Výsledky projektu Korupce v České republice: evidence z kontraktů veřejných zakázek

This study provides evidence of a strong link between two channels facilitating rent-extraction in public procurement: between concealing the ultimate ownership of contractors and manipulation of the anticipated value of tenders. Using data on more than 15 300 tenders awarded to joint-stock companies in the Czech Republic during 2005 - 2010, the study shows that tender value manipulation has been incentivized by the 2006 procurement reform, which established several discontinuities in the anticipated value of tenders. After the reform, manipulation increased much more for tenders awarded to contractors with anonymous owners as opposed to traceable owners. Contractors in manipulated tenders needed to underbid fewer firms in order to win procurements and their winning bids for comparable contracts were, on average, higher than before reform. The results imply disrupted optimality of contractor choice and reduced efficiency of procurement. The results are strongest for contracts on services and construction works, which traditionally conceal rent-extraction more easily.

This article uses data on Czech public procurement contracts from 2005 - 2010 in order to uncover patterns suggestive of corrupt behavior of procuring officials. Using polynomial regressions and local linear density estimators, the article provides evidence that procurement officials manipulate anticipated values of procurements so that contracts can be awarded through less transparent procedures with restricted entry. Manipulations manifest through emergence of sharp discontinuities in the anticipated value distribution. Procurements excessively bunch below statutory thresholds, which determine officials’ scope of discretion, entry-restrictiveness and transparency of the contract-awarding process. The first appearance of discontinuities coincides almost exactly with thresholds being introduced into the procurement legislation. Manipulations occur only in procedures restricted by thresholds and are prevalent only among a narrow group of procuring bodies. The last finding is consistent with manipulations being driven by corruption of procurement officials. Manipulations concern 8.6% of all below-limit procurements.