

3

The External Effects of CSDP Missions

Preview

CSDP is a tool to help the EU and its member states to respond more rapidly and efficiently to regional and international crises, conflicts, and natural disasters. The rationale behind CSDP operations is to produce beneficial security outcomes for host states and societies, thereby reinforcing European and global security. Thus, Chapter 3 focuses on the *external impact* of CSDP operations on host states and societies: the government authorities and populations whom CSDP is designed to assist. CSDP is intended to improve security of the host state and society, to an extent that would not be achieved in the absence of a CSDP operation.

The chapter examines the external effects of mission impact as depicted in Figure 1.1 – the outputs and outcomes of the EU foreign policy decision-making system and the feedback from CSDP operations for institutional learning and new sources of CSDP activity. We introduce five types of external impact:

- **Functional impact:** the technical effects of an operation often with regard to enhancing security and human welfare
- **Political impact:** the effects of a CSDP operation on the domestic politics and foreign policies of the host country and the degree of support (i.e., ‘ownership’) among domestic political leaders and society
- **Societal impact:** the effects of an operation on host societies, particularly with regard to human, gender, and minority rights
- **Unintended impact:** the unintended outcomes and consequences of operations
- **Temporal impact:** the evolution and effects of an operation across time

Each CSDP operation requires a longitudinal analysis based on the following considerations: (a) catalysts for the launch of the operation and its geopolitical context; (b) decision-making processes of the EU and the member states for agreeing to the type of mission mandate (e.g., civil, military, or combined; land or sea; executive or non-executive); (c) procedures for launching a mission in terms of planning, financing, capabilities, force generation and skilled personnel; (d) internal effects within the EU foreign policy decision-making system; and (e) external effects on host states and societies and on other security providers.¹

A growing body of knowledge among scholars and practitioners concerns traditional peacekeeping operations; complex peace operations; and post-conflict stabilization and peace-building, including the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and rule of law.² The challenge is to apply the experience and lessons of international crisis management and peace operations to analysis of CSDP operations.

Thomas Carothers notes that international organizations, political science departments, and law schools are not promoting much research on topics such as the rule of law.³ While international organizations 'profess great interest in lessons learned,' they 'tend not to devote many resources to serious reflection and research on their own efforts.'⁴ Furthermore, the lessons that are presented in organizational reports are often 'too general or obvious, or both.'⁵ His observations are consonant with what we have observed in the EU foreign policy decision-making system. For example, in the CMPD, the 'lessons learned' department has only a handful of personnel. When EU officials are asked about 'lessons identified' from CSDP operations, they often repeat the same few general lessons.⁶

In some cases, CSDP field personnel have been instructed to develop policies and programs that 'cultivate local ownership,' without being told how to do so.⁷ They also lack expertise about the panoply of different strategies for introducing security sector and rule of law reforms. In the area of rule of law, there are unsolved questions about the most effective strategies. Typically, reformers have emphasized building police and judiciary institutional capacity. A corollary focus on the political process, including the role of legislatures, the executive, and civil society, also yields beneficial results.⁸

In the early stages of CSDP, the EU was preoccupied more with launching different types of CSDP operations and building the decision-making structures of crisis management than with the conduct and evaluation of its missions or fostering agreement on the requisite

conditions for a mission exit strategy. Expertise in political, security, military, civilian, legal, financial, geographic, and humanitarian issues is necessary to design, execute, and evaluate CSDP operations. However, for the EU to be a more effective security provider, it will need to rely on more than the expertise provided by its seconded officials and diplomats. It also must institute a robust lessons identified, learned, and applied process within the EU foreign policy system and along with other security providers (including the solicitation of independent evaluations from experts within the research and policy communities).

Both longitudinal case studies of operational impact and comparative studies of CSDP operational effects are valuable and necessary. Evaluating CSDP missions and their impact at various points in the duration of the operation captures both short-term and long-term effects and allows the EU (and its CSDP operations) to 'self-correct' midstream. A focus on short-term and long-term effects, and a combination of qualitative and quantitative comparative methodologies, will produce more nuanced and complete evaluations of CSDP mission impact.

The external effects of CSDP operations on host states and societies are debated – within field headquarters, among EU member states and CSDP personnel, by host authorities in their discussions with the EU, and by other security providers. Impact assessments are not just technical evaluations; they also involve political judgments and calculations by principals and agents with different values and interests.

EU member states have vested interests in successful operational outcomes and provide the money, capabilities, and personnel for CSDP missions. However, it is the host states and societies who stand to lose the most if EU interventions fail or struggle to achieve their primary operational goals. Analyses of external impact must evaluate the extent to which operations 'do good and do it well,' to repeat the tagline of an international development organization.⁹ Thus, we pose the question: what constitutes operational success?

We turn now to examining the first category of external impact, functional impact, with the caveat that each category of external impact (functional, political, societal, unintended, and temporal) relates to and shapes other types of impact.¹⁰ These are not watertight categories. For example, temporal impact (how and why operations change, and the operational effects that are generated across time) is a kind of impact that cuts across other forms of impact. The functional, political, societal and unintended effects of a CSDP operation can be analyzed as a CSDP operation evolves and after the operation ends. Clarifying the different types of internal and external effects of CSDP operations improves

understanding of both the empirical and putative power of the EU foreign policy system in general and CSDP in particular.

Functional impact

Functional impact refers to the technical effects of an operation, often aimed at raising security and human welfare. The starting point for an assessment of CSDP functional impact is the mandate of the CSDP mission that establishes the type of operation and its primary strategic and functional objectives. As Chapter 2 explained, mission mandates require interpretation by personnel who design the policies, programs, and operations that support the primary mission objectives. In the EU foreign policy system, mission objectives and measures of progress are developed in the CONOPS, OPLAN, and subsequent mission-planning documents. Independent analysts do not have access to these documents; however, primary interviews with a wide cross-section of mission personnel and vested stakeholders make possible a comprehensive view of mission impact.

Each objective of the mission mandate must be evaluated for the functional effects it achieved. Functional effects differ, depending on the type of CSDP operation. Is the operation civilian, military, or combined? Does the EU have an executive mandate or non-executive authority? Impact assessments of individual CSDP operations need to delineate the mission objectives that are being reviewed and the measures of progress for each objective, identify constraints and obstacles, and examine the degree to which the mission objectives are met.

For operations with the same general objectives as past CSDP operations, some of the benchmarks and measures are likely to be the same. Indeed, the more the EU has gained experience in fielding crisis management operations, the more adept it has become at developing assessment methodology. For each CSDP operation, however, there will be measures and benchmarks germane to that particular operation.

Examples of functional effects from CSDP operations include monitoring ceasefires (e.g., Indonesia and Georgia) and preventing a resumption or outbreak of violence (e.g., BiH, Chad, and DRC); securing territory (e.g., the Somali coast) and infrastructure (e.g., the airport in Bunia, DRC); creating new institutions of security governance and changing police laws (e.g., BiH); arresting, detaining, and trying suspects (e.g., Kosovo); mentoring and advising law enforcement personnel (e.g., Afghanistan, BiH, DRC, Kosovo, and Macedonia); and reporting on gender-based violence and human rights discrimination (e.g., Afghanistan, Kosovo, DRC, and Somalia).

In rare instances, a CSDP operation is successful in meeting all of its objectives. The CSDP operation in Aceh, Indonesia, which EU officials regularly credit as a 'successful mission',¹¹ achieved its primary tasks of facilitating the transition from conflict to peace and decommissioning and demobilizing the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). However, it experienced significant obstacles related to its mandate to monitor and improve human rights. 'By the time the AMM ended neither the Human Rights Court nor the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had been established' and no case had been brought to trial in the human rights court in the province of North Sumatra.¹² Schulze concludes, 'A too early or too overzealous focus on human rights would have jeopardized the mission,' raising the vital question of how missions should balance human rights with political considerations in immediate post-conflict environments.¹³

Judging the functional effects of the EU naval operation in Somalia means recognizing that the EU has escorted over 160 UN World Food Program ships, all of which reached their destinations safely without being attacked by pirates.¹⁴ The operation has succeeded in meeting the primary functional objective outlined in its mandate. The operation has neither addressed the root causes of piracy nor the pervasive insecurity and violence in Somalia, strategic objectives that are outside the scope of the mission mandate.

The mandate of protecting a civilian population from violence is an example of a functional objective for a military peacekeeping operation. One key consideration in a quantitative measurement of progress is the number of violent acts and civilian deaths that occurred during the period of deployment. This type of benchmark is useful regardless of the deployment context.

For example, the EU military operation in DRC in 2003 was a three-month operation in which the EU secured the Bunia airport and patrolled outside the town in order to deter violence. Some critics have questioned the success of the operation because of the renewed violence that occurred in the area shortly *after* the CSDP operation departed.¹⁵ However, on the basis of its key operational objective – to protect the civilian operation with a minimum of casualties – the operation was judged to be a CSDP accomplishment. The 2003 EU operation in DRC deployed for only 90 days. It achieved its primary functional objectives of rapid deployment of an interim EU force with the specific tasks of securing the town of Bunia and the airport and preventing further violence during the period of the operation.

The security situation in DRC still is highly unsatisfactory in some parts of the country. However, the challenges of intervention

notwithstanding, the EU military operation in 2006 ensured that the election process unfolded without violence.¹⁶ The military training mission by the EU has produced an increase in military salaries – four times the starting amount in a single year.¹⁷ A private in the Congolese military today receives what a general was paid three years ago.¹⁸ The army is slowly developing a command-and-control structure. These are functional effects of CSDP assistance to DRC that can be measured.

As noted in Chapter 2, simple, functional mission mandates are easier to confirm as successes or failures. However, an assessment of functional mission effects is necessary but insufficient. Accordingly, examination of the long-term *political*, *societal* and *temporal* impact of EU assistance in DRC is indispensable. Obviously, security challenges in DRC far exceed the sole capacity of the EU and other security providers; the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) is the largest UN peacekeeping operation, and its struggles are legendary. Questions continue about the political will of host authorities to implement needed reforms. Gender-based violence in DRC is among the worst in the world. Nevertheless, even in DRC, the EU has made a positive contribution; in the absence of CSDP action, there would have been greater insecurity and possibly an increase in violence.

Conflict prevention and deterrence missions are difficult to assess. The classic problem in evaluating deterrence is how to assess the impact of a strategy taken to prevent conflict. Despite operational delays, the EU operation in Chad eventually carried out over 2,500 short-range patrols and 260 long-range patrols that EU personnel believe contributed to the protection of internally displaced persons.¹⁹ EU personnel cite as evidence of the operation's success that, following EU intervention, neither Chad nor Sudan has taken any actions to destabilize the other.²⁰ The situation in Chad is relatively stable, without an international security presence in the country.²¹

However, other EU officials do not cite the operation as a clear CSDP success and assert that it had only a marginal impact on the security situation in Chad.²² In a similar vein, NGOs such as the International Crisis Group conclude that the EU mission did not improve the security situation (and that the UN did not either).²³ A US official maintains that one unintended consequence of the operation in Chad was an actual increase in IDPs after the EU intervention; IDPs did not return home, and nomads still sought shelter, food, and medical care.²⁴ As the CSDP operation in Chad illustrates, disparate assessments of impact are not unusual, especially for operations that require complex indicators of impact.

In Georgia, EUMM is a niche operation that fills a security gap. The unarmed, non-executive monitoring mission has no legal authority to use force. Its 'weapon' is its reporting mechanism,²⁵ which helps to deter conflict through monitoring of, and reporting on, security infractions. Its mission of 225 monitors (mostly from a military or police background) conduct approximately 20 patrols per day. From a standpoint of both functional and political impact, EUMM has stabilized the security situation and helped to prevent a resumption of hostilities.

First, EUMM has defused tensions on the ground. Both Georgia and Russia see the mission as positive for different reasons. For Georgia, it is a security guarantee, and for Russia, it reduces conflict and instability in the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It also helps to deter a resumption of hostilities initiated by the Georgians. Second, it has been able to counter propaganda from both Georgia and Russia. For example, when Russia and South Ossetia claimed that there was a massive Georgian build-up around the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL), the EUMM Head of Mission refuted these claims on the basis of EUMM evidence and patrolling data.²⁶ Third, through the incidence and prevention mechanism and confidence-building activities, EUMM has held meetings with all parties involved in the conflict, an indicator of the unique role held by the EU as an arbiter of conflict resolution. Fourth, the mission has provided important humanitarian assistance by working with internally displaced persons and by reporting on human and gender rights issues. For these vital reasons, EU member states and CSDP officials concur that the mission in Georgia is a success.²⁷

Nevertheless, EUMM is unable to cross the ABL with Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it has no authority to force its way into the heavily armed area of the ABL. The movement of displaced persons is restricted, and arbitrary detentions are the norm. For example, 20,000 ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia became displaced after the Russian-Georgia War of 2008 and have not been permitted to return. The International Crisis Group reports that 'Other than the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), no international humanitarian, development or monitoring organisation operates in the region; dependent on a single unreliable road to Russia, the inhabitants are isolated.'²⁸ These are political problems, however, that necessitate conflict transformation and political compromise by all of the parties involved in the 2008 war. The EU's ability to broker a long-term resolution of the conflict will require a stepped up effort by the EU and member states to apply political pressure utilizing both carrots and sticks.

The EU monitoring mission in Georgia and CSDP operations in DRC and Chad provide convincing illustrations of how different types of impact are related – the functional impact of the mission is inextricably linked to other types of impact (political, societal, unintended, and temporal). For CSDP operations with multiple and long-term mission objectives, such as SSR or rule of law, measuring impact is therefore challenging.

Among CSDP operations, the most difficult to evaluate are civilian rule of law or SSR operations. The EU security sector operations in BiH, Kosovo, and DRC have mission mandates to monitor, mentor, and advise. Successful mentoring and advising require qualified police officials who have specific skills and understand the types of policies and programs that must be developed in the country where they are deployed, including how to ‘mentor and advise’ national counterparts effectively. Interpreters are required for some mission personnel, thus adding another layer of communication to a multinational mission.

Over time, the EU has refined its systems for ‘benchmarking’ change. However, mission personnel still report that there can be confusion among field personnel over how to judge whether an objective has been reached. Despite the lesson identified from the first term of EUPM (2003–2005)²⁹ – that fewer projects are easier to implement and evaluate – there is still a tendency to identify too many mission objectives and/or mission tasks.

For example, the mission statement of the *Council Decision* for EUPOL RD Congo, extending the mission until 2011, identifies four primary objectives: (1) ‘to support the overall SSR process at the strategic level in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with a particular emphasis on the reform of the PNC [Congolese National Police] and its interaction with the judiciary; (2) to support the implementation of the Police Reform and the improvement of the PNC operational capacity and accountability through mentoring, monitoring, and advising (MMA) activities; (3) to enhance the knowledge and capacity of senior PNC officials, trainers and training systems, including through the provision of strategic training courses; (4) to support the fight against impunity in the field of human rights and sexual violence.’³⁰

The *Council Decision* then breaks down the four primary mission objectives into 27 additional mission tasks. Yet, the mission has only 37 international experts. Thus, one wonders how such a small operation can accomplish so many tasks. Indeed, the small size of the mission continues to constrain its functional impact. Nevertheless, the mission has made a positive contribution to police reform despite its personnel

limitations. Moreover, as the case of the DRC indicates all too well, the success of a CSDP mission depends not only on the skill and leadership of the seconded CSDP personnel but on the political will of national authorities to accept and implement advice.

The CSDP operation that has received some of the most negative evaluations is the EU police mission in Afghanistan.³¹ The mission is understaffed in a difficult security environment. Furthermore, insufficient synergy and coherence among the programs deployed by the EU, its member states, and other international security stakeholders exacerbate the deployment challenges for the EU. Nevertheless, over time, the mission has demonstrated flexibility and learned to 'adjust its ambitions to the complex situation on the ground.'³²

The EU police mission in Afghanistan has refined its strategic objectives and now concentrates on six primary areas: '(1) police command, control, and communications; (2) intelligence-led policing; (3) criminal investigation department capacity building; (4) implementation of the anti-corruption strategy; (5) police-justice cooperation; and (6) strengthening gender and Human rights aspects within the Afghan National Police (ANP).'³³ It delivers those six strategic objectives through the 'City police and justice programme (CPJP).' In the last two years, around 125 different training curricula were developed, and training was delivered to more than 11,000 police officials. Furthermore, EUPOL devised over 260 different police plans and provided more than 50,000 hours of mentoring and advising.

The development of training curricula and the provision of training to police officers is a functional effect that can be measured by the number of programs and curricula produced, as well as the number of police trained. What is more challenging to assess is the *actual* impact of the training and the extent to which the CSDP mission has contributed to the increased capacity of the Afghan law enforcement personnel to fight crime and corruption. As is evident from operations around the globe, good training does not always result in greater effectiveness among domestic law enforcement personnel. There can be a delayed period of attitudinal change before newly trained personnel assume leadership positions in the organizational hierarchy.³⁴

EUPOL mentoring of Afghan undercover investigations at police checkpoints produced a series of arrests. This is a concrete measure of effectiveness. EUPOL also has established the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, comprised of prosecutors who bring cases against high-profile public officials suspected of corruption. A measure of impact would involve tracking the number of cases that actually result

in convictions. The EU member states have struggled to staff the operation adequately. These issues notwithstanding, the CSDP mission continues to make a niche contribution to police reform in Afghanistan; what Afghanistan needs is more EU assistance, not less.

The last illustration is drawn from the EU Police Mission in BiH. EUPM has focused its activities on strengthening the BiH capacity to fight organized crime. SIPA, the State Investigative Protection Agency, was created as a result of pressure from the OHR/EUSR and the international community. In June 2004, SIPA became the only police agency with full police authorization and competence across the entire territory of BiH. The EU Police Mission in BiH has played a valuable role in the development of SIPA. Officials from both organizations cite the cooperation between EUPM and SIPA as extremely effective with significant impact.³⁵

The Director of SIPA points out that the Centre for War Crimes Investigation in SIPA 'has submitted 75 reports on war crimes to the State Prosecutor's Office in 2010. In comparison to 2009, that represents an increase of 15.38 percent.'³⁶ Additionally, SIPA officers have arrested 24 persons, carried out 32 searches, conducted 2,923 interviews with citizens, and taken 1,520 statements.³⁷ 'In 2010, SIPA has submitted to the BiH Prosecutor's Office 62 reports against 144 persons, eight legal entities, and one unidentified person on suspicion that they were involved in financial crime and corruption.'³⁸ The reports by SIPA include current and former politicians and prominent business leaders.

The success of SIPA is dependent on a robust adherence to the rule of law in BiH whereby reports to the State Prosecutor's Office lead to actual arrests and convictions, an outcome that has not yet satisfactorily occurred. Again, it is important to evaluate technical mission effects on the basis of the legal mission mandate. EUPM does not have an executive mandate. It is not a comprehensive rule of law mission with the entire law enforcement chain in its remit.

SIPA is still confronted with significant staffing shortfalls.³⁹ Senior investigative police who work in the two entities of BiH must be willing to relocate to Sarajevo (since SIPA is a state-level institution), something that many families are unwilling to do, especially since SIPA salaries are unattractive. Since SIPA concentrates on the most sensitive policing issues – organized crime, corruption, and war crimes – it faces ongoing obstacles to recruiting competent senior police officers. Consolidating security reforms in BiH requires a state-level security structure that is adequately staffed. SIPA will have to attract more entity police officers to work for it; these officers will need to transfer their loyalties from their

entity to the state of BiH. The ability of EUPM to influence this cultural and attitudinal shift is nil to marginal. Nevertheless, the increased capacity of SIPA – and its productive cooperation with EUPM – is a positive functional effect of EU SSR.

Such operational illustrations underscore the importance of standardizing, evaluating, and closely monitoring functional effects, as well as the myriad challenges of doing so. CSDP operations need technical strategies for implementation. Evaluation of those strategies must be standardized along the entire mission continuum. While some CSDP operations are more overtly political than others, all operations are deployed within host states and societies, and all require analysis of political impact, the topic of our next section.

Political impact

Political impact refers to the effect of a CSDP operation on the domestic politics and foreign policies of the host country and the degree of support for the operation (i.e., ‘ownership’) among domestic political leaders and society. The types, forms, and extent of political impact differ according to the mandate of the CSDP operation, the degree of consensus among EU actors and individual domestic conditions in the host country. Among analyzes of CSDP operations, the political effects of CSDP operations are under-studied and difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the political effects of CSDP operations are crucial to identify in order for the EU to design and execute operations suited to the particular needs of host states and societies.

As Chapter 2 concluded, the EU has the unique potential to deliver a comprehensive approach to crisis management and post-conflict transformation. However, at times, member states deploy CSDP operations without agreeing to an overarching policy or implementation strategy. When CSDP operations are launched and conducted in a vacuum of political leadership, the overall positive impact of the operation may be limited. In other words, the CSDP operation might not yield a political dividend worth the investment in resources.

Military crisis management operations

The EU often de-emphasizes the political and strategic effects of its military operations and accentuates the functional and humanitarian effects that are (potentially) less controversial. There are four interrelated reasons for this imbalance.

First, crisis management operations are deployed at the invitation of sovereign states, some of which have active conflicts and whose leaders need to be persuaded about the efficacy and neutrality of the CSDP operation (that the CSDP operation will not interfere in domestic political affairs). As the EU enters dangerous and volatile conflict areas, it seeks to downplay the political aspects of its military operations and to assert the political neutrality of CSDP operations. In so doing, it attempts to ensure that its forces are safe from attack and that they have the cooperative support of domestic populations. For example, the Commander of the EU military operation in Chad and CAR emphasized that the operation would be conducted with the 'neutral, impartial, and independent' aim of placating host government concerns that the operation would interfere in both the national and regional politics of the conflict.⁴⁰ Likewise, in the DRC, the EU military operation had to convince a skeptical population that it would be impartial, all the more because it was intervening during a politically sensitive time of domestic elections.⁴¹

Second, CSDP operations must reflect the interests of the EU member states, not all of which share the same security priorities, foreign policies, and/or threat assessments. In the military operation in Chad/CAR, the reassurances of neutrality and impartiality were also targeted at those EU member states that desired to protect vulnerable populations in the East and promote CSDP, but feared that the CSDP operation would indirectly support an authoritarian regime at odds with European values.⁴² The mission mandate focused on protecting civilians in danger and specified clear rules of engagement; however, the operational commanders did not receive adequate guidance from the member states about how to manage sensitive political debates regarding the *interpretation* of the mission mandate (which involved controversies about civil-military activities and projects).⁴³ There was widespread political debate about the wisdom of encouraging the return of refugees and IDPs to insecure areas, a debate that eventually resulted in a civil-military agreement to limit the number and scope of IDP return projects.⁴⁴

In the DRC, the mission mandate detailed geographic and time restrictions, limiting the operation to the capital of Kinshasa and to a four month deployment, largely due to divergent member state views. As a result of these restrictions, some critics have said that the CSDP operation 'fitted more what the EU had to offer than what the DRC and MONUC needed.'⁴⁵ While the operation fulfilled its limited criteria, it did not contribute to facilitating conflict resolution in DRC. Once the

operation departed, conflict erupted again. However, conflict resolution was not an aim of the operation, and the CSDP operation was politically and militarily helpful – it supported MONUC at a crucial moment and demonstrated positive military effects on the ground.

Third, by their very nature, multinational military operations are difficult to command; member states often attach caveats to the terms and locations of their participation (e.g., NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo; CSDP operations in BiH, Congo, and Chad/CAR). These conditions need to be addressed early in the launch of the operation so that commanders know which troops will perform which tasks. Moreover, disparate national practices and doctrines (military and civil-military) can produce tension among contributing countries, some of whom are more exposed, and thus at risk, when deployed to dangerous areas. Military commanders of multinational operations need to manage these differences but often lack appropriate political guidance from CSDP principals and agents.

Fourth, multinational military operations require civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). An imperative of modern peace support and crisis management operations, CIMIC brings together diverse military and civilian actors into a complex and dynamic relationship that is neither easily understood nor necessarily well executed.⁴⁶ The international military forces interact with national and local governments, citizens, and NGOs, but the operating principles of the military and civilian communities still are often at odds. 'Military and civilian communities largely agree on the need to improve information exchange and increase coordination, but there are still conceptual and methodological fissures over how to deliver a multifaceted, integrated, and comprehensive policy for conflict stabilization.'⁴⁷ In the EU foreign policy system, conflicts have arisen between the CSDP operation and the European Commission (e.g., EUSEC RD Congo), between two CSDP operations (e.g., EUFOR and EUPM in BiH), and between CSDP field personnel and NGOs (e.g., Kosovo, DRC, and Georgia).

To avoid delays and prevent field conflicts, the political-military-civilian objectives for military operations must be clearly articulated at all stages of policy and operational planning. Operational commanders require political guidance about how to interpret their mission mandates, especially when they intervene in volatile conflict areas along geopolitical fault lines (e.g., Chad/CAR, DRC, and Georgia). They also need a degree of operational flexibility to address fluid security changes. CSDP operations may maintain their neutrality without being apolitical. Commanders have choices to make about the execution of mission

mandates; 'functional' decisions have political-strategic consequences, some planned and others unintended, a subject addressed later in this chapter.

Civilian crisis management operations

The proclivity to depoliticize CSDP operations is also visible in civilian crisis management operations. Security sector and rule of law reforms are often packaged by the EU as technical packages of reform measures to be sold to national elites, thereby minimizing the possible politicization and overburdening of a 'technical' reform agenda.⁴⁸ In fact, security sector and rule of law programs involve a highly specialized mix of technical, functional, and juridical changes, some of which are also intrinsically political in nature. The institutions of security sector and law enforcement are embedded within political systems; reform agendas are technical *and* political.

Member states do not always promote political missions due to their disagreements over policies and strategies.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, CSDP operations would profit from an overarching policy framework and a political strategy for mission implementation, including methods to unblock stalled reform agendas. If the CSDP operation is successful, then at some point, the implementation of reform measures may harm the vested interests of national elites. For example, a prime minister, a chief of police, a political party head, or cabinet member may lose out economically, politically or organizationally. This is when reform processes may slow down, and it is precisely at this moment when the EU must use 'political airstrikes' of both carrots and sticks to accelerate and consolidate change.⁵⁰

Yet, many CSDP operations are not framed by a coherent EU foreign policy. When there are policy divergences among EU member states, national elites may exploit such internal EU differences (such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and DRC). In addition, host governments often express frustration that they are expected to implement EU policies and programs when the EU and its member states may not present a unified position.⁵¹

The issue of leadership – and the skillful, measured, effective exercise of political influence, control, and guidance of CSDP operations – is an ongoing challenge for the EU foreign policy system.⁵² The Head of Mission for a CSDP operation plays an important role in shaping the internal direction of the mission; intra-EU relations between the field headquarters with the CSDP structures in Brussels and with other EU instruments in the field; and the external mission relationship with the

host authorities and society. The Head of Mission must possess not only diplomatic and political savvy, but also specialized knowledge of the security challenges germane to the deployment context.

Prior to the reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, the Head of Mission for a CSDP operation worked alongside EU member state embassies, the Commission Delegation, the Council Presidency, and other EU actors such as EU Special Representatives. Through the EEAS and the newly merged functions of the office of the High Representative with the Vice President of the European Commission, the Treaty of Lisbon is intended to remedy the incoherence and *ad hoc* cooperation often characteristic of EU assistance in the field. Nevertheless, the Treaty does not specify the degree of political involvement that the High Representative should have in pressing national elites to adopt and implement reform packages. Former High Representative Solana focused his energies on global security challenges, such as the Middle East peace process. He was not concentrated on the implementation struggles facing individual CSDP operations (which partially explains why there was a need for a civilian operations commander). Moreover, if the new HRVP evolves into the functional equivalent of an EU Foreign Minister, it will be the EU representatives in the field who implement the political-strategic direction provided by the HRVP and the PSC. While the Lisbon Treaty introduces innovations within the EU foreign policy decision-making system, it does not address the relationship between CSDP operations and host authorities, our next topic of analysis.

Cultivating national 'ownership' among political elites and civil society

Two guiding principles for external interventions are sovereign consent (granted by host governments) and the expectation that the CSDP deployment will generate national 'ownership' (so-called 'local ownership'). However, it can be difficult to adhere to these principles. The EU intercedes at the invitation of a host government, which may have come under intense international pressure to accept a crisis management operation. Domestic authorities may show their ambivalence toward the CSDP operation through political obstruction.

Moreover, the discourse of local ownership is misleading.⁵³ First, crisis management operations with an executive mandate are carried out with a 'power-over' approach rather than through collaborative partnerships. For example, in Kosovo the EU has the authority to make arrests and adjudicate trials. Second, EU officials in non-executive operations may find it difficult to establish collaborative relationships with

domestic elites or civil society. CSDP personnel may see little value in consulting with local counterparts whom they perceive as complicit in conflict, corrupt, or less knowledgeable. Additionally, language and cultural barriers at times impede working relationships. Third, local ownership means different things to different officials, in part because the process of cultivating local ownership depends on the timing, sequencing, and type of reforms and the particular country in question.⁵⁴

Member states have mixed motives for international interventions; some members promote national and European agendas and use the political and economic leverage that is most advantageous. Nevertheless, local ownership is a widely accepted principle associated with the successful impact of peace operations, especially for security and rule of law missions that require the reform of existing institutions and laws, or the creation of new government bodies and legislation.⁵⁵ Participation by domestic authorities is obligatory for missions with mentoring, monitoring, and advising (MMA) functions. The success of such relationships depends on the clear direction provided by senior mission leadership to CSDP mission staff about how precisely to 'mentor, monitor, and advise' domestic counterparts.

While the concept of local ownership in practice means different things to different actors, it is indisputable that sustainable reforms require support by domestic political leaders, who must 'buy in' to the reform package.⁵⁶ Without their buy-in and clear understanding of why the reforms are necessary, the reform agenda might never gain traction, or it may unravel as soon as the international mission departs. Additionally, dependency on those who intervene can be a way for host governments to avoid making difficult domestic decisions.

Most importantly, local ownership does not mean merely that national elites accept and implement reform programs designed and executed by the EU. Without host input into the reform agenda, there may be a mismatch between the perceived needs of the host governments and the security interests of the intervening security provider. Ideally, a CSDP operation will serve as a win-win outcome for the EU and the host state – enhancing peace and security for both. To avoid a mismatch, the following questions should be asked:

- What is the extent to which the operation can address the security interests and needs of host governments and citizens?
- What are the anticipated operational effects, and what impact are they likely to have on the host state and society?
- Can any negative effects be anticipated and mitigated?

- How, when, and where, and to what effect, are national elites and societal actors involved in discussing and shaping planning and programming decisions?
- Have CSDP officials cultivated productive working relationships with national elites?
- Is there a will to reform among the host authorities, and, if not, how can the operation find and support 'change agents' in the host state and society?
- On the basis of what (and whose) criteria is success achieved?

Host governments have a chance to shape the direction of the CSDP operation in the period prior to member state acceptance of the *Council Decision* of the operation. Once the legal basis for the operation has been established, host governments will be unable to influence a change in mission direction unless the *Council Decision* is up for renewal (and, even then, the input of host governments may be minimally solicited, if at all). While aspects of the mandate may be controversial, it is often the *interpretation* of the mandate provisos that is politically charged, both within the EU and in host governments.

Moreover, beneficiary organizations in the host country may ask for more assistance than EU member states are willing or able to provide through the CSDP operation. Host authorities may be unaware of assistance provided by other international security providers or by the EU. They also may question the programming priorities of the CSDP operation. This has been true in both BiH and Kosovo. In BiH, the director of the State Investigative Protection Agency (SIPA) indicates that SIPA's 12 strategic priorities require more support from EUPM than simply assistance on organized crime.⁵⁷ He believes that the young SIPA staff members require more training; that SIPA needs robust assistance with developing a witness-protection program, which is not reliable in BiH; and that SIPA personnel need to improve criminal intelligence analysis (which requires senior experts).

In Kosovo, the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) has an executive mandate (with the authority to investigate, make arrests, and even adjudicate trials) in order to allow the mission to address the nexus between crime and politics in Kosovo. Additionally, EULEX has an MMA function (that is non-executive). One primary motive behind the EU mission in EULEX is member state concerns about organized criminal activity originating from Kosovo.

While the Kosovo government authorities have emphasized the MMA mandate of EULEX – which is less invasive than the executive

mandate – civil society and NGO representatives have been outspoken in criticizing the EULEX mission for failing to deliver on its executive mandate in its first year of operation and for the insufficient number of EULEX judges and prosecutors.⁵⁸ They perceive lack of a clear coordinating mechanism among the three components of the EULEX mission; they believe that the mission has lacked political direction; and they report concerns about the growing politicization of domestic police, including political interference by the government of Kosovo with the work of domestic judges and prosecutors.⁵⁹ As one leading NGO official proclaimed, 'It would take a few weeks before we even noticed that EULEX had left Kosovo.'⁶⁰ Unfortunately, for the majority of citizens in Kosovo, the 'soft power of EU enlargement is not visible.'⁶¹

EULEX personnel admit that there is a palpable sense of disappointment in Kosovar civil society and attribute it to an absence of tangible achievements, especially in regard to the executive aspects of the mission and the lack of EULEX activism in the North of Kosovo.⁶² Most of civil society in Kosovo is focused on the performance of the executive component of the mission and not on the MMA tasks. Conversely, host government authorities, eager to assert their political independence and with vested interests to protect, de-emphasize the executive mandate of EULEX and push EULEX to assist more in mentoring, monitoring, and advising work.

Civil society expectations for EULEX are influenced by the rhetoric of EU officials who have emphasized the horizontal, comprehensive aspects of the EULEX mission, the largest civilian mission deployed by the EU. They point out that EULEX is the first civilian CSDP mission with executive powers and the first comprehensive rule of law mission for CSDP. However, EULEX will need to explain the importance of MMA to Kosovar civil society, not just to better publicize the work of the mission but because MMA is a critical component of fostering sustainable local ownership.

Due to the initial legal ambiguities surrounding the deployment of EULEX and ongoing member state political divergences about the status of Kosovo, the first Head of Mission for EULEX, Yves de Kermabon, sought to depoliticize the mission.⁶³ He was chosen for this position because of his military background, his previous experience serving in UN and NATO operations in Kosovo, and his ability to liaise effectively with NATO.⁶⁴ However, his reluctance to address the political aspects of the mission, and the lack of political agreement among member states, constrained the functional effectiveness of EULEX in its first two years of operation. Police and prosecutors have found it difficult

to cooperate effectively in the absence of guidelines for how to do so. Horizontal integration has not been achieved in EULEX because each sector (police, justice, and customs) has operated more or less independently. Furthermore, contributing member states have pursued their own national interests through EULEX. For example, there are different member state policies toward the North of Kosovo. As a consequence, the mission has lacked a unified political-functional-strategic vision.

Unquestionably, CSDP missions that are deployed without policies pose frustrating political challenges to senior mission leadership. Nevertheless, in order to enhance the sustainability of security reforms and the success of both civil and military operations, CSDP personnel need to find appropriate entry points with domestic authorities, parliaments, and civil society (media, NGOs, and community groups). Civil society provides valuable knowledge for multinational operations and has an essential role in consolidating democracy in post-conflict countries. CSDP operations should strengthen the capacity of host authorities to exercise leadership and, where possible, to support civil society. With assistance, these leaders may serve as agents for positive socio-political change.⁶⁵

The EU has learned this valuable lesson from BiH, where police reform was pushed forward, even with visible gaps in local ownership. Over time, the reform process became more elite-driven and less inclusive of host authorities and civil societies.⁶⁶ Thus, a second lesson learned from the EUPM experience in BiH was that it is important to cultivate participation by civil society early in the mission. Consequently, EULEX personnel have regular contact with civil society actors.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, there are ongoing disputes about how to incorporate *systematic* civil society input into CSDP programming and evaluation, and not just occasional consultations. These same issues are visible in the CSDP missions in Georgia and DRC, where mission personnel have contact with NGOs (e.g., women's organizations) and citizens (e.g., IDPs), but where cooperation with civil society is not systematized.

CSDP mission officials have symbolic political capital and influence on the ground to the extent that they create a perception of good will and improved security within the population. Thus, the topic of local ownership generates the question of how CSDP representatives perceive and publicly describe 'locals.' Domestic political elites and civil society leaders sometimes sense derogatory attitudes about the host country and society held by some CSDP officials.⁶⁸ For example, EU officials are accused of negative characterizations of Kosovar society. A collaborative

relationship between CSDP missions and host states and societies depends as much on positive interpersonal relationships and culturally sensitive public and media relations as it does on formal mechanisms of consultation.

As we contend throughout this study, CSDP is only one instrument in the EU foreign policy toolkit. To have significant operational effects, CSDP missions must be an embedded part of a broader EU and member state foreign policy. It is a myth that CSDP operations are purely technical. In fact, many of the CSDP mission mandates include political and societal objectives, not just functional goals. Unfortunately, a comprehensive EU approach to foreign and security policy is difficult to implement. Member states might not agree on the political context, let alone the root causes of conflicts.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, conflicts and crises have roots that must be addressed politically, and missions function within political contexts. A focus on mission programs and benchmarking, without an attendant emphasis on policy and strategy, may jeopardize the long-term sustainability of reforms.⁷⁰ Consider the massive amount of national and EU resources already expended in Afghanistan, DRC, and Kosovo. These resources will be forfeited if conflict resolution is not seriously pursued.

Effective political leadership is the key to unlocking conflicts. Without political direction (and consensus) among member states and EU personnel, CSDP operations might not produce the intended results. Coordination and cooperation are not ends unto themselves; the primary goal is sustainable peace and security for the host state and society. Having examined the political relationship of CSDP with elite and civil society actors, we now turn to the issue of the impact of CSDP on human security.

Societal impact

Societal impact is defined as the effects of an operation on host societies, particularly with regard to human, gender, and minority rights. As the preceding analysis indicated, CSDP operations must accomplish functional and political tasks if they are to be confirmed successes. While CSDP exists to secure fragile countries, to monitor a conflict area, or to reform the security sector of a country post-conflict, it also aims to enhance human security for vulnerable populations and for individual citizens. The ability of EU operations to effect positive societal change depends in part on whether EU officials are sensitive to the unique political and social context in which the operation is deployed.

EU operations with an explicit humanitarian function clearly affect host societies. When the EU provides assistance for internally displaced populations in Georgia or ensures the safe arrival of food shipments to famine victims in Somalia, it improves the human security of citizens. When the EU military mission in BiH secures peace and prevents a resumption of violence, it clearly has an impact on the security of the population. Likewise, civilian operations that reform security or legal services in a country will change the lives of citizens if the targeted reforms address injustice, improve democratic oversight and accountability, and produce greater security – for majority groups as well as for minority populations.

The above illustrations focus on societal impact as an inexorable outcome of civilian and military operations. If the operation succeeds in improving general security, then it has positively affected society. However, this question is only the first step in evaluating societal effects. It is particularly necessary to assess the extent to which CSDP operations positively impact vulnerable populations, such as women, children, and minorities.

The EU and its member states have repeatedly affirmed, without equivocation, the indivisible links among development, peace, and security, strongly emphasizing the promotion *and* protection of human rights as an essential component of all three policy sectors. At the global level, The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) is a relatively new international security and human rights concept that has been promulgated by the UN, individual countries, and the EU.⁷¹ It is in direct response to the international community’s failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in BiH, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia. *The European Security Strategy* of 2003 notes that ‘The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.’⁷² In its 2008 document on the *Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in Change World*, the EU supports the R2P norm and the shared responsibility of states to protect populations from threats to survival.⁷³

Gender equality is a fundamental principle and objective promulgated throughout EU foreign policy – in CSDP and in European Commission programs. Furthermore, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, two organizations to which all EU member states belong, strongly affirm

the centrality of human rights, including the protection of minority rights and gender equality.

To ensure positive societal impact, it is essential that EU military and civilian operations mainstream issues, such as gender and human and minority rights, into EU policy planning and operational conduct. To 'mainstream gender' throughout EU operations means that EU policies and programs take into account the ways in which women, men, boys, and girls have different perceptions, needs, roles, and opportunities. Most important, because gender is about *both* men and women, gender mainstreaming requires the equal commitment and participation of both women and men.

Security, gender, and CSDP operations

Why is gender an integral concern that cuts across peace, security, and development processes?⁷⁴ Women and girls are the frequent targets of gender discrimination and violence; they often bear the greatest costs of armed conflict. Because gender attitudes and roles are learned and are therefore mutable, gender roles and relations often change during and after conflict. Moreover, women are not only victims of insecurity and war; they are also powerful actors within peace, mediation, reconciliation, and post-conflict recovery processes.

Therefore, successful EU operations, peace-building initiatives, and security and justice reforms require sensitivity to the ways in which gender norms shape and constrain societal attitudes and behaviors. Mainstreaming gender perspectives into policy and programming initiatives increases the likelihood that all members of society will benefit equally from operations and reforms and that the operations, policies, and programs sponsored by the EU will achieve sustainable results. To be effective, gender mainstreaming must be carried out at the earliest stages of the EU planning process and through all subsequent phases of policy implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Four UN resolutions – UNSCR 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1889 (2009) – address the intersection of conflict and gender and provide the normative foundation for the EU's framework for mainstreaming gender in EU foreign policy: UNSCR 1325 was the first UN Security Council Resolution to focus specifically on women, peace, and security.⁷⁵ The three subsequent resolutions aim to reinforce aspects of 1325. UNSCR 1820 and 1888 rivet on the prevention and protection of women and girls from gender-based violence.⁷⁶ UNSCR 1889 focuses on ensuring women's participation in post-conflict decision-making, gender mainstreaming in post-conflict recovery programs, funding and

specific programming to empower women, and law enforcement sector reforms to address the needs of women and girls.⁷⁷

Non-binding declarations of normative intent must be accompanied by the political will of EU member governments to act on their good intentions and to follow through – first, by agreeing to launch an operation; second, by writing an effective mission mandate; third, by equipping the operation with adequate resources; and, fourth, by providing skilled officials with the expertise to mainstream gender perspectives into policy and operational conduct. Thus far, the record is mixed, and there is still much work to be done in effectively mainstreaming gender and human rights into CSDP operations.

At the national level, EU member states have reached various stages in implementing the UN resolutions on gender, peace, and security. Thus far, seven member states of the EU have adopted national action plans: Belgium in 2009; Denmark in 2005; Finland in 2008; the Netherlands in 2007; Spain in 2008; Sweden in 2006; and the United Kingdom in 2007.⁷⁸ The member states that have led EU initiatives to implement these UN resolutions have responsive governments with a political culture that is relatively supportive of egalitarian politics, including gender equality. The EU officials who are the most knowledgeable about the intersection of gender and security issues tend to be from many of the countries named above.⁷⁹

At the union level, the member states have made normative progress in identifying gender as a relevant concern for CSDP operations, including specific tasks delineated in CSDP *Council Decisions*, such as the missions in both DRC and Kosovo. In 2008, the Council published a handbook on 'Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into ESDP' that gathered all of the policy guidelines and documents on gender and human rights into one document.⁸⁰ As of 2008, all CSDP operations, with the exception of Guinea Bissau, had at least one gender advisor.⁸¹ Around a half dozen personnel working in the Council and Commission on the security aspects of EU external relations are designated as 'gender focal points' and have cooperative working relations and regularly share information and expertise.⁸²

Nevertheless, there is still a noticeable absence of national officials in the EEAS and in CSDP field operations who are aware of, and concerned with, gender and human rights as security issues.⁸³ Gender and human rights issues are integral to establishing and sustaining peace, security, and development. Why, then, are these concerns still marginalized or invisible in most EU field operations? First, it is difficult to find individuals who understand the gender implications of security and defense

policy. As confirmed by longitudinal interviews in Brussels, national capitals, and field locations, most EU diplomatic and mission personnel are not trained in the inter-relationship of human rights, gender, and security.⁸⁴ Experts specialize either in gender or in defense and security. Member states are responsible for pre-deployment training, and most have not prioritized training in the intersection of gender and human rights with security and defense policy. While such issues have become an integral part of the international discourse about human security, they are still marginalized by a largely male-dominated decision-making elite in national capitals, in the EU crisis management structures, and in CSDP field headquarters.

Second, many officials, with inadequate education and training, are skeptical of and resistant to including gender and human rights in security and defense considerations.⁸⁵ Officials perceive police or legal reform as gender neutral or believe that reform agendas already address gender rights through legal protection of individual rights. Military personnel often believe that gender mainstreaming is unnecessary or irrelevant; in the case of the EU military operations in DRC and Chad, the EU Military Staff did not consider gender in their planning or fact-finding activities.⁸⁶

Third, there is the problem of time constraints. Typically, CSDP officials in Brussels are double- and triple-hatted with multiple portfolios; the amount of time that they can give to any area of responsibility is small, and so gender and human rights concerns are often the first to fall off the radar screen.⁸⁷ In field operations, gender advisors often are double-hatted, so they are overstretched as well. When there is a need for rapid crisis response, such as in Georgia or EUFOR RD Congo, gender is not seen as an essential priority.

In its 2008 implementation report of UNSCR 1325 and 1820, the Council Secretariat assessed the current progress of the EU in mainstreaming gender and the future challenges that CSDP faces as it strives to improve its implementation of the UN resolutions.⁸⁸ The Council document includes a checklist of gender issues for officials, such as increasing women's representation at all decision-making levels and mainstreaming gender through the entire cycle of planning and conducting CSDP operations. Officials are reminded about their responsibilities to:

- Consider gender issues in situation analysis, policy planning, and operational conduct;
- Meet with local and international non-state actors;

- Collect disaggregated data concerning gender issues;
- Provide specific guidance on gender in the OPLAN and further develop the operational tasks identified in the CONOPS;
- Report on gender issues;
- Mainstream gender into policies, programs, and projects; and
- Provide pre-deployment mission training on gender.

The 2008 Council statement provides a comprehensive inventory of the gender issues for which mission personnel are responsible. What is noticeably missing in EU documents and policy is a strategy for precisely 'how' to add a gender and human rights dimension to CSDP operations.

An EU official in EULEX, with experience working in the UN system, believes that the mandate and political will to promote and protect human and gender rights are stronger in UN operations than in EU operations.⁸⁹ While the EULEX mandate to mainstream gender is stipulated in the *Joint Action*, there is no gender-sensitive programming language for EULEX except in regard to its work to combat human trafficking. Gender and human rights concerns are not mainstreamed throughout the majority of mission activities and programs; instead, they are compartmentalized in the Human Rights and Gender Unit.

Even though EULEX is the EU's largest civilian operation, its Human Rights and Gender Unit has only five international staff and two local staff.⁹⁰ The Human Rights and Gender department is a policy unit at headquarters level without an operational mandate. Thus far, its work has focused on providing guidelines for standard operating procedures and best practices in information gathering and reporting; drafting a mission policy on monitoring cases in human trafficking; and training services. Only a few EU countries (e.g., Nordic countries and Germany) include gender and human rights issues in pre-deployment training for EULEX and other CSDP operations. While the office reaches EULEX personnel through induction training, the unit is only allocated forty-five minutes to cover issues of both human rights and gender, and thus it continues 'to fight for more training time.'⁹¹

In addition to induction training, the unit provides specialized in-service training on gender and human rights issues. For example, the justice component of EULEX allocated the unit half a day to provide training for the correctional service work of the justice component of the mission, an opportunity that enabled effective gender mainstreaming and training. However, the unit has limited resources to ensure that gender and human rights issues are properly reported on through the

MMA mandate of the mission. Moreover, while EULEX has appointed personnel ('focal points') who are attuned to human-trafficking issues in the three components of the mission, it has yet to do so for gender.⁹²

The success of the Human Rights and Gender department depends on the receptivity of senior management to utilize its expertise. The Head of Mission for EULEX participated in a November 3, 2010, celebration of UNSCR 1325, where he issued a speech (written by the unit) that indicated his commitment to ensure 'that UNSCR 1325 does not remain a promise and that concerns raised by Kosovo women's organizations are being addressed. Personally, I will make efforts to ensure that women are included in the building process of every part of law and justice.'⁹³ The Head of Mission has met with women's organizations, and the new Chief of Staff is reportedly more responsive to gender and human rights concerns than his predecessor was.

The EU acknowledges that it has 'worked to build human security'; it has identified the importance of developing a comprehensive gender focus in the EU foreign policy system (in the 2008 European Commission document on EU implementation progress of the UN resolutions (1325 and 1820) on women's peace and security and in the update report on the progress achieved by the EU in implementing the ESS).⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the EU admits that it still needs to 'address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror' and calls for the effective implementation of UNSCR 1820.⁹⁵

Nowhere is the 'appalling use of sexual violence' more evident than in DRC, where gender-based violence is pervasive and severe. As Gya, Isaksson, and Martinelli (2009) reveal in their comprehensive UNIFEM report of CSDP operations in DRC, there is a mismatch between the large geographic size of DRC and the mandate limits and small size of the CSDP missions in DRC.⁹⁶ While there is a budget line for funding gender advisors, any money needed for specific programs must come from the general budget of the mission or from additional member state contributions.⁹⁷ The Gender Adviser for EUSEC and EUPOL is double-hatted between two operations (in two different regions) and is extremely overburdened. Only a few CSDP personnel are deployed to the Eastern provinces, where violence against women is most common. Compounding the problem of insufficient personnel, the DRC government administration is weak; the population is extremely poor; and the scale of violence is overwhelming.

Nevertheless, CSDP has had some modest effects. EUFOR has interacted with the population by taking female personnel on foot patrols, and EUSEC has carried out small projects to empower women.⁹⁸ With

full support of the Heads of Missions, the EUPOL/SEC RD Congo Gender Advisor designed an innovative project to teach skills to women in military camps so that they could support their families.⁹⁹ EUSEC reporting revealed that because of a registration error, married female combatants and their children received fewer benefits than male combatants.¹⁰⁰ Upon advice provided by EUSEC, the Congolese government corrected this problem. In addition, the CSDP operations have networked with local women's organizations, voicing their concerns to the EU and to national Congolese authorities.¹⁰¹

Gya, Isaksson, and Martinelli conclude that there is a 'huge lack of dedication and resources for working on gender integration so that it becomes fully mainstreamed' in CSDP operations.¹⁰² Key to increasing positive societal effects is the exchange of best practices among host authorities, the EU, member states, international security providers, civil society, and independent experts. Also essential are improved training for CSDP personnel; expanded resources; and a genuinely comprehensive EU approach to peace and security executed by individual officials, member states, and senior leadership who make gender and human rights a priority for substantive action in mission programming.¹⁰³ Otherwise, gender and human rights will continue to be seen as issues peripheral to security, when in actuality they are essential.

Unintended impact and consequences

Despite the good intentions of member states, EU operations may generate negative effects. As Penksa explains, 'While states know how to wage war, securing the peace is fraught with dilemmas, tradeoffs and unanticipated outcomes.'¹⁰⁴ Unintended consequences are the operational outcomes that participating states in the mission did not expect to produce; these effects may be completely unanticipated, or they may be foreseen based on lessons identified from past interventions. While unintended consequences may be positive or negative, the literature on peace operations focuses on negative outcomes, such as generating an increase in corruption and criminal activities (trafficking; sexual exploitation); distorting the host economy; and creating a culture of dependency on external interventionists.¹⁰⁵

Aoi, De Coning and Thakur distinguish 'Unintended consequences ... from a failure to achieve the intended consequences ... [and] from the "mixed motive" phenomenon in intervention decisions.'¹⁰⁶ There are many reasons why a CSDP operation may fail to achieve

some of its primary objectives. Indeed, in Chapter 2, we explained how contributing states to CSDP operations have a range of interests and motives that affect their support and participation, including 'mixed motives' of national or European interest that are not stated in the mission mandate. For example, while the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo is intended to enhance the police and juridical capacity of the government of Kosovo, EU member states also benefit from the mission because they have access to criminal files that provide valuable information for criminal investigations at home.¹⁰⁷ Of course, EU member states also believe that their intervention will produce positive results in the host state and society.

Decision-makers, practitioners in the field and analysts operate according to the belief that [UN] peace operations...reflect the will of the international community and therefore are inherently 'good.' Peace operations are therefore expected to produce positive outcomes... After the failures of the [UN] missions in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, the liberal assumption has been tempered to accept that peace operations may, for a variety of reasons, fail to produce these *intended* results. However, the liberal assumption has not yet matured to the extent where it is commonly recognized that peace operations also generate *unintended consequences* – especially negative economic, social or political side-effects that are contrary to the liberal intent.¹⁰⁸

In short, 'unintended consequences are about a gap between intentions and outcomes.'¹⁰⁹ Unintended consequences cannot be entirely prevented, because they are outcomes of complex, yet dynamic, decision-making procedures, as in the case of the EU foreign policy system. Nevertheless, it is possible to 'anticipate, mitigate and discount potential negative unintended consequences'¹¹⁰ and to 'render security governance more effective, efficient, and legitimate.'¹¹¹

Given the initial preoccupation of the EU with launching CSDP operations, and belatedly with measuring operational impact and effectiveness, there is a critical need for assessments of unintended impact and consequences. As of yet, discourse about 'unintended consequences' is not a part of CSDP mission vocabulary. Officials speak of 'identifying lessons,' 'learning lessons,' and 'implementing lessons,' but few, if any, EU officials or EU documents use the terminology of unintended impact and consequences – a change in semantics that would denote an adjustment in existing practice.

While, in the EU context, CSDP is a relatively new instrument, EU member states are also UN member states. They have personnel who are familiar with the complexity of peace operations. However, most UN personnel stay within the UN system; best practices are not always exchanged between EU and UN officials, let alone within the EU and among CSDP officials. Even in the UN system, there is still no commonly agreed focus on unintended consequences.

The study of unintended consequences must become a standardized part of CSDP mission reporting and evaluation criteria. For example, EU mission officials are formally tasked with considering and reporting on gender issues in policy planning and operational conduct. Similarly, they should be required to report on unintended effects and consequences. Officials will need training in ways to examine and evaluate unintended consequences, just as they require training about ways to mainstream gender into policy planning, conduct, and evaluation.

EU and member state officials admit that CSDP operations do not always produce the desired effects; however, failure to achieve primary mission objectives is not the same as the production of unintended consequences. CSDP decision-makers must examine whether the primary benefits of an operation outweigh any potential negative outcomes so that the 'collateral damage' generated by a CSDP operation is contained, managed, and minimized.

Four examples drawn from EU operations in BiH, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia illustrate different types of unintended consequences. In BiH, one unintended consequence of the EU's two operations was the blurring of military and police tasks, the 'militarization of law enforcement.'¹¹² When the EU military operation took over from NATO, it engaged in crime prevention and law enforcement activities typically reserved for domestic and international police forces. The Commander of EUFOR had positive intentions; he wanted to put the 7,000 troops of EUFOR to work in the fight against organized crime, especially because he perceived a possible connection between organized crime and the support networks that protect war criminals. Nevertheless, the actions of EUFOR in 2005 raised serious questions about the potential negative impact of international military involvement in domestic law enforcement. Once there was no longer a security gap to justify military involvement in law enforcement, the actions of EUFOR contravened a key principle of SSR that the international community was trying to inculcate in BiH – the importance of separating military from police tasks in law enforcement.

Penksa attributes the blurring of military and police tasks in BiH to the 'exigencies of complex peace support operations and the need to prevent a security gap; the role of individuals with their own threat perceptions and interpretation of mandates; different national [police-military] traditions; and the extent to which institutional learning occurs in organizations and among individuals.'¹¹³ In BiH, CSDP and member state officials identified the negative consequences of militarized law enforcement and implemented changes within a year. They then explicitly limited the role of EUFOR to the provision of operational support to local law enforcement only if the EU Police Mission endorsed the request as necessary. The EU feedback process functioned effectively; the lessons from BiH shaped a recalibrated relationship between EUFOR and EUPM as well as CSDP planning for the anticipated EU rule of law mission in Kosovo.

In Kosovo, while the EU has cooperated successfully with both NATO and the Kosovo Police, the EU operation has still generated unintended consequences. Protracted UN negotiations about the future status of Kosovo and the eventual failure of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's final status proposal for Kosovo delayed the deployment of the EU mission well beyond the initial planning time frame assumed by Council CSDP officials. The EU had not engaged in any alternative planning scenarios in the event that the Ahtisaari proposal failed. No one – neither EU officials nor member states – was willing to discuss 'Plan B' scenarios out of fear that such planning could undermine ongoing negotiations about Kosovo's future.¹¹⁴

Other unforeseen issues plagued the EU operation in Kosovo. In the interim period of inter-institutional conflict between the UN and EU and continued questions about the legal basis for deployment of EULEX, the UN delayed handing over buildings and equipment to EULEX. Because the EU lacks its own equipment for CSDP operations, it needed this assistance from the UN in order to launch its mission in a timely fashion. It could not operate without buildings, cars, and technical equipment. In addition, EULEX inherited a backlog of criminal cases and incomplete investigations from UNMIK. It received 1,800 war crimes and missing persons cases and 400 serious crimes files, while 400 bodies in the morgue are still unidentified. In Northern Kosovo, people in detention have been awaiting trial for over two years. With incomplete case information and lost opportunities for conducting timely and relevant investigative interviews, the EU mission had to make difficult assessments about which cases to pursue.¹¹⁵

Moreover, when the EU started planning for Kosovo, the security conditions were different from when the mission finally deployed.¹¹⁶ EULEX is a large mission of over 2,000 personnel in a small country. EULEX officials recognize that one unintended consequence of such a big mission is that it distorts the local economy. Furthermore, the mission employs significantly more police officers than judges and prosecutors, where the need for EU assistance is greatest. EU and member state officials acknowledge that the Kosovo Police are among the best-trained police officers in the region and that the mission does not need as many EU police officers as it employs. In fact, one unintended consequence of the oversized police capacity of EULEX is that there are fewer EU police officials to deploy to other CSDP civilian operations.

In summary, EULEX faced many obstacles in becoming fully operational, a delay that adversely affected the EU's public image in Kosovo. The EU and UN have since achieved a *modus vivendi* for cooperation. Most importantly, however, the operational delay that the EU experienced in Kosovo produced significant improvements in the planning and conduct of civilian CSDP operations, changes detailed in Chapter 2 that provide evidence of EU institutional learning.

In Georgia, one unintended consequence has been that Russia has a *de facto* veto over the CSDP operation to the extent that it prevents the EU monitoring mission from entering the two occupied provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, contrary to the ceasefire agreement. According to a US official, the EU mission legitimates the territorial *status quo* through its tacit recognition of the new borders of these provinces.¹¹⁷ Without a political solution that is agreed to by all parties to the war, the Russian occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has produced a new frozen conflict in the extended European region. Nevertheless, the current EU and member state consensus is that the EU mission is worth having on the ground, even if it only monitors the ceasefire line from the Georgian side. The mission has enough positive impact to warrant continuation, and it cannot be evaluated on the basis of larger geopolitical responsibilities that it lacks the authority to address.

In Somalia, how should CSDP progress be measured? While EU and member state officials are pleased about the functional success of the naval operation, they acknowledge that the mission has a small impact on the root cause of piracy – the failed state of Somalia.¹¹⁸ In an attempt to address the problem of piracy more comprehensively, the EU agreed to deploy a non-executive military training mission for Somali troops in Uganda. EU and member state officials admit that the military training mission is not likely to provide a solution to the piracy problem

and that the success of the mission is still an open question due to weak governance capacity of the provisional Somali government.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, officials recognize that the EU risks training Somali soldiers who might not remain under the command of the provisional government. In effect, the EU could be training Somali soldiers to kill Somali citizens more effectively.¹²⁰

Clearly, there is a potential unintended negative consequence of the military training mission; it is a risk that EU member states decided was worth taking when they deployed the operation. The EU is taking an indirect approach to crisis management in Somalia. By assisting with military training, it is trying to help the provisional government of Somalia manage its crisis. The EU officials in Brussels who are in charge of the military training operations assert that the mission should be evaluated on the basis of its technical mandate to train soldiers, not on whether it delivers a political solution that is out of the CSDP mission remit.¹²¹ Thus, the outcome to evaluate, using functional criteria, is whether the mission succeeds in training soldiers who operate as a unit with a command-and-control structure that can secure Mogadishu. If, after they are trained, the soldiers return to their villages rather than to the capital, then the EU will have failed to deliver its primary mission objective.¹²² Even more troubling, the mission could result in grave unintended consequences for the people of Somalia. To date, however, the operation has produced neither negative nor unintended effects. Ninety percent of the personnel trained after six months have not disappeared and are still working in Mogadishu.¹²³ Thus far, the EU has received positive feedback from both the provisional government authorities and AMISOM about the behavior and skills of mission-trained personnel.¹²⁴

The long-term success of the EU training program is not only dependent on the EU and the provisional government of Somalia; it also is contingent on effective US-EU-AU cooperation, topics covered in Chapter 4. The US is a key partner in the training mission. It has paid stipends to the Somali troops, provided air transport, and, in cooperation with the AU, selected the Somali personnel to receive training in Uganda.¹²⁵ The EU has also developed a process to monitor Somali troops upon their return from Uganda.¹²⁶ This example of positive functional cooperation between the US and EU illustrates the multilateral cooperation characteristic of global security governance.

To avoid or diminish unintended consequences, the EU and its international partners must learn from past operational mistakes and failures and apply these insights to future operations. Both institutional

and international learning must occur. In BiH, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia, unintended negative consequences have been mitigated by the missions' overall positive functional impacts.

The analysis of unforeseen consequences and how operations are to be evaluated leads back to the question of a mission's mandate. The simpler the operational mandate, the easier it is to judge the outcome of a mission. However, holistic assessments of mission impact also are necessary. Such studies must analyze the outcomes of the mission in accordance with the mission mandate, as well as the congruence between the mission's operational activities with other EU policies and member state bilateral actions. Most importantly, impact assessments must evaluate the extent to which 'unintended consequences' produce deleterious outcomes that contravene the original rationale for the operation.

The success and failure of CSDP operations lie first with the member states' willingness and ability to appropriately fund, task, and empower EU missions to address insecure situations. Second, the success of the operation depends on the cooperation and capacity of host governments. Third, operational success is affected by exogenous events that are unforeseen at the time of mission launch. In some cases, changing perceptions and new circumstances lead to a change in mission direction.

Temporal impact

Temporal impact refers to how and why operations evolve over time and to the effects after operations terminate. What produces change within an operation? Missions may be adjusted because of a recalibrated mandate and/or a new programmatic focus, garnered from lessons identified and unexpected consequences. They may also be modified because of changing threat perceptions or as a natural process of scaling back the work of the mission to encourage host partners to assume more responsibility. The CSDP operation in BiH does not have a fixed termination date; as a consequence, its operational focus has evolved over time as its force levels have decreased and as the security situation has stabilized. When a mission is limited in duration, its operational focus might not change. This is often the case for military operations that deploy for a fixed period.

When an extension of a mission mandate is necessary, the *Council Decision* that provides the legal basis for a CSDP operation requires renewal by the EU member states. Review of the *Council Decision* produces discussion and debate within the PSC about the performance

record of the mission to date. National interests influence the decisions of member states about whether to continue, modify, or terminate an operation. However, while the member states may agree to deploy an operation, they have a choice about whether to second personnel to serve in the operation (and how many). In the case of military operations, the member states provide the financing. Even if member states support a mission's continued deployment, they may decide to withdraw resources from current CSDP operations.

Member state support for the extension of CSDP mission mandates must be examined against the actual resources and personnel that each contributes to missions. Two cases illustrate this point. In 2009, the United Kingdom withdrew personnel from CSDP operations as a result of its financial crisis and the financial strain on its peace-keeping budget.¹²⁷ While the UK remains supportive of CSDP and sees it as a vehicle for shaping the European project of integration, UK financial limitations may constrain the future deployment of CSDP operations.

In another example, Germany has weighed complex national and European interests to determine its support of, and participation in, the EU police mission in Afghanistan. In 2005 and 2006, German officials expressed reservations about deploying an EU mission to Afghanistan.¹²⁸ Given the national resources that Germany had invested in its own training program in Afghanistan, there were conflicting perspectives in Berlin about the value of deploying a CSDP operation to Afghanistan. Eventually, the German Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2007 supported the deployment of EUPOL; the *Joint Action* for EUPOL was passed during Germany's tenure in the presidency. The first two Heads of Mission for EUPOL Afghanistan were German.

EU member states, convinced that EUPOL Afghanistan needed to increase the effectiveness of the mission and that it was limited by its small size, agreed to double the size of the mission. However, rather than contributing more personnel to EUPOL Afghanistan, Germany has reinforced its own bilateral police training mission, thus affecting the ability of EUPOL Afghanistan to meet its target objective of doubling the size of the mission. Germany provides approximately 100 personnel to its bilateral police training program in Afghanistan but only 20 personnel to the EU mission.¹²⁹

As this illustration from Afghanistan cogently demonstrates, temporal impact must be considered in conjunction with other kinds of impact, internal and external. The positive, long-term impact of the EU mission in Afghanistan is indelibly affected by member state political

will to deploy sufficient numbers of qualified personnel. The mission has struggled for many reasons – both endogenous and exogenous – and it is only through a longitudinal study of functional, political, societal, unintended, and temporal impact that a comprehensive assessment of the EU mission in Afghanistan is possible.

Another component of temporal impact is a mission's evolution over time. Since 2003, the EU has been active in both DRC and BiH. In both countries, the EU has continued its CSDP operations out of a political and moral obligation to stay engaged, as well as the belief that both countries require more SSR and that the EU is uniquely placed to make a valuable contribution.

In the case of BiH, the mandates for both the EU military and police missions were recalibrated in 2005: the mandate for EUPM was re-focused on organized crime while the military mission scaled back its counter-crime activities to provide support tasks to EUPM and BiH law enforcement authorities.¹³⁰ Before the recalibration exercise in 2005, there was neither an EU strategy for assisting BiH in counter-crime activities nor systematic consultation among the main EU stakeholders (OHR/EUSR, EUPM, EUFOR, and the European Commission).¹³¹ Thus, the mandate for EUPM changed as a result of two primary factors: first, the need to clarify the role of EUPM vis-à-vis the EU military operation, and second, a growing consensus that BiH needed increased capacity for fighting crime and corruption due to the member states' own concerns about transnational crime originating from the Balkans and as part of the regional pre-accession strategy.

The EU role in DRC provides another illustration of the complexity of the decision-making calculus. Review of a mission mandate for possible extension provides an opportunity for the EU to pressure a host government to make additional reforms. As of early 2010, the EU police mission in DRC had achieved its primary mandate and was waiting for the Congolese to finance police reform and to pass the new police laws. The precondition for a continued EU mission was that the Congolese pass the police law so that a new EU mission would be there to support the implementation of the law.¹³²

Without question, there is palpable EU fatigue in DRC. EU officials are concerned about the insufficient national ownership of the reform agenda and question the willingness of national elites to stabilize the country. As the French CIVCOM representative queried, 'Is security reform feasible in DRC when national officials are unconvinced about its necessity and when the country is still at war in the East, where the EU is least present and where DRC officials are the most focused?'¹³³

Yet, because of the scale of the country's poverty and violence, the EU is reluctant to depart from DRC.

Despite unease about the deteriorating security situation in DRC and questions about the political will of DRC officials to end their campaign of violent conflict and institute genuine reform, the EU continued to pressure the DRC to consent to a refocused EU police mission. In April 2010, the Council welcomed the work of EUPOL RD Congo in supporting the reform of the Congolese national police and its interaction with the justice sector and cited 'in particular recent positive results, such as the submission of the draft Organic Law for the Police to the Congolese National Assembly. The Council also noted the adoption of other significant documents such as the Police Action Plan and the important coordination work conducted by the Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police (CSRP).' By September 23, 2010, the EU police mission in DRC had been extended until September 30, 2011.

A third illustration of temporal impact – and mission metamorphosis – is taken from EULEX. In Kosovo, some national government officials asserted that they required more training in community policing and criticized both UNMIK and EULEX for failing to respond to requests for increased training assistance.¹³⁴ CSDP and member state officials believed that it is important to 'get the big things right first' – namely, to ensure that EULEX is effective in utilizing its executive mandate and that the operation has a robust focus on organized crime.¹³⁵ In response to requests from the KP, by mid-2010, EULEX and the OSCE had sponsored workshops on community policing.¹³⁶ Additionally, EULEX personnel now emphasize community policing through the MMA function of the mission.¹³⁷ This change illustrates the ability of the EULEX operation to respond to the expressed security needs of states and societies.

The three operational illustrations above were presented to explain why CSDP operations evolve and change. However, another question in assessing temporal impact is why mission mandates are NOT changed. For example, the EU deliberated about whether to deploy the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) to Afghanistan, either as part of a revised EU police training mission or as a separate CSDP operation. The EGF is deployed in Afghanistan, but through the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTMA), not as a CSDP operation.

Why did the EGF deploy under NATO auspices rather than the EU? Due to concerns about the performance of the EU mission in Afghanistan, the French examined various options to increase the European police presence in Afghanistan.¹³⁸ They considered EGF deployment through EUPOL, but the EU-NATO blockage meant that the mission would be

unable to receive a security guarantee from NATO for force protection. A second option was for France to provide a bilateral increase to EUPOL. However, almost no French personnel were serving in the EU mission. (France was less engaged in Afghanistan than either Germany or Italy.) Furthermore, a new bilateral police program would be contrary to the US interest to integrate the international effort in Afghanistan. A third option was for the EGF to deploy under its own command-and-control structure. All of the EGF members were ready to launch the EGF in Afghanistan except Italy. Italy was concerned that the EGF headquarters (located in Italy) was untested and that the mission would cost a lot of money in a dangerous conflict area. Italy had also pledged to the new US administration that it would increase its contribution to NATO operations. As a result, Italy vetoed the deployment of the EGF under the independent command and control of the EGF headquarters in Italy.

The political compromise that member states agreed on was to deploy the EGF in the framework of the NATO training mission (NMTA) in Afghanistan. France agreed because NMTA had a unified chain of command, because the US was pushing for more police forces from Europe, and because the EGF would have force protection through NATO. The EGF deployment under NMTA allowed Italy to honor its promise to the US and NATO to increase its contributions and assuaged Italian concerns about the inexperience of the EGF command-and-control structure. This complicated story of member state decision-making demonstrates that in some circumstances, the EU might NOT be the preferred security provider and why a CSDP mission might not change its mandate to expand its operational focus.

In another illustration from the EU monitoring mission in Georgia, EU member state officials agreed that the country of Georgia would benefit from additional SSR.¹³⁹ In the first phase of Georgian defense reform, many Georgian military officials were reallocated to the police services. In October 2008, the EUMM signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs to introduce greater transparency and to impose restrictions on the equipment and activities of the Georgian police forces in the areas adjacent to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Lines.¹⁴⁰

Additionally, another MOU was signed between EUMM and the Georgian Ministry of Defense in January 2009 (and amended in July 2010) that limits the Georgian Armed Forces' positioning of troops and heavy equipment in the areas adjacent to the Administrative Boundary Lines. EUMM reports that the unilateral decision 'made by the Georgian

government contributes to substantiating its commitment to the principle of non-use of force, as contained in the Six-Point Agreement. Security would be further enhanced if reciprocating measures were introduced by the Russian Federation.¹⁴¹

Despite the two MOUs, there are still reports of Georgian police officials who dress in fatigues and carry heavy weapons with only a small insignia designating that they are police officers.¹⁴² This is another example of a blurred relationship between domestic police and military forces. While Georgia would benefit from additional SSR, the CSDP mission is not empowered to address broader SSR tasks (apart from a mandate that gives the mission the power to report on infractions of the MOUs). As of yet, EU member states do not have the political will to press Georgia to allow an expansion of EUMM into a wider SSR program, despite agreement about its necessity.¹⁴³ EU member states believe it would be problematic to focus a SSR mission only on Georgia, given that the mandate of the monitoring mission includes the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Unless Russia permits access to these territories, it is unlikely that the EU decision-making calculus will expand the monitoring mandate to include SSR.

Lastly, an analysis of temporal impact requires an assessment of long-term change; of the sustainability of functional, political, and societal effects; and of the degree to which unintended consequences will be successfully mediated. Missions need to be evaluated both for how well they perform their primary mandate tasks during their deployment and for their long-term impact. Such longitudinal studies thus will situate CSDP operations in the decision-making context of the EU foreign policy decision-making system, evaluating effects, outcomes, impact, and consequences as an integral feature of institutional learning by the EU and international learning by host states and non-EU security providers.¹⁴⁴

Mission completion

CSDP operations were originally conceived as a short-term instrument of crisis management, not as a tool of extended state-building, the domain typically reserved for European Commission intervention. In practice, some of the EU's crisis management operations have lasted longer than originally anticipated. In part, this is because the majority of CSDP missions are civilian and focused on security sector and rule of law reforms, programs that take time to implement because they involve elaborate functional, political and societal changes.

Every *Council Decision* specifies a time frame for deployment. While it is possible to renew a *Council Decision* and extend the operation, some operations are deployed with a fixed end date and the possibility of mission continuation is typically off the negotiating table. The mission is terminated at the end of the time frame specified in the *Council Decision* (e.g. DRC Artemis, Chad/CAR, and Indonesia). In fact, the limited duration allows member states to deploy the operation. A fixed time frame allays fears about an extended, open-ended operation that will be too costly – in terms of personnel and/or financial resources (especially for military operations that are funded by the contributing member states).

For operations with a possibility of an extended mandate (e.g. Afghanistan, BiH, DRC, Georgia, and Kosovo), the decision to continue the operation is subject to a cost benefit assessment. Such calculations are based on the complexity of the mandate and judgments about whether an operation has achieved its primary functional, political and societal objectives. CSDP personnel and EU member states now allocate greater time and attention to the development of benchmarks for evaluating the effects of CSDP operations; this standardization of the assessment process enables member states to better judge when an operation has achieved its primary objectives.

Member states consider the return on their investment – whether the CSDP operation has yielded enough positive effects to justify termination – as well as the availability of resources (personnel, financing, equipment) to determine if renewal is feasible. They also consider the cost/benefit of terminating the operation in light of new CSDP operations that may be on the horizon and evaluate how a decision to terminate an operation will be viewed politically.

For example, the mission in the Palestinian Territories, EUBAM Rafah, has been kept open despite its lack of results because EU officials believe that closing the mission would send the wrong political signal. Likewise, the military operation in BiH long ago fulfilled its functional objectives; EU military officials agree that no credible threats to BiH security justify the continuation of the operation. Politically, however, EU member states have kept EUFOR in place to deter a resumption of hostilities, to hedge EU and international investments in peace building and thus to reassure the BiH population. EUFOR also serves as an ‘over the horizon force’ for Kosovo, in the event those additional troops are needed. Thus, operations may continue to be renewed because of geopolitical factors beyond functional criteria. Conversely, CSDP operations may be terminated because they are viewed as unsuccessful (for internal or external reasons) and not worth continuing, especially in an

era of scarce personnel and resources. The mission in Guinea Bissau is a CSDP operation frequently cited by CSDP and member state personnel as producing nil or marginal impact. Thus, member states decided to close the mission rather than sink more resources into it.¹⁴⁵

In the Treaty of Lisbon era, some CSDP operations may evolve to become programs guided by the new EEAS. For example, following an end of the EU Police Mission in BiH, a follow-on mission could consist of a small group of EU officials who provide ongoing security advice to BiH at the strategic level in a program initiative financed through CSDP funds.¹⁴⁶ This is exactly the type of innovative, structured, visible and coherent presence that the EU should aim for – breaking down, where possible, artificial distinctions between the Council and Commission and reinforcing the gradual and steady evolution of the EU as a foreign policy system.

Review

Chapters 2 and 3 were concerned with the methodology of measuring and evaluating CSDP operations to determine their impact, or influence. Chapter 2 focused on internal impact – the catalyst and mandate for operations, as well as their launch and evaluation. Chapter 3 introduced a typology for evaluating the external impact of CSDP operations on host states and societies. Five types of impact were identified: functional, political, societal, unintended, and temporal. The chapter identified the questions and issues that each of these areas of impact raises with reference to the range of civilian and military crisis management operations. It is on this basis that we hope this methodology of evaluating impact will benefit scholars who conduct case studies of individual CSDP operations. Better analyzes of the impact of CSDP operations not only help scholars explain the evolution of the union as a niche international security provider, but help the EU achieve more accurate self-evaluation.

Indeed, when the EU evaluates the impact of a CSDP operation, it is pressed to declare every CSDP operation a success. This is another reason why independent/objective analysis of CSDP outputs is needed. In the institutional and strategic build-up phase of CSDP, EU and member state officials often felt compelled to justify the contribution of CSDP vis-à-vis other more experienced providers of global security assistance, such as NATO and the UN. Moreover, for those CSDP civilian operations that work to reform host security and justice sectors, EU officials need to substantiate the successful effects of the operation in order to sell painful reform measures to divided political elites and skeptical

citizens. As CSDP has matured, however, EU and national political officials have become more willing to admit where CSDP needs to multiply its effects.

EU officials most frequently cite niche operations, where no other security provider but the EU was able to intervene (in Georgia and in Indonesia where the EU coordinated with ASEAN) and/or those CSDP operations with a clear and limited functional mandate (Somalia) as having achieved significant operational success. Operations in the wider European neighborhood, while challenging to implement, are perceived as making a considerable and even substantial contribution to improved security governance (BiH, Kosovo, and Macedonia). CSDP operations in difficult security environments (Afghanistan, Chad/CAR, DRC) are seen as making a marginal contribution to improved security on the ground, in part because of the limited size of the CSDP operations and the vast scope of domestic security problems. Nonetheless, in the absence of the deployment of many of these CSDP operations, there would have been less government capacity and more insecurity in the host country. Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, CSDP operations have had considerable and significant effects on UN and AU interests in the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, and Chad/CAR.

CSDP operations struggle to achieve their objectives for a range of reasons. The security challenges in Afghanistan, DRC or Chad far exceed what the EU can provide through CSDP and confirm the intricate challenges of global security governance. What constitutes success (or failure) depends on the type of CSDP mission mandate, its geopolitical and domestic deployment context, the sufficiency of capabilities and resources (human, technical and financial), the political will to cooperate among the primary stakeholders (in the EU, the host state and society, and among other security providers) and the ability to design, execute and modulate operational conduct based on a dynamic process of lessons identified and implemented.

Chapter 3 was concerned with the effects of CSDP operations on host states and societies. In Chapter 4, the authors turn their attention to the strategic impact – the effects of CSDP operations on EU and non-EU member states who contribute personnel to such operations, other international security organizations, and those outside the union who do not contribute to operations but who are still affected by them. By examining the full range of impact, we offer a more complete understanding of how the EU itself and the outside world are influenced by EU foreign policy with its new security instruments.