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01 Homework for Session 01 of PPE Classics - Read ONLY chapter 2 & 5 & 8 from LOCKE Two Treatises.pdf | 01 Homework for Session 01 of PPE Classics - Read ONLY chapter 2 & 5 & 8 from LOCKE Two Treatises | Janusz Salamon, Ph.D. |
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02 Homework for Session 02 of PPE Classics - Koyama - The Institutional Foundations of Religious Freedom.pdf | 02 Homework for Session 02 of PPE Classics - Koyama - The Institutional Foundations of Religious Freedom. | Janusz Salamon, Ph.D. |
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03 Homework for Session 03 of PPE Classics - Hardin - Tragedy of the Commons.pdf | 03 Homework for Session 03 of PPE Classics - Hardin - Tragedy of the Commons | Janusz Salamon, Ph.D. |
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JPB856 PPE CLASSICS (4 ETCS)
TIME and PLACE: Only three 3-hour sessions over one week: 29 October to 1 November (for details: see the list of lectures below)
THE LECTURER: Dr William Ian Christmas, PhD (PPE Director at King's College, University of London) www.billyxmas.com Email: wic00002@mix.wvu.edu & billy.christmas@kcl.ac.uk You may also want to contact Dr Janusz Salamon as the host of Dr Christmas: janusz.salamon@fsv.cuni.cz
SCHEDULE: The course will be taught in a block, over a week. It will consist of six eighty-minute lectures, paired into themes that build upon one another, as follows: TUESDAY, 29.10, 17:00 to 20:00 - classroom C122 THURSDAY, 31.10, 17:00 to 20:00 - classroom B228 FRIDAY, 01.11, 9:30 to 12:30 - classroom B228
ASSESSMENT will be solely based on the FINAL ESSAY (due "by the end of January") LENGTH of the final essay: ca. 2000 words (not counting bibliography) ESSAYS SUBMISSION as an email attachment sent to BOTH following addresses: Email: wic00002@mix.wvu.edu & billy.christmas@kcl.ac.uk Each student will choose one of the following three essay questions corresponding to respective lecture pairings, namely: 1. Normatively speaking, which comes first: the state or property rights? 2. Why might stronger states tend to be more liberal? 3. What limits are there to using markets to manage the natural environment?
The detailed CONTENT of the course:
SESSION 1: PROPERTY AND THE STATE In these lectures we will think about the two most central political and economic institutions: property and the state. We will look at two different methodological approaches to thinking about what these institutions are, how they serve humanity, and what their moral justification might be: the natural law traditional and rational choice theory.
Basic reading John Locke, Two Treatise of Government (1689) second treatise, ch. 2, ch. 5, ch. 8 §§112; 116-122
Lecture 1: Property and the State: Locke Key concepts · Natural equality · Natural rights · State of nature · Common ownership · Private ownership · Labour-mixing · Original acquisition Readings: John Locke, Two Treatise of Government (1689) second treatise, ch. 2, ch. 5, ch. 8 §§112; 116-122 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books (1974) pp. 149-164, 167-182 Bas van der Vossen, “As Good as ‘Enough and as Good,’” The Philosophical Quarterly, 17 (2021): 183-203
Lecture 2: Property and the State: Kant Key concepts · Unilateralism · Omnilateralism · Rightful condition · Wrongful condition · Private right · Public rights Readings Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), excerpts: 6: 211-221, 229-233, 245 252, 258-270, 311-318 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press (2009) ch. 6 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation. Cambridge University Press (1999) ch. 3 Anna Stilz, Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford University Press (2019)
SESSION 2: STATE CAPACITY Having whet our palate for thinking about real-world institutions, we will now turn our attention to some of the most cutting-edge work in political economy, broadly construed. This literature empirically studies, and conceptually theorises, state capacity. That is, the ability of states to do the kinds of things we might want and need states to do. A striking paradox drawn from this literature is the states with more power tend to be the most constrained in how they use their power. This bundling of strength and constraint is what gives us liberal society as we know it it, and fosters economic growth.
Basic reading Mark Koyama & Noel Johnson, Persecution and Toleration: the Long Road to Religious Freedom. Cambridge University Press (2019) pp. 1-19
Lecture 1: State Capacity: The Organisation of Violence Key concepts · Problem of violence · Elite coalition · Natural state · Stationary bandit · Violence trap Readings Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorship. Basic Books (2000) ch. 1 Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press (2009), ch. 2 Gary W. Cox, Douglass and Barry Weingast, “The Violence Trap: A Politicel-Economic Approach to the Problems of Development,” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 34 (2019):3-19 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) chs 13, 18
Lecture 2: State Capacity: Impersonality Key concepts · Mature natural state · Impersonality · General rules · Identity rules · State capacity · Abstract order Readings Mark Koyama & Noel Johnson, Persecution and Toleration: the Long Road to Religious Freedom. Cambridge University Press (2019) pp. 1-19 Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press (2009), ch. 4-5 Bruce Beuno de Mesquita, The Invention of Power: Popes, Kings, and the Birth of the West. Public Affairs (2022) F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy. Routledge (1982), chs 2, 7, 11 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. Definitive Edition, Ed. R. Homowy. The University of Chicago Press (2011).
SESSION 3: Environmental Governance
Basic reading Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162 (1958) 1243-1248, sections with highlighted headings only
Lecture 1: Environmental Governance: Common Property Regimes Key concepts · Prisoner’s dilemma · Tragedy of the commons · Mētis · Legibility · State simplifications Readings Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162 (1958) 1243-1248, sections with highlighted headings only Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press (1990) ch. 1 James C. Scott, Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed David Schmidtz, “When is Original Appropriation Required?” The Monist, 73 (1990): 504- 518 Carol M. Rose, “The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and Inherently Public Property,” University of Chicago Law Review, 53 (1986): 711-781 Richard A. Epstein, “The Optimal Mix of Private and Common Property,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 11 (1994): 17-41 Billy Christmas, “Ambidextrous Lockeanism,” Economics and Philosophy, 36 (2020): 193-215
Lecture 2: Environmental Governance: Market Mechanisms Key concepts · Incommensurability · Preference stability · Cost-benefit analysis · Shadow price · Ordinality · Cardinality · Tort liability Readings Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. (2007) chs 2, 4-5 Billy Christmas, “Incommensurability and Property Rights in the Natural Environment,” Environmental Politics, 26 (2017): 502-520 David Schmidtz, “When Preservationism Doesn’t Preserve,” Environmental Values, 6 (1997): 327-339 Poslední úprava: Salamon Janusz, Ph.D. (14.01.2025)
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