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Last update: Anna Tropia, Ph.D. (11.09.2023)
MA Module Wednesdays, 14:10-15:45, P225V Instructors & contact: Dr. Anna Tropia (anna.tropia@ff.cuni.cz) & Dr. André Martin (andre.martin@ff.cuni.cz) Let’s call intellectualism the view that human agency is primarily to be explained in terms of “reason” or “intellect” and voluntarism, in contrast, the view that human agency is primarily to be explained in terms of “the will”. In contemporary debates, Harry Frankfurt, e.g., seems to identify as a voluntarist when he states that, according to his view, the “essence” of personhood “lies not in reason but in will”. On the other hand, this debate also has clear historical roots. Many early historical figures seem to advance an opposed intellectualist view where people are essentially “rational animals” and human agency stems primarily from the exercise of this reason; e.g., Aristotle divides the “soul” into rational and non-rational parts and speaks of action as being voluntarily “chosen” when the rational part, reason, makes judgements and “rules” over our non-rational, sensual, desires and emotions. However, at least since Augustine, one can see a rise in voluntarism, as a contending view, where the “will” serves as a distinct and ruling power for human agency, capable of desiring and acting against what one might rationally deem best; thus, irrationality turns out to be a feature, not a bug, of human nature. In this course we will survey this debate, with an eye on both medieval and contemporary authors. For example, in the early Middle Ages, we will see Augustine and Anselm puzzle over apparent examples of perfectly intelligent agents willing against the good, and in contemporary debates, we will question whether we are radically free to choose what we care about and love, or ought to be ultimately guided by good, independent, reasons instead. |
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Last update: Anna Tropia, Ph.D. (11.09.2023)
Evaluation will be based on (i) in class participation (50%) and (ii) an in-class presentation (50%). In-class participation will chiefly include signing up to present the readings for a given week (up to two times), but will also include regular discussion and comments. Consultation with the instructor will be provided before and after presentations. |
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Last update: Anna Tropia, Ph.D. (11.09.2023)
Schedule: 3.10: Introduction Excerpts from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics 10.10: Frankfurt vs. Watson, Beginning the Contemporary Debate Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom the of the Will and the Concept of a Person” (1971) Gary Watson, “Free Agency” (1975) 17.10: Augustine and the Foundations of Voluntarism Augustine and the Divided Will OPTIONAL: Sarah Byers, “The meaning of Voluntas in Augustine” (2006) 24.10: Frankfurt’s Mature Voluntarism Harry Frankfurt, “On Caring” (1999) OPTIONAL: Harry Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About” (1982) 31.10: Guest Lecture by Tobias Hoffmann 7.11: Anselm and the Devil’s Free Will to Defy God Anselm, De casu diaboli OPTIONAL: T. Williams, “Anselm’s Quiet Radicalism” (2016) 14.11: Criticism of Frankfurt: Wolf and the Good Susan Wolf, “The True, The Good, and the Lovable” (2002) OPTIONAL: Susan Wolf, “Asymmetrical Freedom” (1980) 21.11: Aquinas’ Intellectualism (?) Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia, q. 82, aa. 3-4: Will and Intellect 28.11: Howard on the Rationality of Love Chris Howard, “Fitting Love and Reasons to Love” (2023) 5.12: Scotus on the Will Intellect is not rational, Will only is OPTIONAL: González-Ayesta C. “Scotus’ Interpretation of the Difference between VOLUNTAS UT NATURA and VOLUNTAS UT VOLUNTAS” (2008) 12.12: Holton and Strong Voluntarism Richard Holton, “How is Strength of Will Possible?” (2003) 19.12: TBD 2.1: Wallace on Addiction and the Will R. Jay Wallace, “Addiction as Defect of the Will” (1999) 9:1: Further Reflection on the Will’s Self Construction Marina Oshana, “Autonomy and Self-Identity” (2005) |