

stincts" of men their will; rather, I conceive human will always as *appetitus rationalis*. As *appetitus*, moreover, I conceive not so much the urge (or resistance) to do something as the positive or negative attitude to the object (the *Nicht-Ich*), which forms the basis of the urge to act; this relation becomes essential will only if it is accompanied and coaffected by thought. I repeat: essential will is realized only in the composite will—for I thus interpret the whole realm of ideas of a creative personality, such as an artist or ethical genius, namely, as the expression of his essential will. But I thus interpret as will every free act, inasmuch as it evolves from the essential tendencies of the actor's mind, feeling, or conscience. Therefore: by essential will in its social determination and by *Gemeinschaft* I understand and analyze what Hegel calls the concrete substance of the *Volksgeist*, something rising so far beyond the "social instincts" that, in fact, it determines and supports the whole culture of a people.

Political economy largely leads its own life, apart from philosophy. Yet, political economy always has been searching for a relation to philosophy and often has vividly expressed the desire for a philosophical foundation. During the twenty-five years which have gone by since the publication of this book, this has become more evident than ever before. Pure sociology slowly has been raised to the rank of an auxiliary science of political economy, as was visibly documented by the founding of sociological associations in which economists have taken a leading part.

The concepts of social life, here submitted, although entirely new in their formulation, could not strike the economists as altogether strange. They were prepared for them by the contrast, with which they were familiar, between household economy (*oikos*) and money economy and some related concepts. The two leaders in German social science, Schmoller and Wagner, have both concerned themselves with this treatise, although from very different methodological viewpoints. Rationalism and the rational mechanization of production, indeed of the "world," increasingly have been recognized as the distinguishing traits of the whole modern epoch, and they have been expounded as such in several important investigations.

NORMAL CONCEPTS

EDITORS' NOTE. This chapter makes it evident that Max Weber's elaboration of the ideal type as a conceptual image of essential reality has been anticipated by Toennies, both in his work on Hobbes and in passages from *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* that commonly receive only a fleeting glance from the reader, if indeed they are read at all. In addition, Toennies' contention that thinking in "normal concepts," or ideal-typical thinking, is already contained in the writings of Hobbes makes it imperative to go beyond the classical economists and the Scottish moralists—not to mention Auguste Comte—in the search for the roots of sociological reasoning as we know it today.

Two passages from Toennies' highly significant book on the life and work of Thomas Hobbes are followed by two passages from *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. If seen together, they will make Toennies' position entirely clear.

An additional piece about "Hobbes and the Zoon Politikon" develops the concept of *Gesellschaft* out of the philosophy of Hobbes; the paper on "The Concept of *Gemeinschaft*" may be considered a companion piece.

The Formation of Modern Theory

THE REAL significance of the philosophical disputes at the beginning of the modern epoch is the passing of the Christian world view and the rise of a new one, which seeks its basis in sci-

Translated from *Thomas Hobbes, Leben und Lehre*, 3d ed. (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1925), pp. 86-90. Statements on pp. 87-88 have been slightly abbreviated. Subtitles supplied by the editors.

entific understanding, instead of in faith, but for that very reason finds itself in opposition to all opinions that are held to be natural, traditional, and sacred.

The general character of the social change underlying these conflicts can be grasped by three criteria. The first is that the direction of aims and activities is one from the internal to the external. The second, closely related to the first, is a transition from relative rest to increased motion in greater freedom. And third, the whole spirit of the age and its outstanding thought is a progress from practice and art to theory and science.

For their relationship is that of motion to rest. Theory is motor power, destroying and building. Gradually developed out of practice yet remaining dependent on it, theory tends to become absolute and achieves a dominant position. Practice and art are firmly bound to tradition; with regard to them, thought is subject to authority and remains dogmatic, in agreement with the unlearned folk, to whom simplicity is second nature, the exalted venerable, valid doctrine sacred. Theory and science search for what is new, think freely and critically, set themselves apart from common habits of thought, make everything equally an object of inquiry, fight persistence in the traditional ways, which turn as in a circle, and thus boldly progress in a straight line.

The transition from rounded restrictedness to the establishment of distant contacts, and thus, as it were, from the closed circular line to the infinite straight line, from the organic to the mechanical motion, characterizes the nature of the general economic development in this modern period. It provides for enlarged areas of commerce; subjects their inhabitants to the same laws, the same system of weights and measures, the same currency; makes the state, that is, the absolute government, the sole judge and master, who executes the administration of its own legislation as though by mechanical force. Like economic development, the state acts against folkways and all traditional authorities, hence also against the Church, whenever it keeps in line with its own motive power and its own conception. The state promotes the monetary economy, which it needs for its financial requirements and the augmentation of its power; the state, therefore, promotes not only

commerce and manufacture but the sciences, which open up the treasures of the earth and set free the productivity of labor. To improve weapons technology and tooling for the construction of bridges, fortresses, and roads is the immediate aim of the state as the master of the armed establishment. As the highest judicial authority, it is clearly the concern of the state to act so that legislation be uniform, plain, and lucid, jurisdiction rapid and secure, and law and administration of justice commensurate to actual circumstances, that is, conceived rationally; its concern is to protect the life, property, and honor of everyone against everyone.

These effects of political action are fully analogous to the general social implications of the new development. Within both the political and the social systems arise the unprejudiced, even unscrupulous, rational-willed individual members of society, who aspire to power and make use of every available means for their own ends. As they are made, so they act: individual men, groups, states get more sharply differentiated, engage in competition, learn how to calculate more recklessly their own gain. It is between and beside these social actors that now steps the thinker, enlightened and spreading enlightenment. His activity, too, is one of sharp and clear distinction and combination, in its purest form calculation (arithmetic), and mathematics generally. He, too, turns from the internal to the external, from contemplation of his own self, his salvation, and his faith toward the external world, which no longer is a mere expedient but becomes a truly real object of understanding and knowledge. What the thinker perceives in the external world is no longer a state of rest as its natural condition because it was the godly and blessed condition of fulfillment: what he perceives now is nothing but motion. He analyzes the curve by a set of straight lines that are moving and of varied direction, just as he endeavors to analyze all data by their single component elements, so that what was obscure is rendered lucid, and what was confused can be sorted out. He no longer asks the purpose of things but inquires into the effective cause of all changes in location. He eliminates the variations that are due to differences in language and creed, and tries as much as possible to re-create all phenomena by their common factors. Thus he construes the mutual rights of individuals, who by origin are

equal, as spheres of power established by common consent; he construes the state as the personification of this common will, which, at the same time, is an individual will.

What we here mark off conceptually is never found complete and pure in reality. But here, as elsewhere, we will have to understand reality in a first approximation and with the greatest clarity through ideally conceived schemata. The next step is to inquire into the transitions, and then into the constraints and complications.

The transitions are as fluid and varied as application and extension of rational thought are natural and necessary. Not until this method is freely used and constantly improved to reach fullest mastery are the relevant contrasts revealed.

The Logic of the Social Sciences

"I know (said Hobbes in the dedicatory letter of *De Corpore*) that that part of philosophy, wherein are considered lines and figures, has been delivered to us notably improved by the ancients; and withal a most perfect pattern of the logic by which they were enabled to find out and demonstrate such excellent theorems as they have done. . . ." Despite this acknowledgment, one cannot deny that the logic of Hobbes has some original traits. That famous dispute that arose over the logic of Aristotle: whether the universals, that is to say, concepts, or more exactly their objects, exist in the things or only in our thinking about them, is dismissed briefly. The most rigorous nominalism is to his way of thinking self-evident. Things exist naturally as single objects. We collect them, by giving them names according to their common criteria. We connect names in statements, and a statement is true whenever two names are in fact names of the same thing. Whether they are such depends on man's will, first of all on the will, or intention, of the speaker. But when many use the same name or (which comes to the same) the same language, they must be agreed about the use of names. This is particularly necessary in science, for science consists in exactly true statements. Every science must therefore start with definitions, that is, fixing the names to be used, which is an essentially arbitrary action. One may quarrel about the serviceability of a definition; its truth cannot be called in question. It is true and right for him who has made it and who, to be sure, is presumed to know what it is that he defines. If he decides and declares: this be A, that be named B, he must know the this and that,

Translated from *Thomas Hobbes, Leben und Lehre*, 3d ed. (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1925), pp. 111-14.

In an amending note to the 3d ed. Toennies elaborated on the text translated here. The first part of this note reads as follows: "The most important advance in Hobbes' theory of knowledge was that (1) his (nominalist) opinion that truth rested entirely on the combination of names and that names were arbitrary and by agreement, led him forth to (2) the insight that demonstrable truth exists only as regards those objects that we ourselves construe and create, and that in the definition of the names of such objects their origin and cause must be expressed."

whether by sense perception, or by a mere notion, or, finally, solely by a consciously conceived fiction; in one way or another he must have it before him in his mind. Hence also he who wants to converse with him.

This granted, the way the definitive names have been designed does not matter. They are nothing more than appointed signs, their value does not lie in them but in their being appointed, that is, in a clearly conscious and, as it were, contractual agreement. A thinker may settle for such signs only for himself, for his own use, just as much as several persons may settle for them for common use. But whoever wishes to be instructed must accept the definitions given him by his teacher, and he is at liberty only to examine the consistency of the conclusions, that is, of the connections between definitions and the statements derived from them.

"Thinking is computation"—all mental operations can be reduced to addition and subtraction. The nature of thought activity is not different from the combination and dissolution of images as they occur, when an object at first is recognized at a distance in vague outline, then on approach more distinctly, or, conversely, when it gradually loses its characteristic features as it disappears from view. The former is essentially the same as addition, the latter the same as subtraction.

It is a matter of regret that our philosopher, from these sound points of departure, did not penetrate more deeply into the nature of the thought process.

But in order to know something, it is necessary not only to be familiar with a true statement but to comprehend its content, that is, to recall what the names signify, to relate them to an object as well as to the impression one has of that object, since the name, if it is to make sense, must signify that impression. Scientific knowledge, for which these criteria are essential, is therefore in the last analysis based on experience and recall, just as in common knowledge with regard to facts, of which an animal also is capable. As the animal, so the human being learns by experience, which means to imagine a past event and to expect a future event. The human being, however, in doing so has the support of the system of names or language. Language is fixation in memory.

Science is, differently from all knowledge of facts, knowledge of the cause or of the origin of facts. Science, in the specific sense of a priori demonstrability, then, is possible only of the objects we understand and know for certain. If their causation is not contained in the definitions themselves, it cannot be extracted by a derivative statement. Known to us in this specific way, then, is only the origin of those objects that we make ourselves, "whose generation depends on the discretion of man himself." Objects of this kind are geometric figures, because the causes of their properties are contained in the lines drawn by us. Such objects also are right and wrong, equity and injury, "because we ourselves have created their principles, that is, laws and contracts" (*De Hom*, chap. X, 4, 5).

This is the final solution by Hobbes of a problem that deeply concerned him for a long time. He does not penetrate into the last depths of the theory of knowledge. And even at this final point he is still wrestling to give his ideas a different shape from the solution he came up with. What he was really after was the idea that pure science is possible only of pure objects of thought (*Gedankendinge*)—abstract objects and ideally conceived (*ideelle*), events—therefore also of a "body politic," which is not subject to sense perception but whose type we construct. All such objects of thought, pure and simple, are made by us, by sheer ratiocination. And those, of which we assume that they belong to the external and physical world, can in that reality be represented in a more or less perfect fashion. But what we can always do is to measure the facts of reality by those ideas of ours, even when they exist, like the state, only in our thoughts.

If such pure science is restricted to geometry and politics, as in that last-mentioned procedure, it is indeed relatively easily possible to explain the relationship, although this is somewhat more difficult in the field of politics than in geometry. But what remains problematic, because it no more than approaches the causation of real processes, is what Hobbes also demonstrates a priori in his system, namely kinematics, or the theory of motion. A discussion of this problem must be postponed to the chapter on physics.

The concepts of the forms and configurations of will, by and for themselves, are nothing but artifacts of thought, tools devised to facilitate the comprehension of reality. The highly variegated quality of human willing is made comparable by relating it—under the dual aspect of real and imaginary will—to these normal concepts as common denominators.

As free and arbitrary products of thought, normal concepts are mutually exclusive: in a purely formal way nothing pertaining to arbitrary will must be thought into essential will, nothing of essential will into arbitrary will. It is entirely different if these concepts are considered empirically. In this case, they are nothing else but names comprising and denoting a multiplicity of observations or ideas; their content will decrease with the range of the phenomena covered. In this case, observation and deliberation will show that no essential will can ever occur without the arbitrary will by means of which it is expressed and no arbitrary will without the essential will on which it is based. But the strict distinction between normal concepts enables us to discern the existing tendencies toward the one or the other. They exist and take effect alongside each other, they further and augment each other, but, on the other hand, to the extent that each aspires to power and control, they will necessarily collide with each other, contradict and oppose each other. For their content, expressed in norms and rules of behavior, is comparable. Consequently, if arbitrary will desires to order and define everything in accordance with end, purpose or utility, it must overcome the given, traditional, deeply rooted rules insofar as they cannot be adapted to those ends and purposes; or must subordinate them, if that is possible. Therefore, the more decisive arbitrary will or purposeful thinking becomes and the more it concentrates on the knowledge, acquisition, and application of means, to that extent will the emotional and thought complexes which make out the individual

Translated from *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, new ed. (Darmstadt, 1963), pp. 133-34 (Loomis, pp. 141-42). The translation, on the whole, follows the one by Loomis, but deviates from it in a number of instances.

character of essential will be exposed to the danger of withering away. And not only this, but there also exists a direct antagonism because essential will restrains arbitrary will, resists its freedom of expression and its possible dominance, whereas arbitrary will strives first to free itself from essential will and then attempts to dissolve, destroy, and dominate it. These relations become evident most easily if we take neutral empirical concepts to investigate such tendencies: concepts of human nature and psychological disposition which is conceived as corresponding to and underlying actual and, under certain conditions, regular behavior. Such general disposition may be more favorable either to essential or to arbitrary will. Elements of both may meet and blend in such a general disposition, and one or another may determine its character to a lesser or larger degree.

The Imagination of Types

It is form, not matter, that is enduring. In this regard, the forms of social structure and the forms of essential will are of the same kind; neither can be perceived by the senses or conceived in material categories. The form, as a whole, is always constituted by its elements, which in relation to the form are of material character and maintain and propagate themselves through this very relationship. Thus, for a whole (as enduring form) each of its parts will always be a transitory modification of itself, expressing the nature of the whole in a more or less complete manner. The part could be considered a means to the end of sustaining the whole if at the same time and while it lasted it were not, indeed, an end in itself. At any rate, the parts are similar insofar as they participate in the life of the whole, but different and manifold insofar as each one expresses itself and has a specific function. The same relation exists between a genus (*Realbegriff*) and the groups and individuals that belong to it. This is also true of the relation between individuals and every actual group encompassing them, which must be conceived as being in the process of becoming or declining or in transition to a higher form, always active, alive and changing.

Consequently, what we are taking our departure from is the *essentia* of man, not an abstraction, but the concretely imagined concept of humanity as a whole as the most generally existing reality of this kind. The next steps lead to the *essentia* of race, ethnic group, tribe, and smaller organized groupings and finally to the individual who, as it were, is the centerpiece of these many concentric circles. The more narrowing the lines of the circles which bridge the gap to him, the better is the individual understood. The intuitive and entirely mental recognition of such a whole can be facilitated and more readily grasped by the senses through the imagination (*Vorstellung*) of types each of which must be con-

Translated from *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Darmstadt, 1963), pp. 173-74 (Loomis, pp. 171-73). Translation adapted from Loomis, but deviating occasionally. Subtitle supplied.

Imagination of Types

ceived as comprising the characteristic traits of all the specific manifestations that belong to them prior to their differentiation. Thus, the types are more nearly perfect than the specific manifestations because they embody also those forces and latent capacities which have withered away through lack of use. But, on the other hand, they are more imperfect because they lack the specific qualities which have been developed in reality. For the theory, the concrete but nevertheless constructed image of such a typical entity and its description represents the intellectual idea of the real essence of this meta-empirical whole. In actual life, however, the fullness of the spirit as well as the force of such a whole, can impart itself to its parts only through the natural gathering of the real living bodies in all their initial and actual concreteness; but it may also be conceived as embodied by selected representatives, or even by a single individual who stands for the will and existence of the collectivity.

Hobbes and the Zoon Politikon

The problem. In my monograph on Hobbes I drew attention to several points suggesting the gradual development of his famous political theory, as presented in the three consecutive works: *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic*,¹ *De Cive* (or *The Citizen*), and *Leviathan*.² Long before that, my *Notes on the Philosophy of Hobbes* had outlined certain aspects, which I still maintain are essential in the development of Hobbes' thinking. But on neither occasion did I examine the basis of the system of natural law, of which Otto v. Guericke³ said that it was destined to shatter the traditional natural law doctrine. This explosive element is wrapped in the often repeated thesis that the natural condition of man was a state of war between men; Hobbes calls this, with an expression he did not invent but rendered classic, the war of all against all, while until then (as Guericke puts it) the traditional idea was that of an original community in peace and law. This traditional view fitted well with the thesis of the ancient philosopher that by nature man was an organism designed for the *polis*, that he was a *zoon politikon*. In the *Elements of Law* Hobbes did not mention this theorem. The first chapter of the second edition of *De Cive* (1646), however, which otherwise reproduces the argument of chapter 14 of the *Elements*, has in its second section a paragraph inserted, where Hobbes sets out to refute the doctrine of the *zoon politikon*.⁴

Translated from "Hobbes und das Zoon Politikon," *Zeitschrift fuer Voellierrecht* 12 (1923): 471-88, slightly abridged. This paper appeared two years before Toennies issued the third edition of his monograph on Hobbes. References to the monograph have been changed to the third edition. The quotations Toennies selected and translated from Hobbes' writings are given in the original, although in modern spelling and punctuation.

¹ Ed. F. Toennies, 1889, reprinted 1969, Frank Cass, London.—Eds.

² Page references in the following are to the Cambridge University Press edition by Waller, reprinted 1935.—Eds.

³ Otto v. Guericke, *Johannes Althusius*, third ed., p. 300.

⁴ "The greatest part of those men who have written aught concerning commonwealths, either suppose, or require us, or beg of us to believe, that man is a creature born fit for society. The Greeks call him *zoon politikon*."

Hobbes and the Zoon Politikon

In the first annotation he says: "Since we see actually a constituted society among men, and none living out of it; since we discern all desirous of congress and mutual correspondence: it may seem an amazing kind of stupidity to lay in the very threshold of this doctrine such a stumbling block before the readers, as to deny man to be born fit for society," Hobbes says. The annotation was, as one may infer as probable, called for by the fact that some of his readers had expressed in strong terms their astonishment at this paradox. Hobbes, it appears, was prepared in defense of his theory to make one important concession. It was true, he admitted, that no human being could live in solitude, nor an infant even begin to enjoy living without the aid of others, "wherefore I deny not that men, even nature compelling, desire to come together." Political societies, however—and the operative word is "political"—are not a mere matter of getting together but they are alliances, and to establish an alliance, trust and a compact are needed. Children and uneducated persons, Hobbes goes on, are unable to recognize the nature of these; those who have no experience of the damage that results from the absence of society do not know its usefulness. The ones, who do not understand what society is, cannot enter it; the others, who do not know what it is good for, do not care. "Yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature; wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education. Furthermore, although man were born in such a condition as to desire it, it follows not that he therefore were born fit to enter it; for it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride will not stoop to equal conditions without which there can be no society, do yet desire it."

Critical evaluation. Hobbes has often been praised for the rigorous consistency in his thinking. Indeed the energy with which he knows how to pursue an argument is admirable. But how brittle at certain points those lines of thought are by which he undertook to establish that remarkable political theory of his, I have shown in my early paper of 1880.⁵ In the interpretation to which my own

⁵ Notes on the philosophy of Hobbes I-IV, in *Vierteljahrsschrift fuer wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, 1879-80.

studies have led me, the original conception of the theory was as follows.

In the state of nature man is determined by his emotions, he is frightened of others; for various reasons men conflict with each other, and a state of war is the outcome. In the civil state it is the reasonableness of the possessor of political power which compels people to be amenable, and a state of peace is the outcome. A political power can arise out of the state of nature only in this way, that human beings, through the experience of the state of war, arrive at the insight that to end this terrible state they must create that thing called the State: its essential nature being the complete and unconditional possession and exercise of power, whether by a single or a collective person.

This fundamental idea, which ever so often recurs in his writings, is as it were pushed over by the new theory of the human mind, which Hobbes derived from his scientific and mathematical studies, more particularly from the mechanistic physiology he had learned from William Harvey. The gist of this theory is that the human will is exclusively determined by emotions, and that this determination is a necessary one: human will is emotionally egoistic, and cannot but be egotistical. Greed and fear are the dominant motives. This theory leads Hobbes to the conclusion that only out of fear, that is to say mutual fear, can society be produced. Greed will only move man to subdue and to dominate others. Mutual fear, and mutual distrust as its motive power, were also attributed to the state of nature, and therefore belonged to the general state of enmity. That, according to his own principles, it was a paradox to derive from the same source not only sociability but political power cannot have escaped the author of this theory, and it was presumably this contradiction to which some of his readers drew his attention.

In the second annotation to *De Cive* he tried to meet their objection that the effect of mutual fear must be that human beings could not even bear to look at each other face to face. He explains that by fear he means foresight or prudence, which most often leads to the attempt to cover oneself with weapons and other means of defense—"whence it happens that daring to come forth, they

know each other's spirits; but then, if they fight, civil society arises from victory, if they agree, from their agreement."

This line of reasoning betrays Hobbes' perplexity. In the text to which this annotation relates, a power that quite obviously refers to the state as a fruit of victory had been clearly distinguished from the society (domination versus society): for domination, men would strive with all their greed if they were not kept in check by fear. We note that the philosopher, who places such a high value on definition, fails here to define what he means by society. Does he mean the same thing when he talks of society as such (in the text) as when he talks of civil society (in the annotation)? And is the latter, or are both, to be thought of as equivalent to the state (*civitas*)? Or, are only the "great and lasting societies" the same as the state?

The circumstantial argument. Just as Hobbes found it necessary to answer the objections about the *zoon politikon*, so it is probable that the passage in the text itself which criticized the Aristotelian concept was designed to meet an objection that had been raised in writing or in conversation, whether an objection against his English treatise (*The Elements*), known only by a few handwritten copies, or raised when he developed in conversation his theorem of the war of all against all. With such an objection he might have dealt in the following way, which would have been in line with the rest of his political theory, namely:

If your understanding of the *zoon politikon* is that it means that man cannot live without his fellowmen, one needs the other for his aid, for company, for intercourse, and for communication, then I agree wholeheartedly. The only reservation I, Hobbes, would have to make is that love and goodwill are only to a small part man's motives; it is far more his selfish motives on which the urge to be sociable and to live in society is based. But the selfish motives—and it is they that are second nature to man—lead far more often to quarrel and conflict, or even to open fighting and to war, than to harmony, obedience, and peace. Moreover, the peaceful relationships, for example, between husband and wife, parents and children, are often torn by antagonism, a domineering atti-

tude, and revolt; in the state of nature there is no guarantee that they may last, none of permanent peace, hence no security against hostile attacks, although a sensible person who does not want to quarrel with himself must long for peace and security. ("Whosoever therefore holds that it had been best to have continued in that state, in which all things were lawful for all men, he contradicts himself." *De Cive* I 13.) This need is not satisfied by contracts, where everyone remains independent of everyone else, and which everyone may renounce whenever it seems to be to his advantage. It is not sufficient that, motivated by mutual fear, men come to hold the view that it is better to abandon the general state of war or to alleviate it by seeking allies by force or persuasion. Nor can one maintain oneself permanently by tyranny, which those who are being tyrannized will always try to escape. This need can be satisfied only by setting up a commonwealth, to whose established authorities, recognized by all as legal, those belonging together ("all") voluntarily and cognizant of its common benefits consider themselves subject. Such a commonwealth, by its very constitution, is a work of art. The civil state, which thereby is created, is an artificial state. Perhaps it can never be achieved in perfection, and it can be achieved only by cultivated people, who by restraint (*disciplina* was the term used in that first annotation) or by education (this is the term used in the English translation of that annotation) have learned to understand what is to their true advantage, and to take thought of the future. ("They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, do agree concerning a future good, which indeed is a work of reason; for things present are obvious to the sense, things to come to our reason only." *De Cive* III 31.)

As is suggested by the quotations I have given here, and as will be noted by the attentive reader, most pieces of this line of thought are really there as fragments, but in the text and the annotations they have not been properly joined. They somehow remain lopsided. Why is this? Because the final piece is missing; that is, the clear and complete distinction of a commonwealth, not just from any society or from sociability at large but as much from the "great and lasting societies," from alliances, from all forms of

social life, which are possible also in the state of nature, and actually occur in it, and which as such belong to the state of nature. Again we must ask, Why?

The development of the political theory. In my book-length study of Hobbes I could show how the abstract-rationalist character of the theory was achieved only gradually in the author's thought.⁶ While at the early stages he was still concerned with the basis of empirical states of governments, the definitive formation of the theory grew out of the clear insight that his problem was the abstract idea of the rational state, however far the actual so-called states did or did not measure up to the idea. I also proved that this line of thought did not reach its culmination until *Leviathan*, although even in that work there remain traces of the initial aim at a descriptive explanation of states as they are in reality. Nevertheless, it is only in *Leviathan* that the idea of the state became the main theme. In the first work, *The Elements*, it was the idea of law, in the second, *De Cive*, the idea of the citizen that was his theme. I tried to demonstrate that the progress in Hobbes' thinking was closely linked to the emphasis on the state as a person. In *De Cive*, Hobbes moves in that direction, but the theory becomes dominant only in *Leviathan*. It is there that he fully works out the proposition that the essence of "person" consists in representation (that is, of the words and actions of one or a number of persons, or of those of any other being to whom they can be ascribed, whether as something real or fictional). A natural person is the one that represents only himself, while any other person, being fictitious or artificial, represent the purposes and interests of others. In my paper of 1880 I had made it clear that the concept of the state as a work of art occurs as a dominant concept in *Leviathan*, and that it was in this work that Hobbes compared this political theory of his to architectural principles.

The question of whether man is or is not by nature social was in this context irrelevant. There is no more mention of the *zoon politikon*, and the whole discussion about the exclusively egotistical nature of man, with which it is connected, has been dropped.

6 Op. cit., 3d ed. [1925], p. 244.

True, he repeats: human beings derive no pleasure but a great deal of grief from being in each other's company when there is no power to keep them in awe. But alongside the causes of conflict in human nature—competition, distrust, vanity—he now discovers as many emotions that induce men to peace; they are fear of death, a desire for the things needed for a pleasant life, the hope of achieving these things by industry. The problem he had formerly approached from the outside, that is, of the possibility as well as the historicity of a change from a state of nature or war to the civil state of peace, thus disappears almost completely. The problem has now been internalized. The war of all against all is always latently there wherever competition, distrust, and vanity predominate; but at the same time these motives are being counteracted by other motives, and these will weigh heavier in the balance once the perfect state in keeping with the new doctrine and its rules has been achieved. Until that happens, the situation remains fraught with faults and the ever present danger of relapse. A series of the relevant passages I put together in my monograph⁷ bear out this conception.

To appreciate fully this progress in the idea, it is of interest to compare the statements Hobbes makes about the war of all against all in the three consecutive versions of the theory. The emphasis on the internalized principle is perhaps strongest in one of his late writings (1674),⁸ where he declared: "Most grateful, all men will agree, they must be to those who first induced them to get together (*consociarent*) and make contracts to the effect that they obey one supreme power for the sake of keeping the peace (*inter se pasciserentur*). But I would owe the next-greatest thanks to those who can persuade them not to violate their undertakings." A certain wavering is, however, discernible in his work between trust in an established supreme power, whatever its origin, on the one hand, and the stronger trust in better insight and in the effects of scientific understanding, on the other hand. Absolute power re-

⁷ Op. cit., pp. 244–48, p. 306, with reference to "Notes on the Philosophy of Hobbes," III, op. cit. pp. 428–56.

⁸ *Principia et problemata aliquot geometrica*, Latin Works ed. Molesworth, vol. V, p. 202.

mains decisive, but to be valid it must be based on common consent, as the expression of an enlightened view—today, one might say, of public opinion.

Argument from experience and abstract idea. The idea that the war of all against all does not reflect chiefly, much less exclusively, the position prior to the civil state, but also or even essentially the position within the civil, orderly, peaceful state is being sounded as early as *De Cive*. Not, however, in the text of that work but in the preface to the reader, which Hobbes wrote later. There he sets down, "in the first place for a principle," by experience known to all men: that the dispositions of men are naturally such that, unless they are restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will distrust and fear the other; therefore, as by natural right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to, make use of the strength he has toward the preservation of himself:

Perhaps, you will object [Hobbes continues] that there are some who deny this; truly so it happens that very many do deny it. But shall I therefore seem to contradict myself because I affirm that the same men confess and deny the same thing? In trust I do not, but they do whose actions disavow what their words approve of. We see all countries, though they be at peace with their neighbors, yet guarding their frontiers with military installations, their towns with walls and gates, and keeping constant watches. To what purpose is all this, if there be no fear of the neighboring power? We see even in well-governed states, where there are laws and punishments appointed for offenders, yet individual men travel not without being armed for defence, nor do they sleep without shutting not only their doors against their fellow citizens, but also their trunks and coffers against those who share their abode or are their servants. Obviously, individual men as well as governments (states) who act in this fashion confess that they mutually distrust and fear each other. But in a controversy they attempt to deny it, which means that out of a desire to contradict others they end up by contradicting themselves.⁹

In a different context, in the middle of the chapter "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind," *Leviathan* (I 13) reproduces this thought. Here the inference, deduced from the passions, is being

⁹ P. 11/12 ed. Lamprecht.—Eds.

confirmed by experience. "Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors, when even in his house, he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries that shall be done him: what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words?" Immediately following this, Hobbes concedes that "there never was such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places where they live so now." Renewed mention of the "savage people in many places in America" ("except the government of small families, the concord whereof depends on natural lust") is followed by a sentence that is pregnant with conceptual significance; it reads, "Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life into which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government usually degenerate during a civil war." The same idea occurs in the 1656 polemic about free will with the Bishop Bramhall, where he says, "[T]here are therefore almost at all times multitudes of lawless men."¹⁰

Finally, Hobbes refers again as decisive ("though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another" [*Leviathan*, *ibid.*] "since the creation there never was a time in which mankind was totally without society" [Bramhall polemic]) to the example of the relations between different countries, or, more precisely, "kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another, that is their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbors, which is a posture of war." Curious the remark he adds: "But because they uphold

¹⁰ *The Questions concerning liberty, necessity and chance*, etc., No. XIV, English Works ed. Molesworth, vol. V, p. 184.

thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men."¹¹

Hobbes wrote in the years when the Thirty Years' War on the European continent was drawing to its end, and at that time, no less than today, there would seem to have been good reason to describe the misery of nations in analogy to that of individuals in a state of anarchy. In the seventeenth century, however, permanent armed forces were only in their beginnings. On the same plane as the analogy between the situation of individuals and that of countries is the viewpoint of international law as an applied general natural law, resting as it does on a rational concept of equality, with peace as its aim. Thus as early as in the last line of *The Elements*,¹² again in *De Cive* at greater length,¹³ and in *Leviathan*.¹⁴

The old contrast superseded. There are other indications that Hobbes came to recognize his theory for what it was, that is, a strictly hypothetical scheme, or an ideal construct, invented for the comparison with the antistate.

One of his French correspondents acknowledged, under the date of January 4, 1657, the reply he had received to his own draft thesis; he wrote, "I find that you do not quite do justice to the state of nature by the illustration of the soldiers who serve on different sides, and that of the masons who work under different architects."¹⁵ I would explain this as follows. Hobbes wanted to indicate by these illustrations that wherever people are not subject to the same regimen, and do not live under the same constitution, there is in fact something analogous to the state of nature—they do not want any dealings with each other, they remain strangers

¹¹ *Leviathan* I 13, op. cit., p. 85.

¹² ["For that which is the law of nature between men and men, before the constitution of the commonwealth, is the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign, after."] *Elements* II 10.10, p. 151, ed. Toennies.

¹³ *De Cive* XIV 4, p. 158.

¹⁴ *Leviathan* II 30, p. 257.

¹⁵ From these letters—Hobbes's own letters seem to have been lost, at least, they have as yet not been traced—I made some extracts in 1878 at the Hardwicke hunting lodge in Devonshire where Hobbes died on December 4, 1679. They are kept with some other remains of his in a file "The Hobbes Papers."

to each other, and are potentially opposed to each other. Whether the examples he gave were a happy choice, I would doubt with his French correspondent. It is possible that Hobbes replied once more, and tried to make his meaning clearer. He may in such a letter even have reverted to the question of the *Zoon Politikon*.¹⁶ That he did eventually come up with a different view, as far as the Aristotelian formula is concerned, seems to me cannot be doubted. Such insight was bound to come to him the more he grew conscious of "the state as a work of art"—this, two centuries later, was going to be theme and title of the first part of Jakob Burckhardt's great work on *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*—and it was this very conception to which he was led when he reexamined, in *De Cive*, his own introductory disquisition. Admittedly, the thesis of the ancient Greek philosopher, according to which the *polis* existed *physei*, and man was *physei* a being that was made teleologically for the *polis* (this being the true meaning of the famous sentence), cannot apparently be reconciled with the idea of a work-of-art state. I say "apparently," for the truth of the matter is that the remarks in *Leviathan* I quoted earlier show how Hobbes had indeed widened the conception by combining in his own theory the empirically descriptive study of existing countries as imperfect and faulty edifices with the pure theory of the topic as such and the rules of a consistent political architecture.

The result of this was that he could entertain as a possibility a progressive approximation of the real to the ideal—"Time and industry produce every day new knowledge . . . long after men have begun to constitute commonwealths, imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by external violence) everlasting."¹⁷ Compare with this the re-

mark that he was "at the point of believing this my labour as useless as the commonwealth of Plato," yet recovered some hope "that at one time or another this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign, who will . . . convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice."¹⁸

In a general sense, Hobbes could have said that the ancient antithesis of things existing *physei* and of things existing *nomō* or *thesei* was not absolutely valid; it was valid, in that the thinking about things existing *nomō* or *thesei* was a construction, that is, an abstract concept. But in reality art and the exercise of art belong to human nature, which by its very capacity for abstract thought distinguishes itself from animal nature.¹⁹ In the political theory itself, however, this view was not decisively followed up by Hobbes. The original conception proved too strong, as is particularly evident in his discussion about social animals (bees and ants), which occurs in all three versions. Each time Hobbes insisted, apart from other circumstances that distinguish human beings and counteract their natural harmony, that in the last analysis the agreement among those animals was natural but among men "by covenant only," which is artificial.²⁰ Had Hobbes at this point added words to the effect that the artifact based on reason is for man, because he is capable of reasoning, as natural as is instinctive or emotionally conditioned social behavior for certain animals, he would have expressed only what fully accords with his whole way of thinking. More clearly than in the discussion about social animals, this way of thinking comes to the fore in the last of Hobbes' principal works, *De Homine* (1658). Here he lists the most important advantages man reaps from being endowed with speech. They are: first, the ability to count (which is considered at some length); second, the ability to advise and instruct; and third,

That we can give orders and understand orders, is a benefit of speech, and a very great one at that. Without this, there would be no society

¹⁶ Op. cit., II, chapter 31 [p. 268, Cambridge ed.—Eds.].

¹⁷ "We speak of art as distinguished from nature, but art itself is natural to man," as Adam Ferguson declared in *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 1767. [ed. Duncan Forbes, Edinburgh 1966, p. 6.—Eds.]

¹⁸ *Leviathan* II, chapter 17, p. 118.

¹⁹ Of the numerous letters he wrote to France some may quite possibly still be preserved in provincial libraries. I have searched the libraries in Paris, and not without success, see my "Seventeen Letters to Samuel Sorbière" etc. in *Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. III, 1898, pp. 58-71 [and the reprint by G. C. Robertson in *Mind*, vol. XV, pp. 440-47].

²⁰ *Leviathan* II, chapter 30, p. 244, which I quoted in full in my monograph, 3d ed., p. 232.

among men, no peace, and consequently no high culture; but savagery, first, then solitude, and caves for dwelling-places. For although some animals have got some states (*politiae*) of their own sort, these are not adequate for the good life; they do not therefore deserve being considered here, and they are contrived by animals that are defenceless and have no great needs; man is not among their number, and as swords and shields, the weapons of man, are superior to those of animals, their horns, teeth and claws, so is man superior to bears, wolves and snakes. They are not greedy beyond their immediate hunger and savage only when provoked, but man surpasses them in his greed and savageness, he is famished even to the point where he strives to still his future hunger. From which it will be easily understood how much we owe to speech. By means of speech we socialize and, reaching agreement by means of contract, live securely, happily and in a refined manner; in other words, we are able to live because we will it so.²¹

But, this line of thought continues, speech is also afflicted by evil consequences. It is due to speech that man can err more and worse than other animals. Furthermore, he can lie and arouse enmity in the minds of his fellowmen to the conditions of society and peace; animal societies are not exposed to this. In addition, man can repeat words he has not understood, assuming he is saying something when in fact he says nothing. Finally, he can deceive himself with words, which again the beast cannot do. "Therefore, by speech does man become not better, only more powerful."²²

Individualism. No trace whatever can be found in Hobbes of an idea which is more appropriate for us today than his view of the original state of life, or the state of nature hidden beneath civilization: the idea, that is, that the modern, urbanized, *Gesellschaft*-like civilization, of which he knew only the beginnings, represents a concealed war of all against all. Yet this is in fact the real substance of his theme, even if in abstract expression and in form of a model, which can claim to be conceptually as accurate as the statement that our planet is a sphere. "Individualism" has often been described as the very nature of our age, and hardly ever in such depth of historical insight as in Burchard's *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. It is this individualism that as an eternal truth

²¹ *De Homine* X 3, Latin Works ed. Molesworth, vol. II, p. 91.

²² *Ibid.*

was made the foundation of Hobbes' system of political philosophy. The generally observable conflict among individuals is indeed the consequence of their unconditional self-affirmation. Our more recent times, with their unfettered economic competition, their class struggles, their contests between political parties, and their civil wars, have more and more revealed that Medusa's head (to borrow an expression of Marx)²³ that hides itself under the veil of the presumably highest achievements of civilization, such as the triumphant progress of technology, of worldwide communications, and of science.

²³ Preface to the first edition of *Das Kapital*.

The Concept of Gemeinschaft

For a long time it has been accepted as an achievement of German scientific endeavor that it supplemented the concept of the state, which from of old had occupied the central place in the philosophy of law, by that of society. The essential merit for this is ascribed to Hegel, who, in his lectures on *The Philosophy of Right*, places "civil society" as the second link—the antithesis—between the family and the state, making these three combined phenomena, which reach consummation, of course, in the third, the realization of right (or law) as the moral order (*Sittlichkeit*). In attaching to society the adjective "civil," he takes up an expression which had become current in the French and English literature of the eighteenth century—for instance, through Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767)—although no attempt had yet been made to render this expression as a concept. Hegel had an eminent successor in Lorenz Stein, who (for the first time in 1849) expounded "the concept of society and the principles of its transformation" as an opening chapter to the *History of the Social Movement in France since 1789*. He wanted to show in this work that the constitution and administration of a state are subject to the static elements and dynamic movements of the social order. The economic order, he said, becomes, by means of the division of labor, a social order, comprising man and his activities; and the social order, in turn, through the family, becomes a lasting order of the generations. Within the social order, moreover, the community of men is the organic unity of their lives; "and this organic unity of human life is human society." Stein goes on to argue that the content of the life of the human "community" (*Gemeinschaft*) must be a continuous struggle between state and society, the state, being, to him, the "community" of men asserting itself, as if it were a personality, in will and action. The principle of the state rests with its task of developing

Translated from "Der Begriff der Gemeinschaft," *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken* 2 (1925) : 266-76; the latter part of this paper, about one fourth of the whole, has been omitted.

The Concept of Gemeinschaft 63

itself and, for the sake of that self-development, to strive with its highest power for the progress, wealth, vigor, and intelligence of all individuals encompassed by it. The principle of society, on the other hand, is interest, hence the subjection of individuals by other individuals, that is, the fulfillment of the individual by means of the dependence from it of the other individual.

This theory, which Stein applied and unfolded ingeniously, won its most important follower in Rudolf Gneist, whose influence helped to shape the constitutional and administrative law of Prussia and of the new German Reich. In his treatise on the *Rechtsstaat*, Gneist sets out by acknowledging that the contemporary world, with its deep antagonisms, can be understood only on the ground of *Gesellschaft*. "Science, too," he says, "is compelled to acknowledge that the abstract 'I' from which the older natural law constructed the state is not a part of the real world; that in reality every people is divided and articulated according to the possession and acquisition of the external and spiritual goods which mankind is ordained to acquire and enjoy—an articulation which I comprise, in this treatise, in the concept of 'society' (*Gesellschaft*)." And, in a note, Gneist makes reference to "Stein's masterly explanation," which, he adds, was of decisive importance for his own treatment of English constitutional history.

If the concepts "state" and "society" are placed side by side, the first observation to which the juxtaposition gives rise is that while the latter term merely denotes a collectivity of men interrelated in manifold ways, the term state, whatever its other connotations, indicates at any rate an association—a union or, as is customary to say nowadays, an organization—to which so and so many persons belong who, to begin with, live next to each other in a "state territory." Against the theory of modern natural law according to which the state proceeded, like another association (*Sozietät*), from the will of the individuals, the historical school of jurisprudence had revolved by declaring that the state was something that had grown, something organic, something original in its core, and not at all brought into existence by contract. This polemic against the natural law theory resulted from a misunderstanding of that doctrine and, at the same time, from a

conservative (or restorative) intention to impede the activity of the state that arose from the French Revolution as well as from the princely absolutism that had preceded it and whose avocation and fitness for legislation and codification were denied by the outstanding founder of the historical school (Savigny).

Nevertheless, it must be granted and understood that another construction of the state, as well as of other associations, is possible than that which represents it as a means for the common ends of a great many individual persons; even if it were thought of as a means, it must not necessarily be thought of as an isolated, mechanical means, but may also be an end, so indissolubly intertwined with the common ends of a multitude of individuals that it in fact expresses them by and in itself. For an association may, by its "members," not only be called but also conceived of as a "corporation," essentially independent from the members, as parts, and—while its component parts change, and through that very change—maintaining itself as a living entity or organism. And just as in the case of an association, a mere relationship of two or more men will appear one way if these men are thought of as essentially strange to each other but meeting in their wishes and interests and entering into an exchange relationship for mutual advantage—and another way if it is thought that there is something that they have in common to begin with from which mutual services result as a consequence. The thing they have in common may be, for instance, common descent; but also a common end such as the founding of a common household, that is, if the latter is thought of not as an object of wishes that are incidentally coinciding but as a common incumbency, a duty, and a necessity. In the same manner, all social values which the individual shares either by unreservedly feeling and thinking them as belonging to him or by a mere relationship of high valuation may be thought of in two different ways: either as objective or, in the perfect case, sacred values which exist and persist independently from the evaluating participant although the participant shares in their enjoyment as a companion (*Genosse*); or as caused by the individuals who severally recognize and posit the value. In the first case, the common value is to be conceived of as an indivisible totality or at least one which, if

divided, flows back again into one whole. In the second case, the common value is to be conceived of as composed of the contributions of individuals, always remaining divisible, a mere quantity of means intended for a more or less limited end.

I thought it necessary to state that all social relationships, social values, and social unions and associations, insofar as they exist for their subjects—the social men—are created, posited, or instituted by the will of the latter, and that it is this psychological conditioning which constitutes their essence because, in this manner, they are seen, as it were, from within. This stands in contrast to Stein's definition of the concept of society, or *Gesellschaft*, ("the organic labor in human life"), which remains stuck to the outside of things. Moreover, community, or *Gemeinschaft*, with Stein, is merely an expression meaning that "the whole exists for the sake of the parts." Consequently, he calls society (*Gesellschaft*) and the state "the two great elements of *Gemeinschaft*." (*System der Staatswissenschaft*, vol. 2.)

In contradistinction to this usage, the foremost principle for the subdivision of the social entities must be found in the differing quality of the human will which is contained in them and, indeed, is the maxim of their existence. This becomes more evident if the noun "will," which is a *perfectum*, is replaced by the verb "to affirm," which is in the present mode, so that we may speak of the affirmation of social relationships, social values, and social associations. The sharpest contrast, then, arises if affirmation of a social entity for its own sake is distinguished from an affirmation of such an entity because of an end, or purpose, which is extraneous to it. I call a will of the first kind *essential will*, and a will of the second kind *arbitrary will*. Evidently, this view differs strongly from a theory which is sometimes encountered and which distinguishes "involuntary" from willed or voluntary unions, associations, and so on, and as the former regards, by a definition which is merely external, those which did not originate from a specific decision of the individuals concerned and therefore can be said to be "without will," as, for instance, the family into which one is born. In fact, however, it may be supposed to be the normal case that a man affirms his family with all his heart, so that he posits it by his

essential will, precisely as he posits by his arbitrary will a commercial company, which has the limited purpose of maintaining the value of an investment and deriving the highest possible profit from it.

Further, this view in no way coincides with that which conceives of "spontaneous organizations" as originating from feeling and instinct. In the first place, I do not emphasize the genetic aspect, but a lasting inner relationship. For instance, a marriage—to consider a very individual relationship—may be entered into very enthusiastically, for its own sake, and yet after a short time be maintained and affirmed by both spouses simply with a view to "what people say," for the sake of social respectability, as a means to maintain one's position and the position of one's children in society: in other words, as a *marriage de convenance*. Second, my synthetic concepts of essential will and arbitrary will do not correspond to the distinction of instinctual and volitional actions, as these terms are used by Wundt and others. Essential will definitely comprises what psychologists would call volitional actions insofar as they affirm means and ends as an organic whole, that is, as a belonging together. The concept of arbitrary will arises, as it were, only when and to the extent that means and ends become separated (become alienated from each other), to the point even of becoming outright antagonistic to each other. A perfect arbitrary will affirms a relationship, even in spite of a definite aversion to it—that is, exclusively for the sake of the desired end. For instance, a hike in the mountains, the aim of which is to reach a high summit, I will affirm and welcome as a whole thing, despite great difficulties and labors. But I will consent to a train trip from Eutin to Berlin—especially under the conditions obtaining in 1919—only for the sake of its aim and end. I will make this decision reluctantly insofar as I am thinking of the trip itself, which is envisaged merely as the unavoidable means for reaching my goal. As a rule, some of the pleasurable connotations of the end will be communicated to the means, just as the displeasure caused by the actor to others reflects back to the actor himself; but the more cold reasoning strives to reach the end, seeking it unconditionally, the more will the reasoning human being become indifferent against uni-

tended consequences and incidental phenomena connected with its pursuit—both in concrete reality and in anticipatory thought; he will become indifferent to his own immediate displeasure and even more so to the displeasure caused to others, and to the compassion which may stir in him. All these relationships are conceived of still more generally, if the more general concepts of affirmation and negation are applied. For precisely as the person motivated by arbitrary will disregards inner displeasures, so will he disregard other forms of inner negation; for instance, he will use words which he cannot truly affirm or which he even knowingly negates; in other words, he will deliberately tell an untruth calculated to deceive others.

On the other hand, volitional acts, including words, remain within the meaning of the concept of essential will, if these words are spoken in full conviction, even though they may at the same time be used with a view to gaining some end. Likewise, a relationship which is affirmed through love or affection, or because it has become dear through custom and habit or in the line of duty, remains within the concept of *Gemeinschaft* (community) even though it may at the same time be thought of and appreciated in full recognition of its usefulness to me, the affirmer.

The concept of community in this subjective sense must be strictly distinguished from the concept, or, rather, notion, which common speech intends in combinations such as folk or ethnic community, community of speech, community of work (*Volks-gemeinschaft, Sprachgemeinschaft, Werkgemeinschaft*) and so forth. Here, reference is only to the objective fact of a unity based on common traits and activities and other external phenomena. Stein took his misconception of community from this common usage. To be sure, bridges exist between this external (objective) and the internal, or intimate, (subjective) concept of community which I am using and which, likewise, has affinity to common usage. All forms of external community among men comprise the possibility, even the probability, of an internal, or intimate, community (community), and may thus be conceived of as a potential *Gemeinschaft* of those united in it. Thus, the more language rises into consciousness as an element constituting a bond of minds and as a value which is

held in common, the more will a linguistic community, instead of being a mere external fact, become a significant and unifying relationship. The same is true of the community of descent, which is closely akin to, though not fully identical with, the community of language; true, that is, of the folk community or the nation. In this sense, with which I agree, it was said that on August 4, 1914, the German people became a community. It is somewhat different with a religious community, which, to be sure, can be considered merely in its external shape or form but which, essentially at least, intends and ought to be an intimate community or communion. For it is its very essence that men who pray to, and conceive of, the same God feel bound to each other and that they wish to be bound to each other by a common consciousness. This is especially so if they conceive of themselves as members of a mystical body, the Church, and still more so if they believe that they partake of and receive into themselves the divine head of the Church by participating in a "communion," whereby they enter into a suprasensual-sensual bond with that divine head, and hence with each other.

I proposed three kinds of internal, or intimate, community, distinguished by the familiar terms kinship, neighborhood, friendship. The first two of these frequently and simultaneously designate merely external facts or things, which, indeed, they often are.²⁴ One can say that the idea of community (*Gemeinschaft*) attains fulfillment in friendship, in contrast to the counterconcept of hostility, even though it should be noted that no type of inner community excludes hostile feelings and conduct of those associated in it as factual phenomenon. A relationship, for instance, a marriage, may in the consciousness of those associated in it exist as an essential community and yet often be disturbed by such feelings or conduct. To be sure, they corrode the community and may dissolve it internally, although it may continue to exist externally, even though confirmed by the will and consent of those associated in it. It has then become a societal (*Gesellschaft*-like) relationship in the sense mentioned above. In order to supplement what we

have said of communal relationships with names of true communal unions, I am adding here the terms family, local community (*Gemeinde*), and fellowship (*Genossenschaft*).

Parallel with these divisions and permeating them there is, finally, a distinction by which I discern, as both foundation and expression of *Gemeinschaft*, being together (*Zusammenwesen*), living together (*Zusammenwohnen*), and working, or acting, together (*Zusammenwirken*). If, in contrast to linguistic usage, being (*Wesen*) is here used as a verb, this is done in order to express that through the combination with the term together what is called being becomes an activity, a psychological process. Being together means belonging together raised to consciousness, living together means the affirmation of spatial proximity as precondition of manifold interactions, and working together means these interactions themselves, as emanating from a common spirit and an essential will. Being together, so to speak, is the vegetative heart and soul of *Gemeinschaft*—the very existence of *Gemeinschaft* rests in the consciousness of belonging together and the affirmation of the condition of mutual dependence which is posed by that affirmation. Living together may be called the animal soul of *Gemeinschaft*; for it is the condition of its active life, of a shared feeling of pleasure and pain, of a shared enjoyment and of the commonly possessed goods, by which one is surrounded, and by the cooperation in teamwork as well as in divided labor. Working together may be conceived of as the rational or human soul of *Gemeinschaft*. It is a higher, more conscious cooperation in the unity of spirit and purpose, including, therefore, a striving for common or shared ideals, as invisible goods that are knowable only to thought. Regarding being together it is descent (blood), regarding living together it is soil (land), regarding working together it is occupation (*Beruf*) that is the substance, as it were, by which the wills of men, which otherwise are far apart from and even antagonistic to each other, are essentially united.

With respect to being together, the deepest contrast among human beings, especially with respect to its psychological consequences, is the biological difference of sex; as a consequence, men and women always part with each other while at the same time

²⁴ Also, friendship, so called, in the superficial sense of acquaintance, would have to be considered as a predominantly external relationship.—*Eds.*

different dominant estates, especially the ecclesiastic and the secular estate. Within the secular estate, finally, there is an older substratum, essentially tied to landed estates, and a younger substratum, essentially powerful through the disposition over capital.

II. Elaboration of Concepts

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