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Obstructive All the Way? British Policy towards German Unification 1989–90

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British policy towards German unification has been judged to be at best reluctant, at worst obstructive. This article seeks to revise that perception, using documents from the Federal Chancellor's Office and the author's interviews with British and German diplomats and politicians. It distinguishes between the rhetoric of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The latter played a leading role in the Two Plus Four talks that resolved the external issues involved in German unification, and made a particular contribution to devising the formula for the termination of Four Power Rights over a unified Germany.

German unification was one of the most dramatic events in post-war Europe, fundamentally altering the political architecture of the continent. With its sovereignty restored, the unified Germany emerged a natural hegemon. Reunification also sped up the movement towards the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Political Union in the European Community.¹ As one of the three Western Powers responsible for West Berlin and Germany as a whole,² Britain played a role in the external process of the unification. British policy towards unification, however, has been over-identified with the rhetoric of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, neglecting the somewhat different position of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).³ Accordingly, British policy has been judged to be reluctant at best, obstructive at worst. Few authors, by contrast, have drawn attention to the contribution of the FCO in the Two Plus Four talks that secured international agreement for German unification, and the positive role it played in devising solutions to issues that stood in the way of the unification process. Sir Julian Bullard (British Ambassador to Bonn, 1983–88) and Yvonne Klein have emphasised the contribution of the FCO, pinpointing the suspension of the Four Power Rights as a British idea.⁴

The present article is based on documents from the Federal Chancellor's Office declassified in 1998,⁵ alongside other primary and secondary materials⁶ and interviews that the author conducted with major players involved in the process from both Germany and the UK. It elaborates the arguments of Bullard and Klein that there was a policy difference between Mrs Thatcher and the FCO, and that the latter made positive contributions towards the momentous event.⁷ It seeks to clarify the reasons for policy difference, focusing specifically on policy-making process. It argues that

in contrast to Mrs Thatcher's rhetoric and despite her delaying tactics, British policy towards German unification was actually helpful and constructive. Occupying a different position from Mrs Thatcher's, the FCO cooperated very closely with the US and West Germany in the Two Plus Four talks and made contributions to external aspects of German reunification. The first section of the article describes British attitudes and policy from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to the end of January 1990. The following section analyses the policy differences between Downing Street and the FCO that emerged thereafter. Finally, the article evaluates the role of the latter in the Two Plus Four talks forum.

STATUS QUO VERSUS CREATING STABILITY

The fact that Chancellor Helmut Kohl was visiting Poland on 9 November when the Berlin Wall came down testifies to the unexpectedness of the collapse of the GDR.⁸ The following day, Kohl talked with Mrs Thatcher by telephone. He chose her as the first Western leader with whom to talk about the historic event, because he thought that his talks with her would be most difficult.⁹ The British Prime Minister described the fall and attendant emotional moments as 'historic scenes' and said that a really democratic government was necessary in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). She also advised him to contact Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. She further added that the British troops stationed in West Germany as well as in Berlin would be willing to help accommodate refugees from East Germany.¹⁰ President Bush expressed his highest regard for the way the West German Government handled the situation.¹¹ French President Francois Mitterrand, concerned by the situation, yet with typical grand rhetoric, was more whole-hearted in welcoming the collapse: 'my wishes are with German people. It is actually a great historic moment. We have the opportunity to transform the historic moment into a European development' [author's translation].¹² His remarks, however, concealed well his deep-seated uneasiness towards the event, as his visit to East Germany and meeting with Gorbachev in Kiev following month illustrated. On both occasions, he stressed the importance of keeping stability or balance in Europe, a code word for status quo: a divided Germany.¹³

As can be seen from these accounts, apart from Mrs Thatcher's advice to contact Gorbachev, her remarks about the breach of the Berlin Wall were in tune with other leaders. More importantly, her position was also in agreement with that of the FCO at the time. When Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, visited West Germany on 15-16, a week after the Wall was breached, he was the 'most senior non-German politician to visit West Berlin since the fall'.¹⁴ Hurd reaffirmed British willingness to help to ease the difficult situation in Berlin, just as Mrs Thatcher had done in her telephone conversation with Chancellor Kohl. As to the present situation in Germany, 'reunification was not on the agenda now because the people pressing for reform in East Germany have not put it on the agenda', Hurd told journalists. Concerning the Allied role, he emphasised constant updating, not overnight change. This was also the official position of Downing Street.

However, differences in nuances in the remarks of the three Western powers were noticed by West Germans. Analysing the positions of the Four Powers concerning the

fall of the Wall, Horst Teltschik, Kohl's Foreign Policy advisor at the Chancellor's Office, concluded on 17 November that the British position was one with more reservations than that of the French. He assumed that the British would try to hold on to the Four-Power status along with the French. The two countries stressed the responsibilities of the Four Powers, whereas the US did not use the term.¹⁵

Overall, Mrs Thatcher's analysis and remarks on the situation at the time were sober. She associated the reforms in the GDR with stability in Europe. She was also concerned to prevent the situation from jeopardising Gorbachev's position in relation to conservative critics in the Soviet Union. This concern became paramount once the Federal Republic began to pursue an active unification policy. Rather than a personal feeling towards the Soviet leader, her rationale was based on realpolitik that stability in the whole Europe depended much on the fate of Gorbachev.

Mrs Thatcher's official position regarding the events in Eastern Europe and in East Germany was first made public at the press conference after the European Council's special summit in Paris, called by Mitterrand on 18 November 1989. She explicitly stated that the border was not on the agenda and argued that the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, should continue to exist as a 'background of security and stability at a time of great change'.¹⁶ Her value of the status quo during the event was further in evidence at a private meeting. She argued that 'any attempt to talk about either border changes or German unification would undermine Mr Gorbachev'.¹⁷ Her remarks were specifically targeted at Chancellor Kohl, who defended the right of self-determination for Germans.¹⁸

Prior to the end of November, British reactions to German unification were not significantly different from those of other powers. Mrs Thatcher's suspicions began to escalate, however, in response to Kohl's 'Ten-Point Programme'.¹⁹ Designed to overcome the division of Germany and Europe, the programme put unification firmly on the immediate political agenda. Kohl's drive towards unity awakened a latent, yet deep-seated prejudice in Mrs Thatcher. Henceforward, her strategy was to use Britain's role as one of the Four Powers to manage and slow down the unification process.

Her concerns were conveyed to Foreign Minister Genscher when he was sent to London to expound the Programme in person. Obviously upset about Kohl's *démarche*, she told him: 'we thought that we had arrived at an agreement at the European Council's special summit in Paris. Now everything is moving'.²⁰ She also felt that Kohl should have either consulted his allies on the matter, or informed the allies of the plan beforehand.²¹ On the day Kohl made his key address, she presented her views on East-West relations on a TV programme, saying that the status quo must be preserved, and that 'the West should do nothing to put him [Gorbachev] jeopardy'.²² The mantle of Gorbachev's protector that she had begun to wear in private was shown ostentatiously in public at the end of January 1990, and the remarks that she made in private at the Paris Euro-summit ten days earlier were for the first time expressed in public. Expressed on a domestic TV programme, however, her remarks did not attract much immediate attention. Moreover, the situation in East Germany was still unpredictable, and there remained a possibility that a reformed GDR might remain viable as a state.

Amidst the uncertainties, she initially turned to the US to explore possible assistance in slowing down unification. This strategy was soon foreclosed by President

George Bush's address at the NATO summit in early December, in which he emphasised support for a unified Germany within NATO and the EC.²³ Concluding that she could not get US support, Mrs Thatcher turned to France.²⁴ Private talks with Mitterrand at the Strasbourg European Council on 9 December revealed that the latter shared her concerns, and they agreed to work together to find possible ways of checking any German resurgence. The attempt to enlist French support, however, was thwarted by the historic agreement at the summit to link German unification to a deepening of European integration through Economic and Monetary Union, with a parallel development in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Although Germany was initially reluctant to agree a schedule for an Intergovernmental Conference on EMU, it acceded once this was set back until after the federal election in December 1990.²⁵ The only head of government who opposed setting a timetable for convening the IGC, Mrs Thatcher was powerless to prevent an agreement that neutralised French reservations about unification. Thus, the summit communique recognised the right to German self-determination within a European peace order based on existing treaties and agreements.²⁶

However, because Mrs Thatcher resisted the plans for EMU, the only means that she had to delay German unification was either to cooperate with France or with the Soviet Union. As both options were unavailable, she mounted frontal attacks on Kohl and the Foreign Minister for instigating the coming together of two Germanies. In an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* published at the end of January 1990,²⁷ Mrs Thatcher clearly opposed early German reunification, because 'it would create enormous political problems for Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev'. She feared that he might lose power because of this, which 'would be a disaster for everyone'. The British Prime Minister contrasted the 'more narrow, nationalistic goals' of Kohl and Genscher with broad, Western goals to 'get democracy throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union'. Clinging to the status quo, she argued, 'German unification must come at a rate which gives us time to work things out, otherwise that would destabilise everything'. Although this defence of the status quo was plausible, it was not difficult to see that her primary concern was that German unification would diminish the British role in both European and global politics.²⁸

Mrs Thatcher's invective was motivated in part, by the realisation that she was powerless in the growing partnership between the US, French and West German governments,²⁹ and in part by the resignation of the Soviet Union to unification.³⁰ It was further intensified, however, by an emerging domestic conflict with the FCO. The latter had drawn up an analysis of the German question in late October 1989, advising the government not to 'risk alienating the Germans by openly discouraging reunification',³¹ although it shared Mrs Thatcher's preference for maintaining the status quo. From January 1990, however, its position became more careful and pragmatic.³² This reorientation of the FCO position was predicated on reading of the events in West Germany. In mid-January Chancellor Kohl had predicted to then British Ambassador Sir Christopher Mallaby that unification would take about five to ten years to realise.³³ By then, however, events had already begun to accelerate rapidly with an influx of over 58,000 East Germans to the West in January alone. To stem the tide and stabilise the situation, the Kohl government now decided to absorb East Germany into the Federal Republic as soon as possible.³⁴

Clearly conveyed to London, the decision catalysed a pragmatic policy reorientation in the FCO. By the time he finished his visit to East Germany at the end of January 1990, Hurd believed that German unification was inevitable and would come far quicker than expected. He reasoned that delaying German unity would not be realistic given the strong support that the US had offered to the Federal Republic and the decades-old Franco-German axis.³⁵ Even though he understood the impact of a reunified Germany on British standing, he primarily wanted to pursue British interest of keeping Nato intact.³⁶ Sir Percy Cradock, Mrs Thatcher's foreign policy adviser, also urged the Prime Minister to 'hasten to embrace publicly what we could not prevent. Swimming against the stream would aggravate Britain's relations with allies and reduce Britain's influence, particularly in Washington',³⁷ he argued without much success. After a defence review meeting at Chequers on 28 January, Mrs Thatcher grudgingly accepted the reality that she should endorse German reunification if unified Germany continued to be a member of NATO.³⁸ But her acceptance of the inevitable did not stop her from continuing to express her fears about Germany in public as well as in private, as shown in Chequers seminar held in March.³⁹

THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS: A 'BRITISH PROBLEM'⁴⁰ OR A BRITISH CONTRIBUTION?

In tandem with the fast-changing events in Germany, some kind of forum was considered to be necessary to deal with the external aspects of German unification. The peace treaty favoured by Mrs Thatcher was rejected by the US and Germany. To speed up the unification process, the Two Plus Four forum was created. According to sources available so far, it was the US government that devised the forum in which two Germanies and the Four Allied Powers would discuss the external aspects of the unity, although some British decision-makers have stressed their own role in the creation, going so far as to claim authorship.⁴¹

The CSCE summit, which was proposed by Gorbachev to deal with the situation in Eastern Europe and was accepted by the EC Foreign Ministers,⁴² was considered by the US to be too unwieldy to deal with the issue. Such a gathering would take an enormous amount of time with 35 nations participating, thereby enabling the USSR to present further unfavourable requests for the US and the Federal Republic. Both the Soviet Union and two Germanies had to be involved in the process.⁴³ As the Federal Republic vehemently opposed the peace treaty,⁴⁴ the 'Two Plus Four' formula was deemed to be suitable.

US Secretary of State James Baker floated the idea of the Two Plus Four machinery to his British counterpart Douglas Hurd for the first time during the latter's visit to Washington. Although Hurd did not give any commitments, Genscher gave a hearty welcome to the idea of the 'two' first formulas, as it implied the participation of the two Germanies in the talks.⁴⁵ After Baker's shuttle diplomacy with the Soviet Union and prior understanding with the West Germans, the British and the French, the Two Plus Four formula was agreed in mid-February at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa between NATO and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers. The communique simply stated that two foreign ministers of the FRG and GDR would meet their

counterparts from the Four Occupation Powers to 'discuss the external aspects of the establishment of German unity'.⁴⁶

Once talks got underway, the FCO took the lead in detailed negotiations. Major British participants are at pains to stress that the FCO was not under Downing Street instructions during the talks.⁴⁷ Along with the US, it sought solutions to three of the main *external* issues involved in German unification.

Border Issues

One issue was the recognition of the borders of the unified Germany. The UK position was one of unequivocal support for the establishment of the Oder-Neisse line as a final border between unified Germany and Poland and for the involvement of the Polish in the talks concerning border issues.⁴⁸ The Poles joined the third round of the talks held in Paris in mid-July.⁴⁹ Mrs Thatcher's claim in her interview in the *Spiegel*, that she had heard Kohl say 'I do not recognise present borders' created a bitter exchange between the two governments.⁵⁰ Her *démarche* was understood to represent an attempt to put public pressure on Kohl, who was dithering because of the impact that such a prior commitment would create in the upcoming local election.⁵¹

The Suspension of Four Power Rights

In the first meeting in early May, the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed that the internal and external aspects of German unification be decoupled, and that the Four Powers' rights should only be terminated after the creation of a new pan-European security framework. In so doing, Shevardnadze sought to keep leverage of the Four Powers' rights to wring desirable outcomes from the talks. The West German government was divided between the Chancellery, which wanted a quick solution, and the Foreign Office, which seemed to be receptive to Soviet requests.⁵² Genscher, in particular, seemed to be interested in the Soviet proposal.⁵³ Both the US and British governments were staunchly opposed to the de-linking proposal.

A novelty in terms of an international law,⁵⁴ the idea of suspending the Quadripartite Rights *before* the ratification of the Two Plus Four Treaty was conceived in the British embassy in Bonn and subsequently agreed with the Americans and French. Without this device it is highly likely that the Soviets would have used Four Power rights as leverage to delay the ratification process and to raise more requests. The Supreme Soviet was divided on ratification of a settlement that seemed to give away the hard-won gains of World War II,⁵⁵ and the Soviet parliament was the last among Four Powers to ratify the treaty in March 1991. Thus, the British contribution to the settlement was not insignificant, as it deprived the Soviets of an important bargaining chip.

NATO Membership

A third set of issues surrounded the membership of a unified Germany in NATO. This was the maintenance of the presence of US armed forces at the heart of Europe which the West regarded as being essential. Given its geopolitical importance in Europe, the new Germany was an indispensable part of NATO.⁵⁶ The London Summit of the Alliance was carefully prepared by the US to bring Gorbachev around to accepting German membership by showing him the changed nature of the Atlantic Alliance. The White

House draft 'German Unification and the Soviet Audience'⁵⁷ was kept virtually intact in the London Declaration. It made enough concessions to the USSR not to arouse their fears. It invited Warsaw Pact countries to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO, and showed the Alliance's intention to reduce both conventional and nuclear forces. It also declared that the CSCE would play an increasingly institutionalised role in the peace and security of Europe.⁵⁸ With these assurances, Shevardnadze and Gorbachev managed to defend their policies against conservative forces in the CPSU.⁵⁹ The London Declaration was thus central to Soviet approval for German unification within NATO, announced during Kohl's visit to the USSR in July.⁶⁰ Although Mrs Thatcher was clearly worried about any rapid change in NATO's strategy and doctrine,⁶¹ the British largely supported the US in the summit.

The 'British Problem'?

After the German–Soviet agreement in the Caucasus, the Two Plus Four talks took a smooth course and the Treaty was signed on 12 September in Moscow. The last-minute 'British Problem' was over how to interpret the meaning of 'deployment' in the third section of Article Five, which stipulated that foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons would not be stationed or deployed in the former East Germany.⁶² The three Western Powers viewed the deployment as allowing small-scale military manoeuvres of less than 13,000 soldiers, while the Soviets tried to ensure a total prohibition of such manoeuvres.⁶³ It was the British Political Director at the FCO, John Weston, who was most outspoken on the necessity of clarifying the meaning of deployment.⁶⁴ In the event, the problem was settled by adding an agreed minute to the Treaty, leaving the interpretation of 'deployed' to the discretion of the government of united Germany. Thus, the 'British problem' should be seen instead as a 'British contribution' not only for NATO, but for Germany.

British involvement in this episode was highly dramatised by the German diplomats involved in the process. Elbe and Kiessler, harshly blamed the British for creating the difficulty at the talks and claimed that the British chief negotiator, called on by Hurd to revoke the demand, would probably get an instruction to the contrary from Downing Street'.⁶⁵ Though not so anti-British in his explanation, Genscher expresses a similar opinion.⁶⁶ Kettenacker also asserts that Weston probably acted 'on behalf of Downing Street', giving the impression that the British remained reluctant about German unity to the end.⁶⁷ Hurd himself flatly denies that the British delegation was receiving instructions from Downing Street. 'Mrs Thatcher was not trying to steer the details in the talks'.⁶⁸ It is untenable to assert that the British might have created the difficulty because they were dissatisfied with the minor role in the talks.⁶⁹ As has been shown above, the British shared the same position as the Americans, with whom there was constructive cooperation. Throughout the Two Plus Four talks Britain contributed to reunification rather than creating problems. Thus, the British could be said to have been cast as the scapegoat in this episode.⁷⁰

CONCLUSION

This article has argued that, notwithstanding Mrs Thatcher's negative rhetoric, British policy towards German unification was not completely obstructive. Soon after the fall

of the Berlin Wall, the FCO adopted a pragmatic approach to the increasing tempo of the unification process. It played a consistently helpful and constructive role in the Two Plus Four talks, sharing common positions with the US on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland, and membership of the new Germany in NATO. The British government invented the idea of suspending Quadripartite Rights before the ratification of the Treaty so that unified Germany could get full sovereignty upon reunification. Played out primarily behind the scenes, however, and overshadowed by the US and West Germany as leading actors, this contribution has failed to dispel a public perception that the British were intransigently opposed to unification. This view stems from an undue focus on Mrs Thatcher's stance. As one former British diplomat argued, 'Douglas Hurd stopped Thatcher's German policy rather than directly contradicting her remarks in public'.⁷¹

However, apart from security and border issues, the British government was marginalised in a process of European integration that was accelerated by unification. Showing more angst about German resurgence, it was the French who designed the architecture embedding a unified Germany in a strengthened European Community. Moreover, although Mrs Thatcher *talked* about a need for a mechanism to resolve the external implications of unification, it was the US that actually devised the Two Plus Four formula, as well as playing the lead role in reforming NATO, and in securing Soviet approval for continued Germany membership. By contrast, British policy towards German unification remained largely reactive – although this can only be an interim conclusion, as some relevant documents remain subject to the 30-year rule.

NOTES

1. *Wiedervereinigung* (Unification), and *Vereinigung, Einigung*, (Unification, Unity) in German were both used to express the unification of Germany in 1990. But to be more exact, reunification implied that a unified Germany would return to the borders in 1937, which was practically impossible. See, Karl Kaiser, 'Unity, not Reunification, for Germany', *New York Times*, 6 Oct. 1989, A.31. I will use the two words interchangeably.
2. The General Treaty on Germany between the Three Powers and West Germany in 1954 stated that the US, France, and Britain would 'retain the rights and responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement' (Article 7.2). See, 'Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany', *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954*, Vol.7 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), pp.112–18.
3. See, inter alia, Lothar Kettenacker, 'Britain and German Unification, 1989/90', in Klaus Larres and others, (eds.), *Uneasy Allies* (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp.99–123; Louis Richardson, 'British State Strategies after the Cold War', Robert Keohane and others (eds.), *After the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: London: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.127–54; Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), especially p.241; Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffrey and William E. Paterson, 'Deutschlands europäische Diplomatie: die Entstehung des regionalen Milieus', in Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), *Deutsche Europapolitik: Optionen wirksamer Interessenvertretung* (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1998), p.61. Simon Bulmer and others argue, 'In bezug auf die deutsche Einheit bezog Thatcher, die zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eine dominierende Position in ihrer Regierung innehatte, eine erheblich ablehnende Position als das britische Aussenministerium, und sie setzte sich damit auch durch' [author's italics]. (With regard to the German unification Thatcher, who at that time took a dominant position in her government, took a more rejectionist position than the FCO and she had her own way – author's translation.) Kettenacker also shares this analysis. Both Kettenacker and Bulmer agree that the FCO's position was not so different from that of Margaret Thatcher.

4. Julian Bullard, 'Great Britain and German Unification', in Jeremy Noakes, Peter Wende and Jonathan Wright (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Europe 1949–1990* (Oxford: OUP, 2002); Yvonne Klein, 'Obstructive or Promoting? British Views on German Unification 1989/90', *German Politics* 5/3 (Dec. 1996), pp.405–31. In a similar vein, she stresses the policy differences between Margaret Thatcher and the FCO, during the course of 1990.
5. Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (eds.), *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90* (Munich: Oldenburg, 1998). Being a rare exception of the 30-year rule, the 430 documents disclosed give clear pictures of the German government's conception and implementation of the unification and integration policies during the crucial years. They document the telephone talks that Chancellor Kohl made, letters exchanged between Kohl and other leaders, such as US President George Bush, Mitterrand and the internal discussions in the Federal Republic to tackle the situation in East Germany. The documents are, however, not complete in that other archives such as those at the Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministries are still closed.
6. Among the primary materials used for this article are memoirs by major players from the Federal Republic and the Four Occupation Powers. Helmut Kohl, *Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth (eds.) (Munich: Ullstein Taschenbuch, 2000); Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 2nd edition (Berlin: Siedler, 1995); Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991); Margaret Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, hereafter referred to as 'DSY' (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993); Douglas Hurd, *Memoirs* (London: Little Brown, 2003); Mikhail Gorbachev, *Wie Es War: Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung* (Munich: Econ Taschenbuch, 2000); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998); James A. Baker, *Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: Putnam's, 1995).
7. Neither Bullard nor Klein refer to the 'British Problem' at the last round of the Two Plus Four talks; only Bullard clarifies the timing around which the FCO took a pragmatic approach as end of January. Neither of them used the documents de-classified from the Federal Chancellor's Office.
8. Helmut Kohl, *Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, pp.111–16.
9. *Ibid.*, p.122.
10. Küsters, H.J. and others (eds.), *Deutsche Einheit*, doc. No.81, pp.505–7. Thatcher, *DSY*, p.793.
11. Küsters, H.J. and others, *ibid.*, doc. No.82, pp.507–9.
12. *Ibid.*, doc. No.85, pp.511–12.
13. 'Mitterrand warning on border changes', *The Independent*, 7 Dec. 1989; 'Mitterrand warns of rapid change', *Guardian*, 22 Dec. 1989, p.7; 'Wir können Deutschland schliesslich nicht den Krieg erklären, um seine Wiedervereinigung zu verhindern', *FAZ*, 12 Oct., 1995, p.3.
14. 'Hurd flies over the Berlin Wall', *The Independent*, 17 Nov. 1989, p.7. For his own accounts, Douglas Hurd, *Memoirs*, p.381. The following quotations are from the same source.
15. Küsters, *ibid.*, doc. No.94B, pp.546–8.
16. 'EC heads pledge help for Eastern Europe', *Financial Times*, 20 Nov. 1989, p.1.
17. Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, p.794; Helmut Kohl, *Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, pp.149–50.
18. Thatcher, *ibid.*, p.793.
19. Kohl delivered the speech on 28 November 1989. He gave prior notification only to the US, while the British and French ambassadors to Bonn were given accounts during his address. The Programme did not give a timetable to unity, but stressed German unity within the European context, conceiving of a process from confederation to federation. It also linked economic assistance to East Germany with the regime's political reforms. For background on the speech, see, Kohl, *Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, pp.141–53; Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage*, pp.42–58. For the text of the Programme, see, 'Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europa', 28 Nov. 1989, *Europa-Archiv*, 24/1989, D 728–34.
20. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp.675–6.
21. Author's interview with Baron von Richthofen (German Ambassador to London, 1988–93), 10 Feb. 2004; Thatcher, *DSY*, p.795.
22. 'Clear view of the world from Bonn', *The Independent*, 29 Nov. 1989, p.5.
23. 'Outline of Remarks at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters in Brussels', 4 Dec. 1989, *Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush, 1989, Book II* (Washington, DC: United Government Printing Office, 1989), pp.1644–47.
24. Thatcher, *DSY*, pp.795–6.
25. The Communique states that 'a necessary majority existed for convening such a conference under the Article 236 of the Treaty', *Bull. EC 12-1989*, point 1.1.11.
26. *Bull. EC 12-1989*, point 1.1.20.
27. 'Thatcher sees East European Progress as more urgent than German Unity', *Wall Street Journal (Europe)*, 26 Jan. 1990, A12. The following quotations are from the article.

28. Thatcher, *DSY*, pp.790–1.
29. In the above-cited document, No.148, Teltchik urged Kohl not to engage in open discussions with Thatcher on *Deutschlandpolitik*.
30. At a crucial meeting on 26 January 1990, The Soviet leadership concluded that they should deal with the German unity and give priority to the Federal Republic. See, M. Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Doubleday, 1996), p.528. P. Zelikow and C. Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MASS; London: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp.162–63. Gorbachev, *Wie es war*, pp.95–6. Thatcher also had private talks with Mitterrand on 20 January 1990. They were entirely focused on Germany. Even though the President remained very much irritated about the breakneck speed of events in Germany, nothing came out of the following meetings between the defence and foreign ministers of the two countries. See, Thatcher, *DSY*, pp.797–98.
31. P. Zelikow and C. Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p.97.
32. Julian Bullard also point the FCO's pragmatic approach to the end of January 1990, whereas Yvonne Klein does not specify the timing. See, Julian Bullard, 'Great Britain and German Unification', p.225; Yvonne Klein, 'Obstructive or Promoting?', p.409.
33. Author's interview with Christopher Mallaby (British Ambassador to Bonn, 1988–93), 24 May 2001.
34. Teltchik, *329 Tage*, pp.120–1.
35. Author's interview with Douglas Hurd (British Foreign Secretary, 1989–95), 13 March 2001.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Percy Cradock, *In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on foreign policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major* (London: J. Murray, 1997), pp.110–1.
38. Julian Bullard also describes the Chequers meeting as a point from which 'the organs of British government marched to a different drum, a drum beaten by Mr. Douglas Hurd'. See, 'Great Britain and German Unification', p.225.
39. Mrs Thatcher convened a seminar on Germany at the end of March 1990 in Chequers in which a group of leading academic experts on Germany attended. Its minutes were leaked both to the *Independent on Sunday* and *der Spiegel* in mid-July. Even though the conclusions of the seminar were 'we should be nice to Germans', the fact that traits such as bossiness, an inferiority complex and insensitivity to others' feelings were defined as German national characteristics created a lot of public controversy. See, 'What the Prime Minister learnt about the Germans', *The Independent on Sunday*, 15 July, 1990, p.1; 'Wer sind die Deutschen?', *Der Spiegel*, 16 July 1990, pp.109–12. One academic participant contradicted such national character. See, Timothy Garton Ash, 'The Chequers Affair', *New York Review of Books*, 27 Sept. 1990, pp.20–3.
40. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported about this for the first time and it was repeated in Elbe and Genscher's books, 'Mitten in der Nacht lässt Genscher Baker wecken', *FAZ*, 13 Sept. 1990, p.2.
41. 'Hurd endorses US formula on Unity', *Guardian*, 14 Feb. 1990.
42. During his visit to Rome at the end of November 1989, Gorbachev made 'Helsinki-2 proposal' to deal with the developments in Eastern Europe. The Foreign Ministers of the EC in their informal gathering on 20 January the following year accepted the formula. See, 'EC supports Gorbachev's call for early summit', *Financial Times*, 22 Jan. 1990, p.11.
43. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, pp.166–70.
44. When the Four Allied Powers met on 12 December 1989 at the Soviet request in Berlin, it created a furore in West Germany. See, Elbe and Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners*, pp.72–75.
45. D. Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: the US and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1998), p.393; Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p.173.
46. Elbe and Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners*, p.232.
47. Author's interviews with Lord Hurd, Sir Christopher Mallaby and Dame Pauline, Neville-Jones.
48. 'Poles want place in German talks', *The Independent*, 15 Feb. 1990, p.10; 'Nervous Poles demand a seat at the table for unity talks', *The Times*, 15 Feb. 1990, p.7.
49. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p.343.
50. 'Alle gegen Deutschland-nein!', *Der Spiegel*, 26 March, 1990, pp.1–5.
51. Author's interview with the then German Ambassador Baron von Richthofen.
52. Lothar Kettenacker, 'Britain and German Unification, 1989/90', p.102; Sir Julian Bullard, 'Great Britain and German Unification', pp.225–26.
53. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, pp.248 and 251, Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp.780–82.
54. Author's interview with Dame Pauline, Neville-Jones, 6 March 2001 and Sir Christopher Mallaby.
55. Elbe and Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners*, p.202.
56. See, inter alia, Bush's remarks at the Nato summit in December 1989, note 21; 'A New architecture for a new era', *Financial Times*, 13 Dec. 1989, p.2.

57. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p.321.
58. 'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 6, 1990', *Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush II, 1990*, pp.964–67.
59. For the importance of the London Summit to Soviet leadership, see, Zelikow and Rice, *ibid.*, p.293. Shevardnadze, E., *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), p.141. For the rise of the Soviet military and conservative forces during 1990, see, D. Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era*, pp.404–10.
60. For the talks between Gorbachev and Kohl, see, Küsters, H. and others (eds.), *Deutsche Einheit*, doc. No.350, pp.1340–48/doc. No.353, pp.1355–67. Kohl, H., *Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit*, pp.390–92. Gorbachev, M., *Gipfelgespräche: Geheime Protokolle aus meiner Amtszeit* (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991), pp.162–77.
61. Thatcher, *DSY*, pp.811–12. She wanted to keep intact NATO's nuclear doctrine of flexible response.
62. Elbe and Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners*, p.241.
63. Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p.359.
64. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, p.870.
65. Elbe and Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners*, p.198.
66. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, pp.873–4.
67. L. Kettenacker, 'Britain and German Unification, 1989/90', p.123.
68. Author's interview with Lord Hurd, 13 March 2001. See his own explanations, Hurd, *Memoirs*, p.389.
69. Louise Richardson, 'British State Strategies after the Cold War', p.151. In a similar vein, Kettenacker links 'British problem' to the delaying tactics, asserting that 'Britain had given the impression of trying to hold on to her waning influence by means of procrastination'. Kettenacker, *ibid.*, p.123.
70. Zelikow and Rice also argued that the Germans found it easy to blame the British, as they knew that the US agreed to the British requests – *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p.361.
71. Author's interview with Sir Christopher Mallaby.