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The focus of this course is at the crossroad of nation’s economic strengths and weaknesses and a political power. The course introduces students to economic foundations of nation’s power and various types and modalities of strategies to use this power to achieve nation’s goals in international politics. Attention will be paid to both actions taken in peacetime and in the course of war. The course combines lectures and seminars and emphasizes students’ active involvement in small groups. Poslední úprava: Ludvík Jan, Mgr., Ph.D. (12.10.2018)
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• Active involvement in small groups 30%
Evaluation A - excellent 100-91 B – very good 90-81 C - good 80-71 D - satisfactory 70-61 E - sufficient 60-51 F - fail 50-0 Poslední úprava: Ludvík Jan, Mgr., Ph.D. (26.10.2019)
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Beckley, M. (2010). Economic Development and Military Effectiveness. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33(1), 43-79, doi: 10.1080/01402391003603581. Drew P. J. (2019). Blockade? A Legal Assessment of the Maritime Interdiction of Yemen’s Ports, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 24(1), 35–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krz001 Early, B. R. (2012). Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States: A Study of U.S. Economic Sanctions, 1950-2000. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(3), 547–572. http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711420961 Early, B. R., & Schulzke, M. (2018). Still Unjust, Just in Different Ways: How Targeted Sanctions Fall Short of Just War Theory’s Principles. International Studies Review, 1–24. http://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy012 Flores-Macías, G. A. & Kreps, S. A. (2013). Political Parties at War: A Study of American War Finance, 1789–2010. American Political Science Review, 107(4), 833–48. doi:10.1017/S0003055413000476. Flores-Macías, G. A. & Kreps, S. A. (2017). Borrowing Support for War: The Effect of War Finance on Public Attitudes toward Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(5), 997–1020. doi: 10.1177/0022002715600762. Glosny, M. A. (2004). Strangulation from the sea? A PRC submarine blockade of Taiwan. International Security, 28(4), 125-160. Grauer, R. & Horowitz, M. C. (2012). What Determines Military Victory? Testing the Modern System. Security Studies, 21(1), 83-112, doi: 10.1080/09636412.2012.650594. Horowitz, M. & Reiter, D. (2001). When Does Aerial Bombing Work?: Qualitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(2), 147-173. Levy, J. S. (2015). Counterfactuals, Causal Inference, and Historical Analysis, Security Studies, 24(3), pp. 378-402. Martin, C. H. (2002). Rewarding North Korea: Theoretical Perspectives on the 1994 Agreed Framework. Journal of Peace Research, 39(2), 51-68, doi:10.1177/0022343302039001003. Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(5), 541–558. http://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520379 Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, 22(2), 90–136. https://doi/abs/10.1162/isec.22.2.90 Reilly, J. (2017). China’s economic statecraft in Europe’. Asia Europe Journal, 15(2), 173-185. Shifrinson, J.R.I. & Priebe, M. (2011). A Crude Threat: The Limits of an Iranian Missile Campaign against Saudi Arabian Oil. International Security, 36(1), 167-201. Talmadge, C. (2008). Closing time: Assessing the Iranian threat to the Strait of Hormuz. International Security, 33(1), 82-117. Poslední úprava: Ludvík Jan, Mgr., Ph.D. (26.10.2019)
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