

"to assist in the effort to give some relief to our brothers and sisters across the seas—in the Mother Land." For Yergan, the latter was especially noteworthy, "indicating the common bond between the Caribbean people whose own condition is very low and the exploited peoples of Africa." Even poor women in the Bahamas who had been unable to contribute any money, he explained in the *Gold Coast Observer*, had sent an assortment of handmade straw articles to New York to be sold for South African relief.<sup>133</sup>

The South African consulate in New York, and legation in Washington regularly followed the activities of the Council on African Affairs, but the Ciskei famine relief campaign received particular attention.<sup>134</sup> The government of the Union of South Africa had reason to worry. Not only had the CAA's support for South African miners and the famine campaign mobilized an extraordinary array of Americans, but the belief on the part of African Americans that their struggles were linked to those of Africans and all colonized peoples found its greatest institutional expression in the forums surrounding the founding and the early years of the United Nations. And in 1946, as worldwide attention turned to the new organization, the CAA joined with the government of India, the South African ANC, the Joint Passive Resistance Council of the Transvaal, and Natal Indian Congresses of South Africa to challenge the policies of the South African government at the United Nations.

## THE DIASPORA MOMENT

We say even to the President of the United States, we say to King George VI. of England, to Winston Churchill. If all you White Imperialist Rulers of the world, . . . if you refuse to do justice to those of my race in America. In the West Indies. In South and Central America. . . . We say to YOU LET THE BLACK PEOPLE FREE! GIVE THEM BACK THEIR AFRICAN TERRITORY! . . . Give themselves their own SELF-DETERMINATION! Give themselves their own representatives and protectorate government in Africa! which belongs to 22 millions black people of America 400 million black people scattered all over the world. The New Negro everywhere wants African liberation. . . . The New Negro of Harlem wants Post War jobs. Decent living wages, . . . we want our houses be painted TODAY! according to sanitary conditions. We want work for our Negro painters, Plumbers, Carpenters and others.

—Community Progressive Negro Painters Union, Inc. and the New Harlem Tenants League, to the Mayor of New York City, May 15th, 1946.

IN A LETTER TO Mayor William O'Dwyer of New York City in 1946, the Community Progressive Negro Painters Union and the New Harlem Tenants League invoked their membership in a community of "400 million black people scattered all over the world" to legitimize their own local claims to jobs and decent housing. Just as striking is their sense of audience. In addressing demands to "all you White Imperialist Rulers of the world," including the President of the United States, King George VI of England and Winston Churchill, the organizations named their oppressors not as arbitrarily exploitive and cruel individuals or states but as powerful actors in a global system of empire and racial capitalism that exploited and appropriated the land, labor, and bodies of black peoples "scattered all over the world."<sup>1</sup>

Diaspora identities had a particularly powerful resonance in the unusually fluid politics of the immediate post-World War II period, a time when the wartime agitation and discussion about colonial independence reached fruition. From the formation of the United Nations to the first stirrings of the Cold War, African American activists brought an elaborate vision of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship to their anticolonial political strategies. The Council on African Affairs was the most visible African American group seeking to influence the direction of American foreign policy, and despite its left-wing radicalism, the

CAA stood at the center, not at the margins, of black American opinion on colonialism. A wide range of African American leaders, churches, and fraternal, business, and community organizations lobbied on anticolonial issues and sought representation in UN bodies. The black American press detailed anticolonial politics at the United Nations. In the aftermath of World War II an extraordinarily broad consensus on colonial issues existed among black Americans.

The formation of the United Nations Organization in 1945, providing a forum for international debate, offered new opportunities for a politics imbued with a sense of identity among African peoples everywhere. With the imminent independence of India and the promise of new Asian and African states in the near future, the possibility of winning political and economic rights through international strategies looked very hopeful in this period. Indeed, diaspora-based strategies coalesced in a unique way in 1946 and 1947. The black American CAA, the Joint Passive Resistance Council of the Natal, the Transvaal Indian Congresses in South Africa, the African National Congress, and the government of India came together at the United Nations to fight the attempts of the South African government to annex South-West Africa and to fight new legislation that would further restrict the rights of Indians within the Union of South Africa.

#### LOBBYING FOR GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Through the first part of 1945 the policies of the American government toward colonialism were still indeterminate.<sup>2</sup> Given the continued wartime alliance of the United States and the Soviet Union, and President Roosevelt's real if ambiguous commitment to the independence of European colonies, William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson have argued, "At least up to the summer of 1944 it seemed probable that the State Department's proposals for an international authority to preside over the liquidation of the European colonial empires had the backing of the president and might inspire American policy after the war."<sup>3</sup> Internal governmental squabbling on the question of the future of the colonies—described by then Secretary of State Edward Stettinius as "warfare between the 'Hottentots and Crusaders' in the State Department and 'hard-boiled realists' of the Navy and War Department"—created a situation in which anticolonial activists could lobby those sympathetic to their goals.

The strategies of the Council on African Affairs would change dramatically by the end of 1946, but in 1944, with wartime alliances still in place, it could lobby within a context of widespread support for new international bodies to promote world peace and security.<sup>4</sup> Conveying the sense of hope that the defeat of fascism and the end of European political dominance would open the door

to a far more equitable world, Max Yergan declared in a February radio address that the framework of the Atlantic Charter and the Teheran Declaration offered "the realistic possibility, indeed, the necessity, of carrying forward a broadly conceived plan for meeting the health needs, providing the economic development, and insuring speedy advancement toward complete self-government for the African peoples."<sup>5</sup>

The CAA advocated postwar economic restructuring along the lines of a worldwide New Deal. Paul Robeson and Yergan argued that in order to avoid economic collapse in America and around the world like that of the 1930s, it was necessary to find new markets; this view was shared by a broad consensus of government, business, and labor leaders as well as journalists. The CAA further argued, however, that because the world economy was severely distorted by the political and economic exploitation of colonial peoples, "such markets can only be created by raising the purchasing power in those dependent areas where millions have hitherto known little but poverty and want. In somewhat the same way that the Southern region of this country is called the nation's number one economic problem, so the colonial territories all over the globe may be called the world's number one economic problem."<sup>6</sup> Summing up in a *Defender* article, John Robert Badger quoted Yergan: "Raising the living standards and well-being of the peoples of colonial countries to a new and higher level is an indispensable condition for gaining economic security in the postwar world. It is an indispensable condition for avoiding right here in the United States a repetition of the wholesale unemployment and privation that we experienced in the last decade."<sup>7</sup>

The CAA's contention that anticolonialism was a necessary feature of economic expansion was shared by a large liberal and left faction in the United States, including such politicians as Henry Wallace. Others, though agreeing on the need for economic expansion, emphasized instead the role of U.S. investment in the mode of Henry Luce's vision of the "American Century," which called for U.S. political and economic dominance in world affairs.<sup>8</sup> The resolution of this debate would not become clear until the Cold War years, but the lines were clearly drawn by 1944.<sup>9</sup> Capturing the heart of the differences over postwar policy—the question of who owns and controls the world's resources—Kumar Goshal warned in the *Courier* that "American dreamers of a super-imperialism wish to see a reactionary government in France through which they can gain a foothold in Europe and—through the French empire—in Africa and Asia as well. This policy will only lead to disaster." Goshal argued that "the only sane way out is the way visualized by such leaders as Henry Wallace and Philip Murray. It is to help industrialize the industrially backward—that is, the colonial—countries on the basis of freedom and equality, and free and equal access to all raw materials and natural sources." The necessary role of the leading industrial countries in this

development, he continued, would be as collaborators rather than rivals: "They must forgo the luxury of imperialism, and accept as equal partners the peoples who are in bondage today."<sup>10</sup>

Thus activists promoted Africans' place in international commerce as free and equal trading partners with their own interests, distinct from those of the colonial powers. CAA lobbying regarding British government regulation of the West African cocoa trade illustrates their attempts to work for African economic independence. Wartime inflation had hit British West Africa especially hard. Commodities produced there and in the Belgian Congo became critical following Japanese victories in the Pacific, as the Allies lost access to raw materials in Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies.<sup>11</sup> British policy on the wartime marketing of colonial exports was decisive in squeezing both producers and consumers: "The prices of colonial exports were controlled and kept at artificially low levels during the war by the British government at the same time that the cost of colonial imports rose dramatically."<sup>12</sup>

Calling the British handling of the cocoa crop "a classic example" of commercial exploitation of colonial peoples, the CAA's *New Africa* revealed that the British government's Cocoa Control Board was headed by John Cadbury, an owner of one of Britain's principal chocolate firms. Despite wartime difficulties, Cadbury Brothers had "recorded a profit of nearly fifteen million dollars—a profit not shared by the producers."<sup>13</sup> The Farmers Committee of British West Africa asked the CAA to help the growers gain an audience with the American Embassy in London about cocoa production and prices. When the U.S. State Department intervened on behalf of the U.S. cocoa trade and chocolate industry in response to British policy on cocoa prices, Yergan pressed for a meeting between State Department officials and the Farmers Committee, stressing that "African interests as well as American and British interests are involved in the issue of cocoa production."<sup>14</sup>

Yet work on such specific economic issues was limited by the CAA's lack of political leverage in influencing economic policies and its circumscribed contact with West African groups. The council sought to exploit ambiguities and differences within the U.S. government, pushing for clearer and stronger anti-colonial policy. When the State Department's Division of African Affairs was formed in 1944 with Henry Villard as its chief, the CAA applauded Villard's promotion of the "open door" policy, as set forth in the Atlantic Charter, but described his policies as progressive but inadequate. The CAA endorsed Villard's positing of reciprocal dependence, whereby "Africa needs our skills and services . . . just as we need Africa's resources," but nonetheless cautioned that the open door policy would be worse than useless unless economic developments gave "primary consideration to the interests of the African peoples."

Moreover, the CAA found, Villard "falsely minimized the desire of the Africans for self-government."<sup>15</sup>

Continuing to push for stronger anticolonial policies, in April 1944 the CAA organized a conference for black American and American-based African organizations to develop strategies lobbying the United States and other governments.<sup>16</sup> The meeting's co-sponsors indicate the range of church, community and political groups that allied with the CAA on anticolonial issues. They included Mary McLeod Bethune, president of the National Council of Negro Women; Rayford Logan of Howard University; Cecelia Cabaniss Saunders, executive secretary of the Harlem YMCA; David H. Sims, president of the First Episcopal District, AME Church; and the African Students Association.<sup>17</sup> Kwame Nkrumah, future president of Ghana, was also a participating sponsor.<sup>18</sup> Insisting that promoting the welfare of Africans and other dependent peoples "must be an integral part of the projected international order," conference participants argued that abolishing "the inferior social, economic, and political status of Africans and all colonized peoples" was an essential prerequisite "for the achievement of international harmony and security." Resolutions asked that the United States take the lead in raising living standards and promoting the industrialization of the African economy, stressing that "Africans themselves" should be the "principal beneficiaries of this economic progress."<sup>19</sup> Calling for moves toward self-determination, other resolutions demanded accountability within proposed international bodies; existing or projected regional commissions within Africa, for example, "should be held accountable to the United Nations organization for the abolition of all forms of political discrimination based on race, creed, or color."<sup>20</sup>

The CAA invited Villard to the conference and representatives from other governments as well.<sup>21</sup> Representatives of the Soviet and Belgian governments and the French National Committee attended, as did the consul general for Ethiopia. Neither the U.S. State Department nor the British government participated, but the meeting did draw their attention. British Ambassador Viscount Halifax described increasing pressure in the United States "for an African Charter and guarantees of improved economic conditions and ultimate self-government for the African peoples." Noting that "the driving force behind this pressure" was the Council on African Affairs, Halifax complained that "widespread publicity was obtained through the Council's clever use of Paul Robeson's birthday on the 16th April. A birthday rally . . . to which 8,000 people turned up . . . provided a useful platform for the spreading of the Council's ideas. . . . The negro press, of course, has given full play to these developments, for Robeson's prestige among the colored people is very great."<sup>22</sup>

The wide array of African American institutions that participated in the conference underscores the CAA's leading role in shaping anticolonial discourse in

the African American community.<sup>23</sup> Likewise, the nearly two hundred individuals and organizations that endorsed a CAA letter to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Stettinius, setting forth the central recommendations of the conference,<sup>24</sup> illustrate the widespread support for the CAA's positions in this period.<sup>25</sup> They included editors and publishers of the *Chicago Defender*, *Baltimore Afro-American*, *Pittsburgh Courier*, *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, and *New York Age*, as well as Claude Barnett, director of the Associated Negro Press; leaders of professional organizations such as the National Bar Association, the NAACP, the West Indies National Council, and the National Council of Negro Women—and of church, fraternal, and educational groups; trade unionists such as Michael J. Quill, president of the Transport Workers Union; politicians such as Congressman Adam Clayton Powell; writers and artists, among them Countee Cullen, Langston Hughes, Alain Locke, and Theodore Dreiser.<sup>26</sup> In the fluid context of wartime liberal and left alliances, supporters and participants spanned the political spectrum from liberals such as Channing Tobias, senior secretary for Negro Work at the YMCA, to leading leftists such as Ben Gold of the Fur and Leather Workers Union and Earl Browder of the Communist Political Association (as the American Communist Party was briefly renamed in 1944).<sup>27</sup>

#### GLOBAL REACH: WARTIME CIVIL RIGHTS

The Council on African Affairs was not alone in its attempts to influence American policy. In September 1944 Walter White, as secretary of the NAACP, wrote to President Roosevelt, asking him to make it clear that “the U.S. government will not be a party to the perpetuation of colonial exploitation and to appoint qualified Negroes to serve at U.S. government conferences determining war or post war policies.”<sup>28</sup> White had emerged during the war as a strong advocate of anticolonialism.<sup>29</sup> Despite strong disagreements with White on other issues, Du Bois had returned to the NAACP in July 1944 as director of special research, specifically to work on anticolonial issues. He hoped “to revive the Pan-African movement and to give general attention to the foreign aspects of the race problem.”<sup>30</sup> The historian Robert L. Harris Jr. has demonstrated that the political agenda of many African American protest groups emphasized anticolonial issues. A. Philip Randolph and the March on Washington movement proposed a “Western Hemisphere Policy Conference for Free Negroes whereby people of color would meet to discuss the problems of Africa and the darker races and develop plans to submit to the world peace conference.”<sup>31</sup> The National Council of Negro Women participated in regional meetings sponsored by the State Department across the country to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.<sup>32</sup>

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference of late summer and early fall 1944 marked the beginning of the negotiations about international postwar organization that

led eventually to the founding of the United Nations. Representatives of Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States drafted proposals for maintaining peace and security in the world. A resolution offered by China opposing racial discrimination was rejected by the other three nations in favor of the extraordinarily vague principle of the “sovereign equality of peace loving states.” There was no mention of race or colonialism.<sup>33</sup>

According to Harris, “The most sustained critique of Dumbarton Oaks came from Du Bois, who observed that 750 million black people would have no voice in the proposed world forum.”<sup>34</sup> In Du Bois's view, Dumbarton Oaks said to the peoples of Africa and Asia that “the only way to human equality is the philanthropy of masters who have historic and strong interest in preserving their power and income.”<sup>35</sup> Representing the NAACP at a conference of Americans United for World Organization at the Department of State, he argued that the Dumbarton Oaks “emphasis on nations and states and the indifference to races, groups or organizations indicate that the welfare and protection of colonial peoples are beyond the jurisdiction of the conference's proposed governments.”<sup>36</sup> Attempting to garner support for his position, in a speech before the Men's Club of the Arnet Chapel AME Church, Du Bois “blasted the Dumbarton Oaks conference for kicking out China's resolution on racial equality” reported the *Defender*, and warned that “the gate has been left open for another war.”<sup>37</sup> Du Bois's criticism of the proposed representation through states in a new international organization marked the beginning of a challenge to the idea that human beings had rights and agency only as citizens of a nation-state. That idea would be contested at the United Nations in 1946 and 1947 by an alliance of black Americans, Indian and black South Africans, and the government of India.

Along with the efforts of organizations such as the CAA and the NAACP, leading articles in African American newspapers effectively promoted anticolonial issues, and black American journalists increasingly scrutinized the U.S. State Department. A *Courier* editorial criticized the Trusteeship Council established by Dumbarton Oaks to supervise the administration of the colonies, because it did not address self-government: “In short, the colonial colored folk are to be administered by white bureaucrats.” To correct this, the editors argued, there “should be Negro representatives at the Peace Conference. . . . Somebody must be present to look after the interests of these colonial peoples except the representatives of the Allied powers.”<sup>38</sup>

Despite widespread disillusionment with State Department performance at Dumbarton Oaks, attempts to influence the government continued. Rayford W. Logan, professor of history at Howard, was one of the important and visible African American intellectuals writing on colonial issues. A critic of the League of Nations mandates system, Logan had published his first analysis of it in the

Logan

*Journal of Negro History* in 1928. In 1942 he worked with Anson Phelps Stokes's Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims; in 1943, directly lobbying President Roosevelt, he again criticized the proposed new mandates system and advocated a form of international administration that would guarantee the representation of Africans.<sup>39</sup> Writing in the *Defender* in December 1944, Logan captured the complexity of African American political strategy in the months before the founding of the United Nations. He first expressed "dismay" that Dumbarton Oaks proposals failed to make any reference to the colonial and other dependent areas, since their problems "were a fundamental cause of the first and second world wars and are likely to contribute to the outbreak of a third world war." Logan despaired that "what little hope there was has now been devastatingly weakened" by the actions of the Department of State. Nevertheless, he outlined a political strategy: since the State Department had recently created a division of public liaison to facilitate "the presentation to the Department of public opinion on international problems," he argued, "any failure on our part literally to bombard it with protests against the omission of the problem of dependent areas from the scheme just released" would be reprehensible and "perhaps fatal." Logan further suggested that Du Bois call yet another conference of African American organizations to draw up proposals on colonial and dependent areas that would complement Dumbarton Oaks.<sup>40</sup>

Du Bois began work in January 1945 on just such a meeting, and the Colonial Conference was held in New York City on April 6, 1945, at the 135th Street Branch of the New York Public Library. Participants included Logan, CAA representatives, Kwame Nkrumah, Kumar Goshal, Amy Ashwood Garvey, W. Adolph Roberts of the Jamaican Progressive League, George Harris of the Ethiopian World Federation, Charles Petioni of the West Indies National Council, Ethelred Brown of the Jamaica Progressive League, John Andu from Indonesia, and Maung Saw Tun from Burma.<sup>41</sup> Du Bois worked with Alphaeus Hunton on preparing the conference, and their growing collaboration was an important factor in Du Bois's later decision to join the CAA.<sup>42</sup>

Du Bois also invited Villard and Ralph Bunche from the State Department.<sup>43</sup> Neither attended, but Bunche deserves attention here, given his later prominent role in the United Nations. He had joined the State Department in January 1944, after working for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as an expert on Africa and for the intelligence division of the army's general staff. At the State Department he functioned as an expert on dependent areas and assisted in international organizational matters, including the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.<sup>44</sup> Although Bunche became very prominent among black Americans after 1949, his role as an insider in 1944–46 appears to have set him apart from black American political strategies and to have made him inaccessible to black American leaders; Essie Robeson and Walter White, for example, complained about

his elusiveness.<sup>45</sup> Kenneth Robert Janken has argued that Bunche worked within the constraints of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives, and "his actions troubled other African American intellectuals who saw a severe disjunction between his words and deeds."<sup>46</sup>

The organizers of the Colonial Conference, seeking the widest possible consensus, demanded an international Colonial Commission to "oversee and facilitate the transition of peoples from colonial status to such autonomy as colonial peoples themselves may desire."<sup>47</sup> In fact, the agreement among African American leaders and intellectuals demonstrated at that conference masked political and philosophical differences. For example, Logan's opposition to immediate independence for African nations set him apart from Africans and Caribbeans in the Pan-African Federation and the leaders of the CAA.<sup>48</sup> Consequently, conference organizers intentionally avoided mentioning the demand for immediate independence. As the founding conference for the United Nations approached, debate on the future of colonialism centered on two questions: how to ensure the representation of colonized peoples in international bodies, and whether dependent areas would be administered under a system of international trusteeship or a League of Nations-style mandates system that would in practice give colonial powers unencumbered control. On these issues, African Americans were united.<sup>49</sup>

In the months immediately before the San Francisco conference that established the United Nations, anticolonialism was a central focus of African American political discourse. Leaders and journalists numbered both international and domestic concerns among their political priorities. A. Philip Randolph, in his 1945 New Year's speech from Durham, North Carolina, warned that Dumbarton Oaks was "under the control of the same nations that have exploited and oppressed, robbed and deceived, murdered and dominated the peoples of color for centuries." Linking the fight against Jim Crow with the fight against imperialism, he argued that the tasks lying before black Americans were to support bills for a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission, to wage "an all-out struggle against discrimination and segregation in the armed forces," and to fight for "the freedom of Africa, a Negro at the Peace table, a National Commission on race, . . . and a Federal Education bill to provide educational opportunities for Negroes."<sup>50</sup> Thus, at the dawn of the modern civil rights movement, international issues went hand in hand with domestic concerns.

The evidence strongly suggests that this pioneering work in linking the oppression and political struggles of African Americans with those of Africans and other colonized peoples had a significant impact on the politics and world view of black Americans. African Americans analyzed and predicted the behavior of politicians on domestic issues on the basis of their actions in Africa and Asia. No one should be surprised, a *Courier* editorial remarked, that Secretary of State

Stettinius had transferred "most of the Negro clerks and messengers, who have long served the State Department" and placed "the remaining ones in obscure places," since "he is straight from Wall Street, which is exploiting and oppressing colored people all over the world."<sup>51</sup> Some African Americans even based their electoral decisions on international concerns. Assessing the 1944 presidential candidates, John Robert Badger rejected Thomas Dewey on the basis that Dewey's thinking was dominated by Herbert Hoover, who "made his fortune and his name as an exploiter of colonial labor." Hoover, Badger explained, had "wrangled from the Chinese the deed to the great Kaiping coal mines" through his "dictatorship" of Anglo-Continental Mines Ltd. Moreover, he had exploited black labor in South African, Nigerian, and Trinidadian gold and tin mines, and had been instrumental in Firestone's acquiring control over Liberia. "That," argued Badger, "is the specter which today haunts colonial peoples when they think of the November elections in the United States, and the possibility of Hoover's man Dewey becoming U.S. president."<sup>52</sup>

#### CITIZENS OF THE WORLD

When the founding conference of the United Nations opened on April 25, 1945, Metz T. P. Lochard, editor-in-chief of the *Defender*, declared that "the World Security Conference in San Francisco has but one meaning to the Negro people—that is, how far democratic principles shall be stretched to embrace the rights of our brothers in the colonies and to what extent the American Negro's own security at home shall be guaranteed."<sup>53</sup> African Americans and their allies brought to the United Nations deliberations an elaborate vision of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Delegates at San Francisco sought to correct the stark omissions of Dumbarton Oaks, where the final proposals had ignored colonialism and racial discrimination. Representatives of Egypt, India, Panama, Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Venezuela, supported by numerous nongovernmental organizations, maintained that the purpose of the new organization should go beyond general ideas of peace and security: "Clear and explicit provisions supporting human rights" should be placed at the beginning of the Charter and throughout.<sup>54</sup> As Paul Gordon Lauren has shown, the negotiating power of states determined to insert provisions on human rights and racial nondiscrimination was considerable; in fact, numerous modifications of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were made at San Francisco. Most significantly, Article 1 of the UN charter listed among the organization's major purposes the achievement of human rights and fundamental freedoms "for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."<sup>55</sup>

The inclusion of the demand for equality on the grounds of sex points to another critical dimension of 1940s anticolonial politics as well as an important

shift in Pan-Africanism. In ideological terms, 1940s anticolonialism represented a radical departure from the earlier gendered language of, for example, Martin R. Delany's consistent masculinist positing of Africa as the fatherland and pervasive invocations of the motherland. In the politics of the African diaspora, Africa was neither a motherland nor a fatherland but the site of struggle for the extension of universal rights to all peoples regardless of race, nationality, or *sex*. The adoption of universalist notions of "rights," however, was by itself not sufficient to guarantee that gender inequalities would be challenged. Indeed, activists' concern about calling prevailing gender relations into question was limited; for the most part, they stopped short of critiquing the way gender hierarchies were reproduced within oppositional movements and institutions. Nonetheless, the language of rights helped make possible the critical leadership of women such as Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Charlotta Bass, and Mary McLeod Bethune and initiated the disruption of gendered political categories. Not only was women's leadership important, but the efforts of women in strikes against the pass system in South Africa and against the head tax in Nigeria were a critical and visible part of anticolonial politics.<sup>56</sup>

The broader representation of women was partly a product of the challenges to male authority and leadership in Pan-African politics over the previous two decades. The historian Barbara Bair has explored the critical role of women in the Garvey movement and their challenges to male authority, despite the movement's replication of Victorian gender norms.<sup>57</sup> But the leadership of women in the 1940s was also the result of both the greater space that opened for women during World War II and the broad conception of rights that dominated the liberal and left politics of the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>58</sup> And one of the consequences of the later collapse of the politics of the African diaspora was the reinscription of gender in discourses on Africa and anticolonialism and, arguably, within Pan-African politics.

Black Americans at San Francisco, contending that "the subjection of two-thirds of the world's people" was a threat to international security, supported efforts to include strong human rights clauses in the UN charter.<sup>59</sup> For Du Bois, "what was true of the United States in the past is true of world civilization today—we cannot exist half slave and half free."<sup>60</sup> He argued that the task of the NAACP was to "impress upon the American delegation and others [at San Francisco] that human rights among the great nations and especially among the colonies must be respected. Their flagrant disregard . . . toward colonial peoples has caused two wars in our day and will cause wars in the future."<sup>61</sup>

Although the number of black American observers was relatively large, including Max Yergan of the CAA, the NAACP was the only organization representing black Americans that was granted status as a consultant to the American delegation. Its appointment caused controversy among other African Americans;



## Bubble, Bubble, Toil And Trouble



Anticolonial activists warned again and again that the consequence of continued economic and political oppression of colonized peoples would be unrelenting war. Jay Jackson, *Chicago Defender*, April 14, 1945. (Courtesy of the *Chicago Defender*.)

the Fraternal Council of Negro Churches, for example, protested to the State Department that “no purely Afro-American group” was among the forty-two designated to advise the American delegation and several black organizations chose their own representatives.<sup>62</sup> Du Bois defended the selection of the NAACP, arguing that it “is not speaking simply for itself.” In fact, the cooperation among African Americans and the broad interest in international politics is evident in Du Bois’s list of groups that “have sent us special resolutions”:

We have been authorized to speak for the March on Washington Movement, the National Urban League, the Association of Colored Graduate Students, the Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, the National Association of Deans and Advisers of Men in Negro Educational Institutions, the Conference of Adult Education and the Negro, the National Medical Association, the National Bar Association, the National Association of Ministers’ Wives, the National Dental Association, the Independent Order of St. Luke, the Independent Order of Good Samaritans,

the National Council of Negro Women, the National Negro Insurance Association, and a number of other organizations.<sup>63</sup>

Nonetheless, during months of front-page headlines on plans for the conference, African American journalists predicted that there would be controversy over colonial issues. George Padmore believed that the postwar status of dependent areas in Africa and Asia would “become one of the most important and controversial issues with which delegates to the forthcoming San Francisco Conference will be forced to grapple.”<sup>64</sup> The *Defender* outlined key questions for “Negro Americans and other peoples victimized by forms of political oppression.” Foremost among these were whether there was a substantial basis for hope for an enduring peace; what kind of world organization would be required to keep peace; and whether the representatives of the United Nations would deal with the interests of racial and national minorities.<sup>65</sup> Journalists analyzed the past support for racial equality of participating nations and based predictions on these records. Badger cited French plans for a “colonial New Deal in French overseas territories,” Chinese challenges to racial discrimination, and recent declarations that “the abolition of racial discrimination was one of the USSR’s basic peace aims” as positive indications that there would be support for racial equality augmented by the “voice of many smaller nations such as Latin American countries, Liberia, Ethiopia, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and the Philippines.”<sup>66</sup>

Kumar Goshal, less optimistic, warned that the British government would present the “white man’s burden” theory in its post-World War Second clothes.” He predicted that the British would attempt to deny the colonial status of countries such as India and Burma, with evidence “furnished in the shape of three Indian stooges of the British government—Mudaliar, Noon, and Krishnamachari—attending as delegates.”<sup>67</sup> Lively depictions of the conflict over Britain’s handpicked Indian delegation included George Padmore’s report of Gandhi’s denunciation of “this camouflage of Indian representation through Indians nominated by British imperialism.”<sup>68</sup> Du Bois recounted that he and Walter White “ducked” when photographers attempted to take a photograph of them with the Indian representatives “because these men were stooges of the British Empire appointed to represent India by Great Britain, and representing in no way the Indian people. It would have been a calamity for us to be photographed with them.”<sup>69</sup>

Although the United Nations Charter did finally contain numerous clauses on human rights with provisions for equal rights and self-determination, these principles did not translate into a commitment to practical or effective means of implementation.<sup>70</sup> “The majority of states,” Lauren explains, “remained unwilling to sacrifice elements of their sovereignty for the sake of human rights by

authorizing the international community to intervene in their own domestic jurisdiction and internal affairs." John Foster Dulles, then a member of the American delegation, worried that human rights and nondiscrimination clauses would call attention to "the Negro problem in the South." Similarly, the British expressed apprehension about the implications of such clauses for restrictive immigration quotas in the dominions and their own policies in colonial areas. As Lauren has argued, "Human rights and racial nondiscrimination thus foundered, once again, on the rock of national sovereignty."<sup>71</sup>

As controversies over implementation were played out, the issue of trusteeship was especially important to the United States because it concerned the future of the Pacific islands then controlled by the U.S. military. Faced with questions that affected its own new global interests, the American government rhetorically continued its support of colonial freedom but narrowed the definition of that freedom. At Yalta the United States had chosen to make an alliance with the Soviet Union and China in support of colonial freedom against the British and the French. At San Francisco in May 1945 the American delegation, split between "crusaders" such as Charles W. Taussig and Isaiah Bowman and "realists" such as Navy Commander Harold Stassen, ultimately sided with the British against those advocating a broader definition of colonial independence.<sup>72</sup>

Black American journalists closely monitored the development of American policy. Badger saw the U.S. Army and Navy asking for "unilateral control over dependent territories" but believed the State Department "favorable to the establishment of a colonial body with considerably more authority than the old mandates commissions of the League of Nations" and hoped that the latter would prevail.<sup>73</sup> Rayford Logan, however, worried that the State Department was uncommitted to the principle of international trusteeship and, further, that the Navy Department actually had plans to annex the Pacific islands. To Logan, this distinct retreat from the anticolonialism of Roosevelt had ominous implications for UN colonial policy at the United Nations. Not only would the United States greatly increase the number of persons under its colonial administration, but America would forfeit its moral claim to oppose colonialism elsewhere in the world.<sup>74</sup> Obviously, he said,

if the United States is not even considering placing any of her existing colonies under international trusteeship and if the policy of the Navy Department for the annexation of the Pacific islands should prevail, the delegates of the United States at San Francisco or anywhere else can hardly insist that the former colonies of Italy be denied to England if she contends that she needs them to protect her life line to India, Singapore and Hong Kong.<sup>75</sup>

Disillusioned criticism of the American government deepened as the conference continued. On May 26 the *Defender* reported, "Sweeping demands that the United States delegation end its opposition to freedom for colonial peoples poured into the United Nations here this week."<sup>76</sup> On the same day the *Courier* called the conference "a cruel buoying of the hopes of subjugated and oppressed peoples from one end of the earth to the other. . . . All the words about trusteeship add up simply to saying that each of the three powers is going to do as it pleases, whether the other people of the world like it or not."<sup>77</sup>

Another *Courier* editorial reassessed African American political strategies in light of the shifts in U.S. policy. Arguing that the United States had liberated the "Pacific peoples from Japanese rule, only to substitute American rule, rather than self-rule," the editorial called Du Bois, White, and Bethune of the NAACP delegation "naïve" in pressing for an end to the colonial system by lobbying the U.S. government: "The hope of powerless peoples of the earth lies not in agreement between rival exploiters but rather in disagreement and the fear of conflict which forces concessions."<sup>78</sup>

Despite disappointed hopes for and criticism of the United Nations, it became a focal point for lobbying efforts on the part of black Americans and for joint projects by Africans and those of African descent. In the six months after the San Francisco meeting ended, African Americans organized two separate conferences "calling for the social, political and economic rights of African colonial peoples" and appealing for the "creation of machinery necessary to the participation of African colonial peoples" in the United Nations. The first conference, called by Du Bois, gathered twenty organizations to discuss proposals that had originated with the 1945 Pan-African Congress. The second was sponsored by the African Academy of Arts and Research.<sup>79</sup> The CAA continued its strategy of lobbying the American government on behalf of African interests. The CAA forwarded its "Text and Analysis of the Colonial Provisions of the United Nations Charter," a six-point program for Africa in the peace settlement, to new Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Edward L. Stettinius Jr., then U.S. representative to the United Nations.<sup>80</sup> Robeson sent the document to the consul general of the Union of South Africa as well.<sup>81</sup>

African American international strategies reached their climax in 1946 and 1947. Through the UN, the Council on African Affairs joined with South African Indians and the African National Congress to challenge the South African government's attempt to annex South-West Africa and to restrict further the rights of Indians in the Union of South Africa. This moment stood on the cusp of two very different historical periods. The legitimacy and power of wartime alliances in which black American anticolonial politics had thrived were at their height. Yet



this was also the moment when the seeds of destruction of these alliances began to take root. On the one hand, African American organizations continued to lobby the federal government on anticolonial issues; on the other hand, the same organizations took a sharply adversarial turn in their stance toward the government. Objecting to U.S. support for South Africa and the European colonial powers, and increasingly challenging the notion that America was the legitimate leader of the "free world" and therefore above censure, black Americans both criticized new directions in American foreign policy and attempted to use the United Nations as a forum in which to gain support for civil rights struggles in the United States.

South Africa was especially important to black American international politics in this period and significantly influenced its adversarial turn. As the historian Thomas Borstelmann has demonstrated, relations between the United States and South Africa grew "stronger and friendlier in the immediate postwar years as the Union's economic and strategic importance to Washington increased with the development of the Cold War."<sup>82</sup> In addition to its increasing importance to the United States, South Africa drew black American attention because of the links between the CAA, the ANC, and the South African Indian Congress. Moreover, African Americans, like non-European South Africans, faced color bars and turned to international forums as part of their political strategy.<sup>83</sup>

Through the CAA, black Americans were directly involved in two controversies at the United Nations that brought international attention and criticism to the government of South Africa: discrimination against Indians within the Union of South Africa, and South Africa's attempt to annex South-West Africa (now Namibia). In 1946 and 1947 the Indian government, South Africans in the ANC and the Joint Passive Resistance Council, and black Americans working through the CAA coordinated attempts to put pressure on the South African government through the United Nations. Leaders of these endeavors included the Indian delegate Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit; South Africans H. A. Naidoo and Sorabjee Rustomjee, representatives of the Joint Passive Resistance Council; A. B. Xuma of the ANC; South Africans Senator Hyman Basner, and E. S. Sachs; Rev. Michael Scott; and Alphaeus Hunton of the CAA. Owing to their combined efforts, issues of discrimination and colonial representation were at the heart of the first full session of the United Nations. Earl Conrad summed up the significance of this challenge for many black Americans when he reported for the *Defender* that despite the protests of Prime Minister Jan C. Smuts of the Union of South Africa, the fears of the U.S. delegates, and the opposition of the British, "the color and colonial issues hang like a specter over the entire proceedings of the United Nations General Assembly. . . . Matters concerning India, South

Africa, Negro Americans and other oppressed minorities have entered the United Nations to stay."<sup>84</sup>

#### TESTING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION

The treatment of Indians within the Union of South Africa not only drew world attention but raised salient questions about representation of national minorities. In 1946 the South African government passed the "Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act." Termed the "ghetto bill" by its opponents, the act prohibited Asians "from dealing in land with non-Asians" and from "living in certain 'controlled' areas."<sup>85</sup> In response, South African Indians formed the Joint Passive Resistance Council of the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses and launched a passive resistance campaign.<sup>86</sup> Just as black Americans linked their appeals in international forums to anticolonial struggles, South African Indians looked to India to challenge the government of South Africa at the UN on its treatment of Indians. In so doing, South African Indians reaffirmed their membership in a diaspora community. The *Passive Resister*, organ of the passive resistance movement, constantly affirmed the ties to India in articles such as "'You Are Bits of India'—Nehru's Message To Indians Abroad."<sup>87</sup> In "We Have Not Forgotten South African Indians," the *Passive Resister* reported a speech at the All India Congress Committee declaring that "with India becoming free 'our brethren in other lands are looking to us to bring about an amelioration of their conditions.'"<sup>88</sup>

The expectation on the part of South African Indians and black Americans that the independence of Asian and African states would make a real difference to their own struggles was not based on abstract notions of communion or solidarity. India's participation in discussions of anticolonialism and racial oppression at the founding of the United Nations fueled the belief that there was potential for organizing at the UN.<sup>89</sup> African Americans had argued since Dumbarton Oaks that representation by nation-states at international councils would exclude colonized peoples, noncitizens, and all persons discriminated against within states, since only states could file petitions and grievances. At the first session of the United Nations, India attempted to circumvent this problem by representing South African Indians and thus initiated a controversy about the nature of representation in the UN.

In 1946, with Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit—"the intense and articulate" sister of nationalist leader Jawaharlal Nehru—opening the debate, the interim Indian government filed charges with the General Assembly that Indians living in South Africa were discriminated against.<sup>90</sup> This claim was based partly on a new

interpretation of individual rights in international law. Although India and its allies had failed to gain clear implementation measures in the human rights clauses of the UN charter, they argued that the charter, "as a legal document, recognized fundamental rights of the individual and thereby for the first time in history transformed individuals from mere objects of international compassion into subjects of international law."<sup>91</sup> Indian demands were also based on a historical claim to a relation of kinship with Indians in the diaspora. In a statement protesting their "anomalous status" and lack of representation within South Africa, delegates from the South African Indian Congress supported the complaint lodged by the government of India: "Our well-being since our advent to South Africa has been subject to the oversight and the concern of the people and government of India and, we now hope, the nations of your organization."<sup>92</sup> Arguing for the legitimacy of this position, the statement quoted the deputy prime minister of the Union of South Africa, J. H. Hofmeyr, who said: "We cannot blame the Local Indians, as we put it, running to Mother India unless we recognize them as South African citizens with rights of citizenship."<sup>93</sup>

The other side of the controversy sparked by the efforts of the Indian government on behalf of South African Indians was summed up by a *New York Times* editorial. The charges brought by India, said the *Times*, "raise serious questions for the United Nations itself, and may require a more precise definition of what its jurisdiction and its powers are." Pointing out that "the Indian Government complains about the treatment, not of its own citizens, but of racial kinsmen who have lived in South Africa for generations and are therefore South African citizens and outside the jurisdiction of the Indian Government," the editorial argued that "as long as the United Nations is not a world government representing all the people of the world directly, but rather an organization of states represented by their respective governments, it behooves every member state to respect the domestic jurisdiction of every other state."<sup>94</sup>

The CAA, however, embraced Indian efforts. The South African *Guardian* reported Yergan's declaration that "Prime Minister Smuts' characterization of the Indian issue as a strictly 'domestic' affair was exactly parallel to the argument of poll tax Congressmen in the United States who cry 'Hands Off!' whenever their 'white supremacy' rule is threatened by federal legislation."<sup>95</sup> The CAA also organized letters to President Harry Truman, the U.S. State Department, and Hershel Johnson, American UN delegate, urging "full support to the Indian government's petition to the United Nations protesting South African Government's discrimination."<sup>96</sup>

CAA appeals to the American government fell upon increasingly deaf ears. Thomas Borstelmann has demonstrated the growing economic and strategic links between the American and South African governments: "The need of the

United States at the end of the war to invest abroad to maintain American economic prosperity matched up well with what Truman's Commerce Department called 'the pivotal importance' to South Africa 'of uninterrupted capital flow from Abroad.'" Moreover, the war had ended American self-sufficiency in raw materials, and South Africa was not only mineral-rich but had the world's largest undeveloped reserves of uranium ore capable of early commercial development.<sup>97</sup> Given these ties, at the United Nations in 1946 the Truman administration sought to minimize criticism of South Africa by playing a mediating role in the dispute with India.<sup>98</sup>

In December 1946 the Indian strategy won a small victory when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution asking the government of South Africa and India to discuss their problems, settle their dispute about the treatment of Indians in the Union, and report at the next assembly session.<sup>99</sup> Since the resolution did not contain binding provisions for enforcement, its backers claimed that the terms were so "mild that no one could possibly object." Nevertheless, opponents described it as "blatant interference into domestic affairs." The thirty-two nations supporting India included all states from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Among the fifteen siding with South Africa were the United States and Britain.<sup>100</sup>

Negative publicity at the United Nations, including the work of black American journalists, did not pass unnoticed by the South African government. Prime Minister Smuts declined an interview with A. M. Wendell Malliet, foreign editor of the *New York Amsterdam News*; in the words of South Africa's UN representative, he believed it would draw him into "a first class Press controversy."<sup>101</sup> British officials helped the South African government keep tabs on American opinion: for example, Ronald Sinclair, British consul in New York, sent newspaper clippings from the *New York Times* and black American papers such as the *Chicago Defender* and the *New York Amsterdam News* to the South African consulate general.<sup>102</sup>

#### THE CAA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

CAA opposition to discrimination against Indians in South Africa went hand in hand with opposition to South Africa's plan to annex South-West Africa. When the war was nearing its end, activists and journalists had paid increasing attention to the regional ambitions of the Jan Smuts government. A June 1944 *Defender* editorial warned that if Churchill and the other Empire prime ministers, who had been meeting in secret conclave in London, should agree to Smuts's plan for regional control over the colonial areas, the South African "native policy based upon racial segregation will be extended to other parts of the African continent."<sup>103</sup>

The Union of South Africa's attempts during and after the San Francisco conference to annex South-West Africa were not its first; in fact, South Africa had tried and failed to do so after World War I. Officially made an international mandate under the League of Nations, South-West Africa had in practice been run, "with a minimum of interference," says William Minter, on "South Africa's terms."<sup>104</sup> At the end of World War II, South Africa's renewed efforts for official annexation were universally condemned in the African American press. The *Defender* emphasized the cooperation between the British, American, and South African governments: immediately after the announcement of an American and British proposal on trusteeship, which recommended that former mandated areas revert to the original nations in control, South Africa made its "proposal for extending its rule over Africa." The *Defender* also warned of the belligerence of South African delegates, who "contended that there is no prospect of the territory ever existing as a separate state."<sup>105</sup> *New Africa* pointed to the immediate danger that South Africa would annex not only the mandate territory of South-West Africa but the territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland, given Smuts's claim that "their eventual inclusion in the Union of South Africa is provided for in the South African constitution."<sup>106</sup>

Black South Africans actively sought the support of the international community for their opposition to annexation. In early 1946 A. B. Xuma, president of the ANC, cabled from Johannesburg appealing to the United Nations to "save their black brothers living in the mandated territory of Southwest Africa from annexation by the Jan Smuts' government of the Union of South Africa."<sup>107</sup> R. T. Bokwe, a South African member of the CAA, made a passionate argument for placing South-West Africa under the Trusteeship Council, pleading that if South-West Africa and the Protectorates of Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland were handed over to the Union, "our doom is sealed for many generations to come."<sup>108</sup> But the ANC lacked resources for international work and became involved in UN lobbying only in a somewhat haphazard fashion, when Xuma traveled to the United States in the fall of 1946 for medical treatment.<sup>109</sup> Alphaeus Hunton expressed alarm to Xuma in 1946 that "the United Nations Secretariat has received very few expressions of protest against the annexation."<sup>110</sup>

CAA members, particularly Hunton, did extensive lobbying and publicity at the United Nations.<sup>111</sup> The CAA pamphlets "Facts about South-West Africa—Annexation or Trusteeship," and "South Africa Must Answer to the United Nations" (both written by Hunton), and "8 Million Demand Freedom! What about It, Gen. Smuts?" (on South Africa's treatment of its own African population) were widely circulated among UN delegations and within the United States and South Africa.<sup>112</sup> Members of UN delegations from India, the United States, Ceylon, and the Soviet Union relied on this material for their information on South Africa,


and in a striking admission of the credibility and influence of the CAA, an American representative stated that it "has been considered by members of the Trusteeship Division of the Secretariat as an excellent pressure group."<sup>113</sup> Certainly, the erudite work of Hunton provided delegates with information otherwise hard to come by. "Annexation or Trusteeship," for example, explained South-West Africa's history as a "Class C" mandate under the League of Nations and its division into "reserves" and "police zones," with pass laws for all non-Europeans and a stringent vagrancy law that forced Africans to work for an employer. The pamphlet showed that the region's resources such as diamonds and vanadium were controlled by South African corporations, contended that South-West Africa functioned as "another reservoir of African labor for the gold mines in the Union of South Africa," and emphasized that members of ANC and other South African organizations who opposed annexation were prevented by the government from leaving the country because of this opposition.<sup>114</sup>

The CAA featured work on South Africa at its Big Three Unity rally at Madison Square Garden in New York City, which attracted approximately 19,000 people in June 1946. The *New York Times* reported that resolutions passed at the meeting not only rejected annexation of South-West Africa but demanded investigation of racial discrimination; abolition of pass laws, residential requirements, the color bar, and restricted land ownership; and the inclusion of South Africa in the starvation relief efforts of the American government.<sup>115</sup> This kind of attention again brought the anxious scrutiny of the South African government. H. T. Andrews, its secretary for external affairs, asked Robert Webster, consul general in New York, to attend the rally in order to prepare material "for use by the South African Delegation at the United Nations Assembly."<sup>116</sup> Webster responded that he feared the meeting might be the beginning of a movement to "queer the pitch for Field Marshal Smuts when he comes to the General Assembly in September to ask incorporation of South-West Africa into the Union."<sup>117</sup> He described the hall decorated with enormous posters, the most prominent showing "Africa in the grip of a huge octopus, the various tentacles being labeled with the names of the powers having control," including the Union of South Africa. Reporting the meeting "about 60% colored, 40% white," Webster worried that "the movement has reached dangerous proportions."<sup>118</sup> Alarmed and confused by a movement led by African Americans with "strong white organized support," South African intelligence concluded that the "aim appears to be Africa for Communist-organized Labour-controlled black Africans."<sup>119</sup>

In addition to high-profile meetings and lobbying, press conferences held by the Council on African Affairs facilitated publicity about South Africa. The CAA hosted nearly two hundred leaders of various American organizations at a press conference for the South African representatives Basner, A. B. Xuma, and H. A. Naidoo in late 1946. A number of UN member states were also represented.<sup>120</sup>

Over the Diamond Mines

## Shadow Of Coming Events



A sadly prescient warning of the decades of South African domination in Namibia and the rest of southern Africa that were to follow. Jay Jackson, *Chicago Defender*, December 7, 1946. (Courtesy of the *Chicago Defender*.)

Major Robinson reported in the *Defender* Basner's contention that "behind Smuts' request to the UN General Assembly to annex the mandated territory of South-West Africa is his desire to obtain more cheap labor to work the new gold fields discovered in his Union of South Africa," but a *Defender* editorial speculated that Smuts would make his case "behind a facade of pious phraseology and democratic pretensions." Reflecting the new sharp criticism of American foreign policy, the *Defender* predicted that the majority of U.S. newspapers would highlight Smuts's position because as a "defender of colonialism and imperialism, Smuts serves the interests of U.S. imperialism and the present makers of U.S. foreign policy."<sup>121</sup> Robinson further charged Smuts with causing the "threat of war for years to come, and the end of the UN as an agency for world cooperation."<sup>122</sup> And the *Defender*, though dismayed by the degree of American support for Smuts, urged that "to turn the tables on the senile old vulture is the best way of exposing him in his true character."<sup>123</sup>

In addition to its press conferences, the CAA organized a picket demonstration in front of the South African consulate on November 21, 1946. Some two hun-

dred participants included representatives of thirty trade union, civic, and church organizations.<sup>124</sup> With print media still the major vehicle for trans-Atlantic communication, these pickets, meetings, and lobbying were visible in South Africa through frequent articles and photographs in papers such as the *Guardian* and the *Passive Resister*.<sup>125</sup>

As in the case of discrimination against Indians in South Africa, on the issue of South-West Africa the American delegation to the United Nations sought to reduce antagonism between South Africa and its critics. The U.S. government wanted to avoid provoking non-Western delegates but also feared that attention to South-West Africa had potential implications for American policy toward the mandated islands of the western Pacific, which the American military remained unwilling to place under UN trusteeship.<sup>126</sup> The United States therefore encouraged South Africa to accept a trusteeship arrangement for South-West Africa as a way of retaining its practical advantages there without provoking the anticolonial delegates.<sup>127</sup>

Regarding the weak form of trusteeship advocated by the American government as outrageously inadequate, in October 1946 the CAA petitioned the UN Human Rights Commission for an investigation of human rights in the Union of South Africa, the rejection of South Africa's request for annexation of South-West Africa, and the removal of South-West Africa "completely from under the jurisdiction of the South African government."<sup>128</sup> The *Afro-American* reported that the CAA had charged the South African government with "flagrant violation of the most elementary principles of human rights" and urged the Human Rights Commission to make "specific provisions outlawing all forms of social, economic, and political discrimination prevailing in the Union of South Africa."<sup>129</sup> The CAA argued that South Africa's racial policy and practices were not simply "a matter of local concern for that country, but rather a matter of international concern" because they "adversely affect the rest of Africa and also Asia, as well as causing concern to Negroes throughout the world."<sup>130</sup>

In November 1946 the Trusteeship Committee turned down the Union of South Africa's proposal to incorporate South-West Africa.<sup>131</sup> The United States opposed incorporation and, in fact, sponsored the resolution adopted by the committee rejecting South Africa's request; however, the United States also opposed and helped to defeat two separate resolutions—one introduced by India and Cuba and other by the Soviet Union—that not only would have rejected incorporation but would have placed South-West Africa under international trusteeship.<sup>132</sup> The U.S.-sponsored resolution that did pass merely requested but did not require that South Africa "follow the example of other mandatory powers by bringing South-West Africa under a trusteeship agreement."<sup>133</sup>

Reacting to this resolution, Paul Robeson outlined the CAA's position on South-West Africa and its objections to American policy in a letter to John Foster

Dulles, then an American delegate to the UN General Assembly. In response, Dulles admitted that the U.S. rejection of incorporation was "couched in more conciliatory language than in the case of some other proposals" and, nervously stepping around the issue of Jim Crow, added, "I did not feel that the United States, in view of its own record, was justified in adopting a holier-than-thou attitude toward the Union of South Africa."<sup>134</sup> The following year, when the government of South Africa had failed to submit the requested trusteeship agreement, the CAA complained in a memorandum to the General Assembly. Citing statements by both Smuts and Daniel Malan's Nationalist Party indicating that measures to incorporate South-West Africa were proceeding, the CAA quoted a Smuts government report that South-West Africa would be regarded as a fifth province of the Union. Given the "tremendous industrial development" of the Union and the "vast resources in raw materials" of South-West Africa, it was South Africa's intention to link the economies of the two. Pointing to the South African government's blatant disregard of the UN resolution, the CAA again insisted that the administration of South-West Africa should "be given over to an international body under the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations."<sup>135</sup>

When South Africa finally did submit a report to the Trusteeship Council, it acknowledged that no progress had been made in compliance with the General Assembly resolution based on the complaint of the government of India. Paul Robeson, the *Passive Resister* reported, warned that the South African government was arguing that the UN charter was neither explicit nor binding in its provisions concerning the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all peoples without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and that other nations also practiced discrimination in various forms. Consequently, said Robeson, the case against South Africa must be pressed "as a clear demonstration to the peoples of America, Africa and the world that the Charter's provisions are NOT mere empty idealist expressions which can be ignored and violated with impunity by members of the organization."<sup>136</sup>

Seeking support for its opposition to the South African report, the CAA distributed to UN representatives its "Analysis of the Report of the Union of South Africa on the Administration of South West Africa for the Year 1946," covering education, health, land, and labor.<sup>137</sup> In April 1947 at the 71st Regiment Armory the CAA held a rally for "Africa and Colonial Freedom through a Strong UN." The rally featured the CAA work on South Africa and a special show written by John Latouche, lyricist of "Ballad for Americans" and "Beggar's Holiday," which dramatized the struggles of African and colonial peoples. Latouche had been deeply affected by spending a year in the Belgian Congo working on the Warner Brothers documentary *Congo*. Arguing that "our fate is bound up with that of colonial peoples," and despite growing Cold War ten-

sions and the warnings of "well-meaning people" not to do the show, Latouche declared that "I regard this show as a statement of myself as an American writer." He added on a more personal note that he wanted to present the play to Robeson as a birthday gift.<sup>138</sup> In September 1947, Ashwin Choudree and A. I. Meer joined Robeson, Lena Horne, and Henry Wallace at a rally of 15,000 people at Madison Square Garden in New York.<sup>139</sup> On the South African side, the *Passive Resister* publicized messages to Paul Robeson and the CAA from Nehru, vice-president of India's interim government, and from the South African Passive Resistance Council; CAA reports were read at meetings and rallies in Johannesburg as well.<sup>140</sup>

On October 15, 1947, a resolution introduced by India placing South-West Africa under international trusteeship passed the Trusteeship Committee of the UN by a vote of twenty-seven to twenty. The United States not only voted against it, as did the United Kingdom and all colonial powers, but lobbied afterward to ensure that the resolution would not get the two-thirds majority it needed to pass the General Assembly. Robeson, Yergan, and Hunton voiced their objections to the American vote in a meeting with Francis B. Sayre, American representative on the Trusteeship Committee of the UN General Assembly, who maintained that the resolution as it stood "could not secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the Assembly."<sup>141</sup> Indeed, two weeks later the General Assembly reversed five Trusteeship Committee decisions on Africa and colonial areas. In the words of the CAA, "More than three weeks of work in Trusteeship Committee was largely undone." On South-West Africa the General Assembly adopted a resolution merely expressing "hope that the Union Government may find it possible" to submit a trusteeship agreement by the next meeting.<sup>142</sup> The CAA charged that the American bloc, led by Dulles, won not through legitimate democratic channels but through the procedural maneuver of securing a two-thirds majority requirement. Three decades passed, with a protracted war between the government of South Africa and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), before the United Nations Security Council explicitly stated its intent to secure independence as Namibia (the name adopted in 1968).<sup>143</sup> And it was yet another decade before Namibia celebrated independence.

The year 1946 had begun with promise and hope for anticolonial activists in America, in Africa, and throughout the diaspora. Fascism had been defeated, and European colonialism seemed on its last legs. But the unprecedented challenges to global political and economic inequality and the work of the CAA, the Joint Passive Resistance Council, and the ANC at the United Nations were sharply disrupted by the Cold War. CAA strategy had depended on lobbying a government that was open, at least in principle, to supporting political and economic democracy for colonized peoples. But as the United States consistently chose to support South Africa and its colonial wartime allies, the CAA increasingly viewed the



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**Africans Killed In Gold Mine Wage Strike**

JOHANNESBURG, (AP) — A fatal attack on a mine today killed 100 Africans and injured 100 more. The strike is the worst in the history of the mine industry in South Africa.

**South African Fr Calls For America**

NEW YORK — The American people are urged to support the African people in their struggle for freedom and independence. The Council on African Affairs is calling for a strong U. N. to support the African people.

**Robeson Scores Churchill Urges U.S. Aid for Africa**

LOS ANGELES — An overflow mass meeting at the Los Angeles Coliseum today heard Paul Robeson urge the United States to support the African people in their struggle for freedom and independence. He called for a strong U. N. to support the African people.

**South Africa Backs South West Africa Annexation**

JOHANNESBURG, (AP) — The South African government today announced that it had decided to annex South West Africa. The decision was made without consulting the people of South West Africa.

**Smuts Regime Is Assailed for Discrimination**

JOHANNESBURG, (AP) — The Smuts regime in South Africa is being assailed for its policy of discrimination against the African people. The policy is said to be a major cause of the current strike in the gold mines.

**HELPS OUR HUNGRY**

JOHANNESBURG, (AP) — The Smuts regime in South Africa is being assailed for its policy of discrimination against the African people. The policy is said to be a major cause of the current strike in the gold mines.

**Ship Agreements Imperiling U.N.O.**

JOHANNESBURG, (AP) — The Smuts regime in South Africa is being assailed for its policy of discrimination against the African people. The policy is said to be a major cause of the current strike in the gold mines.

CAA broadside publicizing the Rally for African and Colonial Freedom, Regiment Armory, New York, April 1947. CAA rallies typically featured music and dramatizations. (Courtesy of Lloyd Brown.)

American government as an adversary rather than a potential ally. The broad anticolonial alliances among African Americans and the fledgling politics they represented did not survive the early Cold War. To understand what was at stake and how the 1940s anticolonial alliances disintegrated, one must look more closely at the foreign policy of the Truman administration in 1946 and 1947.



African legation in Washington and the consul general state that they had been corresponding about the CAA in 1943 and 1944: Consul General to South African Legation, May 1, 1946, re African Famine Relief Campaign, SAB, BNY, box 14.

The South African consul and legation discussed the CAA with the British consulate as well. In addition to reports on the CAA received from Ronald Sinclair (above), see F. B. A. Rundall, British Consulate-General, to T. Hewitson, South African Consulate, January 29, 1946, and South African Legation to South African Consul General, February 15, 1946, re *New York Amsterdam News*, SAB, BNY, Box 14.

#### CHAPTER FOUR The Diaspora Moment

1. Victor C. Gaspar, General Secretary-Treasurer, National Joint Conference Committee, The New Harlem Tenants League, to Mayor William O'Dwyer, May 15, 1946; O'Dwyer Papers, box 37, folder "Discrimination 1946," Municipal Archives, New York City. I thank Martha Biondi for bringing this document to my attention.
2. See Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), pp. 214-18, for a discussion of different positions within the U.S. government on colonial policy.
3. William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The United States and the Liquidation of British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941-1951," in *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 37. William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 341. See also Christopher Thorne, *The Issue of War: States, Societies, and the Far Eastern Conflict of 1941-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985), p. 195; Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, pp. 664-67, 490-91.
4. "For a New Africa: Proceedings: Conference on Africa," New York, April 14, 1944, p. 17, W. A. Hunton Papers (CAA, organizational, to 1944), MG 237, Schomburg Library, New York.
5. "Canada Told of Africa's Needs," *Chicago Defender*, February 12, 1944, p. 11.
6. "For a New Africa: Proceedings: Conference on Africa," p. 16.
7. John Robert Badger, "World View: Correct Policy for Africa," *Chicago Defender*, July 29, 1944, p. 13.
8. See Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, pp. 100, 340-41, for the differences and Henry Wallace's criticism of the position of Bernard Baruch.
9. See Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948* (1972; New York: New York University Press, 1985), chap. 1, "Origins of the Foreign Aid Program," pp. 13-69, for a summary of post-war economic restructuring.
10. Kumar Goshal, "As an Indian Sees It: Collaboration Not Rivalry, Key To Post-War World," *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 1, 1944.
11. Timothy Sander Oberst, "Cost of Living and Strikes in British Africa c.1939-1948: Imperial Policy and the Impact of the Second World War" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1991), p. 101.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
13. "Protest Unfair Control of Cocoa Marketing," *New Africa* 3, no. 11 (1944): 2.
14. The CAA was informed that its letter had been referred to the commodities division, which explained that the State Department's previous communication with the British government had expressed "the views of the members of both the cocoa trade and chocolate industry" in the United States and that "it does not appear to us appropriate for the Department to facilitate the

holding of a conference between representatives of the Farmers Committee of British West Africa and representatives of our Embassy in London." In response, Yergan reiterated his hope that "the interests of the African producers" receive consideration "in the exchange of views between our own government and the British government with regard to the cocoa control policy." See Max Yergan to Henry S. Villard, Chief Division of African Affairs, Department of State, January 31, 1945, RG 59, 848K.61334/1-3145 CS/EG; Edward G. Cale, Acting Chief, Commodities Division to Yergan, February 14, 1945, RG 59 848K.6661334/1-3134; and Yergan to Cale, February 21, 1945, RG59 848K.41334/1-3145, National Archives.

15. "U.S. Policy in Africa Outlined by Henry S. Villard, State Department Official," *New Africa* 2, no. 2 (1943): 1.
16. "Conference on Africa Planned," *Pittsburgh Courier*, April 1, 1944, p. 3; Hollis R. Lynch, *Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa: The Council on African Affairs, 1937-1955* (Ithaca: Africana Studies and Research Center, Cornell University, 1978), pp. 26-27; Dorothy Hunton, *Alphaeus Hunton: The Unsung Valiant* (Chesapeake, Va.: ECA Associates, 1986), p. 58; John Robert Badger, "World View: Post War Jobs in Africa," *Chicago Defender*, April 29, 1944. See also, "Roosevelt Leads Way in Making Atlantic Charter a Living Reality for Dependent Peoples," *New Africa* 2, no. 3 (1943): 1.
17. Robeson to Du Bois, March 31, 1944, W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, microfilm collection, Columbia University, reel 55, frame 1130.
18. Nkrumah to Robeson and Yergan, March 26, 1944, W. A. Hunton Papers, box 1, folder 16 (CAA Correspondence).
19. "Africa and Post-War Security Plans: Outstanding American Citizens Join in Endorsing Recommendations to the Government of the United States," letter forwarded by the Council on African Affairs, December 15, 1944, published in *New Africa* 3, no. 11 (1944).
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. Viscount Halifax to Anthony Eden, May 11, 1944, FO 371/38639 188471:AN 1837/397/45.
23. For an example of the cover letter, see Du Bois Papers, reel 55, frame 1133.
24. "Africa and Post-War Security Plans."
25. Lynch, *Black American Radicals*, p. 28.
26. Endorsements are listed with letter "Africa and Post-War Security Plans," and further endorsements in *New Africa* 4, no. 1 (1945). Robeson's letter seeking endorsements further encouraged "independent action" in "voicing the state of colonial peoples in the post-war security plans" by "the Church, the trade unions, fraternal bodies, women's and youth groups."
27. In addition to conference coverage, the work of Robeson, Yergan, and Hunton received much publicity. John Robert Badger, "World View: A Survey of African Events," *Chicago Defender*, February 17, 1945, reported that "New Africa, organ of the Council on African Affairs, contains in its January issue a summary of African events during 1944 which is the best I have seen." The CAA's work on postwar colonial policy also received attention in the West African press. Wallace-Johnson's *African Standard* carried news from the CAA's *New Africa* via Azikiwe's *West African Pilot*: "American Institutions Demand Economic and Political Freedom for All Colonies," *African Standard* 6, no. 22 (1944): 10-11, Marx Memorial Library, London.
28. The text of this letter is reprinted in "FDR Asked to Fight Colonial Exploitation," *Chicago Defender*, September 23, 1944, p. 18. For a reply to the letter from the Department of State to Walter White, October 4, 1944, see Du Bois Papers, reel 56, frame 433.
29. See Chapters 1 and 2.
30. From *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century*, quoted in Robert L. Harris Jr., "Racial Equality and the United Na-

- tions Charter," in *New Directions in Civil Rights Studies*, ed. Armstead L. Robinson and Patricia Sullivan (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1991), p. 128.
31. Harris, "Racial Equality and the United Nations Charter," p. 128.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
33. Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics of Diplomacy and Racial Discrimination* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 147–50.
34. Harris, "Racial Equality and the United Nations Charter," pp. 131–32.
35. A. N. Fields, "Today's Talk," *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 2, 1944, p. 7.
36. "Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Exclude Colonies—Du Bois," *Baltimore Afro-American*, October 28, 1944, p. 3; "Dr. Du Bois 'Depressed' Colonial Questions Ignored at Dumbarton Oaks Peace Session," *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 28, 1944, p. 4.
37. "Gate Open for Another War, Warns Dr. Du Bois," *Chicago Defender*, March 3, 1945.
38. "Control of the Colonies," *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 16, 1944.
39. Kenneth Robert Janken, *Rayford W. Logan and the Dilemma of the African-American Intellectual* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), pp. 169–73.
40. Rayford W. Logan, "Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Ignore Colonial Problem Says Dr. Logan," *Chicago Defender*, December 9, 1944, p. 2. Logan continued to write extensively on the issue. Identified as "Adviser on Foreign Affairs for the *Pittsburgh Courier*," he reported Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry White's "admission"—in a response to a question posed by Du Bois at a roundtable discussion—that "the Bretton Woods Agreement did not concern itself with the problems of colonies and other dependent areas" ("U.S. Admits: Colonies Ignored," *Pittsburgh Courier*, March 10, 1945, p. 1). Logan also addressed the National Council of Negro Women on the results of Dumbarton Oaks in October 1944 (Janken, *Rayford W. Logan*, p. 175).
41. Nkrumah to Du Bois, January 28, 1945; Kumar Goshal to Du Bois, February 26, 1945; and Amy Ashwood Garvey to Du Bois, February 1, 1945, Du Bois Papers, reel 57, frames 727, 240, 228. See also Janken, *Rayford W. Logan*, pp. 175–76.
42. Du Bois to Hunton, and Hunton to Du Bois, January 23, 1945, Du Bois Papers, reel 57, frame 388. Hunton suggested the names of Amy Ashwood Garvey; H. P. Osbourne, West Indian National Council; Jesus Colon, Puerto Rican Cervantes Society; Nkrumah; and Kumar Goshal. See also Du Bois to Hunton, February 26, 1945, reel 57, frames 388–94.
43. Du Bois to Villard, March 7, 1945, and Villard to Du Bois, March 17, 1945, Du Bois Papers, reel 58, frame 12 and 17; Bunche to Du Bois, January 31, 1945, reel 56, frame 1252; Du Bois to Bunche, March 7, 1945, reel 56, frame 56; Bunche to Du Bois, March 17, 1945, reel 56, frame 1253.
44. P. Bernard Young Jr., editor, "Dr. Ralph Bunche Advanced in State Dept. on Rare Merit," *Journal and Guide*, 1945, in Ralph Bunche Papers, box 144, University of California, Los Angeles.
45. Essie Robeson to Bunche, March 24, 1945; and Walter White to Bunche, June 25, 1946, both in Bunche Papers, box 1.
46. Janken, *Rayford W. Logan*, pp. 206–7.
47. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 176.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 173–74.
49. For an assessment of the Colonial Conference looking ahead to the founding conference of the United Nations, see "The San Francisco Conference," *Pittsburgh Courier*, April 14, 1945.
50. "Randolph Warns Negroes of After the War Fascism," *Chicago Defender*, January 6, 1945.
51. "Stettinius Takes Over," *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 16, 1944.
52. John Robert Badger, "World View: The Specter of Hooverism," *Chicago Defender*, August 26, 1944, p. 13. See also Harry Paxon Howard, "Chiang Kai-shek Resists Imperialism: Would

- Not Accept U.S. Dictatorship," *Pittsburgh Courier*, November 18, 1944, p. 9, for a critique of Western interests in China.
53. Metz T. P. Lochard, "Parley May Skip Over Hot Issue of Colonies," *Chicago Defender*, May 5, 1945, p. 2. See also three front-page articles that day under the heading "Delegates Juggle Colonial Question; White, Du Bois Ask Equality of Races," in which Lochard discussed the "ducking" of the colonial issue; Richard Durham, the lobbying on the part of White and Du Bois; and John Robert Badger, the differences between the positions of the State and the Navy Departments. See also Harris, "Racial Equality and the United Nations Charter," p. 126; and Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 65.
54. Quoted in Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, pp. 151–52.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 154–55.
56. Alphaeus Hunton, "Upsurge in Africa," *Masses and Mainstreams* 3, no. 2 (1950): 18.
57. Barbara Bair, "True Women, Real Men: Gender, Ideology, and Social Roles in the Garvey Movement," in *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 154–66.
58. Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (New York: William Morrow, 1984), pp. 235–38.
59. John Robert Badger, "San Francisco Parley: Race Problem to Confront United Nations Parley," *Chicago Defender*, April 14, 1945, p. 1.
60. Quoted in Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 157. See W. E. B. Du Bois, "Color Line Absent at Frisco, Du Bois Finds," *Chicago Defender*, May 5, 1945, p. 1, for Du Bois's assessment of the opening of the conference.
61. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Du Bois Says Many at Parley Don't Know What It's About," *Chicago Defender*, May 19, 1945, p. 1.
62. Harris, "Racial Equality and the United Nations Charter," p. 136; "Statement on San Francisco Issued: Max Yergan Observer at Conference," *New Africa* 4, no. 4 (1945); Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 153.
63. Du Bois, "Du Bois Says Many at Parley Don't Know What It's About." On the role of Du Bois and the NAACP, see also Janken, *Rayford W. Logan*, p. 180.
64. George Padmore, "Colonial Issue on Frisco Agenda," *Pittsburgh Courier*, March 24, 1945, p. 1.
65. John Robert Badger, "San Francisco Parley: Race Problem to Confront United Nations Parley," *Chicago Defender*, April 14, 1945, p. 1.
66. *Ibid.* For earlier discussion of the Soviet Union, see George Padmore, "Soviets to Demand Equality at Peace Table," *Chicago Defender*, January 20, 1945, p. 1. For postwar French colonial policy, see Thyra Edwards and Murray Gitlin, "25 Million Negroes Getting New Deal in French Africa," *Chicago Defender*, January 13, 1945, p. 1.
67. Kumar Goshal, "As an Indian Sees It: Doubts Colonial Powers Will Want to Yield Control at San Francisco," *Pittsburgh Courier*, March 31, 1945, p. 7.
68. George Padmore, "Gandhi Urges Justice for Colored Peoples: Indian Leader Lashes Imperialist Rule over Colonies," *Chicago Defender*, April 28, 1945, p. 1.
69. W. E. B. Du Bois, "Du Bois, White Run from Photo with Indian Stooges," *Chicago Defender*, May 12, 1945, p. 5.
70. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 155.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 155–56.
72. Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, p. 354; Thorne, *The Issue of War*, p. 190.
73. Badger, "Delegates Juggle Colonial Question."

74. Rayford Logan, "U.S. Favors Two Forms of Trusteeship for Colonies," *Pittsburgh Courier*, May 12, 1945, p. 10. See also Janken, *Rayford W. Logan*, p. 180.
75. Rayford Logan, "Colonial Powers May Oppose International Trusteeship," *Pittsburgh Courier*, April 28, 1945, pp. 1, 9.
76. "Hits U.S. Opposition to Colonial Independence," *Chicago Defender*, May 26, 1945, p. 5.
77. "Words! Words! Words!" *Pittsburgh Courier*, May 26, 1945.
78. "No Hope for the Powerless," *Pittsburgh Courier*, May 12, 1945.
79. "Demand U.N. Help Africans: Conferences Ask Political Rights," *Chicago Defender*, October 12, 1946, p. 4.
80. "6-Point Plan for Africa's Independence Suggested," *Baltimore Afro-American*, September 22, 1945, p. 7.
81. Paul Robeson to R. Webster, Consul General of the Union of South Africa, September 20, 1945, and enclosure, "Text and Analysis of the Colonial Provisions of the United Nations Charter" (8 pages), SAB, BNY, box 14, Papers of South African Consulate General, Pretoria.
82. Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, p. 79.
83. The origins of the CAA-ANC relationship are covered in Chapter 1.
84. Earl Conrad, "Color Issue Dominates U.N.: India, South Africa Cases High on Agenda; Protest of American Negroes against Oppression Listed," *Chicago Defender*, November 2, 1946, p. 1.
85. "South African Strife on Racial Issue Seen," *New York Times*, Tuesday, July 30, 1946; SAB, BNY, box 13; Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, p. 69.
86. The campaign continued into 1948, when the new Malan government arrested its leaders and closed down its newspaper, the *Passive Resister*. I owe special thanks to A. M. Kathrada of the African National Congress for alerting me to this paper's existence and its attention to the CAA, as well as for sharing his perceptions of the period and his memories of Hunton, Robeson, and Du Bois from the standpoint of his involvement with the South African Indian Youth Congress and the Young Communist League.
87. *Passive Resister*, August 20, 1948, p. 3, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
88. "We Have Not Forgotten South African Indians," *Passive Resister*, June 11, 1948.
89. See Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, pp. 166–71, for the role of India in the early United Nations.
90. "India and the U.N.," *New York Times*, June 25, 1946; SAB, BNY, box 14; Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, p. 75; Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 159.
91. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 159.
92. Papers of the South African Indian Congress, Acc 105, 6.43, Unisa Documentation Centre for African Studies, Pretoria.
93. *Ibid.*
94. "India and the U.N."
95. "American Condemns S.A. Racial Policy," *Guardian*, April 25, 1946, p. 8, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
96. "South African Freedom Fight Calls for American Support," *Chicago Defender*, October 19, 1946, p. 3.
97. Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, pp. 49–50.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76.
99. "U.N. Approval of Indian Resolution Is Blow to Racism throughout World," *New Africa* 5, no. 11 (1946): 1; Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 171. See *Passive Resister*, December 6, 1946, p. 4, on the interim proposal of the UN Joint Political and Legal Committee in November 1946.

100. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 171. For continuing tensions at the UN over treatment of people of Indian descent in South Africa, see Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, p. 142.
101. A. M. Wendell Malliet, foreign editor, *New York Amsterdam News*, to Sir Francis Evans, British Consulate General, October 28, 1946; and South African Delegation to the United Nations to R. Webster, Consul General for the Union of South Africa, November 11, 1946, both in SAB, BNY, box 14.
102. Ronald Sinclair, British Consulate General, New York, to Robert Webster, South African Consulate General, New York, August 7, 1946; SAB, BNY, box 14.
103. "Gen. Smuts Plan for the Colonial Races," *Chicago Defender*, June 10, 1944. For an example of Afrikaner challenges to Smuts, see "Pro-Nazis in South Africa Heading Country toward Fascism and Chaos," *New Africa* 3, no. 9 (1944): 1.
104. William Minter, *King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), pp. 124–25; Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, pp. 76–77.
105. Richard Durham, "South African Plot Aims at Grabbing More Colonies," *Chicago Defender*, May 19, 1945, p. 1.
106. *New Africa* 4, no. 9 (1945): 4.
107. George Padmore, "UNO Gets South African Appeal," *Chicago Defender*, February 16, 1946, p. 5. See also Padmore, "Starvation and Sadism: Famine Grows in South Africa," *Chicago Defender*, February 23, 1946, p. 5; "South Africa, France Balk on Giving Up Colonies to UNO," *Chicago Defender*, January 19, 1946, p. 4.
108. R. T. Bokwe to Chief Tshekedi Khama, May 20, 1946, papers of South African Institute of Race Relations, AD843 B21:2, Historical Papers Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
109. Jas. A. Calata, Secretary General of the ANC, wrote, "Although you have gone to America for treatment and recuperation your people in South Africa will expect to hear from you when you return that you did represent them at the U.N.O. somehow": see Calata to A. B. Xuma, All Saints Day 1946, ABX 461101; Working Committee to Xuma, ABX 461025; R. V. Selothe Thema, on behalf of Working Committee African National Congress, to Xuma, November 18, 1946, ABX 461118, all in A. B. Xuma Papers, Historical Papers Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
110. Alphaeus Hunton to A. B. Xuma, October 4, 1946, Xuma Papers, ABX 46004.
111. Records of this work survive in the Xuma Papers. See ABX 470928 for the CAA's "Memorandum on the Issue of South-West Africa under Consideration by Committee 4 of the General Assembly," September 28, 1947; ABX 47002b, 471029d, and 471029e for CAA press releases. See also "Colonial Empires Assailed in Rally: Communist-Controlled Council Says U.S. Aids Others in 'Plundering Africa,'" *New York Times*, June 7, 1946, on the CAA's South Africa resolutions at the June 6 rally (also covered in Chapter 2).
112. See "Facts about South-West Africa—Annexation or Trusteeship," issued October 1946 by the CAA, Xuma Papers, 461031.
113. Edgar D. Draper to Walter White, June 3, 1948, Du Bois Papers, reel 61, frame 907.
114. "Facts about South-West Africa—Annexation or Trusteeship," pp. 1–2. The report also covered education and health care.
115. "Colonial Empires Assailed in Rally."
116. H. T. Andrews, Secretary for External Affairs, memorandum, June 13, 1946, SAB, BNY, box 14.
117. R. Webster, Consul General, New York to H. T. Andrews, June 11, 1946, SAB, BNY, box 14. Webster forwarded his report, transcriptions of speeches taken by a Miss O'Connor, a summary

- of the resolutions from the *New York Times*, and four CAA pamphlets distributed at the rally: "Facts about Starvation in the Union of South Africa"; "Facts about the Union of South Africa: South Africa's Aggressive Imperialism"; "What Do the People of Africa Want?" by Paul Robeson; and *The Job to Be Done*. Transcripts of speeches included those of Ferdinand Smith, National Maritime Union; Etukah Okala (Nigerian citizen), Columbia University; William S. Gaelmor, radio commentator, WHN, New York; Mary McCloud [sic] Bethune, president, National Council of Negro Women; Benjamin J. Davis, New York City Council; Adam Clayton Powell, U.S. congressman from New York and pastor, Abyssinian Baptist Church; W. E. B. Du Bois, director of special research, NAACP; William P. Hayes, president, New England Baptist Missionary Convention; Paul Robeson, president, CAA.
118. Webster to Andrews, June 11, 1946.
  119. Council on African Affairs, Notes on the Meeting at Madison Square Garden, on June 6, 1946, SAB, BNY, box 14.
  120. "S.A. People's Spokesmen Welcomed in New York," *Guardian*, November 14, 1946, p. 1; "Smuts' Annexation Demand Is Boomerang; Delegates Expose South African Misrule," *New Africa* 5, no. 10 (1946): 1-2.
  121. Major Robinson, "Money behind Smuts Plea for S.W. Africa," *Chicago Defender*, November 2, 1946, p. 13; "On Smuts," *Chicago Defender*, November 2, 1946.
  122. Major Robinson, "Africa Issue Perils UN: Dictator Smuts Demands Rule of New Territory," *Chicago Defender*, November 23, 1946, p. 1.
  123. "On Smuts."
  124. *New Africa* 5, no. 10 (1946): 3.
  125. Caption: "A New York Demonstration: Demonstration outside S.A. Embassy in New York, organized by the Council on African Affairs," *Passive Resister*, December 20, 1946, p. 1, *Passive Resister*, December 13, 1946, p. 1, and July 31, 1947, p. 1.
  126. Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, p. 77.
  127. Ibid.
  128. "South African Freedom Fight Calls for American Support," *Chicago Defender*, October 19, 1946, p. 3. See "Annexing of S.W.A. Opposed: Council on African Affairs Resolution," *Guardian*, November 14, 1946, p. 8, for South African reporting on these CAA resolutions.
  129. "Probe of Racism in Africa Asked: UN Unit Gets Data from African Council," *Baltimore Afro-American*, May 25, 1946, p. 10; "Africa—Continent in Bondage: Pleads for Subject Colonial Peoples on Eve of Mass Meeting," *New York Herald Tribune*, June 5, 1945.
  130. "Council Urges United Nations Human Rights Commission to Act on Discrimination in South Africa and All Colonies," *New Africa* 5, no. 6 (1946): 2. "S.A. Exposed in U.S.A.: Council's Charge of Racism," *Guardian*, June 13, 1946, p. 1.
  131. *Guardian*, December 5, 1946, p. 1; and "Smuts' Annexation Demand Is Boomerang."
  132. *Guardian*, December 5, 1946, p. 1.
  133. Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, p. 77.
  134. John Foster Dulles, United States Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations to Paul Robeson, Chairman, Council on African Affairs, Inc., December 7, 1946, Hunton Papers, box 1, folder 16 (CAA 1945-55), MG 237.
  135. CAA, "Memorandum on the Issue of South-West Africa under Consideration by Committee 4 of the General Assembly."
  136. "Vindictive Attitude of U.S. Government: Stand at U.N.O. Condemned," *Passive Resister*, October 16, 1947, p. 7.
  137. CAA, "Analysis of the Government of the Union of South Africa on the Administration of South West Africa for the Year 1946," December 10, 1947, Xuma Papers, ABX 471210.

138. CAA Press Release, April 9, 1947, Hunton Papers, microfilm reel 2. Flyers and other publicity for the rally are in the papers of Lloyd Brown, in author's possession.
139. *Passive Resister*, November 20, 1947, p. 4. See also *New Africa* 6, no. 8 (1947): 1.
140. "Messages to Paul Robeson," *Passive Resister*, April 25, 1947, p. 3; "UNO Rally Unites Non-Europeans: Biggest Meeting Ever," *Passive Resister*, May 9, 1947, p. 1.
141. CAA news release, "Council on Africa Urges U.S. Take Strong Stand on South West Africa," October 29, 1947, Xuma Papers, ABX 471029e. See "U.S. Afraid to Hurt Smuts," *Passive Resister*, November 13, 1947, for the South African Indian Congress coverage of the Sayre meeting.
142. CAA news release, "U.N. Assembly Reverses Committee Decisions on S.W. Africa and Colonies—Viewpoint of Colonial Powers Prevails," November 4, 1947, Xuma Papers, ABX 471104c.
143. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p. 262.

#### CHAPTER FIVE Domesticating Anticolonialism

1. Robert L. Zangrando, *The NAACP Crusade against Lynching, 1909-1950* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), p. 6. For the text of Dean Acheson's speech, see Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947)* (New York: Viking Press, 1955), p. 281. I thank Eric Foner for drawing my attention to the speech.
2. Herbert Shapiro, *White Violence and Black Response: From Reconstruction to Montgomery* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp. 355-77; Zangrando, *NAACP Crusade*, pp. 172-73; Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford, 1993), pp. 62-65; Nelson Peery, *Black Fire: The Making of an American Revolutionary* (New York: New Press, 1994), p. 339.
3. Patrick Renshaw, *American Labor and Consensus Capitalism, 1935-1990* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 76. On the precarious economic situation for black workers and the expansion of black poverty and unemployment following the war, see Robin D. G. Kelley, *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class* (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 78-79.
4. On the Truman Doctrine, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 144-46; Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 158; and David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 29. On the impact of the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on race relations within the United States and in the international sphere, see Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle*, pp. 61-68; and Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 186-87.
5. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, p. 109. Leffler adds that although Americans reacted negatively to Churchill's call for a military alliance, the speech accelerated widespread hostility towards the Soviet Union. On negative reaction to the speech, see also Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948* (New York: New York University Press, 1985), p. 64.
6. Martin Bauml Duberman, *Paul Robeson* (New York: Knopf, 1988), pp. 303-4.
7. "Paul Robeson Flays Churchill Plan for Anglo-Saxon World," *Chicago Defender*, March 30, 1946, p. 5.
8. "Churchill's Speech Shatters Colonials' Hopes for Freedom," *Chicago Defender*, March 16, 1946, p. 12.