The Greater Horn of Africa: Geopolitical Aspects of the "Refugee Crisis"

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1 Introduction

In the following various geopolitical perspectives on the so-called refugee crisis will be introduced, based on the geopolitics of not only North-East Africa but also one of the main destinations for refugees and migrants, i.e. Europe or, more precisely, the present European Union (EU). For the sake of convenience we shall use the present name for the precursors of what is today the EU.

The analysis is based on a somewhat broader definition of "geopolitics" than that of the founders of the academic discipline (Gray and Sloan 2013) such as Friedrich Ratzel (1897), Rudolf Kjellén (1917; Holdar 1992), Halford MacKinder (1904), Alfred T. Mahan (1987; Sumida 1999), Haushofer et al. (1928; Haushofer 1951; Wolkersdorfer 1999), and Nicholas Spykman (1942) and "modern classics" such as Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997). It is thus inspired by the writings of Gearóid Tuathail (1996) and others in the field of what they call "critical geopolitics" (Dalby 1991). Whereas classical geopolitical authors treated geography as an empirical constant, offering opportunities for, and presenting obstacles to, state policies and military strategies, the critical geopoliticians usually apply social constructivist and even social psychological insights (Moïsi 2009) to the geographical givens. They thus acknowledge that, for instance, a river is not just a body of water in certain place and running in a certain direction, but that it may be very different things to different people, and that it may be heavily invested with symbolism—as when Joseph Conrad described the travel up the Congo River as "penetrat[ing] deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness" (1988: 37). It also opens up for different conceptualisations of places such as the Horn of Africa or Europe.

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33

As far as human displacement is concerned, there are also legal aspects of geopolitics at work as a person on the move between, for instance, North-East Africa and Europe inevitably traverses various legal domains (Orakhelashvili 2009), which are usually—but in this case not exclusively—demarcated as such by state borders. Far from being fixed, however, such borders reveal themselves on closer inspection as being much more amorphous and fluctuating, for which phenomenon the term "borderscapes" seems appropriate (*vide infra*).

2 The Greater Horn of Africa as a Regional Security Complex

Not only are both the name and the delimitation of the region to which this book is devoted contested, but its regionness may also be questioned (Selassie 1980; Gorman 1981; Woodward 2003, 2006, 2013; Mengisteab 2014; Nzongola-Ntalaja 1991; De Waal 2004, 2015). The most often used names are the Horn of Africa (HoA) and the Greater HoA (GHoA), but one may also encounter labels such as "East and Northeast Africa" and the "IGAD region". The latter refers to the subregional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to which all states belong, even though Eritrea suspended its membership from 2007 to 2011. IGAD's membership does, however, overlap with two other regional (or subregional) organisations or RECs (regional economic communities) in "AU lingo", namely, EAC (East African Community) and COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) (see Table 1).

Table 1 Regions and regional organisations

| Members | Region | | | | |
	HoA	GHoA	IGAD	EAC	COMESA
Djibouti	X	X	X	–	X
Ethiopia	X	X	X	–	X
Eritrea	X	X	X	–	X
Kenya	–	X	X	X	X
Somalia	X	X	X	–	–
South Sudan	–	X	X	X	–
Sudan	–	X	X	–	X
Uganda	–	X	X	X	X
Others	No	No	–	Yes[a]	Yes[b]

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, *EAC* East African Community, *GhoA* Greater Horn of Africa, *HoA* Horn of Africa, *IGAD* Intergovernmental Authority on Development
[a]Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania
[b]Egypt, Libya, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo

Not only is the regionness thus somewhat blurred and questionable, but the stateness of the countries in the region has also been, and probably remains, in flux (Rudincová 2017). Two new states have thus emerged since independence as a result of de jure and internationally recognised secession—Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011. In addition to this, there is Somaliland (i.e. the territory of the former British protectorate of Somaliland) which has been de facto independent since 1991, albeit not recognised as such by any other state (Bradbury 2008; Richards 2014). To this should be added that some borders between states are contested, most recently those between Eritrea and Ethiopia, especially the Badme area (Abink 2003b; Zegeye and Tegegn 2008), and between South Sudan and Sudan, especially the Abyei area (Johnson 2008; Craze 2013). We shall return briefly to both these cases in due course.

The Greater Horn of Africa would seem to qualify for the label as a "regional security complex" (RSC) in the original sense of Barry Buzan, who defined an RSC as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another", regarding such complexes as empirical phenomena (1991: 190). For some reason, Buzan refused to acknowledge that certain states might belong to more than one RSC, preferring to label such states as appeared to straddle RSC boundaries as "buffers" or "insulators" (Buzan 1991: 196), notwithstanding that they might equally well function as "transmission cords". This theoretical idiosyncrasy was unfortunately retained in the revised and more constructivist version of RSC theory which appeared in a work, co-authored with Ole Wæver, on *Regions and Powers* in which the focus was on what states "securitised", i.e. discursively constituted as threats to their security (Buzan and Wæver 2003). In this work, the authors referred to the HoA as a "pre-complex" defined as "a set of bilateral security relations [which] seems to have the potential to bring together into an RSC, but has not yet achieved sufficient cross-linkage among the units to do so" (ibid.: 64, 241–243). They also separated this pre-complex from "East-Central Africa" which they regarded as too unstructured to qualify for this status (ibid.: 243–247). The present author holds a different opinion and is prepared to acknowledge the Greater Horn of Africa as a security complex.

In conflict studies, it is commonplace to distinguish between two extreme versions of security complexes, i.e. "conflict formations" (Väyrynen 1984) in which the risk of war is pervasive and "security communities" in which this risk (which must have been present in the past) has receded so far into the background that war has become well-nigh inconceivable and therefore no longer features in the deliberations of states (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998a, b). Nobody seems to have claimed that the Greater Horn of Africa constitutes such a security community, considering its several armed conflicts and international wars (*vide infra*). It probably does not even qualify as what Buzan called a "mature anarchy" (1991: 175–181, 261–265) both because most of the units of the system, i.e. the states, are so fragile and because mistrust among the states is so pervasive.

Moreover, the Greater Horn of Africa is far from a self-contained and closed system but a heavily "penetrated" one (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 46–47). There is nothing new in this. Indeed, during the Cold War, the two rivalling superpower

"patrons" were so involved with their "clients" in the Greater Horn of Africa that they almost treated them as proxies. However, the "vertical" relations were so uneven and asymmetrical, and the patrons so self-centred, that the United States and the Soviet Union literally swapped clients in the latter half of the seventies with little or no concern for these clients or their "horizontal" relations. Following the toppling of the Ethiopian monarchy by a group of young officers led by Mengistu Haile Mariam (Tiruneh 1993), the USSR thus opportunistically terminated its assistance to Somalia in favour of a close partnership with Ethiopia, to which Somalia responded by becoming a US client state, albeit a bit too late to receive much needed US arms supplies for the war against Ethiopia it had started (Gorman 1981; Farer 1979).

Underlying not only these theories of regionalism but also the political realities in the Greater Horn of Africa is the assumption that geography and distance matter for security, if only because of what Kenneth Boulding referred to as "the loss of strength gradient". A state's military power simply declines with distance (Boulding 1962: 262; Vasquez 1993: 123–152; Garnham 1996; Webb 2007), which means that a country is in a better position to attack a close neighbour than a distant country and that states therefore, ceteris paribus, tend to fear neighbours more than distant countries. This may not be the case of superpowers, but it certainly applies to countries such as those in the Greater Horn of Africa.

Distance and geography also matter for other interactions between countries, such as impact on "security" in an expanded sense, including also environmental, societal and human security. As far as the environment is concerned, several Greater Horn of Africa countries impact on each other in a big way by, for instance, their water consumption in the sense that possible dam construction and/or irrigation projects by upstream Uganda or Ethiopia (Nasr and Neef 2016) may inadvertently deprive mid- or downstream countries such as the two Sudans and Egypt of water from the Nile. Indeed, the latter is so critically dependent on this water that it has officially proclaimed such deprivation as a casus belli (Kendle 1999; Gizelis and Wooden 2010). As far as human security is concerned, the Greater Horn of Africa is also closely connected (Salih 1999), e.g. in the sense that human security problems such as droughts, floods or food insecurity in one country may spur cross-border population flows into other and almost always adjacent countries, thereby perhaps threatening the human security of the inhabitants of these countries—or it may exacerbate pastoral conflicts among nomadic populations or between the nomads and the sedentary farmers (Meier et al. 2007).

It is also conceivable that population movements across state borders may upset delicate ethnic balances, thereby constituting what has been called "societal security" problems, i.e. threats to collective identities (Wæver 1993). This may in fact be the case of multi-ethnic Kenya in the face of a massive influx of ethnic Somalis. It is one thing that the Somali refugees and migrants cluster in the huge Dadaab Camp complex (Horst 2006; Rawlence 2016; Agier 2011: 132–146) in a remote corner of the country, but more of a challenge (or security risk) to have them come in large numbers to Nairobi and settling in Eastleigh, also known as "Little Mogadishu" (Campbell 2006; Carrier and Lochery 2013).

3 Displacement, Geopolitics and Legal Domains

One of the most distance-dependent flows is that of persons, both as far as voluntary migration and forced displacement are concerned. Whereas "globalisation and all that" does indeed reduce the role of distance for prosperous westerners who are able to freely travel the globe (Battersby 2014), the ability to do so is heavily dependent on economic factors. The words of an anonymous refugee from Ghana (quoted in Van Hear 2006: 126), "I went as far as my money would take me", would seem to apply to most of the world's prospective migrants and refugees, the majority of whom invariably end up in neighbouring countries for lack of economic means to reach more attractive but also more distant and expensive destinations. The journey starting with internal displacement is not merely geographical but also takes the person in flight through different legal domains, where his or her status may change, from a bona fide refugee entitled to protection to an "illegal migrant" who has no such rights but is liable for forceful deportation.

Even though they are not usually included in the categories of forced displacement, we may begin with those people whose livelihood presupposes movement, i.e. nomadic pastoralists (of which there are quite a few in the Greater Horn of Africa) who have to trek with their herds in search of water and grazing opportunities. For such nomads, state borders are simply a nuisance which is preferably ignored; and if this cross-border movement is impeded by actually patrolled borders, the consequences may be severe. The more such nomadic peoples are hindered in their movements, the more likely it becomes that they end up in armed conflicts, either with sedentary farmers or with other pastoralists (Goldsmith 2013). Such conflicts are widespread in the Greater Horn of Africa and may produce forced displacement, at least in the sense of what Alexander Betts aptly calls "survival migration" (2013), as opposed to voluntary migration in search of a better life. On the other hand, there are also people (in the Greater Horn of Africa and elsewhere) whose livelihoods are based on the special economic conditions prevailing in borderlands (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010) *qua* liminal or interstitial places which somehow fall outside "the national order of things" (Malkki 1995: 4–6, 253–254; Green 2010).

Within the category of what are generally referred to as forcefully displaced persons, most start off as internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are forced to leave their habitual place of residence but do not cross any international border. Significantly, this IDP category does not discriminate according to the source or nature of the calamity which makes it imperative to relocate. Whereas such IDPs are not protected as such by any universal legal instrument, but merely by a set of guidelines issued by the UNHCR 2007a: 114–121), their legal standing in Africa is slightly better. In 2009 the African Union adopted the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, better known as the "Kampala Convention" (in Yusuf 2010: 461–483), which obliges the signatories (i.e. states) both to refrain from causing internal displacement and to protect the victims, albeit with the reservation that this does not create any immunity to armed

Table 2 Status of legal instruments on refugees and IDPs

	Instrument					
	Kampala Convention		OAU Convention		1951 Convention	1967 Protocol
State	S	R	S	R	D	D
Djibouti	2009	2015	2005	–	1977	1977
Eritrea	2012	–	2012	–	–	–
Ethiopia	2009	–	1969	1973	1969	1969
Kenya	–	–	1969	1992	1966	1981
Somalia	2009	–	1969	–	1978	1978
South Sudan	2013	–	2013	2013	–	–
Sudan	–	–	1969	1972	1974	1974
Uganda	2009	2010	1969	1987	1976	1976

S Signed, *R* Ratified, *D* Deposited

insurgents or criminals (Abebe 2010). It is most unfortunate that not all countries in the Horn have duly signed and ratified this convention, as set out in Table 2, considering the staggering numbers of IDPs in the region. As of 31 December 2016, Ethiopia thus hosted 258,000 conflict-induced IDP, whilst the corresponding numbers in other countries were as follows: Kenya 138,000, Somalia 1,107,000, South Sudan 1,854,000, Sudan 3,300,000 and Uganda 53,000—a grand total of 6.7 million, to which might be added large numbers of disaster-induced IDPs (IDMC 2017: 113–116).

If the fleeing person crosses an international border, he or she may or may not be a refugee, entitled to protection against *refoulement*, depending on the country of refuge. The OAU (Organization for African Unity) in its 1969 Convention (inherited by the African Union) expanded the criteria for refugee status beyond that of "well-founded fear of persecution" on various grounds found in the universal Refugee Convention of 1951 with its 1967 Protocol (UNHCR 2007a: 10–35) to also acknowledge the need to flee from dangerous situations:

> 1.2. The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (UNHCR 2007b: 1004–1008)

By implication, a person fleeing from Somalia may be eligible for asylum in Ethiopia which is a party to the OAU Convention but not, for instance, in Yemen, just across the Red Sea, which is not, but which has, to its credit, nevertheless hosted substantial numbers of Somali refugees until the outbreak of the civil war in 2015 and where a quarter of a million remained in 2016, according to UNHCR (2017).

As far as Europe is concerned, the EU is for obvious reasons not a party to the OAU Convention but only the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The EU has,

however, adopted a "qualification directive", binding for all member states, which opens some scope for granting "subsidiary protection" to a person who "if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm" (EU 2011, Art 2f), even if this "harm" does not qualify as persecution (Mandal 2005). To some extent, this bridges the gap between the refugee conventions, at least allowing the EU to apply as liberal criteria as those of the OAU convention—but, alas, not obliging it to do so.

These legal distinctions may be a partial (but probably not particularly important) explanation of the fact that virtually all refugees from countries in the Greater Horn of Africa remain in the region as refugees in other Greater Horn of Africa countries, as shown in Table 3. It has been suggested that this is, or at least should be, the preferred solution for everybody (Betts and Collier 2017: 128–136), but this seems based on extremely modest ethical ambitions, à la "Since the EU will anyhow not take them in, they are better off not trying to get across to Europe, risking to drown in the Mediterranean". We shall return to this *problematique* at some length below.

Table 3 Refugees and IDPs in the greater Horn of Africa

In / From	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda	Others	Total
Djibouti	**0**	0	81	0	0	0	0	0	1,631	1,712
Eritrea	1,012	**6**	160,056	1,557	70	422	104,225	10,180	216,527	494,055
Ethiopia	2,864	32	**400**	28,744	13,817	4,717	11,426	2,627	102,740	167,367
Kenya	10	0	3,650	**0**	0	0	0	497	7,572	11,729
Somalia	12,660	2,228	251,921	396,693	**1,146,913**	164	245	36,758	459,313	2,306,895
S. Sudan	0	10	287,937	87,030	0	**1,966,244**	232,250	229,176	22,143	2,824,790
Sudan	0	28	38,807	9,522	13	242,455	**3,250,760**	2,772	390,786	3,935,143
Uganda	0	0	28	1,820	0	0	0	**180,000**	11,043	192,891
Others	3,327	0	2,786	55,400	7,604	17,212	20,647	265,021	Legend:	
Total	19,873	2,304	745,666	580,766	1,168,417	2,231,214	3,619,553	727,031	Grey cells: IDPs;	
Net hosting	19,873	2,298	745,266	580,766	21,504	264,970	368,793	547,031	Net host: Total ÷ IDPs.	

Based on data from Table 1.3 in the UNHCR Mid-year Statistics for 2016 at www.unhcr.org/statistics/. The numbers for IDPs only include those "of concern" for UNHCR

4 The Geopolitics of Armed Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa

In the following, we shall look at an assortment of armed conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa in search of geopolitical elements, the logic being that at least some forced displacement is indirectly caused by geopolitical factors with armed conflict serving as an intermediary variable between the independent one (geopolitics) and the dependent variable of displacement. There is neither any presumption that most conflicts are caused by geopolitical factors nor that such factors are always the decisive ones in those conflicts where they do seem to play a role.

First came, of course, the anticolonial wars, which could be seen as geopolitically motivated, i.e. about maintaining independence of one's homeland in the face of European attempts at territorial expansion, in turn to some extent spurred by some of the "classical" geopoliticians (O'Hara 2006). Examples include the two wars between Ethiopia (Abyssinia) and Italy, in 1896 and 1936, respectively, the first one won by Ethiopia and the second by Italy. We do not know much about displacement in the first (Vandervort 1998: 156–166; Reid 2007, passim), but there was a substantial displacement in the second one—where Fascist Italy resorted to an extremely brutal form of warfare, featuring also the use of chemical weapons (Mockler 2003; Wilkin 1980; Sbacci 2005). There was also the war by the self-proclaimed *Mahdi* and his successors against British colonialism in Sudan, which likewise caused forced displacement (Vandervort 1998: 166–183). According to the young Winston Churchill, who participated in and subsequently narrated the history of the reconquest of Sudan in his *The River War*, summed up the destruction by both Mahdism and the fight against it:

> [T]he land lies prostrate and utterly exhausted. Sixty years of merciless oppression, sixteen years of fierce convulsion, have reduced the once teeming population of the Upper Nile valley by more than seventy five percent. Wide regions are depopulated. Great tracts have passed out of cultivation (. . .). Nearly all the men have perished. (Churchill 1899: II, 396–397)

The Sudanese *Mahdiyya* was an important source of inspiration for the rebellion led by Muhammad Abdullah Hassan (ridiculed by the British as the "Mad Mullah") in British Somaliland in the beginning of the twentieth century. The British counter-insurgency against his *dervishes*—occasionally waged in collaboration with Ethiopia and/or Italy and making effective use of aerial bombardment (Killingray 1984: 433–435)—also involved forced displacement of the local population, even though it was not clear whether this was a stratagem of war or a simple side-effect (Hess 1964; Lewis 2002: 63–91).

After a lengthy period of relative calm in the colonial territories—except for the sideshow of the Second World War, in which the British defeated Italy in the Horn of

Africa, by that time merged into a single territory, the *Africa Orientale Italiana* comprising the present Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia (Steiner 1936; Barrera 2003)—came the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya in the mid-1950s (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005). The British, along with non-geopolitical measures, also approached the problem from a geopolitical angle by establishing "prohibited areas" and "special areas" where especially "liberal" rules of engagement applied (Bennett 2007) which produced substantial internal displacement (Munene 2010: 91–92).

Following independence, which almost without exceptions transformed the borders between the European colonial possessions into state boundaries—as agreed at the founding conference of the OAU (Wilson 1994; Touval 1967). Because of the desire for a correspondence between "the sentimental nation [and] the functional state", as aptly put by Charles Kupchan (1995: 2), it was almost inevitable that these borders would be contested in either of two ways or indeed in the form of a combination of the two: Either minorities finding themselves "entrapped" in multinational states would want to secede, or "part-states" with national kin in other (usually adjacent) states would want to conquer and incorporate the "lacking" territories in an irredentist fashion; or they would want to support their national kin in their quest for secession, perhaps as a step to a merger with the "motherland".

In retrospect, it might have been better if some of the federal or confederal schemes proposed by the departing colonial powers had been seriously tested (Møller 2010), but they were not. Hence, secessionist wars were almost bound to follow, as happened almost immediately in Sudan, where the *Anyanya* insurgents in the southern part launched a struggle for independence (Johnson 2011: 21–37), lasting until the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, which granted the non-Muslim and non-Arabic south extensive autonomy (Johnson 2011: 39–58). In comparison, the second round of the civil war, lasting from 1983 to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, was officially not about secession, even though factions of the SPLM/A (Sudan People's Liberation Front/Army) were overtly secessionist (Johnson 2011: 59–166). Also, a secessionist struggle erupted in Eritrea which had by a United Nations resolution been federated with Ethiopia in 1950, only to become incorporated fully into Ethiopia in 1962. The struggle for independence was protracted, lasting until the overthrow of the Dergue regime in Ethiopia by the combined efforts of the EPLF/A (Eritrean People's Liberation Front/Army) and the TPLF/A (Tigray People's Liberation Front/Army) (Pool 2001; Pateman 1998; Young 1997). In both cases, massive human displacement occurred, not only because of the civilian populations fear of "collateral" death.

Especially in Sudan there were also instances of deliberate depopulation of territories undertaken by government forces, intended to facilitate the counterinsurgency against the SPLM/A, the guerrilla warfare of which threatened the oil installations in Sudan, which were of immense economic importance for the government (Goldsmith et 2002). To this should be added deliberate "ethnic cleansing", e.g. undertaken by Arabs and Nuer against Dinka during the second round of the

civil war and even more so during the conflict in Darfur (Daly 2007: 270–316; Natsios 2012: 117–162), in both cases producing huge numbers of IDPs. Small wonder that it was a South Sudanese, Francis Deng, who was at the forefront in highlighting this hitherto largely ignored problem, along with American scholars (Deng 1993; Cohen and Deng 1998).

The establishment and subsequent dissolution of the Italian empire in the Greater Horn of Africa may be blamed for two of the longest-lasting armed conflicts in the region. The roots of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea may be traced to the Italian colonisation of the latter, followed by the failed attempt at conquering the Ethiopian empire and the successful conquest by the Fascist regime in Italy—in both cases using large numbers of troops raised in Eritrea. The defeat and capitulation of Italy landed the UK with responsibility for the remnants of the Italian East Africa, but after the war it passed most of this responsibility to the UN, which mandated a federal solution, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which proved short-lasting. Upon the incorporation of Eritrea, a protracted civil war broke out, which did not end until the toppling of the Ethiopian regime in 1991, followed by a referendum on secession in 1993, which yielded a large majority in favour of secession. This secession was followed by reciprocal deportations of ethnic Ethiopians from Eritrea and Eritreans from Ethiopia (Negash and Tronvoll 2000: 46–52), to which should be added the repatriation of around half a million refugees from Sudan (Kibreab 2002; Bascom 2005).

After a few years of rather "cold peace" between the two states, during which the new rulers in Eritrea gradually transformed the country into a veritable "garrison state" (Tronvoll and Mekkonen 2014), a fully fledged war broke out in 1998 over a piece of land without any intrinsic economic value—the Badme plains, which Eritrea invaded and laid claims to. Ethiopia struck back with its superior military power, which did not suffice, however, for a swift defeat of Eritrea (Negash and Tronvoll 2000). The result became quite a destructive war with very high military casualty tolls but rather modest (and mainly collateral) civilian deaths. In 2000 a peace agreement was negotiated with a UN peacekeeping mission to oversee it and an international boundary commission charged with demarcating the border between the two (Lata 2003; Adebajo 2011: 176–185). Considering that the disputed area was both thinly populated and very poor in all respects, one might have expected this to be fairly uncomplicated. However, having fought over the land and sacrificed human lives for it had now acquired a symbolic value that it did not possess before (Bedrhe 2004; Dias 2011). Even though the war has not broken out again, the conflicting sides have instead opted for a proxy war in the sense of supporting opposing sides in the conflict in Somalia (Abink 2003a; Prunier 2004). In July 2018, a certain rapprochement was achieved through reciprocal state visits (BBC 2018), but whether this will proceed to genuinely peaceful relations was, by the time of writing, impossible to predict.

Somalia was literally born irredentist as marked by the five-pointed star on its flag, signifying the five territories claimed by Somalia (Laitin 1976). The two were seemingly unproblematic, standing for the former Italian colony as well as British Somaliland which voluntarily merged with the Italian part less than a week after attaining independence (Lewis 2002: 164), but the remaining three symbolised

territorial claims on neighbouring states, i.e. the present Djibouti, the North Eastern Frontier Province of Kenya and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. These claims led to, first, the small-scale "Shifta War" with Kenya (Mburu 2005) and in 1977/1978 to the much more bloody and destructive war with Ethiopia (Farer 1979; Tareke 2000) which also led to massive refugee flows (Lewis 1989).

The lost war with Ethiopia also weakened the (initially "progressive") dictatorship of Siad Barre so much that he was toppled in 1991 following quite a nasty civil war. Unfortunately, however, no political faction or alliance was strong enough to establish control over the Somali territory—except in the present Somaliland which declared itself independent and has remained so ever since, albeit without international recognition (Bradbury 2008; Richards 2014). In the rest of the country, the various (and usually clan-based) political factions waged a ruthless and extremely bloody internecine war, very much directed against civilians who became victims of what Lidwien Kapteijns aptly called "clan cleansing" (2013). Gradually, however, religious factors have also gained in prominence, pitting extremist Salafists such as the Al-Shabaab against ordinary (and typically Sufi) Muslims (Hansen 2013), the latter also found in the (unelected) so-called government of the country (Menkhaus 2017; Balthasar 2017).

In addition to these interstate wars, the Greater Horn of Africa has also seen numerous intrastate armed conflicts which it is way beyond the scope of the present contribution to enumerate. Suffice it to say that the forced displacement of civilians has been a companion of all of these armed struggles (Bariagaber 2006: 21–37). Moreover, the causal arrow does not only point in one direction, in the sense that armed conflicts displace people; the reverse is also often the case in the sense that refugee flows may both aggravate a conflict and cause a proliferation into neighbouring countries, for several reasons.

First of all, the sheer magnitude of a refugee influx may pose severe problems for the government of the receiving state, which is not always unwelcome to the sending state (Stedman and Tanner 2003), which might even use the refugee flow as "a weapon of mass migration" (Greenhill 2010). Secondly, the ethnic or religious composition of the refugee flow may be problematic as it may upset a fragile balance in the receiving state, as mentioned above. Thirdly, not all the people fleeing are always innocent civilians, but the columns of refugees may also include combatants or even *genocidaires*, as happed after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Longman 2002). Fourthly, even if the people fleeing are not actual combatants, they may become so. Their flight may either be the (intentional or accidental) result of government policies, as a result of which the refugees will often hold a grudge against this government. Its antagonists may take advantage of this by seeking to recruit refugees into their ranks—what is often called "refugee militarisation" (Muggah 2006; Mogire 2011; Lischer 2005). To the extent that refugees are hosted in camps, the camps themselves may even be used as base areas for the armed struggle in the homeland as happened with the refugee camps in Zaïre after the Rwandan genocide (Lischer 2005: 73–117). In the latter case, the country of origin, represented by the new (Tutsi-dominated) government of Rwanda, would surely strongly object to being attacked by the armed forces of the former genocidal regime

from refugee camps across the border and might therefore be tempted to attack these camps, if only to ensure their demilitarisation, as in fact happed (Longman 2002).

Having now elaborated on the links between armed conflicts and forced displacement, the reader might get the impression that all people fleeing in the Greater Horn of Africa are doing so in order to escape such dangerous situations as mentioned in the OAU Convention. However, some African refugees would also meet the stricter criteria found in the universal 1951 Convention, i.e. they may have well-founded fears of persecution because of their political opinions, race, religion, nationality or their belonging to a particular social group. This is surely the case of many Eritreans, suffering under the despotic regime of the successor to the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and its autocratic leader, Isaias Afwerki (Pool 2001; Tronvoll and Mekkonen 2014; Kibreab 2009a: 53–145; Plaut 2016). Not only are people persecuted for their political opinions, but they also risk being enrolled in the national service for an indefinite period, which comes close to slavery or at least indentured labour (Kibreab 2009b).

Even though the refugee conventions talk about people crossing a border, the Greater Horn of Africa should remind us of the (almost forgotten) opposite eventuality, i.e. that people stay in their place of residence, whilst borders are moved, as happened on a large scale in post-WWII Europe and as it did with the secessions of Eritrea and South Sudan from Ethiopia and Sudan, respectively. Even though it does not automatically follow, it is very common that people suddenly finding themselves behind a border prefer to move as an alternative to becoming strangers in their homeland (Atzili 2006).

5 Europe's Geopolitics and Borderscapes

We shall spend the rest of this contribution looking at one of the favoured destinations of refugee flows from the Greater Horn of Africa, i.e. Europe—again with a focus on geopolitical aspects. The most prominent feature of this is the determined quest for "externalising" asylum-seeking, thus de facto moving the EU's outside border further away, the protection of which is seen as even more important, because internal borders in the EU/Schengen Area have been largely abolished (Cunha et al. 2015; Havlíček et al. 2018).

"Europe" in the sense of the European Union (EU) has always been and remains "work in progress" with borders which have all along been more ambiguous than often acknowledged. For instance, at its foundation, the EU comprised three colonial powers (France, Belgium and the Netherlands), the colonies of which were not, of course, parts of the EU (even though Algeria came much closer to this than other overseas French possessions) but their exports and citizens nevertheless had a somewhat privileged access to Europe (Hansen 2002). Moreover, the remaining French *Régions d'outre-mer* (Guyana in South America, Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Caribbean and Réunion and Mayotte off the east coast of Africa) still formally belong to the EU—as seems to have also been the case of the present Djibouti (*Territoire Français des Afars et*

des Issas) until its independence in 1977, when special rules were needed to determine citizenship for the "real" French residents (Massicot 1986; Hruškovic 2014).

When the UK joined the EU in 1973, followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986, all three had (more or less voluntarily) set the vast majority of their former colonies free, but Spain retained two small enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla, both with an autonomous status, but clearly belonging more to Spain than to Morocco (Gold 2000; Ferrer-Gallardo 2008; Bermant 2017). By implication, an African refugee or migrant could reach "Europe" without leaving the continent—which quite a few have done. Other potential gateways are Madeira and the Canary Islands off the Atlantic coast of Africa, which are integral parts of Portugal and Spain, respectively (Vives 2017; Godenau 2014). Another anomaly is the special status of Cyprus, which joined the EU in 2004, a membership which formally also comprises the part that has since 1974 effectively been occupied by Turkey which has since 1983 even recognised it as an independent state (Faustmann 2011; Theophylacton 2012). Indeed, the present author does not need to look far from home to spot two other anomalies, namely the fact that both Greenland and the Faroe Islands—both with an autonomous status but still parts of Denmark—are not members of the EU (Gad 2016).

Not only does the EU thus have contested and/or unclear borders, but the union is apparently endeavouring to make them even more so via what is usually called "externalisation", representing a quest for spaces which both are and are not parts of the EU, i.e. either "outsides inside" or "insides outside". One way of conceptualising this is to use of the term "heterotopias" coined by Michel Foucault:

> [R]eal places—places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society—which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopia. (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986: 24; Boedeltje 2012; Møller 2015: 5–8)

Another relevant term may be that coined (or appropriated) by Agamben of "spaces of exception" (2005), which may result from what has been called a "sovereignty game" (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Adler-Nissen 2008) in which states both claim the privileges and shed the responsibilities of sovereignty.

If persons on the move, be they bona fide refugees or voluntary migrants, reach one of the outer borders of the EU and utter the magic word "asylum", they are entitled, according to international refugee law, to have their application for such (rather attractive) status processed. Not only does this process take time and consume resources, but it also entails the risk that the applicants—even if they are found not to meet the criteria of being refugees—may still be impossible to deport, either because the *non-refoulement* clauses in the convention (Allain 2002) prohibit this or because they have made themselves impossible to find by "going underground". Hence the attraction for EU member countries of somehow preventing the would-be immigrants and asylum-seekers from reaching an EU border where they might apply for asylum.

Those who somehow manage to enter Europe tend to end up as what has been called "Dubliners", i.e. refugees or migrants arriving in one EU country but wanting

to move on to a different one. Such attempts tend to be blocked by Dublin Regulation, which has been described as "based on a twofold falsehood: that there are equal standards of protection and welfare standards in any signatory state; and that it is physically possible to enter any one of them, so that the asylum 'burden' would be equal across Europe" (Picozza 2017: 234). This is obviously not the case, as the countries on the fringes of Europe with the easiest access happen to also be the least attractive because of their relative poverty, almost inviting "asylum shopping" (Moore 2013). As suggested by both Zygmunt Bauman (2007: 37–38) and Michel Agier (2008: 29–31), it is even possible to see refugees finding themselves outside the "civilised" world, i.e. the "Nomos of the Earth", as Carl Schmitt called it (2003), thereby creating a cultural geopolitics of forced displacement.

In the "good old days", it was possible to apply for asylum at embassies, representing scattered pieces of sovereign ground beyond a country's borders (Noll 2005). Indeed it was occasionally even possible to find refuge at the embassies themselves, as happened after the military coup in Chile in 1973 (Wright and Zúñiga 2007; Bonnefoy 2016). A recent example of the same phenomenon is the de facto asylum enjoyed by Julian Assange at the Ecuadorian embassy in London (Den Heijer 2013), but such instances are becoming distinctly exceptional (Kendall 2014). Applying for asylum at embassies is no longer possible, and the last remaining loopholes for applying for asylum via legal channels have been closed by the imposition of the so-called "carrier sanctions". Even if a prospective refugee can afford to buy an air ticket to a destination in Europe, he will be prevented from checking in at the airline counter at the airport unless he has a visa—either for the Schengen Area or (for non-members of Schengen) the individual country. Not only has the EU/Schengen thus externalised the first step towards asylum, but they have also privatised what would seem to be a public function par excellence (Feller 1989; Rodenhäuser 2014; Lemberg-Petersen 2013; Baird 2017).

An early example of attempted externalisation on land was the internment by Dutch immigration authorities of asylum seekers at a police station close to the Schiphol Airport accompanied by the claim that this was not "really" inside the Netherlands—a claim that was subsequently found illegal (Hamerslag 1989). It seems easier to find "insides outside" at sea, where the domain contains territorial waters, contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones in which states have certain special rights, and the high seas, to which the *mare liberum* rules apply (Grotius 1916)—all depending on whether a state has signed the 1958 or the 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas) or neither (Bateman 2017), to which should be added specific rules for "international straits" (Martin 2010). The ships navigating these domains may also be classified according to the nationality of the owners or according to where they are flagged (Mansell 2009). In some respects ships are like embassies, i.e. small pieces of national territory roaming the seas, which may be an inconvenience, as ships are obliged to rescue people in distress at sea (Pugh 2004). We shall not go any deeper into this complex issue; only note that the very complexity may be welcome as it may open loopholes for "bending the rules" (Fischer-Lescano et al. 2009).

One way of doing this is to intercept ships suspected of carrying "illegal immigrants" in the high seas, i.e. in international waters before they reach the territorial waters of an EU member state (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008). This is more or less what the Italian navy did for about a year from October 2013 (Giuffré 2013; Tazzioli 2015) with their mission *Mare Nostrum*—a singularly bad choice of name, harking back to the geopolitics of the Fascist past (Arielli 2011). To its credit, however, the mission did save around 150,000 "boat people". It has recently been taken over by the EU with its missions "Triton" and "Poseidon" (Tazzioli 2016; Barbulescu 2017; Roberts 2018) and to some extent also the EU Naval Force Mediterranean, EUNAVFOR-MED (Gestri 2016; Perkowski 2016; Johansen 2017) as well as the EUROSUR programme (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015). In all these cases, the two missions of rescuing people from drowning and preventing them from reaching Europe's shores have been combined, in the sense that it is the same ships with the same crews under the same regulations who are supposed to do both (Andersson 2017). Both the United States and Australia have fairly long-standing traditions of the same practices (Legomsky 2006; Schloenhardt and Craig 2015). That not everybody is rescued (Brian and Laczko 2014, 2015; Laczko et al. 2016) became clear with the notorious case of the "left-to-die boat" in 2011 (Heller and Pezzani 2017: Follis 2015). 2013 also saw two consecutive maritime catastrophes in the Mediterranean with 350 and 34 victims, respectively, most of them, incidentally, coming from Somalia and Eritrea (Jones 2016: 18; Basaran 2014). According to the IOM (International Organization for Migration), the main routes from Greater Horn of Africa to Europe are from the countries of origin over land to Libya and Egypt and from there by boat to Europe, typically Italy or Greece (Majidi and Oucho 2016; Marchand et al. 2016).

The unwelcoming attitude of the EU and its member states towards refugees and migrants has often been captured in the concept of "Fortress Europe" (Carr 2016)—a comparison which may in fact be even more precise than most authors realise. Just as a military fortress has usually been much more than a set of thick stone walls surrounded by a moat, also featuring a complex system of ditches, shrubberies, earth ramparts, etc. (Duffy 1996) Europe is, likewise, not only "protected" by its formal borders but also by many other geographical, legal and cultural barriers. The fortress seems to be working well, as the number of refugees and migrants reaching Europe is quite small. As far as refugees from the Greater Horn of Africa are concerned, they are in fact minuscule compared to the "burden" that countries in the region have to carry (see Table 4).

These figures aptly illustrate the hypocrisy involved in the talk about a "refugee crisis", as emphasised by Nathalie Tocci:

> The EU's "refugee crisis" is not a crisis of numbers. A couple of million arrivals in a Union of 500 million people may be a challenge of absorption, integration and naturalisation, but in no way does it constitute a "crisis". Saying so is deeply insulting particularly to those countries in the region that shoulder incommensurately higher burdens in incommensurately worse circumstances (. . .). The EU's "refugee crisis" has been a different sort of crisis. I strongly believe it is first and foremost a crisis of values, of which Europeans should feel ashamed. It is also an intra-EU crisis that has seen deep divergences emerge between the

Table 4 Asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa in EU countries, mid-2015

In	From Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Uganda	Total
Austria	0	141	94	26	2697	14	178	27	3177
Belgium	92	114	95	5	1228	1	115	6	1656
Bulgaria	0	6	0	0	17	0	9	2	34
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	7	0	64	0	3	0	74
Czech R.	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	14
Denmark	0	175	64	5	165	0	70	15	494
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4
Finland	0	38	79	3	1418	1	19	4	1562
France	155	920	433	71	1274	7	3862	23	6745
Germany	30	16,716	3740	276	11,422	72	1587	205	34,048
Greece	0	91	31	13	34	1	26	8	204
Hungary	0	96	8	2	73	15	54	16	264
Ireland	0	11	18	11	31	1	49	14	135
Italy	0	581	73	13	416	0	108	7	1198
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	59	10	2	20	0	11	5	107
Malta	0	14	5	0	17	0	9	0	45
Netherlands	1	2316	84	4	261	0	165	59	2890
Poland	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
Portugal	0	0	7	1	0	0	1	0	9
Romania	0	2	2	0	6	1	1	0	12
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	0	10	0	5	50	0	20	5	90
Spain	0								
Sweden	41	6598	1813	66	5728	6	671	149	15,072
UK	2	2720	453	100	417	1	1182	247	5122
EU total	321	39,608	7031	603	25,338	120	8144	794	72,959

Based on data from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern

Member States, as well as the European Commission, which have prevented meaningful EU steps forward on establishing genuinely common asylum and migration policies. (Tocci 2017: 20–21. See also McDonald-Gibson 2016; Kingsley 2016)

Considering that the EU nurtures a self-image as a "normative power" (Manners 2002; Whitman 2011), it has to wrap its main motives in a moral and moralising discourse, for which the "evil" human smugglers serve perfectly. The discourse misses the point that the smugglers are providing a supply for services in high demand, mainly due to the aforementioned EU policies. This is not to deny that their practices are often very cynical and/or driven by nefarious non-economic motives (Napoleoni 2016), but it probably underestimates the agency of their "customers", for whom it may well be a rational strategy to run the calculated risk of perishing en route in the quest for a better life (Tinti and Reitano 2016). After all, most make it across what has been called "the world's deadliest border" (Jones 2016: 12–28).

6   The Geopolitics of Development Aid and Migration Governance

Whilst most of the above externalisation measures are blatantly selfish, the EU has also resorted to more equitable measures, most of which boil down to "paying" countries in the Greater Horn of Africa for either preventing their citizens from migrating or, at least, taking them back if their applications for asylum are denied, the latter mainly by signing "readmission agreements" (Carrera 2016).

Both are somewhat more complicated than one might think. First of all, as far as bona fide refugees from Greater Horn of Africa countries are concerned, they will usually not be particularly welcome in their home country, even though they have not, according to the EU immigration authorities, been victims of persecution. Secondly, as far as voluntary migrants are concerned, they may be worth more to their countries of origin if they stay abroad than if they return for two related reasons: First of all, no country in the Greater Horn of Africa suffers from a population deficit, but all have fast-growing populations, placing growing strains on the available resources, making emigration welcome but return undesirable (see Table 5).

Secondly, the emigrants usually do not sever all links with their home countries but send back remittances, either to their relatives or to projects in their homeland (see Table 6).

As pointed out by Paul Collier, however, it also has to be taken into account who emigrates and who stays at home. As emigration is usually a collective decision by a nuclear or extended family, it is usually the best-endowed member of the group who is selected for being sent abroad as he (or in rare cases she) is expected to stand the best chances in the country of immigration—but this also means that the home country will be deprived of its most productive citizens (Collier 2013: 195–227).

The same author has previously pointed to another problem with migration, i.e. that the migrants come to constitute diasporas in the receiving countries which

Table 5 Population estimates and forecasts for the HoA, 1950–2030

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
Djibouti	62	84	160	359	590	718	851	1000	1133
Eritrea	1142	1397	1812	2386	3113	3393	4391	5432	6718
Ethiopia	18,128	22,151	28,415	35,265	48,087	66,537	87,703	112,759	139,620
Kenya	6077	8105	11,252	16,269	23,403	31,450	41,350	53,492	66,960
Somalia	2264	2756	3445	6359	7397	9011	12,053	16,105	21,535
South Sudan	2583	2955	3648	4705	5768	6701	10,067	13,610	17,254
Sudan	5734	7544	10,282	14,507	20,148	27,251	34,386	43,541	54,842
Uganda	5158	6788	9446	12,550	17,439	24,039	33,915	47,188	63,842

Source: UN Population Division (2017) *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision*, at https://esa.un.org/unpd/

Table 6 Incoming remittances (US$ mio.)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Djibouti	33	32	33	36	36	36
Eritrea	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ethiopia	345	513	624	624	624	635
Kenya	686	934	1211	1304	1441	1565
Somalia	–	–	–	–	–	–
S. Sudan	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sudan	1100	442	401	424	507	513
Uganda	771	816	913	941	887	908

Source: World Bank (2017) *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group)

may exacerbate conflicts in their countries of origin, because the diaspora will be able to support political or armed groups back home and allegedly will tend to be more radical than the average residents in conflict-ridden countries who have to cope in their daily lives, usually by "cutting corners" (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Adamson 2013).

There is also another approach to making people stay in their native countries, i.e. to help them become more attractive to their own citizens, for which development aid would seem suitable. The EU is certainly a main player in the development aid field, in fact the largest of all donors, if we add the aid from member states (73 billion US$ in 2015) to that granted by the EU institutions (14 billion), amounting to a grand total of around 87 billion US$, way ahead of, for instance, the United States' 31 billion US$ (OECD-DAC 2017). If anybody should stand a chance of instrumentalising development aid to stem migration flows, it would surely be the EU. In November 2015, the EU arranged a major summit on migration in Valetta, Malta, to which all African heads of state or government were invited. The *Political Declaration* adopted by the summit was filled with statements such as:

> We are deeply concerned by the sharp increase in flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants which entails suffering, abuse and exploitation, particularly for children and women, and unacceptable loss of life in the desert or at sea. (…) We agree that the first priority in this context is to save lives and do everything necessary to rescue and protect the migrants whose lives are at risk.

This is, needless to say, "hypocrisy on stilts", as Jeremy Bentham might have called it in analogy with his famous "nonsense on stilts" (1843: 501) considering that the main reason why lives are lost is that Europe has "with malice and forethought" blocked all other routes into Europe, making the reliance on human smugglers or traffickers the only remaining chance for migrants and refugees to reach a destination where they can apply for asylum.

The declaration proceeded to its stated objective of addressing the alleged "root causes" of migration, such as "state fragility and insecurity, as well as (…) demographic, economic and environmental trends", by "reducing poverty, promoting peace, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights," as well as "inclusive economic growth", "the creation of decent jobs", "improving the delivery

of basic services such as education, health and security" and "rekindling hope, notably for the African youth". Quite a tall order, indeed, but one with which it is hard to disagree—something which should always invite scepticism. The same was the case of the numerous somewhat more concrete tasks enumerated in the action plan adopted at the same summit.

Both documents were followed by the launch of an "Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa", to which the commission allocated 1.8 billion euros to which should be added contributions by member countries. Even though this might appear as quite a handsome sum, it is obviously a drop in the ocean compared to the lofty goals listed in the two other documents. Moreover, it is far from clear that whatever will be allocated to the trust fund will be "new money" as opposed to a mere shifting of budget lines within constant (or even shrinking) aid budgets.

Even if it is new money, there are grounds for scepticism about the expected impact in terms of declining migration flows. Indeed, whereas it seems plausible that voluntary migration (as opposed to flight, which is driven by very different motives) from places such as the Greater Horn of Africa to Europe would cease if the difference in income and other living conditions were to disappear, this is most unlikely to be a linear function, in the sense that, say, a 10% rise in living standards would lead to a corresponding 10% decline in emigration (De Haas 2010; Kennan and Walker 2013). Indeed, in some cases even a small increase in income in the country of origin may lead to a rise (*sic!*) in emigration, as the expected gains for the migrant will remain substantial, leaving a constant incentive to emigrate, whilst making the transaction costs of migration (airfare, payment to human smugglers, etc.) affordable to a greater number of people. We may, however, give the EU (in the sense of the politicians as opposed to the EU economists, who must know better) the benefit of the doubt and accept at face value as sincere the intention to improve living conditions in migration-producing countries, which the aid may indeed do—regardless of whether this will have any noteworthy impact on migration.

The Valletta Summit was also related to a special programme for the Horn of Africa, usually referred to as the "Khartoum Process" or the "EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative" (Martín and Bonfanti 2015; Dmitriadi 2016; Weinar 2017; Morone 2017). Not much concrete had, by the time of writing (mid-2018), come out of this, except for a (surely unintended) strengthening of some of the most nefarious militias in Sudan (including the notorious *Janjaweed*) to which some of the border patrols have been outsourced and which has aptly been labelled a "border control from Hell" (Baldo 2017).

7   Conclusion

We have thus seen that there are quite a lot of geopolitical aspects in the refugee or migrant controversies. Geopolitical considerations can explain many, albeit far from all, of those armed conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa as elsewhere which make

people flee, just as there may be geopolitical ways of stemming such cross-border flights. The EU has tried quite a few such strategies of somehow externalising its outer borders—not so much, as some of its member countries have done, by erecting physical and visible barriers such as walls or barbed wire fences but mainly in more subtle ways that do not too blatantly contradict its self-image as a "normative power" and a bulwark against barbarism. For instance, whilst seeking to intercept boats carrying migrants in the Mediterranean, it needs to also try to save the victims from drowning, thus combining a very inhospitable attitude to foreigners with a (maybe lukewarm, but nevertheless genuine) humanitarian attitude.

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