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Last update: Anna Tropia, Ph.D. (14.09.2023)
BA module+Erasmus Tuesday, 10:50-12:25 (in English) e-mail me for consultation or questions: anna.tropia@ff.cuni.cz Is human Will able to will whatever object, or must it conform to the judgement of reason? Are all our acts tending towards goodness, or is our individuality able to impose itself as the sole horizon of our acts? And in what eventually freedom of the human Will consist? These are the main questions that the texts we are going to read confront with. Our focus will be the elaboration by medieval philosophers of a special case, the hatred of God (odium Dei). According to a long-term philosophical tradition in fact, it is not possible to hate God, because, as God is the greatest good, this would correspond to hate goodness itself. According to such tradition, which is exemplified by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, hating what has been recognized as good is simply not possible. Therefore, it is impossible to hate God. But from the second half of the 13th century, the human Will and its freedom to act assume a new skin in the accounts of Franciscan philosophers such as John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. According to them, Will can reject goodness, and want also what is not good. The demarcation between Intellect and Will will be the main object of this course. |
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Last update: Anna Tropia, Ph.D. (14.09.2023)
This course aims to introduce BA students to the problem of human freedom and will through a selective reading of classical medieval texts. At the end of the course, students will acquire familiarity with the concepts of human will (in relation to intellect, and evil), intellect, freedom of indifference, appetite, habit; they will be able to read and expound on the primary sources discussed in class. |
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Last update: Anna Tropia, Ph.D. (16.09.2023)
Primary Sources (all the texts will be provided in English translation)
Augustine, Confessions, II, chapter 4, section 9 (The theft of the pears)
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (ST), IaIIae, q. 8, a. 1 (utrum voluntas creata sit tantum boni)
Thomas Aquinas, ST IIaIIae, q. 34, a. 1 (utrum Deus possit odio haberi)
John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 43, q. unica (vol. VIII) (utrum voluntas creata possit peccare ex malitia)
John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 6, q. 1 (the case of the fallen angel)
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Metaphysica, IX, q. 15: the will is the only rational power William of Ockham, Could the Will Have a Virtuous Act concerning an Object about which there is an error in the Intellect? (Var. Quaest. 8)
Secondary Literature (an example: more on Moodle) Alliney G. (2022), “Angeli mali. Ostinazione al male e libertà del bene secondo Duns Scoto”, Quaestio. Journal of the History of Metaphysics, 22, pp. 383-406
Hoffman T. (2021) Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, chapt. 7
Hoffmann T. (1999), “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus”, AHDLMA, 66, pp. 189-224
Kent B. (1995), Virtues of the Will. The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century. Washington DC, chap. 3
MacDonald S. (2014), “Petit Larceny, the Beginning of All Sin: Augustine’s Theft of the Pears”, in J. Hause (ed), Debates in Medieval Philosophy, New York and London Williams T. (2019), "Will and Intellect", in T. Williams (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics, Cambridge
http://www.stoa.org/hippo/comm2.html#CB2C4S9 (online commentary to Augustine, II.4.9) |
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Last update: Anna Tropia, Ph.D. (14.09.2023)
Students will be evaluated upon the following parameters:
1) Regular attendance and in-class active participation (regular reading of the texts discussed) will be mandatory. 2) Final oral exam (more info to be provided in due time) or in-class presentation (topic and modality to be discussed with the teacher). |