

### The German Conception of Security: Competing Views

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On 9 May 1955, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was able to reach another landmark of his successful policy of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western world: West Germany became a member of NATO. From his point of view, NATO was "eine Gemeinschaft freier Nationen, die ihre Entschlossenheit bekundet haben, das gemeinsame Erbe der abendländischen Kultur, die persönliche Freiheit und die Herrschaft des Rechts zu verteidigen".<sup>1</sup> Thus, from the beginning, German membership in NATO addressed far more than purely defensive or military questions. It touched upon the fundamental issue of West Germany's integration into the West, including its political and cultural repercussions. It also affected the question of German sovereignty after the defeat of Hitler-Germany as well as the conflicting goals of the victorious Allies and - from 1955 to 1989 - the future of the national question.<sup>2</sup> In the following - necessarily brief - remarks I will describe the struggle over German concepts of security as perceived by government and opposition. There exist no clear-cut turning points though: In general, debates in Germany may be roughly attributed to the periods 1949 - 1963 under Adenauer, the transitional period of the 1960s until the end of the Brandt Government 1974, the policy under Helmut Schmidt 1974 - 1982, and finally the Kohl years until unification. Whichever government was in power German attitudes towards NATO always reflected upon the East-West struggle and the unsolved German question at the frontline of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

## 1

When Adenauer led the Federal Republic into NATO despite strong opposition among the population and in parliament, regarding integration as premature and destroying all chances for unification, he was convinced that unification could only come after integration. But the Chancellor had other motives as well. He felt it was necessary to raise an army to gain sovereignty for the Federal Republic and to end Western tutelage in the High Commissions. For Adenauer the 'Bundeswehr' was also a natural status symbol of a partially sovereign state. It was a protection against demilitarisation and neutrality in a hostile environment at the height of the Cold War. Thus the 'Bundeswehr' became a bargaining chip for the entry of the Federal Republic into the Western world. On the other hand, he was convinced that "NATO cannot exist without Germany".<sup>3</sup> For Adenauer all attempts to change this constellation proved to be horror scenarios, regardless of whether they were initiated in the East or in the West. Understandably he reacted with great disappointment and dismay when in 1956, only weeks after the Bundestag majority had passed the new conscription law against a strong opposition, the so-called 'Radford Plan' became known. He perceived this inner-American debate about the role of conventional and nuclear weapons as an attempt to withdraw American troops from Europe.<sup>4</sup> He rejected British disengagement plans, however limited they were,<sup>5</sup> as well as the Polish Rapacki Plan<sup>6</sup> and other Soviet-inspired proposals.<sup>7</sup> They all threatened to undermine his basic belief that the Federal Republic had the same right as the other Western nations concerning security from the Soviet Union. The policy of Stalin and his successors was perceived as aggressive, oriented towards undermining Western democracy. Adenauer felt that only undivided security not a demilitarised zone, which would incorporate Germany, would guarantee an adequate environment for the development of the Federal Republic in peace and freedom. Only then would the West become a magnet for East Germany. He strove for a defensive security partnership within NATO which secured the existence of Berlin as well.<sup>8</sup>

Having traded the establishment of the 'Bundeswehr' for admission to the Western alliance, the Chancellor felt that the Federal Republic now had at least some influence on the formulation of national security. Thus by 1954 he preferred NATO to the abortive European Defence Community (EDC). "Für uns Deutsche insgesamt ist die neue Organisation viel besser, als es die EVG gewesen ist ... . Weil wir aber nun in NATO-Rat sind, haben wir das Recht zum Einblick und zur Entscheidung, das wir sonst nicht gehabt hätten".<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, Adenauer understood only too well that security for the Federal Republic and Europe could only be provided by the United States. It was the only power with adequate strength to balance the Soviet Union. The United States within NATO was the pillar in his security

system. Any autonomous defence policy of the Federal Republic or even the Western European powers was no longer possible. Thus Adenauer was the staunchest supporter of the Atlantic Alliance when American-French relations deteriorated and demands were made by Charles de Gaulle to choose between Europe and the United States. He was 'frightened' by de Gaulle's approach.<sup>10</sup> Adenauer understood that NATO was not a static organisation. It had to be adapted to a changing world. He repeatedly demanded a 'reform' of the organisation and always hoped that its political and even economic importance would increase over time. Without a strong NATO and a Federal Republic securely tied into its structure, West German policy towards the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was deemed to be impossible.

However, there are some indications that Adenauer in the last years of his Chancellorship might have been willing to partially soften what has also been described as the policy of strength towards the Soviet Union and turn toward a policy of rapprochement, if a lessening of tension over Berlin and an improvement for the people in the GDR could have been reached.

For Adenauer security could not be reached by military means alone. The unity and determination of the Western democracies to protect their way of life formed the basic guarantee of security within freedom. This also included domestic stability against communist ideology and agitation. His approach to a West European/Atlantic Alliance was based upon a Christian, western thinking and democratic values. To him NATO was thus always more than just a military alliance. It was a political alliance which bound together states with similar value systems. In order to obtain a common European defence the traditional rivalry with France had to be overcome. The justified distrust of Germany's Western neighbours after the experience with Hitler-Germany had to be taken seriously. Security for and from Germany was the result. The Europeanisation of economic, political, and social conditions would be a big step in this direction. The institutional basis for such a development had to be laid with the Federal Republic as an equal partner.<sup>11</sup>

The Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, plans for a European Union and the European Economic Community (EEC) prevented national isolation. American presence and tutelage contained the fears of Germany's Western European neighbours against a resurgence of German military power. On the other hand, Adenauer recognised that the United States and Europe would not always see eye to eye on all problems. Thus NATO was the security pin between Washington and Western Europe. This was especially true in Germany where these troops became a trip-wire to guarantee US intervention in case of Soviet aggression.<sup>12</sup>

In Adenauer's vision for post-war Europe freedom, integration, and security were thus more important than reunification. Or, to formulate it

differently, unification was only possible with Germany firmly tied to the West. However, his hope remained that the Soviet Union would one day - for political or economic reasons - either give up the GDR or allow more freedom for its people. On the other hand, Adenauer not only distrusted his countrymen in a neutralised Germany, he likewise feared that the Allies might decide independently on the future of Germany. This fear strengthened his concept of security. Binding the Federal Republic strictly to the West prevented Germany from being alone in a dangerous world and allowed influence on political and military decisions.

Psychology also played a major role in Adenauer's thinking. He did not believe in an immediate Soviet military aggression, but argued repeatedly that the show of force, Allied military planes over Germany, would contribute to the public feeling of security.<sup>13</sup>

Without any global defence commitments and relatively safe under the American umbrella of deterrence, the Federal Republic could enjoy the development of a social system which had also been demanded by Kurt Schumacher and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as a 'social magnet'. Social defence more than anything else would contribute to an identification of the population with the West. It would prevent the spreading of a communist ideology, and would create serious problems for the domestic stability of the GDR.<sup>14</sup> Besides the need to rebuild the Federal Republic, the concentration on the benefits of the economic miracle, the perception, that in the East-West conflict the West under American protection was superior to the East prevented the public from searching for alternatives. Comfortable with Germany's role within the alliance, 'massive retaliation' by NATO against an attack from the East strengthened Adenauer's belief that the status quo needed to be preserved. This was widely supported by public opinion, although there was always a high percentage of the population which still rejected a German army.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, the Federal Republic was not a normal state. Initially, many Europeans and many Germans did not want German soldiers and did not see a convincing justification for their presence. After the experience of the Second World War and the institutional role of the 'Wehrmacht' under Hitler, security from the army and its officer corps was a widespread reaction in society. Vigilance against the domestic role of the 'Bundeswehr', the demand for a strong parliamentary role of the 'Bundestag' as guaranteed by its Security Committee was a typical expression of this policy. The 'Bundeswehr' and its commitment to NATO had to be kept under close civilian control. Indeed, the majority of the population felt probably secure with German officers tied into the structure of NATO. Similarly, since the Federal Republic was the only country with all troops fully integrated into NATO structures, possessed no general staff, and had American and other units from European members of NATO stationed on her territory this also

heightened Germany's special role. The presence of NATO troops at the front line with the Warsaw Pact guaranteed both control of West German armed forces and the immediate involvement of the Allies in any attack from the East.

## II

The foreign and security policy of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was during the fifties closely intertwined with reunification. West German entry into any military alliance - EDC or NATO - seemed to prevent unity for Germany. In the formulation of Kurt Schumacher, its dominating leader until his death in 1952, the basic goal of the party was to gain national unity in peace and freedom. Schumacher tried to reach this goal not through military neutrality but what he called 'Bündnislosigkeit', non-alliance. This meant that in the ongoing struggle between East and West a united Germany would be politically tied to the values of Western democracies - the ideas of the French Revolution and not the October Revolution - without belonging to a formal alliance. He imagined that the preferable framework for such a concept was a system of collective security. This was a pan-European concept, which was diametrically opposed to the concept of the government stressing security for the West and the Federal Republic. Schumacher further argued in 1949 that since Germany was still an occupied country, the Allies were responsible for security questions. Furthermore, he demanded equality and a security guarantee from the Allies. The Soviet Union might regard the creation of a West German Army as an act of aggression. However, as long as a collective European security system could not be established Schumacher supported a forward defence. In case of a Soviet attack on Germany he wanted to prevent a conflict to be fought on German territory and demanded a defence between Vistula and Niemen.<sup>16</sup>

However, his ideas were certainly not widespread in his party. The Dortmund party meeting of the SPD in 1952 incorporated the concept of collective security into the programme. It insisted upon a system of collective security which guaranteed Germany equality without endangering reunification.<sup>17</sup> After Schumacher's death, the Berlin party meeting in 1954 demanded that the Western powers should enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union about the creation of regional security systems. They should be based upon the statutes of the United Nations. In such a system the united Germany should on the basis of equal rights and equal risks contribute to the maintenance of peace.<sup>18</sup>

The domestic anti-communist, anti-Soviet atmosphere in the Federal Republic during the Cold War meant that the SPD had to defend such

proposals by stressing the fundamental difference between a democratic West and a Stalinist Eastern Europe. Thus, contrary to the concept of the Adenauer government, the opposition party argued that West integration - before all chances for reunification had been tested in negotiations with the Soviet Union - would prevent unity and increase confrontations between East and West in Europe. The SPD was willing - for the sake of obtaining unity - to accept a functioning international security system established under the roof of the United Nations.<sup>19</sup> The Deutschland Plan of the SPD 1958 mentions a European Security system but not NATO. The Godesberg Programme of 1958 calls it 'European Security system'. During 1956/57 it was described as a European peace order guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>20</sup> Thus security for Germany and within Europe could only be achieved through negotiations between East and West, in which the SPD was willing to pay a price - military neutrality. To put it differently, the SPD hoped to establish a regional security system in Europe with controlled reduction of armament. In the process of German unification the country would be turned into a zone free of nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction. Furthermore, while the government argued that a complete build up of the 'Bundeswehr' was necessary for an adequate West German contribution to Western security, representatives of the SPD were willing to adapt the strength of the 'Bundeswehr' to an improvement of East-West relations.<sup>21</sup>

The disastrous defeat of the SPD in the 'Bundestag' election of 1957, which had been won by the government with the successful slogan 'no experiments' (meaning in both foreign security policy and economic policy) changed everything. The SPD election platform had demanded more effort from Adenauer to obtain unification. The party appeared to be willing to accept a European security system with the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic leaving NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively. The party leadership now recognised that the SPD had to adapt its programme to the domestic and international environment. This slowly led to a modification of security concepts. At the party meeting in Hanover in November 1960, a SPD majority voted in favour of West German NATO membership, but it still rejected nuclear armament of the 'Bundeswehr'. To convince the party basis that a repetition of old formulas would neither change the confrontation in the Cold War nor would it help to gain power in Germany was the work of a small group of security experts like Fritz Eiler, Helmut Schmidt, and Herbert Wehner. They demanded a new approach to foreign policy. But it had been a slow process to overcome the opposition of the party basis. In order to become 'governmental' the SPD leadership turned towards an acceptance of the status quo as represented by Adenauer and West German treaty obligations within the Western alliance. This was harshly criticised by the party's Left, which felt that the new

approach damaged the image of the SPD as the traditional German peace party. However, the qualified commitment to West integration and NATO did not mean that all ideas about European collective security had been given up within the party.<sup>22</sup>

### III

Despite the obvious differences towards a West German commitment to NATO, these remarks suggest that the security policy of the CDU government and the opposition - with the exception of the KPD - was based upon a common platform. Freedom and security for Germany were conditions for unity. The plans for German unity submitted by the SPD<sup>23</sup> and the FDP<sup>24</sup> in the spring of 1959 suggest that unification was only possible in freedom and democracy. Basic freedoms and human rights were central.

However, contrary to Adenauer and his party they felt that integration into the West was not necessary. Instead both SPD and the Liberal Party (FDP) hoped for a democratic, united and bloc-free Germany, without foreign troops and without nuclear weapons. Détente and disarmament had to be part of a European collective security system negotiated by the victorious powers and the two Germanies on an equal basis. The Germans themselves would be responsible for all questions concerning unification through elections.

During this period SPD and FDP were clearly following a more nationalistic policy than the Adenauer government. For the sake of regaining German unity, they were willing to modify the established Atlantic security concept as represented by NATO. If the concept of Adenauer was peace, freedom, security and last but not least reunification, the SPD demanded reunification in peace and freedom based upon security for Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is difficult to imagine that at the height of the Cold War an agreement between East and West would have been possible. Furthermore, those countries occupied by German armies during the Second World War still felt safer with a divided Germany and two Germanies tightly knit into systems of alliances. They also provided a framework for political, military and economic control and integration.

The SPD-concept seems to be hardly realistic for another reason. Any agreement between the two German states - if it had been possible at all - would have had to address the question that even before the foundation of the GDR the Ministry of Interior in East-Berlin had created - with the support of the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) - in 1948: the so-called 'Volks-polizeibereitschaften'. They became the 'Kasernierte Volkspolizei' (KVP) in 1952 and consisted of about 90,000 men.<sup>25</sup> Thus before 1957 only the GDR had a military force. Even if the KVP is seen as a paramilitary

unit for the use of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in case of civil war in the GDR, it is difficult to imagine that the two German governments could have agreed to a common plan.

When it became obvious that such utopian deliberations had failed because the Soviet Union under Khrushchev was not interested in changing the status quo towards unification, but tried to cement division and intended to upset the postwar structures in Germany (Berlin crisis 1958-1961) the SPD under Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr started 'Wandel durch Annäherung' (change through rapprochement). This new policy was based upon the preservation of the Atlantic partnership, a goal the mayor of Berlin described in his Harvard speech 1962 as 'our constant aim'. Any change of the status quo demanded a new approach. A 'policy of transformation', or a 'policy of permeation' had to be put to a positive test in Germany. The goal was to de-escalate the Cold War and turn toward a policy of peaceful coexistence, which Brandt felt would prove the superiority and non-aggressiveness of the Western democracies. A new European peace order, the control of armaments, the end of further nuclear armament, and a modification of the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact seemed to be possible to its most optimistic proponents, only to be destroyed by the harsh realities of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.<sup>26</sup>

#### IV

The 1960s with the beginning of the Grand Coalition and the Brandt government were a period of transition starting with a dialogue on the rejection of force (Gewaltverzicht) with the Soviet Union and an acceptance of the post-war realities in Europe. The status quo was accepted. The policy of strength and reliance on close integration in the West without probing Soviet flexibility and intentions seemed to be outdated. It had brought no solution of the German question. The goal of reaching national unity as a precondition of European security was slowly modified for a European peace order which emphasised rapprochement, a reduction of tension, and confidence building measures between East and West. A policy of active engagement would signal to the Soviet Union that the West did not intend to 'roll back' communist influence. Instead this new policy might influence Warsaw Pact regimes to move toward more open political, economic, and social systems. One of the objectives of this approach would be to buy greater room for manoeuvre for the East European regimes in their relationship with Moscow. In the long run, however, Western security would benefit from evolution within the Soviet Union itself. A Soviet Union less paranoid about its security and more concerned about improving the quality of life for its citizens would be a far more agreeable member of the interna-

tional community. It might even allow a modification of the status quo in Germany. This policy did in fact already start with the Kennedy presidency. The Social Democratic Party and especially Willy Brandt had watched the activities of the late Adenauer Government from the perspective of whether the Chancellor followed Kennedy's attempts for détente, or whether the ageing Chancellor remained inflexible and a stumbling block for détente in Europe.<sup>27</sup>

When Brandt himself became Chancellor the new 'Ostpolitik' was an attempt to assume a greater share of self-determination by entering into agreements with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Old concepts had to be modified in the hope of moving towards rapprochement in Europe while the war in Vietnam led to a new confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were an attempt to accept the results of the Second World War in Europe. They were also seen as a first step towards peace and co-operation. Furthermore, the SPD/FDP coalition government was convinced that a nuclear conflict in Europe was unlikely and impossible. It would have meant the annihilation of European culture. Thus disarmament and arms control seemed to be the only solution of Germany's security dilemma. The substantial influence of the United States over West German policies slowly eroded. There was a greater willingness to define and express West Germany's own security interests. Détente in Europe was the goal while the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union continued on a global basis.

Brandt's policy did not endanger the western orientation or commitment to NATO of the Federal Republic, but his new policy of détente failed. It did not lead to a reduction of military potentials in Europe. Détente did not succeed, the Soviet Union modernised her missile system, regardless of the high hopes of some social democrats. Germany remained divided and the border between the Warsaw Pact and NATO the demarcation line in Central Europe.

#### V

Under Brandt's successor Helmut Schmidt (1974 - 1982), the policy of détente with Eastern Europe was continued while stressing the close ties with the Western alliance. While Brandt's motto had been an idealistic 'Friedenspolitik', Chancellor Schmidt opted for stability and equality. Schmidt reacted most sensitively to one-sided changes in armament. He demanded negotiated reductions of forces and armament and defined this as a 'Strategie des Gleichgewichts'. I submit that more than anything else 'peace through stability' and not 'peace through change' was his motto. It was to be

carried through on a multilateral basis with the United States and Germany's European allies. However, the initiatives already started under Brandt were continued as well. While West German security policy forbade national solutions, Schmidt nevertheless was aware of the special responsibility of the two German states for peace on the border of East and West. The attempt to reach a security partnership and the conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe more than anything else characterise this policy. This certainly led to more freedom of action, but also showed its limits when the East-West conflict was sharpened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Hardly any other political decision in German post-war history has led to similar levels of controversy in West German society as the NATO dual-track decision of December 12, 1979. The decision to station American medium-range missiles and cruise missiles in Western Europe led to a severe crisis in society and to hitherto unknown political confrontation. This is hardly remarkable. Since the highly emotional debates on West German rearmament in the fifties, there had been no serious discussions about security policy which had reached the public sphere. Debates were basically left to specialists in the 'Bundestag' and journalists interested in questions of security. Military equality had been the accepted goal of all previous discussions, the West always knowing that overall equality could only be reached through the American nuclear umbrella and deterrence. The new policy of the Carter administration strongly supported by Schmidt seemed to threaten peace for a new generation. The public hardly understood the formula disarmament through armament. In the face of overkill and military-technical perfection this policy split Germany. It split the SPD, leading in the end to the overthrow of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who had been one of its strongest proponents.<sup>28</sup>

These decisions touched upon the basic self-image of the SPD as the party of peace. From its beginnings the party had been at least ambivalent to questions of military force. It had worked for its abolition in international affairs. Now, under a social democratic government, weapons should be stationed on German soil which could destroy the Soviet Union in a surprise attack the party's Left argued. For Schmidt flexible response was no longer possible nor was an atomic war in Europe. Only deterrence remained. Others in the party, among them Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr, Erhard Eppler, felt that deterrence was less important than détente. Only the desire for power for some time stopped the party from voting down the Chancellor's security policy. Concepts of unilateral disarmament flourished. A growing anti-Americanism in the peace movement, an equidistance between the Soviet Union and the United States with demands for a demilitarised, nuclear-free, and a bloc-free Europe were the result. Concepts like a zero-solution, the stationing of missiles at sea followed. Oskar Lafontaine

thought publicly about a general strike and withdrawal from NATO as means of a political fight against follow-up armament to be opposed by the trade unions.

In the face of new weapon systems Egon Bahr asked "Has mankind turned crazy?" Erhard Eppler believed that NATO policy supported by Helmut Schmidt was a provocation of Moscow. In the SPD-party journal *Korrespondenz* Bahr called the neutron bomb a "perversion of thinking".<sup>29</sup> Torn between different party factions the Schmidt government was no longer 'regierungsfähig'. Schmidt failed in the struggle between a reliable and trustworthy policy towards the alliance and the identity of his party.

The new NATO-formula 'earn and negotiate' divided the SPD. To many it looked like overkill in an age where new, horribly perfect and devastating weapons seemed to open the possibility for the annihilation of Europe in a conflict between the superpowers. They demanded more negotiations before the stationing could begin. The SALT-II-negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed also to open the possibility that the US might agree to concessions to the detriment of the NATO partners. The territory of the Federal Republic might be especially threatened and the stationing of new Pershing missiles would make Germany the battlefield in a nuclear confrontation. Part of the SPD, especially those organised in the youth organisation also demanded that British and French nuclear weapons should be included in any bargaining with the Soviet Union, an argument also forwarded by the Soviets. This didn't help the Schmidt government since it could not dispose of weapons that didn't even belong to Germany nor did it help the Soviet Union.

Demands to leave NATO should the US introduce the neutron bomb had already been submitted to the SPD party meeting in Hamburg 1977.<sup>30</sup> In comparison to what was to come after the dual-track decision this was only a minor problem for a party which still saw in Helmut Schmidt the 'manager' who would be able to prevent the Federal Republic from being drawn into the new Cold War between the superpowers. Solidarity and the desire for power helped for some time to keep the party basis and regional organisations in line with Schmidt's policy.

At the Berlin party meeting in 1979 Eppler described the deployment as a provocation of the Soviet Union. Others demanded a moratorium or argued that advance concessions might not lead to a loss of security. Instead, if the West did not station new missiles this might increase confidence-building measures.<sup>31</sup>

Furthermore, distrust of, or at least uneasiness about, the US grew. The rejection of the SALT-II-Treaty by the new Reagan administration was seen as a renunciation of previous commitments. NATO's heavy reliance on nuclear weapons had been of concern to military experts and public commentators for some time. What Reagan seemed to be suggesting was

the continuation of deterrence while at the same time the United States would use her technological advantage to increase the threshold for nuclear war. A stable conventional balance in Europe could be achieved within the economic capabilities of the European NATO countries. To many Europeans conventional wars in Europe were, however, as unthinkable as nuclear wars. SDI and other programmes like INF tended to reinforce the impression that the missiles were being deployed to make it easier to limit a nuclear war to Europe. Oskar Lafontaine even went so far as to question German membership in NATO when he argued in March 1983 "Es geht um die Frage, welche Bedingungen das NATO-Bündnis uns aufzählt. Im Klartext: Ein Bündnis, das uns auf ein Pulverfaß setzt und die Lunte gleich zündet, ein solches Bündnis ist nicht geeignet, Sicherheit in Mitteleuropa zu garantieren." He also stated: "Leute, die einen Atomkrieg für führbar und gewinnbar halten, die können niemals unsere Bündnispartner sein. Das sind Verfluchte."<sup>32</sup>

While Helmut Schmidt and, initially, a majority of his party were convinced that the Soviet Union had opened a new round of arms build-up which further increased Soviet superiority, others were willing to accept the disequilibrium that always existed. A vicious circle of armament and rearmament between East and West could only be broken if one side - the West - started a policy of confidence building. Furthermore, they did not believe that American representatives were really negotiating in good faith. These arguments together with the growth of the peace movement and a war scare determined developments. A decade of social democratic 'Friedenspolitik' and détente seemed to be threatened. An improvement of German-German relations and normalisation were in danger.

Most outspoken was the criticism of the Greens. 'Wir müssen raus aus der NATO' became the motto of the party. Since the physical survival of the Federal Republic was always threatened in any conflict, this contributed to the peace movement of the 1980s. Foreign nuclear weapons on German territory were a threat to West German security: this was the line taken by security specialists of the Greens like former General Gert Bastian and Alfred Mechtersheimer. They favoured a nuclear-free zone in Germany and argued 'alliances guarantee the escalation and extension of war'. However, criticism was not only limited to the SPD and the Greens. Even Alfred Dregger, one of the conservative spokesmen of the CDU argued "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans", and there was some criticism from 'Bundeswehr' officers as well.<sup>33</sup>

## VI

Although the peace movement rallied behind its demands for getting out of the armaments spiral, the 'Bundestag' elections of 1983 showed that large sectors of West German public opinion wanted a change. Whether this can be attributed to the open split between former Chancellor Schmidt and his party on security policy is an open question. The CDU/CSU received 48.6 per cent of the vote. The SPD fell back to 38.2 per cent, less than in the 1965 election. The decay of détente and the revival of the security debate in the eighties had brought a new concurrence between the so-called German question and European security. The vote in the 'Bundestag' of 22 November 1983 supporting the deployment of the new missiles in Germany was a watershed for both Washington and Moscow. The United States declared victory, the Soviet Union discontinued the Geneva negotiations. However, both the Kohl/Genscher government and Honecker were determined to work for a 'coalition of reason', a special responsibility for peace in Europe. If the SPD had expected that a new 'ice-age' would be the result of the stationing of missiles in Europe the party would soon learn that the new Soviet leadership under Michael Gorbachev was interested in negotiated disarmament and arms control.<sup>34</sup>

- 78 FT online, 7 December 1995.
- 79 Le Monde, 15 June 1995.
- 80 Interviews, Paris, July 1997. J. Howarth, "HiroChirac" and the French Nuclear Conundrum: A Testing Time for the Pursuit of Grandeur', *French Politics and Society*, 13:3 (1995) 6. D. S. Yost, 'France's Nuclear Dilemmas', *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1996) p. 116.
- 81 Le Monde, 10 July 1997.
- 82 For a fuller account, see Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-1997: The Politics of Ambivalence* (London: Macmillan, 1999).

### Chapter 16

1 Felix Becker (ed.), Konrad Adenauer: Die Demokratie ist für uns eine Weltanschauung. Reden und Gespräche 1946-1967 (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 1989), p. 98. Adenauer's statement seems to be a quote from the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April, 1949 "They [the parties to this Treaty - H. R.] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

2 See Helga Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955 - 1982*, 2. Auflage (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986), pp. 49-54ff.; Norbert Wiggershaus, 'Adenauer und die amerikanische Sicherheitspolitik in Europa', in Adenauer und die USA, ed. by Klaus Schwabe, Vol. 14 - Rhöndorfer Gespräche (Bonn: Bouvier, 1994), pp. 18-23; Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Das außenpolitische Konzept Konrad Adenauers', in Klaus Götto, Hans Maier, Rudolf Morsey, Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: Seine Deutschland- und Außenpolitik 1945 - 1963 (München, 1975), pp. 97-155.

3 Adenauer: "... um den Frieden zu gewinnen. Protokolle des CDU-Vorstands 1957 - 1961, bearb. von Günter Buchstab (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994), p. 92, 'Bericht zur außenpolitischen Lage', 17 Januar 1958; already on 11 October 1954 he had argued: "Denken Sie daran, daß die ganze Atlantikpaktorganisation darauf aufgebaut war, daß Deutschland einen Beitrag leistet. Ohne diesen Beitrag hätte die Atlantikpaktorganisation ein Riesenloch." Konrad Adenauer: 'Wir haben wirklich etwas geschaffen.' Die

Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1953 - 1957, bearbeitet von Günter Buchstab (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1990), p. 259.

4 Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung*, pp. 61-5; Konrad Adenauer: *Erinnerungen 1955 - 1959* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967), pp. 197-214; Christian Greiner, 'Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO 1954 - 1957', in *Die Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. by Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (München: Oldenbourg, 1993), Vol. 3, *Die NATO-Option*, pp. 561-845.

5 Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung*, pp. 106-9, 120-2.

6 Wiggershaus, 'Adenauer und die amerikanische Sicherheitspolitik', pp. 33-6; Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung*, pp. 110-6.

7 Similar plans were supported by the government of the German Democratic Republic.

8 Buchstab, p. 1058.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 256, 11 October 1954, Hans-Gert Pöttering, Adenauers Sicherheitspolitik 1955 - 63. Ein Beitrag zum deutsch-amerikanischen Verhältnis (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1975).

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# A History of NATO - The First Fifty Years

Volume 2

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