

CHARLES UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Institute of Political Studies

Master thesis

2018

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The Securitization of Immigration
An Assessment of the Extent of Securitization of Immigration
in the German Political Discourse in the aftermath of the 2015
European Refugee Crisis

Master thesis

Prague 2018

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Academic Year: 2017/2018

Bibliographic note

Grünewald, Tabea M. 2018. *The Securitization of Immigration. An Assessment of the Extent of Securitization of Immigration in the German Political Discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis*. 79p. Master thesis. Charles University Faculty of Social Science, Institute of Political Studies. Supervisors Ondřej Ditrych, PhDr., Wolfgang Seibel, PhDr.

Abstract

This Master Thesis called “The Securitization of Immigration. An Assessment of the Extent of Securitization of Immigration in the German Political Discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis“ aims to identify the influence of the 2015 European refugee crisis on the German political discourse in reference to immigration and asylum. Since immigration became one of the greatest security concerns in the post-Cold War era, it appears plausible that the unprecedented high-numbers of asylum applications in 2015/16 triggered securitization in Germany. This impression is reinforced in reference to the increasing popularity of the anti-Islam, far-right PEGIDA movement and the right-wing populist party AfD. However, the merely welcoming attitude towards refugees among the German population, which attracted attention all over the world, challenges the securitization thesis, because the political discourse is assumed to be oriented towards public opinion. Thus, the political discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis is assumed to be torn between fear (securitization discourse) and optimism (humanitarian discourse) in regard to immigration and asylum. By conducting a discourse analysis, contextualized speech acts based on a generic structure used by Holger Stritzel were identified, in order to analyze whether the securitization or the humanitarian discourse dominated the political discourse. The primary sources of the discourse analysis constitute parliamentary debates that took place in the German Bundestag between August 2015 and February 2016, because literature has given major attention to the media discourse, but has largely ignored the political discourse in the parliament. The results of the analysis confirm the fragmentation of the political debate in reference to asylum and immigration. On the one hand, the majority of identified speech acts originates from political representatives of the political opposition which vehemently took a stand for immigrants and asylum. Most frequently, the opposition constructed specific governmental actions or the absence of specific measures as potential treat to the well being of refugees. On the other side,

speech acts, which aimed to portray certain groups of immigrants as danger, were predominantly uttered by representatives of the CDU/ CSU fraction. Often, those were directed against asylum applicants which were assumed to have purely economic reasons for their migration.

Keywords

securitization, threat construction, discourse analysis, asylum, immigration, European Refugee Crisis, Germany

Abstrakt

Tato diplomová práce se nazývá "Sekuritizace imigrace. Zhodnocení míry sekuritizace imigrace v německých politických projevech v návaznosti na evropskou uprchlickou krizi v roce 2015" a jejím hlavním cílem je zhodnocení vlivu, který měla evropská uprchlická krize v roce 2015 na německé politické projevy ve vztahu k imigraci a azylu. Vzhledem k tomu, že se imigrace stala jednou z nejvýznamnějších bezpečnostních hrozeb v období po studené válce, jeví se jako pravděpodobné, že nebývale vysoké počty žádostí o azyl v letech 2015 a 2016 spustily vlnu sekuritizace v Německu. Tento názor je v souvislosti s rostoucí popularitou antiislamismu dále posilován krajně pravicovým hnutím PEGIDA a také pravicovou populistickou stranou AfD. Nicméně, vřelé přivítání uprchlíků německým obyvatelstvem, což získalo pozornost po celém světě, zpochybnilo tuto tezi sekuritizace, protože se předpokládá, že politické projevy směřují k naplňování vůle lidu. Co se týče imigrace a azylu, je možné z této perspektivy rozčlenit politické projevy v návaznosti na evropskou uprchlickou krizi v roce 2015 na ty, které vycházejí ze strachu (sekuritizační projevy), a ty, které vycházejí z optimismu (humanitární projevy). Provedením analýzy projevů došlo k identifikaci kontextualizovaných ústních projevů a jednání na základě generické struktury Holgera Stritzela tak, aby bylo možné určit to, zda politické projevy byly sledující převážně sekuritizační nebo humanitární cíle. Primární zdroje pro analýzu projevů byly tvořeny parlamentními debatami v německém Spolkovém sněmu mezi srpnem 2015 a únorem 2016 kvůli tomu, že dostupná literatura věnovala většinu pozornosti projevům v médiích a zároveň opomíjela politické projevy v parlamentu. Výsledky analýzy potvrzují fragmentaci politické debaty týkající se azylu a imigrace. Na jednu stranu byli původci většiny identifikovaných ústních projevů a jednání političtí zástupci politické opozice, kteří vehementně podporovali imigraci a azyl. Nejčastěji se opozice zabývala specifickými vládními opatřeními nebo absencí specifických opatření jako potencionální hrozbou

pro blahobyt uprchlíků. Na druhou stranu za ústními projevy a jednáními, které popisovaly určité skupiny uprchlíků jako nebezpečí, byly zejména zástupci frakce CDU/CSU. Tyto projevy byly často namířeny proti žadatelům o azyl, o kterých převažovalo přesvědčení, že migrací sledují čistě ekonomické zájmy.

Klíčová slova

Sekuritizace, vytváření hrozby, analýza projevů, azyl, imigrace, evropská uprchlická krize, Německo

Range of thesis: 30 345 words; 203 351 characters; 79 pages

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague , January 5th 2018

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1. Introduction - Immigrants as object of securitization

Even though international migration is ‘as old as human history’ (Heisler/ Layton-Henry 1993, 149), the re-settlement of people from one place to another constantly caused disputes. The introduction of the principle of national sovereignty changed and intensified these disputes (Wendt 1992, 415f.). Though, international migration increasingly became an important matter of national security only after the end of the Cold War and one of the greatest security concerns after the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks (Buonfino 2004, 23). In the European context, the free movement of people across national borders - triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and progressing European Integration - was increasingly regraded as threat to the sovereignty of national states, internal security, cultural values and other referents (Bigo 2002; Boswell 2007; Buzan et al. 1998; Ceyhan/ Tsoukala 2002; Huysmanns 2000; Tsoukala 2005; Wæver et al. 1993). Thus, immigration increasingly evolved to an important security issue, because various actors increasingly started to construct the issue as threat, in order to justify the implementation of expectational measures beyond normal politics. Due to this procedure, immigration became securitized.

The increasing reliance on securitization after the dissolution of the Soviet Union is enhanced by the instance that terrorist attacks and other forms of modern crisis are characterized by high degree of media coverage, politicization, trans-nationalization and inconceivability (Rosenthal 2003). Since those characteristics of modern kinds of crisis, especially their inconceivable character, faced policy makers with the serious problem to adequately anticipate and react, they increasingly relied on securitization of immigration. The reliance on this measure appears at the first sight beneficial, because it provides quick solution in crisis modes, in which the necessity of quick decisions and solutions is conveyed (Lehmann/ Zobel 2016, 21). In this regard, “[...] security has, in a some sense, become the name of the management problem, of governance in an extremely unstructured universe“ (Wæver 1995, 75).

Due to the frequent reliance on securitization of immigration by policy makes in the context of crisis modes, the case of Germany in the context of the 2015 European refugee crisis appears to constitute an most-likely case for securitization (see Eckstein 1975). In the course of this crisis, an unprecedentedly high number of people fled from prosecution and conflict from countries like Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia or Iraq to Europe to find security and protection (HRW 2015).

The majority of refugees that entered the European Union applied for shelter and protection in Germany which accepted in 2015 about one million asylum applicants predominantly originating from the Arab region.

This immensely high influx of asylum applicants apparently put Germany in a mode of crisis the country had never experienced before (Wiesendahl 2016, 53). For one thing, the processing of asylum applications posed a huge challenge for the BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), while housing and care overburdened decision makers on the state and regional levels. Due to these organizational shortcomings, some argued that the consequences of the European refugee crisis would have led to a crisis of public institutions or even caused a national crisis in Germany (Hahlen/ Kühn 2016). In addition, several reports about arson attacks on initial reception centers of refugees and racially motivated violence against asylum applicants (BKA 2017) are indicative of a heated, hostile atmosphere among a certain part of the German population. Lastly, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, highlighted the immense seriousness of the refugee crisis for Germany and Europe by stating that this crisis will define the decade and the future of Europe (TheGuardian 2015). Those events and their assessments in the course of the refugee crisis suggest that the crisis triggered an important, drastic move towards securitization. This is the reason why this Master thesis attempts to assess its potential prevalence in the political discourse. An investigation of the political discourse is important and relevant, since a lot of attention has already been devoted to the discourse in the media in regard to asylum and immigration in the context of the events in 2015 (see Haller 2017; Smykala 2016). Hence, this work shall give an answer to the following research question:

RQ: How did the 2015 European refugee crisis influence the political discourse in Germany in reference to securitization of immigration?

Despite the mentioned indicators which suggest that the 2015 European refugee crisis throw Germany into a serious crisis, other indicators propose an development contrary to securitization of immigration. For one thing, a positive, welcoming attitude towards asylum applicants was present among the political elite. Especially Angela Merkel provided the impetus for the pronouncement of humanitarian aspects in the political discourse. Even though Merkel did highlight the serious character of the crisis, her perception of its impacts were not pessimistic or negative. Quite the opposite: her famous statement “We can do it!“ (*Wir schaffen das!*) became the quintessence of the arising culture of welcome (*Willkommenskultur*) among the German population (KAS 2017). The

humanitarian sentiment was very well received among the public. Thus, the culture of welcome towards immigrants and asylum applicants was expressed by the public with a high readiness to help, solidarity and the welcoming attitude towards the newly arriving asylum applicants. One event which is exemplarily for this attitude among the population in September 2015 was the welcoming of thousands of refugees from Hungary to Germany with applause (Haller 2017, 133). Pictures of events like this, which illustrate the culture of welcome, were spread all over the world.

All in all, the quick review of the events in the course of the 2015 refugee crisis in Germany suggests the prevalence of the two contradictory developments in reference to the attitude towards immigration and asylum. This indicates that an analysis - that just investigates the extent of securitization in the German political discourse - would exclude important discursive aspects. On this grounds, this work shall investigate the presence of an humanitarian, pro-immigration discourse, in addition to the presence of securitization of immigration or rather a discourse which is directed against immigrants. Additionally, since a discourse is always exposed to change, the dynamics of both discourse types across time shall be investigated. Hence, this thesis aims to answer the following sub-questions:

SQ 1: Did the anti-immigration/ securitization discourse or the pro-immigration/ humanitarian discourse dominate the political debate in Germany in the context of the 2015 European refugee crisis?

SQ 2: How did the discursive dynamics of the anti-immigration/ securitization discourse and the pro-immigration/ humanitarian discourse change across time?

The answer to the research question and its subquestions is crucial in respect to various dimensions. For one thing, the investigation of the occurrence of securitization of immigration in the political discourse in the context of the 2015 European refugee crisis contributes to the clarification of the meaning of the term 'refugee crisis'. The dominance of reports on overburdened public administrations and helpless politicians - which are suggestive of the prevalence of securitization of migration - make it difficult not to lose sight of the actual victims of this crisis: the refugees that fled from misery, terror and conflict. However, Western societies tend to construct refugees as the actual problem of this crisis (Loszycki 2017, 244). In order to avoid the admission of refugees, they attempt to circumvent human rights and asylum law. This suggests the prevalence of a reversal of victimhood.

In addition to the danger of misinterpretations, securitization of immigration has further serious consequences for immigrants and asylum applicants but also for the receiving society on the aggregate level. Due to securitization, immigrants are transformed into a threat to various referent objects (Ceyhan /Tsoukala 2002, 25; Tsoukala 2005, 163), because this process promotes a criminalization process of a certain type of individuals based on racism and stereotypes (Tsoukala 2005, 186). On the aggregate level, this undermines the liberal-democratic principles and multiculturalism of Western societies, since these principles rests upon equality and solidarity which are dismantled by securitization of immigration (Huysmans 2000, 753; Huysmans 2004, 324). Further, the practice endangers social cohesion of Western societies, since it hampers successful integration (Ceyahn/ Tsoukala 2002, 35).

Given these negative implications of securitization of immigration, its needless use should be avoided and prevented, while de-securitization should be encouraged (Wæver 1995, 57). One step towards achieving this goal is to discover extensive securitization and pave the way for effective policies. For that reason, this Master thesis investigates a most-likely case of securitization, in order to uncover but also to push de-securitization forward.

Having highlighted the importance and scope of this investigation, this thesis will proceed by outlining the relevant literature in regard to security and securitization. The primary focus of the literature review is on the constructivist perspective regarding security. Hence, relevant conceptualizations of security or rather securitization by researchers with associate themselves with the Copenhagen-School (Buzan 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Waver et al. 1993; Wæver 1995), Paris-School (Bigo 2002; Ceyhan/ Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 2000, 2004; Tsoukala 2005) and the Post-Copenhagen-School (Balazaq 2005, 2010; Stritzel 2007, 2014; Vuori 2008) are outlined. Subsequent to this literature overview the theoretical argument is presented. In its essence, it is argued that the political discourse in reference to immigration and asylum is characterized by the existence of two overarching discourse types, namely the anti-immigration/ securitization discourse or the pro-immigration/ humanitarian discourse which rest upon different frames. The prevalence of either of both discourse types depends upon public opinion. In order to test this theoretical expectation and to answer the research questions, a discourse analysis of parliamentary sessions in the German Bundestag between August 2015 and February 2016 is conducted. The primary data source constitute parliamentary protocols which will be examined in regard to their content of pro- and anti-immigration speech acts. These acts are identified based on Holger Stritzel's (2014)

generic structure of contextualized speech acts. The quantitative but more importantly the qualitative evaluations of speech acts - during which secondary data sources are taken into consideration - will be used as indicators for the prevalence and dynamics of the securitization and the humanitarian discourse type. In the result section, the findings of the analysis will be summarized and evaluated in reference to the theoretical expectations. Eventually, the research question and the subquestions shall be answered in the concluding section.

2. Literature review - Security and Securitization

2.1 The Traditionalist Understanding of Security

In its most basic understanding “security is about survival“ (Buzan et al. 1998, 21). For Hobbes, security - as a matter of national power - is regarded as absolute value (Hobbes 1994). Threats which endanger the security of nations may arise from outside but also within the own nation (see Ullman 1983). Yet, the traditionalist understanding of security needs to be separated from the Hobbesian understanding. Traditionalist focus on threats which arise outside the state. The introduction of the principle of sovereignty laid the groundwork for this different understanding. Security is defined in terms of the preservation of own territorial property and accompanies the specific expectation regarding the behavior of other collectivities to permanently endanger this territorial property (Wendt 1992, 415f.). The phenomenon of war is regarded to constitute the primary danger to a nation’s territorial property (Ibid., 412). Hence, the survival of nations is equated with the maintenance of fixed territorial properties which implies that nations define security in reference to the maintenance of sovereignty. Thus, states are the primary security referent and national security constitutes the core concepts which states seek to attain (see Krause 1998).

In the Cold War era, the neorealist paradigm dominated Security Studies literature and thus the understanding of security. Contrary to classical realists which highlight the self-interested and unchanging human nature as main driver for insecurity (Morgenthau 1993), neorealist proponents assume that the international system is in a permanent state of anarchy in which rational, self-interested states restlessly compete for security (Mearsheimer 1994; Waltz 1979). States can never

be certain about the intentions of other collectivities and permanently hold themselves in readiness for the possibility of war (Mearsheimer 1994, 9f.). Since this paradigm rules out any central authority above the independent state units, states need to rely on 'self-help' as their primary principle of action to achieve and maintain security (Waltz 1979, 111). This implies that collectivities "[...] must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves" (Ibid., 111); in this sense, military capabilities are assumed to constitute the key means to ensure survival of states (Mearsheimer 1994; Posen 1993). Consequently, security issues are defined upon the criteria whether the issue of concern requires military statecraft. In turn, issues which do not require military means do not qualify as security issues but as low-politics (Baldwin 1997, 9).

States purchase military capabilities to significantly hurt or destroy the threatening 'other' and are particularly interested in size and effectiveness of military capabilities relative to other nations which constitute potential opponents (Posen 1993, 82). Since states constantly "[...] aim to maximize their relative power position over other states" (Mearsheimer 1994, 11), security is defined in reference to other collectivities which constitutes a departure from the Hobbesian understanding of security as absolute value.

Even though military capabilities constitute the primary means to establish national security, the neorealist paradigm does not completely disregard cooperation between nations which may include arms control or diplomacy (Walt 1991, 213). Nevertheless, institutions which facilitate cooperation are not regarded to significantly contribute to the maintenance or establishment of security, since they are established upon the calculations of self-interested states and reflect the international distribution of power (Mearsheimer 1994, 13). Neorealists further assume that it is this distribution of power in the international system which determines war and security. Balance of power, which is acquired by a bipolar world order, is assumed as the key ordering principle to maintain security and avoid war since it contains states' permanent pursuit for power (Mearsheimer 1994; Walt 1991; Waltz 1979).

Despite the primacy of neorealist premises in Cold-War understanding of security, also the assumptions of a moderate realist - Arnold Wolfers - influenced Security Studies and its understanding of security. Contrary to the neorealist assumption that all states restlessly and permanently compete for security, Wolfers (1952) assumes that security is understood as a value

and states vary in the extent they place on this value. Further, Wolfers departs from the traditionalist understanding of security because he argues that security cannot be defined in terms of a nation's objective military capabilities. Rather, national security is not a zero-sum game but an outcome of a negotiation process between national decision makers and the people (Ibid., 502). Thus, states vary in their level of security which can be measured objectively in regard to the "[...] absence of threats to acquired values [...]" (Ibid., 485) and subjectively in respect to the absence of fear to sacrifice these values (Ibid., 485). David Baldwin slightly reformulates Wolfers conception by defining the state of security as "[...] a low probability of damage to acquired values" (Baldwin 1997, 13). The researcher argues that this conception allows to specify security according to the actors and values of concern (Ibid., 13f.). In accordance with Wolfers, he further states that security is one of many policy objectives of a nation. Since resources are limited, security competes with other policy objectives (Ibid., 19).

2.2 The Post-Cold War Understanding of Security

The end of the Cold War - which disrupted the bipolar world order - encouraged researchers to overthink the concept of security. Few researchers refused arising attempts to broaden or deepen the security agenda and favored the maintenance of the military, state-centered conception of security which dominated traditionalist thinking of security. Stephen Walt is one of the most famous proponents for a narrow, traditionalist conception of security. He argues that the inclusion of non-military issues into the security studies agenda "[...] would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of [these] important problems" (Walt 1991, 213). Thus, the new multipolar world order might have brought new challenges but did not eliminate the possibility of war. Therefore, the primary focus to maintain security remains military-centric but will be extended by issues which can be summarized under the term "statecraft" (Ibid., 213). Also David Baldwin argues against broadening attempts of several researchers. The inclusion of non-military issues makes it difficult to assess what issues actually constitute a part of the security studies agenda (Baldwin 1995, 135). The researcher argues that this lack of distinctiveness contradicts the aim of the security concept. Security as policy objective should be distinguishable from other objectives since it is situated in a contest for scarce resources (Baldwin 1997, 24).

Despite the objections of Walt and Baldwin, several researchers argue - which reference to the changes after 1989 - that the neorealist perception of security in a narrow military-centric sense is no longer or never was adequate (Baldwin 1997; Krause/ Williams 1996; Ullman 1983). They pay attention to a wide range of additional non-military issues which potentially constitute a threat in the newly constituted world order, since the fear of war and destruction is assumed to no longer constitute the primary security concern. Therefore, they support the concept of 'comprehensive security' (Caballero-Anthony 2015). This concept does not exclude military threats from the security agenda but further includes issues along the economic, political and socio-economic dimension (Ibid., 12f.). Threats which may arise along these dimensions cannot solely be met by applying military means but require non-military responses. Additionally, those threats are no longer perceived to arise externally to national state borders but may arise from within.

Already in 1983, Richard Ullman warned that the solely military focus of Security Studies ignores other threats which might be even more dangerous (Ullman 1983, 129). Therefore, he promotes a widened national security agenda which includes actions or developments that "[...](1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state" (Ibid., 133). Contrary to Ullman, Barry Buzan's conception of issues, which qualify to gain security status, is more general and closely related to the traditionalist conception of security, because he names that survival of collective units or principles as qualifying criterion (Buzan 1997, 15). This criterion allows to conduct security analysis along various dimensions without risking to destroy its intellectual coherence. In Buzan et al. (1998) a framework for analysis is presented which identifies security issues along this criterion and allows to apply security analysis for the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sector. Thus, it replaced the traditional mono-sectoral with a multi-sectoral approach which includes military and non-military threats (Ibid., 207).

In addition to these broadening attempts, several researchers proposed to deepen the security agenda because the end of the Cold War resulted in the loss of an enemy outside the ideological block and outside national state borders. This instance resulted in an domestication of the security dilemma and an increased focus on intra-state conflicts (Lipschutz 1995, 218). Therefore, several researchers

shifted their focus away from the state-centric understanding of security towards security analysis on the societal or individual level.

Wæver et al. (1993) are among the most famous proponents which advocate a functional differentiation between the state and society as distinct units of the security concept. The researchers argue that societal security became the new focus of insecurity in Europe because - triggered by economic and political turmoil in Eastern Europe and advanced European integration - the end of the bipolar rivalry generated widespread fear of mass migration in Western Europe. Furthermore, security agents in Eastern Europe underlined the danger of cultural domination by 'strong' Western states (Ibid., 5). In a similar manner, this pattern recurs in the North-/ South-divide: whereas in northern countries fear of mass migration is enhanced, the southern ones fear exploitation and cultural domination (Ibid., 5). Despite the pronunciation of society and its focus on identity as new level of analysis, Wæver et al. still consider the state unit as important level of analysis, since they argue that societal security constitutes an "[...] integral and important component of state security" (Ibid., 57). A different approach which focuses on the individual level in respect to security of analysis constitutes the human security concept. The concept was developed in the context of an increase of the number of intrastate conflicts which resulted from issues related to peoples identities and their histories and resources (Caballero-Anthony 2015, 5). Thus, human security deals with the conditions individuals, groups and societies with respect to their physical safety and their ability to hold and secure basic goods as well as human dignity (Ibid., 10).

In sum, the concept of security was exposed to reconceptualization after the end of the Cold War. The majority of researchers advocating a widening or deepening of the security agenda no longer perceive security as an objective condition (see Krause 1998). Rather, researchers adopt a constructivist perspective by regarding the structure of the international system as result of mutual interpretations and responses of various actors (Lipschutz 1995, 213). This allows to organize different relations across units into security relations (Huysmans 1998, 232) and to extent the security agenda by issues relating to people's identity or individual safety. Threats and intensions are perceived to be constructed ones, because security is regarded to be an 'ordering activity' that always rests upon an intentional choice (Ibid., 244f.). This new understanding of security in constructivist terms constitutes the basis for securitization theory, which will be discussed on the next section.

2.3 Securitization Theory

2.3.1 The Copenhagen-School

The body of literature which is known as the Copenhagen-School is among the most prominent contributors to securitization theory. The most important researchers which assign themselves to the school are Berry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jap de Wilde. Like other security approaches after 1989, this school adopts a social-constructivist position, since it rejects the claim that security can be understood objectively. Rather it conceptualizes security intersubjectively, namely as an outcome of a socially constructed process of various actors in the political discourse; the securitization process. However, this school does not assume that the socially constructed is constantly exposed to change. Rather, it becomes relatively stable. This implies that the establishment of security via the process of securitization becomes a relatively stable social accomplishment in practice, even though it is still receptive to criticism (Buzan 1997, 19; Williams 2003, 512).

Despite the school's broadly constructivist position, the Copenhagen-School's technique of security analysis rests upon the assumptions of the speech act theory developed by John L. Austin (1975). According to Austin, people do not just use language to describe or assert things but to perform acts. Sentences which simply assert or describe something are called 'constative utterances', while 'performative utterances' are those utterances through which an action is performed under the appropriate circumstances. Thus, by simply claiming that something will be done the action is performed, because Austin assumes that the utterance constitutes the decisive incident in the performance of an act (Ibid, 8). Yet, Austin concedes that he can only define vague criteria to define the appropriate circumstances for performative utterances and thus, to generally differentiate performative from constative utterances (Ibid., 67).

Authors who assign themselves to the Copenhagen-School address this shortcoming in the realm of security. They assume that security is an outcome of the process of securitization which takes place in the political discourse and therefore define criteria for an utterance being a performative act of securitization. In this realm, securitization is understood as "[...] intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with the saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects" (Buzan 1997, 14; Buzan et al. 1998, 25). Hence, the initial aim of this act is to construct a shared understanding of a threat via a speech act; the utterance of the threat constitutes the primary reality (Wæver 1995, 55). A securitizing actor identifies and represents a development or issue - the referent object - as

existentially being threatened (Buzan et al. 1998, 36) by using a specific rhetoric which includes dramatization and the emphasis of supreme priority to deal with the issue (Buzan 1997, 14; Buzan et al. 1998, 26).

On the one hand, it is this specific rhetorical structure that differentiates the practice of securitization from the practice of politicization (Buzan 1997, 13). On the other hand, both practices are different concerning their initial aims. While the aim of politicization is to introduce the issue as part of public policy which requires governmental decisions, the practice of securitization aims to justify the implementation of specific emergency measures beyond the established governmental proceedings to prevent or eliminate a constructed threat that endangers the survival of the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). Since these institutional proceedings are avoided, the practice of securitization allows for a fast implementation of measures which qualify for the mobilization of maximum effort (Wæver 1995, 54).

That is the reasons why, the practice of securitization can be regarded as extreme form of politicization or even opposed to the practice of politicization. Securitized issues are portrayed as urgent and important which justifies to skip established institutional proceedings and to implement emergency measures (Buzan et al. 1998, 29). This circumvention of governmental decision making is possible for issues across various sector with fulfill the rhetorical criteria for a securitizing speech act (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1995). As a result, researchers of the Copenhagen-School stress that extensive, irrational securitization or 'hypersecuritization' needs to be avoided, since it violates the normal bargaining process of democratic states (Buzan 1997, 21; Buzan et al. 1998, 4). Furthermore, excessive securitization in a specific area allows political actors to exploit threats, because it enables them to gain disproportionately high control over it (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Waver 1995, 54). Thus, they promote an increasing focus on de-securitization in the Security Studies literature (Wæver 1995, 57).

These potential dangers of the practice of securitization highlight that the security agenda is assumed to constitute a result of intentional choices made by securitizing actors and therefore prone to exploitation. These actors have specific intensions why and how to construct and address a specific threat (Ibid., 65). Yet, not every person, group or institution can be a securitizing actor. The school mostly names state representatives like political leaders, bureaucrats, governments but also lobbyists, and pressure groups as potential actors which can undertake the role of an securitizing

actor (Buzan et al. 1998, 40). This is case since they argue that securitizing actors need to be in a position of considerable influence; thus to have the ability to “[...] gain the ear of public and the state [...]“ (Buzan 1997, 14). Nevertheless, influence also refers to the actual power of the actor to implement measures which shall meet the constructed threat; to implement measures with fundamental political effects. Furthermore, the Copenhagen-School names functional actors as important units in the securitization process. Functional actors are those ones who have the ability to influence the dynamics in the specific field in which an issue gets securitized (Buzan et al. 1998, 36).

In addition to the fulfillment of the linguistic-grammatical requirements of the speech act and the position of actors, the securitization actor needs to generate a certain degree of social consensus relating to the constructed threat and its means to address it. Thus, the ability of an securitizing actor to securitize an issue is context-dependent and varies across different nations, societies or regions because every analyzed unit of analysis has a different threshold to perceive a specific referent object to be endangered by a specific threat. In this respect, the Copenhagen-School highlights the role of identity to generate consensus among the population (Wæver et al. 1993). Especially after the Cold War, securitizing actors increasingly portrayed identity to be a threatened referent object due to increasing levels of immigration and fear of competing identities (Buzan et al. 1998, 120; Wæver et al. 1993, 41). Hence, societal security - which can be defined as the prevention of threats to identity - became securitized and has replaced national sovereignty as primary threatened referent object in the security agenda.

Societal security becomes a threatened referent objects when a securitizing actor or group perceives that its identity is threatened by a specific development. The individual or group starts to talk about this threat in a security mode to trigger actions to prevent or avoid it (Wæver et al. 1993, 23). Communication in a security mode entails that the developments are portrayed as danger to the ‘we’ identity of these societies; thereby reproducing or constructing an ‘us’ (Buzan et al. 1998, 120). The construction of the ‘us’ needs to be understood in ideological not simply nationalistic terms, since the national identity constitutes only one of various large-scale social-political identities (Wæver et al. 1993, 22). Yet, the conditions of a successful securitization of this referent object vary across different units, since the contextual conditions and dynamics which influence a societies’ perceptions of threats and their tolerance for multiculturalism are different in every society (Ibid., 43).

Researchers of the Copenhagen-School highlight that the prominence of perceived threats to identities of communities in Europe implicates certain dangers. It provides the foundation for reactionary movements which oppose immigration and European integration (Wæver 1995, 65f.). Furthermore, societies that feel threatened may respond to the assumed threat by strengthening their assumed 'we' identity by means of cultural recollection or reproduction (Wæver et al. 1993, 191). That is why they highlight the important role of national governments to manage the cohesiveness of a nation. On the one hand, governments can be 'agents of threat' (Ibid., 45) by undertaking the role of the securitizing actor who constructs migration or competition identities as existential threats. Even though this might be a characteristic of weak states, the authors argue that even democracies are sometimes not able to prevent internal division and societal security (Ibid., 50).

The concept of societal security is also used in contexts outside the Western European realm. Whereas in Europe ideological communities mostly define themselves along national lines, religion or race have more relevance in other regions (Buzan et al. 1998, 119f.). Therefore, important referent objects which might be prone to securitization include tribes, clans, nations, civilizations, region and race (Ibid., 123).

All in all, the Copenhagen-School defines security as outcome of a threat construction by a securitizing actor who portrays specific referent objects to existentially being threatened. Yet, since security problems are intersubjectively constructed, threats can never be measured objectively (Wæver et al. 1993, 43) and only understood in reference to the particular political sector and referent object a threat relates to (Buzan 1997, 18). Furthermore, the approach suggests that in an utopian state of complete security, the concept of security would be obsolete, since the state of security and insecurity do not necessarily oppose each other. The state of security is presumed to be an outcome of a securitizing process in which a threat and a measure as reaction is identified (Wæver 1995, 56). By contrast, the state of insecurity describes a situation in which a threat is present but no measure is taken in response (Ibid., 56). Given these conceptual implications, the process of securitization does not actually improve levels of security. Nevertheless, securitization became a widely used practice.

In the course of time, the Copenhagen-School's conceptualization of securitization gained worldwide reputation but was also exposed to criticism and reconceptualization. Researchers of the Copenhagen-School themselves redefined their approach and adjusted it in response to the

developments in world politics after 9/11. On the one hand, Wæver (2003) attempted to specify the specific role of the audience in the securitization process because the under-conceptualization of the audience and its role in the process constitutes a rich source of criticism. Referring to Arnold Wolfers (1952) differentiation between objective and subjective security, the researcher argues that the relevant audience varies in relation to the political system and nature of the issue (Wæver 2003, 12). Hence, the securitizing actor needs to take the subjectives fears of the audience into consideration; the relevant audience might not be the whole public or 'the people' but might be limited to a particular group (Ibid., 25f.). On the other hand, Buzan and Wæver extended the concept in respect to the level of analysis. Initially, the Copenhagen-School's conception of security underlies a methodical collectivism and implicit state-centrism, given its focus on security or - rather the survival of collective units - mostly located on the medium level (Buzan 1997, 20; Wæver 1995, 50). About twelve years later, Buzan and Wæver (2009) added the additional concept of 'macrosecritizations' to the securitization theory of the Copenhagen-School. Macro-secritizations deal with referent objects on a higher, global scale, especially by bundling several securitization from lower levels of analysis together to produce one over-arching conflict. Despite the different focus concerning the level, the same rules apply as for the process of securitization on the medium level (Ibid., 257). These securitization on the global level enable to reach multiple audiences across multiple units.

In addition, different researchers criticized several aspects of the school's approach. McSweety (1996) questions the school's idea of collective identities which are perceived to constitute a threatened referent object on the societal level of analysis. The idea of collective identities neglects to assess choices on the individual level of whether a human being actually associates oneself with a specific society (Ibid., 87). This shortcoming rests upon the near-positivist conception of identity which assumes that society and identity are as objectivist as the state (Ibid., 84). McSweety highlights that identity is no objectively accessible fact but a constant process among people and interest groups (Ibid., 85). Furthermore, he highlights that the school's neglect to discuss the moral implications which accompany the securitization of identity and notes that identity is just one of various values which might constitute a matter of concern. Additionally, Michael Williams (2003) notes that the Copenhagen-School's sole focus on speech acts as a key form of communication in the political discourse neglects the increasing importance of visual images. The school's restriction to the linguistic-discursive form of communication fails to incorporate the effects and dynamics of images transmitted via modern media in the securitization process. Therefore, Williams highlights

that the analysis of ways of how speech acts are mediated through modern communication channels constitutes a key challenge to improve securitization theory (Ibid., 527). Despite these critics which concern single aspects of the Copenhagen-School's approach, the following sections will present different and more comprehensive approaches in the realm of securitization theory.

2.3.2. The Paris-School

The Paris-School, which includes the researchers Didier Bigo, Jef Huysmans and Anastasia Tsoukala, is another important body of research in the field of securitization theory and analysis. This school which succeeded the Copenhagen-School's conception of security, does not deny the crucial role of the political discourse as a crucial catalyst of the securitization process. It also defines security as self-referential ordering activity which is determined by specific actors in the community of concern (Huysmans 1998, 230ff.). Nevertheless, it states that the process of securitization primarily takes place at the administrative level. Institutional competition and political struggle are regarded to produce various securitizing measures and technologies; an instance which is criticized to be neglected by the Copenhagen-School approach (Bigo 2002, 73). Thus, the Paris-School is different in regard to the level and its underlying dynamics of where the securitization actually takes place.

The conceptual roots of the Paris-School can be traced back to Foucault's (2004) conception of governmentality which is based on the notion that government by state agencies is a contingent political process. State action is permanently redefined and constitutes an outcome of the interplay between various authorities which want to achieve their specific objectives. Therefore, the state constitutes a 'transactional reality' (Ibid., 301). The school's securitization approach incorporates the importance of the interplay of governmental agencies in their conception of the process of securitization. Furthermore, it relies on Bourdieu's conception of the bureaucratic field which identifies state actors as main producer of social problems. Bourdieu argues that state bureaucracies and their representatives are not just able to exercise physical but also symbolic violence. They have the ability to implement fundamental values and principles of classification based on characteristics like sex, age, skills (Bourdieu 1998, 13). Yet, these values and principles underly political strategies which are in accordance with interests and values of bureaucratic actors (Ibid., 3). Therefore, they are not neutral but prone to produce conflict in society. Thus, they can be regarded as 'great

producers of “social problems” (Ibid., 2). Bourdieu’s position is reflected in the Paris-School approach because the school assumes that securitization processes result from specific dynamics inside the political and administrative practice (Bigo 2002; Tsoukala 2005). Hence, securitization is portrayed as an outcome of political struggle and institutional competition of self-interested security agencies.

Seeking to reinforce their position as providers of security, institutions, agencies and political actors are assumed to be in a permanent competition for resources missions, and reputation (Tsoukala 2005, 15). The practice of securitization is assumed to be a good strategy to adopt an advantageous position in this competition: it enables single agencies, actors or institutions to become indispensable ‘Professional Managers of Unease’ (Bigo 2002, 74). To gain this status, an actor has to construct a development or object as a threat and suggest measures to avert this threat. The initial aim is to construct an image of a dangerous, risky society and to portray oneself as imperative actor in the struggle against this specific threat (Ibid., 63). Securitization not just generates prestige but contributes to secure the organization legitimacy and missions of agencies, actors or institution. Furthermore, it justifies additional resources or budgets to prevent or eliminate a specific threat. Particularly state institutions and agencies of the security sector are assumed to have the ability to identify and respond to threats. They are in a privileged position to exercise authority and have various capacities like institutional knowledge and technologies at their disposal (Ibid., 74). Thus, they are considered to be credible security experts, an characteristic which amateurs in the security field - like churches or association - cannot easily acquire (Bigo 2002; Tsoukala 2005).

The privileged position immunizes actors in the security field against criticism. Decisions, observations and implemented measures remain unchallenged, even if they turn out to be wrong (Tsoukala 2005, 165). This is the reason why, the practice of securitization violates the democratic principles of fallibility of opinion (Huysmans 2004, 332). Additionally, this practice violates the democratic principle of slow decision but rather supports a strong extractive which can promptly implement securitizing measures (Ibid., 332). Hence, researchers who associate themselves with the Paris-School urge that the implementation of exceptional measures to avert a threat would violate institutional proceedings of liberal democracies (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2004); a assumption which was already be made by researchers of the Copenhagen-School.

The practice of securitization is assumed to be beneficial for various state institutions and agencies like intelligence services, the police or suppliers of control and surveillance technologies which are all located in the security sector. These security professionals share the same 'habitus' because they have the same goals and apply the same means to reach them (Bigo 2002, 75). Consequently, 'Professional Managers of Unease' mutually accept and even reinforce claims of different agencies and institutions to secure their legitimacy and resources. Researchers of the Paris-School highlight that this would result in the instance that identified threats often lack precision and work according to gross generalizations (Ibid., 75). Even though this dynamics wouldn't result in an identification of an entirely wrong problem, it contributes to a wrong interpretation which portrays issues and developments in its most negative light (Tsoukala 2005, 165). These specific acuminate interpretations may not just lead to an identification of a wrong or exaggerated threat image. Rather, securitizing measures are implemented to legitimize the status of securitizing agencies and to cover shortcomings of formerly implemented public policies by the very same actors (Bigo 2002, 80f.). In this respect, the Paris-School especially highlights the exploitation of the immigration issue by security agencies, actors and institutions because it qualifies to cover former shortcomings by those actors.

The securitization of immigration became a widespread 'mode of governmentality' (Ibid., 65), which has the potential to replace policies which aim to secure human rights of refugees and immigrants (Huysmans 2000, 757). It enables policy makers and bureaucracies to identify a threat - immigrants or refugees - on ad hoc basis and respond to it by applying securitizing measures and newly developed technologies which otherwise would have been highly controversial. It enables actors to apply these practices in different sectors because immigrants are regarded to constitute a threat to a wide variety of referent objects. Most often, immigration is portrayed as threat to the internal and external security of a country or even the Western civilization in general (Ibid., 758). This image is manifested in the implementation of securitizing measures like risk profiling or identity checks inside national state borders and restrictive visa policy and remote border control which aim to secure national sovereignty (Bigo 2002, 73). These measures do often not just target newly settled immigrants but also legally settled ones (Ceyhan/ Tsoukala 2002, 30). In this realm, increasing "[...] securitization of immigration implies a dramatic change in control methods" (Ibid., 30) which results out of the implementation of new measures of control and surveillance by 'Professional Managers of Unease'. These measures picture the image of a suspect migrants whose behavior needs to be supervised (Ibid., 28).

Furthermore, securitization of immigration also results from securitizing practices in the socio-economic and cultural realm which includes measures that promote welfare chauvinism; measures that exclude immigrants from attaining benefits of the welfare state (Ibid., 34). Additionally, it incorporates measures that actively privilege national members in the internal market (Huysmans 2000, 771) and measures which aim to strengthen national tradition and survival of the home culture (Ibid., 758). All these securitizing measures in various different sectors have in common that they influence and construct social relations. They actively mediate belonging since they define an 'us' and 'them': assume that a culturally homogenous society ('us') is endangered by the presence and otherness of migrants ('them') (Ceyhan/ Tsoukala 2002, 29). Securitizing measures are implemented by public administrations to identify and limit this threatening potential of an adversary - the immigrant or refugee - and thereby define the criteria for the exclusive membership of the home society (Huysmans 2000, 757).

Yet, this 'mode of governmentality' has several advantages for public policy makers and state bureaucracies focusing on the maintenance of security. On the one hand, this practice is a political strategy used by policy makers to mobilize the electorate. A considerable part of the electorate is always concerned about immigration because it is no longer perceived to be beneficial for national economies (Tsoukala 2005, 167). Since this strategy allows public officials to generate a certain degree of public consensus, attention and approval is generated by applying symbolic but mostly inefficient policies (Ibid., 164f.). Additionally, securitization of immigration enables policy makers to name the ultimate reason for many unresolved structural problems (Bigo 2002, 80). On the other hand, this security agencies exploit general fears and attract attention to be most negative effects of immigration to undertake the role as indispensable provider of protection and security (Ibid., 78). This practice enables bureaucratic security agencies to prioritize their missions upon others which secures their own budgets and institutional legitimacy. Additionally, securitization of immigration justifies the implementation of newly developed technologies of control and surveillance and encouraged the convergence among bureaucracies like intelligence services, police and army, since they all benefit from this development (Ibid., 76f.).

All in all, the Paris-School assumes that securitization is an outcome of the dynamics of the administrative level. The school especially focuses on the increasing securitization of immigration which constitutes an alarming development. The immigration issue is a rich source of exploitation of governmental institutions and agencies to secure their legitimacy and budgets; while concerns

about consequences for targeted individuals are set aside (Huysmans 2000; Tsoukala 2005). In this sense, it's not the actual security problem that triggers a specific measure but the security policy that turns issues like immigration into security problems (Huysmans 2000, 757). The practice of securitization completely distorts the security logic. Furthermore, the school under consideration argues that securitization does not constitute a result of a creation of new frames in the political discourse but results from power positions (Bigo 2002, 74). Hence, the analysis of the extent and consequences of securitization necessitates a analysis of the bureaucratic and political interplay. Lastly, the school's approach is an interesting one in reference to the debate concerning the rise of racism and increasing vote shares of extreme-right wing parties. Researchers of the Paris-School argue that securitization of immigration is not a result of the occurrence of extreme-right peripheral political parties or other agencies. Rather, it is a result of structural effects of several triggered by institution competition and political struggles on the administrative level (Huysmans 2000, 758).

2.3.3. Post-Copenhagen-School Approaches

More recent approaches of securitization theory agree with the Paris-School which criticizes the sole focus on the political discourse of the Copenhagen-School (Balazacq 2005, 2010; Stritzel 2007, 2014; Vuori 2008). However, their extended focus not just takes the administrative level into consideration but also the whole sociological structure. These approaches define securitization as process and include explicit claims of how the practice of securitization can be empirically assessed and analyzed. This constitutes a sharp contrast to the Copenhagen-School approach, which avoids claims about explicit guileless but interprets the diversity of approaches of assessing securitization practices empirically as sign of strength (Wæver 2003, 21).

Thierry Balazacq is a harsh critic of the Copenhagen-School approach. He argues that this school has failed to take variations concerning the intensity of securitization into account (Balazacq 2008, 78). Furthermore, he remarks that the establishment of security often requires a certain level of secrecy beforehand. Thus, securitization often occurs in the absence of political discourse (Ibid, 76). Nevertheless, his main critique refers to the school's conceptualization of securitization as speech act which reduces security to no more than a conventional institutional procedure (Balazacq 2005, 2010). This procedure is assumed to work on the basis of 'universal principles of communication', without taking the context, culture or power positions into consideration (Ibid., 172). Thus,

Balazacq criticizes the school's implicit objectivism; a critique which is also supported by Stritzel (2007; 2014) and in a similar manner by McSweety (1996).

Therefore, Balazacq (2005, 2010) proposes that the process of securitization cannot be equated with the sole use of a specific rhetorical structure. Rather, it should be understood as strategic practice or an 'The Pragmatic Act' which is aligned with the external context. In this realm, the process of securitization is perceived as interactive activity, in which a securitizing actor "[...] works to prompt an audience to built a coherent network of implications [...] about the crucial vulnerability of a referent object [...]" (Balazacq 2010, 3). Yet, the securitizing actors are assumed to constitute equally important entities, because both entities are decisive factors whether an issue will be successfully securitized (Balazacq 2005, 184). Once this awareness is created and the audience agrees with these claims, the securitizing actor suggest practices to prevent or eliminate the threat. To assess the effectiveness of an attempted securitization, Balazacq suggests an analytical distinction between the act and agent (Ibid., 178). On the agent level, one has to take the power position and personal and social identity of the securitizing actor but also the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience into consideration (Ibid., 178f.). On the act level, one has to analyze the linguistic structure of a speech act but also its contextual, nonlinguistic meaning to understand heuristic artifacts (Ibid., 179).

Balazacq shifts the analysis of securitization away from the political discourse and suggests that securitization consists of actual practices (Balazacq 2010, 15). Thus, he shifts the analysis of securitization towards a so-called 'tool approach to securitization' (Balazacq 2008, 76). This tool approach allows to identify securitization as the implementation of empirically observable policy tools and thereby allows for the assessment of dynamics of these practices (Ibid., 76). Thereby, one needs to differentiate between instruments of securitization - which are implemented to address an already identified threat - and securitizing tools - which create a threat through their implementation (Ibid., 79f.). Yet, the actual process of securitization takes place by implementing securitizing tools, not instruments of securitization. Securitizing tools actively transform something into a threat by stressing its danger and suggest emergency measures to meet this threat; thereby this tool actively constructs social relations (Ibid., 80). Thus, the implementation of securitizing tools is a powerful strategy because it harmonizes what otherwise would remains highly disputed (Ibid., 78). In this manner, they not just support to de-policization of security issues. Moreover, Balazacq discovered in his analysis about the EU's counterterrorism strategy that established modes of governance of

security and its institutional design are getting disrupted via securitization. This practice supports cross-pillarization and interoperability of various security agencies, especially by merging competences of police and intelligence services (Ibid., 95f.)

Also Juha Vuori argues that an researchers of securitization theory need to take both - the linguistic and social structure of an performative act of securitization - into consideration (Vuori 2008, 66). Securitization needs to understood as open social process in which neither the linguistic nor the social structure constitutes a fully determining factor of success (Ibid., 94). Thus, securitization neither constitutes a simple decision or a 'moment of creation' in the context of the political discourse but an often protracted process (Vuori 2010, 274). Nevertheless, his major contribution to the Security Studies literature is the re-conceptualization of the securitization concept in order to apply it to various different contexts. He criticizes the democratic and Eurocentric bias in the securitization literature which includes researchers of the Copenhagen-School but also Balazacq or Huysmans and suggests that this literature should rather take all kind of regions and political systems into consideration (Vuori 2008, 66).

Therefore, he develops several analytical guidelines to investigate the construction of security in various contexts. Most generally, he argues that a securitizing actor wants to convince his audience - decision makers or the electorate - to do something to repel a threat (Ibid., 76f.). The audience must to a certain extent be able of acting in response to the constructed threat (Ibid., 78). Vuori identifies a specific generic grammatical structure of security for an attempt of an securitizing actor to convince the audience to do something which constitutes out of three acts (Ibid., 77). The first act represents a claim that the survival of a referent object is being endangered by a specific threat which is underpinned by presenting some kind of proof (Ibid., 77). Secondly, the securitizing actor warns about the potential or already realized consequences of the threat and thirdly demands that something needs to be done about it (Ibid., 78). Hence, a speech act constitutes a sequence of claim, warning and demand.

Furthermore, Vuori specifies political purposes for which the practice of securitization can be utilized for. On the one hand, the securitizing actor might be future oriented and therefore use the practice of securitization to raise an issue to the agenda and legitimate a certain action. On the other hand, the actor might be past oriented and intents to legitimize past acts or reproduce security (Ibid., 83). Additionally, this practice is used to deter a threat which implies that the audience of the speech

act is the constructed threat itself (Ibid., 81). Lastly, securitization measures might be implemented by an actor to control the audience or make them obey to certain directives (Ibid., 88f.). Thus, the securitizing actor states that in order to meet the threat, a certain behavior of the audience is required.

Holger Stritzel (2014) incorporates Vuori's generic grammatical structure of security in his own securitization theory. While he acknowledges its analytical usefulness, he states that the sequence of claim, warning and demand is rather abstract and not sufficient to understand the complexity of a securitizing speech act. In order to assess a securitizing move, he suggests that one need to closely consider the overall context and situation (Ibid., 48). This contextualization allows to empirically assess Vuori's abstract conceptualization and "[...] theorizing securitization as a specific conceptualization of discourse dynamics" (Ibid., 38). In this regard, securitization is not perceived as single, static event but as a process in which meaning is generated via discourse (Stritzel 2007, 359).

The importance of dynamics and contextual understanding of securitization moves are justified with the assumption that textual structures are always temporally and spatially constituted (Ibid., 371). In this sense, a local reality based on pre-existing narratives or culturally-rooted stereotypes is created (Stritzel 2014, 52). Yet, Stritzel argues that local threat images have the potential to 'travel' which means that "[...] they reach beyond the specific discursive structures of their initial location and genesis" (Ibid., 56). Hence, meaning is constantly adapted and redefined in various contexts in order to produce or reproduce a threat image and thus to generate a new discourse (Ibid., 57). This indicates Stritzel's structural understanding of the social context according to which security is understood as 'translation' and the act of securitization as 'act of translation' (Ibid., 56). Therefore, securitization moves are always interconnected to past and present practices (Ibid., 175).

In order to understand the complex dynamics of a securitization moves, Stritzel identifies a three layered triangle of interrelated determining forces (Stritzel 2007; 2014). The first one constitutes the performative power of an articulated text as form of sociolinguistic action. This force refers to the socio-linguistic dimension which aims to understand the speech act. Thus, constitutive rules, linguistic resources and narratives on basis of which a speech act might be constructed need to be analyzed (Stritzel 2007, 369). This is crucial since the embedment of a securitizing speech act in the structural context constitutes the second determining force (Stritzel 2007, 370; 2014, 46). The

structural context refers to the existing discourse and its specific communicative and sociopolitical context. Lastly, the third determining force is the positional power of the securitizing actor in the discursive context. This power refers to the sociopolitical dimension and thus, to the social and political structures that enable or constrain actors to exercise authority and construct meaning (Stritzel 2007, 369). This triangle of interrelated forces indicates the interconnectedness of agents, structures and context (Ibid., 368). Methodically it suggests that securitization needs to be assessed by combining a text analysis to include the sociolinguistic dimension and a sociopolitical analysis to take the sociopolitical context into consideration (Stritzel 2014, 47). To a certain extent, the distinction between the sociolinguistic and sociopolitical dimension reflects Balazacq's (2005) analytical division between act and actor.

With respect to the understanding of security as translation which relies on three central layers, Stritzel predicts that in order to be effective “[...] security articulations need to be related to their broader discursive context from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act/ text gain their power“ (Stritzel 2007, 360). Hence, the articulation must be reconcilable with the existing discourse in a given context (Ibid., 370). This implies that language and content of the speech act must be congruent to the convictions, attitudes and behavior patterns of the specific audience (Stritzel 2014, 55). Furthermore, the securitizing actor must be in a position of authority to represent the audience. Positional power of the actor mostly refers to his position as credible proponent of the audience's attitudes and convictions; thus, his ability to influence the process of meaning construction in the discourse (Stritzel 2007, 373). This power cannot be equated with the institutional anchored power of an actor, because security issues may arise in completely new, less-institutionalized areas (Stritzel 2014, 50). For this reason, traditional security agents in the established institutional setting might not be well located in relation to newly arising threats which paves the way for actors outside the institutionalized setting to become securitizing actors.

Taken together, the congruence of moral and ethical values of securitizing actor and audience help the actor to ethically and politically legitimize a proposed policy (Ibid., 56). However, the cultural context and the locally perceived reality are no solely determining factors which enables a securitizing actor to successfully establish a securitizing move (Ibid., 180f.). Rather, since threat images are assumed to travel, one has to take pre-existing structures and narratives into consideration.

3. Theoretical argument

As the foregone literature review has shown, security is predominantly defined on basis of a constructivist perspective after the end of the Cold War. Thus, threats which endanger the security of referent objects across different units are understood as being constructed. Although securitization theorists of the Copenhagen- and Paris-School disagree on the level where the practice of securitization primarily takes place, they highlight that securitizing actors started to increasingly construct immigration as threat to various referent objects after the fall of the iron curtain. While the rivalry of the two superpowers was no longer a imminent threat, those actors made immigration the 'new focus of insecurity' in Europe (Wæver et al. 1993, 2). This tendency was strengthened by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The global fight against terrorism, which started after these attacks, enhanced suspicion of immigrants and asylum seekers in Western societies and provided opportunities for securitizing actors to link terrorism to immigration (Boswell 2007, 589). Thus, it enhanced securitization of immigration as widespread 'mode of governmentality' (Bigo 2002, 65), since immigration was constructed as 'one of the greatest security concerns of the 21st century' (Buonfino 2004, 23).

Nevertheless, researchers - which associate themselves with the Post-Copenhagen-School - highlight the importance of contextual conditions which suggests that the occurrence of securitization in reference to immigration is not universalist but a context-dependent phenomenon (Balazacq 2005; Stritzel 2007, 2014; Vuori 2008). Since not just the linguistic structure, but overall contextual conditions influence the process, successful securitization of immigration and asylum cannot be taken for granted in any case. Christina Boswell's (2007) findings are exemplary for this claim. Even though 9/11 provided a good opportunity for European policy makers to securitize migration, she could find sufficient evidence for securitization in the US but not for Europe. This findings correspond to her argument that neither securitization is the most beneficial strategy in any case nor is rationality the only variable which explains behavior of policy makers and public organizations (Ibid., 592f.). For that reason, Boswell suggests that research should not solely focus on the practice of securitization in the immigration discourse, but further consider alternative approaches of politics to deal with immigration and asylum. This implies, that in order to assess the extent of securitization, one needs to take potential counter-discourses into consideration.

Despite the context-dependence which explains the absence or presence of securitization, two discourse types dealing with immigration are always present in every democracy (Buonfino 2004, 26f.). Concretely, the securitization discourse type, which promotes national homogeneity, is assumed to compete for hegemony with the pro-immigration discourse type, which favors heterogeneity in different democratic contexts. Both discourse types underly different frames. These frames define a problem based on a moral judgement and provide specific solutions to the defined problem (Lehmann/ Zobel 2016, 21). The pro-immigration discourse sets immigration in a universalist frame that highlights human rights and international agreements (Ibid., 18). Thus, humanism, sympathy for individual fates as well as the general principle of granting asylum for those who are in need for help are highlighted (Buonfino 2004, 29). By contrast, the securitization discourse is based on a nationalistic frame, which highlights the maintenance of sovereignty and internal security, that is endangered by immigrants and refugees (Lehmann/ Zobel 2016, 18). Additionally, several researchers underline the existence of a discourse types with aims for the *economization* of migration (Buonfino 2004; Geiger/ Pécoud 2010, Kalm 2010). This discourse type - which cannot be fully assigned to one side of the two over-arching discourses - turns immigration into a development with the potential to be beneficial for the receiving states, sending countries and immigrants themselves (Geiger/ Pécoud 2010, 9). The use of the term ‘immigration-control’ is avoided. Rather, migration needs to be ‘managed’ to enable positive outcomes for all three sides (Geiger/ Pécoud 2010; Kalm 2010).

The existence of the two over-arching discourse types in reference to immigration and asylum could be observed in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 European refugee crisis (Haller 2017; Lehmann/ Zobel 2016; Mühe 2017; Wiesendahl 2016). In respect to the pro-immigration, humanitarian discourse, literature highlights the widespread culture of welcome (*Willkommenskultur*), which was based on Angela Merkel’s famous paradigm “We can do it“ (*Wir schaffen das*) and the widespread readiness of the German population to voluntarily engage in refugee aid. This discourse type - which rests upon the humanitarian rationale - perceives the recognition and welcoming of refugees as self-evident (Smykala 2016). Refugees are primarily regarded to be highly traumatized victims of war and terror. Also immigration in general is regarded as positive, even desirable development, because it is regarded as valuable development to change Germany for the better (Smykala 2016; Wiesendahl 2016).

On the other hand, increasing popularity of the right-wing, anti-immigration party “Alternative for Germany“ (AfD) and the movement of the so-called “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West“ (PEGIDA) indicate the existence of a securitization discourse in Germany in the context of the refugee crisis. This discourse type is characterized by the prevalence of an authoritarian body of thoughts; maintenance of security, patriotism, law and order are especially emphasized, while this discourse seamlessly merges to the radical, racist camp (Wiesendahl 2016, 63). Refugees and immigrants are perceived as threat, especially in reference to the Western culture and the German social system (Mühe 2017).

Due to the instance that both discourse types were present in the political discourse in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, in this thesis the extent to which both were represented in the political discourse and the hegemonic one shall be identified. Thus, two competing theses shall be tested against each other:

Securitization thesis:

The securitization discourse dominated the political discourse in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis.

Humanitarian thesis:

The pro-immigration/ humanitarian discourse dominated the political discourse in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis.


In this respect, it is plausible to assume that public opinion was a critical factor which influenced positioning of political parties and policy makers; thus, public opinion determined which discourse predominated the political discourse. Since Germany is a representative democracy, political parties and policy makers need to fulfill their representative function by representing the opinion of the electorate. This representative function is not the only motivation behind their positioning, since they are assumed to be rational, vote-seeking actors. Thus, they seek to increase their support among the electorate by positioning themselves with respect to the distribution of preferences (Downs 1957). Concretely, this implies that a national party system is assumed to represent the distribution of public preferences for every issue of considerable importance, which includes the issue of immigration and asylum (see Wiesendahl 2016). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the hegemonic political discourse in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis was the one

which corresponded to the predominant public opinion in the German population concerning immigration and asylum. This argument is in accordance with Bunofino assumptions of the hegemonic discourse in reference to immigration: “[...] only the discourse that will be better able to respond to public fears and preserve the unity of the community will become hegemonic“ (Bunofino 2004, 29).

While Bunofino (2004) uses this claim to relate widespread public fear of increasing flows of migration to the hegemony of the securitization discourse in reference to migration, in this thesis it will be argued that Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 European refugee crisis is not such an obvious case. Public opinion polls during that time show that the German population is rather divided in reference to the refugee question (see line chart 1 & 2). The Politbarometer polls shows that between July and September 2015 the majority of the population was convinced that Germany can cope with the amount of refugees which enter Germany (see line chart 1). This conviction decreased between October 2015 and January 2016, while the pessimistic view that Germany will not cope with these numbers gained more popularity. Nevertheless, from February 2016 onwards, optimists were in the majority again. The ARD-DeutschlandTREND pool delivers similar results between September 2015 and February 2016 (see line chart 2). This pool questioned how people feel about the current high number of refugees in Germany and indicated that a large majority of the German population was not frightened by current migration. Yet, in between October 2015 and February 2016 the proportion of people which were frightened by immigration and the one which were not converged and stabilized in the range of 50%. Thus, the proportions of people which were positively and negatively disposed towards migrants were rather close according to ARD-DeutschlandTREND. By contrast, the Politbarometer pool indicates that the range between the camps was somewhat larger, while majorities shifted across time.


All in all, assuming the inter-relatedness between public opinion and political discourse, the expectation - on basis of data reflecting the public opinion - is made that neither the securitization thesis nor the humanitarian thesis completely holds for Germany in the aftermath of the European refugee crisis. Rather, it is forecasted that none of these discourse types was dominant over a longer period, but either of them will be hegemonic over rather short periods. Thus, the expectation prevails that the German political discourse in reference to immigration and asylum was torn between fear and optimism.

Line chart 1: Can Germany cope with the amount of refugees?



Source: Politbarometer (2017), own presentation

Line chart 2: How do you feel about the current high numbers of refugees in Germany?



Source: Infratest dimap (2017), own presentation

4. Research Design

4.1. Research Method

The overall aim of this research is to identify the dominant political discourse and its dynamics in reference to immigration in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis in order to assess whether and to what extent securitization of immigration took place. Therefore, a discourse analysis of the political discourse on immigration in the Bundestag - the German parliament - will be conducted. The discourse on immigration is assumed to include the asylum debate but also comprises various other forms and motivations of immigration to Germany. Thus, this analysis is limited to debates concerning immigration to and immigrants in Germany which leads to a primary focus on domestic politics or rather developments and policies which considerably affect German politics and/ or society. Foreign affairs and development which do not directly influence German politics or society will not be included.

A discourse analysis which constitutes the selected research method “[...] involves studying language in the context of society, culture, history, institutions, identity formation, politics, power, and all the other things that language helps us to create and which, in turn, render language meaningful in certain ways and able to accomplish certain purposes“ (Gee/ Handford 2013, 5). Yet, there exist different approaches to discourse analysis. Some focus on the linguistic or grammatical dimension of corpora, while others concentrate on the interconnectedness of language and the social, political and cultural dimension of texts (Ibid., 5).

This research will adopt the later approach which is also promoted by post-Copenhagen securitization theorists (Balazacq 2010; Stritzel 2007; 2014). This approach is based on Norman Fairclough’s (2013) concept of a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This research method is used to investigate the interconnectedness of discourse and social elements like power relations, ideologies, initiations or social identities (Ibid., 9). CDA is not descriptive but evaluates and explains realities which are assumed to constitute a product of human actions (Ibid., 10). Hence, the conception of a CDA is useful to study securitization along the socio-linguistic dimension as well as socio-political dimension and allows to investigate discursive dynamics.

The conduction of a discourse analysis which focuses on interrelatedness between discourse and the social sphere is compelling, since it allows for an in-depth investigation of political discourse

dynamics in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis. This enables to identify reasons that underly specific discursive developments and events because motivations and constraints of securitizing actors and the overall course of events are investigated. Furthermore, the analysis enables to identify whether discursive dynamics change over the time of the investigation. On the one hand, changes might occur in reference to the quantitative intensity of securitization attempts. On the other hand, this kind of analysis allows to assess the qualitative intensity of securitization. This refers to the investigation of changes concerning the usage of rhetorical arguments along different axis or changing exploitation of different narratives, stereotypes or other semantic shots of enunciation to construct a threat image. In comparison, the conduction of solely an social-linguistic analysis or a quantitative content analysis wouldn't allow to investigate all these underlying discursive dynamics in reference to the context. Thus, these research methods wouldn't enable to draw an explanatory and realistic pictures of the political discourse in the selected case under investigation.

Hence, the research design departs from the Copenhagen-School securitization theory (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1995; Wæver et al. 1993), since it does not limit the analysis of securitization to spoken or written utterance in the context of the political discourse. It also departs from the Paris-School (Bigo 2002; Tsoukala 2005) conception since it focuses on threat constructions through political discourse without particularly considering the political-bureaucratic practice. Rather, it relies on a more dynamic, contextual understanding of securitization outlined by Balazacq (2010) and Stritzel (2014).

4.2. Operationalization

The initial aim in this analysis is to identify the dominant discourse and the discourse dynamics in reference to immigration and asylum. Since this discourse analysis focuses on the political discourse during parliamentary sessions, the relevant securitizing actors constitute the parliamentarians of the Bundestag and members of the federal government - that includes ministers and the German chancellor - which are accountable to the legislative. Since this study is investigating the debates during the 18th legislative term (see section 4.3.), potential securitizing actors are party members of the Christ-Democratic Union (CDU), the Christ-Social Union (CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party (Die Grünen) or the Leftists (Die Linke). In the

analysis the ideological position of the securitizing actors - which will be evaluated on basis of the party membership - but also their relative power position will be assessed. By analyzing the power position of a securitizing actor, her belonging to the governing coalition (CDU/CSU/ SPD) or the opposition (Die Grünen/ Die Linke) but also to the executive or legislative body will be assessed.

In reference to political discourse on immigration, the prior section has shown that one can generally identify two overarching strains of discourse types: the securitization and the humanitarian discourse (see table 1). The securitization discourse securitizes immigration and asylum by constructing immigrants or rather asylum seekers as threat, while the humanitarian discourse portrays immigrants or asylum seekers as threatened referent objects. Yet, in both discourse types either the threat or the referent object is already determined, while the missing components in the context of each discourse needs to be identified in the discourse analysis.

Table 1: Two overarching discourse types in reference to immigration and asylum

	Threat	Referent Object(s)
securitization discourse	Immigrants/ Asylum seekers	*
humanitarian discourse	*	Immigrants/ Asylum seekers

** identification in discourse analysis*

The missing component in relation to either the threat or the referent object will be identified by detecting and analyzing speech acts of the securitizing actors; in this case speech acts of representatives of the German legislative and executive in the context of parliamentary sessions. These actors are assumed to use a specific securitizing speech act in the political debate to clearly assign themselves to either the anti-immigration discourse which securitizes migration or the pro-immigration discourse which demands humanity. These specific utterances are identified on the basis of the generic structure of speech acts developed by Vuori (2008). However, since the initial aim of the analysis is not just to identify utterances with an special linguistic-grammatical structure, speech acts need to be identified and analyzed in relation to the overall context. The overall context includes important developments (e.g. numbers of asylum seekers entering Germany), important events (e.g. night of New Years eve in Cologne) but also the strengthening of radical, political movements outside the institutionalized setting (especially AfD and PEGIDA). Therefore, Stritzel's contextualized conception based on Vuori's generic structure of speech acts is used to identify and evaluate utterances in reference to immigration and asylum (see table 2)

Table 2: Generic structure and empirical identification of speech acts

Generic speech act	Abstract securitizing speech act (Vuori 2008, 77ff.)	Contextualized speech act (Stritzel 2014, 49)
Claim	something is an existential threat for a referent object that should continue to exist	contextualized description of the danger
Warning	if something is not done, the threat will be realized	contextualized description of the consequences of inaction
Demand	recommendation, suggestion, request or insistence that sth. should be done immediately	contextualized description of an action plan
Preparatory conditions	proof of reasons in support of the claim/warning	contextualized presentation of proof and/or reasons

Since the securitization- and humanitarian discourse differs in relation to the constructed threat and the threatened referent objects, the speech acts by a securitizing actor is assumed to vary in its content in reference to the position the actor adopts (see table 3). Yet, the extent of securitization of immigration is assessed in relation to the quantitative and qualitative intensity of contextualized speech acts which suggest the adoption of an anti-immigration stance by an securitizing actor. In a similar manner, the prevalence and intensity of the humanitarian discourse type is assessed according the quantitative and qualitative intensity of speech acts suggesting a pro-immigration stance in the discourse.

Table 3: Structure of speech acts within securitization and humanitarian political discourse


Generic speech act	Contextualized speech act (Stritzel 2014, 49)	Contextualized speech act securitization discourse	Contextualized speech act humanitarian discourse
Claim	contextualized description of the danger	contextualized warning that I./A.* constitute a threat	contextualized warning that I./A.* are threatened
Warning	contextualized description of the consequences of inaction	contextualized description of consequences not to react to risk that originated from I./A.*	contextualized description of consequences not to react to danger that threatened I./A.*
Demand	contextualized description of an action plan	contextualized action plan to respond to threat that emanates from I./A.*	contextualized action plan to eliminate threat that endangers I.A.*
Preparatory conditions	contextualized presentation of proof and/or reasons	contextualized presentation of proof and/or reasons	contextualized presentation of proof and/or reasons

* I./A. = Immigrants/ Asylum-seekers

4.3. Data

The discursive analysis is limited to the political discourse in Germany which took place in parliamentary sessions of the German Bundestag during the 18th legislative term from August 21st 2015 to February 21st 2016. The study period of six months is sufficient to identify a considerable number of securitization attempts and further allows to identify changes of discursive dynamics over time. The start date of the investigation will be August 21st when Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) announced to suspend the EU Dublin-Regulation for Syrian asylum seekers (Euractiv 2015). According to the Dublin-Regulation, an asylum request needs to be made in the EU country which the asylum seeker enters first. Usually this obligates countries like Greece, Spain or Italy which are located on the EU's southern external border to proceed asylum requests. Yet, the decision of German chancellor Angela Merkel encouraged an increasing number of people to apply for asylum in Germany (see bar chart 3). Hence, it is plausible to assume that the increasing numbers of asylum applications after August 2015 were a powerful starting point for securitization attempts in reference to immigration. Therefore, the analysis starts in the aftermath of this controversial measure.

Bar chart 1: Number of First- and Follow-up Asylum Applications between 01/2015 and 08/2016



Source: BAMF 2017, own presentation

The primary data source to identify utterances - which either indicate an speech act suggesting the securitization of immigration or one that promotes humanitarian aspects of the immigration debate - constitutes the parliamentary protocols of the parliamentary sessions during the time under investigation. It is important to note that a securitizing actor can make several speech acts in one speech and/or or session if it concerns a different threat/ threatened referent object. However, it is necessary that a speech act fulfills all the requirements (the sequence of claim, warning & demand) outlined before. These protocols are online accessible at the official homepage of the German Bundestag (<https://www.bundestag.de/protokolle>). All parliamentary sessions between August 21st 2015 and February 21st 2016 with the agenda item in reference to immigration and asylum are analyzed. The sessions of interest can be identified according to special key words included in the agenda item of the plenary protocol (see table 4). Additionally, budgetary debates and government statements will be included, since under these important agenda items the parliament is assumed to comprehensively discuss the overall political situation in the country. Thus, it is plausible that these agenda items encompass pro-/ or anti-immigration speech acts because the unprecedented high number of asylum applications during that time indicates that this issue also appeared in political debates which dealt with the overall political situation.

Table 4: Key words for identification of relevant parliamentary protocols

Key word (English)	Key words (German)
Asylum, Asylum-law, Asylum-seeker(s), Migration/ Migrant, Immigration/ Immigrant(s), Refugee(s), Dublin-Regulation/ Schengen(-Agreement), Border(s); Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)	Asyl, Asylrecht, Asylbewerber/Asylsuchenden, Migration/ Migrant(en), Immigration/ Immigrant(en)/ Einwanderer; Flüchtling(e)*/ Geflüchtete(r); Dublin-Abkommen; Schengen(-Abkommen), Grenze(n)*; Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF)

The investigation of parliamentary protocols allows to investigate utterances of members of the parliament and the government in the same setting over time. This is very useful for the analysis of discursive dynamics, because the effect of a setting in which an utterance is made is held constant. Additionally, this is especially important since the behavior of politicians is assumed to differ in relation to the specific setting (see Wodak 2013). On the most general level, researchers differentiate between two settings where all social and political action can take place and which underly different dynamics: front stage and backstage (Goffman 1959, 17). While a performance is intentionally initiated for an listening audience, informal procedures dominate the backstage which are not accessible to the audience.

Yet, parliamentary sessions of the Bundestag - other than sessions that take place in committees and commissions - can be regarded as part of institutionalized front stage politics. Usually, the parliamentary sessions are official and thus accessible to the electorate; nevertheless, the right is reserved to exclude the public with a two-thirds majority of the members of the parliament (Deutscher Bundestag 2017). However, since parliamentary sessions in the Bundestag are usually public, parliamentarians and representatives of the executive need to intentionally stage their performance on the speaker's desk during these sessions. Hence, they don't leave something to chance and carefully prepare their speeches. In reference to the immigration discourse this implies that parliamentarians intentionally position themselves on either of the two sides in the discourse to transmit their position to the audience or rather to the potential electorate.

Since the parliamentary protocols are not sufficient to give a general picture over important developments, events and radical, anti-immigration movements outside the institutionalized setting, other data sources need to be taken into consideration to assess the overall context of the immigration discourse over time. One source of information constitutes party programs of the federal elections of 2013 of those political parties which are present in the German Bundestag in its 18th legislative period. These party programs are valuable sources to understand the ideological foundation on which securitizing speech acts might be based on. Another source to understand the German political discourse in reference to immigration constitute expert reports on that issues, which are helpful to identify the use of typical narratives and stereotypes in the context of the political debate. These reports may refer to the specific developments after 2015 but also about the development of the political discourse concerning immigration and asylum in Germany in general. In addition, different newspaper articles published online by Germany's most popular online newspapers will be taken into consideration in order to keep track of the sequence of events and important developments which might be crucial to understand a certain speech act. Lastly, published statistics but also reports of official institutions will constitute a data source to incorporate important developments and turning points which might have influenced the political debate concerning immigration and asylum.

4.4. Shortcomings

The outlined research design is not free from defects, which will be shortly discussed in the following. Firstly, it is worth mentioning that this qualitative research design does not allow to single out a certain effect of a potential cause by excluding the potential effects of other independent variables. Hence it doesn't allow for contrafactual reasoning, since it is not possible to isolate the effect of the 2015 refugee crisis on the political discourse. The interrelated, complex character of the social sphere might be to blame for this shortcoming; nevertheless, the incorporation of several context factors due to reliance on secondary data sources might counterbalance this instance.

The second source of criticism refers to self-established limits of the research design due to the limited scope of this work. On the one hand, the limitedness of the research design refers to the length of the period of investigation. Having said this, one also needs to highlight that the length of six months under investigation allows for an in-depth investigation of events during period. Nevertheless, it doesn't completely cover the complete aftermath of the refugee crisis, which continues until present. On the other hand, identification and analysis of speech acts of the federal parliament as primary data source obviously leaves out utterances made by political representatives on the state-level (*Landespolitik*). Thus, especially little, extreme parties who might influence the political discourse on this level are completely ignored. This is especially true for the case of the right-wing populist party AfD, which was not represented in the Bundestag in the 18th legislative period but in regional parliaments in Saxon, Brandenburg and Thuringia (SpiegelOnline 2015a). In a similar manner, this is also true for utterances which have been made in the media. Yet, the use of various secondary data sources shall assure that important events and developments will not be neglected.

The last source of criticism in regard to the research design refers to potential errors by the researcher. Since the data are collected qualitatively and according to subjective judgement, it is possible that a speech act will be overlooked or one will get included, which might not fully fulfill the demanded requirements. This might be also true in regard to conceptual stretching of certain terms, which are also used according to subjective judgement.

5. Analysis

5.1. Descriptive statistics

Over the six-month period of investigation, 130 pro-immigration/ humanitarian speech acts and 76 anti-immigration/ securitizing speech acts were identified in parliamentary sessions in the German Bundestag (see table 5). The majoritarian part of the pro-immigration speech acts were found in the ranks of the political opposition: About 62% of the pro-immigration speech acts were uttered by parliamentarians of the Green-Party (Die Grünen) and the Left-Party (Die Linke); whereas the Left-Party registered the most pro-immigration speech acts in absolute (42) and proportional terms (32%). However, the difference to the Green-Party but also to the Social-Democrats (SPD) was rather small, since 29% of all speech act originated from representatives of the Greens and 25% from Social-Democrats. Remarkably, parliamentarians of the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) as well as the Christian-Social Union (CSU) performed significantly less speech acts in favor of immigrations and refugees. While just 10% of all pro-immigration speech acts were uttered by parliamentarians of the Christian-Democrats, only 4% came from parliamentarians of the Christian-Social Union. Given the limited involvement of the CDU/CSU fraction in pro-immigration speech acts, its not surprising that only 10% of all speech acts were uttered by the political executive, while 90% originate from representatives of the legislative.


Considering anti-immigration speech acts, the distribution of acts between the legislative and executive resembles the distribution of pro-immigration. While 13% of all identified anti-immigration speech acts were uttered by the political executive, about 87% were performed by the legislative. Nevertheless, in contrast to the distribution of speech acts between the executive and legislative, the distribution across parties is very different in comparison to the humanitarian ones. While only one securitizing speech act was found to be uttered in the political opposition of the German Bundestag, about 99% percent of all identified acts originated from the governmental coalition. 62% of this type of speech acts can be assigned to representatives of the Christian-Democratic Union, while the Christian-Social Union recorded the second-largest share of anti-immigration speech acts (23%). Taken together, the CDU/CSU fraction is responsible for about 85% of all anti-immigration speech acts in the period under investigation. Furthermore, 13% of this kind of speech acts originate from representatives of the Social Democrats, while only one speech act can be attributed to a representative of the Leftists. Lastly, no anti-immigration speech acts was identified among the ranks of the Green Party.

Table 5: Pro-/ Anti-immigration speech acts in the German Bundestag (21/8/2015 - 21/2/2016)

Party	Pro-Immigration speech acts		Anti-immigration speech acts	
	Absolute	%	Absolute	%
Christian-Democratic Union	13	10	47	62
Christian-Social Union	5	4	18	23
Social Democrats	32	25	10	13
Green Party	38	29	0	0
Leftists	42	32	1	2
Total	130	100	76	100


Considering the absolute number of speech acts across time (see line chart 3), one can observe that the number of pro-immigration speech acts was on a high level at the beginning of September 2015 - the start of the investigation. This high level was never reached again during the whole time of investigation. Nevertheless, the amount of pro-immigration acts was on a constantly high level during mid-/ end of November but eventually stabilized on a lower level between December 2015 and mid-February 2016. However, one can observe the trend that pro-immigration speech acts started to rise again mid-February; the same is also true for the number of anti-immigration speech acts during that defined end of the investigation. Despite the trend that the levels of both kind of acts seem to have risen again from mid-February, in contrast to pro-immigration acts the number of anti-immigration speech acts was on a rather low level during the the start of the analysis. The number of anti-immigration acts rose during October and November 2015, but also declined during December 2015 and January 2016. Most generally, one can recognize that the amount of pro-/ and anti-immigration speech acts does not significantly differ between December 2015 and mid

Line chart 3: Pro/ Anti-immigration speech acts across the period under investigation



February 2016, while pro-immigration speech acts clearly predominate parliamentary sessions during September and November 2015.

During the time of investigation, seven referent objects threatened by immigrants and asylum seekers could be identified in the context of speech acts performed by political representatives during parliamentary sessions (see bar chart 2). Most often, securitizing agents referred to the referent object “Persons in need“ which is told to be threatened by uncontrolled or/ and high-level of immigration to Germany. Concretely, securitizing agents argued that immigration would pose a risk for persons which really are in need and therefore need the protection of the German state; in this respect, securitizing actors often argued that high-levels of immigration would endanger the well-being of “real“ asylum seekers since capacities are limited. Securitizing actors which constructed this referent object came from the ranks of CDU, CSU and SPD (see Appendix I). The second most frequently mentioned referent object is labeled “Receptivity“. This label refers to the readiness of the German population to accept immigrants and refugees. Thus, securitizing actors which again constituted out of representatives of all parties of the governmental coalition, argued that high or uncontrolled immigration would endanger this readiness of the population in general, but also that of municipalities and volunteers which actively take care of refugees and immigrants.




Further, “Internal Security“ is the third most frequently mentioned referent object, which was used by representatives of the CDU, CSU and once by “Die Linke“. The referent object “State Order“ is

closely related to “Internal Security“. Nevertheless, they differ in an important aspect: while “Internal Security“ refers to the actual levels of crime in Germany, the “State Order“ referent focuses on the general principle of the rule of law or rather the maintenance of the constitutional state (*Rechtsstaat*). Additionally, securitizing agents constructed immigration as threat for the established German social system and the predominant cultural values in the German society. These two referent objects were told to be threatened solely by representatives of the Christian-Democratic and Christian-Social Union. Lastly, immigration is perceived to endanger the European project and accomplishments of the European Union; even though the interest in this referent object was with two speech acts - one from a representative of the Christian-Democrats and one of the Social Democrats - rather small.

Observing the constructed referent objects in the course of time of the analysis (see Appendix II), one notices some particularities. While the referent objects “Persons in need for asylum“, “Internal Security“, “State Order“ and “Social System“ were used across the overall duration of the analysis, “Cultural Values“ appears as threatened referent object only until mid-October 2015. Furthermore, “Receptivity“ was frequently mentioned as threatened referent object between October and December 2015, while its peaks during the end of November 2015. Lastly, speech act constructing the EU/ Schengen as threatened referent object appeared mid-October and end of November 2015.

In reference to the constructed threats which were told to endanger immigrants and asylum seekers, - and therefore need to be assigned to the humanitarian discourse - ten constructed ones could be identified in the analysis (see bar chart 3). The constructed threat “Governmental (in-)action“ was by far the most frequently mentioned threat used by representatives of the parties in the German parliament. This constructed threat refers to the implementation or absence of implementation of concrete measures, laws, actions, etc. by the German government which are regarded to threaten immigrants and asylum seekers. This threat needs to be differentiated from the constructed threat “Politicians of the CDU/CSU“, since the first refers to concrete measures by the government, the later relates to single utterances by individual politicians from the ranks of CDU and CSU which do not necessarily lead to concrete actions. Unsurprisingly, only representatives of the Social Democrats, Green Party and Leftists constructed the utterances from politicians from the ranks of the CDU/CSU as potential threat to the well-being of immigrants and asylum seekers (see Appendix III). Additionally, only few speech acts mentioning the implementation or absence of governmental action as threat could be attributed to representatives of the governmental coalition themselves

(CDU: 2,5%; CSU: 2,5%; SPD: 11%). The majority of these speech acts originates from the political opposition: 40% of all speech acts mentioning this threat were uttered by representatives from the Green Party, while 44% came from Leftists parliamentarians.



The second largest threat which was told to threaten immigrants and asylum seekers is racism. Speech acts which portrayed racism as threat were made by representatives of all represented parties but especially frequently by the ones from CDU, SPD and “Die Linke“. Furthermore, the third most frequently mentioned threat for asylum seekers and immigrants in the period under investigation is labelled “Consequences of war/ conflict“. This label implies that securitizing agents framed these consequences as present, relevant threats, even though they occurred in the past and outside German borders. This constructed threat was identified in speech acts of representatives across all parties. In addition, the lack of perspectives for immigrants and refugees in Germany was mentioned as threat by all Left-wing parties in the parliament (SPD; Die Grünen; Die Linke), while economic exploitation was constructed as threat only by representatives of the Social Democrats and Leftists. However, especially representatives of the Green Party mentioned the poor treatment of refugees and immigrants in Hungary, Kosovo and Albania as serious threat. Lastly, organized traffickers and AfD/ PEGIDA which might appear to be well-known and apparent threats that endanger refugees and immigrants in general got rather little attention from representatives of the

represented parties. The same is true for potential measures, situations and developments which might cause violence between refugees.

Observing the constructed threats across time (see Appendix IV), one notices that the threats “Consequences of war/ conflict“, “Organized traffickers“ and “Poor treatment of refugees in other national states“ were predominantly used by securitizing agents during September 2015. Also “Racism“ was most commonly constructed as threat during beginning of September 2015, but was also frequently used during mid-November 2015 and mid-January 2016. Furthermore, “Governmental (in-)action“ was frequently mentioned as threat during the whole time under investigation, but reached its highest level during mid-February. Moreover, “Politicians of the CDU/CSU“ was predominantly constructed as threat for immigrants and refugees in November 2015. For the remaining threats is difficult to identify a trend across time.

5.2. Humanitarian Discourse

5.2.1. General characteristics

The humanitarian-discourse is understood as the accumulation of speech acts of securitizing actors which construct several threats endangering immigrants and asylum-seekers. Thus, immigrants and asylum-seekers constitute the threatened referent objects. This discourse type in the period under investigation was characterized by vehement language or rather the use of strong words like tragedy, mystery, repression, inhumanity, violations of human rights/ human dignity, propaganda, hate(-crime) that point out seriousness and urgency.

Furthermore, political representatives which became securitizing actors, mostly relied on the term *Flüchtling* (refugee) or *Mensch* (human), when speaking about people which applied for asylum in the course of the 2015 European refugee crisis. Almost never, the rather negatively connoted term *Wirtschaftsflüchtling* (economic refugee) was used in the context of the humanitarian discourse. Quite the reverse: in speech acts, which can be assigned to the humanitarian discourse, securitizing actors strongly underlined that those people must be detached from general suspicion to exploit the asylum system and hospitality and prevented from getting abused as scapegoats. Rather, they should be primarily treated as victims of wars, conflicts and other terrors.

Further, the positive, welcoming attitude towards people which applied for asylum was often expressed by arguing that the 2015 European refugee crisis would constitute a great chance for Germany. Sometimes, securitizing actors entirely avoided to speak about a crisis but used the term *Herausforderung* (challenge). In both cases, securitizing actors stated that Germany will overcome the crisis or rather will master the challenge; often in direct reference to Merkel's *Wir schaffen das!* (We can do it!).

In the context of the humanitarian discourse, political representatives often highlighted that crisis or challenges are always associated with new opportunities. Especially the young age of the majority of asylum applicants would constitute a great change for Germany to moderate the consequences of the demographic change. Further, they argued that these people could help to solve the dwindling supply of skilled workers on the labour market. Indeed, the provision of skilled labour constitutes an important factor that guided German politics in regard to immigration for many years (Haller 2017).

Although, economic considerations might play a certain role, the humanitarian discourse predominately aimed to portray the newly arrived people in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis responsible, fully-integrated citizens. The acceptance of thus huge challenge is based on the widespread desire among securitizing actors not to repeat past mistakes in regard to integration (Deutscher Bundestag 18/119; 18/120; 18/ 121; 18/136; 18/139; 18/153). Especially the negligence in terms of integration of the guest workers which came to Germany since the 1960s until the early 1970s is highlighted in this context. During that time, German politics appeared to imply that immigration is entirely dirigible and guest-workers would only reside in Germany for a short-term (Pries 2001). Thus, the lack of integration and the failure to acknowledge Germany as country of immigration detached immigrants from the German state and society (Meier-Braun 2013; Pries 2001).

5.2.2. Governmental (in-)action & Organized traffickers

“Governmental (in-)action“ was by far the most frequently mentioned threat to immigrants and asylum seekers constructed by parliamentarians which became securitizing actors in the context of parliamentary sessions in the time under investigation. Most often, representatives of the political

opposition constructed the implementation or the absence of specific governmental measures as potential threat to asylum applicants. Unsurprisingly, representatives of the governmental coalition used it only very few times to express self-criticism. The threat “Governmental (in-)activity“ was found to be constructed during the whole time under investigation but reached its highest level in February 2016, in the context of the adoption of the Asylum package II.

In reference to governmental inactivity, securitizing actors, mostly from the political opposition, criticized the government for their inactivity in regard to the misery refugees experience on their way to the European Union. During the whole time under investigation, they reminded the federal government that loads of people are drowning in the Mediterranean Sea, suffocate in trucks or die of starvation on their way to Europe. Hereby, the media and politics focused on two disastrous events. One was the maritime disaster of April 2015. Even though maritime disasters of boats operated by human smugglers on the Mediterranean sea constantly result in a huge number of casualties, one of the most tragic ones took place in April 2015, where a boat ride from the Libyan coast towards the European Union resulted in about 700 deaths (ZeitOnline 2015a). The other took place in August 2015 in Austria, close to the Hungarian border. More than 70 people suffocated in a refrigerated truck, which was also operated by human smugglers (ZeitOnline 2017b)

The German chancellor herself stated in reference to tragedy of the suffocated refugees in Austria, that events like this cannot recur (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120, 11613). To prevent such attacks on humanity, Angela Merkel demands effective measures against human traffickers. Also various other political representatives, highlight the despicability of the tragedies that take place in reference to human trafficking. However, representatives of the Greens, Leftists and Social Democrats often mention that the fight against smuggling does not constitute the best option, since the reliance on traffickers is portrayed to be inevitable because there are no legal ways to enter the European Union. In this context, securitizing actors demand legal, secure ways for asylum applicants to access the European Union, since it is argued that this would constitute the most effective way to fight smugglers.

The plans to suspend family reunion for persons with subsidiary protection status as foreseen in the Asylum package II, is assumed to encourage human trafficking, since this measure might not prevent people to take on the dangerous way to Europe. In this sense, Volker Beck (Die Grünen) states that the limitation of family reunion can be regarded as ‘Schleuserankurbelungsprogramm’, a

program that cranks up the business of human traffickers (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138, 13552). That's why, they point out that even more people will continue to drown, suffocate or starve if the government does not undertake any action guided by humanitarian thought. These measures incorporate the right of family reunion and the abolishment of maximum limits (*Obergrenzen*) regarding the acceptance of asylum applicants. More generally, securitizing actors demand a major shift of asylum politics on the national- and European level. This new European asylum policy shall be guided on the basic values of the union, namely freedom, equality and fraternity, for which the German government shall serve as 'moral compass' (Deutscher Bundestag 18/146, 14389).

These European values are told to have been grossly violated by the resolutions of the European Council meeting in Valetta in November 12 2015 and the joint action plan between EU head of states and Turkey in November 29 2015 (European Council 2017). The German government is criticized to have supported or even initiated cooperation with dictators from African countries and the deal with Turkey which aims to hinder potential asylum applicants from entering the European Union. Securitizing actors argue that these measures lead to dangerous deterrence politics which will not prevent refugees from attempting to enter the union but force them to take even more dangerous routes. In this context, representatives of the Greens and Leftists argue that these measures do not aim to fight the causes of migration but rather pursue a policy against humanity which includes an active fight against immigrants (Deutscher Bundestag 18/145). Therefore, the political opposition introduced a request in the parliament which envisages to fight the causes of migration instead of fighting refugees (Deutscher Bundestag 18/146). This request includes the demand to stop building 'Fortress Europe' and discontinue military equipment exports in crisis regions. Lastly, rather than paying Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 3 billion Euro to keep asylum applicants in Turkey, the money should be allocated to the World Food Programme.

Despite the actions of the German government on the European level, securitizing actors constructed several implemented measures of the government within German state borders as potential threat to immigrants and asylum seekers. During parliamentary sessions from September 2015 onwards, the political opposition criticized the mandatory residence of asylum applicants in initial reception centers, or rather mass camps, as threat to the well being of those. Mandatory residence in these reception centers, which was pre-longed from three to six months in the context of the implementation of the Asylum package I (Tagesschau 2015), are told to constitute a form of inhumane repression. Furthermore, it triggers hostility and stigmatization of asylum applicants,

since these mass camps are prone to produce conflicts. The present conditions in these camps are even assumed to very likely produce abusive structures (Deutscher Bundestag 18/136, 13298). Thus, the instance of long-term residence in mass camps is assumed to be ‘social dynamite’ and might even endanger the readiness of volunteers which actively engage in refugee aid (Deutscher Bundestag 18/127, 12282). Political representatives describe a situation of overcrowded initial reception centers which are not able to provide basic services for asylum applicants without the help of volunteers. Thus, they demand better crisis management of government in terms of provisions of housing, education and health care. Especially the lack of the provision of special protected areas for vulnerable groups like women or children in initial reception centers is highlighted. Mid-November 2015 the Greens introduced a request in the Bundestag to better protect refugees in mass housings (Deutscher Bundestag 18/136). The request intends to improve psychological health of minor refugees, women and other groups with a special need for protection by implementing retreats and provide leisure activities in these reception centers.

Also the federal government made efforts to improve the situation of minor refugee applicants with a eponymous law (Deutscher Bundestag 18/125; 18/127). This law was criticized by representatives of the Green Party and the Leftists since it foresees the dispersion of minor refugees by applying the quota system *Königsteiner Schlüssel*. This procedure is assumed to endanger children’s well-being, since some municipalities might not have the infrastructure to provide crucial services like schooling, health- and psychological care which are necessary for the well-being for this especially vulnerable group of asylum applicants. Further, forced dispersion might encourage minor, unaccompanied asylum applicants to leave the initial reception center since they might not agree with the place of residence which was granted to them. Thus, they are endangered to disappear in illegality. Lastly, the law is even criticized as an assault against human dignity and its adoption would strengthen politics of deterrence (Deutscher Bundestag 18/127, 12279).

Although securitizing actors demand to decrease the time that children have to spend in initial reception centers, they highlight not to disperse them afterwards by applying quota systems. Instead of their dispersion, the expenses should be split among municipalities. Moreover, minor refugees should be included in the decision concerning the location of their subsequent accommodation (*Anschlussunterbringung*) which might make it possible to accommodate them by family members or friends.

Securitizing actors do not just limit their critique on governmental actions to housing. Rather, they argue that the present health- and psychological care system seriously threatens the well-being of asylum applicants (Deutscher Bundestag 18/125). The complex bureaucratic procedure for asylum applicants, which entails to apply for a treatment certificate in the town hall, is assumed to prevent people from getting necessary care. In order to prevent unnecessary pain, securitizing actors advocate the introduction of an insurance card for refugees which shall provide medical care for everyone independent of the resident status.

Furthermore, the political opposition portrays different measures included in the asylum packages I and II as threats to human dignity of asylum seekers. In addition, they entail measures which trigger general suspicion and mistrust among the population. On the one hand, the law to expedite asylum application for several groups of asylum seekers (known as asylum package I) is told to constitute an assault against basic law, since it violates the principle of equal treatment and even the basic right of asylum. It is communicated that all asylum applicants, independent of their origin, shall have the legal right to live in dignity. On the other hand, the Asylum package II is told to seriously endanger people's well-being, since even seriously ill and traumatized asylum applicants are planned to be sent back to their home countries. All in all, securitizing actors warn that both asylum packages threaten legal rights and physical condition of asylum applicants (Deutscher Bundestag 18/127; 18/156; 18/130). Therefore, they demanded not to implement these packages which aim for deterrence and isolation. Rather, securitizing actors of the political opposition propose certain measures which shall enhance social integration by investing in education, health care and social housing.

Lastly, the plans of Thomas de Maizière, Minister of Interior, to reject people from Afghanistan in large numbers, which requires to change the decision-making procedure of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) by assuming an improving security situation in the country, triggered several speech acts of the parliamentary opposition. Securitizing actors of the opposition accuse the federal government of cynicism, since they want to limit the chances of asylum for Afghan people but on the same time extend the deployment of the Federal Armed Forces (Deutscher Bundestag 18/143). The same justification was used to accuse the federal government for the action of classifying Kosovo as safe country of origin (Deutscher Bundestag 18/127).

Hence, securitizing actors demand full asylum status for people from Afghanistan, since especially minor Afghans are endangered of forceful recruitment by the Afghan army, Taliban or other warlords. This implies to stop speaking about a positively changing situation in the country but to acknowledge the 'hell' of Afghanistan and Germany's co-responsibility (Deutscher Bundestag 18/143, 14014).

5.2.3. Politicians of the CDU/ CSU

In contrast to the widespread criticism concerning several governmental actions or its absence, some securitizing actors pointed out that individual politicians from the ranks of the Christian-Democratic and Christian-Social Union constitute a threat for immigrants and asylum seekers. This criticism on individual politicians of the CDU/ CSU fraction was equally dealt out by members of the Greens and Leftists but even by the Social Democrats, despite their belonging to the governmental coalition. Remarkably, securitizing actors clearly stated that the attitude towards asylum and immigration between Angela Merkel and those policy makers, which are constructed as threat, strongly differ. While the German chancellor is assumed to constructively seek ways to solve the refugee crisis, individual CDU/CSU politicians are assumed to be self-interested (Deutscher Bundestag 18/156, 15349). Concretely, they are blamed for seeking to maximize their vote shares by enticing away potential voters of the Alternative of Germany (AfD), whose popularity increased among the electorate from September 2015 onwards (see Infratest dimap 2017; Politbarometer 2017).

On the one hand, some individual politicians were blamed for specific statements which picture immigrants and asylum applicants in a negative light. For instance, Ulla Jelpken (Die Linke) attacked Thomas Strobel (CDU) who blamed that a large portion of asylum applicants from the Western Balkans would abuse the asylum system (Deutscher Bundestag 18/119). She states that Mr. Strobel's statements would undermine the right of asylum for a whole group of asylum applicants and endangers asylum law in general. Therefore, she demands constitutional examinations of each asylum application instead of sweeping condemnation of the group of immigrants from the Western Balkans. Furthermore, Frank Schwabe (SPD) criticizes Max Straubinger (CSU) for his suggestion to send Syrian refugees back to their home country (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120), since the ongoing civil war in Syria would make any suggestion to send people back there incomprehensible.

Therefore, Mr. Schwabe highlights that no Syrian refugee can be deported back to Syria but underlines the need to improve the humanitarian situation in the country. Eventually, also the statement of Finance Minister during the time of investigation, Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), was constructed as threat for immigrants. Gesine Lötsch (Die Linke) states that Mr. Schäuble implicitly stirred up hatred against refugees with mischievous statements, like the demand to deploy Federal Armed Forces internally (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138).

On the other hand, politicians were predominately criticized for the overall course in regard to asylum and immigration. Most often, securitizing actors blamed the party elite of the CSU to encourage resentments against refugees and Muslims in general (Deutscher Bundestag 18/127; 18/130). Especially Horst Seehofer (Leader of the CSU) but also Markus Söder (Bavarian State Minister) are mentioned in this contexts. These politicians consider Merkel's refugee policy, especially her decisions to allow refugees stranded in Hungary to freely enter Germany, as "unique political mistake" (FAZ 2015a). Since September 2015 Horst Seehofer and Markus Söder are regarded to constantly fuel the populist, anti-immigration debate, because they highlight that excessive demand and the crossing of load limits. They demand maximum limits in regard to the number of asylum seekers that enter Germany (*Obergrenze*) and the establishment of transit centers on German borders. In reference to the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who pursues a strict anti-immigration course, Ulla Jelpken (Die Linke) demands the CSU party elite to stop these measures which resemble the political course of Orbán (*Orbanisierungspolitik*) (Deutscher Bundestag 18/127, 12274).

Also several other parliamentarians highlight that these demands of the CSU politicians, which are assumed to be made in order to prevent voters to turn to the AfD, are assumed to endanger internal security in Germany and encourage hatred. Such speech acts were uttered particularly in the context of the Paris Terrorist Attacks on November 12 2015 (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138; 18/139). In the course of the attacks by members of the so-called 'Islamic State' that took 130 lives (ZeitOnline 2015b), securitizing actors aimed to prevent asylum applicants to get abused as scapegoats for terrorism in Europe. It is argued that terrorism should not be set into relation with asylum and immigration and an eventual spread of this relationship must be prevented or uncovered. To put refugees in close relationship with gangs of murders is told to encourage right-wing populism and extremism. Thus, securitizing actors demand these individual politicians to stop campaigning on the costs of refugees but rather strengthen solidarity among the population.

5.2.3. Racism/ AfD & PEGIDA

Racism was the the second most frequently constructed threat to immigrants and asylum seekers within the humanitarian debate. It was used by representatives of the Christian-Democratic Union, Social Democrats and the Leftists. Considering the time span under investigation, it is remarkable that it was most frequently used during the beginning of September. This time was characterized by an explosion in the number of attacks on refugee camps. In contrast to 2014, the number of attacks against refugee camps increased fivefold in 2015; while the number of arson attacks even increased fifteen-fold (BKA 2017). Further xenophobic excesses, especially the one that took place in the Saxon city Heidenau on August 26 2015, dominated the media coverage (Haller 2017, KAS 2017). In the context of the racist attacks in Heidenau, Sigmar Gabriel, Minister for economic affairs at that time, called the responsible people for these crimes “pack“ (LPB 2017). Even though the opinions to Gabriel’s statement were rather divided, it is exemplary for the major focus of politicians to portray xenophobia among the population as threat to asylum seekers and immigrants. Also AfD and PEGIDA were portrayed as threat, but were taken into consideration to a lesser extent.

Due to the huge increase of racist violence, the topic dominated the political debate in the German Bundestag after the summer break (Deutscher Bundestag 18/119; 18/120; 18/121). Norbert Lammert - President of the German parliament during that time - condemned in his opening speech after the summer break open xenophobia, which is expressed due to attacks against police, refugees and refugee camps (Deutscher Bundestag 18/119, 11513ff.). He warned that the present situation might turn into enduring racism in the German society and encourages civic society and volunteers to firmly oppose racism. Furthermore, Angela Merkel underlined that she will not allow that actions of humanity will be undermined by people with racists opinions (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120, 11609ff.). Therefore, she announced a policy of no tolerance against racism.

Considering the several other speech acts, which constructed growing racism as imminent threat to immigrants and asylum seekers, a polarization of the German public was outlined. On the one side, securitizing actors praised the open, welcoming atmosphere established by a huge amount of volunteers. On the other side, they condemned increasing tendencies of hatred and violence against foreigners. Securitizing actors often revive the picture of burning refugee camps or the ‘pack’ of Heidenau to show the extent of hatred against vulnerable persons and warn that these despicable

events might replicate itself. However, they increasingly refer to the crucial role of PEGIDA, AfD and organizations on the right margin of the political spectrum which encourage and fuel fears among the public (Deutscher Bundestag 18/127; 18/130).

In order to show strength, securitizing actors demanded a resolute action of the constitutional state against right-wing violence. A policy of zero-tolerance was demanded which shall show that the constitutional state is able to resist and capable of action. As concrete measure to reach this aim the tightening of criminal law in respect to racist, inhumane behavior was suggested. Prosecution of hate-crimes shall also take place in social networks like Facebook or Twitter. In this context, efforts of the Minister of Justice - Heiko Maas (SPD)- are mentioned, who is about to tighten criminal law which takes place online. Despite a zero-tolerance policy, securitizing actors, especially the ones of the Leftist party, underlined the need to strengthen civil society to prevent and fight against a “lack of culture“ (*Unkultur*) among the German society (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120, 11635). Concrete measures in this context included the expansion of the voluntary service for young people or increasing support for several civil programs like *Demokratie leben!* (Living democracy).

The Paris Terrorist Attacks on November 12 2015 slightly changed the debate. Securitizing actors uttered the crucial need that politics and public should not treat asylum applicants generally as terrorist suspects. They must be prevented to be placed under general suspicion, because refugees must be further on perceived as victims and not as perpetrators since they fled from the same terror which has taken place in Paris recently. This position is also advocated by several members of the executive. Thomas de Maiziere (CDU), Minister of Interior, warns right-wing populists and extremists from setting the Paris Terrorist Attacks into relation with the increasing levels of asylum applications. Directed to this people, he states that patriots love their country but do not hate foreigners (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138, 13548). Also Heiko Maas (SPD), Minister of Justice, highlights that racism in reaction to the events in Paris must be contained to secure societal peace (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138, 13569). Therefore, he demand that Muslims shouldn't be placed under general suspicion. Lastly, Frank Tempel (Die Linke) introduced a different perspective. He demands to pay attention to the terrorist potential that originates from right-wing extremists, instead of focusing on the potential link between terrorism and asylum. He warns that the real terrorist threat originates from the right-wing, since terrorist networks, similar to the National Socialist Underground (NSU), might re-establish or are already present (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138, 13549).

Similar to the Paris Terrorist Attack, also the events during the Night of New Years Eve in Cologne 2015/16 triggered several speech acts aimed to portray the danger of increasing racism since right-wing populists and extremists exploit the recent events to encourage hatred against immigrants and asylum seekers. Especially high-ranking politicians like Katja Kipping (Chairwoman of the Leftists), Heiko Maas (Minister of Justice, SPD), Kathrin Göhring-Eckhard (Chairwoman of the Greens) and Manuela Schwesig (Minister of Minister of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth, SPD) made this kind of humanitarian speech acts (Deutscher Bundestag 18/148). All these politicians uttered that right-wing extremists and populists exploit the assaults and abuses against women from men, primarily originating from Arab region and Northern Africa, for a disgusting smear campaign against immigrants and asylum seekers. This campaign does not allow for any differentiation between perpetrators and refugees and therefore encourages hatred and general-suspicion of asylum seekers among the society. Katja Kipping argues that this tendency might even lead to an explosion of the number of hate crimes against asylum seekers and further encourages the popularity of AfD and PEGIDA (Deutscher Bundestag 18/148, 14574).

In this context, securitizing actors demanded better protection of sexual abuse, which includes to tighten sexual criminal law and the consequent conviction of criminals, which are assumed to have endangered internal peace. Beyond the conviction, Heiko Maas demanded the eased departure of specific groups of perpetrators which are asylum applicants. This claim was settled by the introduction of the Asylum Package II which was adopted in March 12 2016 (BMI 2016a).

After the easing of the debate about New Years Eve, securitizing actors increasingly directed their attention towards the AfD (Deutscher Bundestag 18/154). Securitizing actors mentioned in parliamentary sessions, that this party is developing into an extreme right-wing, racist party, would be a crucial force which further polarizes German society and encourages hatred against asylum applicants. The increasing attention can be explained by the rise of its popularity: in comparison to September 2015, the ring-wing populist party could increase its assumed vote share from 5% to 11% in January 2015 (Politbarometer 2015a; 2016). However, the assumed radicalization can be ascribed to a specific demand of two spokespersons of the party, Frauke Petry and Beatrix von Storch, to use of weapons against refugees on German borders. This demand triggered harsh reactions from representatives of the established parties (SpiegelOnline 2016). Also political representatives, which made speech acts in favor of immigrants and asylum applicants in the

context of parliamentary sessions, condemned Petry's demand and urged for an alliance against the AfD. Furthermore, they directly appealed to voters to abstain from voting the AfD in the context of the upcoming state elections.

5.2.4. Consequences of War/ Conflict & Treatment in other countries

Even though asylum applicants entered German territory and thereby escaped war and conflict in their home countries, political representatives often argued that its consequences are still present and a serious threat for asylum applicants in Germany. This threat was most frequently mentioned during September 2015, when the influx of asylum applicants to Germany was on a very high level (KAS 2017; SZ 2016)

Securitizing actors which use this referent portrayed asylum applicants primarily as victims of armed conflict, misery and terror in their home countries. These factors are assumed to constitute the primary reasons for their escape during which their well-being was told to be still endangered. In this context, political representatives highlighted the critical situation in Hungary during August 2015 (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120, 11619). Thousands of refugees were kept from movement on the Budapest main station without any provision of food, drinkable water or medical care by the Hungarian government (SpiegelOnline 2015b). Further, parliamentarians reported that refugees experienced physical abuses by border police forces during their escape (Deutscher Bundestag 18/124, 11955), while few actors mentioned the bad situation of Roma people from the Kosovo which reside as refugees in Serbia (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120; 18/127). However, since the investigation period covers the peak of the European refugee crisis, securitizing actors paid predominant attention to the situation of Syrian refugees along the Balkan-route.

Thus, securitizing actors highlighted that arriving asylum seekers are exhausted from their escape during which they potentially got physically and mentally hurt. Heiko Maas (Minister of Justice, SPD) underlined that war, conflict and the escape from these horrors were serious attacks to the human dignity of these people (Deutscher Bundestag 18/119, 11561). This is told to be especially true for unaccompanied, minor refugees. Political representatives assumed that this most vulnerable group is immensely suffering from war and conflict in their home countries which separated them from their families and accustomed environment (Deutscher Bundestag 18/119; 18/121; 18/125;

18/126). Moreover, due to war and conflict these children and also refugees in general suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders since they ‘escaped hell’ (Deutscher Bundestag 18/125, 12151).

Several politicians, including Manuela Schwesig (Minister of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth, SPD), warned that refugees with such traumata and psychological distresses cannot be left alone. Refusal of access to health care and psychological treatment could potentially lead to a chronification of their sufferings. The probability of children to develop such chronifications was assumed to be higher than for adults. Further, psychological distresses and traumata were assumed to get enforced by residing in big camps - like those initial reception centers in which asylum applicants are accommodated. Despite unnecessary human suffering, untreated psychological distresses and traumata were communicated to hamper successful integration. Securitizing actors instantly alerted that the failure to integrate them would be very serious, since refugees are portrayed to be citizens of tomorrow. Furthermore, minor refugees are regarded to constitute a valuable factor for the future well-being of Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 18/125, 12143). Hence, securitizing actors made several demands which aimed to ensure good medical care and fast psychotherapeutic treatment for refugees like the provision of better funding in traumata centers. Since the debate was especially focused in minor refugees, the federal government passed a law on the initiative of the Ministry of Family, Seniors, Women and Youth which aims to improve care and accommodation of minor refugees.

5.2.5. Lack of Perspectives/ Economic Exploitation

“Lack of Perspectives“ and “Economic Exploitation“ were introduced into the German parliamentary debate as threats to immigrants and asylum seekers after September 2015. Only representatives of the Green Party, Leftists and the Social Democrats constructed this threat. This is fairly surprising, since these left-wing parties present themselves as advocates of the working class or rather for people which are economically worse off. Thus, they actively advocate social justice and condemn economic exploitation (Die Grünen 2013; Die Linke 2013; SPD 2013). The Social Democrats propose fair chances and perspectives for every person living in Germany, independent of their origin (SPD 2013, 42ff.), while Greens and Leftist demand more active provisions of chances and perspectives for immigrants (Die Linke 2013, 29ff.; Die Grünen 2013, 231ff.). The

Greens call this measure *Einbürgerungsoffensive* (naturalization campaign) (Die Grünen, 2013, 231).

Very often, securitizing actors of the left-wing parties highlighted that lacking access to education, which is told to constitute a universal human right (Deutscher Bundestag 18/128, 12490), obstructs refugees' future perspectives. Due to the fact that especially young people apply for asylum in Germany, education was perceived to be the most important factor for good future perspectives. Fast, uncomplicated access to educational structures would enable societal integration and prevent long-term unemployment. However, representatives of the Leftists and Green Party stated that the opposite is the case in reality. They criticized that asylum applicants currently need to wait 15 months until they are allowed to start studying or undergo vocational training. Further, they denounced long waiting terms to apply for asylum in the first place, since during the waiting time it is not possible for applicants to visit a language course or send the children to school. Lastly, the previous procedure of revocation checking of asylum applications after three years is regarded as additional reason why asylum applicants have limited perspectives to build up a life. Securitizing actors - especially from the Greens - argued that the granting of asylum status should involve the perspective of long-term residence. However, since revocation checking leads to a prolonged stay in most cases, the measure is regarded as unnecessary burden or even harassment. Resulting trepidation concerning the extension of residence hampers integration or - in case of rejection of the asylum status - it undoes integration success. All in all, these regulations are told to force refugees to inaction (Deutscher Bundestag 18/149, 14715); a representative of the Leftist party even argued that the government would intentionally organize life in hopelessness for refugees (Deutscher Bundestag 18/136, 13257).

Political representatives warned that increasing polarization among the German society would be a potential consequence of this widespread "Lack of Perspectives" for asylum applicants. Right-wing populists and extremists were assumed to gain more power if a considerable amount of refugees need to rely on social welfare. In addition to assumed danger of societal polarization, which entails cheap propaganda against refugees, securitizing actors warned of the development of "french conditions" (Deutscher Bundestag 18/153, 15091). This utterance need to be understood in reference to the widespread violence and riots committed from young gangs of people primarily originating from the Maghreb countries in specific areas outside french city centers (FAZb 2015). Even Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Andrea Nahles (SPD), warned that the feeling of isolation,

which might develop due to lack of perspectives, might lead to frustration and even violence and radicalization (Deutscher Bundestag 18/140, 13762).

Securitizing actors doubted that the present educational system is capable of fulfilling these new challenges, thus to provide chances and perspectives for asylum seekers. Therefore, the parliamentary opposition demanded a *Bildungsoffensive* (educational offensive strategy), which entails large investment in educational structures. They reminded the federal government that successful integration of refugees is not free of charge (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138; 18/153). The initial aim is to enable fast and open access to education, which includes daycare, schools, vocational school and universities. These demands were summarized in the request of the political opposition to grant refugees equal access to education and training, which was introduced into the German Bundestag beginning of October (Deutscher Bundestag 18/128). Lastly, the Green Party introduced a request to eliminate revocation checking in the German Bundestag mid-January (Deutscher Bundestag 18/149).

"Economic exploitation" can be regarded as a potential subsequent result of lacking perspective due to hindered access to the educational system. Especially in the context of the debate concerning exceptions of the minimum wage during the end of September 2015, representatives of the Social Democrats and Leftist Party named this potential results as very threatening in various respects. The potential, disastrous effects of the planned exceptions - especially economic exploitation of refugees - were vehemently uttered by the representatives of both parties. They underlined the importance to prevent a division of the German working societies; which implies not to play off people from the low wage sector against refugees. Opposition leader Sara Wagenknecht warned that if the exceptions of the minimum wage apply for refugees, they will be misused for low wage dumping (Deutscher Bundestag 18/124, 11951). Additionally, she warned that future integration of refugees into the labour market shouldn't result in a wave of low-wage dumping and cuts in social service, because this would give right-wing populists reasons to encourage hatred against refugees. Similarly, Thomas Opperman (Chairman of the SPD fraction) warned about potential societal polarization if refugees would become a cheap "reserve army" (Deutscher Bundestag 28/124, 11954). Hence, actors which mentioned the threat of economic exploitation for asylum applicants demanded to refrain from exceptions of the minimum wage. In addition, representatives of the Leftists party requested a ban of temporal limitation of employment agreements, temporary work, misuse of service contracts and more efforts to prevent illegal employment.

5.3. Securitization-Discourse

5.3.1. General characteristics

The securitization-discourse is understood as an accumulation of speech acts of securitizing actors in the German parliament in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, who construct immigration and asylum as threats to various referent objects. Most generally, the analyzed anti-immigrant speech acts make evident that the political discourse during the time under investigation was not characterized by a general refusal to immigration and asylum. Rather, most identified speech acts aimed to construct a specific group or type of immigrant as threat but refrained from gross generalizations. Additionally, securitizing actors abstained to portray immigrants and asylum seekers individually as a threat, but mentioned the threatening potential of their high influx on the aggregate level.

The consequences of the European refugee crisis for Germany were overwhelmingly perceived to be a task which can be managed, since Germany is an economically strong country. Nevertheless, the securitization-discourse was characterized by several pleas of securitizing actors to be rational and accept the limited capacity of the German population and state to welcome immigrants. In these context, they highlight the imminent or already existing loss of control (*Kontrollverlust*) over national and external EU border and more generally over the entire situation. The (potential) loss of control is underlined by portraying the current influx of refugees as flow (*Flüchtlingsstrom*) or wave (*Flüchtlingswelle*) to highlight the overwhelming potential of these developments.

In reference to wording, it is remarkable that very few negatively connoted words were found to be used in reference to immigrants and asylum seekers in the securitization-discourse. Especially the term *Asylant*, which constitutes a very negative term used for asylum applicants which are regarded to be “bad“, non-authorized applicants primarily originating from Third World countries (Jäger/Jäger 1993, 55), was not found to be used in the parliamentary debates under investigation. Rather, securitizing agents used neutral or positive terms like *Mensch* (human) or *Flüchtling* (refugee). The term *Flüchtling* implicitly portrays asylum seekers and immigrants as victim of wrongdoing (Smykala 2016, 200), while the speaker - when using the term *Mensch* - places immigrants and asylum seekers on the same level like himself.

However, the term *Wirtschaftsflüchtling* (economic refugee) was found to be utilized several times by political representatives during the time under investigation. This term describes asylum applicants - primarily from the Western Balkans - which migrate to Germany out of economic reasons. Even though politicians expressed a certain understanding for their decision to leave their home countries, they underlined that these immigrants have no right to gain governmental support and need to return to their home countries. Therefore, the term *Wirtschaftsflüchtling* is negative connoted in a sense that it describes an immigrant with no legal right to stay in the country and therefore wrongfully enjoys state support. By contrast, the labeling of a person as *Schutzbedürftig(er)* (Person in need of protection) is positively connoted, since it is used for persons which are assumed to be entitled to get asylum status. This term is predominantly set in relation to people migrating from war and terror that takes place in Syria and Iraq.

5.3.2. Persons in need for asylum

The referent object “Persons in need for asylum“, which was constructed by securitizing actors to portray immigration as threat, appears at the first sight misplaced. However, this referent object - which was the frequently mentioned referent object in the context of parliamentary sessions during the investigation period - refers to the instance that high levels of immigration are assumed to threaten the well-being of ‘real’ asylum seekers. It is argued that a mass influx of people, which are not in severe need for protection, would endanger Germany as ‘save heaven’ for refugees.

This argument was frequently made in September in the context of consultations concerning the federal budget and pre-consultations of an informal meeting of European head of states (Deutscher Bundestag 18/119; 18/120; 18/124). Remarkably, several high-ranking politicians like Angela Merkel (German Chancellor), Volker Kauder (Chairman of the CDU/CSU fraction) and Thomas Oppermann (Chairman of the SPD fraction) used this referent in the context of their speech acts primarily in September 2015 (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120; 18/124). This is attributable to the chaotic situation during September. On the one side, the suspension of the Dublin procedure in late-August 2015 and the decision of the German government to grant entry to asylum applicants stranded in Hungary without border checks beginning of September 2015, led to increasing levels of uncontrolled immigration and triggered increasing concerns about the consequences of those decisions (KAS 2017). On the other side, the picture of a dead boy on the beach of Bodrum

(Turkey), as symbol for all misery and desperation of millions of refugees, contributed to a new wave of solidarity for asylum applicants among the German population (Haller 2017, 112).

Both contradictory developments in September 2015 couldn't be ignored by the political executive. Due to the widespread *Willkommenskultur* (culture of welcome) among the German population, securitizing actors showed great willingness to help the ones which really are in need for protection and have prospects to remain in Germany permanently. Nevertheless, at the same time they warned that Germany might not be able fulfill its humanitarian obligations in the future; especially to guarantee asylum for people which really are in need. The need to accept the limits of capacities was communicated, since the situation nowadays would constitute an over-proportional increase of immigration to Germany in comparison to past years and even more immigrants are expected to cross German borders.

Thus, indirectly but more often directly, speech acts from actors of the political executive and legislative aimed to divide the group of immigrants in two, namely 'wanted' or 'real' and 'unwanted' immigrants. Asylum applicants originating from the Western Balkans were regarded as 'unwanted' immigrants. This might be attributable to the fact that the number of asylum applicants from this region steadily rose since the abolition of the visa regime for citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2009/2010 (BAMF 2017). Even though the quota of recognition is extremely low, high immigration rates since that time are explained by the entitlement to receive cash payments according to § 3 of the German Asylum law (Ibid.).

Also in the context of the 2015 European refugee crisis, politicians argued that governmental benefits would act as significant pull-factors that encourage immigration to Germany. These immigrants are assumed to reduce available capacities for the 'wanted ones' - especially refugees from Syria - which have good prospects to gain asylum status in Germany. While 'real' refugees are met with sympathy and support, securitizing actors warned that immigrants from the Western Balkans would be primarily motivated by monetary incentives and wrongly benefit from services of the German welfare state. Thereby, they would abuse and endanger the asylum system. That's why, securitizing actors avoided to use of the term *Flüchtling* (refugee) for asylum applicants from the Western Balkans but often used the term *Wirtschaftsflüchtling* (economic refugee) instead (Deutscher Bundestag 18/125; 18/138; 18/156). Sometimes, securitizing actors even made an direct appeal

towards those immigrants with bad perspectives by stating that they shouldn't give up their livelihoods in their home countries and not migrate to Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120; 18/127).

Therefore, politicians made demands according to the dictum of maximizing support for 'real' refugees and minimizing potential pull-factors for 'unwanted' ones. In short, they demanded to treat people with good and bad prospects to legally gain residence status differently. In this context, demanded measures for refugees with good prospects to gain asylum status included the provision of more language courses and good integration into the German labour market. However, the majority of measures suggested in the context of the securitization debate aimed to reduce unorganized immigration and the influx of applicants with bad prospect to stay. These incorporated demands to contain illegal immigration via human traffickers, better control of EU-external borders and the establishment of so-called "Hotspots" in Greece and Italy, which constitute pre-examination centers of asylum applications. Furthermore, securitizing actors demanded payment in kind instead of cash payments to limit monetary incentives for migration to Germany. Lastly, fast, simplified procedures for people with bad prospects to get refugee status and the expansions of several countries of the Western Balkan - especially Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro - as safe countries of origin were demanded. They aim to ensure that the already low chances for people from this region to gain asylum status get even lower and to guarantee that this group of asylum seekers leaves Germany quicker. Despite the measures concerning human traffickers and EU-external border control, those demands were included in the law to expedite asylum applications which was passed by the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) in October the 16th 2015 (Die Bundesregierung 2015). The fast implementation is another strong signal that the political executive has put a lot of effort in the securitization of immigration from the Western Balkans.

After the adoption of the law to expedite asylum applications in October 2015, "Persons in need for asylum" was still constructed as threatened referent in the context of parliamentary debates. Though, the group of immigrants from the Western Balkans was no longer regarded as primary threat to the well-being of the 'wanted' asylum applicants. Rather, illegal immigration motivated by economic considerations was generally constructed as threat to the asylum system and to 'real' asylum seekers. Thus, securitizing actors argued that these kind of migration should be contained by combating its causes. This includes financial aid for countries of origin and transit countries closely located to the conflict region - like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan - but also for countries along the

Balkan route. In respect to create spare capacity for persons in need for protection, fast, consequent emigration of people with no perspective to gain residency status was still a frequently mentioned demand of many politicians from October 2015 onwards.

5.3.3 Receptivity

The referent object “Receptivity“, which refers to the readiness and ability of the German population to welcome immigrants and asylum seekers, appeared in the German parliamentary debate most frequently between November and mid-December 2015. The securitization-debate concerning the referent predominantly took place in the context of decreasing rates of support for Merkel’s asylum and immigration policies. In November 2015, more people thought that Angela Merkel is handling the refugee crisis rather bad than good for the first time (Politbarometer 2015b). On the same time, the number of asylum applicants reached its highest level up to this date. During the end of November, nearly 7000 asylum applicants per day were registered in the so-called EASY-System, which regulates the initial distribution of applicants across German states (SZ 2016). These increasingly high rates of applications increased pressure on states and municipalities, which needed to accommodate applicants according to a quota system called *Königsteiner-Schlüssel* which regulates proportions of financing for the German states.

In this context, securitizing actors constructed “enduring high levels of irregular immigration to Germany“ as threat to the receptivity of the German population. Thus, the acceptance of nearly one million refugees each year would endanger the culture of welcome (*Willkommenskultur*) or more generally the current merely positive attitude towards asylum seekers and immigrants. Yet, those arguments must be considered by acknowledging the instance that a positive attitude towards immigration and asylum is not firmly established among German public and politics. Not until 2010, German politics made efforts to establish a culture of welcome (Haller 2017). In the beginning, efforts were based on purely economic considerations to recruit highly-qualified immigrants but increasingly were extended by moral consideration. Therefore, these newly established attitude slowly started to compromise asylum applicants. Nevertheless, the so-called Sarrazin debate in 2010/2011 triggered by book of Thilo Sarrazin, which demonizes immigration from Muslim-countries, showed that the positive attitude among the German population concerning immigration was fragile (Meier-Braun 2013). Thus, the basis of the culture of welcome was rather

unstable as well. That's why securitizing actors in the German parliament argued that a repetition of the situation of 2015 would be irresponsible. The integrative capacity of the German population was assumed to have certain limits which are clearly overburdened by the influx of about 800 000 asylum applicants per year or as Carsten Körber, member of the German parliament, states: "[Denn] kein Staat der Welt kann auf Dauer 10 000 Flüchtlinge pro Tag aufnehmen" (No state is permanently able to welcome 10 000 refugees per day) (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138, 13518).

The "Receptivity" referent was predominantly used by parliamentarians among the ranks of the CDU/CSU fraction and just once by a member of the political executive. Representatives of the legislative denounced the chaotic situations in German cities and constituencies in their jurisdiction. They reported on overburdened majors, volunteers and a strained housing market which potentially results in distributional conflicts. Thereby, the critical situation in Bavaria is especially highlighted by parliamentarians of the CSU fraction, since the majority of asylum applicants enter Germany at the Austrian/Bavarian border (Deutscher Bundestag 18/130; 18/139; 18/143).

To deal with the situation which endangers receptivity, those parliamentarians, which made an appearance as securitizing actors, demanded different measures to decrease the number of asylum applications. Like for the "Persons in need" referent, they demanded to expand the countries of the Western Balkan as safe countries of origin, expedition of asylum applications and better protection of the German but also EU-external borders which includes the establishment of so-called "Hotspots". Further, securitizing actors often demanded the reintroduction and consequent implementation of the Dublin regulation.

Securitizing actors tried to generate a sense of urgency for the implementation of their demands, by stating that Germany cannot fulfill the challenge of the European refugee crisis on its own (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120; 18/145; 18/148; 18/149). Further, while international and European efforts which would discharge Germany are assumed not to be effective in the foreseeable future, securitizing actors warned that more refugees are assumed to migrate to Europe, especially from the African continent (Deutscher Bundestag 18/139; 18/154). These alerting assumptions were made in the context of failed attempts of Germany to reduce immigration. On the one hand, the attempt to enforce consequent re-implementation of the Dublin-Agreement by introducing temporary border controls in September 13 2015 was of little avail (KAS 2017). On the other hand, several attempts

of Germany to introduce a regulation to redistribute asylum applicants across different countries of the European Union largely failed (KAS 2017; SZ 2016).

From January onwards, the debate surrounding the “Receptivity“ referent became more forceful. The multitude of assaults and abuses on women in the night of New Years Eve 2015/16 in Cologne - primarily through men originating from countries of Northern Africa and the Arab region - intensified growing polarization among the German population concerning immigration and asylum (Haller 2017, 115). Thus, a considerable amount of people which were sympathetic towards refugees increasingly began to doubt the receptivity of the German society. Therefore, this referent object was no longer solely portrayed to be threatened by representatives of the political legislative but attracted the attention of the executive. Thomas de Maizière, (Minister of Interior, CDU), argued that “Receptivity“ is endangered by the high numbers of asylum applicants and limited ability of the state apparatus to send criminal or illegal applicants with no right for protection back to their home countries (Deutscher Bundestag 18/156, 15344f.). Therefore, the minister demanded the expedition asylum applications, limitation of family reunions and put heavy emphasis on the consequent departure of criminal asylum seekers. All these demands were included in the legislative proposal known as *Asylpaket II*, which came into force in March 17 2016 (BMI 2016a). De Maizière justified these measures by arguing that they would secure the acceptance of refugees among the German population and avoid stigmatization. All in all, the Asylum package II corresponds to the demands of several securitizing actors which requested a “pause to breath“ since capacities and abilities to accept even more asylum applicants are communicated to be already exhausted (Deutscher Bundestag 18/156, 15351).

5.3.4. Internal Security

The use of the “Internal Security“ referent was not very prominent in the beginning of the investigation but gained popularity by parliamentarians from the ranks of the CDU and CSU fraction in the aftermath of the Paris Terrorist Attacks in November 2015 and the events of New Years Eve 2015/16 in Cologne. The use of this referent by the CDU/CSU fraction is hardly surprising, since besides the maintenance of prosperity, security is one of the parties’ main focuses. In the fractions’ party program for the federal elections of 2013, the word security (*Sicherheit*) can be found about 80 times (CDU/CSU 2013). While security is told to be established or maintained in

many sectors, internal security gets major attention in this program, which shall be guaranteed by a strong reliance on police and the judiciary (Ibid., 71ff.).

Since the establishment and maintenance of internal security is a crucial feature for the identity of both parties, securitizing actors from the CDU/CSU fraction often constructed the influx of young, unaccompanied, male refugees as potential threat to internal security in Germany. Few times it was argued that the influx of those kind of asylum applicants could potentially lead to the continuation of the Middle Eastern conflicts on German territory (Deutscher Bundestag 18/136). Therefore, concerns and fears of minorities, especially those of the Jewish community, are reminded to be taken seriously.

In the aftermath of the Paris Terrorist Attacks by the so-called Islamic State, the potential relationship between the influx of asylum applicants from the Middle East and Northern Africa and the terrorist threat dominated the parliamentary debate (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138; 18/140). On the one hand, policy makers warned that the Islamic state would use the European refugee crisis to infiltrate terrorists to Germany and other European countries. Though, securitizing actors highlighted that this would only hold true for very few asylum applicants; no politician uttered that all immigrants should be placed under general suspicion. Nevertheless, to stop potential terrorist from entering German territory, securitizing actors demanded better protection of the EU-external border and improvement of registration and control of those people who enter the union. Further, the reimplementation of the Dublin Agreement and a general return to the state under the rule of law (*Rückkehr zur Rechtsstaatlichkeit*) was requested, since the current unawareness about the people entering state borders would constitute a violation of the responsibility towards the German population.

On the other hand, securitizing actors remarked in reference to the Paris Terrorist Attacks, that asylum applicants could potentially radicalize themselves during their residence in Germany. Since the majority of applicants would be very young and therefore particularly vulnerable to radicalization, they constitute a potential risk for internal security within German state borders. Therefore, political representatives highlighted the need to prevent a dissociation of accepted refugees from society and to implement structures that enable integration into the society but also the job market. In addition, the importance of more qualified personnel who take care of refugees and the extension of the voluntary service on the federal level to support these personal was

presented as crucial measures that would divert impeding radicalization in Germany. All these demands reflect the prominent opinion, which was literally expressed by Frank Tempel (Die Linke), that it is essential for the maintenance of internal security to stop or prevent a spiral of violence and hatred (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138, 13549). Tempel portrayed France as example which did not prevent but even encouraged the spiral of violence by concentrating on surveillance and retention of data of immigrants and asylum applicants.

Yet, the events in Cologne during the Night of New Years Eve 2015/16 changed the initial aim of the demanded measures from securitizing actors. While integration was formerly perceived to be the ultimate measure to establish internal security, the focus shifted towards a policy of zero tolerance for criminal asylum seekers (Deutscher Bundestag 18/148; 18/149). Hence, the focus of the securitizing discourse in reference to the “Internal Security“ referent was no longer on young, unaccompanied immigrants that are potentially prone to radicalization. Rather, they were constructed as potential threat factors to the safety of girls and women in public areas. In order to avoid a repetition of these events and secure security of public areas, securitizing actors demand edmore police and a tightening of sexual crime law. Further, requested measures constituted the fast departure of criminal asylum seekers and the maintenance of revocation checking for asylum applications even after three years.

Lastly, the law to regulate registration and data exchange in reference to asylum was introduced by Thomas de Maizière, Minister of Interior, during the discussion concerning internal security after New Years Eve (Deutscher Bundestag 18/149). This law, which allows for comprehensive retention of data of asylum applicants, is assumed to be an effective measure against international terrorism (BMI 2016b). It centrally collects biometrical data that allow for faster identification and surveillance of suspect persons. Thus, with the introduction of this law, which was eventually realized in April 12 2016, Germany emulates France concerning its (failed) strategy to provide or maintain internal security.

5.3.5 State Order & EU/Schengen

Speech acts that constructed the “State Oder“ referent as threatened in the context of the securitization debate, were especially present during mid-November and mid-January. Thus, similar

to “Internal Security“, the referent object of concern was predominately present in parliamentary debates in the aftermath of the Paris Terrorist Attacks of November 2015 and the Night of New Years Eve 2015/16 in Cologne. Most generally, securitizing agents, which constructed this referent object, argued that due to the high amount of influx of asylum applicants state order was out of whack. Therefore, measures which would lead back to the state under the rule of law (*Rechtsstaatlichkeit*) were demanded. Hence, in contrast to “Internal Security“ which focuses on crimes within German state borders, the referent object of concern refers to the maintenance of the general principle of the state under the rule of law.

The majority of political representatives that argued that the “State Order“ referent is threatened, named increasing levels of uncontrolled immigration due to losing sovereignty as primary reason. It was argued that the catastrophic situation of September 4 2015 cannot become the normal operation mode and its repetition needs to be prevented. On this special date, the German government decided to welcome thousands of refugees which were stranded in Hungary (KAS 2017; SZ 2016). Securitizing actors warned that further gross violations of sovereignty - similar to the decision of September 4th - would result in over-proportionally high immigration to Germany in comparison to other EU-member countries. This would endanger the commitment to the Schengen Agreement which eliminated border check inside the European Union. Thomas Oppermann (Chairman of the SPD fraction) and Volker Kauder (Chairman of the CDU/CSU fraction) even constructed the “EU/ Schengen“, which are achievements that are told to be envied in the whole world, as primary threatened referents which are endangered by uncontrolled immigration. Both actors demanded better protection of EU external borders which is assumed to eventually result in a reduction to asylum applications.

Demands that aim for the protection of the “State order“ referent were rather focused on the protection of national borders. This became especially evident in respect to the request of the parliamentary opposition to no longer treat illegal entry to Germany as punishable offense. In this context, some parliamentarians strongly defended borders as ultimate measure to maintain state order and deter high levels of immigration. Exemplary, Martina Wendt (CDU) stated that a state without borders would give itself up (Deutscher Bundestag 18/150, 14816), while Volker Ullrich (CSU) argued that borders would results from the purpose of the state itself and therefore are inevitable to maintain state order (Deutscher Bundestag 18/150, 14823). Since the importance of borders was highlighted, political representatives suggested several measures to secure national and

external borders of the EU. Most generally, the need for ordered proceedings was underlined, which incorporates the demand to prosecute illegal border crossings, the establishment of reception centers, so-called “Hot-Spots“ in Greece and Italy and the establishment of legal possibilities to gain residency status in the EU or rather Germany.

Despite the debate concerning national sovereignty, the second strain of discussion in reference to the “State Order“ referent refers to the maintenance of the legal capacity of the German state inside its defined borders. Several developments are enumerated which throw doubt on the stability of the state to maintain order in reference to the consequences of the European refugee crisis. First, several courts of law are told to be overburdened, because many refused asylum applicants filed a suit against this decision. The high number of such files led to a high accusation of legal proceedings in reference to immigration and asylum. Thus, a large number of people with no legal right of residence are still located in Germany. This situation is told to be intensified by the instance, that several states which are governed by SPD and the Green Party even refuse to send back rejected applicants, as Nina Warken (CDU) urged (Deutscher Bundestag 18/156, 15366). Therefore, securitizing actors demanded more judges for legal courts of law on the federal level in order to adhere to the constitution and to reassure the function of the legal system and especially asylum law.

In addition to the overburdened courts, the events of New Years Eve in Cologne 2015/16 increased doubts regarding the ability of the state to uphold order. In this context, Heiko Maas (SPD), Minister of Justice, warned that the population is about to lose trust in the legal capacity of the state and its ability to maintain state order (Deutscher Bundestag 18/156, 15354f.). Therefore he pledged for a strict prosecution of crime as intended in the Asylum package II (BMI 2016a). Lastly, very few times political representatives uttered that state order would be threatened by the different legal and constitutional understanding of the asylum applicants (Deutscher Bundestag 18/138). Especially the maintenance of basic rights like the freedom of religion and gender equality were assumed to be threatened by immigrants. Thus, actors warned against the potential development of parallel societies with a different legal understanding and therefore demanded to obligate immigrants to accept German constitutional law and the legal system. This demands and fears resemble the ones which are made in the context of the cultural values referent, which will be dealt with in the following section.

5.3.6 Cultural Values

The securitization debate regarding the “Cultural Values“ referent had little presence in the securitization debate and was only found in parliamentary debates in September and beginning of October 2015. The referent was solely used by politicians of the CDU/ CSU fraction since these parties represent and promote a moral concept based on Christian values (CDU/CSU 2013, 4). Some parliamentarians from the fraction which became securitizing actors, embraced that these values are challenged by the admission of a large amount of asylum applicants which predominantly originate from Muslim countries. Thus, these securitizing actors assumed that the influx of people with a different cultural understanding endanger Christian or rather Western cultural values and achievements like the freedom of expression and religious freedom.

The protection of these values and achievements is told to constitute a macro social challenge. To master this challenge, securitizing actors demanded not to tolerate the development of parallel societies or rather milieus which refuse integration that are partially already present in several German cities. Even Angela Merkel is among the securitizing actors with constructed this referent object as threatened. She named the potential threat of parallel societies and highlighted the crucial need for an open society to clarify and communicate applicable rules to people from other cultural areas (Deutscher Bundestag 18/120, 11611f.). Also Martin Patzelt (CDU), uttered the crucial need to prevent the development of parallel societies (Deutscher Bundestag 18/125, 12146), while Peter Friedrich (CDU) pledged for a limitation of immigration and acceptance of asylum seekers in order to save ‘our’ culture and identity (Deutscher Bundestag 18/130, 12570). Eventually, Sylvia Pantel (CDU) suggested that cultural knowledge must be conveyed to asylum applicants by introducing a dominant culture (*Leitkultur*) which is characterized by the values of the constitutional state (Deutscher Bundestag 18/121, 11808).

Even though the later demand was just found once in the Bundestag debates during the time under investigation, the term *Leitkultur* triggered a widespread debate in German public and politics. The need for a dominant culture in order to cope with the integration of the newly arrived asylum applicants was especially promoted by representatives of the CDU/CSU but also the Social Democrats (Goethe Institut 2016). Nevertheless, the debate did not result in a consensus regarding particular values which would belong to such a culture. Despite this disagreement, Thomas de Maizière (Minister of Interior, CDU) presented ten theses about a German dominant culture in April

2017. These theses were made in the context of the 2017 federal elections in order to limit vote shares for the AfD, which exploited the term for their own purposes (ZeitOnline 2017a).

5.3.7. Social System

The referent object “Social System“ was already subject of a vehement political immigration and asylum debate beginning of the 1990s in respect to attempted liberalizations of German asylum law. Public discourse was characterized by racism and discriminations since asylum applicants were regarded as *Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge* (economic refugees) or even as *Asylschmarotzer* (parasites); persons which abuse asylum law to enjoy benefits of the welfare state (Schulz-Kampf 2005, 426). This discourse during that time was accompanied by violent attacks against immigrants and their housings.

In the aftermath of the 2015 European refugee crisis, these kind of attacks happened again (BKA 2017) and also the narrative of the asylum applicant, who migrates to Germany to exploit the social system, was found to be used in German parliamentary sessions by representatives of the CDU/CSU fraction. However, the use of the term *Asylschmarotzer* was not used in the context of any of the analyzed speech acts. Rather, securitizing actors stated that the German social system or the capacity of the welfare state is endangered by persons with no right for legal protection or rather by economic refugees which predominantly originate from countries of the Western Balkan. It is communicated that the prospects to gain certain benefits of the welfare state constitute the primary pull-factor that led to high levels of migration from the Western Balkan to Germany.

These assumptions were not just made by representatives of the political legislative but by high-ranked representatives of the political executive as well. Thomas de Maiziere (Minister of Interior, CDU) argued that asylum applications out of economic motivations are a serious problem for the social system. By citing the Serbian Prime Minister, who admits that the monetary payment of the German state for asylum applicants would constitute a major pull-effect for the Serbian population, de Maizière underlined the need to restrict this kind of immigration (Deutscher Bundestag 18/126, 12214). In a similar manner, Angela Merkel warned that migration out of economic reasons needs to be limited in order to prevent congestion of the social system (Deutscher Bundestag 18/130, 12556).

Even though neither representatives of the legislative or of the executive did not deny that reasons of an economically motivated asylum application aren't comprehensible, they demanded different measures to eliminate several pull-factors for immigration to Germany. Those measures included the demand to prevent asylum applicants from the right to enjoy comprehensive insurance coverage. This demand was very vehemently expressed in reference to health care. Especially parliamentarians from the CSU strongly opposed the introduction of the insurance card for asylum applicants in Bavaria. Furthermore, the inclusion of countries of the Western Balkans into the list of safe countries of origin, contribution in kind instead of monetary payments as well as general benefit cuts for people with no legal right to stay in Germany were demanded. These later demands were actually fulfilled with the implementation of the Asylum package I in October 2015 (Tagesschau 2015). Lastly, the law to regulate registration and exchange in reference to asylum which was introduced by Thomas de Maiziere in mid-January 2016, is primarily presented as measure against international terrorism (BMI 2016b) but also aims to prevent and uncover misuse of services of the welfare state (Deutscher Bundestag 18/149, 14730). This law proposes that each asylum applicant is being registered during his first contact with public authorities; thereby multiple or wrong payments for asylum applicants shall be prevented.

Despite the widespread argument that economic refugees would endanger the German social system, some parliamentarians pointed out that also legally accepted refugees might endanger this referent object (Deutscher Bundestag 18/121; 18/140; 18/152). Refugees are perceived as potential danger for the social system since they are portrayed to be poorly qualified in contrast to other group of migrants. Hence, the chances to integrate them into the German job market are assumed to be rather low. Due to comprehensible reasons, securitizing actors underlined that increasing immigration, triggered by war, conflict and terror, does not correspond to the needs of the German labour market nor does it entirely solve the demographic problems. Nevertheless, the developments in the context of the 2015 European refugee crisis clearly contradicts with the efforts of German government or rather the CDU/CSU fraction since 2011 to actively hire well qualified immigrations which correspond to the needs of the economy (CDU/CSU 2013; Haller 2017; Meier-Braun 2013).

Thus, securitizing actors predicted high levels of long-term unemployment for a considerable part of the asylum applicants who arrived in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. This development will lead to high burdens for the welfare state which might be unbearable in the long-term, since

legally recognized refugees are entitled to receive basic provision. To avert long-term unemployment of the group of legally accepted refugees, policy makers demanded the provision of structures of education and training which enable the integration of refugees into the job market. Further, they requested a general limitation of immigration to Germany, which also incorporates the reduction of the levels of admission of refugees in the future.

6. Results

The results of the analysis of speech acts by parliamentarians in regard to immigration and asylum between August 21st 2015 and February 21st 2016 will be presented in the following section. Several parliamentarians and members of the political executive became securitizing actors by using a specific rhetorical structure in regard to the defined topic and context, compromising claim, warning and demand. Due to the application of the determined rules for identification of relevant parliamentary protocols, 26 relevant protocols were singled out and analyzed in regard to their contained speech acts. The analysis of the parliamentary protocols identified 130 pro-immigration/humanitarian speech acts, which were predominately uttered from representatives of the parliamentary opposition, and 76 anti-immigration/ securitizing speech acts, mostly originating from representatives of the CDU/CSU fraction.

Table 6 gives an overview over the addressed threats and referent objects in the context of the securitization and humanitarian discourse. The analysis of speech acts, which can be assigned to the humanitarian discourse, identified ten different threats to immigrants and asylum seekers, while speech acts associated with the securitization discourse entailed seven different referent objects which were constructed to be endangered by asylum seekers and immigrants. In this context, it is worth mentioning that several political representatives became securitizing actors supporting the humanitarian but also the securitization discourse. The affiliation of a securitizing actor on either of the discourse types was dependent on the overall context of the debate.

Despite the quantitative characteristics of both discourse types, the main focus of this analysis constituted the qualitative characteristics of both discourses and their dynamics. Considering the qualitative aspects of speech acts which can be attributed to the securitization discourse, it became

evident that those almost never entailed utterances that expressed a general refusal towards all groups of immigrants and asylum seekers. Rather, some securitizing actors constructed the aggregate phenomenon of the huge, unprecedented influx of asylum applicants as danger to the “Receptivity“ and “State Order“ referents. In order to limit this influx, securitizing actors who constructed either of the two referents to be threatened, pledged for the establishment of Hotspots on the EU external border, consequent reimplementation of the Dublin regulation and sometimes also for a better protection of national borders.

Table 6: Results for the two overarching discourse types in reference to immigration and asylum

	Threat	Referent Object(s)
securitization discourse	Immigrants/ Asylum seekers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social System; • Persons in need; • Cultural values; • Receptivity; • State order; • Internal security; • EU/ Schengen
humanitarian discourse	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Racism; • Governmental (in-)action; • Consequences of war/conflict; • Organized traffickers; • Poor treatment in other countries; • Politicians of the CDU/CDU; • Economic exploitation; • Lack of perspectives; • AfD/ PEGIDA; • Violence between refugees 	Immigrants/ Asylum seekers

Yet, most securitizing actors portrayed just specific groups of immigrants and asylum applicants - which were regarded as bad, exploitative or undeserving - as threat to a specific referent. At the same time, these group were contrasted with the groups of asylum seekers that were portrayed as innocent, good or deserving. Such distinctions between two groups of immigrant and asylum applicants were mostly made in the context of speech acts by securitizing actors which constructed the “Persons in need“ and the “Social System“ as threatened referents. Especially during the first half of the period under investigation, distinctions between asylum applicants primarily originating from the Western Balkans and the ones from crisis regions in Syria and Iraq were made. While applicants from the first group were often characterized as economic refugees (*Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge*) that are not entitled to state support and right of asylum, the later were regarded as ‘real’

asylum seekers which deserve state support and right for asylum, since they are told to originate from ‘severe’ crisis regions.

Thus, even within the secularization discourse that took place in parliamentary sessions, the attitude towards refugees from certain conflict regions was mostly positive and welcoming. By contrast, the narrative of the economic refugee - who exploits the social system and was already present during the beginning of the 1990s - was revitalized. In accordance with this narrative, securitizing actors suggested several measures which limit assumed pull-factors that encourage migration to Germany out of economic motivations. Hence, they demanded certain limits for those applicants who attempted to apply for asylum in Germany out of economic considerations; especially to curtail the rights to receive monetary payments and other services by the welfare state. Further, they demanded several measures which further minimize their already low chances to gain asylum status and pushed fast emigration after their rejection.

However, the Paris Terrorist Attacks of November 2015 and the Night of New Years Eve in Cologne 2015/16 changed and intensified the securitization discourse in the aftermath of these events. They might be even regarded as turning points that changed both discourse types in regard to immigration and asylum. The former distinction between real or unreal or rather deserving and undeserving asylum applicants no longer dominated this discourse type. In point of fact, securitizing actors additionally began to differentiate between people in the group of asylum applicants from crisis regions, namely between criminal and innocent asylum seekers. Thus, the securitizing debate no longer refrained from constructing asylum seekers from crisis regions as potential threats. This is especially true for the “Internal Security“ referent. Securitizing actors which used this referent pointed out two potential dangers emanating from refugees from conflict regions: on the one hand, they might be infiltrated to Germany by the so-called Islamic state, while on the other hand, they could potentially radicalize themselves in Germany. In order to meet this threat and ensure internal security, political representatives suggested several measures that aim to limit the threatening potential of suspect asylum applicants. Nevertheless, securitizing actors still abstained from making gross generalizations and pointed out that the majority of asylum applicants would be innocent.

The adoption of the Asylum packages I and II - that entail several of the demands made by securitizing agents which aim to treat several groups of asylum applicants differently - suggests that those demands found support by the political executive. The analysis of the parliamentary protocols

revealed, that especially Angela Merkel and Thomas de Maizière often constructed the “Persons in need“, “Social System“and “Internal Security“ referents to be potentially threatened; thereby they actively promoted differentiation among various groups of asylum applicants in order to protect innocent, good or deserving asylum applicants.

In contrast to the securitization discourse, the humanitarian discourse predominantly abstained from separating different groups of asylum applicants. On the contrary, securitizing actors highlighted the positive aspects and chances of the influx of asylum applicants to Germany and further stressed the crucial need to abstain from general suspicion towards certain groups of asylum applicants. Such claims were especially directed towards the federal government or individual politicians, since securitizing actors in the context for parliamentary sessions predominantly devoted their attention to these referent objects. Thus, “Governmental (in-)action“ was by far the most frequently constructed threat to the well-being of immigrants and asylum seekers that was found in speech acts, which were mostly uttered from representatives of the political opposition. On the one hand, securitizing actors harshly criticized governmental inaction in regard to lacking attempts to solve the misery, refugees experience on their way towards Europe. Moreover, they condemn efforts of the German government on the European level but also the Asylum package II, since these measures are assumed to enhance human trafficking and suffering. On the other hand, the “Governmental (in-)action“ threat refers to measures of the German government to deal with the European refugee crisis inside Germany, especially in regard to housing, health- and psychological care. Particularly, the bad situation of minor, unaccompanied refugees was highlighted in this context.

Additionally, “Lack of Perspectives“ and “Economic Exploitation“, which might often be a result of governmental misconduct, were addressed threats by the left-wing parties of the Germany parliament in the context of the humanitarian discourse. Representatives of those parties warned that hopelessness due to lacking future perspectives would constitute a potential threat factor for immigrants and asylum seekers and might fuel racist propaganda. In addition, the dangerous potential of economic exploitation in spite of planned exceptions from the minimum wage were discussed. Securitizing actors argued that this plans have the potential to polarize German working society and public.

Further, racism among the population was frequently made a subject of discussion. This threat towards asylum applicants and immigrants was often highlighted in the context of violent attacks

against initial reception centers for refugees, especially throughout August and September 2015. In order to prosecute racist crimes, securitizing actors demanded a strong reaction of the constitutional state but also underlined the need to strengthen civil society in Germany. Some actors even portrayed individual politicians from the rank of CDU/CSU as potential threats, since they are regarded to picture asylum applicants and immigrants in a negative light in order to prevent voters from casting their vote for the AfD. Though, the ideological distance between addressed individual CDU/CSU politicians and Merkel's more liberal, humanitarian position was highlighted.

Also in the case of the humanitarian discourse, the specific events in Paris and Cologne changed the discursive focus. In the aftermath of those events, securitizing actors refocused on the defense of asylum applicants by highlighting that they should not be placed under general suspicion. Neither as potential terrorist suspects or as potential perpetrators that endanger the safety of women in public areas. Thus, they demanded a clear differentiation between perpetrators and victims, since the events were told to have been exploited by extremist and populist movements and parties for a smear-campaign against asylum applicants and immigrants in general. Indeed, the campaigning apparently made an impact since the AfD could constantly increase its vote share in the aftermath of the events. This is the reason why securitizing actors increasingly diverted their attention towards this party, some even directly appealed towards the electorate not to vote for this right-wing populist party.

In these last two paragraphs, the results of the analysis of both overarching discourse types shall be computed with the theoretical assumptions made in section three. Reflecting upon the results in regard to the securitization and humanitarian discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 European refugee crisis, one recognizes that both discourse types were present and dealt with various different dimensions. By taking the absolute number of speech acts across time into consideration (see Graph; section 5.1), one can conclude that the pro-immigration/ humanitarian speech acts dominated over the securitizing speech acts between September and November 2015. Afterwards, the number of speech acts converged. In a similar manner, public opinion pools (see Graphs; section 3) between September and October 2015 show that the majority of respondents is rather optimistic or rather sympathetic in reference to the handling of the refugee crisis and asylum applicants. In regard to the period afterwards, opinion pools show that the respondents were split in two camps with shifting majorities across time.

Hence, even though the number of speech acts across time is not completely congruent with public opinion pools in regard to immigration and asylum, they indicate the same trend. While the German political discourse during the start of the investigation was characterized by widespread willingness to improve the situation of asylum applicants, to consider the crisis as chance and to prevent and contain racism among the population, the Paris Terrorist Attacks and the attacks and abuses in Cologne changed the discourse, shuttered optimism to a certain extent and increased polarization. In respect to the humanitarian discourse, securitizing actors predominantly focused on the protection and defense of asylum applicants after these events. Considering the securitization discourse, securitizing actors no longer focused on the threatening potential of asylum applicants from the Balkans but shifted their attentions to the threatening potential of refugees from other crisis regions. All in all, following the course of events during the period under investigation, one can conclude that the German political discourse was indeed torn between optimism and fear. While the optimists might have dominated the political debate in the beginning, fear increasingly penetrated the political debate during its further course.

7. Conclusion

In this last concluding section, the results of the discourse analysis shall be reflected in order to answer the research question and its subquestions. In addition, the implications of the findings will be discussed in reference to future developments and research.

Firstly, in regard to the overall research question - *How did the 2015 European refugee crisis influence the political discourse in Germany in reference to securitization of immigration?* - one can clearly state that the refugee crisis had an immense impact on the political discourse in Germany. In the analysis, 206 pro- and anti-immigration speech acts were identified in total, which follow a specific rhetorical structure that is characteristic of securitization. This number in a six month period of investigation suggests that immigration and asylum in reference to the European refugee crisis was a very important topic or even one of the most vital topics discussed in the Bundestag in the period under investigation. Apart from the strong presence of immigration and asylum, the crisis clearly influenced the political discourse in reference to securitization of immigration. The results of the analysis suggest that political representatives - which became securitizing actors in the context

of parliamentary debates - predominantly constructed increasing levels of asylum applications from the Western Balkans as threat. This group of immigrants is assumed to exploit the social system and takes away capacities which are actually intended for refugees from Syria or Iraq. Hence, the European refugee crisis influenced the political discourse in a sense that the image of a exploitative migrant from the Western Balkans - which was already present in the discourse in the early 1990s - was revitalized. In addition, the Paris Terrorist Attacks in November 2015 and New Years Eve in Cologne 2015/16 increasingly diverted attention to the potential threat of criminal or radicalized asylum applicants. In this sense, both events that happened in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis enhanced the focus of policy makers to construct certain groups of newly arrived immigrants as potential threats to internal security but also to state order. Taken together, within the context of parliamentary sessions in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, different groups of immigrants and asylum applicants were constructed as threat to seven referents objects. Nevertheless, the majority of securitizing actors did state that immigrants and asylum applicants in general do not pose a threat to these referents.

Secondly, the answer to both sub-questions - which addressed the dominance of either the anti-immigration/ securitization discourse or the pro-immigration/ humanitarian discourse and their discursive dynamics across time - is even more complex. No discourse type was found to be hegemonic over the whole time under investigation. Rather, the results of the analysis indicate that the humanitarian discourse lost its hegemonic status beginning of December 2015 at the latest. Afterwards, both discourse types were effectively equally represented in parliamentary sessions. Despite the Paris Terrorist Attacks and New Years Eve in Cologne - which were crucial events for the dynamics of both overarching discourse types - several measures implemented by the federal government but also other developments outside the parliamentary realm influenced dynamics of the securitization and the humanitarian discourse concerning immigration and asylum.

In regard to the humanitarian discourse, human tragedies - like the 70 refugees that suffocated in a truck in Austria in August 2015 - but also verbal and physical racially motivated attacks against refugees and initial reception centers - which climaxed in August and September 2015 - were important developments that influenced dynamics of this discourse type. Furthermore, several measures of the federal government - like the implementation of the Asylum packages I and II and planned exceptions from the minimum wage for refugees - triggered a lot of pro-immigration speech acts. The same is true for governmental actions on the European level. Especially increasing

efforts by the German government to establish increasing cooperation with several head of states from countries of origin of asylum applicants and transit states - in the context of the European Council meeting in Valetta in November 2015 - resulted in an increasing number of speech acts which can be attributed to the humanitarian discourse. Eventually, increasing strength and radicalization of the AfD, especially since January 2016, promoted the humanitarian discourse.

Considering the securitization discourse, tragedies and miseries of refugees - like the picture of the dead boy on the beach of Bodrum - surprisingly enhanced speech acts that can be attributed to this discourse type. This is especially the case since those securitizing speech acts were directed towards asylum applicants from the Western Balkans, in order to save capacities for refugees from assumed really 'severe' conflict regions like Syria or Iraq. Very often, only those refugees were assumed to be associated with these miseries and tragedies. More obvious, the decision of the suspension of the Dublin Agreement and to welcome thousands of asylum applicants stranded in Hungary were critical events that largely influenced dynamics of the securitization debate. Lastly, reports on increasingly scarce capacities and a growing feeling of overload by representatives of the state and regional level, in the context of several failed attempts by the federal government to limit the influx of asylum seekers, increased the number of speech acts that can be attributed to the securitization discourse.

In summary, the results of the analysis lead to the conclusion that in the most likely case of securitization - Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis - constrained securitization was discernibly present in the political discourse. Though, one need to acknowledge that the humanitarian discourse was temporarily more dominant and securitization of immigration was mostly not directed towards refugees from 'severe' crisis regions. The theoretical argument made in this thesis allows the conclusion that public opinion - which was predominantly positive and welcoming during the beginning but lost its prevalence during the investigation - has prevented widespread alarmism and hatred against asylum seekers by established parties represented in the 18th legislative period. Hence, public opinion averted more serious and comprehensive securitization of immigration in the most-likely case of consideration.

Yet, the 2017 federal election have shown that a considerable part of the German electorate has feelings of hatred or bitterness against immigrants and asylum applicants. In the elections of the 19th legislative period, the right-wing populist, anti-immigration party AfD gained 12,6% of the

vote shares (Bundeswahlleiter 2018). The entry of a party - which predominantly thematizes the immigration and asylum - suggests that a considerable amount of the electorate was not satisfied with the political discourse, that took place in the aftermath of the 2015 European refugee crisis in the 18th legislative period. Wiesendahl identifies an 'vacuum of representation' (*Repräsentationsvakuum*) in the political competition in regard to immigration and asylum which paved the way for increasing popularity of the AfD (Wiesendahl 2016, 77). In this regard, one could argue that established political parties left comprehensive securitization of immigration and asylum to the AfD, which successfully exploited the topic for their purposes. Hence, its electoral success underlines the importance of an investigation of the characteristics and dynamics of the political discourse.

Despite the crucial influence of the political discourse in regard to the rise of right-wing, populist parties, the results of the discourse analysis indicate a crucial difference between the discourse in the media and the one that took place in a parliamentary setting. While the media coverage largely focused on the positive aspects of the refugee crisis and highlighted the threatening potential of AfD or PEGIDA (see Haller 2017; Smykala 2016), the results of the discourse analysis - based on parliamentary sessions as primary data source - indicate that actions or inaction of the federal government were the most frequently mentioned threat to immigrants and asylum seekers. By contrast, AfD and PEGIDA played a merely ancillary role. In this sense, the political system criticized itself or some of its representatives more than the media did. This instance suggests that future research should not solely focus on the discourse in the media but increasingly on the political discourse in parliamentary sessions. Especially in regard to the 2015 refugee crisis, a comparative analysis between the political discourse in parliamentary settings and the discourse in the media be of considerable value and bring further insights.

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
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Appendix

Appendix I: Distribution of uttered referent objects by party membership (%; own data and presentation)

REFERENT OBJECT	CDU	CSU	SPD	DIE GRÜNEN	DIE LINKE	TOTAL (COLUMN PERCENTAGE)
Social System	66,66	33,33	0	0	0	11,84
Persons in need for asylum	65,00	10,00	25,00	0	0	26,31
Cultural values	75,00	25,00	0	0	0	5,26
Receptivity	52,63	31,58	15,79	0	0	25,00
State order	75,00	12,5	12,5	0	0	10,53
Internal security	57,14	35,71	0	0	7,14	18,42
EU/ Schengen	50,00	0	50,00	0	0	2,63
Total (row percentage)	61,84	23,68	13,16	0	1,31	100 %


Appendix II: Distribution of uttered referent objects across time (own data and presentation)



Appendix III: Distribution of uttered threats by party membership (%; own data and presentation)

THREAT	CDU	CSU	SPD	DIE GRÜNEN	DIE LINKE	TOTAL (ABSOLUTE VALUE)
Racism	28	8	32	4	28	25
Governmental (in-)action	2	2	11	40	44	45
Consequences of war/ conflict/ escape	25	6,25	31,25	25	12,5	16
Organized traffickers	33,33	0	33,33	33,33	0	3
Poor treatment in other countries	0	16,66	16,66	66,66	0	6
Politicians of the CDU/ CSU	0	0	30	40	30	10
Economic exploitation	0	0	50	0	50	6
Lack of perspectives	0	0	30,77	30,77	38,46	13
AfD/ Pegida	0	0	33,33	33,33	33,33	3
Violence between refugees	0	0	33,33	33,33	33,33	3
Total speech acts (Column)	13	5	32	38	42	130

Appendix IV: Distribution of uttered threat across time (Own data and presentation)



Research Proposal

Charles University Prague

Research Proposal

by Tabea Magdalena Grünewald

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The Securitization of Immigration

An Assessment of the extent of Securitization of Immigration in the German political discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis

Introduction - Immigrants as an object of securitization

Even though migration of people is as old as human history (Waever et al. 1993, 149), it constantly causes disputes between immigrants and the domestic population. Especially after the end of the Cold War, this recurrent dispute increasingly became a matter of national security and after 9/11 even one of the greatest security concerns (Buonfino 2004, 23). Migration triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and proceeding European Integration is increasingly regraded to threaten the sovereignty of nation states and yet is constructed as threat to national security in Europe. In this realm immigrants are portrayed as threat to internal security who would endanger the well-being of the host country (Ceyhan/ Tsoukala 2002, 25; Tsoukala 2005, 163). Thus, immigration got securitized.

The process of securitization can be described as a process in which a threat is theoretically constructed aiming for the implementation of exceptional measures (Bigo 2002; Buzan et al. 1998; Ceyhan/ Tsoukala 2002; Waever 1995). Especially in respect to immigration, this practice entails certain dangers. On the aggregate level, it undermines the liberal-democratic principles and social cohesion of Western societies (Ceyahn/ Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 2004). On the individual level, it promotes a criminalization process of a certain type of individuals based on racism and stereotypes (Tsoukala 2005, 186). Lastly, the practice of securitization encourages policy makers not to react to actual but constructed threats. This inability of policy makers to appropriately respond to crisis might even result in a “false illusion of security“ (Boin/ Lagadec 2000, 185). Thus, the practice of securitization does not necessarily make countries safer but rather entails serious negative implications. Therefore its extensive use needs to be avoided and prevented. One step to reach this aim is to discover extensive securitization.

This work takes on this tasks by focusing on the 2015 European refugee crisis; an event which will define the decade and the future of Europe, the German chancellor Angela Merkel asserts (TheGuardian 2015). In the course of this crisis an unprecedentedly high number of migrants and asylum seekers fled from prosecution and conflict from countries like Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq to Europe to find security and protection (HRW 2015). The unexpected high number of immigrants which fled into the European Union endangered the commitment to the Schengen Agreement and overburdened certain countries to process asylum applications and to control the EU external borders (EY 2016, 1). These instances which indicate an existing security problem in the course of the developments in 2015, make the refugee crisis a most-likely case for the implementation of securitization practices. This might be especially true for the case of Germany which accepted with more than one million the highest number of refugees in the course of the crisis (Wiesendahl 2016, 53). Therefore, my overall research question is *To what extent occurred securitization of immigration in German political discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 European refugee crisis?*

Even though Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis constitutes a most-likely case for a high extent of securitization, one could observe an opposite development in the form of a widespread culture of welcome (Willkommenskultur) which was based on Angela Merkel's "We will make it!" (Wir schaffen das!). In contrast to the practice of securitization, this tendency highlights the humanitarian aspects of the refugee crisis by stating that the developments of 2015 do not constitute a crisis which endangers security of European nations but a crisis for the people which fled from chaos and misery in their home countries to Europe (see Loszycki 2017, 247). Hence, to answer the overall research question one has also assess the subquestion, whether humanitarian pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant securitization arguments were dominant in Germany.

Since a lot of attention has been given to the immigration topic in the media-discourse (see Haller 2017; Matouschek/ Kodak 1993; Wiesendahl 2016), I adopt the Copenhagen-Schools conception of securitization which states that securitization primarily takes place on the level of the political discourse (Buzan 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Waever 1995); which is one of the "most prominent and influential approaches in the theory of securitization" (Williams 2003, 511). This framework will also be used for the analysis. By analyzing plenary protocols of the Bundestag sessions, the Copenhagen-School framework will be used to identify speech-acts which aim for securitization and will also be remodeled to identify speech-acts which aim for pro-immigration arguments in the political discourse in Germany.

Review Literature - Security and the Process of Securitization

The first part of the literature review shall give an overview of the traditionalist understanding of security and the general characteristics of the concept of security. Most generally, "security is about survival" (Buzan et al. 1998, 21) and involves the establishment of a „collective self vis-a-vis other collective self

(Lipschutz 1995, 217). In the traditionalist view, “the primary focus of security studies is the phenomenon of war“ (Walt 1991, 212), therefore security is conceptualized in a militaristic, state-centered view (Walt 1991, Wendt 1992).

With the end of the Cold War, the traditionalist view of security was challenged by a new understanding of security which the second section shall investigate. A debate about the widening or narrowing of the security agenda took place in Security Studies literature. “Wideners“ want to include non-military issues from the political, economic and societal sector in the security agenda (Buzan 1997; Buzan et al. 1998) while traditionalist argue that this would hamper the intellectual coherence of the concept (Walt 1991). In addition, security was increasingly understood not as an objectivist condition but as an result of an interactive process in which a threat is theoretically constructed (Hansen/ Nissebaum 2009, 1158; Williams 2003, 513). This process of threat construction is called “securitization“.

Like the literature review will indicate, immigration has become increasingly prone to the practice of securitization after the end of the Cold War (Ceyhan/ Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans 2000; Waever et al. 1993). Yet, scholars focusing on securitization of immigration differ in regard to the level through which threat is constructed. One body of literature, known as the Copenhagen School, argues that a threat is intersubjectively constructed via political discourse (Buzan 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Waever 1995). This implies that a threat is constructed via a speech-act through which an issue (referent object) is presented to be existentially threatened which justified the implementation of extraordinary measures. Another body of research, which can be summarized as Paris School, argues that a threat is constructed via political-bureaucratic practices (Balazaq 2005, 2008; Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2004; Tsoukala 2005). This school argues that securitizing tools (Balazaq 2008, 80) or rather security policies that violate normal political procedures (Huysmans 2004, 324) which are implemented by self-interest security agencies (Bigo 2002, Tsoukala 2005) lead to threat construction. Nevertheless, they do not deny the importance of the political discourse in respect to securitization. In this work, I will use the Copenhagen Schools conception of securitization and focus on the political discourse.

Theory/ Hypothesis

Literature focusing on the political discourse concerning immigration not just identified one discourse type which securitizes immigration but also a pro-immigration one, which supports the principle of granting asylum and stresses human rights (Buonfino 2005, 2). Anti- and pro-immigrant discourse types are always present as long as democracy exists (Buonfino 2005; Jäger/Jäger 1993). Yet, both discourse types underly different thinking patterns which suggest different measures to deal with immigration. One underlies a universalist-humanitarian thinking pattern which aims for granting human rights and fosters international

cooperation and one nationalistic one which aims to defend national sovereignty and reestablish security (see Lehman/ Zobel 2016).

Since both discourse types are always present, one need to identify the dominant/ hegemonic discourse. To assess the extent of securitization in Germany in the aftermath of the 2015 developments, one has to identify the dominant discourse type. Therefore two competing hypothesis must be tested:

The securitization-thesis (migration as security concern):

High extent of securitization in the German political discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis

The Humanitarian-thesis (immigrants/ refugees as threatened referent):

High pronunciation of humanitarian aspects in the German political discourse in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis

Methodology - Assessment of the extent of securitization in the political discourse

The analysis constitutes a case study of the German parliamentary discourse in the Bundestag by analyzing parliamentary protocols. The period of investigation will be one year from August 2015 onwards since at that time Angela Merkel announced that Germany would suspend the EU Dublin-Regulation. The analysis shall identify the dominant/ hegemonic discourse to assess the extent of securitization in the parliamentary discourse and the variation of its extent during the period of investigation. Further, the same shall be done for the pro-humanitarian discourse. Thereby, variations in the discourse between different parties or rather governing coalition and opposition shall be taken into consideration.

For that reason, the Copenhagen School technique of analysis which rests upon the assumptions of the speech-act theory developed by John L. Austin (1975) shall be used to identify speech-acts which either aim to portray immigrants/ refugees as a threat (anti-immigrant speech-act) or aim to secure/ protect immigrants/ refugees (humanitarian speech-act).

Table 1: Operationalization of speech-acts/ Criteria for speech-acts

	Threat	Referent Object(s)	Necessary Condition I	Necessary Condition II	Necessary Condition III
anti-immigrant speech-act	Immigrants/ Refugees	*	stressing priority of issue	stressing endangered survival of referent object	suggesting measures taken in response to threat

	Threat	Referent Object(s)	Necessary Condition I	Necessary Condition II	Necessary Condition III
humanitarian speech-act	*	Immigrants/ Refugees	stressing priority of issue	stressing endangered survival of referent objects	suggesting measures taken in response to threat

* = *identification in discourse analysis*

Hence the overall coding scheme to identify speech acts according to the Copenhagen School framework can be summarized in the following manner:

speech act = naming of a threat + naming threatened referent object + fulfillment of NC I + fulfillment of NC II + fulfillment of NC II

Thereby one need to acknowledge that the referent object can be just identified in reference to the threat and the threat can just be identified in reference to the referent object. Further, the speech-acts should be identified on the basis of several signal worlds (see table 2). Yet, in respect to the establishment of a threat, a securitizing actor may construct a threat explicitly by using signal world which directly indicate a threat or implicitly by making use of various stylistic devices (like (over-)generalizations, quasi-expertness, comparisons, use of citations, rhetorical questions). Since this analysis of the political discourse will be conducted in a qualitative manner, this allows to identify the implicit and explicit construction of threats.

Table 2: Signal words

Signal worlds (in german)	
Refugees/ Immigrants as Threat or referent object	Immigrant, Ausländer, Migrant, Flüchtling, Asylbewerber, Asylant, Geflüchtete
Threat (explicitly)	Gefahr, Bedrohung, Gefährdung, Welle, Überschwemmung Herausforderung, Veränderung
NC I (priority)	Priorität, ...
NC II (survival)	Überleben, ...
NC III (measures)	Maßnahmen, ...

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