

Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture

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Book I

FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

Le capitaine Jonathan,
Etant âgé de dix-huit ans,
Capture un jour un pélican
Dans une île d'Extrême-Orient.
Le pélican de Jonathan,
Au matin, pond un oeuf tout blanc
Et il en sort un pélican
Lui ressemblant étonnamment.
Et ce deuxième pélican
Pond, à son tour, un oeuf tout blanc
D'où sort, inévitablement,
Un autre qui en fait autant.
Cela peut durer très longtemps
Si l'on ne fait pas d'omelette avant.

ROBERT DESNOS

Chantefleurs, Chantefables

Prolixity and rigmarole might be somewhat curtailed if every orator were required to state at the beginning of his speech the point he wishes to make.

J.-J. Rousseau,

Le gouvernement de Pologne

The legislator, being unable to appeal either to force or to reason, must resort to an authority of a different order, capable of constraining without violence and persuading without convincing. This is what has, in all ages, compelled the fathers of nations to have recourse to divine intervention.

J.-J. Rousseau,

The Social Contract

Abbreviations used in Book I

PA : pedagogic action
PAu : pedagogic authority
PW : pedagogic work
SAu : school authority
ES : educational system
WSg : the work of schooling

The purpose of these graphical conventions is to remind the reader that the concepts they stand for are themselves a shorthand for systems of logical relations which could not be set out in full in each proposition, although they were required for the construction of these propositions and are the precondition for an adequate reading. This device has not been extended to all the 'systemic' concepts used here (e.g. cultural arbitrary, symbolic violence, relation of pedagogic communication, mode of imposition, mode of inculcation, legitimacy, ethos, cultural capital, habitus, social reproduction, cultural reproduction), but only because we wished to avoid making the text unnecessarily difficult to read.

O. Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.

Gloss 1: To refuse this axiom, which states simultaneously the relative autonomy and the relative dependence of symbolic relations with respect to power relations, would amount to denying the possibility of a science of sociology. All the theories implicitly or explicitly constructed on the basis of other axioms lead one either to make the creative freedom of individuals the source of symbolic action, considered as autonomous from the objective conditions in which it is performed, or to annihilate symbolic action as such, by refusing it any autonomy with respect to its material conditions of existence. One is therefore entitled to regard this axiom as a principle of the theory of sociological knowledge.

Gloss 2: One only has to compare the classical theories of the foundations of power, those of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, to see that the conditions which enable each of them to be constituted exclude the possibility of the object-construction carried out by the other two. Thus, Marx is opposed to Durkheim in that he sees the product of a class domination where Durkheim (who most clearly reveals his social philosophy when dealing with the sociology of education, the privileged locus of the illusion of consensus) sees only the effect of an undivided social constraint. In another respect, Marx and Durkheim are opposed to Weber in that by their methodological objectivism they counter the temptation to see in relations of force inter-individual relations of influence or domination and to represent the different forms of power (political, economic, religious, etc.) as so many sociologically undifferentiated modalities of one agent's predominance (*Macht*) over another. Finally, because his reaction against artificialist conceptions of the social order leads Durkheim to emphasize the externality of constraint, whereas Marx, concerned to reveal the relations of violence

underlying the ideologies of legitimacy, tends in his analysis of the effects of the dominant ideology to minimize the real efficacy of the symbolic strengthening of power relations (*rapports de force*) that is implied in the recognition by the dominated of the legitimacy of domination, Weber is opposed to both Durkheim and Marx in that he is the only one who explicitly takes as his object the specific contribution that representations of legitimacy make to the exercise and perpetuation of power, even if, confined within a psycho-sociological conception of those representations, he cannot, as Marx does, inquire into the functions fulfilled in social relations by misrecognition (*méconnaissance*) of the objective truth of those relations as power relations.

1. THE TWOFOLD ARBITRARINESS OF PEDAGOGIC ACTION

1. All pedagogic action (PA) is, objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power.

Gloss: The propositions which follow (up to and including those of the third degree) refer to all PAs, whether exerted by all the educated members of a social formation or group (diffuse education), by the family-group members to whom the culture of a group or class allots this task (family education) or by the system of agents explicitly mandated for this purpose by an institution directly or indirectly, exclusively or partially educative in function (institutionalized education), and, unless otherwise stated, whether that PA seeks to reproduce the cultural arbitrary of the dominant or of the dominated classes. In other words, the range of these propositions is defined by the fact that they apply to any social formation, understood as a system of power relations and sense relations between groups or classes. It follows that in the first three sections, we have refrained from extensive use of examples drawn from the case of a dominant, school PA, to avoid even

implicitly suggesting any restrictions on the validity of the propositions concerning all PAs. We have kept for its logical place (fourth degree propositions) specification of the forms and effects of a PA carried on within the framework of a school institution; only in the last proposition (4.3.) do we expressly characterize the school PA which reproduces the dominant culture, contributing thereby to the reproduction of the structure of the power relations within a social formation in which the dominant system of education tends to secure a monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence.

1.1. PA is, objectively, symbolic violence first insofar as the power relations between the groups or classes making up a social formation are the basis of the arbitrary power which is the precondition for the establishment of a relation of pedagogic communication, i.e. for the imposition and inculcation of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary mode of imposition and inculcation (education).

Gloss: Thus, the power relations which constitute patrilineal and matrilineal social formations are directly manifested in the types of PA corresponding to each successional system. In a matrilineal system, where the father has no juridical authority over his son and the son no rights over his father's goods and privileges, the father has only affective or moral sanctions to back up his PA (although the group will grant him its support in the last instance, if his prerogatives are threatened) and cannot have recourse to the juridical assistance which he is guaranteed when, for example, he seeks to affirm his right to the sexual services of his spouse. By contrast, in a patrilineal system, in which the son, enjoying explicit, juridically sanctioned rights over his father's goods and privileges, stands in a competitive and even conflictual relation to him (as the nephew does, vis-à-vis the maternal uncle, in a matrilineal system), the father 'represents the power of society as a force in the domestic group' and so is able to make use of juridical sanctions in imposing his PA (cf. Fortes and Goody). Although there can be no question of ignoring the specifically biological dimension of the relation

of pedagogic imposition, i.e. biologically conditioned childhood dependence, it is not possible to leave out of account the social determinations which specify in every case the adult-child relationship, including those cases in which the educators are none other than the biological parents (e.g. the determinations deriving from the structure of the family or the family's position in the social structure).

1.1.1. Insofar as it is a symbolic power which, by definition, is never reducible to the imposition of force, PA can produce its own specifically symbolic effect only to the extent that it is exerted within a relation of pedagogic communication.

1.1.2. Insofar as it is symbolic violence, PA can produce its own specifically symbolic effect only when provided with the social conditions for imposition and inculcation, i.e. the power relations that are not implied in a formal definition of communication.

1.1.3. In any given social formation, the PA which the power relations between the groups or classes making up that social formation put into the dominant position within the system of PAs is the one which most fully, though always indirectly, corresponds to the objective interests (material, symbolic and, in the respect considered here, pedagogic) of the dominant groups or classes, both by its mode of imposition and by its delimitation of what and on whom, it imposes.

Gloss: The symbolic strength of a pedagogic agency is defined by its weight in the structure of the power relations and symbolic relations (the latter always expressing the former) between the agencies exerting an action of symbolic violence. This structure in turn expresses the power relations between the groups or classes making up the social formation in question. It is through the mediation of this effect of domination by the dominant PA that the different PAs carried on within the different groups or classes objectively and indirectly collaborate in the dominance of the dominant classes (e.g. the inculcation

by the dominated PAs of knowledges or styles whose value on the economic or symbolic market is defined by the dominant PA).

1.2. PA is objectively, symbolic violence in a second sense insofar as the delimitation objectively entailed by the fact of imposing and inculcating certain meanings, treated by selection and by the corresponding exclusion as worthy of being reproduced by PA, re-produces (in both senses) the arbitrary selection a group or class objectively makes in and through its cultural arbitrary.

1.2.1 The selection of meanings which objectively defines a group's or a class's culture as a symbolic system is arbitrary insofar as the structure and functions of that culture cannot be deduced from any universal principle, whether physical, biological or spiritual, not being linked by any sort of internal relation to 'the nature of things' or any 'human nature'.

1.2.2. The selection of meanings which objectively defines a group's or a class's culture as a symbolic system is socio-logically necessary insofar as that culture owes its existence to the social conditions of which it is the product and its intelligibility to the coherence and functions of the structure of the signifying relations which constitute it.

Gloss: The 'choices' which constitute a culture ('choices' which no one makes) appear as arbitrary when related by the comparative method to the sum total of present or past cultures or, by imaginary variation, to the universe of possible cultures; they reveal their necessity as soon as they are related to the social conditions of their emergence and perpetuation. Misunderstandings over the notion of arbitrariness (particularly confusion between arbitrariness and gratuitousness) derive, at best, from the fact that a purely synchronic grasp of cultural facts (such as anthropologists are generally condemned to) necessarily induces neglect of all that these facts owe to their social conditions of existence, i.e. the social conditions of their production and repro-

duction, with all the restructurings and reinterpretations connected with their perpetuation in changed social conditions (e.g. all the degrees distinguishable between the quasi-perfect reproduction of culture in a traditional society and the reinterpretative reproduction of the Jesuit colleges' humanist culture, suited to the needs of a salon aristocracy, in and through the academic culture of the nineteenth century bourgeois lycées). Thus the genesis amnesia which finds expression in the naive illusion that things have always been as they are', as well as in the substantialist uses made of the notion of the cultural unconscious, can lead to the eternizing and thereby the 'naturalizing' of signifying relations which are the product of history.

1.2.3. In any given social formation the cultural arbitrary which the power relations between the groups or classes making up that social formation put into the dominant position within the system of cultural arbitraries is the one which most fully, though always indirectly, expresses the objective interests (material and symbolic) of the dominant groups or classes.

1.3. The objective degree of arbitrariness (in the sense of proposition 1.1.) of a PA's power of imposition rises with the degree of arbitrariness (in the sense of proposition 1.2) of the culture imposed.

Gloss: The sociological theory of PA distinguishes between the arbitrariness of the imposition and the arbitrariness of the content imposed, only so as to bring out the sociological implications of the relationship between two logical fictions, namely a pure power relationship as the objective truth of the imposition and a totally arbitrary culture as the objective truth of the meanings imposed. The logical construct of a power relation manifesting itself nakedly has no more sociological existence than does the logical construct of meanings that are only cultural arbitrariness. To take this twofold theoretical construction for an empirically observable reality would be to condemn oneself to naive belief either in the exclusively physical force of power,

a simple reversal of idealist belief in the totally autonomous might of right, or in the radical arbitrariness of all meanings, a simple reversal of idealist belief in 'the intrinsic strength of the true idea'. There is no PA which does not inculcate some meanings not deducible from a universal principle (logical reason or biological nature): authority plays a part in all pedagogy, even when the most universal meanings (science or technology) are to be inculcated. There is no power relation, however, mechanical and ruthless which does not additionally exert a symbolic effect. It follows that PA, always objectively situated between the two unattainable poles of pure force and pure reason, has the more need to resort to direct means of constraint the less the meanings it imposes impose themselves by their own force, i.e. by the force of biological nature or logical reason.

1.3.1 The PA whose arbitrary power to impose a cultural arbitrary rests in the last analysis on the power relations between the groups or classes making up the social formation in which is carried on (by 1.1 and 1.2) contributes, by reproducing the cultural arbitrary which it inculcates towards reproducing the power relations which are the basis of its power of arbitrary imposition (the social reproduction function of cultural reproduction).

1.3.2. In any given social formation the different PAs, which can never be defined independently of their membership in a system of PAs subjected to the effect of domination by the dominant PA, tend to reproduce the system of cultural arbitraries characteristic of that social formation, thereby contributing to the reproduction of the power relations which put that cultural arbitrary into the dominant position.

Gloss: In traditionally defining the 'system of education' as the sum total of the institutional or customary mechanisms ensuring the transmission from one generation to another of the culture inherited from the past (i.e. the accumulated information), the classical theories tend to sever cultural reproduction from its function of social reproduction,

that is, to ignore the specific effect of symbolic relations in the reproduction of power relations. Such theories which, as is seen with Durkheim, simply transpose to the case of class societies the representation of culture and cultural transmission most widespread among anthropologists, rely on the implicit premiss that the different PAs at work in a social formation collaborate harmoniously in reproducing a cultural capital conceived of as the jointly owned property of the whole 'society'. In reality, because they correspond to the material and symbolic interests of groups or classes differently situated within the power relations, these PAs always tend to reproduce the structure of the distribution of cultural capital among these groups or classes, thereby contributing to the reproduction of the social structure. The laws of the market which fixes the economic or symbolic value, i.e. the value qua cultural capital, of the cultural arbitraries produced by the different PAs and thus of the products of those PAs (educated individuals), are one of the mechanisms – more or less determinant according to the type of social formation – through which social reproduction, defined as the reproduction of the structure of the relations of force between the classes, is accomplished.

2. PEDAGOGIC AUTHORITY

2. Insofar as it is a power of symbolic violence, exerted within a relation of pedagogic communication which can produce its own, specifically symbolic effect only because the arbitrary power which makes imposition possible is never seen in its full truth (in the sense of proposition 1.1); and insofar as it is the inculcation of a cultural arbitrary, carried on within a relation of pedagogic communication which can produce its own, specifically pedagogic effect only because the arbitrariness of the content inculcated is never seen in its full truth (in the sense of proposition 1.2) – PA necessarily implies, as a social condition of its exercise, pedagogic authority (PAu) and the relative

autonomy of the agency commissioned to exercise it.

Gloss 1: The theory of PA produces the concept of PAu in the very operation by which, in identifying the objective truth of PA as violence, it brings out the contradiction between that objective truth and the agents' practice, which objectively manifests the misrecognition of that truth (whatever the experiences or ideologies accompanying those practices). Thus the question is posed: what are the social conditions for the establishment of a relation of pedagogic communication concealing the power relations which make it possible and thereby adding the specific force of its legitimate authority to the force it derives from those relations? The idea of a PA exercised without PAu is a logical contradiction and a sociological impossibility; a PA which aimed to unveil, in its very exercise, its objective reality of violence and thereby to destroy the basis of the agent's PAu, would be self-destructive. The paradox of Epimenides the liar would appear in a new form: either you believe I'm not lying when I tell you education is violence and my teaching isn't legitimate, so you can't believe me; or you believe I'm lying and my teaching is legitimate, so you still can't believe what I say when I tell you it is violence.

To draw out all the implications of this paradox we only have to think of the vicious circles awaiting anyone who might seek to base his pedagogic practice on the theoretical truth of all pedagogic practice: it is one thing to teach 'cultural relativism', that is, the arbitrary character of all culture, to individuals who have already been educated according to the principles of the cultural arbitrary of a group or class; it would be quite another to claim to be giving a relativistic education, i.e. actually to produce a cultivated man who was the native of all cultures. The problems posed by situations of early bilingualism or biculturalism give only a faint idea of the insurmountable contradictions faced by a PA claiming to take as its practical didactic principle the theoretical affirmation of the arbitrariness of linguistic or cultural codes. This is a proof *per absurdum* that every PA requires as the condition of its exercise the social misrecognition of the objective truth of PA.

Gloss 2: PA necessarily gives rise, in and through its exercise, to experiences which may remain unformulated and be expressed only in practices, or may make themselves explicit in ideologies, but which in either case contribute towards masking the objective truth of PA: the ideologies of PA as non-violent action – whether in Socratic and neo-Socratic myths of non-directive teaching, Rousseauistic myths of natural education, or pseudo-Freudian myths of non-repressive education – reveal in its clearest form the generic function of educational ideologies, in evading, by the gratuitous negation of one of its terms, the contradiction between the objective truth of PA and the necessary (inevitable) representation of this arbitrary action as necessary ('natural').

2.1. Insofar as it is an arbitrary power to impose which, by the mere fact of being misrecognized as such, is objectively recognized as a legitimate authority, PAu, a power to exert symbolic violence which manifests itself in the form of a right to impose legitimately, reinforces the arbitrary power which establishes it and which it conceals.

Gloss 1: To speak of recognition of the legitimacy of PA is not to enter the problematic of the psychological genesis of representations of legitimacy to which Weber's analyses are liable to lead; still less is it to engage in an attempt to ground sovereignty in any principle whatsoever, whether physical, biological or spiritual, in short, to legitimate legitimacy. We are simply drawing out the implications of the fact that PA implies PAu, i.e. that it 'is accepted', in the sense in which a currency is accepted, and also, more generally, a symbolic system such as a language, an artistic style or even a style of dress. In this sense, recognition of PA can never be completely reduced to a psychological act, still less to conscious acquiescence, as is attested by the fact that it is never more total than when totally unconscious. To describe recognition of PA as a free decision to allow oneself to be cultivated or, conversely, as an abuse of power inflicted on the natural self, i.e. to make recognition of legitimacy a free or extorted act of recognition, would be just as

naive as to go along with the theories of the social contract or the metaphysics of culture conceived as a logical system of choices, when they situate the arbitrary selection of signifying relations constitutive of a culture in an original, hence mythical, locus.

Thus, to say that certain agents recognize the legitimacy of a pedagogic agency is simply to say that the complete definition of the power relationship within which they are objectively placed implies that these agents are unable to realize the basis of that relationship although their practices, even when contradicted by the rationalizations of discourse or the certainties of experience, objectively take account of the necessity of the relations of force (cf. the outlaw who objectively grants the force of law to the law he transgresses in the mere fact that, by hiding in order to transgress it, he adapts his conduct to the sanctions which the law has the force to impose on him).

Gloss 2: The weight of representations of legitimacy, particularly of the legitimacy of the dominant PA, within the system of the instruments (symbolic or not) securing and perpetuating the domination of one group or class over others is historically variable. The relative strength of the reinforcement given to the balance of power between the groups or classes by symbolic relations expressing those power relations rises with (1) the degree to which the state of the balance of power hinders the dominant classes from invoking the brute fact of domination as the principle legitimating their domination; and (2) the degree of unification of the market on which the symbolic and economic value of the products of the different PAs is constituted (e.g. the differences in these two respects between the domination of one society over another and the domination of one class over another within the same social formation, or, in the latter case, between feudalism and bourgeois democracy with the continuous increase in the weight of the school within the system of the mechanisms of social reproduction).

Recognition of the legitimacy of a domination always constitutes a — historically variable — force which strengthens the established

balance of power because, in preventing apprehension of the power relations as power relations, it tends to prevent the dominated groups or classes from securing all the strength that realization of their strength would give them.

2.1.1. Power relations are the basis not only of PA but also of the misrecognition of the truth about PA, a misrecognition which amounts to recognition of the legitimacy of PA and, as such, is the condition for the exercise of PA.

Gloss 1: Thus, as the chief instrument of the transubstantiation of power relations into legitimate authority, PA presents a privileged object for analysis of the social basis of the paradoxes of domination and legitimacy (e.g. the part played in the Indo-European tradition by the brute fact of sexual, warlike or magical potency as evidence of legitimate authority can be seen in the structure of genesis myths and in the ambivalences of the vocabulary of sovereignty).

Gloss 2: We leave it to others to decide whether the relations between power relations and sense relations are, in the last analysis, sense relations or power relations.

2.1.1.1. Power relations determine a PA's characteristic mode of imposition, defined as the system of the means required for the imposition of a cultural arbitrary and for the concealment of the twofold arbitrariness of the imposition, i.e. as a historical combination of the instruments of symbolic violence and the instruments of concealment (i.e. legitimation) of that violence.

Gloss 1: The link between the two senses of the arbitrariness inherent in PA (as in proposition 1.1 and 1.2) can be seen, inter alia, in the fact that the likelihood of the arbitrariness of a given mode of imposing a cultural arbitrary being at least partially revealed as such, rises with the degree to which (1) the cultural arbitrary of the group or class under-

going that PA is remote from the cultural arbitrary which the PA inculcates; and (2) the social definition of the legitimate mode of imposition rules out recourse to the most direct forms of coercion. The experience a category of agents has of the arbitrariness of PA depends not only on its characterization in this twofold respect but also on the convergence of these characterizations (e.g. the attitude of the Confucian literati to a cultural domination based on the colonizers' military force) or their divergence (e.g. in present-day France, the detached attitude working-class children manifest towards school sanctions, both because their distance from the culture inculcated tends to make them feel the arbitrariness of the inculcation as inevitable, and, in another respect, because the cultural arbitrary of their class has less room for moral indignation at forms of repression which anticipate the sanctions most probable for their class).

Every cultural arbitrary implies a social definition of the legitimate mode of imposing cultural arbitrariness and, in particular, of the degree to which the arbitrary power which makes PA possible can reveal itself as such without annihilating the specific effect of PA. Thus, whereas in certain societies recourse to techniques of coercion (smacking or even giving 'lines') is sufficient to disqualify the teaching agent, corporal punishments (the English public school's cat-o'-nine-tails, the school-master's cane or the Koran school teacher's *falaqa*) appear simply as attributes of teacherly legitimacy in a traditional culture where there is no danger of their betraying the objective truth of a PA of which this is the legitimate mode of imposition.

Gloss 2: Awareness of the arbitrariness of a particular mode of imposition or a given cultural arbitrary does not imply apprehension of the twofold arbitrariness of PA. On the contrary, the most radical challenges to a pedagogic power are always inspired by the self-destructive Utopia of a pedagogy without arbitrariness or by the spontaneist Utopia which accords the individual the power to find within himself the principle of his own 'fulfilment'. All these Utopias constitute an instrument of ideological struggle for groups who seek,

through denunciation of a pedagogic legitimacy, to secure for themselves the monopoly of the legitimate mode of imposition (e.g. in the eighteenth century, the role of discourse on 'tolerance' in the critique with which the new strata of intellectuals strove to destroy the legitimacy of the Church's power of symbolic imposition). The idea of a 'culturally free' PA, exempt from arbitrariness in both the content and the manner of its imposition, presupposes a misrecognition of the objective truth of PA in which there is still expressed the objective truth of a violence whose specificity lies in the fact that it generates the illusion that it is not violence.

It would therefore be pointless to counterpose to the definition of PA the experience which the educators and the educated may have of PA, particularly of those modes of imposition most capable (at a given moment in time) of masking the arbitrariness of PA (non-directive teaching): this would be to forget that 'there is no liberal education' (Durkheim) and that one must not take for an abolition of the twofold arbitrariness of PA the form it assumes when resorting, for example, to 'liberal' methods in order to inculcate 'liberal' dispositions.¹ The 'soft approach' may be the only effective way of exercising the power of symbolic violence in a determinate state of the power relations, and of variably tolerant dispositions towards the explicit, crude manifestation of arbitrariness.

If some people are nowadays able to believe in the possibility of a PA without obligation or punishment, this is the effect of an ethnocentrism which induces them not to perceive as such the sanctions of the mode of imposition characteristic of our societies. To overwhelm one's pupils with affection, as American primary school teachers do, by the use of diminutives and affectionate qualifiers, by insistent appeal to an affective understanding, etc. is to gain possession of that subtle instrument of repression, the withdrawal of affection, a pedagogic technique which is no less arbitrary (in the sense of proposition 1.1) than corporal punishment or disgrace. The objective truth of this type of PA is harder to perceive because, on the one hand, the techniques employed conceal the social significance of the pedagogic relation

under the guise of a purely psychological relationship and, on the other hand, their place in the system of authority techniques making up the dominant mode of imposition helps to prevent agents formed by this mode of imposition from seeing their arbitrary character. Indeed, the simultaneity of the changes in authority relationships which accompany a change in power relations capable of bringing about a rise in the threshold of tolerance for the explicit, crude manifestation of arbitrariness, and which in social universes as different as the Church, the school, the family, the psychiatric hospital or even the firm or the army, all tend to substitute the 'soft approach' (non-directive methods, 'invisible pedagogy', dialogue, participation, 'human relations') for the 'strong arm', reveals the interdependence which constitutes into a system the techniques for imposing symbolic violence characteristic of the traditional mode of imposition as well as those of the mode which tends to take its place in the same function.

2.1.1.2. In any given social formation, the agencies which objectively lay claim to the legitimate exercise of a power of symbolic imposition and, in so doing, tend to claim the monopoly on legitimacy, necessarily enter into relations of competition, i.e. power relations and symbolic relations whose structure expresses in its own logic the state of the balance of power between the groups or classes.

Gloss 1: This competition is sociologically necessary because legitimacy is indivisible: there is no agency to legitimate the legitimacy-giving agencies, because claims to legitimacy derive their relative strength, in the last analysis, from the strength of the groups or classes whose material and symbolic interests they directly or indirectly express.

Gloss 2: Although the relations of competition between the different agencies obey the specific logic of the field of legitimacy considered (e.g. political, religious or cultural), the relative autonomy of the field never totally excludes dependence on power relations. The specific

form taken by the conflicts between the legitimacy-claiming agencies in a given field is always the symbolic expression, more or less transfigured, of the relations of force which are set up in this field between these agencies and which are never independent of the relations of force external to the field (e.g. the dialectic of excommunication, heresy, and challenges to orthodoxy in literary, religious or political history).²

2.1.2. Insofar as the relation of pedagogic communication within which PA is carried on presupposes PAu in order to be set up, it is not reducible to a pure and simple relation of communication.

Gloss 1: Contrary to common-sense prejudice and various scholarly theories which make attention conditional on understanding, in real learning situations (including language learning) recognition of the legitimacy of the act of transmission, i.e. of the PAu of the transmitter, conditions the reception of the information and, even more, the accomplishment of the transformative action capable of transforming that information into a mental formation (training).

Gloss 2: PAu so strongly marks all aspects of the relation of pedagogic communication that this relationship is often experienced or conceived along the lines of the primordial relation of pedagogic communication, i.e. the relationship between parents and children or, more generally, between generations. The tendency to re-establish with any person invested with PAu the archetypal relationship with the father is so strong that anyone who teaches, however young, tends to be treated as a father; e.g. *The Laws of Manu*: 'That brahmana who is the giver of spiritual birth and the teacher of the prescribed duties becomes by law the father of an aged man, even though he himself be a child'; and Freud: 'We understand now our relations with our teachers. These men, who were not even fathers themselves, became for us paternal substitutes. That is why they struck as so mature, so inaccessibly adult, even when they were still very young. We transferred onto them the respect and hopes the omniscient father of our childhood inspired in us,

and we started to treat them as we used to treat our father at home.'

2.1.2.1. Insofar as every PA that is exerted commands a PAu from the outset, the relation of pedagogic communication owes its specific characteristics to the fact that it is entirely dispensed from the necessity of producing the conditions for its own establishment and perpetuation.

Gloss: The professional ideology which transmutes the relation of pedagogic communication into an elective encounter between the 'master' and the 'disciple' induces teachers to misrecognize in their professional practice or deny in their discourse the objective conditions of that practice, and to behave objectively, as Weber says, like 'little prophets in the pay of the State'. Contrary to what is proclaimed by such ideology, the relation of pedagogic communication differs from the various forms of communicative relation set up by agents or agencies which, seeking to exert a power of symbolic violence in the absence of any previous, permanent authority, are obliged to win and endlessly rewin the social recognition that PAu confers from the outset, once and for all. This explains why agents or institutions who, without commanding a PAu from the outset, presume to exercise the power of symbolic violence (propagandists, publicists, scientific popularizers, healers, etc.), tend to seek social respectability by usurping the direct or inverted appearances of legitimate practice, like the sorcerer, whose action stands in a homologous relation to the PA of the priest (e.g. the 'scientific' or 'educational' guarantees invoked by publicity and even scientific popularization).

2.1.2.2. Because every PA that is exerted commands by definition a PAu, the pedagogic transmitters are from the outset designated as fit to transmit that which they transmit, hence entitled to impose its reception and test its inculcation by means of socially approved or guaranteed sanctions.

Gloss 1: The concept of PAu clearly has no normative content. To say that the relation of pedagogic communication presupposes the PAu of the pedagogic agency (agent or institution) in no way prejudices the value intrinsically attached to that PAu, since PAu has precisely the effect of ensuring the social value of the PA, regardless of the 'intrinsic' value of the agency exerting it, and whatever, for example, the degree of technical or charismatic qualification of the transmitter. With the concept of PAu we are able to escape the pre-sociological illusion of crediting the person of the transmitter with the technical competence or personal authority which is, in reality, automatically conferred on every pedagogic transmitter by the traditionally and institutionally guaranteed position he occupies in a relation of pedagogic communication.

Gloss 2: Because the sending of a message within a relation of pedagogic communication always transmits at least the affirmation of the value of the PA, the PAu which guarantees the communication always tends to eliminate the question of the informative efficiency of the communication. Proof that the relation of pedagogic communication is irreducible to a formally defined relation of communication and that the informational content of the message does not exhaust the content of the communication, may be seen in the fact that the relation of pedagogic communication can be maintained as such even when the information transmitted tends towards zero, as in the limiting case of initiatory teaching or, closer to home, in some literary education.

2.1.2.3. Because every PA that is exerted commands by definition a PAu, the pedagogic receivers are disposed from the outset to recognize the legitimacy of the information transmitted and the PAu of the pedagogic transmitters, hence to receive and internalize the message.

2.1.2.4. In any given social formation, the specifically symbolic force of the sanctions, physical or symbolic, positive or negative, juridically guaranteed or not, which ensure, strengthen and lastingly consecrate

the effect of a PA, is greater the more the groups or classes to which they are applied are disposed to recognize the PAu which imposes them.

2.1.3. In any given social formation the legitimate PA, i.e. the PA endowed with the dominant legitimacy, is nothing other than the arbitrary imposition of the dominant cultural arbitrary insofar as it is misrecognized in its objective truth as the dominant PA and the imposition of the dominant culture (by 1.1.3 and 2.1).

Gloss: The monopoly on the dominant cultural legitimacy is always the object of competition between institutions or agents. It follows from this that the imposition of a cultural orthodoxy corresponds to a particular form of the structure of the field of competition, whose particularity becomes fully apparent only when compared with other possible forms such as eclecticism and syncretism, the academic answer to the problems raised by competition for legitimacy in the intellectual or artistic field and competition between the values and ideologies of different fractions of the dominant classes.

2.2. Insofar as it is invested with a PAu, PA tends to produce misrecognition of the objective truth of cultural arbitrariness because, being recognized as a legitimate agency of imposition, it tends to produce recognition of the cultural arbitrary it inculcates as legitimate culture.

2.2.1. Insofar as every PA that is exerted commands a PAu from the outset, the relation of pedagogic communication within which PA is carried on tends to produce the legitimacy of what it transmits, by designating what it transmits – by the mere fact of transmitting it legitimately – as worthy of transmission, as opposed to what it does not transmit.

Gloss 1: This is the basis of the sociological possibility of PA, which

inquiry into the absolute beginning of PA – an inquiry as fictitious in its own way as the speculation which runs into the dead-ends of the social contract or the 'pre-linguistic situation' – would lead one to regard as logically impossible, as is shown by the paradox of the *Euthydemus*, which rests on the hidden postulate of a PA without PAu: what you know, you don't need to learn; what you don't know, you can't learn, because you don't know what you need to learn.

Gloss 2: If one reduces the relation of pedagogic communication to a pure and simple relation of communication, one is unable to understand the social conditions of its specifically symbolic and specifically pedagogic efficacy which lie precisely in concealment of the fact that it is not a simple relation of communication; by the same token one is obliged to assume a 'need for information' in the receivers, a need, moreover, informed as to the information fit to satisfy it and pre-existing the social and pedagogic conditions of its production.

2.2.2. In any given social formation, legitimate culture, i.e. the culture endowed with the dominant legitimacy, is nothing other than the dominant cultural arbitrary insofar as it is misrecognized in its objective truth as a cultural arbitrary and as the dominant cultural arbitrary (by 1.2.3 and 2.2).

Gloss: The cultural arbitraries reproduced by the different PAs can never be defined independently of their place in a system of cultural arbitraries more or less integrated depending on the social formation but always subject to the domination of the dominant cultural arbitrary. Failure to recognize this fact is the source of the contradictions both of ideology concerning the culture of dominated classes and nations and of drawing-room chatter about cultural 'alienation' and 'dis-alienation'. Blindness to what the legitimate culture and the dominated culture owe to the structure of their symbolic relations, i.e. to the structure of the relation of domination between the classes, inspires on the one hand the 'culture for the masses' programme of 'liberating'

the dominated classes by giving them the means of appropriating legitimate culture as such, with all it owes to its functions of distinction and legitimation (e.g. the curricula of the *Universités populaires*³ or the Jacobin defence of the teaching of Latin); and on the other hand the populist project of decreeing the legitimacy of the cultural arbitrary of the dominated classes as constituted in and by the fact of its dominated position, canonizing it as 'popular culture'. This antinomy of the dominated ideology, which is directly expressed in the practice and discourse of the dominated classes (in the form, for example, of alternation between a sense of cultural unworthiness and aggressive depreciation of the dominant culture) and which spokesmen, whether or not mandated by these classes, reproduce and amplify (complicating it with the contradictions of their own relation to the dominated classes and their contradictions, e.g. *proletkult*), can outlive the social conditions which produce it, as is attested by the ideologies and even the cultural policies of formerly dominated classes or nations, which oscillate between the aim of recovering the cultural heritage bequeathed by the dominant classes or nations and the aim of rehabilitating the survivals of the dominated culture.

2.3. Every agency (agent or institution) exerting a PA commands PAu only in its capacity as the mandated representative of the groups or classes whose cultural arbitrary it imposes in accordance with a mode of imposition defined by that arbitrary, i.e. as the delegated holder of the right to exercise symbolic violence.

Gloss: 'Delegation of authority' does not imply the existence of an explicit agreement, still less a codified contract, between a group or class and a pedagogic agency, although, even in the case of the family PA of a traditional society, the pedagogic agency's PAu may be juridically recognized and sanctioned (cf. Gloss on proposition 1.1). Even when certain aspects of the agency's PAu are explicitly codified (e.g. the codification of the right of violence on which *patria potestas* is based, or the juridical limitations on paternal PAu in modern societies,

or again the delimitation of the syllabus and legal conditions of employment in an educational institution), 'all is not contractual in the contract' of delegation. To speak of delegation of authority is simply to name the social conditions for the exercise of a PA, i.e. cultural proximity between the cultural arbitrary imposed by that PA and the cultural arbitraries of the groups or classes subjected to it.

In this sense, any action of symbolic violence which succeeds in imposing itself (i.e. in imposing misrecognition of the violence which is its objective truth) objectively presupposes a delegation of authority. Thus, contrary to popular or semi-learned representations which credit publicity or propaganda and, more generally, the messages conveyed by the modern media, with the power to manipulate if not to create opinions, these symbolic actions can work only to the extent that they encounter and reinforce predispositions (e.g. the relationship between a newspaper and its readers). There is no 'intrinsic strength of the true idea'; nor do we see grounds for belief in the strength of the false idea, however often repeated. It is always power relations which define the limits within which the persuasive force of a symbolic power can act (e.g. the limits on the efficacy of any revolutionary preaching or propaganda applied to the privileged classes).

Similarly, prophetic action, i.e. an action which, like that of the religious prophet, an *auctor* claiming to find the source of his *auctoritas* within himself must apparently constitute the transmitter's PAu ex nihilo and progressively win the adherence of his public, succeeds only to the extent that it rests on a prior (though virtual and tacit) delegation of authority. If one is not to resort to the miracle of an absolute beginning (which the Weberian theory of charisma tends to require), it is necessary to posit that the successful prophet is the one who formulates for the groups or classes he addresses a message which the objective conditions determining the material and symbolic interests of those groups have predisposed them to attend to and take in. In other words, the apparent relationship between prophecy and its audience must be reversed: the religious or political prophet always preaches to the converted and follows his disciples at least as much as they follow him,

since his lessons are listened to and heard only by agents who, by everything they are, have objectively mandated him to give them lessons. Though one must not forget the effects of prophetic quasi-systematization, with its allusions and ellipses conducive to pseudo-understanding and misunderstanding, the fact remains that the likelihood of success for the prophetic message cannot be deduced from the intrinsic properties of the message (cf. the relative spread of Christianity and Islam). A verbalization which, simply by stating them, consecrates, i.e. sanctifies and sanctions, the expectations it meets, can add its own specifically symbolic strength to the pre-existing power relations only because it draws its strength from the tacit delegation it is granted by the groups or classes involved in those power relations.

2.3.1. A pedagogic agency commands the PAu enabling it to legitimate the cultural arbitrary that it inculcates, only within the limits laid down by that cultural arbitrary, i.e. to the extent that both in its mode of imposing (the legitimate mode) and in its delimitation of what it imposes, those entitled to impose it (the legitimate educators) and those on whom it is imposed (the legitimate addressees), it reproduces the fundamental principles of the cultural arbitrary that a group or class produces as worthy of reproduction, both by its very existence and by the fact of delegating to an agency the authority required in order to reproduce it.

Gloss: It is all too easy to perceive the limitations inherent in the delegation when they are explicitly defined, as they are whenever PA is exerted by an academic institution; but they are also observed in the case of the PA of the family group (both in the dominant and in the dominated groups or classes). The definition of the legitimate educators, the legitimate scope of their PA and its legitimate mode of imposition, takes very different forms, for example, depending on the kinship structure and the mode of succession, considered as a mode of transmission of power and economic goods (e.g. the different forms of division of pedagogic labour among the kin in patrilineal or matrilineal

societies, or in the different classes of the same social formation). It is no accident that the children's upbringing is the object of conflicting representations and a source of tension or conflict whenever families cohabit or whenever lineages or generations belonging to different classes cohabit within the same family (for example, the extreme case of conflicts over the right of adults from one family to exert a PA, especially physical repression, on the children of another family; this conflict over the legitimate boundaries of family PA always owes its specific form to the relative position in the class structure of the family groups involved).

2.3.1.1. The delegation of the right of symbolic violence which establishes the PAu of a pedagogic agency is always a limited delegation; i.e. the delegation to a pedagogic agency of such authority as it requires in order to inculcate a cultural arbitrary legitimately, in accordance with the mode of imposition defined by that arbitrary, entails the impossibility for that agency of freely defining the mode of imposition, the content imposed and the public on which it imposes it (the principle of the limited autonomy of pedagogic agencies).

2.3.1.2. In any given social formation the sanctions, material or symbolic, positive or negative, juridically guaranteed or not, through which PAu is expressed, and which ensure, strengthen and lastingly consecrate the effect of a PA, are more likely to be recognized as legitimate, i.e. have greater symbolic force (by 2.1.2.4), when they are applied to groups or classes for whom these sanctions are more likely to be confirmed by the sanctions of the market on which the economic and social value of the products of the different PAs is determined (the reality principle or law of the market).

Gloss 1: The recognition a group or class objectively accords a pedagogic agency is always (whatever the psychological or ideological variations of the corresponding experience) a function of the degree to which the market value and symbolic value of its members depend on

their transformation and consecration by that agency's PA. It is therefore understandable that the medieval nobility should have had little interest in Scholastic education and that, in contrast, the ruling classes of the Greek city-states should have had recourse to the services of the Sophists or rhetors; and again, that in modern societies the middle classes, and more precisely those middle-class fractions whose ascension most directly depends on the School, differ from the working classes by an academic docility which is expressed in, among other things, their particular sensitivity to the symbolic effect of punishments or rewards and more precisely to the social-certification effect of academic qualifications.

Gloss 2: The more unified the market on which the value of the products of the different PAs is determined, the more the groups or classes which have undergone a PA inculcating a dominated cultural arbitrary are likely to have the valuelessness of their cultural attainment brought home to them both by the anonymous sanctions of the labour market and by the symbolic sanctions of the cultural market (e.g. the matrimonial market), not to mention academic verdicts, which are always charged with economic and symbolic implications. These calls to order tend to produce in them, if not explicit recognition of the dominant culture as the legitimate culture, then at least an insidious awareness of the cultural unworthiness of their own acquirements. Thus, by unifying the market on which the value of the products of the different PAs is determined, bourgeois society (as compared, for example, with feudal society) has multiplied the opportunities for subjecting the products of the dominated PAs to the evaluative criteria of the legitimate culture, thereby affirming and confirming its dominance in the symbolic order. In such a social formation, the relation between the dominated PAs and the dominant PA can thus be understood by analogy with the relation set up, in a dualistic economy, between the dominant mode of production and the dominated modes of production (e.g. traditional agriculture and crafts), whose products are subjected to the laws of a market dominated by the products of the

capitalist mode of production. At the same time, the unification of the symbolic market, however far advanced, in no way prevents the dominated PAs from imposing recognition of their legitimacy, at least for a time and in certain areas of practice, on those who undergo them, although their products are destined to discover that the cultural arbitrary whose worth they have had to recognize in order to acquire it is worthless on an economic or symbolic market dominated by the cultural arbitrary of the dominant classes (e.g. the conflicts accompanying acculturation into the dominant culture, whether for the colonized intellectual — the man the Algerians call *m'turni* — or for the intellectual of dominated-class origin, condemned to reassess paternal authority, with all the renunciations, repressions or accommodations this involves).

2.3.1.3. The more directly a pedagogic agency reproduces, in the arbitrary content that it inculcates, the cultural arbitrary of the group or class which delegates to it its PAu, the less need it has to affirm and justify its own legitimacy.

Gloss: In this respect, the PA exerted in a traditional society constitutes a limiting case since, in relaying an undifferentiated and therefore indisputable and undisputed social authority, it is accompanied neither by an ideological justification of PAu as such, nor by technical reflexion on the instruments of PA. The same is true when a pedagogic agency has the principal if not sole function of reproducing the lifestyle of a dominant class or a fraction of the dominant class (e.g. the training of the young nobleman by farming him out to a noble household — 'fosterage' — or, to a lesser extent, the making of the English gentleman in traditional Oxford).

2.3.2. Insofar as the success of any PA is a function of the degree to which the receivers recognize the PAu of the pedagogic agency and the degree to which they have mastered the cultural code used in pedagogic communication, the success of any given PA in any given social forma-

tion is a function of the system of relations between the cultural arbitrary imposed by that PA, the dominant cultural arbitrary in that social formation, and the cultural arbitrary inculcated by the earliest phase of upbringing within the groups or classes from which those undergoing the PA originate (by 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2.2 and 2.3).

Gloss: It is sufficient to situate the different historical forms of PA, or the different PAs simultaneously operating in a social formation, by reference to these three principles of variation, in order to explain the likelihood of these PAs and the cultures they impose being recognized by groups or classes differently situated with respect to the pedagogic agencies and with respect to the dominant groups or classes. It goes without saying that the adequacy with which the characteristics of a PA are accounted for by reference to these three dimensions rises with the degree of integration of the different PAs of the same social formation into an objectively hierarchized system, i.e. rises in proportion as the market on which the economic and symbolic value of the product of a dominated PA is constituted, is more fully unified, so that the product of a dominated PA is that much more likely to be subjected to the principles of evaluation reproduced by the dominant PA.

2.3.2.1. In any given social formation, the differential success of the dominant PA as between the groups or classes is a function of (1) the pedagogic ethos proper to a group or class, i.e. the system of dispositions towards that PA and the agency exerting it, defined as the product of the internalization of (a) the value which the dominant PA confers by its sanctions on the products of the different family PAs and (b) the value which, by their objective sanctions, the different social markets confer on the products of the dominant PA according to the group or class from which they come; and (2) cultural capital, i.e. the cultural goods transmitted by the different family PAs, whose value qua cultural capital varies with the distance between the cultural arbitrary imposed by the dominant PA and the cultural arbitrary inculcated by the family PA within the different groups or classes (by 2.2.2, 2.3.1.2 and 2.3.2).

2.3.3. Insofar as it derives its PAu from a delegation of authority, PA tends to produce in those who undergo it the relation which members of a group or class have to their culture, i.e. misrecognition of the objective truth of that culture as a cultural arbitrary (ethnocentrism).

2.3.3.1. In any given social formation, the system of PAs, insofar as it is subject to the effect of domination by the dominant PA, tends to reproduce, both in the dominant and in the dominated classes, misrecognition of the truth of the legitimate culture as the dominant cultural arbitrary, whose reproduction contributes towards reproducing the power relations (by 1.3.1).

3. PEDAGOGIC WORK

3. Insofar as it is the arbitrary imposition of a cultural arbitrary presupposing PAu, i.e. a delegation of authority (by 1 and 2), which requires the pedagogic agency to reproduce the principles of the cultural arbitrary which a group or class imposes as worthy of reproduction both by its very existence and by the fact of delegating to an agency the authority needed in order to reproduce it (by 2.3 and 2.3.1), PA entails pedagogic work (PW), a process of inculcation which must last long enough to produce a durable training, i.e. a habitus, the product of internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary capable of perpetuating itself after PA has ceased and thereby of perpetuating in practices the principles of the internalized arbitrary.

Gloss 1: As an action which has to last a certain time in order to produce a lasting habitus, i.e. an action of imposing and inculcating an arbitrary which can be fully achieved only through PW, PA is distinguished from discontinuous and extraordinary actions of symbolic violence like those of the prophet, the intellectual 'creator' or the sorcerer. Such actions of symbolic imposition are able to bring about

the profound and lasting transformation of those they reach only to the extent that they are prolonged in an action of continuous inculcation, i.e. in a process of PW (sacerdotal preaching and commentary or professorial commentary on the 'classics'). The conditions required for the performance of PW ('the educator', says Marx, 'himself needs to be educated') are such that every pedagogic agency is characterized by a longer structural duration, other things being equal, than other agencies exercising a power of symbolic violence, because it tends to reproduce, so far as its relative autonomy allows, the conditions in which the reproducers were produced, i.e. the conditions of its own reproduction: for example, the extremely slow tempo of the transformation of PA, whether in the traditionalism of family PA which, entrusted with the earliest phase of upbringing, tends to realize more fully the tendencies of all PA and is thus able, even in modern societies, to fulfil the role of a conservatory of inherited traditions; or in the inertia of educational institutions, whose essential function always leads them to self-reproduce as unchanged as possible, like traditional societies.

Gloss 2: Education, considered as the process through which a cultural arbitrary is historically reproduced through the medium of the production of the habitus productive of practices conforming with that cultural arbitrary (i.e. by the transmission of a training [*formation*] capable of durably patterning and 'informing' the receivers), is the equivalent, in the cultural order, of the transmission of genetic capital in the biological order. If the habitus is the analogue of genetic capital, then the inculcation which defines the performance of PA is the analogue of generation, in that it transmits information generative of analogous information.

3.1. Insofar as it is a prolonged process of inculcation producing a durable training, i.e. producers of practices conforming with the principles of the cultural arbitrary of the groups or classes which delegate to PA the PAu needed for its establishment and continuation, PW tends to reproduce the social conditions of the production of that

cultural arbitrary, i.e. the objective structures of which it is the product, through the mediation of the habitus, defined as the principle generating practices which reproduce the objective structures.

3.1.1. The specific productivity of PW is objectively measured by the degree to which it produces its essential effect of inculcation, i.e. its effect of reproduction.

3.1.1.1. The specific productivity of PW, i.e. the degree to which it manages to inculcate in the legitimate addressees the cultural arbitrary which it is mandated to reproduce, is measured by the degree to which the habitus it produces is durable, i.e. capable of durably generating practices conforming with the principles of the inculcated arbitrary.

Gloss: The specific effect of PA may be contrasted with the effect of political power in terms of their temporal range, in which the structural duration of the corresponding powers of imposition is expressed: PW is capable of perpetuating the arbitrary it inculcates more lastingly than political coercion (except when political power itself resorts to PW, i.e. a specific educative programme). Religious power lastingly informs practices to the extent that it is incarnated in a church performing PW directly or indirectly, i.e. through the medium of the family (Christian upbringing). In other words, the power of symbolic violence of the PA which has recourse to PW is long-term, in contrast to the authority of political power, which is always confronted with the problem of its own perpetuation (succession).

3.1.1.2. The specific productivity of PW, i.e. the degree to which it manages to inculcate in the legitimate addressees the cultural arbitrary it is mandated to reproduce, is measured by the degree to which the habitus it produces is transposable, i.e. capable of generating practices conforming with the principles of the inculcated arbitrary in a greater number of different fields.

Gloss: Thus, the hold of a religious power is measured by the degree to which the habitus produced by the PW of the corresponding pedagogic agencies generates practices conforming with the inculcated arbitrary in areas remote from those expressly regulated by doctrine, such as economic conduct or political choices. Similarly, the 'habit-forming force' (Panofsky) of Scholastic education may be seen in the effects it produces in the structure of the medieval cathedral or the graphical layout of manuscripts.

3.1.1.3. The specific productivity of PW, i.e. the degree to which it manages to inculcate in the legitimate addressees the cultural arbitrary it is mandated to reproduce, is measured by the degree to which the habitus it produces is exhaustive, i.e. the completeness with which it reproduces the principles of the cultural arbitrary of a group or class in the practices it generates.

Gloss: Although the congruence of the three measures of the reproduction effect is not logically necessary, the theory of the habitus as the principle unifying and generating practices enables us to understand why the durability, transposability and exhaustivity of a habitus in fact prove to be closely linked.

3.1.2. The delegation which establishes a PA implies, in addition to a delimitation of the content inculcated, a definition of the mode of inculcation (the legitimate mode of inculcation) and of the length of inculcation (the legitimate training period), which define the degree of completion of PW considered necessary and sufficient to produce the accomplished form of the habitus, i.e. the degree of cultural attainment (the degree of legitimate competence) by which a group or class recognizes the accomplished man.

3.1.2.1. In any given social formation, the delegation which establishes the dominant PA implies, in addition to a delimitation of the content inculcated, a dominant definition of the mode and length of inculcation

which define the degree of completion of of PW considered necessary and sufficient to produce the accomplished form of the habitus, i.e. the degree of cultural attainment (the degree of legitimate competence in legitimate culture) by which not only the dominant but also the dominated classes tend to recognize the 'cultivated man' and against which the products of the dominated PAs, i.e. the different forms of the accomplished man as defined by the culture of the dominated groups or classes, come to be measured objectively.

3.1.3. Insofar as it is a prolonged process of inculcation producing a durable, transposable habitus, i.e. inculcating in all its legitimate addressees a system of (partially or totally identical) schemes of perception, thought, appreciation and action, PW contributes towards producing and reproducing the intellectual and moral integration of the group or class on whose behalf it is carried on.

Gloss: Only when it is seen that a group's integration rests on the (total or partial) identity of the habitus inculcated by PW, i.e. when the principle of the homology of practices is located in the total or partial identity of the practice-generating grammars, is it possible to escape from the naiveties of the social philosophies of consensus. Such sociologies, in reducing group integration to the possession of a common repertoire of representations, are unable, for example, to apprehend the unity and the integrative function of practices or opinions that are phenomenally different or even contradictory but produced by the same generative habitus (e.g. the style of the artistic productions of a determinate epoch and class). Moreover, the same habitus which engenders a particular practice can equally well engender the opposite when its principle is the logic of dissimulation (e.g. in apprentice intellectuals, who are inclined to play the intellectual game of self-demarcation in a particularly direct fashion, the same privileged-class habitus can generate radically opposed political or aesthetic opinions, whose deep unity is betrayed only in the modality of their declarations of position or their practices).⁴

3.1.3.1. Insofar as it is a prolonged process of inculcation producing internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary in the form of a durable, transposable habitus, capable of generating practices conforming with those principles outside of and beyond any express regulation or any explicit reminding of the rule, PW enables the group or class which delegates its authority to PA to produce and reproduce its intellectual and moral integration without resorting to external repression or, in particular, physical coercion.

Gloss: PW is a substitute for physical constraint: physical repression (internment in a prison or asylum) is brought in to sanction the failures of internalization of a cultural arbitrary. And it is a profitable substitute: although (and perhaps because) it is more masked, PW is in the long run at least as efficacious as physical constraint – which can continue to produce an effect once it has ceased to be applied only inasmuch as it always tends to exert an additional, symbolic, effect (which is to say, in passing, that the emperor is never naked and that only an innocently idealist conception of the intrinsic force of justice, founded on the implicit dissociation of force from the legitimacy which it necessarily engenders, could lead one to speak, like Russell and others after him, of 'naked power'). Thus PW, insofar as it secures the perpetuation of the effects of symbolic violence, tends to produce a permanent disposition to give, in every situation (e.g. in matters of fertility, economic choices or political commitment), the right response (i.e. the one laid down by cultural arbitrariness, and no other) to symbolic stimuli emanating from the agencies invested with the PAu which has made possible the PW responsible for the habitus (e.g. the effects of sacerdotal preaching or papal bulls as symbolic reactivations of the Christian upbringing).

3.2. Insofar as it is a transformative action tending to inculcate a training, a system of durable, transposable dispositions, PW, which cannot be exercised without PAu, has the effect of irreversibly confirming and consecrating PAu, i.e. the legitimacy of PA and of the

cultural arbitrary: it inculcates, by masking more and more completely, through the success of the inculcation of the arbitrary, the arbitrariness of the inculcation and of the culture inculcated.

Gloss: To see a vicious circle in the presence of PAu at the beginning and end of PA is to fail to realize that, in the order of genesis (biography and the succession of the generations) the PAu commanded by every PA that is exercised breaks the pedagogic circle to which any PA without PAu would be condemned, only to lock the recipient of the PW thus made possible ever more firmly in the circle of (group or class) ethnocentrism. A paradigmatic image of this paradox is seen in the circle of baptism and confirmation: the profession of faith made at the age of reason is supposed to validate retrospectively the undertaking given at the time of baptism, which committed the infant to an education necessarily leading up this profession of faith. Thus, as it is accomplished, PW produces more and more fully the objective conditions for misrecognition of cultural arbitrariness, i.e. the conditions for subjective experience of the cultural arbitrary as necessary in the sense of 'natural'. The man who deliberates on his culture is already cultivated and the questions of the man who thinks he is questioning the principles of his upbringing still have their roots in his upbringing. The Cartesian myth of innate reason, i.e. of a natural culture or cultivated nature pre-existing nurture, the retrospective illusion necessarily inscribed in education as an arbitrary imposition capable of imposing ignorance of its arbitrariness, is just one more magical solution of the circle of PAu: 'Since we have all been children before being men, and since it has long befallen us to be governed by our appetites and our preceptors, who were often contrary the one to another and who none of them perhaps counselled us for the best, it is nigh impossible that our judgements should be as pure or as solid as they would have been had we had full use of our reason from the moment of our birth and we never been led but by reason alone.' Thus one escapes from the circle of inevitably confirmed baptism only to offer sacrifice to the mystique of the 'second birth', whose philosophical transcript is perhaps

seen in the transcendentalist phantasm of the reconquest by the sheer power of thought, of a thought leaving nothing unthought.

3.2.1. Insofar as it is a prolonged process of inculcation producing more and more complete misrecognition of the twofold arbitrariness of PA, i.e. recognition of the PAu of the pedagogic agency and recognition of the legitimacy of the product which it offers, PW produces the legitimacy of the product and, inseparably from this, the legitimate need for this produce qua legitimate product, by producing the legitimate consumer, i.e. one equipped with the social definition of the legitimate product and the disposition to consume it in the legitimate manner.

Gloss 1: Only the concept of PW can break the circle in which one is trapped when one forgets that a 'cultural need' is a cultivated need, i.e. when one severs it from the social conditions of its production. Thus, religious or cultural devotion, which engenders religious or aesthetic practices such as assiduous church-going or museum-going, is the product of the PAu of the family (and secondarily of the institution, the Church or School), which, in the process of a biography, breaks the circle of 'cultural need' by consecrating religious or cultural goods of salvation as worthy of being pursued, and by producing the need for these goods by the mere fact of imposing their consumption. Since we know that the need to frequent museums or churches is conditional on frequenting museums and churches, and that assiduous frequentation supposes the need to frequent, it is clear that breaking the circle of the first entry into a church or museum requires a predisposition towards frequentation which, short of a miraculous predestination, can only be the family disposition to cause frequenting by frequenting sufficiently to produce a lasting disposition to frequent.⁵

Genesis amnesia leads to a specific form of the Cartesian illusion in the case of the cult of art. The myth of an innate taste owing nothing to the constraints of apprenticeship because wholly given at birth transmutates the determinisms capable of producing both determined choices

and ignorance of that determination into the free choices of a primal free will.

Gloss 2: If it is not seen that PW produces indissolubly both the legitimate product as such, i.e. as an object worthy of being materially or symbolically consumed (i.e. venerated, adored, respected, admired, etc.), and the propensity to consume this object materially or symbolically, one is condemned to interminable speculation as to the priority of the veneration or the venerable, the adoration or the adorable, the respect or the respectable, the admiration or the admirable, etc. that is, to oscillate between trying to deduce the dispositions towards the object from the intrinsic properties of the object and trying to reduce the properties of the object to the properties conferred on it by the dispositions of the subject. In reality, PW produces agents endowed with the adequate disposition who can apply it only to certain objects; and objects which appear to the agents produced by PW as calling forth or demanding the adequate disposition.

3.2.2. Insofar as it is a prolonged process of inculcation producing more and more complete misrecognition of the twofold arbitrariness of PA, PW tends, the more it is accomplished, to conceal more and more completely the objective truth of the habitus as the internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary which is more accomplished the more the work of inculcation is accomplished.

Gloss: It is clear why the social definition of excellence always tends to make reference to 'naturalness', i.e. to a modality of practice entailing a degree of accomplishment of PW capable of effacing awareness not only of the twofold arbitrariness of the PA of which it is the product, but also of all that accomplished practice owes to PW (e.g. Greek *arete*, the ease of the *honnête homme*, the *sarr* of the Kabyle man of honour, or the 'anti-academic academicism' of the Chinese mandarin).

3.2.2.1. Insofar as it is a prolonged process of inculcation producing

more and more complete misrecognition of the twofold arbitrariness of PA, i.e. inter alia, misrecognition of the delimitation constitutive of the cultural arbitrary which it inculcates, PW produces more and more complete misrecognition of the ethical and intellectual limitations which are correlative with the internalizing of that delimitation (ethical and logical ethnocentrism).

Gloss: This means that the PW which produces the habitus – a system of schemes of thought, perception, appreciation and action – produces misrecognition of the limitations implied by this system, so that the efficacy of the ethical and logical programming it produces is enhanced by misrecognition of the inherent limits of this programming, a misrecognition which is a function of the degree of completion of the PW. The agents produced by PW would not be so totally the prisoners of the limitations which the cultural arbitrary imposes on their thought and practice, were it not that, contained within these limits by self-discipline and self-censorship (the more unconscious to the extent that their principles have been internalized), they live out their thought and practice in the illusion of freedom and universality.

3.2.2.1.1. In any given social formation, the PW through which the dominant PA is carried on succeeds all the better in imposing the legitimacy of the dominant culture the more it is accomplished, i.e. the more completely it succeeds in imposing misrecognition of the dominant arbitrary not only on the legitimate addressees of the PA but also on the members of the dominated groups or classes (the dominant ideology of the legitimate culture as the only authentic culture, i.e. as universal culture).

3.2.2.1.2. In any given social formation, the PW through which the dominant PA is carried on always has a function of keeping order, i.e. of reproducing the structure of the power relations between the groups or classes, inasmuch as, by inculcation or exclusion, it tends to impose recognition of the legitimacy of the dominant culture on the members

of the dominated groups or classes, and to make them internalize, to a variable extent, disciplines and censorships which best serve the material and symbolic interests of the dominant groups or classes when they take the form of self-discipline and self-censorship.

3.2.2.1.3. In any given social formation, because the PW through which the dominant PA is carried on tends to impose recognition of the legitimacy of the dominant culture on the members of the dominated groups or classes, it tends at the same time to impose on them, by inculcation or exclusion, recognition of the illegitimacy of their own cultural arbitrary.

Gloss: Contrary to an impoverished conception of the symbolic violence one class exerts on another through the medium of education (a conception paradoxically common to those who denounce an ideological domination reduced to the image of forced feeding and those who affect to deplore the imposition of culture 'not made for them' on children of 'humble origin'), a dominant PA tends not so much to inculcate the information constituting the dominant culture (if only because PW has a lower specific productivity and a shorter duration when applied to groups or classes lower down the social scale) as to inculcate the fait accompli of the legitimacy of the dominant culture. It may do so by inducing those excluded from the ranks of the legitimate addressees (whether before formal education, as in most societies, or during it) to internalize the legitimacy of their exclusion; by making those it relegates to second-order teaching recognize the inferiority of this teaching and its audience; or by inculcating, through submission to academic disciplines and adherence to cultural hierarchies, a transposable, generalized disposition with regard to social disciplines and hierarchies.

In short, in every case, the major thrust of the imposition of recognition of the dominant culture as legitimate culture and, by the same token, of the illegitimacy of the cultures of the dominated groups or classes, comes from exclusion, which perhaps has most symbolic

force when it assumes the guise of self-exclusion. It is as if the legitimate duration of the PW conceded to the dominated classes was objectively defined as the necessary and sufficient length of time for the fact of exclusion to take on its full symbolic force, i.e. appear to those undergoing it as the sanction on their cultural unworthiness, and for ignorance of the law of legitimate culture to be no excuse. One of the least noticed effects of compulsory schooling is that it succeeds in obtaining from the dominated classes a recognition of legitimate knowledge and know-how (e.g. in law, medicine, technology, entertainment or art), entailing the devaluation of the knowledge and know-how they effectively command (e.g. customary law, home medicine, craft techniques, folk art and language and all the lore handed on in the 'hedge-school of the witch and the shepherd', as Michelet puts it) and so providing a market for material and especially symbolic products of which the means of production (not least, higher education) are virtually monopolized by the dominant classes (e.g. clinical diagnosis, legal advice, the culture industry, etc.).

3.3. Insofar as PW is an irreversible process producing, in the time required for inculcation, an irreversible disposition, i.e. a disposition which cannot itself be repressed or transformed except by an irreversible process producing in turn a new irreversible disposition, primary PA (the earliest phase of upbringing), which is carried out by PW without any antecedent (primary PW), produces a primary habitus, characteristic of a group or class, which is the basis for the subsequent formation of any other habitus.

Gloss: Husserl discovers the self-evident fact of the empirical genealogy of consciousness: 'I have had the education of a German, not that of a Chinaman. But also that of a small-town dweller, in the family and school of a petty-bourgeois, not that of a great landowner, brought up in a cadet school.' And he observes that while one can always acquire a theoretic knowledge of another culture and even remake one's education along the lines of that culture (e.g. 'by trying to learn the series of

courses taught at cadet school' or by 'remaking one's education Chinese-style'), this appropriation of China is not possible in the full sense, any more than 'one can appropriate the Junker type in the full sense, in its fully concrete being'.

3.3.1. The specific degree of productivity of any PW other than primary PW (secondary PW) is a function of the distance between the habitus it tends to inculcate (i.e. the cultural arbitrary it imposes) and the habitus inculcated by the previous phases of PW and ultimately by primary PW (i.e. the initial cultural arbitrary).

Gloss 1: The success of all school education, and more generally of all secondary PW, depends fundamentally on the education previously accomplished in the earliest years of life, even and especially when the educational system denies this primacy in its ideology and practice by making the school career a history with no pre-history: we know that through all the skill-learning processes of everyday life, and particularly through the acquisition of the mother tongue or the manipulation of kinship terms and relationships, logical dispositions are mastered in their practical state. These dispositions, more or less complex, more or less elaborated symbolically, depending on the group or class, predispose children unequally towards symbolic mastery of the operations implied as much in a mathematical demonstration as in decoding a work of art.

Gloss 2: Equally one sees the naivety of posing the problem of the differential efficacy of the various agencies of symbolic violence (e.g. family, school, modern media) while neglecting – like the devotees of the cult of the omnipotence of schooling or the prophets of the all-powerfulness of the mass media – the irreversibility of learning processes. Because learning is an irreversible process, the habitus acquired within the family forms the basis of the reception and assimilation of the classroom message, and the habitus acquired at school conditions the level of reception and degree of assimilation of the

messages produced and diffused by the culture industry, and, more generally, of any intellectual or semi-intellectual message.

3.3.1.1. Any given mode of inculcation is characterized (in the respect considered in 3.3.1) by the position it occupies between (1) the mode of inculcation aiming to bring about the complete substitution of one habitus for another (conversion) and (2) the mode of inculcation aiming purely and simply to confirm the primary habitus (maintenance or reinforcement).

Gloss: The essential characteristics of secondary PW seeking to bring about a radical conversion (*metanola*) may be deduced from the fact that such operations are required to organize the social conditions of their performance with a view to killing off the 'old man' and engendering the new habitus ex nihilo. Consider, for example, the tendency to pedagogic formalism, i.e. the flaunting of the arbitrariness of the inculcation as arbitrariness for its own sake, and more generally the imposition of rules for rules' sake, which is the main feature of the mode of inculcating proper to the PAs of conversion: e.g. exercises of piety and self-mortification (Pascal's "*abêtissez-vous*"), military drill, etc. In this respect, 'total' institutions (barracks, convents, prisons, asylums, boarding schools) unambiguously demonstrate the deculturating and reculturating techniques required by PW seeking to produce a habitus as similar as possible to that produced in the earliest phase of life, while having to reckon with a pre-existing habitus. At the other extreme, the traditional institutions for young ladies of good family represent the paradigmatic form of all institutions which, thanks to the mechanisms of selection and self-selection, address themselves exclusively to agents endowed with a habitus as little different as possible from the one to be produced, and can therefore content themselves with ostentatiously organizing all the appearances of really effective training (e.g. the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*). If, in all periods when the ruling classes entrust the earliest phase of their children's upbringing to agents from the lower classes, the educational

institutions reserved for them have all the characteristics of the total institution, this is because they are obliged to effect nothing less than a re-education (e.g. boarding-school life in the Jesuit colleges or in the nineteenth-century German and Russian gymnasias).

3.3.1.2. Given that the primary habitus inculcated by primary PW is the basis for the subsequent formation of any other habitus, the degree of specific productivity of any phase of secondary PW is measured, in this respect, by the degree to which the system of the means required for carrying out the PW (the mode of inculcation) objectively takes account of the distance between the habitus it aims to inculcate and the habitus produced by previous PW

Gloss: Secondary PW is that much more productive when, taking into account the degree to which the addressees of the pedagogic message possess the code of the message, it creates more fully the social conditions for communication by methodically organizing exercises designed to ensure accelerated assimilation of the code of transmission and, therefore, accelerated inculcation of the habitus.

3.3.1.3. The degree of traditionalism of a mode of inculcation is measured by the degree to which it is objectively organized by reference to a limited audience of legitimate addressees, i.e. the degree to which the success of the secondary PW presupposes that the addressees be equipped with the adequate habitus (i.e. the pedagogic ethos and cultural capital proper to the groups or classes whose cultural arbitrary it reproduces).

3.3.1.3.1. Because, in any given social formation, the dominant mode of inculcation tends to correspond to the interests of the dominant classes, i.e. the legitimate addressees, the differential productivity of the dominant PW according to the groups or classes on whom it is exerted tends to be a function of the distance between the primary habitus inculcated by primary PW within the different groups or classes and the

habitus inculcated by the dominant PW (i.e. the extent to which education or acculturation is re-education or deculturation, depending on the group or class).

3.3.2. Given (1) that the making explicit and the formalizing of the principles at work in a practice, i.e. symbolic mastery of that practice, must logically and chronologically follow practical mastery of those principles, i.e. that symbolic mastery is never its own foundation; and given (2) that symbolic mastery is irreducible to the practical mastery from which it proceeds and to which it nonetheless adds its own effect: it follows (a) that all secondary PW produces secondary practices irreducible to the primary practices of which it gives symbolic mastery, and (b) that the secondary mastery which it produces presupposes a previous mastery which is that much closer to simple practical mastery of practices, the earlier this secondary PW comes in the biographical order.

Gloss: The teaching of grammar in school does not, strictly speaking, inculcate a new linguistic practice-generating grammar: the child must already possess in their practical state the principles he learns to subject to logical scrutiny (e.g. conjugations, declensions, syntactic constructions); but in acquiring the theoretic codification of what he does, he acquires the capacity to do it more consciously and systematically (cf. Piaget and Vygotsky). This transformation is the analogue, in the biographical order, of the historical process by which customary law or traditional justice (*Kadl Justiz*) is transformed into rational, i.e. codified, law derived from explicit principles (cf. more generally Weber's analyses of the process of rationalization in religion, art, political theory, etc.). We have similarly seen that the success of the prophet's action of symbolic imposition is a function of the degree to which he manages to make explicit and systematize the principles which the group he addresses already holds in a practical state.

3.3.2.1. Any given mode of inculcation, i.e. the system of the means

by which the internalization of a cultural arbitrary is produced, is characterized (in the respect considered in 3.3.2) by the position it occupies between (1) the mode of inculcation producing a habitus by the unconscious inculcation of principles which manifest themselves only in their practical state, within the practice that is imposed (implicit pedagogy), and (2) the mode of inculcation producing a habitus by the inculcation, methodically organized as such, of articulated and even formalized principles (explicit pedagogy).

Gloss: It would be a mistake to suppose it possible to hierarchize these two opposed modes of inculcation according to their specific productivity, since this efficiency, measured by the durability and transposability of the habitus produced, cannot be defined independently of the content inculcated and the social functions which the PW in question fulfils in a determinate social formation. Thus, implicit pedagogy is doubtless the most efficient way of transmitting traditional, undifferentiated, 'total' knowledge (the assimilation of styles or knacks), in that it requires the disciple or apprentice to identify with the physical person of the more experienced 'master' or 'companion', at the cost of a thorough self-remission which prohibits analysis of the principles of the exemplary conduct; on the other hand, an implicit pedagogy which, presupposing prior attainment, is per se ineffectual when applied to agents lacking that prerequisite, can be very 'profitable' for the dominant classes when the corresponding PA is performed in a system of PAs dominated by the dominant PA and thereby contributes to cultural reproduction, and through it, to social reproduction, by enabling the possessors of the prerequisite cultural capital to continue to monopolize that capital.

3.3.2.2. Given that all secondary PW has the essential effect of producing practices irreducible to the practices of which it gives symbolic mastery, the degree of specific productivity of any phase of secondary PW is measured in this respect by the degree to which the system of the means required for carrying out the PW (the mode of inculcation) is

objectively organized with a view to ensuring, by explicit inculcation of codified formal principles, the formal transferability of the habitus.

3.3.2.3. The degrees of traditionalism of any mode of inculcation is measured by the degree to which the means required for carrying out PW are reduced to the practices which express the habitus and which tend, by the mere fact of being performed repeatedly by agents invested with PAu, to reproduce directly a habitus defined by practical transferability.

Gloss: PW is that much more traditional to the extent that (1) it is less clearly delimited as a specific, autonomous practice, and (2) is exerted by agencies whose functions are more comprehensive and more undifferentiated, i.e. the more completely it is reduced to a familiarizing process in which the master transmits unconsciously, through exemplary conduct, principles he has never mastered consciously, to a receiver who internalizes them unconsciously. In the limiting case, seen in traditional societies, the whole group and the whole environment — that is, the system of the material conditions of existence, insofar as they are endowed with the symbolic significance which gives them a power of imposition — exert an anonymous, diffuse PA without specialized agents or specified moments (e.g. the forming of the Christian habitus in the Middle Ages, through the 'catechism' of the calendar of feasts and the ordering of everyday space, or the devotional 'book' of symbolic objects).

3.3.2.3.1. In any given social formation, the primary PW to which the members of the different groups or classes are subjected rests more completely on practical transferability the more rigorously the material conditions of their existence subject them to the imperatives of practice, tending thereby to prevent the formation and development of the aptitude for symbolic mastery of practice.

Gloss: If one accepts that PW is that much closer to explicit pedagogy

to the extent that it resorts to a greater degree of verbalization and classificatory conceptualization, then it can be seen that primary PW prepares that much better for secondary PW based on explicit pedagogy when exerted within a group or class whose material conditions of existence allow them to stand more completely aside from practice, in other words to 'neutralize' in imagination or reflection the vital urgencies which thrust a pragmatic disposition on the dominated classes. All the more so because the agents responsible for primary PW have themselves been very unequally prepared for symbolic mastery by secondary PW and are therefore very unequally capable of orienting primary PW towards the verbalization, formulation and conceptualization of practical mastery which are demanded by secondary PW (e.g. the limiting case of continuity between family PW and school PW in the families of teachers or intellectuals).

3.3.3. Given the delegation on which it is based, the dominant PA tends to dispense more completely with explicit inculcation of the prerequisites of its specific productivity, the more completely the legitimate addressees have mastered the dominant culture, i.e. the greater the proportion of what it is mandated to inculcate (capital and ethos) that has already been inculcated by the primary PW of the dominant groups or classes.

3.3.3.1. In a social formation in which, both in pedagogic practice and in all social practices, the dominant cultural arbitrary subordinates practical mastery to symbolic mastery of practices, the dominant PW tends to dispense with explicit inculcation of the principles giving symbolic mastery, the more completely practical mastery of the principles giving symbolic mastery has already been inculcated in the legitimate addressees by the primary PW of the dominant groups or classes.

Gloss: Contrary to what is suggested by certain psychogenetic theories which describe intelligence development as a universal process of uni-

linear transformation of sensorimotor mastery into symbolic mastery, the respective primary PW of the different groups or classes produces primary systems of dispositions which differ not merely as different degrees of explicitness of the same practice but also as so many types of practical mastery unequally predisposing their bearers to acquire the particular type of symbolic mastery that is privileged by the dominant cultural arbitrary.

Thus, a practical mastery oriented towards the manipulation of things, with the correlative relation to words, is less favourable to theoretic mastery of the rules of literate verbalization than a practical mastery directed towards the manipulation of words and towards the relation to words and things which is fostered by the primacy of word manipulation.

It is precisely when its legitimate public is made up of individuals equipped by primary PW with a verbally-oriented practical mastery, that secondary PW which is mandated to inculcate above all the mastery of a language and of a relation to language can, paradoxically, content itself with an implicit pedagogy, especially as regards language, because it can count on a habitus containing, in practical form, the predisposition to use language in accordance with a literate relation to language (e.g. the structural affinity between teaching in the humanities and bourgeois primary PA). Conversely, in secondary PW which has the declared function of inculcating practical mastery of manual techniques (e.g. the teaching of technology in institutions of technical education), the mere fact of using theoretic discourse to make explicit the principles of techniques of which working-class children have practical mastery is sufficient to cast the knacks and tricks of the trade into the illegitimacy of makeshift approximation, just as 'general education' reduces their language to jargon, slang or gibberish. This is one of the most potent effects of the theoretic discourse which sets an unbridgeable gulf between the holder of the principles (e.g. the engineer) and the mere practitioner (e.g. the technician).

3.3.3.2. Given that, in the type of social formation defined in 3.3.3.1,

the dominant PW which uses a traditional mode of inculcation (in the sense of 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.2.3) has a specific productivity that much lower when it is exerted on groups or classes carrying out primary PW more remote from the dominant primary PW which inculcates, inter alia, a predominantly verbal practical mastery, such PW tends in and by its very exercise to produce the delimitation of its really possible addressees, excluding the different groups or classes more rapidly the more completely they lack the capital and ethos objectively presupposed by its mode of inculcation.

3.3.3.3. Given that, in the type of social formation defined in 3.3.3.1, the dominant secondary PW, which uses a traditional mode of inculcation and is defined as not fully producing the conditions for its own productivity, can fulfil its eliminatory function merely by default, such PW tends to produce not only the delimitation of its really possible addressees, but also misrecognition of the mechanisms of delimitation, i.e. tends to bring about recognition of its actual addressees as the legitimate addressees and of the length of the inculcation actually undergone by the different groups or classes as the legitimate length of inculcation.

Gloss: While every dominant PA entails a delimitation of its legitimate addressees, exclusion is often carried out by mechanisms external to the agency performing the PW, whether by the more or less direct effect of economic mechanisms or by customary or juridical prescription (e.g. the numerus clausus as an authoritarian restriction of the addressees by ethnic or other criteria). A PA which eliminates certain categories of receivers merely by the effectivity of the mode of inculcation characteristic of its mode of inculcation conceals the arbitrariness of the de facto delimitation of its public better and more fully than any other, thereby imposing more subtly the legitimacy of its products and hierarchies (the sociodicy function).⁶ The museum, which delimits its public and legitimates their social standing simply by the effect of its 'level of transmission', i.e. by the sheer fact of presupposing possession of the

cultural code required for decoding the objects displayed, may be seen as the limiting case towards which tends all PW founded on the implicit prerequisite of possession of the conditions of its productivity. The action of the mechanisms which tend to ensure, quasi automatically – i.e. in accordance with the laws governing the relations between the different groups or classes and the dominant pedagogic agency – the exclusion of certain categories of receivers (self-elimination, deferred elimination, etc.), can moreover be masked by the fact that the social function of elimination is concealed under the overt function of selection which the pedagogic agency performs within the set of legitimate addressees (e.g. the ideological function of the examination).

3.3.3.4. Given that, in the type of social formation defined in 3.3.3.1, the dominant secondary PW which uses a traditional mode of inculcation does not explicitly inculcate the prerequisites of its specific productivity, such PW tends, by its very exercise, to produce the legitimacy of that mode of possession of the prerequisite acquirements on which the dominant classes have a monopoly because they monopolize the legitimate mode of inculcation, i.e. inculcation of the principles of the legitimate culture in their practical state through primary PW (the cultivated relation to legitimate culture as a relation of familiarity).

3.3.3.5. Given that, in the type of social formation defined in 3.3.3.1, the dominant secondary PW which uses a traditional mode of inculcation does not explicitly inculcate the prerequisites of its specific productivity, such PW presupposes, produces and inculcates, in and through its exercise, ideologies tending to justify the question-begging which is the condition of its exercise (the ideology of the 'gift' as a negation of the social conditions of the production of cultivated dispositions).

Gloss 1: A paradigmatic image of the typical effects of the ideology of 'giftedness' can be seen in an experiment by Rosenthal: two groups of experimenters who were given two batches of rats from the same stock

and were told that one batch had been selected for its stupidity and the other for its intelligence, obtained significantly different progress from their respective subjects (e.g. the effects on both teachers and pupils of distributing the school population into sub-populations academically and socially hierarchized by type of establishment – classical lycées, CESs and CETs,⁷ or *grandes écoles* and faculties – by section – classical or modern – and even by discipline).

Gloss 2: In the type of social formation defined in 3.3.3.1, the dominant secondary PW, characterized by a traditional mode of inculcation (in the senses of both 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.2.3), because its specific productivity varies inversely with the distance between the dominant cultural arbitrary and the cultural arbitrary of the groups or classes on which it is exerted, always tends to deprive the members of the dominated classes of the material and symbolic benefits of the accomplished education. It may be wondered whether a type of secondary PW which, conversely, took into account the distance between the pre-existent habitus and the habitus to be inculcated, and was systematically organized in accordance with the principles of an explicit pedagogy, would not have the effect of erasing the boundary which traditional PW recognizes and confirms between the legitimate addressees and the rest. Or, to put it another way, whether perfectly rational PW – i.e. PW exerted ab ovo in all domains on all the educable, taking nothing for granted at the outset, with the explicit goal of explicitly inculcating in all its pupils the practical principles of the symbolic mastery of practices which are inculcated by primary PA only within certain groups or classes, in short, a type of PW everywhere substituting for the traditional mode of inculcation the programmed transmission of the legitimate culture – would not correspond to the pedagogic interest of the dominated classes (the hypothesis of the democratization of education through the rationalization of pedagogy). But the Utopian character of an education policy based on this hypothesis becomes apparent as soon as one observes that, quite apart from the built-in inertia of every educational institution, the structure of power relations

prohibits a dominant PA from resorting to a type of PW contrary to the interests of the dominant classes who delegate its PAu to it.

Furthermore, to regard such a policy as congruous with the pedagogic interest of the dominated classes entails identifying the objective interest of those classes with the sum of the individual interests of their members (e.g. as regards social mobility or cultural advancement), ignoring the fact that the controlled mobility of a limited number of individuals can help to perpetuate the structure of class relations; or, to put it another way, it entails assuming it possible to generalize to the whole class properties which socio-logically can belong to certain members of the class only inasmuch as they remain reserved for a few, hence denied to the class as a whole.

4. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

4. Every institutionalized educational system (ES) owes the specific characteristics of its structure and functioning to the fact that, by the means proper to the institution, it has to produce and reproduce the institutional conditions whose existence and persistence (self-reproduction of the system) are necessary both to the exercise of its essential function of inculcation and to the fulfilment of its function of reproducing a cultural arbitrary which it does not produce (cultural reproduction), the reproduction of which contributes to the reproduction of the relations between the groups or classes (social reproduction).

Gloss 1: The task is now to establish the specified form which the propositions stating in their full generality the conditions and effects of PA (1, 2 and 3) must take when that PA is exerted by an institution (ES), that is, to establish what an institution must be in order to be capable of producing the institutional conditions for the production of a habitus at the same time as misrecognition of those conditions. This

question is not reducible to the essentially historical search for the social conditions of the apparition of a particular ES or even of the educational institution in general. Thus, Durkheim's effort to understand the characteristics of the structure and functioning of the French ES on the basis of the fact that it initially had to organize itself with a view to producing a Christian habitus which would as far as possible integrate the Greco-Roman heritage with the Christian faith, leads less directly to a general theory of the ES than Weber's attempt to deduce the transhistorical characteristics of every church from the functional demands which determine the structure and functioning of any institution aiming to produce a religious habitus. Only when the generic conditions of the possibility of an institutionalized PA have been formulated is one able to give full significance to the search for the social conditions necessary for the realization of these generic conditions, i.e. to understand how, in different historical situations, social processes such as urban concentration, the progress of the division of labour entailing the autonomization of intellectual tribunals or practices, the constitution of a market in symbolic goods, etc. take on a systematic meaning qua the system of the social conditions of the apparition of an ES (cf. the regressive method by which Marx constructs the social phenomena linked to the break-up of feudal society as the system of the social conditions of the apparition of the capitalist mode of production).

Gloss 2: So long as it is not forgotten that the relatively autonomous history of educational institutions has to be reinserted into the history of the corresponding social formations, certain features of the institution which first appear in conjunction with systematic transformations of the institution (e.g. paid teaching, the establishment of schools capable of organizing the training of new teachers, the standardization of educational organization over a wide area, examinations, Civil-Service status, salaried employment) may legitimately be regarded as significant thresholds in the process of the institutionalization of PW. Thus, although the educational history of Antiquity exhibits the stages

of a continuous process leading from preceptorship to the philosophy and rhetoric schools of Imperial Rome, passing through the initiatory education of the magi or the masters of wisdom and the independent itinerant lecturing of the Sophists, Durkheim is justified in regarding the medieval university as the first true ES in the West, since the advent of juridically sanctioned validation of the results of inculcation (the diploma), Durkheim's decisive criterion, here joins the continuity of inculcation and the homogeneity of the mode of inculcation. It is equally possible, from a Weberian standpoint, to consider that the determining features of the educational institution are present with the appearance of a corps of permanent specialists whose training, recruitment and careers are governed by a specialized organization and who find in the institution the means of successfully asserting their claim to a monopoly of legitimate inculcation of legitimate culture.

If it is just as possible to understand the structural characteristics linked to institutionalization by relating them to the interests of a body of specialists progressively gaining a monopoly as it is to understand the latter in terms of the former, the reason is that these processes represent two inseparable manifestations of the autonomization of a practice, i.e. of its constitution as a specific practice. In the same way that, as Engels observes, the apparition of law qua law, i.e. as an 'autonomous realm', is correlative with the advances in the division of labour which lead to the constitution of a body of professional jurists; in the same way that, as Weber shows, the 'rationalization' of religion is correlative with the constitution of a priesthood; and in the same way that the process leading to the constitution of art qua art is correlative with the constitution of a relatively autonomous intellectual and artistic field – so the constitution of PW as such is correlative with the constitution of the ES.

4.1. Given that (1) an ES cannot fulfil its essential function of inculcating unless it produces and reproduces, by the means proper to the institution, the conditions for PW capable of reproducing, within the limits of the institution's means, i.e. continuously, at the least expense

and in regular batches, a *habitus* as homogeneous and durable as possible in as many of the legitimate addressees as possible (including the reproducers of the institution); and given (2) that, in order to fulfil its external function of cultural and social reproduction, an ES must produce a *habitus* conforming as closely as possible to the principles of the cultural arbitrary which it is mandated to reproduce – the conditions for the exercise of institutionalized PW and for the institutional reproduction of such PW tend to coincide with the conditions favouring the function of reproduction, inasmuch as a permanent corps of specialized agents, equipped with the homogeneous training and standardized, standardizing instruments which are the precondition for the exercise of a specific, regulated process of PW, i.e. the work of schooling (WSg), the institutionalized form of secondary PW, is predisposed by the institutional conditions of its own reproduction to restrict its activity to the limits laid down by an institution mandated to reproduce a cultural arbitrary and not to decree it.

4.1.1. Given that it must produce the institutional conditions enabling interchangeable agents to carry on continuously, i.e. daily and over the widest possible territorial area, WSg reproducing the culture it is mandated to reproduce, the ES tends to ensure that the corps of agents recruited and trained to carry out inculcation operate within institutional conditions capable of both dispensing and preventing them from performing heterogeneous or heterodox WSg, i.e. those conditions most likely to exclude, without explicitly forbidding, any practice incompatible with the function of reproducing the intellectual and moral integration of the legitimate addressees.

Gloss: The medieval distinction between the *auctor* who produces or professes original works 'extra-ordinarily' and the *lector* who, confined to repeated, repeatable commentary on authorities, professes a message he has not himself produced, expresses the objective truth of professional practice, which is perhaps most evident in the professorial ideology of mastery, the laboured negation of the truth of the professorial

function, or in the magisterial pseudo-creation which employs all the academic tricks and dodges in the service of an academic outclassing of academic commentary.

4.1.1.1. Given that it must ensure the institutional conditions for the homogeneity and orthodoxy of the WSg the ES tends to equip the agents appointed to inculcate with a standard training and standardized, standardizing instruments.

Gloss: The teaching tools which the ES makes available to its agents (manuals, commentaries, abstracts, teachers' texts, syllabuses, set books, teaching instructions, etc.) must be seen not simply as aids to inculcation but also as instruments of control tending to safeguard the orthodoxy of SW against individual heresies.

4.1.1.2. Insofar as it must ensure the institutional conditions for the homogeneity and orthodoxy of the WSg, the ES tends to subject the information and training which it inculcates to a treatment the principle of which lies at once in the demands of the WSg and in the tendencies inherent in a corps of agents placed in these institutional conditions, i.e. tends to codify, standardize and systematize the school message (school culture as 'routinized' culture).

Gloss 1: The condemnations which prophets and creators, and, with them, all would-be prophets and creators, have levelled through the ages at professorial or priestly ritualization of the original prophecy or original work (cf. the anathemas, themselves doomed to become classic, against the 'fossilizing' or 'embalming' of the classics) draw their inspiration from the artificialist illusion that the WSg could escape bearing the mark of the institutional conditions of its exercise. All school culture is necessarily standardized and ritualized, i.e. 'routinized' by and for the routine of the WSg, i.e. by and for exercises of repetition and reconstitution which must be sufficiently stereotyped to be repeated ad infinitum under the direction of coaches (*répétiteurs*) them-

selves as little irreplaceable as possible (e.g. manuals summaries, synopses, religious or political breviaries and catechisms, glosses, commentaries, cribs, encyclopaedias, corpuses, selections, past examination papers, model answers, compilations of dictums, apothegms, mnemonic verses, topics, etc.). Whatever the habitus to be inculcated, conformist or innovatory, conservative or revolutionary, and whether in the religious, artistic, political or scientific fields, all WSg generates a discourse tending to make explicit and systematize the principles of that habitus in accordance with a logic which primarily obeys the requirements of the institutionalization of apprenticeship (e.g. academicism, or the 'canonization' of revolutionary writers, according to Lenin). If syncretism and eclecticism, which may be explicitly grounded in an ideology of the collection and universal reconciliation of ideas (with the corresponding conception of philosophy as *philosophia perennis*, the precondition for imaginary conversations in Hades), are one of the most characteristic features of the 'routinization' effect of all teaching, it is because the 'neutralization' and de-realization of messages and, therefore, of the conflicts between the values and ideologies competing for cultural legitimacy constitute a typically academic solution to the typically academic problem of reaching a consensus on the programme as a necessary condition for programming minds.

Gloss 2: The extent to which a given ES (or a given department of the ES) obeys the law of 'routinization' rises with the extent to which its PA is organized in relation to the function of cultural reproduction. For example, the French ES exhibits more fully than others the operating characteristics which are functionally linked to the institutionalization of PA (e.g. primacy of self-reproduction, inadequacy of research training, academic programming of the norms of research and the objects of inquiry); and within this system, literary education exhibits these characteristics to a greater extent than scientific education. This is doubtless because few ESs are less called upon by the dominant classes to do anything other than reproduce the legitimate culture as it stands and produce agents capable of manipulating it legitimately (i.e. teachers,

leaders and administrators, or lawyers and doctors and, at a pinch, *littérateurs*, rather than researchers and scientists or even technicians).

Furthermore, the extent to which the pedagogic and, a fortiori, intellectual practices (e.g. research activities) of a category of agents obey the law of 'routinization' varies directly with the extent to which this category is defined by its position in the ES, i.e. varies inversely with the extent to which it participates in other fields of practice (for example, the scientific field or the intellectual field).

4.1.2. Given that it must reproduce through time the institutional conditions for the performance of the WSg, i.e. that it must reproduce itself as an institution (self-reproduction) in order to reproduce the culture it is mandated to reproduce (cultural and social reproduction), every ES necessarily monopolizes the production of the agents appointed to reproduce it, i.e. of the agents equipped with the durable training which enables them to perform WSg tending to reproduce the same training in new reproducers, and therefore contains a tendency towards perfect self-reproduction (inertia) which is realized within the limits of its relative autonomy.

Gloss 1: We should not see simply an effect of *hysteresis* linked to the structural duration of the cycle of pedagogic reproduction, in the tendency of every teaching body to retransmit what it has acquired by a pedagogy as similar as possible to the pedagogy of which it is the product. In reality, when they work to reproduce through their pedagogic practice the training of which they are the product, the agents of an ES, whose economic and symbolic value depends almost totally on academic sanctions, tend to ensure the reproduction of their own value by ensuring the reproduction of the market on which they have all their value. More generally, the pedagogic conservatism of the champions of the rarity of academic credentials would not receive such strong support from the groups or classes most attached to the conservation of the social order were it not that, under the guise of merely defending their market value by defending the value of their diplomas, they

thereby defend the very existence of a certain symbolic market, together with its conservative functions. Dependence can take a thoroughly paradoxical form when operating through the medium of an ES, i.e. when the tendencies of the institution and the interests of the personnel can express themselves under cover of and within the limits of the institution's relative autonomy.

Gloss 2: The self-reproductive tendency is most fully realized in an ES whose pedagogy remains implicit (in the sense of 3.3.1), i.e. an ES where the agents responsible for inculcation possess pedagogic principles only in implicit form, having acquired them unconsciously through prolonged frequentation of masters who had themselves mastered them only in practical form: 'People say that the young teacher will be guided by his memories of his life at the *lycée* and as a student. Don't they see that this is to decree the perpetuity of routine? Tomorrow's teacher can only repeat the gestures of his teacher of yesterday, and since the latter was merely imitating his own teacher, it is not clear how any novelty can find its way into this unbroken chain of self-reproducing models' (Durkheim).

4.1.2.1. Given that it contains a tendency towards self-reproduction, the ES tends to reproduce the changes occurring in the cultural arbitrary that it is mandated to reproduce only after a time-lag commensurate with its relative autonomy (the cultural backwardness of school culture).

4.2. Given that it explicitly raises the question of its own legitimacy in setting up PA as such, i.e. as a specific action expressly exercised and undergone as such (school action) every ES must produce and reproduce, by the means proper to the institution, the institutional conditions for misrecognition of the symbolic violence which it exerts, i.e. recognition of its legitimacy as a pedagogic institution.

Gloss: The theory of PA brings out the paradox of the ES by juxta-

posing the objective truth of every PA with the objective significance of the institutionalization of PA. In abolishing the happy unconsciousness of familial or primitive educations, actions of hidden persuasion which, better than any other form of education, impose misrecognition of their objective truth (since they tend towards the point of not even appearing as education), the ES would lay itself open to the question of its right to set up a relation of pedagogic communication and to delimit what deserves to be inculcated — were it not that the very fact of institutionalization gives it the specific means of annihilating the possibility of this question. In short, the persistence of an ES proves that it resolves by its very existence the questions raised by its existence.

Such a reflection may appear abstract or artificial when one considers an ES actually in operation, but it takes on its full meaning when one examines moments in the institutionalizing process when the questioning of the legitimacy of the PA and the masking of this question are not simultaneous. Thus, the Sophists, teachers who proclaimed their educative practice as such (e.g. Protagoras saying 'I acknowledge that I am a professional teacher — *sophistès* — an educator of men') without being able to invoke the authority of an institution, could not entirely escape the question, endlessly posed in their very teaching, which they raised by professing to teach; whence a teaching whose themes and problematics consist essentially of an apologetic reflection on teaching.

Similarly, at moments of crisis when the tacit contract of delegation legitimating the ES is threatened, the teachers, placed in a situation not unlike that of the Sophists, are called upon to resolve, each on his own behalf, the questions which the institution tended to exclude by its very functioning. The objective truth of the teacher's job, i.e. the social and institutional conditions which make it possible (PAu), is never more clearly revealed than when the crisis of the institution makes the job difficult or impossible (e.g. a teacher writes to a newspaper: 'Some parents are unaware that Sartre's *Respectable Prostitute* deals with the colour problem and imagine that the teacher — mentally deranged, drug crazed or whatever — wants to drag his class off to a brothel Others protest because the teacher has agreed to talk about the pill —

sex education is a matter for the family One teacher finds he is called a Communist for having explained Marxism to the sixth form; another learns he is suspected of religious propaganda for having thought it necessary to explain what the Bible is, or the work of Claudel . . .').

4.2.1. *Insofar as it endows all its agents with a vicarious authority, i.e. school authority (SAu), the institutionalized form of PAu, by a two-step delegation reproducing within the institution the delegation of authority from which the institution benefits, the ES produces and reproduces the conditions necessary both for the exercise of an institutionalized PA and for the fulfilment of its external function of reproduction, since institutional legitimacy dispenses the agents of the institution from having endlessly to win and confirm their PAu.*

Gloss 1: Resting as it does on a two-step delegation, SAu, the authority of the agent of the ES, is distinguished both from the PAu of the agents or agencies carrying on an education in a diffuse and unspecified way, and from the PAu of the prophet. Like the priest, the office-holder of a Church holding a monopoly on the legitimate manipulation of the goods of salvation, the teacher, the officer of an ES, is not required to establish his own PAu, on every occasion and at all times, since, unlike the prophet or the intellectual creator, auctores whose auctoritas is subject to the discontinuities and fluctuations of the relation between the message and the audience's expectations, he preaches to a congregation of confirmed believers, by virtue of SAu, a legitimacy by position which he is guaranteed by the institution and which is socially objectified and symbolized in the institutional procedures and rules defining his training, the diplomas which sanction it, and the legitimate conduct of the profession. (Cf. Weber: 'The priest dispenses salvation by virtue of his office. Even in cases in which personal charisma may be involved, it is the hierarchical office that confers legitimate authority upon the priest as a member of a corporate enterprise of salvation.' And Durkheim: 'The teacher, like the priest, has a recognized authority,

because he is the agent of a moral body greater than himself.')

Once again the Catholic tradition offers the paradigmatic expression of the relation between the office-holder and the pedagogic office, with the dogma of infallibility, an institutional grace which is but the transfigured form of institutional PAu and explicitly described by commentators as the condition of the possibility of teaching the faith: 'In order that the Church may be able to perform the task assigned to her as guardian and interpreter of the sacred trust, it is required that she enjoy infallibility, that is, that she be assured of a special assistance from God, in virtue of which she is preserved from all error when setting forth officially a truth for the belief of the faithful. Thus the Pope is infallible when he teaches *ex cathedra* as a doctor of the Church' (Canon Bardy).

Gloss 2: Although educational institutions have almost always sprung from the laicizing of ecclesiastical institutions or the secularizing of sacred traditions (with the exception, as Weber points out, of the schools of classical Antiquity), the fact of common origin leaves unexplained the manifest similarities between the personage of the priest and that of the teacher, until one takes account of the structural and functional homology of Church and School. As happens with Durkheim (who nonetheless formulated the homology between the professorial and the sacerdotal office), the self-evidence of historical filiation tends to preclude further explanation: 'The University was made up in part of laymen who still had the clerical physiognomy, and of laicized clerics. Henceforward, alongside the ecclesiastical body there existed another body which, though separate, was partly formed in the image of the body to which it was opposed.'

4.2.1.1. Any given pedagogic agency is characterized, depending on the degree of institutionalization of its PA, i.e. its degree of autonomization, by the position it occupies between (1) a system of education in which PA is not set up as a specific practice but falls to virtually all the educated members of a group or class (with only sporadic or partial

specialization), and (2) an ES in which the PAu necessary for the exercise of PA is explicitly delegated to and juridically reserved for a corps of specialists, specifically recruited, trained and mandated to carry out PW in accordance with procedures controlled and regulated by the institution, at fixed times and in fixed places, using standardized controlled instruments.

4.2.2. Insofar as it produces a SAu, an institutional authority which, resting on a two-step delegation, seems to be based on nothing other than the agent's personal authority, the ES produces and reproduces the conditions for the performance of institutionalized PW since the fact of institutionalization is capable of setting up PW as such without either those who carry it out or those who undergo it ever ceasing to misrecognize its objective truth, i.e. to remain unaware of the ultimate basis of the delegated authority which makes the WSg possible.

Gloss 1: All ideological representations of the independence of PW with respect to the power relations constituting the social formation in which it is carried on take on a specific form and force when, owing to the two-step delegation, the institution stands in the way of an apprehension of the power relations which in the last analysis found the authority of the agents appointed to carry on WSg. SAu is the source of the illusion — which adds its force of imposition to the power relations it expresses — that the symbolic violence exerted by an ES is unrelated to the power relations between the groups or classes (e.g. the Jacobin ideology of the school's 'neutrality' in class conflicts; the Humboldtian and neo-Humboldtian ideologies of the University as the haven of science; the ideology of *Freischwebende Intelligenz*; or the limiting case of the Utopian vision of a 'critical university', capable of bringing before the tribunal of pedagogic legitimacy the principles of the cultural arbitrariness from which it proceeds, a Utopia not far removed from the illusion, cherished by certain anthropologists, that institutionalized education, unlike traditional education, constitutes a 'mechanism of change', capable of 'creating discontinuities' and 'building a new world' — Margaret Mead).

Inasmuch as it more fully masks the ultimate foundations of its pedagogic authority, hence of its agents' SAu, the 'liberal university' conceals the fact that there is no liberal university more effectively than a theocratic or totalitarian ES, in which the delegation of authority is objectively manifested in the fact that the same principles directly establish political authority, religious authority and pedagogic authority.

Gloss 2: The illusion of the absolute autonomy of the ES is strongest when the teaching corps is fully assimilated into the Civil Service (*fonctionnarisation*), so that, with his salary paid by the State or the university institution, the teacher is no longer remunerated by the client, like other vendors of symbolic goods (e.g. the corporate professions), nor even by reference to the services rendered to the client, and so finds himself in the conditions most conducive to misrecognition of the objective truth of his task (e.g. the ideology of 'disinterestedness').

4.2.2.1. *Insofar as it allows the authority attached to the office (SAu) to be deflected onto the person of the office-holder, i.e. insofar as it produces the conditions for the concealment and misrecognition of the institutional basis of SAu, the ES produces the conditions favouring the exercise of institutionalized WSg, since it deflects onto the institution and the groups or classes it serves, the effect of reinforcement produced by the illusion that WSg is carried on independently of its institutional conditions (the paradox of professorial charisma).*

Gloss: Because sacerdotal practice can never so entirely escape stereotyping as can pedagogic practice (the manipulation of secularized goods), priestly charisma can never rest so entirely as teacherly charisma on the technique of ritual deritualization, the juggling with the syllabus that is implicitly on the syllabus. Nothing is more likely to enhance the authority of the institution and of the cultural arbitrary it serves than the enchanted adherence of teacher and taught to the illusion of an authority and message having no other basis or origin than

the person of a teacher capable of passing off his delegated power to inculcate the cultural arbitrary as a power to decree it (e.g. scheduled improvisation as compared with the pedagogy which, in taking its stand on the argument of authority, always affords a glimpse of the authority from which the master derives his authority).

4.3. *In any given social formation, the dominant ES is able to set up the dominant PW as the WSg without either those who exercise it or those who undergo it ever ceasing to misrecognize its dependence on the power relations making up the social formation in which it is carried on, because (1) by the means proper to the institution, it produces and reproduces the necessary conditions for the exercise of its internal function of inculcating, which are at the same time the sufficient conditions for the fulfilment of its external function of reproducing the legitimate culture and for its correlative contribution towards reproducing the power relations; and because (2) by the mere fact of existing and persisting as an institution it implies the institutional conditions for misrecognition of the symbolic violence it exerts, i.e. because the institutional means available to it as a relatively autonomous institution monopolizing the legitimate use of symbolic violence are predisposed to serve additionally, hence under the guise of neutrality, the groups or classes whose cultural arbitrary it reproduces (dependence through independence).*

NOTES

1. 'The word *disposition* seems particularly appropriate to express what is covered by the concept of the *habitus* (defined as a system of dispositions): it expresses, first, the result of an organizing action, with a meaning very close to that of words such as "structure"; it can also denote a manner of being, a habitual

state (especially of the body), and, in particular, a *predisposition*, tendency, *propensity* or *inclination*' (P. Bourdieu, 1972, 1, p. 247) (trans.).

2. The word 'field' must be understood in a strong sense, as a 'field of forces' (see Translator's Note).

3. Set up at the turn of the century (in the wake of the Dreyfus affair) by a coalition of Socialist groups and Republicans, the *Universités populaires* attempted to educate the working classes in humanist culture and positivist science; the movement went into decline after about 1905 (trans).

4. See 1964, 1, Ch. III. (trans.).

5. See 1966, 1 (trans.).

6. 'Sociodicy': formed by analogy with theodicy: see Book II, Chapter 3 (trans.).

7. See glossary for these and similar terms.

GLOSSARY OF INSTITUTIONS AND TITLES

Other terms are defined ad hoc in the text or notes. In general, the following list offers 'juridical' definitions; the sociological realities of prestige and opportunity cannot be summarized here.

<i>agrégation</i>	a <i>concours</i> (q.v.) in each subject, for a small number of teaching posts in secondary education as <i>agrégé de l'Université</i> (in fact a sine qua non for a post in higher education).
<i>Arts et métiers</i>	a further education college training technicians (<i>Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers</i>).
<i>baccalauréat ('bac')</i>	the national school examination taken at about 18; there are several types corresponding to different curricula; most – but not all – give access to the <i>facultés</i> .
<i>CAPES</i>	<i>Certificat d'Aptitude au Professorat de l'Enseignement Secondaire</i> : giving access to a post in secondary education as <i>professeur certifié</i> , a category of lower status than the <i>agrégés</i> ; awarded by <i>concours</i> (q.v.).
<i>caclique'</i>	(<i>normalien</i> jargon) the candidate who comes top in a major <i>concours</i> (also: 'major').
<i>CEG</i>	<i>Collège d'Enseignement Général</i> : a secondary school giving a short 'modern' course.
<i>CES</i>	<i>Collège d'Enseignement Secondaire</i> : a secondary school giving the various types of secondary schooling under one roof.
<i>CET</i>	<i>Collège d'Enseignement Technique</i> : a secondary technical school giving a vocational course after age 14.
<i>classes préparatoires</i>	classes in the most important <i>lycées</i> , preparing candidates for the <i>concours</i> of the <i>grandes écoles</i> (q.v.).
<i>concours</i>	an annual, national, competitive examination, e.g. for the <i>agrégation</i> or the <i>CAPES</i> . Each of the major <i>grandes écoles</i> has its own recruitment <i>concours</i> .

<i>Concours Général</i>	a national competition for secondary school pupils (for a prize).
<i>doctorat d'état</i>	the highest university degree; see <i>thèse d'état</i> .
<i>ENA</i>	the <i>Ecole Nationale d'Administration</i> : a <i>grande école</i> training future high-ranking Civil Servants.
<i>ENS</i>	the <i>Ecole Normale Supérieure</i> (rue d'Ulm): the <i>grande école</i> leading the academic hierarchy of the <i>grandes écoles</i> ; its two sections, <i>lettres</i> (Arts) and <i>sciences</i> , each recruit by <i>concours</i> (see <i>classes préparatoires</i>), about 50 students a year, most of whom will become secondary or higher education teachers or research scientists.
<i>grandes écoles</i>	opposed to the <i>facultés</i> in the bi-partite university system, the <i>grandes écoles</i> differ considerably amongst themselves (e.g. in age at entry) but are generally characterized by selectivity, superior facilities and guaranteed professional outlets. They include ENS Ulm (q.v.) and several other ENS, <i>Polytechnique</i> (q.v.), <i>HEC</i> (q.v.) 'Sciences Po' (the Political Science Institute), the <i>Ecole Centrale</i> and the <i>E.N.S. des Mines</i> . As well as these 'super-grandes' the term is also applied to a large number of less prestigious engineering schools.
<i>HEC</i>	the <i>Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales</i> , a <i>grande école</i> whose graduates take up senior managerial posts in industry and commerce.
<i>licence</i>	approximately the 'bachelor's' degree.
<i>lycée</i>	the traditional type of State secondary school (cf. <i>CEG</i> , etc.); there are now also <i>lycées techniques</i> and <i>lycées modernes</i> .
<i>maîtrise</i>	the 'master's' degree.
<i>'major'</i>	see 'caclique'.
<i>normalien</i>	a student of the ENS.
<i>Polytechnique</i>	the <i>Ecole Polytechnique</i> , a <i>grande école</i> whose students (<i>polytechniciens</i>) are trained for State administrative posts; they tend to move sooner or later into the private sector.
<i>thèse d'état</i>	long thesis required for the <i>doctorat d'état</i> (q.v.).
<i>section</i>	in secondary education, denotes one of the types of curriculum ('classical', 'modern', 'general', 'practical' – also subdivided) leading to the <i>baccalauréat</i> (q.v.) or a certificate of vocational training, etc.
<i>sixième</i>	the first year of secondary schooling, the subsequent years (counted downwards) leading to <i>première</i> , <i>terminale</i> , and the <i>classes préparatoires</i> (q.v.).