evident, in the protesters’ discourse, the main dividing line within the polity was drawn between ‘we – the citizens’ and ‘you – the politicians,’ while emphasis was placed on the spontaneity of the demonstrations, and a lack of formal structuring of the citizens’ gatherings in contrast to the elites ‘organised’ in political parties, institutions or various associations. The most common explanation for staging protests was that, by not passing a law necessary for issuing personal identification numbers, the authorities threatened the rights of babies who were denoted as “the youngest, most innocent and vulnerable citizens” (Karić et al. 2013). Being prevented from obtaining identification numbers, babies were in the protesters’ narrative essentially deprived of their citizenship and citizenship rights, and turned into non-citizens possessing less rights than animals (Degirmendžić 2013a).

The concern about all children of the country and their future was widely expressed as the most important uniting factor by people who took part in demonstrations. Their will to fight for the rights of the babies, to protect the weakest from the most powerful, was then articulated as the incentive for action. The participation of parents and children among protesters was stressed by the protesters, as well as journalists, and supported by the plentiful visual materials widely shared on social media. Images of mothers with babies in strollers, and of parents with children carrying protest banners became iconic symbols of the JMBG protests, and were used as self-explanatory signs of the righteousness of protesters’ actions and demands.⁴

The protests were largely framed as a fight for the fundamental rights of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the youngest ones, by means of belonging to a citizen’s legitimate rights. The notion of citizenship rights as a cornerstone of democracy gained a prominent place in the discourse related to the JMBG protests. An image of an ‘active citizen’ who is ready to stand for his or her rights and demand accountability of the governors was often evoked as an essential condition for a functioning democracy. Appeals to citizens’ consciousness and responsibility, acclaimed as fundamental citizenship virtues, reappear in many articles and interviews with activists participating in

⁴ “JMBG za sve #jmbg za sve,” Facebook page of protests, <https://www.facebook.com/Ja.BiH.JMBG/> (accessed April 20, 2018).

the protests. Many of them expressed their delight that protests succeeded in awakening the population and encouraged others to fulfill their role as responsible citizens and stand for their legitimate rights.

Other characteristic attributes frequently associated with citizenship were dignity and peacefulness, embodied by the non-violent and peaceful nature of the gatherings and resistance. Protester's goals, articulated as a fight for the rights of the vulnerable and innocent, also gave rise to frequent references to humanity, human rights, and solidarity as inherent traits of the protests. Mutual solidarity of 'all' citizens, repeatedly verbalized during the demonstrations, was celebrated for providing cohesion and bridging the deep ethno-national divisions of Bosnian citizens. The participation of people from various parts of the country was emphasised in many accounts of the events. Unity of all protesters, united by their common fight for citizenship rights regardless of their ethnicity, religion, age or occupation, represented a central place in protesters' discourses. Exclamations of "death to nationalism" or calls for "BiH of citizens" reoccurred in speeches, on banners, as well as in articles and commentaries, and references to unity appeared on many posters and slogans of the protests (Osmović 2013a).⁵ Protesters expressed their political fatigue, in which they largely held politicians accountable for spreading the divisive ethno-national rhetorics.

The 'other,' the group excluded from this unified mass of citizens, was represented as politicians and those in power, although who exactly this group consisted of usually remained vague in the protesters' discourse. One of the most often voiced critiques of political representatives was that they were 'not doing their job,' the job of service to, and representation of, the citizens who elected them and pay them to do so. Protesters often referred to politicians' unprofessionalism or human rights violations, which were described as a result of their 'ethnicization' of politics. If the citizens' responsibility was often invoked in texts and proclamations, politicians were largely characterized as irresponsible (Ademović 2013). Responsibility thus frequently reappeared as one of the crucial elements for drawing a boundary between the citizens and the others and thus as a distinguishing trait of citizenship. The narrative of politicians as irresponsible, unprofessional and not doing their job, crystallized over time into calls for resignation of political elites, and even their symbolic removal from power. The demonstration that took place on July 1, 2013,

⁵ "JMBG za sve #jmbg za sve," Facebook page of protests, <https://www.facebook.com/Ja.BiH.JMBG/> (accessed April 20, 2018).

and eventually turned out to be the last major event related to the JMBG protests was named “Fire them!” (“Dajmo im otkaz!”) (Rizvanović 2013; Osmović 2013b).

The discursive framing of ‘we – the citizens’ versus ‘you – the politicians’ was on several occasions confronted and contested by those who happened to be a part of the out-group. In particular, the blockade of the Parliament building was by some interpreted as an attack against the state, thus implying an attack against its citizens (Tim 2013). Furthermore, several female MPs in interviews cited by many media, and also later reoccurring in the public space, pointed out that they were themselves mothers, personally supported the JMBG agenda and agreed with protesters demands (Degirmendžić 2013b). Despite that, they proclaimed, it was not in their competence to do anything about the situation and accusations raised against them were therefore unjustified. Furthermore, they expressed dissatisfaction that by keeping the MPs in captivity, protestors claiming to fight for the rights of all children, deprived the MPs’ children of their right to be with their parents (Degirmendžić 2013b). By this representation of events, the respective MPs pointed to an alleged fallacy in the protestors’ claims, and directly confronted their narrative framing of the boundary between ‘we – the citizens’ versus ‘you – the politicians.’ Several other of the MPs kept inside the building expressed their disapproval over the fact that protestors fighting for human rights effectively deprived others of their own (Degirmendžić 2013b). The captivity theme was then recontextualized by some protestors, who rejected interpretations put forward by politicians as overstated. One journalist reframed the narrative upside down and asserted that it was politicians who had kept all citizens in captivity treating them as servants and slaves and holding them in a “camp of poverty, dark present and even darker future” (Osmović 2013c).

In addition, the ‘captivity argument’ was also used by Bosnian Serb representatives to reframe the JMBG protests in ethno-national terms, which protestors openly defied. The president of the RS, Milorad Dodik, asserted that demonstrations were not spontaneous, but politically motivated, implying the involvement of Bosniak politicians or other agents and political manipulations with anti-Serb and anti-RS focus, and interpreted the blockade as a security threat to Bosnian Serbs and Croats (Tim 2013). These concerns were later also shared by some Bosnian Croat representatives (Hasić 2013b). Such a narrative reframing aimed at questioning the apolitical and anational character of citizens’ protests went directly against the understanding of citizens as standing outside, rather than above, the ethno-national categories widely present in Bosnian civil society.

Furthermore, a closer look at the reporting on the JMBG protests in the media in the RS reveals that protesters' claims of unity and depictions of state-wide support of their cause seem rather disillusioned (S.V. 2013). In the RS media, the protests were often described as only concerning the FBiH and its citizens, referring to the entity-level citizenship which is constantly accentuated by the RS representatives, and their extent was significantly downplayed (Hasić 2013b). While not denying a degree of justice of the protesters' demands as such, events were largely seen as politicised means by Bosniak representatives to achieve their particular political ends. Expressions of distance from the protests, such as: "organizers of the protests who say about themselves to be citizens of BiH" were common, thus also showing distance from whatever conceptions of citizenship protesters might have articulated, automatically depicting them as a "Bosniak fantasy" (Imamović 2013; Hasić 2013a).

5.5 The Bosnian spring

During the wave of protests and the establishment of plenums that took place in 2014, both the character of the public debate, and the content of dominant narratives and conceptualizations of citizenship significantly differed from the JMBG protests. The public space was characterized by a higher narrative plurality, and a more active exchange of opinions took place among various actors. Many of the debates, during which also narrative constructions concerning citizenship were negotiated, contested, and reframed were sparked by violence that accompanied unrests in several towns, and provoked fierce political reactions. The protests were also characterized by a higher level of decentralization and regionalism. Although some cooperation among protesters took place and main narrative framings were shared, protests and plenums to a large extent maintained their local character and raised specific demands to their cantonal governments.

Furthermore, a new set of political and social imagery emerged in relation to the conceptualization of citizenship. As pointed out previously in earlier analyses, the social dimension became a crucial defining trait of citizenship, and replaced the notion of the citizen as a bearer of civic and political rights, and as a cornerstone of democracy dominant during the JMBG protests. Although the discourse of citizens' struggle for their rights was often articulated, the content of the rights changed and was usually narrowed to social rights and justice. The debate was, from the protesters' side, also characterized by more a

revolutionary political language inspired by radical leftist ideologies, and drawing on the political imagery of the socialist Yugoslav regime.

Protests came to be known as a ‘rebellion’ (‘pobuna’), or more specifically as a ‘social rebellion’ among protesters, journalists, and other public figures sympathetic with the protest agenda. Widely articulated was the conceptualization of citizens as ‘ordinary people,’ which was rather rare during the JMBG protests. Such framing refers to, in the Bosnian context, a particular notion of ‘građanstvo’ that overlaps with the term ‘narod,’ and implies a socio-economic dimension. Furthermore, a category of workers entered the discourse, especially in Tuzla where factory workers initiated the whole wave of protests. The ‘awakening of the working class’ was praised by several commentators and participants of demonstrations (Šehić 2014). The relationship of ‘workers’ to ‘citizens’, however, remained fuzzy; whether workers were to be included in the category of citizens was often unclear since the two categories sometimes appeared side by side, thanks in part to the legacy of the Yugoslav socialist discourse (Brkić 2014).

The most common adjectives used to denote citizens pointed to the salience of the social aspect, and thus largely differed from the ‘Babylution.’ Citizens were characterized as ‘impoverished,’ ‘disempowered,’ ‘robbed,’ ‘deceived,’ ‘hungry,’ or ‘discontent,’ and social justice was often mentioned as the ultimate aim of their struggle (Mustafić 2014). An image of ‘a hungry citizen’ became particularly widespread. In various narrative constructions, ‘hunger’ over time began fulfilling the role of a substitute for a wide range of problems stemming from dire socio-economic conditions, inefficient government, or corruption. Exclamations such as “We are hungry!” then came to be used as a general explanation of reasons for protests, and as a justification of the righteousness of the plenums’ demands. Hunger was additionally often evoked as a source of cohesion and citizens’ unity, as manifested for example by the following expression: “Hungry stomach reacts the same, it has no ethnicity” (Šehić 2014).

The anational character of the unrests was widely emphasised, similarly to the JMBG protests, and considered their key feature. As suggested by Mujkić (2016) and Stipić (2017), the fight against the ethno-national divisions, seen as a major source of impoverishment of the country and its citizens, together with the struggle for social justice and solidarity, constituted the crucial axes of the unrest, along which demands were formulated. In protesters’ narrative constructions, political elites accused of constantly playing on nationalist card and stealing the country’s resources were the ones responsible

for all problems of the country. As in the case of Babylution, and as already pointed out by other scholars (Stipić 2017; Mujkić 2016; Kurtović & Hromadžić 2017), the main boundary line drawn by protesters ran between ‘we – the citizens’ and ‘you – the political elites.’ However, in contrast to earlier protests, the critique of politicians became more radical in 2014. Instead of being predominantly depicted as ‘those not doing their job,’ political elites were portrayed as criminals and corrupt officials, robbing the country and impoverishing its citizens. Although being profoundly political in nature, plenums declared themselves as ‘apolitical,’ and explicitly distanced themselves from any partisan politics and official organisation. The anti-elite discourse was additionally salient, especially targeting the so-called ‘regime intellectuals’ (Kazaz 2014).

To maintain the plenums’ apolitical character, all citizens were encouraged to come but only as citizens, not as representatives of any political party or organisation. Plenum participants repeatedly emphasised that they had no leaders or formal hierarchy, and only the ‘narod,’ or ordinary people willing to use their legitimate and democratic right to power stood behind them. Plenums (in manifestos issued during their sessions or in articles written by their participants) presented themselves as places of direct democracy, where every male and female citizen can express his or her opinion, or as forums representing “all politically conscious citizens.” Reoccurring expressions such as “We are all Plenum” or “Plenum is everyone who wants to change the social map of BiH” hinted at the plenums’ hegemonizing claims to represent the will of all the citizens and speak in their name (Okić 2014).

Such articulations were not left unnoticed, and provoked dissenting reactions from those who did not identify with the plenums, and openly challenged the boundaries between ‘us’ versus ‘them’ that they embodied. Well known Bosnian Croat analyst Raspudić (2014), for example, called it “comic” that the Plenum of citizens of Mostar, had only a handful of people participating (he estimated it as 0,05 % of inhabitants of the city), but nevertheless pretended to speak in the name of all. Raspudić furthermore pointed out a paradox that the body that represented itself as the highest form of democracy openly called for a boycott of democratic elections. Plenums’ assertions to represent the will of people were also challenged from within when the internal fragmentation of several plenums became apparent, and their hegemonizing claims thus largely untenable. In addition, the hegemonizing claims were somehow complicated by the overlap of two different meanings of the term ‘citizen,’ referring both to a town inhabitant and a citizen of

a country. Given that plenums were established in different cities and were even named as Plenums of citizens of the particular city (Sarajevo, Tuzla, etc.), it often remained unclear to whom exactly the appeals to ‘citizens’ referred, thus increasing tensions between the simultaneous claims of universality and acknowledged regionalism of the plenums.

The most significant contestations of the outlined framing of protests and plenums, and of the dominant conceptualizations of ‘the people’ reappearing in the protesters’ discourse was, however, articulated by the governing political elites or intellectuals, and important public figures close to them. Violence that accompanied the unrests in several cities was described as politically motivated and contrived, and used as a reason for interpreting the unrests as a coup. Although references to the existence of a coup were made by some Bosnian Serb politicians already during the blockade of Parliament in June 2013, the fast outburst of violence and burning of several governmental buildings in February 2014 resulted in the acceptance of, what I call, the ‘coup framing’ of the events by almost all prominent political figures across the party spectrum and ethno-national boundaries (Anon 2014). Even though theories on the identity of the instigators of the violence significantly differed among politicians, and sometimes led to mutual accusations, the coup frame was largely used to enhance a sense of insecurity, since it threatens the country and security of its citizens.

Politicians used the frame to portray themselves as protectors of their voters and citizens from the criminals, hooligans, the uncivilized mob, or even the ‘left Al Kaida’ who stood behind the violence and protests (Hodžić 2014). Such accusations were usually openly disputed by arguments that protestors were not hooligans, but university-educated people who could not find a job, or that violence was a natural reaction of people in their struggle to protect their bare existence in the non-functional corrupted system (Anon 2014). Calls for radical reorganisation of the institutional system of the country articulated by some Plenums and protesters, ranging from the dissolution of entities and centralization of the country, to not participating in elections and the establishment of a direct democracy, were also interpreted as posing a threat to peace and security and used to further support the coup framing.

By such reframing of the events, political elites proposed a radically different conceptualization of citizenship and boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ with the former consisting of citizens and democratically elected political elites who protected them, and the latter of criminals aiming to destroy the country. Frequent descriptions of these

criminal forces as being commanded from behind and politically motivated, then served to position the coup framing on the ethno-national grid. The ethno-national interpretation of the events by political elites became more salient with time. Bosnian Croat politicians in Mostar soon began framing the protests and activities of Plenums as being politically motivated by Bosniak politicians aiming to centralize the country. On a similar line, the RS representatives portrayed them as attempts to dissolve the entities (Kazaz 2014). Furthermore, similarly to the JMBG protests, the RS media and political elites described the protests as concerning exclusively the FBiH, encouraged the RS citizens to remain calm and depicted the RS as a safe harbour, in contrast to the chaos in the FBiH (Krajišnik 2014).

5.6 Discussion of main observations

When analysing the discursive crafting of citizenship during the two series of protests that took place in June 2013 and February 2014, important differences regarding the way in which citizenship was dominantly conceptualized are apparent. As already pointed out by Chiara (2017, p.1356), during the JMBG demonstrations, the protesters' discourses remained narrowly focused on rights-based citizenship, while during the February protests socio-economic issues assumed a key role, and a critique of the existing institutional system was more elaborated. The analysis of the citizenship talk has made it apparent that these differences also gave rise to strikingly different portrayals of citizens, and the values they were associated with, which became dominant throughout the duration of the protests. Citizenship debates were also characterized by a very distinct political imagery and language which made the mentioned differences in conceptualizations of citizenship even more pronounced.

During the JMBG mobilisation, the notion of an active citizen ready to stand for his rights and demand the accountability of the authorities depicted as a cornerstone of democracy dominated the protesters' discourse. During the February 2014 protests, citizens were largely portrayed as 'ordinary people' struggling for social justice. Responsibility, dignity, peacefulness, solidarity, and humanity that commonly appeared as the defining traits of citizenship during the first series of protests, were then replaced by characterizations of citizens as hungry, impoverished, disempowered and discontent. Additionally, the definition of the central cohesive force uniting citizens and transcending the ethno-national boundaries significantly differed. Humanity and compassion for rights

of the ‘youngest citizens’ which were often depicted as sources of solidarity during the Babylution, were replaced by hunger and poverty during the latter protests.

Two different images of Bosnian citizens articulated by protesters during the two mobilisations attest to the emptiness of the notion of citizenship in the Bosnian context. The concept of citizenship is devoid of clear reference to its meaning, and its content and values it is associated with are largely context-dependent and significantly vary across time and space. In contrast to fluid and shifting notions of what citizenship is there seems to be, however, a much broader consensus on what it is not. The boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, drawn within the Bosnian polity by individual actors are much more stable, thus signaling the persistence of the most salient cleavages within the society.

The main boundary separating ‘us’ from ‘them’ was by protesters formulated as a division between ‘citizens’ and ‘political elites’ on both occasions, although the characterization of the out group and its main wrongdoings slightly differed. The dividing line between politicians and citizens was somehow softer and appeared more porous during the Babylution, while becoming more radical during the protests in 2014. This can be attributed to the overall more radical and revolutionary nature of the February protests, in terms of their aims and demands as well as their means of action. The apolitical character, claimed by both protest movements, results from a deep-seated alienation of the citizens from the political elites, and the state which has been pointed out by several anthropological studies (Hromadžić 2015; Bougarel et al. 2007; Jansen et al. 2017).

Given the negative connotations that politics is linked with in the Bosnian context, even profoundly political agendas and demands, as in the case of Plenums, strictly distance themselves from any partisan and official politics. This has also a particularly salient consequence for the citizenship debate. By drawing unbridgeable boundaries between citizens and politicians, movements which claim to be profoundly democratic and to represent all citizens regardless their ethnicity, status, or occupation, effectively construct new, sharp frontiers running inside the Bosnian polity. People categorized and labelled as members of the ruling class are therefore excluded from the category of Bosnian citizens, and turned into aliens. The dominant narrative construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ articulated by protesters therefore included some inherently undemocratic notions, and did not propose any all-encompassing notion of citizenship on which a viable alternative to the post-Dayton order could have been based.

The discursive formulations of citizenship by political elites proposed contradictory views of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. By framing the events as threatening to the security of the country, and therefore its citizens, politicians presented themselves as protectors of their citizens and turned the protesters into ‘the other.’ Who this category of citizens encompassed remained either vague, or implied their own voters and constituent peoples. Political elites furthermore directly contested the notion of citizenship and values associated with it in the protesters’ discourses, by depicting the protesters as a marginal group of radicals, hooligans or even terrorists. Especially during the February unrests when more active dialogue between protesters organized in Plenums and political leaders took place, these conflicting narratives were often repeatedly reframed and recontextualized by the involved actors, dynamically influencing each other’s constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The category of ‘citizens,’ no matter whom it was to represent, largely emerged in these debates as a subject of competing claims for appropriation by multiple actors who asserted to speak in its name and defend its interests.

The ethno-national dividing line which constitutes the dominant societal cleavage in the post-war BiH, and which the protesters aimed to override and remove, kept reappearing in the citizenship debates. Although the citizenship regime in the constitution is defined in strictly civic terms, the ethno-national logic, which is entrenched in other constitutional provisions and pervades the whole institutional system, influentially shapes the understanding of citizenship and its discursive formulations. In both cases, the ethno-national boundary became more salient with the proceeding of time and the politicization of the events. Serbian and Croatian political leaders often defied the spontaneous character of the protests, and portrayed them as politically motivated. Some of them implicated the involvement of Bosniak politicians, and presented protests as threatening to the interests of the constituent people they represented and protected.

While not denying the political elites’ role in reifying the ethno-national divides by its constant accentuation and by the politics of fear, it would be, however, misleading to consider ethno-national divisions as solely crafted from above and thus artificial. The analysis of the citizenship debate supported existing scholarly studies that document a deep chasm between the ethnic communities, and the high level of mutual mistrust in present day BiH. The ethno-national understanding of citizenship was articulated also by some Bosnian Serb and Croat analysts, journalists, and activists who distanced from the protest movements understanding them as a Bosniak issue. They also vocally expressed

disagreements over protesters' claims to embody 'all citizens,' and thus contested these hegemonizing narratives from within the group it claimed to represent.

Furthermore, the analysis pointed to the salience of the inter-entity divide for the citizenship debate. Protests represented in Sarajevo-based media as concerning the whole country, expressed often by the term 'throughout Bosnia' ('širok Bosne'), and claimed to be of universal interest of all Bosnians by their participants, were mostly limited to the FBiH. Media in the RS reported little about the protests and portrayed them as only concerning the people in the FBiH. Entity-level citizenship was widely accentuated by the RS representatives, who on the rhetorical level systematically presented the RS as a sovereign state. Appeals to citizens were therefore usually specifically referring to the 'citizens of the RS,' who are in the nationalising entity, largely understood as consisting of only Serbs. From outside the RS, the existence of the entity-level citizenship is sometimes interpreted as a tool for easy secession of the RS and as Dodik's invention standing outside the DPA framework, thus showing a significant lack of information about the citizenship regime of the country. The ethnic—and entity—dimensions of citizenship are also sources of confusion, and often understood as closely overlapping.

The complicated structure of the citizenship regime and the ethno-nationally defined institutional system which leave little space for civic loyalties to the state, therefore, significantly shape the citizenship debate and contribute to the constant 'emptying' of the notion of citizen. In addition, the floating and multiple meanings that the term 'građanstvo' acquires in different contexts have proved to play an important role in the crafting of citizenship on the rhetorical level. References to 'građani' can, in Bosnian discourse, point to ordinary people, politically active citizens, people defying their ethno-national identity, or members of a particular ethnic community. Simultaneously, the term also denotes inhabitants of a city, and is therefore used to refer to people or a specific number of people in general, for example, when speaking about participants of a particular event or television viewers. Various levels and meanings of the term 'građanstvo' are often mixed and overlapping in public discourse, and contribute to the sidelining of the notion of citizenship as a relationship between an individual and the state. The 'državljanstvo' meaning of 'građanstvo,' as an all encompassing term referring to all legal citizens of BiH, has turned out to be largely missing in citizenship debates defining what it means to be a Bosnian citizen. To some extent, this absence is to be understood as simultaneously produced by, and constitutive of, the contested legitimacy of the Bosnian statehood.

6 Conclusion

This thesis has aimed to provide a better understanding of the ways in which various actors make sense of Bosnian citizenship, how they formulate what it means to be a Bosnian citizen, and how these conceptualisations reflect, and challenge, the symbolic level of BiH citizenship and different loyalties to the state. By focusing on the citizenship debate as a dynamic field wherein multiple and shifting narratives formulated by both elites and ‘lay citizens’ intersect and influence each other, this thesis has aimed to bridge the top-down and bottom-up approaches dominant in scholarly studies, and thus enrich the existing research.

This thesis has been theoretically grounded in the theory of citizenship, particularly in rhetorically oriented approaches to citizenship that consider it to be lived, experienced, and shaped by collective narratives, and a subject of constant negotiations (Kock & Villadsen 2017; Asen 2004). It has understood citizenship as a multidimensional concept encompassing status, rights, and identity, and therefore intimately related to belonging and emotional attachments to the state. This thesis has also drawn on discourse theory, mostly on Laclau’s (2005) notion of empty and floating signifiers, and on the methodology of a discourse-historical approach proposed by Wodak and Reisigl (2015).

This thesis has analysed the discursive crafting of citizenship in BiH during two series of civil mobilisation: the so-called ‘JMBG protests’ that took place in June 2013, and the unrests that erupted in February 2014, labelled as the ‘Social Uprising.’ These protests represented two recent events with the most intensive debate on the fundamental questions of citizenship, since they opened a space for new formulations of the question ‘who is a Bosnian citizen,’ and negotiations of boundaries of membership and belonging.

The analysis has focused on the way in which various actors, political elites, protesters, journalists, and analysts conceptualised citizenship, with which meanings and values they associated it, how they drew the boundaries of ‘we, the citizens’ versus ‘them,’ and how individual narratives interacted and influenced each other.

The analysis has pointed to significant differences in dominant conceptualisations of citizenship between the protests in June 2013 and February 2014, and thus confirmed the hypothesis that there is a lack of consensus over the meaning of Bosnian citizenship, and the emptiness of such a notion make its discursive constructions highly context-dependent.

The JMBG protests were mobilised in reaction to the MPs' failure to pass a new law enabling the issuance of citizen identification numbers (JMBG) to babies, and the protesters' discourses throughout its duration remained narrowly focused on right-based citizenship. During the February uprising, in contrast, socio-economic issues assumed a key importance, and a critique of the existing institutional system was more elaborated. Differences in the protesters' demands and goals gave rise to substantially different portrayals of citizens, values they were associated with, and the language used to characterise them.

During the JMBG demonstrations, an emphasis was placed on positive values as main traits of citizenship. Citizens were associated with solidarity, humanity, responsibility, dignity, or peacefulness. The notion of 'građanstvo,' which was most often evoked by protesters, referred to the idea of 'active citizens' who stand for their rights, and represent a cornerstone of democracy. The February protests were characterized by the dominance of the socio-economic dimension, and much more revolutionary language that drew on radical leftist and socialist Yugoslav political imagery. Citizens were most often depicted as 'ordinary people,' and described by adjectives such as hungry, impoverished, angry, or disempowered, thus signalling a high level of frustration and discontent.

Despite the lack of consensus on content and values associated with the notion of citizenship, mirrored by the presented account, the conceptualisations shared one central pattern consisting of explicit and vocal refusal of the ethno-national framework of society. Unity of all citizens regardless of their ethnicity was frequently verbalised and stressed by the protesters. Furthermore, the negative delineation of citizenship, the construction of 'who citizens are not,' was drawn along anti-political and anti-elite positions during both the protest. The boundary between 'we, the citizens' and 'you, the political elites,' who are to blame for all the problems of the country in the protesters' discourse, replaced the ethno-national frame as the most salient societal cleavage.

These conceptualisations of the Bosnian polity articulated during the protests and related debates were not universally shared, but subjected to contestations from various actors. Nor were they coherent and stable over time, but shifted and developed as a result of internal negotiations, as well as in relation to conflicting narratives. Political elites often framed the events and notions of citizenship radically differently, and directly contested the protesters' claims to represent the people. Particularly when violence occurred, politicians strived to present themselves as protecting the citizens (sometimes more

narrowly referring to their own voters) from a threat posed by the protesters, whom they portrayed as hooligans or an uncivilised mob. In dynamically developing debates between these frames, often recontextualising and reframing images of each other, the category of ‘citizens’ was frequently appropriated by the actors involved, who claimed to speak on behalf of the citizens, and thus support the validity of own arguments.

The radically new conceptualisations of citizenship which transcended the ethno-national boundaries asserted by protesters to some extent succeeded in off-setting the hegemonic position of ethno-national framing. Over time, however, an ethno-national understanding of events and of the concept of citizenship became more visible, not only among the political elites blaming Bosniak politicians from staging the protests, but also among actors of civil society. Voiced distancing from the civic mobilisations understanding them as a Bosniak issue and expressed dissent over the hegemonising claims of protesters to represent ‘all the citizens’ were not rare among Bosnian Serb and Croat journalists or analysts. The analysis has thus confirmed the hypothesis that the conceptualisations of citizenship transcending ethno-national boundaries and acclamations of unity of all citizens formulated during the protests were not shared by many Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. A differing understanding of ‘who Bosnian citizens are’ and who has the right to speak in their name, were made evident on the rhetorical level. Another salient factor for the citizenship debate, and contested loyalties to the state, has proved to be the entity level citizenship in the RS, which is widely accentuated by the RS representatives. In the nationalising and predominantly Serbian entity, ‘the citizens of the RS,’ to whom it is most often referred, are usually implicitly understood as consisting of Serbs only.

The analysis has confirmed also the third hypothesis, which is that given the ethnicisation of daily life, and deep divisions and level of distrust, there is no place for the articulation of an all-encompassing notion of Bosnian citizenship. Struggles to override the ethno-national divisions lead to the discursive crafting of new sharp boundaries within the Bosnian polity. The construction of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ articulated by protesters, particularly during the February protests, asserted an unbridgeable division between the groups, and essentially excluded the ‘elites’ from the citizenry. It, therefore, included some inherently undemocratic notions, and did not propose any comprehensive vision for the organisation of the polity, upon which a viable alternative to the post-Dayton order could have been based.

The analysis has furthermore pointed to the importance of language, existing concepts, and their historical legacy for the discursive crafting of citizenship. Multiple meanings of the term *građanstvo*, some of which bear no relation to citizenship, and the historical legacy of using the term to denote a specific category of people appearing alongside other categories instead of overarching them, further undermine the understanding of citizenship as a bond between a citizen and a state. The *‘državljanstvo’* meaning of *‘građanstvo,’* as an all encompassing term referring to all legal citizens of BiH, has turned out to be largely missing from citizenship debates. This absence poses additional difficulties for any formulation of a comprehensive notion of citizenship, and further research into this issue would be of a particular interest.

The analysis has also pointed to the preoccupation with internal citizenship boundaries in Bosnian citizenship debates. It interestingly contrasts with current debates in most European states, which focus on citizens versus alien boundaries as a result of challenges raised by refugee crisis or increasing transnational links of many citizens. It would be interesting to observe whether the recent redirection of refugee routes through Bosnia (although only marginal numbers has come through so far), causing more visible presence of a foreign element, will stir up debates on citizenship matters, and shift their inward-looking nature.

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8 List of Abbreviations:

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-present)
RBiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)
SRBiH	Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1943-1992)
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SR	Republika Srpska
DPA	Dayton Peace Accords
OHR	Office of the High Representative