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When to escalate, when to compromise in international conflict? - JMMZ370
Anglický název: When to escalate, when to compromise in international conflict ?
Zajišťuje: Katedra evropských studií (23-KZS)
Fakulta: Fakulta sociálních věd
Platnost: od 2021
Semestr: letní
E-Kredity: 6
Způsob provedení zkoušky: letní s.:
Rozsah, examinace: letní s.:2/0, Zk [HT]
Počet míst: neurčen / neurčen (20)
Minimální obsazenost: 5
Virtuální mobilita / počet míst: ne
Stav předmětu: nevyučován
Jazyk výuky: angličtina
Způsob výuky: prezenční
Poznámka: předmět je možno zapsat mimo plán
povolen pro zápis po webu
Garant: prof. Pierre Allan
Mgr. Anna Lukešová
Mgr. Miroslava Pisklová
Termíny zkoušek   Rozvrh   Nástěnka   
Anotace - angličtina
Poslední úprava: doc. PhDr. Jiří Vykoukal, CSc. (15.12.2017)
When do international actors prefer conflict, and when are they willing to compromise in order to settle their
disagreements ? This course will examine this question in various ways, with the help of theories of international
relations. Its central focus is on diplomacy, not in terms of formal relations between states only, whether bilateral or
multilateral, but focusing on the skill, the craft and science of influencing others.
Cíl předmětu - angličtina
Poslední úprava: doc. PhDr. Jiří Vykoukal, CSc. (15.12.2017)

Using historical cases as well as current international issues, the course aims at providing students with useful theories for their own analyses. Students will be encouraged to think deeper about their personal views of international relations and evaluate them critically. Thus they will become familiar with concepts and theories helping them to develop their own thoughts about the challenges of international conflict and compromise.

Literatura - angličtina
Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Lukešová (13.02.2018)

Required readings

(about 200 pp. in total. N.B. According to international events to come, a few newspaper articles may be further required during the semester.)

 

Pierre Allan & Cédric Dupont (2015), "International Relations Analysis With Game Theory”, in Gianluca Manzo (ed.), Theories and Social Mechanisms, Oxford: The Bardwell Press, Vol. II, pp. 209-214 (extract).

Pierre Allan & Alexis Keller (2012), "Is a Just Peace Possible Without Thin and Thick Recognition ?", in Thomas Lindemann & Erik Ringmar (eds.), The Struggle for Recognition in International Politics, Boulder, Col.: Paradigm Publishers, pp. 71-84.

Pierre Allan & Albert Stahel (1983), "Tribal Guerrilla Warfare Against a Colonial Power: Analyzing the War in Afghanistan," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27/4, 1983, pp. 590-598 (extract).

Graham Allison (2012), "The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, July/August, pp. 11-16.

Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow (1999), Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.), New York: Longman, chapter 7 ("Conclusion"), pp. 379-407.

Daniel Ellsberg (2017), The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, London: Bloomsbury, pp. 305-311, 319, 330-334.

Roger Fisher & William Ury (1981), Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 3-15, 157-163.

Christer Jönsson & Martin Hall (2003), "Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy," International Studies Perspectives, vol. 4, pp. 195-210.

Mao Zdong (1936), Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, and (1937), On Guerilla Warfare, extracts, 16 pp.

Avishai Margalit (2010), On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 19-28.

Alex Mintz & Karl DeRouen Jr. (2010), "Psychological Factors Affecting Foreign Policy Decisions", and "Framing, Marketing, and Media Effects on Foreign Policy Decision Making"" in their Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chaps 6 & 8, pp. 97-114 & 149-155.

NYT (2018), "To Counter Russia, U.S. Signals Nuclear Arms Are Back in a Big Way", The New York Times, February 4.

Thomas C. Schelling (1956), "An Essay on Bargaining", in his The Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, chapter 2, pp. 21-46.

Kenneth N. Waltz (2012), "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, July/August, pp. 2-5.

Metody výuky - angličtina
Poslední úprava: doc. PhDr. Jiří Vykoukal, CSc. (15.12.2017)

Thus, we will examine bargaining and negotiation approaches, explain why and how the weak sometimes prevail over the strong, study international crises, evaluate the impact of nuclear weapons on foreign policy, and focus on the logic of terrorism and of guerrilla warfare. Rational choice, the sociology of organizations, political and psychological approaches to explain impediments and possibilities of action, will be used to better study decision-making in the complex world of foreign affairs, and to uncover its potentials for leading to dangerous crisis developments. Simple game-theoretical models will show the interrelationships between strategies and tactics of strength and weakness, promise and threat, violence and peace. Last, but not least, the course will study the logic of giving and taking, of violence and compromise, of thin and thick recognition of the other and the necessary renouncement needed to be made in order to find a settlement acceptable to both sides.

Požadavky ke zkoušce - angličtina
Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Lukešová (13.02.2018)
  1. Class attendance and participation: attendance is mandatory, with one unjustified absence tolerated; active participation based on discussion within class including points raised from the readings. Evaluation: 33% of final grade.
  2. Final two-hour written exam after the course, no documentation allowed. Evaluation: 67% of final grade.
Sylabus - angličtina
Poslední úprava: Mgr. Anna Lukešová (17.04.2018)

Course outline

 

Monday 12 & Tuesday 13 March 2018; Tuesday 17 & Wednesday 18 April; Wednesday 9 & Thursday May 10; (schedule: 14:00 to 16:50).

 

1. Tweet: "I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” The rationality of the "Madman theory" and a brief overview of the course.

Reading: Ellsberg

 

2. Hitler playing and winning the game of chicken, and the (nuclear chicken) "balance of terror".

Reading: Ellsberg; Allan & Dupont; NYT (4 February 2018)

 

3. "Between 1 in 3 and even": the probablility of disaster as estimated by Kennedy for the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and rational foreign policy decisionmaking.

Readings: Allison; Allison & Zelikow (1999)

 

4. Organizations: a necessary tool of foreign policy decisionmaking – the sociology of organizations and foreign policy.

Readings: Allison; Allison & Zelikow (1999)

 

5. Foreign politics is also domestic – the politics of foreign policy.

Readings: Allison; Allison & Zelikow (1999)

 

6. Misperceptions in decision-making and non-rational explanations – the psychology of foreign policy.

Reading: Mintz & DeRouen

 

7. Iran, North Korea, etc.: is nuclear proliferation good ? Pro and contra.

Reading: Waltz

 

8. Diplomacy: an art and a science.

Readings: Jönsson & Hall; Schelling; Fisher & Ury

 

9. Strength and weakness, promise and threat: How to use coercion and exchange for reaching an agreement ?

Readings: Jönsson & Hall; Schelling; Allan & Dupont; Fisher & Ury

 

10. Terrorism and its strategic logic, a weapon of the weak (and the strong, too !).

 

11. Mao Zedong's war against Japan and for a revolution in China: What makes his political theory of guerrilla warfare successful ?

Readings: Mao; Allan & Stahel

 

12. Che Guevara, the internationalist guerrillero in Bolivia: Why did he fail ?

Readings: Mintz & DeRouen; Allan & Stahel; Mao

 

13. What are thin and thick recognition ? Renouncement, sacrifice, and looking for compromise.

Readings: Allan & Keller; Fisher & Ury

 

14. What are "rotten" compromises ? Political and moral compromise, pro and contra.

Readings: Margalit; Allan & Keller

 

15. Conclusions: when to escalate, when to compromise in international conflict ?

 
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