punctuation and interpretation were restored by Paul Maas, *CR*, liii (1939), 58.

c 7–8. **Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε—ὡμολόγησας**: "Yes, Callicles, so long as he had that one self-defence which you have repeatedly agreed he must have." ἐκεῖνο is explained by εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς κτλ. We must write ἓν, not ἐν, since ὑπάρχειν always governs a simple dative. **πολλάκις**: 509 bc, 510 a.

d 2. I think Burnet was right in accepting **τῆς βοηθείας** from F. αὕτη agrees in gender with the predicate κρατίστη, which is itself attracted into the gender of the partitive genitive βοηθείας: cf. *Rep.* 416 b 5 τὴν μεγίστην τῆς εὐλαβείας, *Symp.* 209 a 6 μεγίστη, ἔφη, καὶ καλλίστη τῆς φρονήσεως ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακόσμησις, Kühner-G. i. 279. We might expect τῆς ἑαυτῷ βοηθείας, like *Rep.* 496 d 1 τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν: cf., however, *Apol.* 30 d 7 τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν. τις βοήθεια (BTW) can scarcely be combined either with αὕτη or with κρατίστη, and Cobet's ἡ βοήθεια, which Theiler adopts, fails to account for the MS. readings. The papyrus unfortunately omits the whole sentence.

d 5–6. **καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς . . . καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου**. The last is the only ἔλεγχος which Socrates recognizes as valid (471 e ff.).

d 7. **κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεία**. This is the reason which Socrates gives in the *Apology* for his failure to convince the jury: ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἑάλωκα . . . τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἵ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν (38 d 6). We need not delete ῥητορικῆς with Naber: cf. 517 a 5–6.

d 8. **ῥᾳδίως** seems rightly placed by the first family in the emphatic position at the beginning of the clause. Its position in F and the papyri is probably due to a desire to make clear that it qualifies φέροντα, not ἴδοις. —Socrates' cheerful acceptance of death is everywhere emphasized by Plato: cf. *Crito* 43 b 8 ὡς ῥᾳδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾴως φέρεις: *Phaedo* 63 a 8 ῥᾳδίως φέρεις ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων, 117 b, *Apol.* 38 e.

e 1–4. Cf. the passages quoted above on 511 a 4–513 c 3, and for the comparison of death and wrongdoing as things to be avoided, *Apol.* 39 a. But the tone here is strikingly different from the agnosticism of the *Apology* (29 b 5 οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι, 40 c ff.): see Introd., p. 20.

Epilogue. The myth and its consequences (523 a–527 e).

523 a 1–524 a 7. *The myth. It is an ancient law of the gods that the just should go after death to the Isles of the Blest, the unjust to Tartarus. But in the old days men were judged while they yet lived, and by living judges. That led to bad judgements, for they called false witnesses to testify for them, and their souls were veiled from the judges. So Zeus decreed that henceforth souls should be judged naked, stripped of earthly finery and earthly friends, and by judges no less naked. And he appointed his sons Minos and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus to give judgement in the Meadow where the three ways meet.*

This Vision of Judgement is the shortest and simplest, as it is the earliest, of Plato's eschatological myths. It displays none of the quasi-

scientific trappings of the myths in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, but has the directness and vividness of folktale, and keeps something of folktale *naïveté* in its style (e.g. in the story-teller's repeated "says he", c 2, c 3, c 4, d 6). It is presented as something which Socrates has heard from an unnamed informant (524 a 8), like the myth of the Water-carriers (493 a 1) and like the *Phaedo* myth (108 c 7 ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι). This is certainly, in part at least, a device to avoid making Socrates responsible for opinions which he did not in fact hold. But it has been thought to indicate a common source for these myths, and this has been supported by pointing to the recurrence in the eschatological myths of certain distinctive details, such as the λειμών and the τρίοδος, which are introduced casually, as if already familiar to the reader. And since some of these details also appear in documents loosely described as 'Orphic' or influenced by 'Orphism', it has been argued, especially by Dieterich (*Nekyia*, 113 ff.), that Plato took over his eschatological picture from an Orphic Κατάβασις, a poem describing a visit to the Underworld. This view was for a time very generally accepted, and still has its upholders (cf., e.g., Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, chap. v). But in recent years it has been severely criticized, particularly by H. W. Thomas (*Epekeina*, diss. München, 1938), who holds that Plato drew his material from a variety of sources, none of which can safely be labelled 'Orphic'. It is therefore desirable to dissect the present myth and see what is known about the antecedents of each component. In doing so, it will be convenient to take account not only of the myth itself but of Socrates' interpretation and expansion of it (524 a 8–526 d 2).

(i) *Literary reminiscence.* The authority of Homer is appealed to at the outset (523 a 3) and also by Socrates later on (525 d 6, 526 d 1). All these references are, however, concerned with unessential details, and it looks as if Plato had introduced them merely to give an air of orthodoxy to a not wholly orthodox narrative. Other features also are Homeric, but are used in an un-homeric way: i.e. the λειμών has changed its character (see iv below) and Tartarus has a more varied population than of old, as have Hesiod's Isles of the Blest (see on 523 b 1, b 3). The charge of Zeus to Prometheus (523 d 5–e 1) comes either from Aeschylus or from the Attic folk-tale which Aeschylus used.

(ii) The *Judgement of the Dead* involves, and is a natural result of, the belief in *post mortem* reward and punishment. That belief is certainly older than Pythagoras or 'Orphism'. The punishment of certain special offenders is referred to at *Iliad* 3. 278 f. and 19. 259 f. and described at *Odyssey* 11. 576 ff.; and a doctrine of reward for initiates and an unpleasant fate for all others was taught at Eleusis by the seventh century at latest (*H. Dem.* 480–2). Nor was the fear of *post mortem* punishment confined in Plato's day to Pythagoreans or 'Orphics' (cf. *Rep.* 330 de; [Dem.] 25. 52; Democritus frs. 199, 297; Nilsson, *Gesch. d. griech. Religion*, i. 651 ff., 767 ff., and *Greek Popular Religion*, 117 ff.; P. Jacobsthal, 'The Nekyia Krater in New York',

Metrop. Mus. Studies, v (1934), 117 ff.). The idea of a Judgement, however, appears first in Aeschylus, *Supp.* 230 f., *Eum.* 273 ff., P. Oxy. 2256. 9 (a), and in Pindar's *Second Olympian*, 58 τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ ἀλιτρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις. Since in Pindar it is associated with rebirth, and so with Pythagorean (or Orphic) belief, we may probably believe Iamblichus (*vit. Pyth.* 155, 179, cf. Diog. L. 8. 35) that the doctrine of Judgement was taught by Pythagoras (the evidence is quoted in full by L. Ruhl, *de mortuorum iudicio* 45 ff.). Whether it is older than Pythagoras remains an open question. At *Ep. vii* 335 a 3 it is described as a παλαιός τε καὶ ἱερὸς λόγος (see on 523 a 2); at *Laws* 959 b 4, more surprisingly, as part of the πάτριος νόμος. The latter passage, together with the name Triptolemus (see next paragraph), suggests to me that the doctrine was taught at Eleusis. Diodorus 1. 92. 3 attributes it to 'Orpheus', but we do not know what his authority was, or what its date.

(iii) The *names of the judges* are missing from our oldest references to the Judgement. In Pindar the judge is an anonymous τις, perhaps identical with the Ζεὺς ἄλλος of Aesch. *Supp.* 231 (i.e. Hades, whose name men fear to pronounce, *Crat.* 403 a 7, Philemon [?] fr. 246. 10 Kock). Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus first appear as judges at *Apol.* 41 a, where λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν together with Triptolemus "and other demigods who have lived just lives". λέγονται shows that the names are traditional, and the context makes it improbable that Socrates is quoting an exclusively 'Orphic' tradition (Burnet's assumption of 'dicasts who had come under the influence of Orphic ideas' seems an unconvincing expedient). The inclusion of Triptolemus points rather to Eleusis. On the Altamura vase at Naples (late-fourth-century?) and in other south Italian vase-paintings of the Underworld he takes the place of Minos in the triad of judges, perhaps under Attic influence (cf. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, 599 ff.). The other three probably owe their office in Hades primarily to their fame as judges on earth. Minos in Homer continues his earthly function by judging disputes *between* the dead (*Od.* 11. 568 ff.), and this may have been the original conception of all the underworld judges (cf. Rohde, *Psyche* chap. vii, n. 13). Rhadamanthys was considered δικαιότατος (*Laws* 624 b, cf. 948 b, Eur. *Cycl.* 273 f.); and Aeacus in his lifetime acted as arbitrator in disputes among the gods (Pind. *Isthm.* 8. 26). All three are cited as patterns of justice by Demosthenes, *de cor.* 127. But it may also be relevant that both Rhadamanthys and Aeacus enjoyed a special status in the world of the dead, independent of their judicial function: Rhadamanthys is the earliest known inhabitant of Elysium (*Od.* 4. 564), while Aeacus is Pluto's assessor (Isocr. *Evag.* 15) and holds the keys of Hades ([Apollod.] 3. 12. 6, cf. Rohde, loc. cit., and *Pap. Gr. Mag.* iv. 1467). Both, moreover, belong to a very ancient stratum of mythology: Rhadamanthys' name marks him as a Minoan, while Aeacus seems to be an old priest-king—he saves Greece from drought (Isocr. *Evag.* 14, etc.) and persuades Zeus to make men out of ants (Hesiod fr. 76). None of the three is known to us as an 'Orphic' figure; nor does Ar. *E.N.* 1132^{b}25 prove that the Pythagoreans made Rhadamanthys an underworld judge.

(iv) Certain *topographical details* have been labelled 'Orphic'.

(*a*) The λειμών of 524 a 2, which reappears at *Rep.* 614 c 2 (cf. also *Phdr.* 248 c 1), has been associated with the λειμών of the *Frogs* (326, etc.), with the "red-rose meadows" of Pindar fr. 114 Bowra (129 Snell), with the mention of λειμῶνας ἱεροὺς in the poem of the Gold Plates (Diels, *Vors.* 1 [66] B 20 = Kern, *O.F.* 32 f), with the statement of Diodorus (1. 96. 2 = *O.F.* 293) that "Orpheus" talked about τοὺς τῶν εὐσεβῶν λειμῶνας, and with the καλὸς λειμών in an Orphic fragment quoted by Proclus (*O.F.* 222). But all these have a common source in the "asphodel meadow" of *Od.* 11. 539. And whereas in Aristophanes, Pindar, Diodorus, and the Orphic fragment, and probably also in the poem of the Gold Plates, the Meadow is the home of blessed souls, in Plato (and Plato alone) it is the place of judgement. It is therefore improbable that Plato is here following an Orphic source.

(*b*) The τρίοδος of 524 a 2 is evidently related to the σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους (so Ol, Proclus: περιόδους MSS., Stob.) of *Phaedo* 108 a 4. In the myth of Er the just go to the right, the unjust to the left (*Rep.* 614 c), which has been compared with Aristotle's statement that the Pythagoreans τὸ δεξιὸν . . . ἀγαθὸν ἐκάλουν (fr. 200 R.^{3}), and with χαῖρε, χαῖρε, δεξιὰν ὁδοιπορῶν in the poem of the Gold Plates (on the new Gold Plate, however, published in *Arch. Eph.* 1950/51, the directions are reversed). But the idea of an infernal crossroads is so natural that we need hardly postulate a special 'source' for Plato here.

(v) A feature which is absent from the myth proper, but is added later by Socrates (525 b), is the doctrine of *Purgatory*. We have reason to think this a Pythagorean invention: for the Greek Purgatory, unlike the Catholic one, prepared its victims not for Heaven but for a return to Earth. Plato associates it with reincarnation in the *Phaedo* (113 a, d) and the *Republic* (615 a ff.); and although reincarnation is not mentioned in the *Gorgias*, it is, I think, implicit (see on 493 c 3 and 525 b 1–526 d 2). This suggests that 525 bc is based on Pythagorean doctrine. Some slight confirmation may perhaps be seen in the description of the incurable sinners as ἀνηρτημένους (525 c 7); for when Pythagoras visited Hades he saw the wicked soul of Homer hanging from a tree (Hieronymus of Rhodes *apud* Diog. L. 8. 21, cf. Virg. *Aen.* 6. 740 and Cumont, *Symbolisme funéraire*, 133). The argument is, however, not strictly conclusive; for it is at least possible that Hieronymus' source is Heraclides Ponticus, who may have got the idea from the *Gorgias* (see I. Lévy, *La Légende de Pythagore*, 80 ff., and Heraclides fr. 75 Wehrli). The beatification of philosophers, briefly referred to at 526 c 3, may also have its roots in Pythagoreanism: see note ad loc.

(vi) There remains a substantial residue of ideas which have no known pedigree and in the absence of contrary evidence are most naturally credited to Plato himself. These include the central idea

that the soul must be judged naked (which seems to imply Plato's epistemology, see on 523 e 3), and the associated fancies of an earlier judgement in the body which did not work (523 b 4 ff.) and of the "scars" on the soul (524 d 3 ff.).

If this analysis is even approximately correct, it will be evident that there is little foundation for Dieterich's view that Plato is simply reproducing an Orphic *Κατάβασις*; for Taylor's assertion (128) that 'the basis of the story seems more strictly Orphic and less Pythagorean' than in the myths of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*; or even for an opinion like Frutiger's, who thinks it 'conclusively proved' that all the essential elements of the eschatological myths are borrowed from Orphic–Pythagorean tradition (*Mythes de Platon* 260). On the contrary, no single element of the present myth can be called 'Orphic' in the sense that it is known to have figured in a poem attributed in the classical age to Orpheus (nor is this surprising, considering Plato's very low opinion of Orphic books, *Rep.* 364 e–365 a). We do find, especially in the 'interpretative' part, some elements which we have more or less reason to call Pythagorean; but they are mixed with matter which we have no ground for attributing to such a source. Some of this residual matter is traditional, but much of it is probably Plato's own invention.

523 a 1. Ἄκουε δή, φασί, " 'Give ear, then', as story-tellers say." A traditional way—as *φασί* shows, and as Proclus tells us, *in Tim.* i. 80. 8 Diehl—of calling the listener's attention to what follows. Cf. *Theaet.* 201 d, *Tim.* 20 d, and Aristoph. *Knights* 1014 *ἄκουε δή νυν καὶ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν ἐμοί* (introducing an oracle). Dr. Maas cites Choricius of Gaza, 379. 14 Foerster *ἄκουε δὴ (φασὶν) πρὸς τοῦτο μάλα καλοῦ λόγου*, which might encourage the guess that Plato is adapting an iambic trimeter, did not *φασὶν* suggest that Choricius' source is Plato and his trimeter fortuitous.

a 2. ὡς ἀληθῆ . . . ὄντα. In what sense did Plato believe his myths to be "true"? The clearest answer is that given at *Phaedo* 114 d: *τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα . . . τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος*. Obviously Plato did not regard Zeus' change of plan as an historical event, or claim to know the exact composition of the Last Tribunal. Nor is he presenting philosophical truth in the guise of an allegory: his eschatological myths describe a world which he admits to be beyond ordinary human knowledge (cf. 527 a); they are the imaginative expression of an insight which could not be expressed save in symbolic terms. What, then, does Socrates mean by his insistence that he regards the present myth as a *λόγος*? We might say, with Friedländer (i. 42, 189 Eng. trans.) and others, that a Platonic myth is a kind of 'extrapolation', a prolongation into the unknown of the lines established by philosophical argument, *λόγος* (hence the usual position of the myth at the *end* of a dialogue). This is true enough, but a passage in the *Seventh Letter* suggests a different view of the meaning of

λόγος here. We are told there that we ought seriously to believe *τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἳ δὴ μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι δικασταί τε ἴσχειν καὶ τίνειν τὰς μεγίστας τιμωρίας, ὅταν τις ἀπαλλαχθῇ τοῦ σώματος* (335 a 2), and that this is the foundation of the thesis that to do wrong is worse than to suffer it. The writer plainly had the *Gorgias* in mind; and if the writer is Plato we must, I think, say that the *Gorgias* myth is called a *λόγος* because it expresses in imaginative terms a 'truth of religion' (cf. 'Plato and the Irrational', *JHS*, lxv (1945), 23 f.). Noteworthy also are *Laws* 927 a, where the belief in the vengeance of the dead on the living, called a *μῦθος* at 865 d, is now described as "contained in true *λόγοι*"; and 872 de, where the Athenian hesitates whether to call the doctrine of *exact* requital in a future incarnation a *μῦθος* or a *λόγος*.

a 3. Ὅμηρος: *Iliad* 15. 187 ff.

a 5. παρέλαβον: "took over", the ordinary word for peaceful inheritance. Plato ignores the shocking story of the revolt of Zeus against his father (*Il.* 14. 203 and Hes. *Theog.* 629 ff.), a story which in his opinion should not be told to the young even if it were true (*Rep.* 378 a).

a 6. ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν, "still to this day". **ἐν θεοῖς** marks the law as a divine ordinance: we should not excise the words with Deuschle.

b 1. μακάρων νήσους: the abode of the Heroic Race, Hes. *Works and Days* 166 ff.; of good men in general, Pind. *Ol.* 2. 68 ff., Pl. *Rep.* 540 b.

b 2. ἐκτὸς κακῶν: as in the Golden Age men lived *κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν*, Hes. *Works and Days* 115.

b 3. Τάρταρον. In Homer, only the Titans are in Tartarus, *Il.* 8. 478 ff. But by the fifth century it was open to human sinners, e.g. Orestes fears that he will be sent there (Eur. *Or.* 265). It had a place in Pythagorean belief, as we learn from Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* 94^b33.

b 5. ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων. Diodorus 1. 92 describes as an Egyptian custom a judgement of the dead by human judges on the day of their funeral. But Plato's judgement of the *living* by the living is probably his own invention.

b 7. οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων. The article, preserved only by Plutarch, is indispensable; otherwise Pluto would be described as coming from the Happy Isles instead of from the opposite quarter. **ἰόντες** qualifies both subjects.

c 1. σφισιν. So Plutarch and Stobaeus. The direct tradition has *σφιν*, which is foreign to Attic prose; it is doubtful if the 'poetic' character of the myth justifies its adoption here.

c 1–4. Zeus analyses the problem in a series of short sentences connected by *γάρ*. He must intervene because the judgements are bad. That is because the defendants are "clothed". That is because they are judged before death. Cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 61.

c 5. ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματα. A chief reason why people fear death is that their souls will be "naked" in death's kingdom (*Crat.* 403 b 5). Cf. Empedocles fr. 126, where Nature clothes the soul in the "alien tunic of flesh", *σαρκῶν ἀλλογνώτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι*, and Seneca, *Ep.* 92. 13 *corpus animi est velamentum.*

c 7. **πολλοὶ μάρτυρες** recalls the *μάρτυρας πολλοὺς* of 471 e 5. Plutarch's omission of *μάρτυρες* is not a strong reason for deleting the word with Cobet, since it would fall out naturally before *μαρτυρήσοντες*.

d 4. **ἐπίπροσθεν**, the *vox propria* for the interposition of an obstacle, used at *Tim.* 40 c 7 to describe the 'occultation' of a planet. Plutarch's *ἐπιπρόσθησις* is Aristotle's word for such an interposition, but is not Platonic; it looks like a gloss.

d 7–e 1. **τοῦτο μὲν οὖν** κτλ. "This faculty Prometheus has already (*καὶ δή*) been instructed to remove from them." For the rare use of *ὅπως ἄν* after a verb of commanding cf. *Phaedo* 59 a 6 *παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμερᾷ τελευτᾷ*, and Burnet's note. **αὐτῶν** has usually been taken as a possessive genitive depending on *τοῦτο* ("this faculty of theirs"); but its position suggests that Plato meant it as a genitive of separation with *παύσῃ*, reversing the normal construction which would be *τούτου παύσῃ αὐτούς*.—Plato does not tell us why Zeus gave this order; possibly his intention was to discourage death-bed repentances. In Aeschylus, *P.V.* 248 ff., Prometheus claims to have taken this step on his own initiative, in order to give men hope. Plato may be adapting Aeschylus here to suit his own purposes, but it is at least as likely that both are drawing on an old folk-tale about the fatal foreknowledge which men originally possessed (Wilamowitz, i. 227 n.).

e 3. **αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα**. Cf. *Alc. i*, where true converse is said to be conducted *τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν* (130 d 9) and Alcibiades is warned that he should see Demos *naked* (132 a 6); also M. Ant. 12. 2 *ὁ θεὸς πάντα τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ γυμνὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀγγείων καὶ φλοιῶν καὶ καθαρμάτων ὁρᾷ*, and for the lucid vision of the dead, Tennyson, *In Memoriam* LI,

> There must be wisdom with great Death:
> The dead shall look me thro' and thro'.

The implication that the senses are a hindrance, not a help, to clear thinking points forward to the *Phaedo*, where this point is developed at length (66 a ff.) and the conclusion is *ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ* (sc. *τοῦ σώματος*) *καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα* (66 e 1).

e 4–5. **ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος**: not (as Apelt and Jowett[4]) "upon death without warning", but "immediately upon death", like *Crat.* 396 b 4 *ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης* "immediately on hearing", and *supra* 520 c 7 *ἅμα μεταδιδοὺς*. Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 2. 57 *θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκα . . . ποινὰς ἔτεισαν*. **ἔρημον . . . καὶ καταλιπόντα**, governed by *θεωροῦντα*: the soul to be judged has become the person to be judged, owing to the interposition of *ἑκάστου*.

e 7. **πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς**: Zeus is omniscient and has already (as at d 7) taken action. —Plutarch and perhaps Ol read *πρότερον*, but Plato has a preference for the adjective (*Phil.* 67 b 12, etc.).

e 8. **δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας**. As Ol explains (240. 12 ff.), Plato like many ancient geographers recognises only two continents (cf. Hipp. *Aer.* 12, Isocr. *Paneg.* 179, Sallust, *Jugurth.* 17. 3, How and Wells, *Commentary on Herodotus*, Appendix xiii. 5); and he assigns Crete, the homeland of Minos and Rhadamanthys, to Asia.

524 a 2. **ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ**: see above, p. 375.

a 5. **ἐπιδιακρίνειν**: "to be a judge of appeals". Plato applies here a principle which he approved in human law, *Laws* 767 a.

a 6. **ἀπορῆτόν τι**. It has not been noticed that Ol (236. 31) had the true reading here, which was first restored to the direct tradition by the scribe of the Meermanianus, a late MS. in the Bodleian, and was first printed by Findeisen. Its loss was caused by the unfamiliarity of the dual (cf. on 500 d 2).

a 7. **τῆς πορείας**, the *post mortem* journey, called *τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας*, *Phaedo* 107 d 5.

524 a 8–525 a 7. *Socrates expounds the implications of the myth. The soul, like the body, retains after death the marks of a lifetime's experience. Thus the soul which has lived an evil life will show the resulting scars, and the judges will make no mistake.*

Plato here gives a new turn to the old and widespread popular idea that when ghosts appear they show the *physical* scars or mutilations which their bodies suffered during life. Cf. *Odyssey* 11. 40 f.

> *πολλοὶ δ' οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείῃσιν,*
> *ἄνδρες ἀρηῖφατοι, βεβροτωμένα τεύχε' ἔχοντες.*

So Clytemnestra's ghost displays her wounds, Aesch. *Eum.* 103; and so Hector's appears (*Aen.* 2. 270–9) disfigured with blood and dust, *vulneraque illa gerens, quae circum plurima muros accepit patrios*. Here, however, the soul bears the traces not of the body's ignominy but of its own, and thereby stands self-condemned before its Judge: 'les fils de Dieu ne font que rendre un verdict que nous fûmes les premiers à prononcer sur nous' (V. Goldschmidt, *La Religion de Platon*, 78). At *Laws* 904 b–e Plato developed this thought to its logical conclusion: something like a law of spiritual gravitation operates throughout the *κόσμος*, and causes every soul to pass at death to its own place and kind. Judgement is thus automatic, and the judges are but symbols.

The scars on the soul reappear frequently in later writers: Lucian, *Cataplus* 24 ff., makes elaborate play with them; cf. also Philo, *Spec. Leg.* i. 103; Plutarch, *ser. num. vind.* 22, 564D; Epictetus 2. 18. 11; Tacitus, *Annals* 6. 6; Themistius, *orat.* 20, 234 a. All these probably derive directly or indirectly from Plato. See Cumont, *Symbolisme funéraire*, 133, on the history of the idea.

524 b 2. **ὁ θάνατος . . . διάλυσις**. Death is similarly defined at *Phaedo* 64 c. As Hackforth there points out, the definition was accepted both by Stoics (Chrysippus, *S.V.F.* ii. 790) and by Epicureans (Lucretius 3. 838 f.): it does not prejudge the question of the soul's survival, which in the *Gorgias* is simply assumed.

b 6. **τό τε σῶμα** κτλ. This corresponsive *τε* looks forward to a coming *καί*, but after the long explanatory excursus c 1 *οἷον εἰ*—d 3 *χρόνον* the construction is changed and the corresponding statement about the soul takes the form *ταὐτὸν δή μοι* κτλ. There is no need to emend

d 7. **Ὅμηρος**: *Od.* 11. 576–600.

e 2. **Θερσίτην**. In the myth of the *Republic* Thersites chooses to be reborn as an ape (620 c 2). There he is not so much the typical petty criminal as the typical buffoon; and so, e.g., Lucian describes him as *παγγέλοιος ἄνθρωπος, διάστροφος τὸ σῶμα καὶ λελωβημένος* (*adv. indoct.* 7).

e 4. **οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἐξὴν αὐτῷ**, sc. *μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνειν*: *ἐξὴν* picks up the *ἐξουσίαν* of d 5. I see little reason to suppose with Richards and Theiler that any words are lost, and none for deleting the whole parenthesis as Morstadt and Cobet wished to do. The thought is Platonic: cf. *Crito* 44 d, where we are told that the masses lack the power to do either the greatest harm or the greatest good, and *Rep.* 491 e 5 *ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι*. It takes absolute power, united with force of character, to bring out the worst in men. **εὐδαιμονέστερος** is simply "luckier"; it does not imply that Thersites was *εὐδαίμων* in the Socratic sense.

e 5. **τῶν δυναμένων**, "the powerful": cf. *Meno* 77 b 3, Thuc. 6. 39. 2. There is no reason to prefer Aristides' *τῶν αὐτῶν*, as Cobet did; Aristides is in fact merely adapting his quotation to the context of his own words. This passage is probably the source of Spenser's description of the house of Pryde (*Faerie Queene*, 1. 5. 51), 'But most of all, which in that dongeon lay, | Fell from high Princes courtes, or Ladies bowres' (quoted by Shorey ad loc.).

526 a 2–3. **ἀγαθοὺς . . . ἄγασθαι**. Has Plato in mind here the derivation (possibly correct) of *ἀγαθός* from the root of *ἄγαμαι* which he suggests in the *Cratylus* (412 c 1 *τό γε "ἀγαθόν" . . . τῷ ἀγαστῷ βούλεται τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικεῖσθαι*, and 422 a 5)? —For the extreme rarity of men who can resist the temptations of power cf. *Laws* 691 cd, where Plato's language is even more pessimistic than it is here. Hence the asceticism imposed on the Guardians in the *Republic*, and hence the resigned conclusion of the *Laws*, that there can be no security save in a society where those in power are *δοῦλοι τοῦ νόμου* (715 d 5).

a 7. **ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν κτλ.** restricts the meaning of *καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*, like *Apol.* 20 b 1 *καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν*.

b 2. Aristides is claimed as an exception to the rule that power corrupts: he had the virtue of "discharging honestly the duties entrusted to him" (cf. Plutarch, *Aristides* 25, where stories of his honesty are cited from Aeschines Socraticus and Theophrastus). It is not claimed that he was a true statesman in the Platonic sense, and on Plato's assumptions it could not be; for he too, like Themistocles and Cimon, was ostracized, thus showing that he had failed to "improve" the Athenian people. He also failed to teach the principles of statesmanship to his son, which for Plato is evidence that he did not possess them (*Meno* 94 a).

b 4. **ἔλεγον**: 524 e.

b 7. **ἐπισημηνάμενος κτλ.**: "stamping him as curable or incurable". Cf. the *σημεῖα* attached to the souls at *Rep.* 614 c.

c 3–4 **φιλοσόφου . . . οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος**. The reference is primarily to the philosopher's refusal to take part in public life, the refusal which Callicles condemned (484 c ff.). Helpless as he may be before a human court, Amphion is likely to come off better than Zethus at the Last Assize. *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, though viewed with ironic scorn by men like Pericles (Thuc. 2. 63. 2, 64. 4) and Alcibiades (id. 6. 18. 6), appealed increasingly as an ideal both to philosophers and to the man in the street during the troubled years of the late fifth century and throughout the fourth: cf. V. Ehrenberg, 'Polypragmosyne', *JHS*, lxvii (1947), 46 ff., and Gomme on Thuc. 2. 40. 2. At *Rep.* 433 a 8 *τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν* is quoted as a popular (and in Plato's view essentially sound) definition of justice. —The beatification of the true "philosopher"—that is to say, of the true contemplative—is a constant feature of Plato's eschatological myths: cf. *Phaedo* 114 c, *Rep.* 619 de, *Phaedrus* 249 a. It may perhaps derive from Pythagorean sources (Boyancé, *Culte des Muses*, 233 ff.; Cumont, *Symbolisme funéraire*, 263 ff.). Cf. Aristophon fr. 12 Kock *διαφέρειν δὲ πάμπολυ | τοὺς Πυθαγοριστὰς τῶν νεκρῶν· μόνοισι γὰρ | τούτοισι τὸν Πλούτωνα συσσιτεῖν ἔφη | δι' εὐσέβειαν*.

c 6. **καὶ ὁ Αἰακός**, sc. *ποιεῖ*. **ἑκάτερος τούτων** stands in partitive apposition to (*ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς*) *καὶ ὁ Αἰακός*. At the suggestion of Mr. John Gould I have ventured to bracket *δικάζει* as a grammarian's gloss or supplement. If it is construed with *ἑκάτερος* (as Burnet, and most editors), we are faced with a most unlikely asyndeton; and Y's remedy of inserting *δὲ* after *ἑκάτερος* leaves us with a string of jerky, disconnected statements. It would be preferable, with Dr. Maas, *Hermes*, lx (1925), 492, to put a comma after *ἔχων* and take *ὁ Αἰακός* as the subject of *δικάζει*: but the verb is to my mind awkwardly placed after the parenthetic clause. Other scholars have dealt more drastically with the passage: Heindorf wished to delete all reference to the *ῥάβδος* and the sceptre; Wilamowitz (ii. 344 n. 5) thought *ἑκάτερος—δικάζει* an interpolation from some eschatological source; Jachmann (316) thinks it the idle fancy of a 'diaskeuast'. This is surely unjustified. The *ῥάβδος* is the judge's normal badge of office: cf. *Prot.* 338 a, where Hippias recommends appointing a *ῥαβδοῦχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν*: schol. Aristoph. *Peace* 733 *ῥαβδούχους εἶπε τοὺς κριτὰς τοῦ ἀγῶνος*: and especially Pindar, *Ol.* 9. 33, where Hades controls the dead with a *ῥάβδος*. (Jurymen at Athens carried a similar staff, called *βακτηρία*, Dem. *de cor.* 210, etc.) As the ordinary badge, the *ῥάβδος* is quite naturally mentioned in contrast to the golden sceptre of Minos; and both are in place in this final picture of the Judges in all the dignity of their dreadful office.

d 1. **ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσσεύς**: *Od.* 11. 569. Plato blandly overlooks the fact that Homer's Minos does not judge the earthly lives of the dead, but judges disputes between them. The apocryphal dialogue *Minos*, perhaps in imitation of this passage, also mentions the sceptre as a special mark of honour assigned by Homer to Minos (319 d).

526 d 3–527 e 7. *The conclusion of the whole matter. Socrates appeals to Callicles and to all the world (526 e 1) to prepare themselves for the divine Assize beside which all mortal issues are trivial. Callicles may think that Assize an old wives' tale. But he and his companions, "the three cleverest men in Greece", have failed to upset Socrates' theses on the relative importance of ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι and on the proper use of rhetoric. Let us not, then, set out to govern others until we have put our own lives to rights, taking as our guide that doctrine which reveals to us the true rule for living and will bring us happiness both here and hereafter.*

This προτρεπτικὸς λόγος is the counterpart and the answer to that of Callicles (486 a–d). At 527 a Callicles' words are thrown back one by one in his teeth: ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἐκεῖνος ἄγῃ (486 a 6–7), χασμήσῃ καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις (486 b 1) . . . καί σε ἴσως τυπτήσει τις ἐπὶ κόρρης (486 c 3)—it is Callicles, not Socrates, who is truly in mortal peril. And the entreaty which follows is couched in a tone of the deepest moral earnestness. No other dialogue of the early group ends in this way (though there are protreptic passages in the *Euthydemus*); but we shall encounter a similar tone at the conclusion of the *Phaedo* myth (114 d–115 a), and in the last words of the *Republic*. The programme of first reforming ourselves and then society may also be said to look forward to those dialogues. The theme of self-reform is given a new and positive development in the *Phaedo*, where it is explained as a process of κάθαρσις or withdrawal from the body (64 c–67 b). And in the *Republic*, where the Platonic Socrates at last ἐπιτίθεται τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, we are shown that the possibility of the Just Society depends on the right moral and intellectual training of the individual—in other words, that the only road to true statesmanship leads through the discipline of the Academy. As a recent writer has put it, adapting Clausewitz, philosophy was for Plato 'the continuation of politics by other means' (V. de Magalhães-Vilhena, *Socrate et la légende platonicienne*, 128).

526 d 5. **τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων** is usually translated, with a rather forced interpretation of the genitive, "the honours *sought by* the many". I should prefer to render "the valuations of the many", as at 497 b 8.

d 6. **τὴν ἀληθειαν ἀσκῶν**, "practising sincerity". Bury's conjecture τὴν ἀληθῆ αὖ ἀσκῶν (sc. τιμήν) is at first sight tempting, but cf. 525 a 3 διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι, 526 c 1 ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας. σκοπῶν (BTW) is adopted by many editors and translators, but gives a less suitable sense: Socrates is vowing himself not to research but to a way of living and dying. It probably came in from σκοπῶ in the preceding sentence (d 4); while, conversely, T's marginal note there, γρ. ἀσκῶ, may have originated in a note γρ. ἀσκῶν on d 6. Cf. 527 d 2 ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν . . . κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες and Hdt. 7. 209. 2 τὴν ἀληθείην ἀσκέειν.

e 4. **τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων**: primarily in the judicial sense, though the word is applicable to any kind of conflict or contest. Cf. *Rep.* 608 b 4 μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών . . . τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι.

ὀνειδίζω σοι: the retort to 486 a–d, described at 508 c 4 as ἃ σὺ ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις.

e 6. τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκεῖνον . . . ἐκεῖνος ἄγῃ: the pronouns add to the solemnity of the passage, and editors have failed to notice that they have the authority of Eusebius as well as F.

527 a 1. **τῆς Αἰγίνης**, the eponymous nymph of Aegina, who bore Aeacus to Zeus (Pindar, *Isthm.* 8. 19 ff.).

a 3. [καὶ] ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως: to hit a man on the jaw was an act of ὕβρις (see on 486 c 2–3). W proves to omit the rather awkward καὶ, which Cobet had already deleted. ἄτιμον occurs at 486 c 2, which is against Cobet's further assumption that ἀτίμως is a gloss here: Socrates is throwing back Callicles' words in his face.

a 5. ὥσπερ γραὸς, "like an old wives' tale". Cf. *Rep.* 350 e 2 ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις, and the proverbial γραῶν ὕθλος, *Theaet.* 176 b 7. Old women were in demand as nursery story-tellers, *Hipp. ma.* 286 a 1.

a 7. εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν . . . ἀληθέστερα εὑρεῖν. Cf. *Phaedo* 85 cd: since certainty concerning the fate of the soul is impossible, we should pin our faith either to the strongest human arguments we can find or else to a divine revelation (λόγου θείου τινός). Acceptance of the myth is similarly recommended here, *faute de mieux*; but Socrates really bases his appeal on the preceding ethical arguments, which are independent of the myth, though they lead to the same rule of life.

b 2. ἐκεῖσε . . . συμφέρων, "advantageous for the life yonder". We need not insert ⟨ἰοῦσι⟩ (Herwerden) or ⟨ἀφικομένοις⟩ (Richards): the advantage is imagined as a force which originates in this life but *reaches forward* into the life beyond death. On this 'pregnant' use of local adverbs see Kühner-G. i. 545.

b 3. οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, "this proposition holds its ground"—whereas the generality of propositions skip away from their author like Daedalus' robots (*Euthyphro* 11 b–d, *Meno* 97 d–98 a).

b 5–6. οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι. Plato probably has in mind the well-known line of Aeschylus, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει (*Sept.* 592), to which he explicitly refers at *Rep.* 361 b 7 κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα.

c 6. ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. Stallbaum defended ὁ σὸς λόγος (BTW) as meaning "your own admission" (cf. 495 e 1). But it is doubtful if Callicles has admitted the happiness of the good in this life, and he has certainly not admitted their happiness after death (cf. a 5). Neither ὁ σοφὸς λόγος (Münscher) nor ὁ ὅσιος λόγος (Goebel) is at all Platonic. Father H. D. Saffrey has called my attention to a forgotten conjecture which is certainly much neater and more alluring, ὁ σῶς λόγος (Ch. Graux, *Les Articles originaux*, 4 f.), equivalent in sense to ὁ ἠρεμῶν λόγος: cf. *Theaet.* 164 a 1 εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον, 167 d 3 σῴζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος, *Rep.* 621 b 8 μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο. But F may well be right in simply omitting the word, which could be a gloss (cf. 460 c 4) or could have arisen out of an accidental dittography, ΩCOCO read as ὡς ὁ σὸς. The phrase ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει recurs